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    John Quincy Adams: Guide for Today?

    May 11, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Angelo Codevilla: America’s Rise and Fall among Nations: Lessons in Statecraft from John Quincy Adams. New York: Encounter Books, 2022.

     

    Progressives can be said to have re-founded the American state and the American regime, centralizing the former by establishing a substantial, unelected (therefore non-republican) bureaucratic element in the latter. At the same time, Progressives changed the emphasis of foreign policy, eschewing the Washington-Jefferson foreign policy of non-entanglement with foreign powers and promoting a set of comprehensive ‘entanglements,’ beginning with the League of Nations (never ratified by still-unProgressive Senate) and on to the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, NATO, SEATO and many others. In these organizations, too, bureaucracy looms big. This foreign policy is usually called liberal internationalism; Codevilla more precisely calls it Progressive internationalism. 

    Why the shift? Progressives criticized the American regime not only for its institutions and policies but for its moral foundation in natural right. The Founders considered security for life and happiness to be the purpose of government. Progressives had more ambitious plans. They rejected natural right as a fiction and followed instead the claim of more recent philosophers who derived right not from the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God but from ‘history,’ the course of events. Governments’ new task was to position themselves on ‘history’s’ cutting edge, leading the people to the perfection of democracy, of economic, social, and political equality. The fact that a bureaucratic oligarchy might compromise the very historical movement it claimed to lead seems not to have troubled American Progressives, although Karl Marx and his followers saw this clearly enough, promising that someday the bureaucratic state would “wither away.” 

    The results have not been uniformly favorable. “This book contrasts America’s successful foreign relations under presidents from George Washington to Theodore Roosevelt with the disarray resulting from Progressive management ever since,” “bid[ding] us to reenter the minds of America’s founding generation to consider how their principles might be applicable in our time.” The contrast is rather stark. After all, the United States has done rather well for itself since Wilson took it into the First World War, replacing Great Britain as the major ‘power’ in the world. Still, no one is satisfied with American foreign policy of the past half-century or so, or with much of American domestic politics, for that matter. Can (and should) recurrence to the political thought of the American Founders, particularly the foreign policy of John Quincy Adams, their political and intellectual heir, serve as a guide for us still?

    Americans then, and for the most part now, want American foreign policy to protect their self-government by defending the American way of life. Before the Founding, Americans protected themselves, fighting “the Indian tribes”—some, not all—that “slaughtered, enslaved, and retreated behind French protection,” protection offered because France competed with England for control of North America. More, after independence, “neither the British nor the French, nor the Spaniards who controlled the exit from the Mississippi, nor the Barbary pirates who ruled the Mediterranean, were going to be nice to impotent Americans.” Americans wanted peace, including peaceful commerce with other nations, but they “had no pacifist illusions.” Beyond our own continent, American statesmen avoided wars on land because we could fight better on our own ground and because involvement in the wars of foreigners, especially Europeans, would embroil us unnecessarily in their endless conflicts, leading to disunion at home. The attempt by France to lure us into their war with Great Britain in the 1790s, which spurred angry partisan disputes here, brought that lesson home, and Washington’s Farewell Address famously linked the continuance of America’s political union to the avoidance, when possible, of foreign wars. 

    John Quincy Adams followed and elaborated upon Washington’s policy, earning himself consideration as “the fount of American geopolitical thought,” framing policies on his “primordial distinction between America’s own interests—hence the ’causes’ for which Americans might fight—as well as…the (largely geographic) bases for evaluating the extent to which any cause or interest may be our own.” This framework enables Americans to rank foreign policy issues in their order of importance to their country: first, our borders and the islands nearby, “followed by the oceans,” the “great highway of nations,” as Thomas Jefferson called them, “then the rest of the world.” Because treaties with nations whose purposes differ from ours never hold, “Adams practiced and taught a meticulous sort of diplomacy that aims at the mutual clarification of objectives,” at finding out what other countries’ rulers really want, and letting them know what we really want. This enabled him to establish “good relations with the governments of Britain, Russia, and so forth, in full acknowledgement of the radical differences between their regimes and ours.” Avoiding wars with such regimes typically required non-interference with them on their territories, “the essence of the 1648 treaties of Westphalia,” which solemnized relations among sovereign states in Europe, limiting most of its wars to compromisable boundary disputes and making a beginning of the end of the wars of religion.

