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    Personalism

    August 6, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Emmanuel Mounier: Personalism. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952.

     

    “A philosophy but not a system,” Personalism refuses to trap human beings into any comprehensive determinism, whether natural, historical, or religious. “The existence of free and creative persons” is “its central affirmation,” but neither is it Nietzschean. Although versions of Personalism may include agnosticism, Mounier affirms Christian Personalism. Morally and politically, Christian Personalism beckons men to “the adventure of responsible liberty.” It posits a paradox that needs resolution: that “the personal is the mode of existence proper to man” but it “has ceaselessly to be attained.” It participates in “the human struggle to humanize humanity” against those who would dehumanize it, as the scientific manipulators of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World attempt to do. Personalism comports with the Bible’s personal God, not the ‘god of the philosophers,’ whether Aristotelian or Spinozist. It is not alien to some of the philosophers, however, as Socrates’ “‘Know thyself’ is the first great personalist revolution of which we know” and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics follows in the wake of that adjuration.

    Still, “it is Christianity that, first of all, imports into these gropings a decisive notion of the person.” God “through love brings [persons] into existence,” creating the world ex nihilo and peopling it with individuals, each of whom has an “eternal destiny.” He unifies the world, makes it a cosmos, not “through the abstraction of an idea but by an infinite capacity for the individual multiplication of these separate acts of love.” This metaphysic so scandalized the world that Averroës attempted to return to generality, to abstraction, to depersonalization—to the notion of “one common soul for the whole human race.” But “the individual soul is not a crossroads where several participations in general realities meet (matter, ideas, etc.) but an indissoluble whole, in which the unity is prior to the multiplicity because it is rooted in the absolute,” by which Mounier means the God of the Bible and (emphatically) not Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. (Indeed, “Hegel remains the imposing and monstrous architect of all the imperialism of the impersonal idea,” an empire that demands that we “believe in complete subservience of the individual to the State.”)  No “abstract tyranny of a Destiny,” no Platonic or neo-Platonic “heaven of ideas,” no “Impersonal Though indifferent” to individuals and their “destinies”: the personal God “grant[s] man a freedom analogous to his own, by his readiness to be generous to the generous,” to be gracious.

    God’s grace forces no one. Rather, “the profound purpose of human existence is not to assimilate itself to the abstract generality of Nature or of the Ideas, but to change  “the heart of its heart,” to convert, to undertake a ‘turning around’ of the soul, a “personal choice” made in “the inviolable domain which no one can judge and of which nobody knows, not even the angels, but God alone,” a transformation to which “man is freely called,” given that “liberty is constitutive of his existence as a creature.” Human liberty entails the freedom to sin, as well, the freedom of a man to “refuse his destiny”; otherwise, the choice wouldn’t be real. 

    This inviolability, this “absoluteness of the person” does not isolate him from the world or from other persons. The Trinity itself, the very structure of God (as it were) suggests “an intimate dialogue between persons, and is of its very essence the negation of solitude.” Since “every human being is created in the image of God, every person is called to the formation of one immense Body, mystical and physical, in the charity of Christ.” That is the commonality underlying human individuality, the commonality that makes human beings persons, not atoms. Mystical and physical: Mounier rejects Christian neo-Platonism of the Middle Ages, which in his estimation “hampered full reaffirmation, by the Albertino-Thomist realism, of the dignity of matter and the unity of the human being” as a being created in God’s image and thereby as a person. Glimmers of Personalism, proto-personalism, may be seen in various ways in Occam, Luther, Descartes, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Rousseau in their several critiques of “scholastic decadence,” although Descartes also “bequeaths to us, in his Cogito, the germs of the idealism and metaphysical solipsism,” while Pascal and Kierkegaard succumb to a “lofty and solitary religion” that isolates them from human beings. As a result, “what one might call the Socratic revolution of the XIXth century, the fight against all those modern forces that tend to depersonalize man,” seen in Kierkegaard’ spirituality and Marx’s dialectical materialism—each a rebellion against Hegel but also a failure truly to overcome him—has led to a sharp duality between spirit and matter which Christian Personalism seeks to restore to the harmony God intends. [1]

    Not dualism but “the indissoluble union of the soul and the body is the pivot of Christian thinking.” Christianity teaches that thought, soul, the divinely granted breath of life “fuse[s] with the body in existence.” When soul and body strive wrongly, in “the direction opposed to the supernatural vocation of man,” the “destiny” of man, Christianity calls that ‘the flesh’ (not to mention the world and the Devil). The flesh causes a “downward drag” of both body and soul, but when this unity, this person, “collaborate[s]” with the power of the Holy Spirit, it reaches out to “the substantial kingdom of God,” not “some ethereal realm of spirit.” That is, the Kingdom of God will see us not only in renewed souls but in new bodies. “The Christian who speaks of the body or of matter with contempt does so against his own most central tradition,” partaking not of the Gospel but of “the Greek contempt for the material,” transmitted us “under false Christian credentials.” Man is indeed incarnate, but he was so before the Fall, not only after it. His incarnation “is an abiding occasion of perversity,” not perversity per se. (While Marxism correctly regards material poverty as “an aberration,” one that needs correction of “the development of humanity,” that correction will not end all other kinds of aberration, “even upon the natural plane.” Marxism “is a kind of secularization of the central value that the Christian tradition claims for work.”) To exist subjectively and to exist bodily “are one and the same experience,” inasmuch as “I cannot think without being and I cannot be without my body.”

    “If we are to render an account of humanity, we must grasp the living reality of man in his total activity.” Unlike other animals, man knows the cosmos and transforms it and, moreover, is capable of loving his neighbor and of loving cooperation with God, understanding both neighbor and God as persons. He can do this not only because he has a soul but because his body itself “takes me constantly outside of myself into the problems of the world and the struggles of mankind,” “pushes me out into space”; my body ages, thus “acquaint[ing] me with duration,” and, because it dies, “confront[ing] me with eternity.” “We bear the weight of [the body’s] bondage,” but we must never ignore that “it is also the basis of all consciousness and of all spiritual life, the omnipresent mediator of the life of the spirit.” This constrained liberty, this liberty limited by an incomplete bondage, perfects itself in struggle. “The right road for man is in this tragic optimism, where he finds his true destiny in a goal of greatness through unending struggle,” with no ‘end of history’ to be delivered by impersonal forces of nature or of history.

    Mounier carefully distinguishes personalism from individualism, “the ideology and the prevailing structure of Western bourgeois society in the 18th and 19th centuries,” which conceives of “Man in the abstract, unattached to any natural community, the sovereign lord of a liberty unlimited and undirected; turning towards others with a primary mistrust, calculation and self-vindication; institutions restricted to the assurance that these egoisms should not encroach upon one another, or to their betterment as a purely profitmaking association.” So defined, individualism “is the very antithesis of personalism, and its dearest enemy” because it denies that “the fundamental nature of the person is not originality nor self-knowledge nor individual affirmation.” Personalism affirms not “separation but communication” whereby the individual “make[s] himself available…and thereby more transparent both to himself and to others,” more gracious. Far from limiting the person, as ‘individualists’ suppose, other persons enable each person “to be and to grow.” Borrowing Martin Buber’s language, Mounier affirms that “the thou, which implies the we, is prior to the I—or at least accompanies it.” Failure of communication diminishes me. To avoid such failure, including the corruption of communication seen in lying, sophistry, and rhetorical domination, one must stand ready to go outside of oneself; to see others from their point of view; to share in their destinies, joys, and sorrows, to be liberal in the original sense of the word, generous (“an economics of donation, not of compensation nor of calculation”); and to be faithful in “devotion to the person” in “love and friendship.” “Love is the surest certainty that man knows; the one irrefutable, existential cogito (I love, therefore I am); therefore being is, and life has value (is worth the pain of living).” What “shakes me out of my self-assurance, my habits, my egocentric torpor” is what “most surely reveals me to myself.”

    That is, love as agape dislocates as it rewards. Communication is difficult. Misunderstandings happen. Even when they don’t, “there is something in us that deeply opposes every movement toward reciprocity, the kind of fundamental ill-will that we have already mentioned.” Other persons aren’t easy to understand, given the “irreducible opacity about our very manner of existing.” Forming a community—whether a family, a nation, or a religious community—tempts us into “a new egocentricity of its own,” a collective selfishness and shutting-out. While the person “cannot be duplicated or repeated,” he also cannot fully realize his personhood without “the world of persons,” and that goes for communities, too. This means that “there must be some common factor,” some “abiding human nature,” a point that “contemporary thought” inclines to reject in favor of existentialism, historicism, conventionalism, or some other such claim. Contemporary thought “rejects the conception of ‘human nature’ as a prejudice that would limit” the possibilities of human achievement, typically claim that “every man is nothing but what he makes himself.” But personalism, whether Christian or agnostic, affirms “the unity of mankind, both in space and time.” It opposes “the totalitarians’ denigration of political adversaries” because “any man, however different, or even degraded, remains a man.” “This sense of humanity as one and indivisible is strictly implicit in the modern notion of equality,” although many egalitarians don’t recognize that. 

    That includes egalitarian ‘idealists,’ who would abolish property. “Man must on no account play at being pure spirit,” however. He needs property, “a certain range of objects, with which [he] can form relations of intimacy somewhat like those that it seeks with other persons, relations of frequency and of long duration.” ‘To be’ and ‘to have’ are not mutually exclusive but “opposites between which our embodied existence is held in tension.” Embodied existence makes it impossible “to be without having”; it also requires a man “to give up [his] isolation, to ‘bear with’ something. The tension comes when he refuses to act generously with what he has, but to do so he must have things in the first place. “Moral idealism is not uncommonly the quest for an existence freed at last from any burden whatever: an aspiration opposed to nature which can end only in ruin, or in anti-humanity.” Rather, “concentrating in order to find oneself; then going forth to enrich and to find oneself again concentrating oneself anew through dispossession; such is the systole and the diastole of the personal life, an everlasting quest for a unity foretold and longed for but never realized.” And while “mystics of personality” forget that their persons are embodied “in the world,” “politicians of the person” incline to think of themselves beings in need of defensive walls against all others. Neither can be a hero, who risks himself in battle, or “a lover giving himself for love,” or a saint “inspired by love for his God.” They are too focused on their own interiority for any of that. 

