Will Morrisey Reviews

Book reviews and articles on political philosophy and literature.

  • Home
  • Reviews
    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
  • Contents
  • About
  • Books

Recent Posts

  • Meditating on the Declaration
  • Political Parties: A Neo-Marxist Account
  • The Economic and Social Thought of the American Progressives
  • A Critique of Progressivism from the ‘Progressive Era’
  • The Northwest Ordinance and the Empire of Liberty

Recent Comments

    Archives

    • July 2026
    • June 2026
    • May 2026
    • April 2026
    • March 2026
    • February 2026
    • January 2026
    • December 2025
    • November 2025
    • October 2025
    • September 2025
    • August 2025
    • July 2025
    • June 2025
    • May 2025
    • April 2025
    • March 2025
    • February 2025
    • January 2025
    • December 2024
    • November 2024
    • October 2024
    • September 2024
    • August 2024
    • July 2024
    • June 2024
    • May 2024
    • April 2024
    • March 2024
    • February 2024
    • January 2024
    • December 2023
    • November 2023
    • October 2023
    • September 2023
    • August 2023
    • July 2023
    • June 2023
    • May 2023
    • April 2023
    • March 2023
    • February 2023
    • January 2023
    • December 2022
    • November 2022
    • October 2022
    • September 2022
    • August 2022
    • July 2022
    • June 2022
    • May 2022
    • April 2022
    • March 2022
    • February 2022
    • January 2022
    • December 2021
    • November 2021
    • October 2021
    • September 2021
    • August 2021
    • July 2021
    • June 2021
    • May 2021
    • April 2021
    • March 2021
    • February 2021
    • January 2021
    • December 2020
    • November 2020
    • October 2020
    • September 2020
    • August 2020
    • July 2020
    • June 2020
    • May 2020
    • April 2020
    • March 2020
    • February 2020
    • January 2020
    • December 2019
    • November 2019
    • October 2019
    • September 2019
    • August 2019
    • July 2019
    • June 2019
    • May 2019
    • April 2019
    • March 2019
    • February 2019
    • January 2019
    • December 2018
    • November 2018
    • October 2018
    • September 2018
    • August 2018
    • July 2018
    • June 2018
    • May 2018
    • April 2018
    • March 2018
    • February 2018
    • January 2018
    • December 2017
    • November 2017
    • September 2017
    • August 2017
    • July 2017
    • June 2017
    • May 2017
    • April 2017
    • March 2017
    • February 2017
    • January 2017
    • December 2016
    • November 2016
    • September 2016
    • August 2016
    • July 2016
    • June 2016
    • April 2016
    • March 2016
    • February 2016
    • January 2016

    Categories

    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
    • Uncategorized

    Meta

    • Log in
    • Entries feed
    • Comments feed
    • WordPress.org

    Powered by Genesis

    In Defense of Humanism

    July 20, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Tzvetan Todorov: Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism. Carol Cosman translation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

     

    For more than a century, humanism both Christian and ‘secular,’ has come in for a thrashing. Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, decidedly lesser lights such as Sartre and Foucault, to say nothing (well, as little as possible) about clamoring ‘postmodernists’—the most fashionable thinkers have despised it, leaving it in the hands of a few redoubtable defenders: England’s Christian ‘Inklings,’ Malraux and Camus in France, Havel and his fellow Central European dissidents. And in America, aside from Saul Bellow, has there been a recent humanist who was not rather dull? The Bulgarian-born expatriate Tzvetan Todorov has now raised the honorable old flag once more, adding to it an even more controversial vindication of the Enlightenment, also much mauled by his fellow men, along with the women and several other ‘genders,’ of the Left.

    Todorov sketches the current intellectual atmosphere in terms of three “hidden pacts” with Satan. Satan offered Jesus rule of the world in exchange for submission to himself; Jesus declined the offer, but His Church surreptitiously accepted it, leading to ecclesiastical corruption, religious warfare, and other worldly sins. Satan next offered Faust supreme knowledge in exchange for the same submission, and Faust accepted, although by the time Goethe revealed the pact it had been in place for two centuries. Satan finally offered modern man the third pact—thought and action freely willed, with no authority “superior to the will of men,” individually or collectively. With no more God, “you will be a ‘materialist,'” Satan announced; you will no longer love your neighbor, being an ‘individualist’; and even the ‘self’ that you now so prize will give itself over to “subterranean forces”—Nietzsche’s will to power, Freud’s libido—conceiving itself as only “an anomalous collection of impulses, an infinite dispersal,” “an alienated, inauthentic being, no longer deserving to be called a ‘subject.'” Once again, modern men only understood the pact’s fine print after they’d signed it.

    A profoundly unsatisfactory condition, this modern ‘human condition.’ In response to it, four “intellectual families” have gathered: conservatives, humanists, individualists, and proponents of “scientism.” Conservatives seek to recover the intellectual and moral life enjoyed before the “pacts.” In the West, this often means the return to the Christianity of Christ. The individualists despise conservatism, saying, “You believe that our freedom entails the loss of God, society, and the self? But for us this is not a loss, it is a further liberation,” a liberation to be defended and furthered. The scientists reject both of these stances, insisting that when it comes to the freedom of the will, there has been no loss and no gain, since “there never was any freedom, or rather, the only freedom is that of knowledge,” which enables us to conquer natural necessity. Finally, the humanists “think, on the contrary, that freedom exists and that it is precious, but at the same time they appreciate the benefit of shared values, life with others, and a self that is held responsible for its actions; they want to continue to enjoy freedom, then, without having to pay the price” Satan would exact. Todorov counts himself among the humanists, a thinker in the line of Montaigne, Rousseau, and Constant, men of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the aftermath of the French Revolution, respectively. “I will turn to them to seek tools for thought that can serve us again today,” tools with which he can “build a model of humanist thought,” a “type” of the humanist.  

    He claims that the modern world emerged from and replaced the ancient world, “a world whose structure and laws were preexisting and immutable givens for every member of society.” This crucially ignores the importance of prudential choice in certain pre-modern thinkers; tradition alone did not prevail absolutely, “without one’s consent.” This notwithstanding, it is more or less true that both Jerusalem and Athens “require that human beings should submit to an authority external to them,” namely, God and/or nature. This is more true in the sense that human souls were understood to exist within a spiritual and natural order larger than themselves; it is less true in the sense that this order pervaded human souls themselves in the form of speech and reason. Still, “it was revolutionary to claim,” as the moderns did, “that the best justification of an act, one that makes it most legitimate, issues from man himself: from his will, from his reason, from his feelings”—a shift of “the center of gravity…from cosmos to anthropos, from the objective world to the subjective will.” Individuals reconceived themselves as responsible for themselves, and so did “the modern nation-states,” jealous of their sovereignty. 

    The conservatives do not attempt, futilely, to “lead us back to the world of the ancients, pure and simple,” but they do hope to lop off or at least moderate modern excesses. Todorov’s examples are Louis de Bonald and Alexis de Tocqueville. Bonald rejected what he took to be the underlying doctrine of the French Revolution, the rejection of Roman Catholic Christianity which began with Protestantism, with its valorization of the individual conscience, and found ‘secularized’ expression in Descartes and Rousseau. Because modern man “knows nothing external to himself,” and because souls are sinful and consciences weak, “we have come under the rule of personal interest,” sundering ties of family, friendship, and country. “Persons bound together by relationships,” he wrote, have become “individuals, each with their rights.” Add modern materialism to this, and you have a new form of atomism. Bonald wants to return European men to Christendom.

    Tocqueville acknowledges the ineluctably “democratic” or socially egalitarian, anti-“aristocratic” character of modernity and sees resistance to it as futile and indeed undesirable. He seeks to moderate modernity by setting its passion for liberty against its passions for equality and well-being. He especially deplores democrats’ intellectual inclination to materialist determinism, which he considers compatible with or propaedeutic to despotism. Understanding that “the ultimate result of individualism” under the sway of modern egalitarianism “would be the disappearance of the individual” into the mass of humanity, “he wants to do through his work is to make modern man conscious of the dangers that threaten him and to seek remedies for them.” From the ‘ancients’ he takes the love of political liberty, which requires not the assertion of personal freedom but association and deliberation with others. 

    The modern scientists, on the contrary, embrace determinism, whether socioeconomic, biological, or psychological, regarding “the freedom of the individual to be essentially an illusion.” Everything has a cause, and “modern science is the royal road to knowledge” of causes. They do not, however, accept the fatalism of the ancients or the providentialism of the prophets. “Opposed to the passive acceptance of the world as it is,” scientism “can envisage another reality, better adapted to our needs,” emerging from the laws of causality themselves. That is, in understanding natural causes scientists can then manipulate them, adapting them to human “needs.” If we understand genetics, for example, we can breed more nourishing plants and animals. And “there is a temptation to extend the same principle to human societies: since we know their mechanisms, why not engineer perfect societies?” This raises the question, What is perfection? Perfection in their opinion turns out, somewhat circularly, to be “the results of science,” science as “a generator of values, similar to religion.” “Having discovered the objective laws of the real, the partisans of this doctrine decide that they can enlist these laws to run the world as they think best”; “the scientific scholar is tempted to become a demiurge.” The urges of the demiurges incline toward modern utopianism, “the attempt to establish heaven on earth, here and now.” “We have seen the brutal consequences,” shown by Todorov himself in his book, Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps [1]—genocidal tyranny or ‘totalitarianism.’ In the milder, democratic-republican regimes one sees instead what Tocqueville calls the soft despotism of bureaucracy, wherein “the expert replaces the sage as purveyor of final aims, and a thing becomes good simply because it is frequent,” made so by the “technocratic collective” and decidedly not self-governing individuals. 

    At this, individualists rebel. They proclaim self-sufficiency. Far from lamenting their aloneness, they rejoice in the freedom it brings them. “If they have one regret, it is that man is not even freer of those fictions consisting of morality, communal life, and the coherent self.” Their most extreme representative, the Marquis de Sade, maintains that man, born “in the image of other animals,” not in the image of the God he denies, “is a purely egotistical being who knows only its own interests.” “Are we not all born in utter isolation,” in “a perpetual state of war”? he asks, rhetorically. His notorious preoccupation with the body comports with this, as the body “belongs exclusively to the individual.” He takes no care of the bodies of others, “having discovered that the pain of others gives him more pleasure than their joy.” Such sadism makes him “the black sheep of the individualist family.” The utilitarians have been more moderate, but perhaps only because they have decided that sadism isn’t very useful.

    Humanists take a different view from all of the other moderns. They share with Tocquevillian conservatives and the individualists the capacity and the right “of being able to act at one’s own will,” both initiating activities and carrying them through without undue interference. This right “implies that the ultimate end” of free human acts is “a human being, not suprahuman entities (God, goodness, justice) or infrahuman ones (pleasures, money, power).” This human being might be oneself or another, but always human; humanism is both human-centered and humane. Todorov summarizes the humanist claims as “the autonomy of the I, the finality of the you, and the universality of the they.” Therefore, humanism is no egoism, as individualism inclines to be. “What guarantees the unity of these three features is the very centrality granted to the human race, embodied by each of its members: it is at once the source, the goal, and the framework of its actions,” anthropocentric not theocentric. Politically, humanists prefer “regimes in which subjects can exercise their autonomy and enjoy the same rights.” The slogan, if not the practice of the French Revolution puts it, famously: Liberty, equality, fraternity.