    These policies remained in place, Codevilla claims, up to the last years of the nineteenth century. Even the war with Mexico was undertaken reluctantly by President Polk, who, after winning the war, “paid Mexico the price he would have paid to purchase what he conquered.” Such imperialist temptations as Americans entertained were resisted, and American foreign policy centered on reducing the sway of European imperial ambitions in the Western Hemisphere. Even Theodore Roosevelt, who did entertain such temptations as a young man, acted with sobriety as president, pursuing Alexander Hamilton’s policy of building up the navy. 

    All this changed with Woodrow Wilson. For him, “humanity’s good was primary and America’s secondary.” “Wilson led American into the Great War on behalf of his private abstractions”—namely, the doctrine of Progressivism. And “because his admirer Franklin Delano Roosevelt led American into an even greater war on similar bases, the American people have known little peace ever since.” Progressives have been “trying to bring into reality their own imagination,” although in practice this has led them to justify their own self-aggrandizement as a set of de facto oligarchs. Codevilla goes so far as to claim that “keeping foreign lands out of Soviet hands was merely the international background of and the domestic justification for the U.S. establishment’s deep involvement in other nations’ affairs,” partly out of ‘idealism’ but mostly for profit. In the decades following the end of the Cold War, the elites have collaborated with Russian ex-Communists and Chinese Communist bosses, claiming that their self-enriching schemes will serve to ‘liberalize’ those regimes. They haven’t.

    Those who fancy themselves to have positioned themselves on ‘history’s’ ever-progressing ‘edge’ will likely view those behind them as, well, backward—at best to be pitied and guided forward, at worst to be viewed with contempt. Today, “the U.S. ruling classes [have] ceased to respect the American people, who, in turn, have ceased to respect their rulers.” The sham morality of Progressivism has had much the same effect as the equally historicist morality of Marxism: to maintain the illusion of unceasing project, workers (including students) pretend to work and their overseers pretend that they, and themselves, deserve ever-increasing credit. Inflation sets in, from money to school grades to the ‘celebrity’ that has replaced honor. “Fully and safely returning to the principles and practices that built the once-great but now-depleted reservoir of respect for American requires of disposing of current problems in a manner that enhances America”; in foreign policy “that means leaving enemies either dead or sorry that they ever troubled America and eager to avoid giving Americans cause for reengaging against them.”

    Having outlined his overall argument, Codevilla next turns to a fuller account of Adams’s statecraft. Adams founded his statecraft upon the Declaration of Independence, with its affirmation of the natural rights of human persons and the consequent separate and equal station of each nation. Although all human beings possess such rights, and all nations deserve such a station, only Americans at the time of the Founding “had grasped, declared, and practiced to some extent the connection between civil liberty, self-rule, and reciprocal respect among nations.” This is why no American statesman up to and including Adams’s administration expressed any “desires or designs, to reform, to dominate, much less to conquer any other people.” Peace was the priority of American foreign policy because “combining virtuous living at home with political neutrality abroad was Christians politics in the most fundamental sense: Christians believe that Christ’s birth ended the history of nations and that, thenceforth, God’s relations have been with individual souls, not with nations,” and governments should merely “provide the context within which individuals might worship God and show His glory.” In foreign policy as in personal conduct, do unto others as you would have others do unto you.

    It must be said that much of this is rubbish. Americans quite obviously conquered the Indians and did indeed attempt to change their regimes, too, beginning with the Washington Administration’s largely successful efforts to bring the Five Civilized Tribes of the American southeast to lives of agriculture. This policy remained in effect, with considerably less success, when Americans encountered the Lakota on the Great Plains, decades later. No American president seriously diverged from such policies, including Adams. As Codevilla himself writes, “America’s long-term interests determined Adams’s diplomatic objectives—not the least being expansion over the North American continent.” That, however, meant war or the threat of war with Indians and European imperialists alike. It was to be Jefferson’s “empire of liberty,” to be sure: newly acquired territories would enter the United States as states constitutionally equal to the original thirteen. But the Indians would become domestic dependent peoples, as Chief Justice John Marshall called them, and the Europeans would go.