    A true person must ready himself for struggle. “To be a presence in the world is not easy! I am lost if I flee from it, I am also lost if I give myself up to it,” failing sometimes “to say no, to protest, to break away.” “Experience demonstrates that there is no value that is not born of conflict or established without struggle, from the political order to social justice, from sexual love to human unity, or, for Christians, to the Kingdom of God.” Mounier’s person strikes a balance, recognizing that “the machines, the masses, the ruling powers, administration, the universe itself and its forces present themselves to him increasingly as a general menace,” inviting him to succumb to “a kind of social paranoia,” while also recognizing that “love is a struggle,” life ” struggle against death,” spiritual life “a struggle against the inertia of matter and the sloth of the body”—a call for engagement in that very modern world. Christians call for the virtue of fortitude, whose “great aim” is to “overcome the fear of bodily evil,” the “fear of being hit,” still another manifestation of individualism or perhaps merely selfishness equally opposed to liberality and magnanimity. “In modern conditions of comfort and of indulgent care for the feelings, we have long cultivated, under the cover of philosophies of love and of peace, the most monstrous misunderstandings of these elementary truths,” which incline to deny not the wrong use of force but the use of any force at all. On the contrary, “rights themselves are an always precarious effort to rationalize force and incline it towards the rule of love.” Immoral violence must be confronted by violence, Mounier writes, a few years after the Second World War, an event which brought that point to one’s attention. “To try to eradicate aggressiveness altogether from education, or too early to swamp the virile energies of youth in idealistic hopes—this is less likely to realize any ideal than to spoil the fighters for it.” Education entails cultivation, and “to cultivate means to sacrifice”—to weed out, to prune. “Every organization, every technique, every doctrine which tends to deny or diminish this fundamental vocation of the person to exercise responsible choice, whatever advantages it may offer, is a poison more dangerous than despair”; “the most solemn declarations of Rights are speedily transgressed in a state that contains too few men of indomitable character to confirm them, or social structures too weak to guarantee their realization.”

    This emphasis on the wholeness of human life, the integration of all its elements into the person, precludes any strict dualism. “As soon as one isolates freedom from the whole structure of the person, it tends toward some aberration.” And while it is true that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, “the indeterminism of modern physics,” refutes materialist determinism, “it does no more” than that. “If freedom were merely an irregularity in the working of the universe, who could prove that it was not reducible to a defect in our perception, or even to some systematic distortion in nature or in man?” Human freedom “is the freedom of a person, moreover of this person,” a naturally constituted and therefore limit being, “situated in the world and in the presence of definite values.” “To be free is, in the first place, to accept this position and base oneself upon it,” exercising choice and accepting the sacrifices choice requires, given our ‘givens’ of body, space, time. “He who is blind to his servitude is the only real slave, even if he is a happy one.” By “values” Mounier means not the arbitrary and/or conventional claims people make when they say that they, or ‘society,’ ‘places a value’ on some thing or some act. Real liberty means “liberation to choose the good,” to be a “responsible man.” Freedom is “the mode and manner in which the person is everything that it is”—its fully developed nature. In this, Christian personalism shows its affinities to Christian Aristotelianism.

    And this is a Christian Aristotelianism. It is not mere vitalism, inasmuch as “the life-force never prompts us to anything other than itself,” tempting us to refuse “to accept suffering and death” because animated by “the passion for life at any price.” Not so: as the Personalist Gabriel Marcel writes, “I am more than my life,” more than my biological existence. That is the Christlike stance, but also the stance of the self-described ‘anti-Christ,’ Friedrich Nietzsche. The difference is that, like Christ, and unlike Nietzsche with his amor fati, Personalists “cannot willingly surrender the person to anything impersonal,” instead “deduc[ing] all values from the unique appeal of the one supreme Person.” To those who demand proof “of the transcendent,” Mounier replies, simply that “the transcendent, being inherent in the universe of freedom, is not susceptible of proof,” which requires firm predictability; its only verification “is manifested in the fullness of the personal life.” A person isn’t “tied to a given position like a horse hobbled to a post” but one who can “survey the universe from the angle of his own position, and indefinitely to lengthen to the bonds by which he is attached to it.” The “values” or principles by which he governs his conduct are independent of “the peculiarities of a given subject”—not ‘subjective’ in the sense moral subjectivists propound—but “they are subjective in the sense that they exist only in relation to subjects, that they have to be reborn through persons, yet without being bound to any one of them, mediating between all, drawing them out of their isolation and relating them to the universal”—ultimately, the supreme Person. It is true that “God remains silent; all that is of value in the world is steeped in silence.” What is ruinous is steeped in noise and distraction: “the modern techniques of degradation—financial trickery, bourgeois complaisance and political intimidation”—all “more deadly than weapons of war.” [2]

    The Personalist theory of knowledge is rational without being rationalist, not an attempt to find a purely objective truth reducible to logical syllogisms. Spinoza, Adam Smith, and other modern philosophers aspire to a universality that “is not that of a world of persons,” either by attempting to “eliminate the spectator,” the one looking at the world, “in order to uphold the preeminence of the idea” or by positing “an ‘objective’ spectator, one who explains all things, understands all things, and admits everything.” Mounier calls this “the internal weakness in liberalism,” one that Nietzsche saw; “the knowing spirit is not a neutral mirror” but one “linked with a body and a history, called to a destiny, and involved in the situation by all its actions, including its acts of knowledge.”. But this is not to concur with Nietzsche’s attack on objectivity itself and his consequent valorization of the will-to-power. Science has its place, so long as one understands what it can and cannot do. “There is no valid reflection which does not give full weight to scientific knowledge,” but science cannot tell us anything about God, except the impersonal ‘god of the philosophers.’ A person who seeks truth must do what Plato’s Socrates (no mean logician) demands in his allegory of the cave: a conversion, a turning-around of the soul. To link oneself to transcendence and to communication with others requires “the recognition of objectivity,” the fact that there are other persons ‘out there,’ along with the impersonal objects of nature and art. Engagement is no solipsism. “A complete logic needs to formulated upon this basis”; Mounier refers his readers to his Treatise on Character for the beginnings of such a logic. Such a conversion is as necessary in morality as in epistemology. “The moral ‘cogito’ develops through suffering,” through engagement not only with one’s own faults but with other faulty persons. 

    More generally, the whole field of action or engagement “presupposes freedom.” Action has four “dimensions”: poesis or making, behavior, “contemplative action,” and “collective action.” Making aims at “dominat[ing] and organiz[ing] external matter.” It requires ‘economy,’ that is, industriousness and efficiency. “But man has no satisfaction in fabrication and organization unless he finds in them his own dignity, the fraternity of his fellow-workers, and some fulfilment above that of utility.” That is, economy requires “the guidance of politics, which relates” its problems “to ethics.” “It is at the level of politics that an economy becomes personalized and its personnel institutionalized.” Behavior or ethical action thus requires a politics that treats human persons as persons, not as instruments. (In this, Mounier taps into not only Existentialist ‘authenticity’ but Kant’s refusal to treat human beings as means to an end rather than as ends in themselves, although as a Christian he insists that treating human beings only as ends in themselves is an attempt to bypass God.) “Contemplative action” means an action not of the mind alone but of the whole person, the Socratic and Christian conversion just mentioned, aiming at “perfection and universality, but by way of finite works and particular actions.” Far from denigrating theory in the attempt to exalt praxis, Mounier observes that “the highest mathematical speculations, the least directly useful…have found the most fruitful applications, and at the same time the most unforeseen.” The same is true of “the two centuries of theological controversy which established the full significance of the Incarnation of Christ,” speculations that “also founded the only fully activist and industrial civilizations.” Further, contemplation may more directly disrupt “existing practice” by action “of the type that we call prophetic,” by “affirm[ing] the absolute in all its trenchancy, by speech, writing or behavior, when its meaning has been blunted by compromises.” Finally, collective action affirming “the community of labor, a common destiny or spiritual community” must never “confuse engagement with regimentation,” as seen in fascism and communism, with their “systems and dogmatisms.” In all of its dimensions, action as personal engagement meets the scorn of fanatics, who despise its hesitation to act without thinking and of politicians who “reproach it as intractable because it never forgets claims that are absolute.” “But courage lies in acceptance of these inconvenient conditions.” 

    Mounier criticizes modern education as “the worst possible preparation” for a culture of Personalism. “The universities distribute formal knowledge which predisposes men to ideological dogmatism or, by reaction, to sterile irony” and “spiritual educators” often “base moral edification upon scrupulousness and moral casuistry instead of the cultivation of decision,” of responsible choice in the real world. “The whole climate of education needs to be changed if we no longer want to see, on the plane of action, intellectuals who set an example of blindness and men of conscience who inculcate cowardice.”

    “European nihilism,” impelled by the critiques of modern rationalism as seen in the way of life of “the bourgeois world” delivered by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, all deniers of Hegel’s claim to have constructed a philosophic system that marks the end of history because it marks “the end of philosophy,” of philosophizing, of the love of wisdom, the ever-renewed reasoned quest for the truth, “is spreading and organizing its forces in every field left vacant by the retreat of those substantial beliefs which kept our fathers in heart—the Christian faith, the culture of science, of reason and of duty.” Mounier identifies “the great question of the twentieth century” as whether the century “can avoid that dictation by the technocrats, either from the right or the left, which loses sight of man in the organizing of his activities.” Mounier knows what he doesn’t want: “the proletarian condition,” the “anarchic economy of property,” “state monopoly,” and paternalism. He wants “the priority of labor over capital,” abolition of “class distinctions founded upon the division of labor or of wealth,” and “an economy directed to the fulfilment of the totality of personal needs.” He is less sure of how to achieve these ends. Precisely as a Personalist, he must leave such things open to choices made in the future.

    He does offer some preliminary reflections. “Politics is not an end in itself, overruling all other aims,” since “the State is meant for man, not man for the State.” Nevertheless, “if politics is not everything, it enters into everything.” Anarchists are mistaken to think that “power wielded by man over man” cannot be reconciled with “the interpersonal relation,” and this is the core of Mounier’s complaint about liberalism, as well; it is too antipolitical. “Anarchism and liberalism forget that since man’s personality is deeply rooted in the natural world it is impossible to exercise power over things without exercising some constraint over man.” But fascism and other forms of absolutism (he pointedly overlooks communism) ham-handedly reject “authority,” by which he means “the final destiny of the person, which power ought to respect and promote.” To do that, power must be used to protect the person “against abuses of power” with a constitution that limits the powers of the State including its police powers, institutes federalism, permits citizens to appeal decisions of the State, establishes an independence of the judiciary, and asserts the right of habeas corpus. Calls for “democracy” must define that term. Mounier defines it as “a form of government erected upon the spontaneity of the masses in order to ensure their participation as subjects in the objective structure of powers”—Aristotle calls that “ruling and being ruled in turn”—a form that prevents “the ‘mob-rule’ at one extreme”—the excesses of the French Revolution seldom drift far from the minds of French political writers—or “the irremovable one-party State at the other”—both “but different forms of irresponsible tyranny.” The “spontaneity of the masses” can be registered through representative government, itself informed by “political education,” typically undertaken by the political parties. With the parliamentary regime of the Fourth Republic now established, Mounier is predictably dissatisfied with the current parties. “Political democracy needs to be wholly reorganized in relation to an effectual economic democracy adapted to the contemporary systems of production.” And although “the Marxist criticism of formal democracy is on the whole unanswerable,” as a Christian Mounier also tacitly rejects real, existing Communism, with its “divinized” Leader and Party. In modern life, “all the regulative ideals that are set forth in the ‘phenomenology’ of religion come back again in novel cults and in generally debased forms, decidedly retrograde in comparison with those of Christianity, precisely because the personal universe and its requirements are eliminated.” 