    This is not to say that the regime of liberal democracy excludes the other three modern “families.” But they tend to strain its limits—individualists working toward a-civism or even anarchy; conservatives toward ‘authoritarianism’; scientists toward ‘totalitarianism.’ For humanists, the individualists’ liberty is attractive, especially their esteem for consent to laws of one’s own making, but not “outside the human community.” The scientists’ demand that human beings figure things out for themselves makes sense to them, but not their dogmatic materialist determinism. They share the moderation of conservatives without framing that moderation by divine or natural laws. Todorov considers humanism “the most satisfying if not the only worthwhile response to the devil’s challenge.” Neither rationalists nor irrationalists, they seek knowledge but recognize that it “sometimes follows paths that elude rational analysis.” They need not be religious, but neither need they be atheists, inclining to leave “a somewhat vague space” for religious experience. As to one’s relations with nature, “humanists affirm that man is not nature’s slave, not that nature must become his slave.” In their estimation, human beings share power with God and nature. Accordingly, they refrain from worshipping man in place of God, since “man is neither good nor bad” but ‘can become one or the other, or (more often) both.” While not deriving “values” from divine or natural law, neither do they concede that they are arbitrary. By nature social, human beings need one another not only for survival and reproduction but “as conscious and communicative beings.” This natural sociality enables them to mitigate the harshness of physical nature, including “the laws of their biological nature,” without aspiring to master it. In political life, as the great humanist Montesquieu writes, their laws correspond to their existence as “reasonable beings, and not on the dispositions or particular wills of those beings.” 

    Given the centrality of freedom to so much of modern thought, “just what does the freedom of modern man consist of?”  Modern freedom or ‘autonomy’ consists of “one’s choice to feel, to reason, and to will oneself.” In the higher ranges, this means Kantian autonomy in accordance with his ‘categorical imperative,’ but Todorov means more generally the right to take “action that finds its source in the subject himself.” Montaigne, “the pivotal figure between the old and the new, who read all the Ancients and whom all the Moderns would read,” claims, first, “a form of affective autonomy,” to “live with those he loves, not with those whom custom imposes on him,” first of the latter being his family, from whom he distanced himself every day in his famous tower. Montaigne rates friendship, which is voluntary, over family, which is given. Even animals love their children; “the fact that we tend to cleave to our blood relations is proof that we have not left the ‘animal’ condition, that we have not achieved a separate ‘humanity.'” And as a (mildly) individualistic sort, he also dislikes the aristocratic preoccupation with the past and the future seen in their concern for bloodlines; “one must live in the present rather than in the future, and in the self rather than in others.” Similarly, one should guard one’s freedom of mind, especially from the tyranny of books—evidently including the Book. His Essays are just that: essays, attempts at understanding, not revelations or dogmatic assertions. Montaigne writes “against scholastic knowledge and the submission to tradition, in favor of the autonomy of reason and judgment.” “Memory can be useful but it gives me a borrowed knowledge; reason is weak but it is mine; it is therefore the better of the two.” He shares with the Bible a certain humility, nonetheless, “hasten[ing] to show how human reason is weak, how men’s pride has little justification,” given their frailty and their too-frequent depredations upon one another. But neither is the individual “a simple plaything in the hands of Providence.” We can rule ourselves by reason—tentatively, knowing that our reason can fail us. Reason is the way to human freedom. Unlike the Ancients, who regarded reason as the distinctive human characteristic, Montaigne gives freedom this place.

    Descartes views freedom similarly but exhibits more confidence in its power. He “sets off on the path of ‘proud’ humanism.” This, thanks to his celebrated “method” of rational thought. Regarding intellectual freedom as inalienable (“I think, therefore I am” replacing God’s “I am that I am,” at least for humans), he more clearly connects modern science to the immaterial than does Bacon’s experimentalism. In the realm of action, no such ‘abstraction’ can be had; political freedom requires the exercise of prudence within concrete, changing circumstances. Descartes as it were ‘brackets’ God, whose revelation, while “incomparably more certain” than human reason “teaches us nothing about a great part of the world,” leaving a very wide space for human thought to roam. “The domain of human knowledge has certain limits; but within these, the Cartesian method is sovereign.” This confidence, Todorov suggests, was likely to spill into the political world, sooner or later. Although “Descartes is not a defender of scientism…the total power he attributes to the will and the reason of the individual paves the way for the theoretical justifications the scientists will use to support their policies.”

    The much more thoroughly political Montesquieu defends the humanist claim that “philosophical determinism does not exclude political will.” If materialist determinism takes the place of divine providence, Montesquieu makes himself the ‘secular’ equivalent of the Pelagians and Erasmus, holding man, not God, responsible for his own actions, adjuring the physician to save himself. He never goes so far as the scientistic utopians, claiming that politics can be conducted as a straight deduction from natural laws. Yes, climate is important, but “moral causes are more powerful than physical ones,” and the best way to learn how to deal with physical causes is education. By studying, traveling, discussing through considering received laws, religion, and customs, individuals and p0litical societies find it “possible to surmount the determining force of conditions that preexist [their] voluntary intervention.” Thus, Montesquieu writes, “We fashion for ourselves the spirit that pleases us, and we are its true artisans,” and “this interpretation of the human condition is found at the basis of Montesquieu’s analysis of political regimes.” This leads to his preference for regimes of liberty over despotisms. Only those political institutions “are good that do not hinder [man’s] autonomy of action.” These include republics and constitutional monarchies. The choice of one or the other depends upon the circumstances in which a people finds itself, very much including the kind of education it has received.

    Rousseau pulls back from ‘proud’ humanism, maintaining the distinction between freedom of thought and freedom of action that Descartes maintained less than firmly. Human nature exists, but it is somewhat malleable by human beings themselves. “In all his reflections Rousseau will seek to articulate the given and the chosen: love of self and pity are in the nature of man, although they are equally the source of virtues, which depend on the will.” Given this ambiguity, with its inherent possibility of choosing wrongly, Rousseau teaches that individuals must obey the laws, although peoples may revolutionize. This is because the laws, customs, traditions of civil societies are necessary to constrain individuals, but they nevertheless “consecrate the triumph of might, not right.” Anticipating his contemporary, David Hume, he refuses to derive right from facts. “The only legitimate government of a country is the one chosen by the free will of the people of that country,” its “general will.” 

    If peoples revolutionize, however, laws, customs, and traditions will no longer constrain individuals as they do in more settled times. To guard against rapine, Rousseau educates his Emile to become “an autonomous being,” self-governing and not prey either to the wills of others or to his own passions. Not for him will be the “servile submission to current opinions and absurd conventions, the habit of conducting himself according to the norms of the day even if they are constantly changing,” worries about what the neighbors will say. Emile will never hide his nature from others, giving up his natural autonomy and becoming “alien to himself.” He will stand as a loyal citizen in the nation of his own soul, ready to act as the head of his household and an example to his countrymen. With this, Todorov draws an important distinction: for Rousseau, “the notion of autonomy is no longer limited in scope; it intervenes in knowledge and in action, in public life and in private life; yet it is not absolute but limited.” That is, “humanists do not misjudge the power of the given, either of physical nature or of social custom,” but they do contend that “liberation is always possible.” “Human life is an imperfect garden,” no Eden then, no utopia in the future. Freedom is rather “a goal inscribed in us,” a goal which “can become the horizon of political institutions.” When it does, however, it brings with it “an unforeseen danger.” Benjamin Constant was the humanist thinker who recognized this danger and addressed it.

    If Rousseau criticizes Enlightenment scientism and the social conventions ridiculed by the Enlighteners, and if his firm insistence on self-discipline would have moderated the French Revolution his superficial admirers carried out, Constant writes in that revolution’s aftermath, freedom of the individual “is now threatened” by “the very generalization of the idea of freedom.” Popular sovereignty may threaten individual self-government. Freedom of all may contradict the freedom of each one amongst the all.

    With the French Revolution’s replacement of the ‘absolute’ rule of the one with the rule of the many, tyranny took a new and much more lethal turn: the Jacobin Terror. Constant rejects Rousseau’s insistence that the individual alienates all his rights in entering into the social contract, a claim that opens the way for a new and more lethal absolutism. Rousseau’s theory should never have been implemented directly; abstractions do not have good results in the real world, where his General Will must be wielded by real individuals. From moderate Montesquieu, he draws the lesson that neither the origin nor even the structure of political power makes it good; one must consider “the way it functions,” whether it is limited by law or, better, by balancing, countervailing powers. “How can power be limited other than by power?” Constant quite sensibly asks. Individual and political liberty depend upon such limitation. Only then can “what was described by Montaigne and Descartes as a personal practice” be “protected by law as an inalienable right.” In so arguing, Todorov rightly observes, Constant sides with Locke against Hobbes. “Constant thus sketches out, just after the Revolution, the only framework in which a politics in accord with humanist principles can be situated.”

    To be sure, the garden will remain imperfect. The democratic side of the modern state, popular sovereignty, may still lean against its republican side, the side that features representative government and balance of separated powers, just as statism may still lean against democracy. Each side moderates “the other’s excesses.” [2]

    Constant sees that this likely condition of instability needs moral ballast to maintain it. But with Christianity declining and Machiavellianism ascending, where will morality ‘come from’? Constant finds that source in humanity itself, in the ‘Rights of Man’ asserted but then cruelly violated in the Revolution. “These rights do not decide the politics of states”—that would introduce a pseudo-geometrical deduction into practice that invites the all-too-clearcut rule by guillotine—but they can and should be invoked as limits of political action, limits to the means by which rulers may rule. Constant reverses the approach to natural rights taken by the Jacobins. Instead of using natural rights, including liberty, as justification for the use of any means in order to obtain a perfect—and therefore impossible to realize—garden on earth, Constant invokes natural rights as limitations to the way of life of the democratic republican regime, limitations to the way it rules. As with Christian teachings before it, natural-rights teaching will indeed require teaching: an educational system devoted to its promulgation. 

    For Constant, then, the philosophy of freedom turns away from the early moderns’ ‘state of nature’ teaching, without erasing natural rights. Those rights must be understood in a new way, however. “In the network of human interactions, no isolated entities exist but only relations; the very opposition between essence and accident has no place in the world of intersubjectivity,” a world in which “I love the being who is in a certain position in relation to me.” As Constant puts it, more politically, “Everything in life depends on reciprocity.” That is, ruling and being ruled, seen in the family and in the polis by Aristotle and defined by him as politics strictly speaking, can be reintroduced under conditions of modern statism if modern men design their regimes as democratic and republican both, and if they learn to respect natural rights in others with at least some of the concern with which they insist on them regarding themselves.

    Despite their emphasis on human sociability and indeed the political character of man, the humanists have not ignored the aspect of human being that at times craves solitude. “Isn’t Rousseau one of the first to have understood this, describing himself as a solitary walker?” And Montaigne, if not a solitary walker, could surely be described as a solitary sitter. Fundamentally, is there “a tenable difference between humanists and individualists?”

    Rousseau seeks solitude “to escape the weight of social obligations in order to live freely,” Todorov proposes. He did not cut himself off from all social ties. As seen in the Confessions, he maintained “constrained communications” with others. In The Reveries of a Solitary Walker his solitude serves a purpose, the experience of “a pure feeling of being.” Rousseau thus does not claim that human nature as such is solitary. He rather implies that he differs from the human norm. Todorov describes this as his acknowledgement of his own special “fate,” the condition of being persecuted. This, however, raises the question of why Rousseau suffered persecution. Could it be that he, like Socrates, was a philosopher? “The philosopher was wisest when he preferred the solitude of his desert and written communication of the result obtained by his search for truth. Rousseau understands this and readily admits that his own choice of solitude is hardly that of Descartes, or, one might add, of Montaigne.”

    As for Montaigne, “he bases his way of being on his ‘dreamy way.'” Some men are social, some not. “We are no longer dealing with a matter of principle but with the way of life that best suits each individual. There is no single ideal conduct in this regard but several, and everyone has the right to act according to his penchant.” Montaigne sets limits on each of these polar choices: the life “exclusively devoted to the need for glory and honors” leaves no space for reflection; the life of “exclusive concern with the inner life and indifference to any aspect of the social order” neglects the social and political conditions needed to support it. And in both of these lives are indeed ‘exclusive,’ impossible for human beings to live. One is reminded of Aristotle’s remark, that the man outside the city is either a god or a beast; the hero seeks self-deification, the solitary individual lives like a bear or a mountain lion. Futilely, they deny their humanity, their nature as human beings. 