    Overseas empire and military-political entanglements were a different story. Codevilla quotes Adams as saying that “the most important paper that ever went from my hand” was dated November 27, 1823 and addressed to Russian envoy Baron de Tuyll. As President James Monroe’s Secretary of State, Adams had been negotiating with Tuyll over Russian colonies in North America. During these discussions, Tuyll had communicated the czar’s request that the United States continue its policy of neutrality respecting the wars between Spain and the nations it ruled in its American empire; for his part, the czar intended to refuse to recognize the independence of the Spanish colonies or to receive their diplomats. In a subsequent message, the czar justified his refusal by stating “his belief in the superiority of monarchic, divine-right rule” to the democratic republicanism then being established, however tentatively, in Latin America. 

    Adams had authored the Monroe Doctrine. He opposed any “possible attempts by France, Russia, and Spain to reconquer the newly freed South American states.” Accordingly, in his reply to the czar in his letter to Tuyll he emphasized the Christian character of their two countries, their similar moral perspectives. He didn’t overlook the political differences, however, clearly stating that “the United States is republican,” a regime founded upon the consent of the governed.” Being that, Americans hold that “each Nation is exclusively the judge of the government best suited to itself, and that no other Nation may justly interfere by force to impose a different Government upon it.” This was the basis of the neutrality the czar hoped Americans would observe. But it did not entail acquiescence in the imperial designs of foreign governments in the Western Hemisphere, where Americans’ geopolitical interests were strong. Unlike Russia, the United States recognized the independence of South American governments from Spain once that independence had been won by South American nations without U.S. assistance. And, as Codevilla summarizes the argument, “the United States would continue to be neutral in any wars between them and Spain—so long as others so remained as well.” If Russia wanted U.S. neutrality in those conflicts, Russia “should itself practice neutrality.”

    Adams had consistently associated foreign policy with moral principles and moral principles with prudence throughout his lifetime. As a young man, he “rejoiced at the Louisiana Purchase’s doubling of American territory” while “trembl[ing] that it had been done without clear constitutional authority, and that neither party was interested in regularizing such authority through constitutional amendment.” He opposed the annexation of Texas because it was a slave state, believing, in Codevilla’s words, “that power that decreases the nation’s moral integrity makes for domestic strife, which precludes greatness as he understood it.” The portion of America from Texas to California would fall into American hands without war “because it was being peopled by Americans,” anyway. Peaceful ‘demographic conquest’ had been in the offing, had Americans been more patient. 

    Regime conflict and imperial ambition threatened peace in the Americas when Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France formed the Holy Alliance against political liberalization at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. The Alliance’s most pressing concern was Spain, which had deposed its king; in violation of Westphalian principles, they invaded. They also “spoke of reconquering its South American colonies for her,” a notion that alarmed the British government. Equally worried, President Monroe and his Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, initially responded favorably to British feelers regarding an alliance to repel any such venture. Adams demurred. He argued that the Holy Alliance couldn’t sustain an invasion of the Western Hemisphere politically, let alone militarily. “Governments so unsure of their standing with their own peoples as to require each other’s support to stay in power could not risk sending their armies across the ocean to secure a nonmember’s colonies.” And the Alliance would fall apart soon enough, given the divergent interests among the monarchs in matters other than their shared opposition to republicanism. Militarily, France alone had “a good navy,” but not one capable of standing up to the one Britain had. Finally, what exactly were British intentions regarding the former Spanish colonies? Would it buy Cuba, for example? Cuba’s closeness to American shores makes it a permanent point of interest to the United States. Would a formal alliance with Britain to resist Holy Alliance incursions into the Western Hemisphere not open it to British imperial ambitions? 

    In Adams’s words, “the first and paramount duty of the government is to maintain peace amidst the convulsions of foreign wars and to enter the lists as parties to no cause, other than our own.” Therefore, we have engaged in “the maritime wars of Europe,” inasmuch as we have “a direct and importance interest of our own” in waging wars defending our access on the sea, “an element which is the common property of all.” Given our maritime commerce, “we have already been once compelled to vindicate our rights by war,” the War of 1812. Since the Cubans were unlikely to vindicate their own right to independence, even if they expelled the weak Spanish rulers, American should continue to support Spanish rule against all European rivals to it, including the British. Even if Spain sold it to the Brits, the United States should, as Codevilla puts it, “consider itself in its rights in supporting the Cubans to resist such transfer.”