    Mounier hopes that someday “there will no longer be any need to direct attention” to the personal character of human beings and of God, a time when this “will have become the common and accepted knowledge of the situation of mankind.” The Christianity of the Bible prophesies that this will only occur with divine intervention at the end of days. Mounier’s ‘Left’ Catholicism inclines to forget that, although it nobly offers resources with which Christians might endure the interim.

     

    Note

    1. Leo Strauss regards this dualism as inherent in modern philosophy itself, seen first in Machiavelli’s invitation to the prince to master Fortuna, and in Bacon’s analogous invitation to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate.
    2. It is noteworthy that Mounier’s journal, Esprit, became the voice of an anti-American, ‘Left’ Catholicism after World War II. That is, he clearly regarded liberalism as a more insidious threat to France and to humanity generally than Marxism, although that did not commit himself to adherence regimes of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat.’ See Seth D. Armus: “The Eternal Enemy: Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit and Franch Anti-Americanism.” (French Historical Studies, Volume 24, Number 2, Spring 2001, pp.271-304.)

     

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Miriam Winter, the Person

    July 30, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Miriam Winter: Trains: A Memoir of a Hidden Childhood during and after World War II. Jackson, Michigan: Kelton Press, 1997.

     

    ‘The Jew’: a stock figure in European theater, an abstraction. Miriam Winter: a person who was Jewish. Her memoir of her childhood in hiding from the Nazi, under an assumed identity, a fake name, chronicles not only or even primarily her survival—about which her feelings were tortured—but her struggle to rediscover her real identity, her individuality, the personhood she needed to uncover under a layer of salvific lies. “Lies saved my life during the war, and I didn’t stop lying when the war ended.” 

    “My name in hiding was Marysia Kowalska, but my real name was Miriam Winter…. until the fall of 1941,” when the Nazis took Lodz under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact partitioning Poland, “I was a daughter, a granddaughter, a sister, a niece, and we lived like a string of beads, always together. Then, the string broke, and I wasn’t called Mirka anymore.” Mirka is a child’s nickname but also a name of endearment. (My own mother, Rose Wacyra, one of nine children born to a young Polish couple who had moved from Galicia to Cliffwood, New Jersey in 1900, recalled a Jewish lady who lived in the neighborhood who called her ‘Rosala.’) She recalls the strings of amber beads, soft and warm to the touch, the color of “summer fields full of grain” in the Polish countryside, “full of life” because they are the “fossil resin of the prehistoric trees.” “For years my own feelings lay dormant like a fossil insect inside an amber bead. Now, fifty years after the war ended, I want to uncover my past and learn who I was. I want to know a girl called home by Mother,” whom she remembers only by the sound of her voice. “I can’t recall my mother’s face.” In Judaism, Jewishness itself is passed down through the mother. The partial severance from one’s mother means severance from oneself, from the people of whom you are a part.

    Trains: trains took Jews to the death camps, but for Miriam Winter they also meant life, life preserved by escape, not in permanence, like amber. Her memory of the war is “a memory of running scared,” running away from her parents, little brother, grandparents, none of whom she would see again. Even after the war, “I didn’t try to find my family,” and although “I didn’t have to hide anymore…I remained in hiding,” refusing to admit she was Jewish. “I wore my mask well and smiled often,” moving from place to place, taking trains, a life “marked by packing and unpacking.” Why? That question serves as a guide not only to the reader but to her, to the author of the memoir. “I have very little memory because I lost my family. Adults pass on a sense of continuity to a child. I had nothing to help me recall life as it once was.” It was only in 1991 that she learned that the Jews in the Lodz Ghetto, Ozarow, were murdered in the Treblinka concentration camp, where they were taken in October 1942. That is what happened to her parents and her brother. But she knew it in her soul before that, which is one reason why she kept on moving, avoiding what her soul knew.

    “Fifty years have passed since a loving voice called me Mirka.” She wants no murderous abstractions, none of ‘the Jew,’ the hate-name children taunted her with. The individual name was loving; the generic name murderous. She wants to know through her own senses: “I try to picture, to taste and touch, to hear and smell; I try to catch the image of myself in Ozarow, to recall how it felt to be called by my mother.” She wants to know herself as a person. And she relies on her senses, which disclose things that are solid in a world that passes by, passes through, like a train.

    Her parents saved her by sending her away at the age of eight. She does remember some of her life before that: her uncle, Szmulek, who “laughed louder and longer than anybody I knew”; her grandfather, Szymon Kohn, a Hassid; her playing at being a storekeeper, imitating her grandparents; her father, Tobiasz Winter, “short, bald, funny, and fast as a bullet; “the white armbands with the blue star of David”; the Yiddish her parents spoke when they didn’t want the children to know something; the time she broke open a doll’s head to see what was inside. The doll’s head turned out to be empty, with “no dreams or memories or songs or games inside”—even more void of identity than she would become. “I hug the baby and tell her not to worry because I will take care of her.” Taken away from her mother, Majta-laja or “Lonka,” Miriam Winter finally became her own mother, her own caregiver and guardian. During the war, her first adult caretaker outside her family was Cesia, a friend of her family (blond, she didn’t ‘look Jewish’), who took her away from the Ghetto on the train.

    This book, this collection of words, is about trains, running for your life, and about words, which can give life or take it away, depending on how they are used or abused. In Polish, the word for Germany is Niemcy, derived from ‘mute’; by contrast, ‘Slovak’ means ‘word.’ For the Poles, the Germans appear as a people without words, the way the ‘barbarians’ did to the Romans, as a nation that shows up not to speak but to kill. In fact, the Nazi Germans did use words, but they used them wrongly, invoking ‘the Jew,’ ‘the Slav” (as when the great chess player, Alexander Alekhine, taunted Aron Nimzovich with “Slav means slave”). Using words wrongly, they murdered. Against this, when her father said goodbye to her in Lodz, he handed her a piece of paper on which he had written the Lord’s Prayer, the words of a Jew commended to Jews and Gentiles, words that would be more than acceptable to the Polish Catholics among whom his daughter must ‘pass’ as a Christian if she is to survive. As for the trains, a train was “my first hiding place.” “Other trains rolled their wheels, and I survived by a roll of dice, pure random luck”—a “life saved by chance, punctuated by train stops.” To her, during the war, life was random, not providential. The Lord’s Prayer, invoking divine providence, came to seem a part of the camouflage, of appearance not the reality. ” Her father also “told me that from now on my name was Marysia Kowalska,” a safe Polish name. Her father did not think at random. He had a plan for his daughter living, not dying. On the train, at a platform in Kielce, a Polish woman named Maryla boarded and met Cesia, “a chance meeting of two strangers on a train.” Cesia gave her to this unknown woman, despairing of being able to care for her; her Warsaw apartment only had room for the child she had come to Ozarov to save, her nephew. “If Maryla had gone to another compartment I would have been killed,” since by the fall of 1941 “the slaughter of Jews in Poland was put into motion in an organized way,” anything but randomly”—death being much better organized than life, in that time and place. “I survived, but I can’t recall my mother’s face, although I do remember the train that took me away.” 

    Years later, at the Holocaust Hall of Remembrance at Yad Vashem, in Israel, she saw the names of the cities where Jews were herded into ghettoes by the Nazis, including Ozarow in Lodz, “the last place I was with my parents.” she could touch the name of Ozarow, carved into the wall; the warm, solid “sun-bathed stones returned my touch.” The wall is a collection of names of the ghettoes and of the men and women who lived in them before being murdered. A man there told her that he didn’t even know his own name. “Like me, he had many false names; like me, he survived alone. I am still searching, but there are no traces. I have often wondered why I survived.” Was it really just random? “I am all that’s left of the families of Winter and Kohn; if I hadn’t lived, there wouldn’t be a soul to say that they even existed. I am their witness.” As her own mother, now, her own source of remembrance, however tenuous, her life became the meaning of what seemed random.

    What she can remember is the Lord’s Prayer, the “Our Father” given to her by her own father for use as a lifesaving mask. As long as she stays with the “Our Father,” lives by her father’s wisdom, she will be safe, her life preserved, as if in amber. But it will also be a fossilized life, removed from real life, lived behind a mask. She would keep the mask on, let it slip, put it back on, not knowing when to remove it. “I kept my prayer note, repeating it again and again, quickly becoming an obedient girl who would memorize her knew prayer and forget the face of her mother.” Jewishness is matrilinear. The “Our Father” consists of words that are indeed fatherly and salvific but recited at the price of emptying herself of herself. In leaving her mother, at her mother’s desperate request to Cesia, “I didn’t know we were parting; I didn’t realize that it was forever; I didn’t know what I left and why.”

    For her part, Cesia didn’t know, either—didn’t “know what to do with me,” a child whose “curly, black hair marked me as Jewish,” unlike her nephew, “blond like Cesia.” “I can only guess what motivated Maryla” to accept her. “Don’t let them know that you are afraid,” she tells them, when news of a Nazi patrol “passed through the crowded corridor” of the train “like a telegram on a wire.” “Tall and strong, a handsome peasant girl who had migrated to the city and made her own way” by smuggling food to hungry Poles in her city, Lwow, she “could smell an informer from a distance and knew how to keep him at arm’s length.” Smell: in this case, sensual knowledge in the mind, immediate knowledge, intuition.

    Maryla cut that telltale hair and told her to stay out of sight, away from the window. “I missed being talked to and touched.” Eight-year-olds find it hard to follow commands, consistently, and when she peeked out at some children she heard outside, the cry went up: “Zydowa! Zydowa!”—Jewess, Jewess, an abstract word with hateful implication. They moved to another village, where another girl taunted her in singsong, Zydowa. “The song turned to incantation,” a sign not merely of taunting but of domination. “‘Words will never kill me,’ goes the nursery rhyme, except then—in German-occupied Poland,” where “being called Zydowa possessed the power to kill.” Judaism teaches that God calls His creation into being with a word; words create or kill, include or exclude. At a New York gathering of Holocaust survivors in 1991, she objected when a speaker says that European Jews “abandoned their religion in hiding.” His words were too general. She shows her first communion photo to a Christian friend (in America, she can have Christian friends), explaining it as an image that “defended me from Jew hunters.” Such evidence, however dubious, caused salutary doubts in the fully loaded heads of her persecutors.