    If humanism maintains a balance between freedom and sociality, how does it deal with love, which has taken an at times overwhelming prominence in modern ‘popular culture’? Todorov carefully excludes the more dilute forms of love—humanitarianism or philanthropy and patriotism—following Aristotle in understanding it as “affection pushed to its supreme degree,” eros “addressed only to a single being”—an irreplaceable you, as the song has it. Equality may enter into personal love regarding the relations of the two lovers, but no equality can enter into the relations of the lovers with anyone else. It isn’t “that we cannot love several beings at once, but that every love is defined by its particular object.” And unlike animals, human love consists of more than sexuality; eros or “love-desire” consists of longing, delights in possession, whereas philia or “love-joy” consists of reciprocity, delighting in “the simple existence of the love object,” taking “joy in presence” of it. In theological terms, philia “is a benevolent love, not a concupiscent love,” and its “goal is not fusion,” as with eros, as “I cannot rejoice in the existence of the other unless he remains separate from me.” Philia accords with humanism, eros not. Rousseau tells his readers why: “Love, which gives as much as it demands, is in itself a sentiment filled with equity.”

    Here Todorov brings in the moral principle of his favored moral philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who replaced the postmodernists as his guiding star sometime between his book on the Spanish conquest of the Americas and his book on the Holocaust. [3] With philia, the you is no longer a means, it becomes the end; in addition, [the lover] must reserve the autonomy of his will.” “These two characteristics relate love-joy to humanist doctrine.” My beloved isn’t the means to my satisfaction; more, she is free to be herself, even as “the beneficiary of my love.”

    This humanist conception of love differs from those of both classical philosophers and of Christians. For Plato and Aristotle, love of a person forms a rung on a ladder or scale, as seen in Plato’s Symposium and in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where the beloved (including the beloved friend) embodies something beyond the person who is beloved: beauty, virtue—a fine principle or abstraction. Genuine philia cannot exist except “between virtuous and worthy individuals.” Christian love (as Milton says of Eve’s love of Adam) is love of God in him. “This explains why, in love-charity, the substitution of the object is possible; I must not attach myself to this or that person, but bring the same love to everyone.”

    Not so, for the pioneering humanist, Montaigne. He loves “the unique character of [his] friend,” La Boétie. Montaignian philia “celebrates the achievement of individual identity,” not the person as the embodiment of either virtue or the image of God. “Love of the creature does not lead here to love of the Creator.” “The person of the friend is the sole justification for his choice.” This is why Rousseau’s Héloïse is the new Héloïse. Being loved for her humanity, the humanist’s beloved cannot be perfect, although it is permissible, even laudatory, to imagine her so. Again, “human life is an imperfect garden,” making the act of imagining perfection in the loved one “the most precious feature of human love,” an act of “putting our capacity to fabricate the real in the service of our relations with concrete human beings.” Rousseau Kantifies love before Kant came along to Kantify morality. Philia “promotes the other man [or woman] as the ultimate end of my action, as humanism would have it.” Humanism cherishes the human.

    Philia strictly limits the modernist tendency toward making the human will triumphant. Love does not subject itself to the will; therefore, “will cannot govern everything.” After all, “being what one is, one can choose to act according to one’s will, and this justifies the demand for political autonomy, but can one choose to be what one is?” Freedom of the will exist, but within the framework of one’s individual nature.

    Obviously, in humanism “the human takes the place of the divine.” Humanism nonetheless avoids tyranny—as scientism does not—by limiting itself in its love to individual persons, by not directing itself toward ‘the state’ or ‘the leader’ or all humanity (as in, for example, communist doctrine). Nor is it conservative in Todorov’s sense of the word, refusing to view human beings as “means in view of a transcendent end,” whether divine, natural, or simply abstract.” Constant wrote in a letter to Annette de Gérando, “A word, a look, a squeeze of the hand have always seemed to me preferable to all reason, as indeed to all earthly thrones.”

    If, then, humanism counters Satan’s pacts by showing that life without God need not result in the loss of free will (materialism) or the loss of friendship and love (Machiavellian lives spent jostling for self-interest), does it mean that the soul, now reduced to the self, has no real nature, that it is “in reality impressionable, fickle, distracted”—prey to subconscious forces? Having given up the proud dreams of modernists, does the self dissolve in the acids of postmodernism? “For if the individual is merely a bundle of multiple characters over which he has no control, if he is merely the label haphazardly slapped onto a series of discontinuous states, if he can never take advantage of any unity, can we still speak of his autonomy?” Can the real condition of the self sustain a philosophy of freedom?

    Todorov recurs to Montaigne, that adept of self-knowledge. Montaigne addresses two problems in considering himself: his inconsistency over time; his multiplicity in space. He more than concedes, he insists upon, the fact of “human changeableness.” He goes so far as to deny that the human self has an “essence that would resist the vagaries of existence.” “But this does not mean, on another level, that this individual has no stability or that one can never generalize from one individual to another.” How so?

    The facts of time and space, he argues, within which we witness our own changes, mental and physical, themselves limit his freedom to change. He has his own unique history, his life over time. And he is born within a framework of custom, a space in which certain customs prevail, which forms habits; habit is a second nature, “no less powerful” than physical nature. “The outcome of a life is the identity of the person.” A life lived rightly “converts form into substance, fortune into nature, habit into essence.” This is why the faces of mature men and women differ from one another far more than the faces of infants. The ‘nature’ so developed “consists precisely of our indeterminacy, of our capacity to supply ourselves with an individual and collective identity: nature has put us into the world free and unfettered,” allowing us to give “unity and meaning to [our] life.” What much later comes to be called ‘history’ becomes, in the hands of humanists, “the place for the constitution of being.” 

    Todorov seems unsure whether Montaigne proposes self-creation in a strong sense, or whether, as he puts it, “the course of human life leads everyone to discover his ruling quality, and to stick by it,” as he engages in dialogues with himself and with others. For Montaigne, the dialogues with others range over an array of thinkers, ancient and modern, whose writings he discusses as a means of achieving self-knowledge, self-revelation. As he reads them, he judges one opinion sound, another wrong, gradually forming his own opinions, settled by capable of being unsettled by a better argument.

    This apparent plasticity sat on epistemological bedrock. “Montaigne drew all of his conclusions concerning the human race from the nominalism of William of Ockham, which he embraced there are only particular objects in the world; where humanity is concerned, only individuals exist.” And along with William of Ockham stands Niccoló of Florence, who taught his readers “how to separate…the ideal and the real,” discarding the former for the latter. Montaigne claims to present himself as he is, further claiming that he is worth the trouble you take to know him, in his long and complex book. In this, Montaigne too becomes a ‘prince,’ a ruler in the sense of a leader of human thought and sentiment. I am worth knowing, but so are you, since you and I are equally human. Humanism saves itself from narrow individualism, however, because self-knowledge requires others, both those one meets in books and those we meet as friends. Plato, yes, but La Boétie even more. Not just any friends, evidently. “The best friendship and the best dialogue between two men are animated by the impulse to know: ‘The cause of truth should be the common cause for both.'”

    This self-knowledge, valuable in itself, also result in knowledge of human beings generally, since in order to acquire it, one must pay attention to others. If “the individual exists only in relationship” with other individuals, there must be some commonality among interlocutors. They “resemble on another,” although they “cannot be reduced to one another.” Montaigne’s “person becomes an instrument for interrogating,” if not an essence, a human nature, then “the human condition.” In this way, Montaigne brings together “all the basic of ingredients of humanist doctrine”: individual freedom, “the autonomy of the authorial I“; the “finality” of the you, the fact that you are unique, with nothing beyond yourself; and “the universality of the they,” all individuals living within “the same human condition.” “In the objective world, everyone is a member of the same species; in the intersubjective universe, everyone occupies a unique position; in communion with oneself, everyone is alone, and responsible for his actions.

    But (as Satan insists, and many Christians fear) does humanism inevitably result in the death of God, and the death of God in nihilism, as the God-substitutes men propose are rejected, one after another? And does nihilism result in societal collapse or the rule of force, in anarchy or the renunciation of freedom? Todorov denies these things. Looking first, however, at the other modern “families” of principles, he finds each defective. Conservatives, he claims, do “believe in the existence of common values fixed by the society in which we live,” but define morality as conformity to “the current norm.” (This is obviously an absurd assertion, since “the current norm” is precisely what modern conservatives reject, but let it pass as a literal definition what ‘conservatism,’ for now.) Scientism rejects morality as meaningless, but exempts itself and its activities from that stricture.

    Todorov is more concerned with the challenge of individualism, which transforms the Ancients’ “aspiration to the good life” into “the cult of authenticity,” which effectively means doing as one likes. His concern is that the founder of humanism in France, Montaigne, inclines toward Epicureanism. He pretends to Christianity, dividing his life “into two parts: his knees bend, his public actions conform to custom, but his reason and his judgment remain free, and he chooses for himself an art of living that suits him personally, with no concern to impose it on others.” This “paves the way for the individualist attitude,” although it doesn’t go all the way there. In their own ways, both La Rochefoucauld and Hobbes show similar inclinations. Individualism achieves its fullest flower in the esthetes, particularly Baudelaire, who rejected moral principles altogether in favor of “aesthetic values.” Their dandyism parodied the old Platonism, “asking life to be beautiful rather than good”—sundering what Plato had seen together. 

    These “families” of moral principles are either do result in nihilism or fail to block its surge. How does humanism fare?

    Todorov begins with Rousseau. Between the state of nature and the rule of social convention, Rousseau seeks a “middle way.” The key text here is the Emile. [4] Emile’s education proceeds in stages, the first intended to develop his natural capacities, the second intended to develop his social capacities. That is, he first learns how to defend his physical and moral independence, his liberty, then (upon reaching puberty) his “social virtues,” which will enable him to love a woman and raise a family in civil society. Rousseau avoids nihilism by pointing to the natural “voice of conscience” in every human heart. He firmly rejects the materialism he finds in the Enlightenment, which would indeed bring on nihilism and the destruction of social life. In this, Rousseau ‘secularizes’ Christianity. “He does not seek to establish an art of living that would lead every individual separately to the ideal of the good life”—the path of Montaigne—but “places himself in the perspective of benevolence, a relation that presupposes sociability.” In Rousseau’s political philosophy, there is no divine-law foundation of morality, pity or compassion replaces charity or agapic love (that is, sympathy for the other as human, not as a sufferer), and no sharp distinction between the good as a manifestation of a holy Spirit and evil as ‘the flesh.’

    But in locating morality squarely in human nature, acknowledging man’s freedom either to accept the promptings of conscience or to reject them, Rousseau thereby rejects the notions which led to the excesses of the French Revolution. His famously astringent condemnation of the hypocrisy of the aristocratic society of his own day registers his understanding that any society, society as such, can go wrong. A new society will not necessarily improve the existing one; it could even be worse. “No one who proposes to reform society in order to make all men good and happy can legitimately claim affiliation with Rousseau, as the revolutionaries of a later generation (or more recently) have done. It is not the fault of this or that society if men are wicked: they are so because they are sociable beings, free and moral—in other words, because they are human….Man discovers good and evil only in the state of society and through society; but his discovery does not determine him one way or another, it simply offers him the possibility of becoming good or evil.” No utopianism need apply.

    What does apply is the voice of conscience, “the true capstone of [Rousseau’s] moral theory,” one of the distinctive features of human nature. It is “the capacity to separate good and evil and therefore the counterpart of human liberty, without which morality has no meaning.” It exists only in the individual soul, not in civil society. It is neither reason nor feeling; it requires no complex logical thought to arrive at, but unlike feelings which vary “according to individuals and circumstances,” it “is the same in everyone”—written, Rousseau writes “by nature with ineffaceable characters in the depth of my heart.” Without it, “reason is mute.” He who follows it is good; he who follows it only after overcoming his vices is virtuous—virtue denoting strength. To be good is to be happy; to be virtuous is to be dutiful. 