    The resulting Monroe Doctrine, which Adams in fact authored, amounts to “a principle of geopolitical priorities that concerns Latin America only because of its proximity.” It did nothing to contradict “George Washington’s formula for America’s relationship with extra-hemispheric powers: mutual non-interference, and to extend that formula to the rest of the hemisphere.” It reserves American sovereignty while respecting the sovereignty of other nations. Thus Adams stood up in defense of General Andrew Jackson when he invaded Florida, then a Spanish colony, where British officers leading British soldiers of fortune joined with Indians and blacks who had escaped from slavery in attacks on U.S. territory. When Britain and Spain, feigning outrage at this violation of sovereignty, “demanded that Jackson be punished,” Adams coolly responded that Spain had never protested the presence of British marines in Florida, who had arrived there near the end of the War of 1812 and stayed. Spain had also done nothing to stop the subsequent outrages. General Jackson’s incursion didn’t initiate war; it finished one. Territories conquered by him, Adams wrote, “should be restored whenever Spain should place commanders and a force there able and willing to fulfill the engagements of Spain to the United States or of restraining by force the Florida Indians from hostilities against their citizens.” End of squabble. It wasn’t long before Spain would cede all of Florida to the United States. 

    With Adams running the State Department, the Monroe Administration also faced down threats to Cuba and Puerto Rico by the newly liberated Latin American countries. Led by Simon Bolivar, Colombia and its ally Mexico had promoted a “far more muscular version of the Monroe Doctrine: an alliance, perhaps a confederation, of all American republics to keep European monarchies at bay.” Bolivar invited those republics to a conference in Panama in 1825, intending to advance this proposal. For his part, Adams (by then president) regarded such a “permanent alliance” as contradictory to our “most basic commitment to unilateralism,” even if “some sort of cooperation with other hemispheric republics made undeniably good sense.” At the conference, American delegates persuaded “Latin American countries individually to redouble their commitment to republicanism, to hold European influences at bay and to act as good neighbors while privileging commercial contact with another.” Adams and his Secretary of State Henry Clay called this the American System. It was “the Monroe Doctrine’s version rather than Bolivar’s.” 

    Codevilla duly notes the major deviations from the Washington-Adams foreign policy, namely, the Mexican War and ‘popular sovereignty,’ Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas’s amoral version of Manifest Destiny, enunciated in his debates with Lincoln, in which he averred not to care if territories eligible for statehood voted to legalize slavery. The Mexican War was the more complex and interesting of the two. Polk intervened in Mexico’s domestic politics by backing Antonio López de Santa Anna’s bid to return to power in return for his (empty) promise to sell California and New Mexico to the U.S. and to fix the Mexico-U.S. border at the Rio Grande. Santa Anna expected to win the war, hoping to continue on to seize New Orleans; although Codevilla cites this as proof of his competence, it must be said that most Europeans capitals expected the same outcome. Underestimation of the United States seems to have been chronic among foreigners and even some Americans alike, for all of our history. Throughout the century, calls for an overseas American empire went up from persons as diverse as James Buchanan and Walt Whitman. Nothing much came of them, although President Grover Cleveland did face down an attempt to seize Hawaii, even as he took care to renew a treaty binding the islands to the U.S. commercially and establishing a naval base at Pearl Harbor. It was left to U.S. expatriates on Hawaii to overthrow Queen Liliuokalani, with the assistance of a rogue U.S. Navy ship’s crew, during the William Harrison administration. After returning to office in the next election, Cleveland refused annexation, and told the Americans “to restore the queen”; “when she made that impossible by demanding the plotters’ beheading, Cleveland washed his hands of the matter,” although he left annexation to a future administration.

    It was left to President William McKinley to more or less stumble into an overseas empire which, however, didn’t really amount to much of an empire. The problem of Spain’s weak rule over Cuba had never been solved. Codevilla fails to give a clear account of what happened, contenting himself with saying that he tried to solve the problem with “legal finesse,” offering battle without declaring war and leaving it to Spain to declare the war, which of course the United States won and “saddled itself with an empire.” 