    “In truth my first communion was an unconsummated act. It never took place.” The Catholic priest refused to perform the service. In the future, “you may think that I am forcing my religion on you,” his mouth “curl[ing] onto a grimace as if he had bitten into a rotten part of an apple,” rather as Adam in the Garden. Not wanting her to be killed, he commanded, “You must pretend to take communion.”  “I felt rejected, deprived, and fearful,” alive without life. “I had to pretend to be a Christian girl,” which added another burden of complication to her pretending. “I was bound to make mistakes,” and she did.

    Moved to a farm owned by a widow named Maslow, with her two sons and daughter, she was terrified by a gander in the barnyard. Sensing her fear, it struck, just as the Nazis preyed upon those who betrayed their identity by fear. To overcome the girl’s fear of animals, Maslow would strike her if she refused to perform chores. “I hardened,” even if “it was harder to live without tenderness,” the blow of the farm woman replacing the caresses of her parents. “My only attachment was to my new religion. I loved Jesus, I wanted to serve him,” hoping to bring herself a loving relation with a person. “My Jewish life was over for me. In the villages where I now lived everyone was Roman Catholic,” the family cow her only companion. In her catechism book she saw a drawing showing Jesus surrounded by Jews chanting “Crucify him, crucify him!” “I was sure that I would go to hell. I was guilty because I were Jewish.” The Catholic children lived with their families, safely, out in the open. “I didn’t want to be Jewish anymore.” Reading the lives of the saints, “moved by their pride and defiance of danger, I wanted to be like them.” She wanted to become a nun, although she was now only “a shepherd girl taking a cow into the pasture,” a girl-David waiting to hear back from God. The farm work hardened her physically, too. She no longer went to bed with illnesses, as she had done many times at home. “Now, running barefoot across a frozen pond without a scarf, a hat, or a coat, I didn’t catch cold or didn’t notice if I did.”

    None of it quite worked. In the Catholic Church, confession should be a set of honest words, salvific words, words bringing the worshipper back into the community of God. In still another town, Stykow, in 1943, “I committed a grave mistake.” “That I was not baptized felt like a knife in my heart. I loved Jesus now. This was the only object of affection in my lonely life.” But at the church in Stykow, she needed to continue to pretend to take communion, although “I knew that what I was doing was wrong,” a “mortal sin” that was life-preserving but also a bar against community, preventing her from truly joining the Church. Her mistake was to go to confession and to tell the priest that she had never been baptized, believing that “the sanctity of the sacrament” would protect her. But the priest refused to absolve her, and an old woman overheard, shouting “Father”—no protective father—this girl “didn’t receive absolution!” It was the truth, but the truth not only did not set the girl free, it endangered her life and effectively expelled her from the Catholic community. She ran to the forest, having disobeyed her real father’s wise command, “deserted and betrayed” by the communion-community. There, she calmed herself, embracing a tree (“the bark was rough but warm; behind a hard crust the tree was gentle”) and promising herself “to be smarter now,” never to “admit that I am Jewish,” never to “reveal who I am,” as her father had told her. She would no longer confess the truth but follow her father’s wisdom. From the forest she walked to the town of Hucisko, where Maryla’s sister lived. “Try to remember your way to Hucisko,” Maryla had told her, a long time ago. She did. Remembrance can save.

    The sister, Zosia, lived there with her husband, Bartek, and their four children. They took her in, giving her the same chore as previously, tending a cow. Zosia supplemented the farm income (“food was scarce”) by fortune-telling; watching her manipulate the villagers with words, Miriam Winter learned not to be manipulated. She did read a lot, much to the annoyance of the adults, who wanted her only to work. “After my failed confession I kept watch all the time” over herself. “I lived only in the present,” suppressing memories of her family. “I learned to conceal my feelings.” She dreamt, alternately, of being exposed and of being rescued by a knight. “Childhood? Even the name seems ironic.” 

    By mid-1944, the Germans were in retreat, the Red Army advancing. Everyone hid, emerging when it was safe. “The war was over for them, but not for me.” One boy found a grenade the Germans left behind in a storehouse. He pounded on it, the grenade exploded, and “they found his remains scattered around a tree.” The war was over, its aftermath not—as Poles would learn in subsequent decades of Communist rule.

    Maryla arrived and retrieved her, taking her back to Lwow. They pretended to be mother and daughter, with Miriam now “hiding behind a Christian name,” Maria Dudek. “I didn’t look for my family,” as if “I didn’t want them to live even in my memory,” having “survived the hunt” “frozen, with no identity of my own” as a kind of reverse Odysseus, a No-Man who had not voyaged to return home but to escape it. “I should have shouted out, ‘My name is Miriam Winter!’ But I didn’t come out of my hiding, and so no one called me by my real name”—free, alive, but “dead inside.” The opposite of the amber, the opposite of the tree in the forest. She peddled vodka on street corners to Russian soldiers (“vodka was the life of the city,” or at least that of the occupiers). Better, a neighbor introduced her to the novels of Henryk Sienkiewicz, the Polish Nobel Laureate and to the poems of Adam Mickiewicz (author of “Locomotive,” evoking the memory of trains). For the most part, her life remained miserable, as Maryla’s new lover, a pastry chef who “could tell that I was a Jewess” and “didn’t like it,” kept her confined to the shop, first in Lwow and then in Lublin. There, she was finally baptized, now that the war was over and the pretense of priestly conscientiousness had evaporated. They moved still again, now to Warsaw, a city in ruins over which returning Polish soldiers wept at “the once vibrant city now covered with broken relics of the previous life.” (Fifty years later, I can attest, the city was only somewhat improved, with dreary Soviet-style buildings sitting on top of the ground cleared of war rubble.) 

    Another move, to Zabkowice, where she started writing a diary, careful to make no entries about “my Jewishness, nor about my real family.” There, she also managed to persuade her ‘parents’ to send her to school for the next “three unhappy years.” (‘Father’ “believed that reading was a waste of time,” and yelling, “at the slightest cause,” “You cursed Yid! I’ll kill you like a dog!”) When some relief workers came by, offering to take her to a home for Jewish war orphans, Maryla’s response was, “After everything that I did for you, you will betray me like Christ-killers betrayed Jesus Christ.” In another “wrong move,” she agreed to stay with her tormenters. They let her go a year later, when ‘Father’s’ sister came to work for them and she became expendable.

    “And then I was free.” She ended up in a Jewish orphanage in Szczecin, many kilometers north of miserable Zabkowice. But who was this person, now free? She thought of “what I would do, where I would live, but I didn’t stop to think about my true identity.” “Why didn’t I stop and reflect?” She kept her false name throughout those “good-hearted days free of anger and violence.” But the other children had relatives, if not parents; “even in the orphanage, the kids were not alone.” She “was the only one who had nobody,” the mark of Jewishness, then. Everyone knew that, “so it didn’t really matter that I didn’t admit my identity.” “It mattered that I couldn’t admit it.”

    At summer camp in 1949, the “commandant” was an atheist biology teacher, possibly selected for her position by the regnant Communist regime. Their conversations “persuaded me that science has all the answers,” and “Other books intensified those doubts until I became a nonbeliever,” including those of Anatole France and André Gide. She continued to attend religious classes to avoid the disapproval of the other girls in high school, “but I didn’t go to church anymore.” After high school, she enrolled in acting classes, where she could wear physical masks she made out of papier-mâché. “My mask fit well.” 

    Writing in her diary “kept me sane.” She gradually “went from not wanting to know from trying to forget, from leaving everything at once, from not wanting to remember, from discarding the past like unwanted rummage, to a search taken up too late, without a map, with no guideposts and no directions, to slow and painful discoveries.” For a long time, however, “concealing the murder of my family, I said that my parents died before the war,” “liv[ing] my false life as if I were watching a film.” At the same time, the regnant Communists, following the lead of Soviet premier Nikita Khruschev, admitted (some) of the crimes Stalin committed. “Why did we believe all those lies?” Winter asked herself in her diary. The truth “is always hidden” and “what’s more, we passionately believe and then, when the truth comes out, we feel deceived.” Having directed a production of Peer Gynt, with its much traveled, self-deceiving anti-hero, she wrote, “Peer Gynt threw away principles. He followed his impulses without thinking, without control. Looking back at the end of the play, he concluded that he had wasted his life. And I, who seemingly proceeded with self-control, have arrived at the same sorry balance.”

    After relocating to Warsaw, she met Romek Orlowska, “a Pole, not a Jew,” another war orphan whose “days in the youth house turned to a beat similar to mine and formed him in a mold not unlike mine.” He was the one who saw through her mask, “want[ing] to see my face.” “Finally I told him the truth and fell in love with this man who could make me real.” “Someone had shown me the real me.” This was in 1963. They had two children, named Daniel and David, Jewish names; severed from her own Jewish mother, she saw to it that her own sons would not be. It was still four years after her marriage, during the Six Day War, when she affirmed herself publicly. The Communist regime in Poland had denounced Israel, which had switched its alliance from France to the United States. At the Culture Center where she worked, when asked whose side she was on, she replied, “I am on the side of my people.” The Communist Party informer in the meeting complimented her, assuming that she meant the Poles. No, “I am Jewish.” “Why did I let these people know that I was Jewish at a time when Jews were being persecuted again?” Was it “a substitution for a funeral rite for my murdered brother, Jozio?” Whatever it was, she “had to scream out: ‘Look at me. I, too, should have been killed. I am Miriam Winter!'”

    The Party was not amused. She could keep her job if she wrote a letter to the local newspaper “condemning the Jews”—a Jew condemning Jews, quite the propaganda coup, had she complied. She didn’t. She lost her job and “former acquaintances turned away, pretending not to know me.” After her husband found her birth certificate, and Jozio’s, in the Lodz archives (“the first proof of my identity”) the family left Poland in May 1969, first for Italy (“the Italian Communists marched and shouted; their slogans, carried on large wooden boards, reminded us of why were in Rome”) and then for the United States. “I have never gone back.” “I have found my place.”

    Why did she take so long to face herself? I was guilty, she writes. “Guilty for being spared when others were killed. Guilty for surviving when my family didn’t. I listen to the sound of the word guilt, and I can touch its slimy pulp. It holds like glue,” like the flour-and water paste that went into making her theatrical mask. “I wanted to punish myself for surviving.” 

    Jewish, then, but in what way? At a sabbath service during a Gathering of Child Survivors event in Montreal in 1994, her roommate asked her if she believed in God. “I believe in Jews praying together. I don’t know whether God exists, but even if he doesn’t, he is here.” 

    “I felt that I had returned to my tent.” “I could remember that I was home.” Not ‘a Jew,’ but a Jewish person. That was when she recognized that she needed to write what she remembered.

    In 2014, only a few months before her death, Miriam Winter visited Hillsdale College, not far from her house and garden in Jackson, Michigan. My colleague Robert Eden thought that she might have some good things to say to the students. “When I speak about the Holocaust, I tell only about the things I know,” she said to them—the things she saw, heard, touched, smelled, tasted. As to writing the book, “I think it helped me become a truer person.”