    Can the dutiful, virtuous man find his way to the happiness goodness brings? Yes, through love—through love of oneself (as Montaigne saw, and practiced) and through love of others, as the Christians saw and as Emile was brought to understand. Moral duty constrains, but “love is joy.” Since love or benevolence “consists of cultivating what is already inside us,” through right education, “love and friendship are therefore constitutive of man.” Loving another does “not sacrifice one’s being, it completes it.” Rousseau writes, “The eternal laws of nature and of order to exist. For the wise man, they take the place of positive law,” rather as Christ’s law of love takes the place of the Mosaic law for the Gentiles. For the philosopher, for a Rousseau, inquiry into those laws continues throughout his life; for him as for Plato’s Socrates, philosophy is zetetic and dialogic. But non-philosophers, the attachments of friendship and love, “with their inevitable freight of illusions and disappointments,” will prevent the founding of any utopia, any Eden, while preventing them from falling into nihilism, whether a nihilism of violence or a nihilism of listlessness.

    For the humanist view of politics, Todorov turns not to Rousseau, however, with his ever-problematic Contrat Social, but to more down-to-earth Constant. Constant was what was beginning to be called a liberal in politics and economics, but he rejected the utilitarian form of liberalism then propounded by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, itself derived from the Machiavellian line, seen in Hobbes and La Rochefoucauld. Self-interest alone cannot explain a considerable part of human behavior, as seen in religion, love, and war. And it can be dangerous, as seen in the career of Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Constant described as “self-interest personified.” That is, self-interest may usually motivate peaceful, commercial relations, but not in the tribe of the lion and the eagle. Fortunately, self-interest on the Napoleonic scale defeats itself, as Napoleon’s career in fact illustrated. But why tempt future would-be Napoleons by valorizing self-interest? “The Napoleonic tyranny was at least partially due to the success of philosophic theories that reduced man to a being subject to the reign of interest.” Lions and eagle will never go extinct; it is wiser to redirect their ambitions to things beyond themselves.

    Constant concedes that “valorizing individual interest was liberating” at the beginning of modernity, as was popular sovereignty, which seemed to promise that the people really would “act in their own interest.” The Revolution had dampened the latter hope as surely as Napoleon had dampened the former. What is needed then, is a more capacious sentiment, not to replace but to supplement and restrain self-interest, which Constant calls “enthusiasm.” Reason alone won’t suffice because reason alone is weak; it is “an instrument not a force.” Nor is enthusiasm Christian or Rousseauian conscience. It is a moral sentiment, directed at the good of the other, whether the other is a human being, a nation, nature, or God.

    Of these kinds of enthusiasm, religious enthusiasm is the most dangerous. (Constant hadn’t seen the truly virulent nationalisms that would come later.) If directed toward the Deity or Supreme Being, it is ennobling; if directed by the “positive religions,” it can lead to persecution, a policy of a religion whose priests use the enthusiasm of the faithful to serve their self-interest. Positive religion “cannot serve as the basis of morality, and it should be as isolated as possible from political authority,” but “though religion cannot be the foundation for morality, morality will be the measure of how we evaluate particular religions,” as “each of them comes closer to religious feeling the less interest in and farther removed it is from political power.” To ensure that positive religions hew to this standard, Constant reaches for what had become the familiar religious solution: church disestablishment and the resulting multiplicity of sects, competing amongst themselves to perfect “religion itself and its action on society.” In Constant’s metaphor, if religion divides into a thousand streams, “they will fertilize the ground that the torrent” of enthusiasm released by one or two religions alone “would have devastated,” and in fact had devastated in Europe’s religious wars.

    Todorov optimistically claims that the same might be said of moral systems themselves. Multiply them and let them compete. This, he stipulates, ought to be “the credo of the state,” not of humanists. He seems hopeful that humanism will win the battle of moral ideas and sentiments, in the long run, and he obviously intends his book as a soldier in that battle.

    In differentiating politics from morality while at the same time refusing to divorce them, Constant ventured to criticized Kant’s dictum, drawn from Christian thought, that one must do right even if in so doing the world perishes. Specifically, he regards the obligation to tell the truth as applicable only among decent persons. A murderer sets himself outside of civil society; as previous thinkers had held, they put themselves in a state of war with their intended victims. Since, as Constant writes, “no man has the right to truth that injures another,” Socrates is right to say that one may lie if a man in a murderous rage demands to know where you keep the knives. Kant took this criticism unkindly, devoting a long essay, On the Claimed Right to Lie Out of Humanity, to refuting it. In Kant’s rigorously deductive analysis, lying contradicts the truth which, for Enlightenment rationalists as much as for Christians, alone sets you free. He is simply “not interested in the practical consequences of acts.” Constant replied that the true moral goal is “to do no harm to another,” which usually comports with truthfulness, but not always. When it doesn’t, “love of neighbor must win out…over the love of truth,” since the aim of morality is the ‘you,’ not the Kantian ‘I’ who wants to maintain his integrity. In this, “led by his infallible sense of the concrete,” Constant is the better humanist. “If there were an ultimate conflict between truth and humanity, Constant would choose humanity.”

    And in the public realm, “truth is not the main thing, but being able to seek it.” A government may surely lie to deceive its enemies and protect citizens; it may not suppress freedom of speech and of the press. “”For Constant, the real virtue of liberty consists precisely in that it allows the examination of all opinions, the pursuit of all arguments.” This practice ensured, the better opinions will prevail, in the long run. Pluralism will do the work Providence does in Christianity.

    In a thoroughly Montaignian move, Todorov immediately extends Constant’s dialogue beyond current opinions to past thinkers. “To make [the past] intelligible is also to begin to know ourselves,” since we cannot trust the rhetoric of “our contemporaries,” who often lack the clarity of judgment perspective offers. Having passed from aristocratic or oligarchic civil societies to democratic ones, ‘we moderns’ think and act exactly as Aristotle said democrats do: “claim[ing] allegiance to the principle of equality and cherish[ing] the choices of one’s own will.” “This transformation generated many new sufferings” for the nations of the twentieth century. European moderns split between “conservatives,” who attempted to save some of the old regimes, especially the Catholic Church, under neo-aristocratic or ‘authoritarian’ regimes, and pseudo-scientists, whose claim to rule consisted of their alleged knowledge of “impersonal and implacable laws” of history. Invoking ‘science’ as justification for their “revolutionary utopianism,” they imposed ‘totalitarian’ regimes, modern tyrannies. Their counterparts in more genuinely democratic regimes eschewed rule by terror, relying instead on bureaucracy; “politics then becomes a domain on which we consult experts, and the only debate is over the choice of means, not ends.” Except that ever-more-powerful means often suggest ends, as “capability becomes wish, which is transformed in turn into duty.” As in Tocqueville’s “soft despotism,” “the oppression here is not violent, as in the totalitarian states; it is indirect and diffuse, but as a result it is more difficult to circumscribe and reject.” Once “the technicians of democratic societies” have “master[ed] the code of living species,” “humanity will be capable of making itself conform to its own wishes”—or, rather, the technocratic oligarchy will.

    To avoid this, Todorov urges recourse to the “humanist core” of modernity. As he has stated, that core consists of understanding human beings as one “biological species”; sociability, by which he means “mutual dependence” for nourishment, reproduction, and self-understanding; and “relative indeterminacy,” that is, the capacity to choose among the many varieties of thought and courses of action. Thinking in a non-utopian way about morality and politics requires us to acknowledge these core human facts—this “‘human nature,’ if you will.” The humanist morality that recognizes “equal dignity for all members of the species,” that elevates the other person rather than myself as “the ultimate goal of my action,” and that prefers “the act freely chosen over one performed under constraint” comports with that humanist anthropology. “Humanism asserts that we must serve human beings one by one, not in abstract categories.”

    Human nature, then, provides a capacious standard for human conduct. There are actions which are good for it and actions which are bad for it. The free will inherent in that nature also ensures that human beings can choose good or evil; “men are not necessarily good, that they are even capable of the worst.” “But it is precisely in living through the horrors of the war and the camps that modern humanists, men like Primo Levi, Romain Gary, and Vasili Grossman, have made their choice and confirmed their faith in the human capacity also to act freely, also to do good.” Todorov’s books on the Spanish conquest of the Americas and the Holocaust, along with his own life in Bulgaria under the Communist regime, also confirm that faith.

    Politically, this means that “the democratic regime has affinities with humanist thought, as authoritarian regimes have with conservatism, totalitarian regimes with utopian scientism, and anarchy with individualism.” But modern democracy in Europe does not mean majority rule, simply; it is ‘liberal,’ restraining itself from “choos[ing] among conceptions of the good” held by its citizens, “provided that these do not contradict its ultimate principles.” Humanism in morality and in politics makes a wager not entirely like Pascal, only for it the wager isn’t on the existence of God but on the capacity of human beings to choose what is good for beings such as they are, against the determinist doctrines who deny that this is possible. Todorov quotes the Christian humanist, Erasmus: “What good is man, if God acts on him as the potter acts on the clay?” And he asks modern determinists, “If everything is played out in advance, what good is man?” On the contrary, we can “prefer the imperfect garden of humankind to any other realm, not as a blind alley, but because this is what allows us to live in truth.” And of course the maxim, “live in truth,” galvanized the dissidents of Central Europe under the Soviet empire, men and women to whom Todorov remains faithful to this day.

     

     

     

    Notes

    1. Tzetan Todorov: Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps. See “The Holocaust Reconsidered,” on this website under the category “Manners and Morals.”
    2. Oddly, Todorov claims that “it is with Constant that humanism leads to a political structure, the structure of liberal democracy.” His ignoring of the American founding, which did exactly that, may register his earlier, mistaken, claim that the authors of the Declaration of Independence secretly signed on to Satan’s third pact, the one that struck down the principle of obedience to the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God. If so, he may be taking the Freemasonry of many of the Founders a bit too far. It is also possible that he is restricting his field of inquiry to Europe and especially to France.
    3. See “Spanish Conquistadors Through a Postmodernist Lens,” on this website under the category “Nations.”
    4. For a discussion of the Emile, see the several articles on this website under the category of “Philosophers.”

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Chateaubriand and Napoleon: Parallel Defeats

    July 12, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    François-René de Chateaubriand: Memoirs from Beyond the Grave, 1800-1815. Alex Andriesse translation. New York Review Books, 2022.

     

    With Napoleon out of the way, Louis XVIII came to Paris, returning the Legitimist regime to France. Things did not look well to Chateaubriand, who saw Napoleon’s troops, a regiment of the Old Guard, lining the route to Notre Dame; “I cannot believe human faces and bodies have ever worn such menacing and terrible expressions” as these veteran soldiers, “the conquerors of Europe,” now “forced to salute an old king—enfeebled by time, not battle—while being guarded by an army of Russians, Austrians, and Prussians in Napoleon’s invaded capital.” “Never, it must be said, have men been put to such a test or suffered such torment.” 

    The monarch, his foreign allies, and his advisers had “committed an irreparable error” by allowing the French troops to remain united. They should have dissolved the army temporarily, kept the top officers on the payroll, then gradually reconstituted French forces, integrating some of Napoleon’s troops with new men. As it was, defeat followed by humiliation fostered “regrets and feelings hostile to their new leader,” along with resentment toward new recruits who had been given high ranks unearned in battle.

    To this moral and military error Louis added a political one, a new constitution issued by himself, a royal charter instead of a document ratified by the people. Although the Charter of 1814 guaranteed a bicameral legislature, “taxes freely consented to, public and individual liberty, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, inviolable and sacred rights of property,” and an independent judiciary—the regime institutions of pre-Jacobin France—its origin as an act of the monarch reignited “the smoldering question of royal, as opposed to popular, sovereignty.” No one was satisfied: not the Bonapartists, whose hero had been deposed; not the republicans, who objected to the implication of Bourbon resumption of the power to make constitutional law; not the royalists themselves, who disliked the Charter’s rather un-monarchic contents. Although the Charter “was sufficient to satisfy men of conscience,” how many of those are there in any society, especially when it comes to politics? “In the end, if the Charter seemed defective, it was because the Revolution wasn’t over; the principles of equality and democracy had rooted themselves in men’s minds and worked against the monarchical order.” Chateaubriand had seen three regime changes, already: old, absolutist monarchy to constitutional monarchy; constitutional monarchy into republic; republic into “military autocracy”; military autocracy back into a constitutional monarchy. “Such metamorphoses would be repugnant were they not partly attributable to the flexibility of the French spirit,” Chateaubriand offers, with a touch of irony, having already described Napoleon as similarly chameleonlike. (“A Frenchman would shout ‘Off with my head!’ if he heard his neighbor shouting it;” reasoning having fallen into habitual disuse in politics, of what use was one’s head?) “Overjoyed” by the exile of Napoleon, who had brought down such suffering upon them, the French were not really Legitimists, either, but rather “a mob who held all manner of opinions” when it came to the question of what regime France should adopt. This would remain true for the next century and a half. In the meantime, “we Legitimists, poor devils, we were not admitted anywhere and counted for nothing” in French civil society, despite the titular reign of Louis.

    In response to all of this, Chateaubriand published a new book, Political Reflections, annoying the king with his insistence that monarchy could survive only if it acknowledged popular sovereignty as the only kind acceptable in contemporary France. Fortunately, he had again won the friendship of influential woman, the Duchess of Duras, who arranged his appointment to the French embassy in Sweden, headed by Louis’s brother, King Bernadotte. (“A man protects you with what he is worth, a woman with what you are worth: that is why, of these two empires, the former is so odious and the latter so sweet.”) Before leaving, Chateaubriand witnessed the exhumation and transfer of the remains of Louis XVI and his queen, Marie Antoinette, preparatory to their transfer to the Saint-Denis cemetery, where French kings are properly buried. “Among the bones, I recognized the queen’s head by the smile she had given me at Versailles.” A memoir from beyond the grave thus encompasses a memoir from the grave, and while the moral lesson of such a memento mori is so obvious as to need no remark, Chateaubriand draws a less obvious moral-political lesson. On this matter, the Bourbons got something right. They “must be praised for having thought of Louis XVI from the moment they returned. They had to smear their forehead with his ashes before they put his crown on their heads,” in a gesture of humility, memory, and respect before the dignity of rule. At the time, Chateaubriand “wanted a statue of Louis XVI to be set upon the very spot where the martyr shed his blood,” but he now thinks otherwise. “At the present time it is to be feared that a monument raised with a view to remembering the terror of populist excesses may well instill a desire to imitate them,” evil being “more tempting than good.”

    Still, the deaths’ head smile of the queen and the sight of the tombs of French kings raise questions not merely about “the vanity of human grandeur” but about “the nature of man.” “Is everything emptiness and absence in the region of the grave? Is there nothing in this nothing? Is there no life at all in the void, no thoughts at all to be had by dust?” And “in your eternal silence, oh, tombs, if tombs you be, does a man hear nothing but mocking laughter forever and ever? Is this laughter God, the only derisory reality, which will survive the imposture of the universe?” Chateaubriand can only answer: “I am a Christian.”

    Unlike the elderly Bourbon now elevated to the throne, Napoleon in exile retained “the two sources from which his extraordinary life had sprung: democracy and royal power”—democracy in the sense of the ability to gather popular support, royal power in the sense of “his genius,” his virtù in the Machiavellian sense, which the Bourbon line and especially its entourage no longer possessed. “His ambition had been disappointed, not extinguished; misfortune and vengeance were rekindling its flames.” The same was true of his partisans in France whose ambition to act grew “as it became progressively clearer to them how weak the Bourbons’ character was.” Cartoons began to be published, showing eagles flying through the Tuileries Palace windows, “while a flock of turkeys doddered out through the gates.” All that the Bonapartists and Napoleon lacked was an opportunity, as “more traitors are made by events than by opinions.” As always, Napoleon was guided not by news from France but by “the faith he had in himself,” and in the event he was right. Eluding his captors on Elba, “he advances unhindered among those men and women who, a few months previous, had wanted to murder him.” “Alongside the wonder of a one-man invasion” Chateaubriand places “the torpor of the Legitimacy,” its cowardice, which spread throughout the state and “paralyzed France.” Louis managed to pull himself together to give a strong and noble speech to the Chamber of Deputies, a speech worthy of a “heroic dynasty on the verge of extinction”; students from the university schools of law and medicine rallied to his side, as did Chateaubriand (“one is never entitled to say all is lost if he has attempted nothing”). With his “ragtag collection of troops,” Napoleon would not have attempted to seize a Paris united behind the king. But his courtiers wavered, and the people did not rally. Exiled from France for twenty-three years, the Bourbon circle no longer understood the people, and the people felt little connection to the old monarchy. “Thus the impossibility of understanding or supporting each other. Religion, ideas, interests, language, earth, and heaven—everything was different for the people and the king, for they were separated by a quarter century equivalent to centuries,” thanks to the succession of regime changes the people had endured. Chateaubriand can only lament, “Why was I born into an era where I was so badly placed?… Why was I hurled into this horde of mediocrities, who took me for a fool when I spoke of courage and a revolutionary when I spoke of freedom?” (“And you, youthful generations of the moment, let twenty-three years go by, and when I am dead and buried, you, too, shall be asking yourselves what happened to the loves and illusions you cherish today.”)

    The king fled to Ghent, where Chateaubriand joined him and was named Acting Minister of the Interior of the regime in exile. He took the appointment as an opportunity to propose an amendment to the Charter guaranteeing freedom of the press, “for this freedom is inseparable from any representative government.” But “I perceived the catastrophe of society,” taking “refuge from idlers and boors” in a cloister, the kind of place where The Genius of Christianity had granted him a lifetime passport. And he nursed his memories; “it seems no one can become my companion unless he has gone to the other side of the grave.” “I wandered around Ghent as I wander around everywhere, alone.”

    As he consoled himself, the French once again began to long for the ruler they did not have. “The French enjoyed the sight of a sovereign, who, defeated, had borne the chains of a man bearing, victorious, the yoke of a dynasty,” a dynasty from whom “all the royal lines of Europe” derived. In Ghent a hostess trapped him into dining with Joseph Fouché, former Jacobin and ardent advocate of Louis XVI’s execution, former and future Minister of Police under the Directory, then Napoleon, and soon Napoleon once again. As cynical a habitual turncoat as they come, he earns Chateaubriand’s sharpest irony: “regicide was the peak of his innocence.” “Garrulous, like all revolutionaries, beating the air with empty phrases” [1] full of ‘fate,’ ‘the law of things,’ ‘progress,’ ‘the march of society,’ ‘the justice of success,’ and similar resounding general ideas brandished to impress the easily impressed. “M. Fouché never forgave me my dryness or the minimal effect he had on me….The Jacobins detest men who ignore their atrocities and deride their murders; their pride is provoked, like that of writers whose talents one contests.”

    But “Ghent was merely a dressing room behind the scenes of the show being put on in Paris,” where Napoleon ruled for his One Hundred Days after his seizure of the capital. By now, “the spell was broken” since “the few moments in which the laws had reappeared” under Louis and his Charter, however dubious, “were enough to make the reestablishment of arbitrary rule unimaginable.” “Despotism seems like freedom when it takes the place of anarchy,” which Napoleon had done at the beginning of his rule, “but it remains what it truly is when it takes the place of liberty.” Napoleon now “could do nothing with victory, which had turned its back on him, and nothing for order, since it existed without him.” The factions that preceded him continued under his faltering rule; he was reduced to “proclaim[ing] the sovereignty of the people in which he did not believe.” French internal politics could not topple him, however, since “the power combating him was as exhausted as he was,” bringing on “only a battle between ghosts.” Regime changes and the timeserving prevarications of those, like Fouché (merely an exceptionally conspicuous example of the type) left Napoleon with no one to trust, a “great man” standing “alone among all those traitors, men and fate, on a reeling earth, beneath a hostile sky, face-to-face with his destiny and the judgment of God.” [2]

    At the Congress of Vienna, Czar Alexander agreed to an alliance with the Bourbons, Austria, and England against Bonaparte, who no longer had anything like the military power he’d wielded during his first reign. Heading toward Waterloo, the French army consisted of only 70,000 men. Chateaubriand wondered, “Were lots being cast upon the world, as upon Christ’s vesture?” If the Allies won, wouldn’t French glory be lost? And “if Napoleon won, what would become of our liberty?” He confesses that his heart was with France and Napoleon, against the “foreign domination” that he expected to result from the victory of a coalition now led by the British and their general, Wellington (“a mind seeing nothing in the French year of 1793 but the antecedent English year of 1649”). A restoration of the Bourbons under those circumstances would de-legitimatize Legitimacy. This time, “Alexander was not there at the beginning to temper the triumph and curb the insolence of victory.”

    The Allied victory (at a cost of 25,000 French soldiers, 18,000 Allied)—there “was not a family in England who did not mourn”—came after the “two armies crossed iron and fire with a bravery and ferocity animated by ten centuries of national enmity.” Napoleon “threw himself upon his horse and fled” to Paris, not before raging at the French officer who urged him to do so. There, he “abdicated so as not to be forced to abdicate,” uselessly declaring his young son his successor as Emperor Napoleon II. That wasn’t going to work, although “all the omens of the Second Restoration” were almost equally bad: “Bonaparte had returned leading four hundred Frenchmen, while Louis XVIII was returning behind four hundred thousand foreigners.” Understanding that, Chateaubriand declined the position of advisor to the king, despite also understanding that he was ceding the position to the despicable Talleyrand. “Had I remained with the king, the combination of the Talleyrand and Fouché ministry would have become almost impossible; had the Restoration begun with a moral and honorable ministry, the future might have been difference.” He can only sigh, “History is full of tangles like this one.” Soon, he would witness the arrival of both these enemies at the king’s chambers: “Vice, leaning on the arm of Crime.” “The loyal regicide,” Fouché, “on his knees, put the hands that ordered the beheading of Louis XVI into the hands of the martyred king’s brother, and the apostate bishop,” Talleyrand, “stood surety for this oath.”

    While “everyone spoke of the constitution, liberty, equality, the rights of the nations,” “no one wanted these things; they were merely fashionable verbiage.” “Material interests predominated.” Royalists judged Chateaubriand too much the lover of liberty, whereas the republicans resented him for being “too contemptuous of their crimes.” When he told the king that the “monarchy is finished,” Louis admitted, “Well, Monsieur Chateaubriand, I believe you are right.” 

    Napoleon would not be the one to finish it. At Malmaison, stripped of power, awaiting exile, “he could wonder whether, with a little more moderation, he might have held on to his happiness.” He would have no real companions with whom to discuss the matter. Having derived his authority from his successes, in failure those who accepted the example abandoned their teacher for the next successful set of men. “Like most despots, he was on good terms with his servants, but deep down he cared for no one. A solitary man, all he needed was himself. Misfortune did nothing but restore him to the desert that was his life.” After his presidency of the American republic, Washington returned to his home to live as a farmer among the farmers “he had freed.” Napoleon hadn’t defended the French as citizens; in exile, he could have neither equals nor subjects. On the distant island of St. Helena, he squabbled with his British captors, famous but miserable. “I, who believe in the legitimacy of good deeds and the sovereignty of misery, had I served Bonaparte, would not have left him. With my fidelity, I would have shown him the falsity of his political principles. Sharing his disgrace, I would have stayed by his side, like a living contradiction of his barren doctrines and the limited value of the rule of prosperity.” But of course Napoleon was incapable of accepting such a friendship, of any friendship; “a solitary man, all he needed was himself,” his soul a monument to self-sufficiency wrongly understood.