     

    Filed Under: Remembrances

    The Second World War: Decisions of Statesmen

    July 23, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Ian Kershaw: Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-41. New York: The Penguin Press 2007.

     

    Kershaw calls the Second World War “the defining period” of the twentieth century because its consequences enduring longer than those of the First World War. They included the Cold War between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the end of the British Empire, the rise of Communist China in the wake of Japan’s defeat, the transformation of Germany and Japan into economic but not military powerhouses, and the mass murder of eleven million Europeans, six million of them Jews, leading to the founding of modern Israel and, with that, the transformation of Middle East geopolitics. Those consequences arose from ten decisions made “by the leaders of Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan and Italy” operating in “very different” regimes with “different decision-making processes.” Kershaw wants to understand the influences on the statesmen in question, the extent to which their decisions were “pre-formed by government bureaucracies or shaped by competing power-groups within the ruling elites,” how rational and how freely made those decisions were and, conversely, how and to what extent the statesmen ‘influenced’ their regimes. Or were their decisions largely determined by “external and impersonal forces?” And, finally, did their “room for maneuver” narrow during that early year of the war?

    He begins with the decision of the British Cabinet to fight instead of negotiating with the Nazis. Although ‘appeasement’ became synonymous with weakness and pusillanimity in the decades after the Allied victory, it was “widely popular in Britain” at the time. The 1930s had seen Great Britain weakened by the Great Depression, restiveness within its extensive empire, and the expense of rearmament. Economically, it lost its financial preeminence to the United States; its industrial might and trade surpluses declined. Along with the other commercial republics, it faced regime rivals throughout the world—rivals intent on “challenging and ‘revising’ (or overthrowing) the international order” established in the aftermath of the Great War. In Asia, confronting the formidable Japanese navy (Japan itself being a sort of geographical counterpart of Britain, an island off the coast of a continent or, if you will, off the opposite coast of Mackinder’s ‘World Island’), Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain asserted that good relations with Japan mattered more to his country than good relations with the U.S., China, or the League of Nations. And when at the same time the Nazis founded their regime in Germany, that country became “the wildest card in the European pack,” challenging Britain’s policy of disarmament, Britons generally clung to wishful thinking, although Germany’s open defiance of the Versailles Treaty’s strictures against rearmament, which it formally rejected in 1935, doubts arose. When British rearmament began three years later, no one expected military readiness to be achieved until 1942, at the earliest. As Germany and Italy began their campaigns to seize territory, the British had nothing but verbal rejoinders to offer. Now Prime Minister, Chamberlain thought “buying Hitler off” by refusing to challenge his nationalist claims in the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia “a price well worth paying.” Famously, Winston Churchill did not, but those were his ‘wilderness years.’ When Churchill urged an anti-fascist alliance with France and the Soviet Union, Hitler beat him to the punch diplomatically with his 1939 pact with Stalin and militarily with his Blitzkrieg conquest of Belgium, the Netherlands, and France in 1940. This brought Churchill to the prime ministership, over the opposition of Chamberlain and the royal family, and many in his own Conservative Party, who judged him deficient in “political judgment.” 

    As British forces fled France in May 1940, Hitler missed his chance to kill them with his advancing army, relying instead on his air force, which failed. Churchill saw his only hope in “dragging the Americans in” to the war, but President Roosevelt, confronted with public opinion still opposed to another military venture in Europe, demurred politely, instead recommended that Britain withdraw its fleet to North America, for safe keeping. But Churchill regarded any European settlement which left Germany in control of the Continent as likely fatal to his country. At a minimum, he needed first to convince Hitler that he couldn’t defeat Britain. Over the opposition of his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, who imagined that Hitler might fall victim to political infighting, and who “had been unable to stomach” Churchill’s preference “to go down fighting” rather than surrender, Churchill argued that it “was impossible to imagine that Herr Hitler would be so foolish as to let us continue our re-armament” as a condition of a truce. “His terms would put us completely at his mercy.” Looking back, Kershaw concurs: “No terms which Hitler was likely to offer Britain would be acceptable.” And it is likely that another precondition for a deal would have been the removal of Churchill from office, probably to be substituted by David Lloyd George, whom Hitler admired and who admired Hitler; “he would most probably have been acceptable to Hitler as the British equivalent of Marshal Philippe Pétain at the head of a Vichy-style government.” In the event, however, the realistic prospect of being able to continue the fight, not to die choking in blood, suddenly appeared with the rescue of “practically the whole of the British Army” from northern France in the ‘Miracle of Dunkirk.’ 

    Kershaw finds it “striking” that, in a parliamentary republic, so few persons deliberated on this crucial decision and indeed how few “had any inkling of what was at stake”: “Only the highest level of officialdom within the Cabinet and Foreign Office was aware of what was happening.” The old aristocratic character of the British regime lived on, at least in the realm of foreign policy. Was aristocrat Churchill rational in making his decision, or utterly irrational, as aristocratic Halifax supposed? Kershaw writes that Churchill won the intra-Cabinet debate “because he had the better arguments.”

    The consequence of Churchill’s Cabinet’s decision to fight was a two-front war for Germany—exactly what the Germans had attempted, and failed, to prevent in the First World War. “With western Europe secured and any threat from the United States a distant one, Hitler would have been able to turn his full attention to fighting the war for ‘living space’ against the Soviet Union, but now with British backing.” Hitler correctly saw that “time was not on Germany’s side,” that “Germany had to remove Britain from the war before the Americans were ready and willing to enter it.” But now he had his own decision to make. This is the second statesman’s decision Kershaw addresses.

    Hitler saw that Britain needed such a two-front war, needed the Soviets as an ally. “With Russia smashed, Britain’s last hope would be shattered.” Therefore, crush the Soviet Union by attacking in spring of 1941, in time to avoid the hardships of the Russian winter. This was Hitler’s “most fateful choice of the Second World War,” triggering “the bloodiest conflict in history” so far, “cost[ing] the lives of over thirty million Soviet and German citizens” (more accurately, subjects). Hitler had precedent on his side, as Germany had seized Belorussia and Ukraine in the First World War, with the Bolsheviks solemnizing those gains in the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He aimed not merely at establishing a line of “buffer states” in eastern Europe but at regime change there, as General Ludendorff had planned for the Baltic states when it still seemed that Germany would win the earlier war. Hitler also had a financial worry. His rearmament had been “undertaken at reckless cost to state finances”; “guns and butter were possible only for a limited time,” as “an overstretched and overheated economy could not be indefinitely sustained.”

    If British foreign policy was governed by a few, German foreign policy was governed by one. As Kershaw gently puts it, “Hitler disliked the potential check to his authority posed by any collective body.” This included his Cabinet, which had stopped meeting by 1938. Since no man can literally rule alone, Hitler established institutions staffed by Nazi Party men; as an added precaution, he allowed the original government institutions to remain, thus setting up “competing agencies” acting within “administrative anarchy,” ensuring that “Hitler’s position was supreme.” Whenever a crucial decision needed to be made, he was the only man he could make it. 

    His decision had not only a regime component but, as always with Hitler, a malignant ideological one. “Through an attack on the Soviet Union he would destroy the power of the Jews,” he reckoned, “embodied in his worldview by the Bolshevik regime, and at the same time gain ‘living space’ for German settlement.” The ensuing “racially purified empire…would be equipped eventually to challenge the United States for world domination,” especially since it would give Japan a free hand in the Far East, “tying down the United States in the Pacific and deterring her involvement in the Atlantic and in Europe.” That is, Hitler would relieve himself of a two-front war while eventually waging one on the Americans. Thus, while the timing of the attack on the Soviet Union was “military-strategic,” the purpose was regime-ideological.  The conquest of Ukraine and Russia would provide Germans with a rich supply of grain, saving the German economy from exhaustion and providing nourishment for future expansion. In the event, both Hitler and his army officers “grossly underestimated the Red Army,” probably basing their assessment of its very recent poor performance against Finland. Meanwhile, the German naval officers targeted, first, the British Royal Navy and then the U.S. Navy “in the contest for world domination.” “The maritime and Continental alternatives” to German imperialism “could easily stand alongside each other in the prewar years,” with the army pointed east and the navy expecting to use the coasts of France, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark as a launch pad for conquests in Africa. Hitler prioritized: eastern Europe first, Africa second, the Americas third. He briefly considered the plan conceived by Admiral Gerhard Wagner: capture Gibraltar from the British “with Spanish support”; push through north Africa toward the Suez Canal, controlled at the time by the British; then gain access to raw materials in Egypt and the other Arab countries, along with Sudan. This, Wagner remarked, would sever Britain’s best routes to the Indian Ocean and to the jewel of its imperial crown. But without firm Spanish and Italian support (each had its own imperialist agenda, and they contradicted one another), Hitler came to prefer his original ‘drive to the East.’ How rational? Although Herr Hitler might well be described as having occupied the opposite end of the ‘decisiveness’ scale from Prince Hamlet, his too “was madness, but there was method in it.” 

    Given the European and American presence in China, Japan’s 1937 invasion of continental Asia had worldwide implications. These were realized in 1940, when “Hitler’s astonishing military triumphs in western Europe” gave Japanese statesmen and military officers the opportunity to move into southeastern Asia, where the British, French, and Dutch colonial possession now seemed much more vulnerable. The Japanese decision “led eventually to blending the two separate wars in Europe and in China into one huge global conflagration.”

    Ten years earlier, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, then controlled by China, had “not only marked a turning point in international relations in the Far East but also signaled the changing basis of power within Japan”—a regime change. As far back as the late nineteenth century, the Meiji dynasty, “undergoing rapid modernization, accommodating western methods to Japanese culture,” intended to drive the Western empires out of east Asia and to build its own empire. In 1915, Japan demanded that the Chinese accept joint police forces on the mainland and the presence of Japanese “advisers” in political, economic, and military matters, which would have “effectively reduced” China “to the status of a Japanese colony.” In 1917, the United States agreed to recognize Japan’s “special interests” in China in exchange for Japanese acceptance of America’s “Open Door” policy, whereby all nations could enjoy equal access to Chinese trading ports. Chinese resistance to Japan and international displeasure with its actions there culminated in a nine-nation treaty that asserted China’s sovereignty, which Japan signed and honored throughout the 1920s. By the end of the decade, however, such internationalist sentiments weakened in response to the financial crisis; young, middle-level army officers became restive, and the civilian authorities lacked control over them. When some of those officers ordered an attack on Chinese forces in Manchuria in 1931, “the League of Nations failed its first major test,” imposing no sanctions—an “early manifestation of the weakness that was soon to be fully exposed both in Asia and in Europe.”