    Writing some thirty years later, Chateaubriand appraises the long-dead tyrant. “The greatness of Napoleon’s heart did not match the greatness of his head.” [3] “A poet in action, an immense genius in war, an indefatigable, able, and intelligent mind in administration, and an industrious and rational administrator,” “as a politician he will always seem deficient in the eyes of statesmen.” His murder of the Duc d’Enghien was an act “contrary to all prudence” as well as God, and it must be understood as “the secret leaven of the discords that later arose between Alexander and Napoleon as well as between Prussia and France.” Alexander was a Christian prince, Prussia (in those days) a Christian nation. His offenses committed against Orthodox and Protestant Christians matched his offense against Catholicism; his imprisonment of the pope and annexation of the Papal States were nothing but “a tyrannical caprice, which lost him the advantage of passing himself off as the restorer of religion.” Deranged by his spectacular military successes, he lacked the moderation and prudence that would have told him to stop at the invasion of Russia; his refusal to heed the danger of the Russian winter, his hyper-modern defiance of nature itself, brought on nature’s just revenge. As a result, “he lost Europe as swiftly as he had seized it.” “He had the world at his feet, and all he got out of it was prison for himself, exile for his family, and the loss of all his conquests as well as a piece of old French territory.” 

    All of these errors “originate in Bonaparte’s shortcomings as a politician.” After making an alliance, he would change its terms, “constantly showing a tendency to take back what he had given, and never letting anyone forget the oppressor for a moment.” After making a conquest, he would move on to the next one, without troubling to reform the regime of his latest nation he had acquired. By so doing, he built not stable ruling institutions but a “poetic edifice of victories, lacking a foundation and kept in the air only by his genius,” and edifice that “fell the moment his genius deserted him.” He wanted to rule the world but “never troubled his head about how to preserve what he ruled.” It is noteworthy that Chateaubriand here identifies exclusively political failures, without recapitulating Bonaparte’s moral flaws. But the moral flaws did cause the political failures: “One of the things that most contributed to rendering Napoleon so repellent in his lifetime was his penchant for debasing everything,” a penchant owing to his “monstrous pride and incessant affectation.” He was an actor, “his own mime.” 

    What, then, motivated him? Libido dominandi, the vice Augustine regards as the Satanic passion. “Domination incarnate” and “dry as a bone,” Bonaparte “had nothing good-natured about him,” finding “within himself no word, only actions—and actions ready to become hostile at the slightest sign of independence.” That is, he had neither philosophic logos nor Christian Logos. He ruined Europe’s legitimate monarchs not to replace them with republics but with himself, with tyranny. True, he came to power initially on the wave of Jacobin ‘republicanism’—itself tyrannical—but to say, as some were doing in the 1840s, that he intended to act as a modern version of the Roman dictator, tyrannizing in order to found or to defend republican regimes, tyrannizing in order to restore liberty, “proves only one thing: how easily reason can be abused.” The same sort of sophistry animates those who pretend that the Terror “was a time of great humanity”; in fact, its leaders called “for the abolition of the death penalty while they were killing half the world.” The same sophism, it might be added, reappeared in the arguments of apologists for the genocidal tyrannies of the twentieth century. 

    Eric Voegelin has asked how it was that the German people allowed themselves to follow Hitler. [4] Chateaubriand addresses that question respecting the French. The French, he maintains, love not freedom but authority. “Equality alone is their idol,” and as Chateaubriand’s nephew, Alexis de Tocqueville, had already seen, “equality and tyranny have secret links.” Napoleon “pleased the French” by exercising military authority and “seat[ing] common people beside him” on the imperial throne. “A proletarian king, he humiliated kings and nobles in his antechambers.” By so inflating the pride and vanity of the French, he quietly set up another aristocracy, one beholden to himself, all the while teaching “us all to worship brute force.” In this he was in truth “the mortal enemy of equality,” the equality he made a show of delivering. “The wrong that true wisdom will never forgive Bonaparte is his having habituated society to passive obedience, driven mankind back to times of moral degradation, and perhaps bastardized human character to such a degree that it is impossible to say when hearts will begin to throb with generous feelings again….Bonaparte has deranged the future.” “The despotism that Bonaparte left hanging in the air will come down and enclose us like a fortress.” 

    Brute force is a false god. Bonaparte sacrificed as many as three million French soldiers to it. To say that today’s generations flourish, that such calamities “were for the salvation of all,” ignores the reality: “He did not make France. France made him.” The justification of Chateaubriand’s memoir may be seen here. “No talent, no eminence will ever induce me to consent to an authority that can, with one word, deprive me of my independence, my home, my friends.” But “without liberty, the world is nothing,” as it “makes life worthwhile.” “Even if I should find myself the last man defending it, I will never cease proclaiming its rights.” By committing “crimes against liberty,” Napoleon committed crimes “against the human race.” 

    The true honor is not in Napoleonic triumphalism but in martyrdom at the hands of that triumphalism. Chateaubriand regards his defense of liberty in his memoir as likely to fail. “The world belongs to Bonaparte,” to the legend of Bonaparte. “What the ravager was unable to conquer, his fame usurps. While alive, he may have failed to win the world, but dead, he possesses it.” As the despot of our memories, reigning as a “fantastical hero” held up by “poets’ whims, soldiers’ estimations, and the people’s stories,” by the “busts and portraits of Napoleon in [French] houses, palaces, cottages.” “Today there is universal agreement we should accept the shackles he throws on us from beyond the grave,” for “how can a free government come into being, when he has corrupted the principle of liberty in the hearts of humanity”? As of the 1840s in France, even in Europe, the authoritative memoirs from beyond the grave are not Chateaubriand’s but Napoleon’s. He acted, spectacularly, allowing the artists and the people to do the rest by telling everyone, including themselves, that his greatness was also goodness, that the soul of libido dominandi must have been a soul of magnanimity, too. “Fortunately for him, he did not write his life. He would have diminished it.”

    On St. Helena, Napoleon eventually “takes to bed and does not rise again.” No Christ, he nonetheless professed on his deathbed, with a crucifix on his chest, “I die in the apostolic and Roman religion, in the bosom of which I was born more than fifty years ago.” That he did not live as he was born and died may be seen in the world he left behind, a world without the Legitimist—Christian and law-governed—monarchies of pre-revolutionary Europe. “The map of the world has changed; we have had to learn a new geography,” a political geography in which, “separated from their legitimate sovereigns, nations have been thrown to rulers picked at random,” picked democratically in the manner Plato’s Socrates’ ascribes to democratic regimes, by a lottery of one sort or another. Thanks to this egalitarianism, “his will be the last of the great individual lives. From now on, nothing will dominate in our minor and equalized societies. Napoleon’s shade will stand alone at the far end of the devastated old world, like the phantom of the deluge at the edge of its abyss.” Eventually, Napoleon’s bones were transferred to Paris, but they “will not reproduce his genius, they will teach his despotism to mediocre soldiers.” Napoleon III comes to mind.

    As he died in exile, Napoleon manifested a glimmer of the magnanimity that had otherwise eluded him. When Chateaubriand wrote an article, saying that “the nations have called Bonaparte a scourge, but God’s scourges retain something of the eternity and grandeur of the divine wrath from which they emanate”—the dry bones the prophet Ezekial hears God promise he will breathe life back into—Napoleon told General Montholon, who accompanied him to St. Helena, that the restored monarchy should have put Chateaubriand in charge of affairs, not Talleyrand and Fouché. “There is no question that all that is great and national must befit his genius,” Napoleon continued; “he would have indignantly rejected the shameful acts of the administration of those days.” And more: “Nature has accorded Chateaubriand a sacred fire,” a prophetic insight, as his works attest. Admitting that Bonaparte’s remarks pandered to his pride, Chateaubriand rightly ventures to remark that “many little men to whom I have rendered eminent services”—surely including Talleyrand, quite possibly Louis XVIII—have “not judged me so favorably as the giant whose power I had dared to attack.”

    It is telling that Bonaparte did not reflect upon what good Chateaubriand might have done him, had the Emperor brought him into his confidence. If Louis could not, owing to his mediocrity—having dismissed Chateaubriand as a worse than useless poet—Napoleon, the embodiment of libido dominandi, perhaps distanced himself out of a need not to reflect. Napoleon restricted his thinking to vulpine calculation. On St. Helena, had he paused, speaking of Louis but thinking of himself, as well? Chateaubriand never suggests it, but it is not impossible. [5]

    He has a larger consideration in mind. “Napoleon brought the era of the past to a close. He made war in such a way, on such a scale, that it no longer interests mankind. He slammed the doors to the Temple of Janus impetuously behind him, and behind those doors he piled up stacks of corpses, so that they would never be opened again.” True, but only in Europe, and only for a hundred years.

    And much more than that. He recalls visiting Cannes, near where Napoleon landed upon returning from Elba. He recalls Saint Honorat, who landed on the nearby Lérins Islands in the fifth century and founded a monastery, inaugurating Christian civilization in France. “Paganism vanished and a new civilization was born in the West.” “Fourteen hundred years later, Bonaparte came to finish that civilization in the very place where the saint had started it.” “The last of an exhausted race,” Chateaubriand could not halt Christendom’s ruin. At most, he slowed it. “Ah, if only I was as carefree as one of those old waterfront Arabs I saw in Africa,” who “while away their final hours watching the beautiful flamingos fly through the azure over the ruins of Carthage.” “Lulled by the murmur of the waves,” like the waves on the beach at Cannes, “they forget their existence and, in a hushed voice, sing a song of the sea: they are going to die.”

     

    Notes

    1. Editor/translator Alex Andriesse marvelously cites the Biblical allusion: “So fight I, not as one that beateth the air” (I Corinthians 9:26).
    2. “It is hard to be born in times of improbity, in days when two men chatting together must be on guard against using certain words for fear of causing offense or making the other man blush.” So then, and so in more recent times, in other countries.
    3. De Gaulle to André Malraux: “What do you think of the Emperor?” Malraux: “A very great mind, and a rather small soul.”
    4. Eric Voegelin: Hitler and the Germans (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999). Reviewed on this website; see “Voegelin, Hitler, and the Germans” in the “Philosophers” section.
    5. Malraux regretted that Chateaubriand did not visit Bonaparte on St. Helena.

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Napoleon and Alexander: Parallel Lives

    July 5, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    François-René de Chateaubriand: Memoirs from Beyond the Grave. Alex Andriesse translation. New York: New York Review Books, 2022.

     

    Napoleon led a life parallel to Alexander the Great—the main difference being, as Chateaubriand has observed, that in modernity it is impossible to pass oneself off as a god. After his victory at Austerlitz over the allied forces of Austria and Russia, Napoleon engaged in badinage with the defeated Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II. “Were such sovereigns worth being slaughtered for?” No, but there was another Alexander, Czar Alexander I, who was worth fighting for. “After the Battle of Austerlitz, almost everything Bonaparte does is in error,” and the Russian Orthodox Christian Czar of Russia, neither a god nor a beast (no emulator of the lion or the fox) exposed those errors. “The designs of Providence were fulfilled no less surely than those of Napoleon: we can see both God and man together on the march,” the one unerring, the other not. If Hegel claimed that the arrival of Napoleon in Prussia in 1806 betokened the appearance of the Absolute Spirit, the Holy Spirit finally marched its rival right back again, a decade later. Although Napoleon reconstructed the burial vaults at the Church of Saint-Denis to house the bodies of “the princes of his race,” not even he would be entombed there. “Man digs the grave, and God fills it.” To write memoirs from beyond the grave means, among other things, to write them from the vantage point of seeing how Providence worked things out. For himself, while Berlin, “this monument of philosophy, was crumbling on the banks of the Spree, I was in Jerusalem, visiting the imperishable monument of religion.”

    More immediately, Austerlitz resulted in the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, Francis II renouncing the imperial throne and becoming the founding emperor of Austria-Hungary as Francis I. With Napoleon the principal emperor of western Europe, having established the Confederation of the Rhine, Prussia would be free to unite the many German states, once Napoleon was disposed of, initiating the geopolitics of twentieth-century Europe. As early as the 1840s, Chateaubriand judged that although “Germany dreamed of political unity…it lacked the political education needed to attain liberty—just as Italy lacked the military education to attain it.” Chateaubriand considered the Confederation of the Rhine “a great unfinished work, which required a good deal of time and a special knowledge of the laws and interests of the nations” to realize, “but it fell quite suddenly to pieces in the mind of the man who had conceived it” because the triumph of Austerlitz turned Napoleon from the task of political founding toward the task of mere conquest. “All that remained of this profound scheme were a military and a fiscal machine,” as “once the genius of his early vision passed, Bonaparte thought of nothing but money and soldiers”: “the tax collector and recruiting officer took the place of the great man.” Even on that level, Providence had other ideas. By barring England from his continental system, Napoleon did help to spur the industrialization of France, Germany Switzerland, and Italy,” as intended, but it also “extended English trade to the rest of the globe,” extending the already formidable British Empire, still recovering from the loss of its North American possession.

    One civil accomplishment Napoleon did undertake successfully was the integration of Jews in his new ‘confederal’ empire (not so confederal, since he selected the rulers of the several nations within it). He did this by calling for the convening of a “Grand Sanhedrin,” in imitation of the Sanhedrin of ancient Israel, consisting of prominent rabbinical and lay Jewish men, charged with establishing laws governing the legal status of Jews; these laws, promulgated in 1808, consisted of a ban on polygamy, permission to intermarry with Gentiles in civil, not religious, ceremonies, and acknowledgment of Jewish-Gentile brotherhood within the nations of the new empire (including the obligation to defend national territories alongside Gentiles). Chateaubriand is having none of this, falsely claiming that the agreement “let the finances of the world go to the stalls of the Jews, and thereby produced a fateful subversion in the social economy.” In fact, the new Sanhedrin banned usurious practices by Jews in their dealings with fellow Jews and Gentiles alike. While the actual intention of this new set of laws was to promote Jewish assimilation (thus setting many German Jews against Orthodox Jews in eastern Europe), settling the so-called ‘Jewish problem’ along Napoleonic lines, Chateaubriand takes it to have been a (failed) attempted preliminary to the empire’s extension into the Holy Land.

    Napoleon and Alexander I met at the Tilsit conference in 1807. They agreed to divide Europe between them, Turkey going to Russia, along with “whatever conquests the Muscovite armies could make in Asia,” while Bonaparte was free to consolidate Italy, take Spain, Portugal, and North Africa, thereby making the Mediterranean a French mare nostrum. In the event, Napoleon’s invasion of Spain diverted troops he would need against Russia in the war he soon would undertake against the czar, whom he believed to be “a fool.” But Alexander was only playing for time, “pretend[ing] to be a conquered prince.” “The politics of the West and the politics of the East did not depart from their usual character.” 

    In Italy, Napoleon attempted to dominate the papacy. “Perhaps it was the moral and religious power of the Holy See that Napoleon feared,” although by his bullying he only enhanced that power. “What drove Napoleon?” Chateaubriand asks, not for the first time. It was “the evil side of his genius, his inability to remain at rest,” the same incapacity that caused him to botch the founding of the Confederation by making it a platform for new conquests. “An eternal gambler, when he wasn’t laying bets on new empires, he was chancing fantasies.” These, Chateaubriand suggests, were fantasies spurred by libido dominandi. “All authority (even the authority of time and faith) not attached to him personally struck the emperor as usurpation.” He failed to “see that by persecuting Pius VII, and thus making himself guilty of pointless ingratitude”—the pope had participated in the ceremony crowning him Emperor—Napoleon “lost the advantage of passing, among Catholic populations, for the restorer of religion.” It is true, Chateaubriand concedes in proper Catholic fashion, that “Rome is always the world’s greatest prize.” Napoleon annexed the Papal States to the French Empire in 1809, a degradation of the papacy numbering among the “miserable outrages of sophomoric philosophy.” But “the lowering of the pontifical flag” and its replacement by the Tricolor “presaged glory and ruins” there, as it would do “in every corner of the world.” When the pope now excommunicated Napoleon, Napoleon had him arrested and imprisoned. “If the iniquitous invasion of Spain turned the political world against Bonaparte, the disagreeable occupation of Rome repulsed the moral world,” as Napoleon “alienated himself from both the nations and the churches, from both man and God.” Pius XII died in French custody. Chateaubriand reminds his readers that this was the pope he had met in the course of his ambassadorial duties in his brief diplomatic career under the Consulate. “May my remembrance of his torments pay the debt of gratitude I owe him for the torments he blessed in Rome, in 1803,” when Chateaubriand was recovering from the loss of Madame de Beaumont.

    In spring of 1809, yet another coalition, this consisting of England, Austria, and Spain, declared its opposition to Napoleon. The allies still did not fully understand the new kind of warfare Napoleon had invented, although they were learning. Chateaubriand calls it “large-scale war,” a notion “inspired by the conquests of the Republic, which had requisitioned the masses.” That is, Napoleon democratized warfare. Instead of small, aristocratic armies, anchored in castles, Napoleon, the man who could not rest, led his armies out into the enemy’s country, “uninterested in retreats” but instead concentrating his troops on a single point in the enemy’s line, breaking it. “This maneuver, which was peculiar to him, was well suited to French fury, but would never have worked with less agile and impetuous soldiers.” But the result of Napoleonic action was European reaction: “When France went to war, Europe, learned to march,” as “the masses have counterbalanced the masses.” Chateaubriand hopes that Europeans will return to “civilized warfare,” warfare “that leaves populations alone while a small number of soldiers do their duty” of defending their country instead of devastating others in “fields of carnage, which ultimately bring about no results commensurate with their calamities.” Looking ahead from the 1840s, Chateaubriand forecasts that “Europe, barring unforeseen events, will be fed up with fighting for a long time to come,” as “Napoleon killed war by blowing it out of proportion.” A long time to come turned out to be a century after Napoleon’s defeat, some seventy years after Chateaubriand wrote his memoirs. Even in the twenty-first century, such restraint seems to need relearning, once a generation that has learned it passes from the scene.

    By marrying the Hapsburg Archduchess Marie Louise in 1810, Bonaparte “obtained the only thing he lacked”: a link to monarchic legitimacy. “He is now, in every sense, master of the ages—if only he had wished to settle at the summit,” from which he could survey a domain of more than 85 million persons, “half the population of Christendom.” His wrongly ordered soul prevented him from so wishing. “While he has the power to stop the world, he does not have the power to stop himself. He will go on until he has conquered the last crown, which gives meaning to all the others, the crown of misfortune.” 

    For “in the depths of his heart, Napoleon had retained a secret enmity for Alexander” of Russia. Russia remained formidable, a possible rival for control of Europe. The peace he had established with the czar was “a peace that Bonaparte’s character could not endure.” “By expanding the boundaries of France, Bonaparte had collided with the Russians, as Trajan, crossing the Danube, had collided with the Goths.” He formed an alliance with Austria and Prussia, while Turkey and Sweden aligned with Russia. In his new empire, “the French no longer recognized each other in the vastness of a country delimited by no natural border.” He had deranged the spirit of the city in his own country, “blinded by his hatred for the liberty of the nations”—his “hatred of constitutional governments [being] invincible.” And he failed to learn the geopolitical lesson of the Great European Plain: “that warlike people who inhabit the plains are condemned to be conquered,” as “all the various invaders of Europe have swooped down on the plains.” If Moses and Mohammad were armed prophets, Napoleon was an “armed poet.” Nero-like, “He wanted to ascend the Kremlin to sing and sign a decree on the theaters”—an allusion, Mr. Andriesse helpfully informs us, not only to Nero’s tyrannical antics but to Napoleon’s contemporaneous reorganization of the Comédie Française.

    In May 1812, Napoleon headed the Conference of Dresden, whose attendees included the nominal rulers of the states composing his empire (“they are fighting over vassalage”). There, the Emperor gathered his polyglot armies for the invasion of Russia—680,000 infantry, 176,850 cavalry. Napoleon, Chateaubriand writes, “addressed himself to Destiny,” his counterpart, Alexander, addressed himself “to Providence.” 

    The Russians refused to engage in the kind of war Napoleon wanted to fight. They retreated, lengthening the French supply lines. Characteristically, “Bonaparte could not restrain himself” pushing forward. “Consumed by his own existence, Bonaparte saw everything in relation to himself; Napoleon had taken possession of Napoleon: there was no longer anything in him but him.” At times, he caught up with the Russians; after the Battle of Kolodrina, “a murderous clash,” “French corpses were buried in haste, so that Napoleon could not measure the enormity of his losses.” September 1812 saw the Battle of Borodino, where Napoleon won a Pyrrhic victory in the bloodiest day of the Napoleonic Wars, seeing some 30,000 French imperial troops killed, wounded, or captured and more than 40,000 Russians taken in defense of their homeland. 

    Russian Field Marshall Mikhail Kutuzov, surrounded himself with Orthodox priests and religious icons. His soldiers prayed before battle, impressing a French officer who witnessed them by their piety, which “reminded me that the greatest of our kings, Charlemagne, also prepared for the most perilous of his undertakings with religious ceremonies.” Many among the French troops, sons of the Revolution, mocked the Russians for doing so, but one officer recalled, “our utter annihilation,” months later, “whose glory they cannot claim, since it was the manifest work of Providence, went to prove…that they had received what they had asked for.” In the battle at hand, however, “the French troops covered themselves with glory and demonstrated their great superiority over the Russian troops,” but “cursed be victories not won in defense of the homeland, which merely serve a conqueror’s vanity!” One of Napoleon’s generals “admitted that, on that important day, he no longer saw any signs of Napoleon’s genius.” As his difficulties mounted (the Russians continued to retreat, evading any decisive battle), Napoleon struggled. “We can find no other explanation for this other than in the very nature of the man. Adversity arrived, and its first touch froze him.” Unlike a Christian, ready to sacrifice, to suffer humiliation and injury, “prosperity alone left him with his faculties intact.”

    “The Russians were withdrawing in good order to Moscow.” When Bonaparte’s army entered, the city’s governor-general, Fyodor Rostopchin, ordered the evacuated capital to be burned, “a decision [that] will go down in history as a heroic decision that saved one nation’s independence and contributed to the liberation of several others.” Chateaubriand concurs with the judgment of Madame de Staël: “This religious city has perished like a martyr whose spilled blood reinvigorates the brethren who survive.” Had Bonaparte seized Moscow, he would have “wrapped the world in his despotism like a mortuary sheet.” In destroying the city before he could do that, the Russians showed that “the rights of humanity come first.” “Speaking for myself, if the earth were an explosive globe, I wouldn’t hesitate to set it on fire were it a question of delivering my country from an oppressor. However, nothing less than the supreme interests of human liberty are needed to induce a Frenchman—his head covered in mourning and his eyes full of tears—to speak of a decision that would prove fatal to so many of his countrymen,” beginning with those who choked on the smoke or were crushed by collapsing arches and buildings. Bonaparte himself could only escape ingloriously “over the coals of a neighborhood that had already been reduced to ash.”

    Bonaparte railed at what he took to be the madness of Rostopchin. “He who fails to understand greatness in another will not understand what it would mean for himself, when the time for sacrifices comes.” As for the czar, “Alexander betrayed no despondency when he learned of his adversities,” instead blessing “the hand that has chosen us to be first among nations in the cause of virtue and liberty.” As always, Chateaubriand understands the way men use words. To speak of God, virtue, and liberty pleases, reassures, and consoles a people. “How superior it is to those affected phrases, sadly scrounged from pagan locutions and defined by fatalism: it was to be they had to be, destiny drags them on!—empty phraseology, which is always barren, even when it refers to the most significant acts.” A century later, Russian rulers would take up exactly such language, and Russia has systematically ruined itself, ever since.

    Having conquered an empty place, Bonaparte turned to the thought of attacking St. Petersburg. “Such were the new chimeras that filled Napoleon’s head”—chimeras, since “it is not possible to subjugate a nation whose last stronghold is the North Pole.” “The man was on the brink of madness, yet his dreams were still those of a great mind.” As he drew up his new plans, he lingered at Moscow, despite the threat of the Russian winter. “By delaying these few days”—thirty-five, to be precise—he “was sentencing the 100,000 men left to him to death.” 