    The Japanese parliamentary republic dissolved in May 1932; Japan, now under military control, tempered somewhat by the longstanding oligarchic families, left the League of Nation the next year. The Emperor’s seemingly absolute power wasn’t absolute at all, although his blessing on a proposed policy formally legitimated it. By 1940, “a new nationalism had been forged that bears more than a passing resemblance, though in Japanese cultural guise, to contemporary European fascisms. Its ‘spiritual’ focus was the Emperor, as an embodiment of the Japanese nation,” but “its vehicle was militarism.” Japanese nationalism, called the kodo or “imperial way,” “envisaged a Japan returning to the ‘true values’ of the nation’s long (and legendary) history, overcoming the subjugation to western influence and realizing her destiny and mission, as a superior people and culture, to dominate east Asia.” Propaganda duly transmitted this ideology to the people, and it included a sharp critique of what one Japanese statesman called the “democracy and humanitarianism” of Anglo-Americans, a mere “mask for their own self-interest.” Japan, he continued, “which is small resource-poor, and unable to consume all her own industrial products, would have no resort but to destroy the status quo for the sake of preservation, just like Germany.” Territorial and resource redistribution must occur, both in Asia and in Europe, under what another Japanese statesman called “the new world order” including a “New Order” in Asia.

    With the League of Nations powers exhibiting no real power in the region, this left the Soviet Union as the principal worry of the new regime. Japan joined the Anti-Comintern Pact late in 1936, each country guaranteeing that if it fought a war against the USSR, the other partners would provide no aid to the Russian Communists. The Japanese then attacked China, and while “the orgy of killing and rape” in Nanking “shocked the world,” the West did nothing more than condemn it. By 1938, however, the Chinese government under Chiang Kai-Shek had retreated, consolidating in western China. “It was now stalemate.” Still eager to extend its empire, Japan seized islands off southern China and fought Soviet troops on the border with Outer Mongolia. The August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact stunned Tokyo by removing a potential ally. Recalculating, the Japanese military regime expected a Europe ruled not by commercial republics but by Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Seeing that a European war might provoke an Anglo-American alliance, some wanted to reach out to the U.S., but America’s strong support of Chiang Kai-Shek made such an overture unlikely to succeed. No matter. As Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuka averred, “In the battle between democracy and totalitarianism the latter adversary will without question win and will control the world. The era of democracy is finished and the democratic system bankrupt.” War between Japan and the United States was nothing less than a “historical inevitability.” 

    That being so, the regime designed contingency plans for a blitzkrieg attack on the Dutch East Indies via air bases to be constructed in Indochina and Thailand—plans that only became feasible when the Nazis began their rampage in Europe. In Asia now, “wherever diplomacy failed…armed strength would be deployed, if circumstances demanded it.” Circumstances did not favor a long war with the United States, but “a decisive blow” in a short war would work, military planners believed, especially if Great Britain were tied down in Europe against Japan’s allies there, the signatories to the September 1940 Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Navy General Staff expected to be ready for war with the United States by spring of 1941. 

    The American response to the Pact upended this expectation. Far from intimidating the Americans, the Tripartite Pact “merely confirmed American views that Japan was a belligerent, bullying, imperialist force in the Far East, an Asian equivalent of Nazi Germany, and had to be stopped.” The Pact proved to be not a deterrent but a provocation. While the Roosevelt Administration decided against imposing an oil embargo on Japan immediately after Pact was signed, “it was becoming increasingly evident that only a trial of strength would decide control over southeast Asia.” For Japanese planners, circumstances strongly indicated ‘Now or never.’ To settle with the U.S. would have meant an unacceptable capitulation regarding Japanese occupation of eastern China.

    Italy’s Benito Mussolini and his Fascist Party had seized power in 1922. Initially, he had fairly good relations with the United States and Great Britain, especially since his imperial ambitions were hemmed in by Italy’s war debts. He did conquer Abyssinia in 1935—no great achievement, but one that boosted the esteem Italians felt for him. He also moved closer to the Nazis, supporting Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and accepting the Anschluss two years later. He fretted that Italians “were too peace-loving, far from ready for war” and imagined that he had a promise from Hitler not to start Germany’s planned war until 1943. He also understood that his own power over Italians and the Italian state was not as absolute as Hitler’s power over Germany. His Foreign Minister, son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano, distrusted Hitler; the military officers had been reluctant to strike against Abyssinia. They saw that Italy was not militarily ready when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany in 1939. Mussolini himself saw no alternative to allying with the Nazis, fearing that trying to stay out would only bring Hitler’s fury against his country. His colleagues were not nearly so sure. “Had the German victory over France been less conclusive, it is even imaginable that intervention could have been postponed.” Kershaw thinks that “with clever diplomacy, Italy could have continued to play off each side against the other, retaining the advantages of neutrality.” But Germany’s rapid crushing of French defenses convinced Mussolini to enter the war “against the plutocratic and reactionary democracies of the West”—Mussolini was, after all, a kind of socialist—which “have repeatedly blocked the march and even threatened the existence of the Italian people,” confining it to the Mediterranean. To Mussolini and now to his colleagues, “it looked a safe bet that Italy would profit hugely and cheaply from the astonishing victories of the Wehrmacht in western Europe,” even if “Mussolini smarted under his relegation to the status of a second-rank dictatory”—he, the most senior Fascist!

    And so, in October 1940 he chose to satisfy Italian ambitions in the Balkans by invading Greece, “a calamitous folly,” the “first defeat for the seemingly invincible Axis forces.” Worse still, the campaign against Greece diverted Italian forces from the main geopolitical prize in the eastern Mediterranean: Egypt, with its Suez Canal, where “weak British forces” might have been driven out. Had they been, “the war might have taken a different course.” And the Fascists’ power in Italy, which had peaked with the triumph in Abyssinia, would not have waned so soon. Mussolini’s hope at the time was that the Germans, preoccupied with the Battle of Britain, would leave him with a free hand in Egypt. None of it worked, thanks to his “underestimation of the Greeks,” who fought with “bravery and tenacity.” The Greek war bogged down the Italians in the Balkans as much as the British had frustrated the Germans in the skies over the English Channel. “Within six weeks, the would-be world power, Italy, had shown herself to be militarily weaker than the flyweight force of Greece.” A successful British torpedo attack on the Italian fleet anchored at Taranto left half of Mussolini’s warships at the bottom of the harbor. “Fascist dreams of empire sank along with them.” Hitler agreed: “the pointless campaign in Greece compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans”—he ordered his own troops into Greece in April 1941—and “that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack on Russia.” Kershaw doesn’t go that far, judging that Operation Barbarossa would have failed no matter when it was started. But Italy’s defeat did severely damage Axis chances for victory in north Africa. In sum, “the imbecility of Mussolini’s decision reflected the dictator’s severe personal shortcoming” and “the imbecility of a political system” that was too weak to prevent his folly.

    In fall 1940, near the end of his unprecedented and successful third presidential campaign, President Franklin Roosevelt promised, “Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign war.” Well, not right away. He preferred incrementalism, which meant that no step he took toward intervention could not be reversed. His most important decision was his support for the Lend-Lease bill, which “open[ed] up America’s vast material resources to Britain’s struggling war effort at no direct financial cost” while clearly taking its side. His reluctance was understandable, given Americans’ opposition to entry into another European war in which 50,000 American soldiers and sailors died. In the war’s aftermath, many Americans concluded that “America had been inveigled into involvement by foreign financiers, bankers and arms manufacturers who stood to profit from an Allied victory.” Roosevelt himself had supported neutrality legislation in the mid-1930s and reduced the size of the Army. “It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words,” Britain’s Neville Chamberlain sniffed. It was the peace treaty Chamberlain brought back from Munich in 1938 that spurred Roosevelt into action, however, cautious though that action was, initially. He ordered U.S. rearmament and attempted, without success, to repeal the arms embargo on the European republics Congress had enacted. For his part, Hitler understandably discounted the possibility of American intervention, scorning FDR’s offer of negotiations “to settle disarmament and trade” if Germany and Italy would promise not to attack some thirty countries for the next ten years. Hitler instead signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin, guaranteeing the Nazis a free hand to assault on France and Britain. 

    In September 1940, FDR reaffirmed his promise that the United States would support the democracies by taking measures “short of war,” while taking care to quadruple the size of the Army and to prepare defenses along the Atlantic coast against German submarines. Ever the master of words, he now argued for the repeal of the Neutrality Act on the grounds that “true neutrality” as to stop treating aggressors and victims alike. The fact was that the United States at this time lacked either the military or logistical capability to do much against the Germans. The United States had only 1,350 airplanes and could spare none for the French. The U.S. army ranked twentieth among the nations of the world, “one place behind the Dutch”—five well-equipped divisions against the 141 divisions the Germans had on the western front. And what good would American aid do, anyway, if the British were defeated and the Germans seized the American supplies?

    FDR surrounded himself with solid Cabinet officers and military officers. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, “a man of firm principles based upon moral rectitude and commitment to the law,” who “detested Nazism to the core,” and respected only Winston Churchill among the European republicans, “brought a much needed dynamism” to the rearmament campaign. He worked well with Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, who went directly to the president in May 1940 to urge a substantial buildup. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau was also a hawk, although Secretary of State Cordell Hull remained more cautious, still hoping to negotiate, as State Department officials usually do. Congress continued to lean toward isolationism, reflecting Americans’ pessimistic assessment of Allied chances in the war. Marshall, the strong advocate of rearmament, wanted nothing to do with military aid to Britain, worrying that this would weaken American self-defense. 

    But public opinion began to shift. “The fall of France and the imminent threat to Great Britain sharpened awareness of the menace to the United States from German domination of the Atlantic” even in the Midwest, far from the more vulnerable Atlantic coast. When Italy entered the war in June 1940, FDR announced, and Americans supported, sending more materiel to Britain, even while seeing “where this might lead.” “There was now massive support, teaching even into previously hardcore isolationist circles, for rapid and wholesale rearmament.” Roosevelt could say, publicly, that the British navy was the only force capable of blocking the German navy; therefore, the loan of American destroyers to the British was crucial. Churchill weighed in: “Mr. President, with great respect I must tell you that in the long history of the world this is a thing to do now.” FDR brought Congress on board by his proposal to lease British territories in the New World for American use while lending the destroyers. 

    In themselves, the destroyers didn’t amount to much, militarily. They were World War I vintage ships. Hitler was not impressed. But what the deal accomplished wasn’t so much a contribution to the balance of power. It rather showed the American public that their country had “effectively abandoned neutrality” and that their hearts went with that abandonment. There was a serious legal problem, however. The Johnson Act of 1934 prohibited U.S. loans to nations in default on their World War I loans, as Britain was. Only cash-and-carry deals were legal. FDR solved the problem by loaning arms to the Brits to be repaid in kind after the war; no money was advanced by the U.S. or owed by Great Britain. Lend-Lease passed Congress in March 1941, to Churchill’s relief and delight. As for Germany, the military chiefs “interpreted it as ‘a declaration of war'” and Hitler extended the north Atlantic combat zone to the waters of Greenland. Yet Roosevelt could still maintain to the American public that he had stopped short of war, which he had. He continued “to mold opinion without outpacing it,” inasmuch as eighty percent of Americans opposed sending troops to Europe. He also knew that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union in violation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and this would mean that “new prospects would open up” in western Europe. Meanwhile, “there was widespread backing for a policy of maximum aid to Britain short of war, in America’s own interest.” In the republican regime, public opinion and the separation of government powers evidently hampers quick decisions while supporting the ones that are carefully and patiently justified.

    In the Soviet Union, it is safe to say, Josef Stalin didn’t run a republican regime. He had long abandoned the Leninist oligarchy of “collective leadership,” in which the CCP boss ruled as first among not-quite-equals. He still had nominal opposition as late as 1929—persons who received firm instruction on exactly how nominal they were during the Great Terror. In 1937-38, Stalin “sought to wipe the slate clean of those whose experiences of the ‘glory days’ under Lenin might have stood in the way of his own claim to be his sole and legitimate heir.” The purges eliminated 44,000 CCP members, along with 700,000 others; another 1.5 million were arrested and tossed into the Gulag. The work was undertaken by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs or NKVD, the secret police force answerable to Stalin alone. Stalin loyalists replaced the missing, but in the army, where some semblance of competence was more urgently needed, quick replacement proved impossible. “Of the 101 members of the supreme military leadership, 91 were arrested, and of these 80 shot” on “absurd, trumped-up charges of anti-Soviet activity,” in what Kershaw calls the “decapitation of the Red Army.” They included Stalin’s best general, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. By 1941, seventy-five percent of field officers and seventy percent of political commissars had held their posts for less than a year. Terror was not only a method of purging the ranks of Party and Army but a method of ruling the survivors. Extraordinarily enough, this was done in part to prepare the Soviet Union for the war Stalin expected. For his part, Hitler “thought Stalin must be mad,” a fascinating judgment when one considers the source.

    But the primary war Stalin expected was one between the ‘capitalist’ empires, battling for the world’s material resources. Just as in World War I, he supposed, the world Communism generally and the Soviet Union in particular would reap the benefits of capitalism’s self-destruction. The main task for the Soviet regime, to strengthen itself under the slogan ‘Socialism in One Country,’ required exactly the kind of ideological purification Stalin undertook with the Terror. At the same time, he undertook a foreign policy of “peaceful coexistence” with foreign governments—to be sure, continuing to finance Communist parties, with numerous ‘underground’ operative, providing intelligence, generating propaganda, and preparing to move against those regimes if the opportunity arose. In this scheme, Germany held a central place, quite literally in the center of Europe. It was the Soviet Union’s “most important commercial partner,” providing Stalin with nearly half of his imports; it had a strong Communist Party; after a few years of estrangement following Hitler’s accession to power, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 registered what Stalin considered the impotence of the League of Nations and of the commercial republics generally. He suspected that the statesmen of those regimes intended to escape war with Hitler by fomenting war between Germany and the Soviet Union and, after testing Britain and France by offering them a treaty and noting their lack of interest, he beckoned Hitler. Whatever Hitler’s immediate intentions toward the Soviets might have been (and Stalin knew they were hostile, in principle and therefore in the long run), Stalin knew he needed “to stay neutral and save our strength.” He believed he had three years. As it turned out, it was only two. In the interim, he could and did move against Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, although “Finland proved…a step too far,” as the 200,000 Soviet battlefield dead attested. 

    France’s sudden collapse forced him to revise his strategy. He accelerated his rearmament program, subjected his workers “to even more draconian labor discipline,” and even rehabilitated some of the military officers he’d consigned to his prisons. He formally annexed the Baltic states and hoped to extend Soviet power into the Balkans, a prospect Hitler crushed by the simple expedient of seizing Romania. Meanwhile, he received a report from Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, who wrote that “no operational war plan is available; an operational total plan or partial plans do not exist.” His army even lacked a sufficient number of maps. Since “the failings could not be put right immediately,” “it was crucial to avoid any provocation that might give Hitler a pretext for attack.” Like many in the republics, Stalin became an appeaser, although not in his case animated by any love of peace. The problem, of course, was that Hitler needed no pretext to attack anyone, given his powers of propagandistic invention. 

    Since the 1920s, Soviet military strategy had been based on the idea of “deep operations”—that is, absorbing an enemy offensive and then counterattacking, in imitation of Russia’s war against Napoleon, more than a century earlier. Nazi surprise and blitzkrieg called this strategy into question, or should have done, but the Soviets didn’t much alter their plan. Soviet planners also assumed that Germany would attack through Ukraine, if they attacked, but Stalin believed that Hitler wouldn’t risk a two-front war. The German conquest of Greece and the rest of the Balkans should have put both of these assumptions into question, yet Stalin stubbornly began to disbelieve all information that contradicted his wishful thinking. While he received reports to the contrary from reliable agents who had obtained access to Germany’s secret plans, he chose to brush them aside. He “stuck to his policy of non-provocation and playing for time,” remaining “unshaken in his conviction that the Germans would not invade until they had attained victory or a compromise settlement in the west.” He imagined he had ‘history’ on his side, since the two-front war had ruined the Germans in 1917-18. Even when Hitler launched his attack, he expected the Red Army to “inflict a crushing defeat on the German invaders.” When that didn’t happen, he began to hope that territorial concessions might buy Hitler off. And although the Red Army, aided by General Winter, did stop the Wehrmacht as it approached Moscow in December 1941, beginning a grinding military turnaround, “the cost of Stalin’s decision” was “colossal”—twenty-five million of his subjects killed.

    This was a regime failure. “The failings were those of a system of highly personalized rule,” a “system where reason had lost its way,” and more than that (pace Kershaw), a system of Marxist ideological rule, assured that ‘history’ must be on its side. Another way of saying it is that reason lost its way because Marxian dialectic, supposedly a feature of scientific verity, causes reason to lose its way by giving the human mind the illusions provided by a comprehensive system of pseudo-reasoning.

    In the United States, Roosevelt could take heart that Germany had embroiled itself in a two-front war. However, he could not know if the Soviets could hold out. His military brass expected Hitler to win, quickly, then return his attentions to Great Britain, the last European rival. Roosevelt faced renewed opposition from the isolationists, who hoped that the Nazis and the Bolsheviks would kill each other off, making American intervention unnecessary. And what would Japan do? Aid the Germans by attacking the Soviet Union? Or continue pushing into the south Pacific, attacking American interests? “I simply have not got enough Navy to go round,” he lamented. He chose to step up aid to Britain, while refraining from direct intervention. Aid required shipping; shipping could be attacked by German submarines (as in the First World War); such attacks could draw America into the war (as they did in the First World War). His policy of taking “all measures in the fight against Hitler ‘short of war” had “now come to mean ‘undeclared war,’ even to the extent of armed clashes in the Atlantic which, despite the state of non-belligerency that technically prevailed in American-German relations, threatened to explode into all-out conflict.”

    FDR dispatched his former Secretary of Commerce, now trusted White House aide Harry Hopkins to Moscow, where Stalin requested military equipment and American military intervention against Hitler. He would even “welcome American troops on any part of the Russian front and entirely under American control.” He recognized that “Hitler’s army would finally be crushed only once the United States had entered the fray,” an opinion shared by Roosevelt’s military advisers. The Americans estimated that Germany’s unconditional surrender would require five million troops on the ground in Europe. The president took Germany to be a far greater threat to the U.S. than the Soviet Union could be; in this, he retained the optimism of the ‘Popular Front’ days of the mid-1930s. 

    Accordingly, he sent U.S. soldiers to Iceland in July 1941, a move that met with public approval. He expanded the Selective Service Act in the same month by extending their terms of any future draftees and allowing them to be used outside of the Western Hemisphere. Without this legislation, “the attack on Pearl Harbor, four months later, would have struck a country with its army in a process of dissolution.” In geopolitical terms, he worried about Nazi agents “penetrating the bulge of Arrica and opening the way for Hitler to make a quick strike through the Iberian Peninsula into north Africa,” where it was a “relatively short distance across the Atlantic…to Brazil”—the “simplest way for German troops to establish a footing on the American continent.” This never happened, and in his August 1941 summit conference with Churchill in Placentia Bay, near Newfoundland, he began to see “the eastern front as the key to the outcome of the war.” 

    When a German submarine attacked the USS Greer, an American destroyer, in the north Atlantic, this gave FDR “an opportunity of the kind he had awaited.” Turning to the medium he had mastered, the radio, he charged that this attack was part of a German plan “to acquire absolute control of the seas as a prelude to domination of the western hemisphere by force of arms,” a prospect the isolationists had long denied. “When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike,” he told his audience, “you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.” He thereby justified the use of military escorts for convoys in the Atlantic with orders to shoot on sight. The justification wasn’t really justified by the facts of the case, as the Greer had in fact harassed the German submarine, provoking its commander to fire first. And “although Roosevelt could not know it, Hitler had given express orders forbidding provocation in the Atlantic while he had his hands full in the east.” But Kershaw approves, citing “the long-term threat posed by Hitler’s regime.” “As Roosevelt had seen all along, the defense interests of the United States would be irreparably damaged if Britain were to be forced to capitulate or to negotiate an unfavorable settlement, leaving Hitler in charge of the European continent and dominating the Atlantic.”

    When another attack on a U.S. ship occurred in October, Roosevelt gave another “fiery address,” in which he placed before the American people an “absolute choice in a future world between American freedom and Nazi tyranny,” a regime which therefore must be destroyed. He came close to announcing a request to Congress for a declaration of war but, ever the master of political timing, he held off, as “the United States was still not ready for war,” either materially or in spirit. “The longer America could remain out of the formal combat, the more advanced her military buildup and the mobilization of an arms economy would be,” and the less plausible sending arms and equipment to Great Britain and the Soviet Union would be, given the increasingly obvious necessity of linking American national defense with theirs. “There was also the real concern that a declaration of war against Germany would immediately bring Japan—Hitler’s ally under the Tripartite Pact—into the war.” As it happened, Japan was readying itself for exactly that, with or without an American declaration of war against Germany.