    As he finally retreated from Moscow, the Russians counterattacked, cutting off his escape route. Passing back over one battlefield, the French saw that “the birds of the sky had not finished eating what we had sown when we passed that way again.” Kutuzov pursued, leisurely. “Just wait until the snow comes.” At Borodino, “a vast scene of butchery lay before them, with forty thousand corpses in various stages of decay.” Would they “soon be like the companions whose remains they had seen”? But Napoleon, “indifferent to the miseries of his soldiers, cared for nothing but his own interests.” One of his officers asked, “Is this the civilization we’re bringing to Russia?” Chateaubriand remarks, “When you have committed a reproachable act, Heaven imposes on you the sanction of witnesses.” With Napoleon, Chateaubriand himself is the most eloquent among them. “The Russian expedition was a true extravagance, which all the civil and military authorities of the Empire had condemned.”

    And what of the Russian dead? Who remembers them? “Who thinks of the peasants left behind in Russia? Are those rustics glad to have been at ‘the great battle beneath the walls of Moscow’? Perhaps I am the only one who, on autumn evenings, watching the birds of the north wheel high in the sky remembers that they have seen our countrymen’s graves.” Now that industrial companies have taken over that land, “with their furnaces and boilers,” the bones of the French “have been converted to animal black. That is what we are doing with the dead nowadays! These are the sacred rites of the new religion!”

    Concurrent with this long retreat, a coup attempt failed in Paris, a sign of Napoleon’s waning authority. “The rights that Napoleon had founded on force were being destroyed, along with his forces, by Russia, while in the capital all it took was one man to cast them into doubt. Outside of religion, justice, and freedom, there are no rights at all”—none, that is, that can be secured. As for Napoleon himself, he took care to leave his troops behind, just after declaiming that he would never do so. After all, “Can I remain at the head of a rout?” Not if I am Napoleon. His great cavalry commander, Joachim Murat, lamented, “It is no longer possible to serve a madman. We are no longer safe with him. Not a prince in Europe believes his words or his treaties.” Indeed, “the European defection had begun.”

    The French Senate nonetheless ‘doubled down,’ providing another quarter of a million men under Napoleon’s command. But Napoleon could no longer overawe the Legitimists. Louis XVIII issued a proclamation “that would later be set down in a constitutional charter—the first hopes of liberty, which came to us from our ancient kings.” Czar Alexander addressed his own proclamation not to the French but to all of Europe: “May there soon be nothing left of the bloodthirsty colossus who has threatened the continent with his endless criminality but a long-abiding memory of horror and pity!” And the pope repudiated the so-called Concordat of 1813, whereby Napoleon would have increased his power over the Church, thus “giving the signal to depose the oppressor of nations.” For his part, “Bonaparte declared that he had always wanted peace and that the world was in need of it. But this world no longer had any wish to serve him.” More, it wished to overthrow him, as England’s Duke of Wellington, “the fatal man,” opened a new front in the west of France and the “Young Germany” movement, spurred by the philosophy professor Johann Gottlieb Fichte, brought Prussian forces to bear on the side of Russia, marching to patriotic verses “full of religious feeling and sincere human nature that sang of God, loyalty, and Germany.” “The man whose life was a dithyramb in action fell only when the poets of Young Germany had sung and taken up the sword against their rival, Napoleon, the poet of arms,” who had claimed that he made his battle plans out of the dreams of his sleeping soldiers. Czar Alexander “shared their lofty sentiments, and he was in a position powerful enough to make their dreams a reality,” but eventually would allow himself “to be scared by the fearful monarchs around him,” who, unlike French Legitimists, did not want liberty, that is, constitutional monarchy. The absolutists of the Holy Alliance would deny political liberty to post-Napoleonic Europe, eventually bringing on the revolutions of 1848 in the years immediately after Chateaubriand wrote these words.

    Reinforced, Napoleon careened on, losing the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813 and watching as Allied forces advanced across the Rhine in December. When the French legislature dared to tell him that he should restore political liberty to the country, he replied, while closing the legislature, “Do you wish to restore the sovereignty of the people? Very well, in that case, I declare myself the people, for I claim to be where sovereignty resides, now and forever.” Chateaubriand contents himself by remarking, “Never has a despot so emphatically explained his nature.” 

    Not Napoleonic ‘Destiny’ but divine Providence “had changed the fortunes of the world.” Napoleon departed for the eastern front while Pius VII, now liberated, made his triumphal return to the Vatican, “making his way amid hymns and tears, to the sound of bells and cries of ‘Long live the pope! Long live the head of the Church!'” Protestants turned out, saying, “Here is the greatest man of his age,” a living martyr. “Such is the greatness of true Christian society,” Chateaubriand writes, “where God ceaselessly mingles with men. Such is the superiority of the power of the weak, sustained by religion and adversity, over the power of the sword and the scepter.” 

    Chateaubriand himself had his own, literary, card to put down. He wanted the French to rise up against Napoleon before the foreign troops could defeat and overthrow him, to restore the Bourbon monarchy with institutions “modified to suit the times”—that is, institutions ensuring political liberty rather than the absolutism of Louis XIV, which Napoleon had attempted to revive. In the struggle of rival regimes that would wrack his country for a century and a half to come, Chateaubriand opposed radical, Jacobin republicanism, Napoleonic despotism, and socialism in defense of constitutional monarchy, a regime strong enough to defend France from foreign enemies (which would soon see a united Germany at the forefront) without engaging in wars of conquest, while maintaining domestic tranquility under the rule of law and of Christian, especially Catholic, moral authority. He made his argument in a pamphlet, Bonaparte et des Bourbons, but it was too late for any insurrection to stop the Allied armies. 

    “The war came and installed itself outside the gates of Paris”—the first time in centuries that “Paris had seen the smoke of enemy camps.” Defeated once again, Napoleon had returned to the capital, “leaving behind him the immense inferno of his pointless conquests.” Ever-scheming Talleyrand wanted to get rid of him and to replace him with the regency of Marie-Louise which of course he would head. It was too late for his schemes, as well. Paris surrendered on March 31, 1814, “within ten days of the anniversary of the Duc d’Enghien’s death.” Recalling Napoleon’s vicious injuries to Russia, Christian Czar Alexander refused vengefulness. “I am a just man, and I know that the French people are not to blame. The French are my friends, and I want to prove to them that I come to return good for evil. Napoleon is my only enemy.” He extended his protection over Paris, respecting “all its public institutions,” quartering only so many troops there as to guarantee civil order while the French “secure for yourself a government that will give peace to France and Europe both.” Not long after, having seen that “order, peace, and moderation reigned throughout” the city, “Alexander departed, leaving us our masterworks”—unlike Napoleon, he plundered no paintings or statues from the country he had conquered—and “our liberty, set down in the charter—a liberty we owed to his intelligence as well as to his influence.” “Chief of two supreme authorities, an autocrat of the sword and the church, Alexander alone, of all the sovereigns of Europe” (very much including the deposed Napoleon) “understood that France had reached an age of civilization at which she could only be governed under a free constitution.” The Czar “considered himself merely an instrument of Providence and claimed nothing for himself.” When Louis XVIII entered Paris, Alexander kept out of sight. Most beautifully, when told by a Frenchman that his arrival had “long been waited and wished for,” he replied, “I would have come sooner, had French valor not delayed me.” In all, “he appeared to be astonished by his triumph; his almost tender gaze wandered over a population he seemed to consider superior to himself,” “as if he felt he was a barbarian in our midst, as a Roman might have felt ashamed in Athens.” 

    It was at this point that the Chateaubriand’s pamphlet did have some good effect. Napoleon still had “more than forty thousand of the best soldiers on earth surround[ing] him,” and for his part, ever-scheming Talleyrand hoped to place the French crown on the four-year-old Napoleon II (as a former revolutionary, “he dreaded the Bourbons”), a policy consistent with Bonaparte’s own stated desire at the time. With the publication of Bonaparte et les Bourbons, “I flung myself headlong into the fray” in “an effort to tip the scales” in favor of Legitimacy. Later, Louis XVIII said that “my pamphlet was more advantageous than an army of a hundred thousand men,” and even Bonaparte allowed that “I have no reason to reproach Chateaubriand; he resisted me when I was still in power.” Chateaubriand courteously returns, “My admiration for Bonaparte has always been great and sincere, even when I was attacking him with all my might,” although cautioning his readers that the uncritical admiration of the Emperor among those who no longer remember the sufferings he inflicted during his years of tyranny distort the past and threaten France’s future. Like Alexander, Chateaubriand wants a life of Christian humility without personal or national humiliation, for himself and for his countrymen, and for the men of every country. 

    Such a life had been impossible under the regime of Napoleon. Under it, we French “no longer mattered.” “Everything belonged to Bonaparte: I have ordered, I have won, I have spoken; my eagles, my crown, my blood, my family, my subjects.” Even under the pseudo-republican oligarchy of the Jacobins, “we did not have the shame of being the property of a man,” and no foreigner invaded us, thanks to the valor and sacrifice of our own men. “Despite his enormous acquisitions,” Napoleon “succumbed not because he was defeated, but because France no longer wanted him. An important lesson! Let it never be forgotten that there is a germ of death in everything that offends human dignity.”

    The French would re-learn this lesson in the 1940s. To that generation, Chateaubriand still spoke: “God, in His patient eternity, sooner or later brings justice to bear. In those moments when Heaven appears to sleep, it is a fine thing that honest men look on with disapproval, for this disapproval remains as a rein on absolute power. May France never repudiate the noble souls who cried out against her servitude when all were prostrate, when there were so many advantages to remaining prostrate, so many graces to receive in exchange for flattery, so many persecutions to reap for sincerities sown.”

    In the end, Talleyrand got what he really wanted: power for himself. He negotiated with Alexander for permission to form a provisional government with himself as its president, even as he adroitly switched to backing the Bourbon Restoration. “From that moment forward, M. de Talleyrand seemed to be the arbiter of the world; his parlors became centers of negotiation.” Chateaubriand issues his riposte. “The first acts of the Restoration were entrusted to the barren Bishop of Autun.” [1] Alluding to the likelihood that Talleyrand owed his physical condition to syphilis, Chateaubriand remarks, “He infected this Restoration with sterility and passed on to it a germ of dishonor and death.” 

    Napoleon abdicated in April 1814. Departing for what would be only his first exile, at the island of Elba, Napoleon continued to hold Louis XVIII less legitimate than himself, since Louis was elected by the “lowly Senate,” while Napoleon had been chosen by “the unanimous wish of the people.” That he now departed in accordance with the nearly unanimous wish of the people he preferred not to notice. Chateaubriand, it is scarcely necessary to say, does.

    Chateaubriand concludes his assessment of Napoleon’s character. “Bonaparte cannot be judged according to the rules we apply to the great geniuses, for he lacked magnanimity.” Unlike the great-souled man of Aristotle’s Ethics, Bonaparte could expand or condense his soul as conditions warranted. “Like the rebel angel, he could shrink his immeasurable mass down and fit himself into a measurable space; his ductility permitted him both salvation and rebirth,” enabling him to live in exile on an island and then return to France in a final attempt to regain his empire. “Changing his manners and costume at will, flawless in comedy and tragedy alike, he was an actor who could look natural under the tunic of a slave or the mantle of a king.” As such, he “was, in one person, all things great and miserable in man”—a consummate Machiavellian prince, waging a futile war against God and nature alike.

     

    Note

    1. Talleyrand, an ordained priest, had risen to the station of Bishop of Autun by the eve of the French Revolution. He quickly metamorphosed into an open scoffer at religion, earning excommunication. Reinstated as a member of the Church at the beginning of the century, he was laicized by Pius VII in 1802, an act very much in line with prudential reasoning on the Pope’s part.

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    • « Previous Page
    • 1
    • …
    • 46
    • 47
    • 48
    • 49
    • 50
    • …
    • 244
    • Next Page »