    By the summer of 1941, the Japanese needed to respond to Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, which “caught Japan’s power elite unawares, in spite of the clear warnings they had been given.” They had hoped to build a coalition based on regime lines, a struggle against the commercial republics; based on the Nazi-Soviet Pact, they had expected an Axis Powers + Soviet Union bloc, freeing them to continue building what they were pleased to call a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Such a bloc would counter the statement issued by Roosevelt and Churchill in their August summit, reaffirming their “commitment to freedom, peace, economic liberalism and the rejection of force in international affairs enunciated in the Atlantic Charter.” But to the Japanese, this meant an intention to maintain “a system of world domination on the basis of Anglo-American world views,” as the most influential Tokyo newspaper editorialized. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke advocated a military turn to the north to aid the Germans on the grounds that “great men will change their minds.” But the military officers disagreed, expecting a German victory and occupying Indochina while waiting. Fearing a move on the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, the Unted States froze Japanese assets and cut off oil supplies to Japan. With the war in China still boiling, the Japanese knew that they could no longer delay “a gigantic showdown” with the Americans, British, and Dutch. “The only question seemed to be: when?” But there were still Japanese statesmen opposed to expanding the war; they included Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro and the Emperor. “Opinions in the elites were split,” given the possibly “calamitous” consequences of a protracted war. Nonetheless, “a samurai-like fatalism prevailed”; “destruction with honor was better than survival with shame.” The American ambassador to Japan remarked, “Japanese sanity cannot be measured by American standards of logic.” The ‘logic’ of the one regime—its purposes, its way of life, upheld by its rulers and their ruling institutions—contradicted the ‘logic’ of the other. Put in logical terms, different premises yielded different conclusions.

    Peace overtures from Japanese civilian officials, reciprocated by Roosevelt, finally went nowhere. And in Japan, “diplomacy was only given the briefest of chances.” The conditions Japanese statesmen demanded were unacceptable: cutoff of military and economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek; no extension of Western military presence in the Far East; provision of “necessary economic resources” to Japan. But although the civilian side was willing to eschew further advance into south Asia and to withdraw from Indochina after a peace deal had been reached, the military insisted on a continued alliance with the Axis and the attainment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. “Without support from the military, no civilian government could survive.” That is, the military had already won the regime struggle within Japan itself, and they regarded war as a ‘now or never’ circumstance. When assured that Japanese forces would win the war in three months, the Emperor initially rebelled, pointing out that the Pacific Ocean is even bigger than China, and we’re already entangled there. But he lacked the real authority he needed to veto the operation; “in practice, it was unthinkable.” “To have attempted conflict with the military leadership in those circumstances would conceivably have been to put the position of the monarchy itself in jeopardy.”

    The Army General Staff issued a statement calling “the construction of a New Order in East Asia” an “unshakable national policy.” The United States stood in the way of that, “obstruct[ing] the Empire’s rise and expansion in East Asia in order to dominate the world and defend democracy” [italics added]. “The policy of Japan is in fundamental contradictions to this”; ergo, “collisions between the two will finally develop into war” as a matter of “historical inevitability.” Thus, a regime conflict was presented and justified under the terms of historicism, as it was in Germany and the Soviet Union, even if the contents of historicist doctrine differed sharply among the rulers of those countries. Not long after this, the prime minister resigned, replaced by hardliner Tojo Hideki. And in any event, the Japanese prime ministers “had no direct control over the operational staff” of either the army or the navy. 

    The Pearl Harbor attack “would be one prong of the overall offensive,” including simultaneous attacks on Malaya, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and soon the Dutch East Indies. Victory in those countries was now anticipated, a bit more modestly, in four to eight months, although the war against the United States would last longer, to be concluded with “a negotiated peace to [Japan’s] advantage.” This treaty would stipulate no more U.S. or British aid to China, thus putting Chiang Kai-Shek on the road to extinction. Japanese military planners anticipated a German declaration of war against the U.S., “which would then become enfeebled through prolonged embroilment in the European conflict.” Although the Emperor “was still wracked with doubts and worries,” the officers had no time to imitate Hamlet, and Hirohito acquiesced. 

    The Americans expected war, but not an attack on Pearl Harbor. They expected an assault somewhere in southeast Asia. Although Pearl Harbor air strike was “a massive shock,” the Japanese had no adequate follow-up to it. The Japanese expected the Americans to fold. (Were its people not a mob of decadent liberal democrats, a soft commercial people incapable of matching the martial valor of the Japanese?) But American public opinion regarded the Sino-Japanese war as “a moral cause”; “the anti-Japanese backlash in the United States stirred by accounts of atrocities by Japan’s army against Chinese civilians had certainly made American public opinion a factor which the Roosevelt administration could not ignore.” At the same time, American and British interests centered not so much in China but in the Pacific Ocean. “To have abandoned China would have had the most serious consequences,” economically, extending to the war in Europe, where Japan was allied with the Axis. A Japanese monopoly in the south Pacific would have seriously injured the sinews of war in Europe. And it would have ruined any prospect of free trade in Asia, once peace returned.

    The next crucial decision belonged to Hitler, who declared war on the United States almost immediately after the Japanese attack. Given the German experience in the First World War, why did he formally invite American intervention in Europe, this time? He had admired Americans’ vast imperial conquest of the most valuable section of the North American continent in the previous century, which he attributed to the virtues of “a dominant white ‘Nordic’ racial core.” He regarded this as a model for his own policy of Lebensraum, and that would come at the expense of Russia, not of far-off America. True, “at some dim and distant future date,” he expected, “a German-dominated Europe would have to face a contest for supremacy with the United States,” a country, “though with a good racial stock in its white population” had come to be ruled by “Jewish capital, and by Jewish control of politics and culture,” according to his lights. In his own words, this made the United States (and Britain) “absolute enemies” of Germany. As he put it, “the only state that will be able to stand up to North America will be the state that has understood how—through the character of its internal life as well as through the substance of its external policy—to raise the racial value of its people and bring it into the most practical national form for this purpose.” Fortunately, the financial crisis of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed had substantially weakened the United States, reinforcing American isolationism and giving the Nazi movement an opportunity to reshape Europe without outside interference. Only in the very late 1930s, as Roosevelt began to stir, did Hitler complain about U.S. “agitating” against Germany, again linking this to hated Jewry. “He depicted Jews as warmongers forcing Germany into a conflict she did not want.” If war did occur, he warned, “then those who had caused it, the Jews, would perish” or, as he put it, “the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe” would result. He contemptuously rejected FDR’s April 1939 call for an anti-war declaration by the Axis powers. His war strategy required, and expected, rapid victory of the Wehrmacht in Europe, precluding any effective American involvement. The future conflict with America would come no sooner than the mid-1940s, when Germany, “dominating the whole of the European continent, and by this time with a mighty battle-fleet ready to contest control over the oceans,” would be more than ready and able for it. But “Woe betide us if we’re not finished by then,” he confided to his inner circle.

    Hence the decision to support Japan’s war with the United States by declaring war on the United States. With the anticipated thrashing of the Soviet Union in mind, he wanted Japan free to take southeast Asia from its British colonial occupiers and to dismantle American naval bases in the region. This would preoccupy the Allies, giving Germany the time to consolidate its continental empire. Hitler’s lack of any aircraft “capable of bombing American cities” was “his only regret,” although he expected his submarines to deal with the Americans in the Atlantic, after Russia and the Balkans were secured. He told the Japanese ambassador in Berlin that he did not fear the United States because the European armaments industry far surpassed anything Americans could muster. (In this, his assumption was bolstered by his military attaché in Washington, who was confident that “American would not be ready for war before Germany had won it.”)  He was already planning to base his bombers on the Azores, from which sanctuary they could strike North American targets. He told the ambassador, “We should work jointly” to destroy both the Soviet Union and the United States. What he didn’t know was that “the leaders of Japan were less sure than Hitler was that the German war in the east was already won,” as good as won. Nor did he know that Japan had no intention of attacking the Soviets’ eastern flank but instead would push into the south Pacific right away, not waiting for the outcome of the German attack on Russia. But given the limited information he had at the time, Hitler’s declaration of war made good tyrannical sense to him. “He now had the justification he needed for opening up all-out submarine warfare in the Atlantic and preventing the U-boats from being as ‘worthless’ as they had proved in 1915-16.” In the First World War, Japan had been an ally of the republics. No more.

    “Hitler’s extraordinarily inflated hopes in his Japanese ally led him on 11 December [1941] to his fateful choice: all-out war against an enemy whom, as he conceded to [Ambassador] Oshima at the beginning of January 1942, he had no idea how to defeat.” Still, “given his underlying premises, his decision was quite rational,” if not “sensible.” Not only the Soviet Union but the United States would prove more formidable than he wished.

    The tenth and most sinister decision of these months, Hitler’s determination to begin ‘the war against the Jews,’ was documented by Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, who summarized the Führer’s thoughts: if the Jews “brought about another world war, they would experience their annihilation.” The world war has begun; ergo, “the annihilation of the Jews must be the necessary consequence.” By the end of 1941, the Nazis had already murdered 230,000 Jews, first in the occupied sections of the Soviet Union but soon extended to “the whole of Nazi-occupied Europe.” Unlike the Armenian genocide by the Turks in the First World War, limited to those who refused to convert to Islam, this genocide was ‘racial,’ based on “the pathology of demonic antisemitism” which “defies rationality,” although not the Nazi assumption that “the war could never be won unless the Jews were destroyed.” Hitler held German Jews responsible for Germany’s defeat in the First World War, regarding them “as war profiteers” and “as shirkers avoiding military service and as fomenters of internal unrest that undermined the military effort.” As he put it in Mein Kampf, had “twelve or fifteen thousand of these Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas” at the beginning of that war, German victory would have been assured. Less than one percent of the population had ruined all the others, and that, Hitler determined, would not happen again. He had already built a political party in which hatred of Jews formed part of an ideology of racist historicism, giving him thousands of willing co-executioners by the time the Second World War began. “This time,” he promised in a speech in Munich in November 1941, “we will make good what we were then cheated of.” Near the end of the war, he bragged, “I have lanced the Jewish boil. Posterity will be eternally grateful to us.”

    Kershaw concludes by emphasizing the way in which regimes shaped the decisions of statesmen during this period. “The fateful choices that were made were not predetermined or axiomatic. But they did reflect the sort of political system that produced them.” In the tyrannies, Germany and Italy, “all-powerful leaders” could enforce their commands upon the elites, especially given the popular support they shaped by their control of all major media organs. In Japan, where a “collective form of government” of the few prevailed, the truly ruling few were military officers; civilian ministers “falling afoul of the military were soon ousted—or assassinated.” The military ethos of honor and victory crucially inflected all policy choices. “The contrast with the two democratic systems, those of Great Britain and the United States, was stark.” In those regimes, “there was little scope for arbitrary decision-making.” In Great Britain, “even in the extreme gravity of the situation, the decision had arisen from rational debate” in the Cabinet between Churchill and appeasers Halifax and Chamberlain. In the United States, the president wasn’t responsible to his Cabinet, which served more as “an advisory body.” It was Congress, not the Cabinet, that limited executive authority; “and behind Congress there was public opinion to consider.” 

    Regimes inflected but did not determine statesmen’s decisions.

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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