    What actually happened was more complicated. Since 1895, Cuban revolutionaries had fought for independence from Spain. The conflict interested America, given Cuba’s proximity to the United States, the possibility of foreign intervention, and Spanish atrocities. When the Battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor in February 1898, Americans suspected Spanish sabotage; many years later, it was determined that an engine-room malfunction was the more likely cause. In this charged atmosphere, McKinley asked Congress to authorize U.S. intervention to end the fighting and to establish a “stable government” on the island, one that would guarantee the safety of Cuban citizens and American residents. He had no intention to annex Cuba. Congress passed a joint resolution recognizing Cuban independence and authorizing U.S. military intervention, absent a formal declaration of war. Spain immediately severed diplomatic relations with us. McKinley ordered a naval blockade and called for volunteers for a military intervention. Spain then declared war and Congress did likewise—the third of our five such declarations. 

    Both countries accepted France’s offer to host a peace conference after the United States easily won the war. The resulting treaty stipulated not only the cession of Cuba to the United States but also the cession of Guam and Puerto Rico. Spain also agreed to sell the Philippines to us. The Spanish couldn’t rule any of them, anymore, and the McKinley administration hardly wanted them to fall into the hands of foreign empires, given the proximity of Cuba and Puerto Rico to the U.S. coastline and the strategic utility of military bases between our west coast and the Asian mainland. While they were at it, McKinley and Congress also took the opportunity to annex Hawaii.

    Codevilla concludes his own oversimplified summary of the events with the dour observations that “interference in Cuba ended up transforming it into a cancer on the Americas” and “possession of the Philippines, incompetently managed, eventually brought war with Japan.” This begs the question whether competent management would have avoided these consequences. If so, what was the real harm in taking over places we stood up for self-government or, in the cases of Guam and Puerto Rico, incorporated as American commonwealths? Codevilla writes that “by not allowing Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and others conquered in 1898 to enter the Union as States equal with others, the U.S. had abandoned its founding principle that political legitimacy derives wholly, entirely, exclusively, from the consent of the governed.” Except that it didn’t, as our dozens of Indian wars so obviously attested. What is more, this obscures our fulfilled intention to turn Cuba and the Philippines over to the peoples in question, once they seemed ready for self-government. As for Puerto Rico, it has held several referenda on independence and has rejected it.

    Additionally, Codevilla never carefully outlines the options considered by U.S. policymakers in the 1890s. By the beginning of the decade, when the United States had fully secured its continental empire ‘from sea to shining sea,’ statesmen considered four possible policies. By then, such technologies as steamships and telegraphs had made the oceans what Alexander Hamilton had said they were, writing as Publius in 1787: not simply barriers to foreign intervention in North America but potential highways for foreign troops. What should we do about that new and massive fact? One recommendation, advocated by an old Lincoln ally, Carl Schurz, would have continued the Washington-Adams policy. On the opposite extreme was Beveridge, whom Codevilla mentioned earlier, who pressed for what the Confederate States of America had wanted, a colonial empire in Latin America over supposedly ‘inferior’ races. A third notion, progressive/liberal internationalism, also began to be formulated during the Nineties; its main alternative proved to be that of Theodore Roosevelt.

    Codevilla doesn’t get Roosevelt’s policy quite right. According to him, TR retreated from his earlier imperialist stance and as president “showed most fully how America could fulfill George Washington’s and J.Q. Adams’s view of foreign affairs by wielding world-class power for America’s own maintenance.” This effort consisted of building the Panama Canal and treating it as part of the American shoreline; building a navy capable of defending that expanded ‘shoreline’ and of undertaking and completing a world-spanning voyage while assuring foreigners “that none of that power was necessarily directed at anyone.” All true, but this ignores the worldwide system of naval bases TR also began to construct, beginning with those already acquired in the Spanish-American War. American naval presence overseas would not be a one-off event. Our bases would be consented to by their foreign hosts, given the mutual advantage of American protection for them and a convenient worldwide set of naval fueling stations for us. That is no real empire (’empire’ denotes imperium, rule), and in fact avoided the main burdens of such a structure. But neither is it non-involvement in the domestic politics of other countries. It is a reasonable policy founded upon the realities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

    In Part II, Codevilla addresses U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century. “By 1903, the issue of empire had lost importance to both sides,” as the wisdom of Roosevelt’s strategy became increasingly apparent. “But the division over empire had masked a deeper one,” namely, the division between those who held to the natural-rights moral foundation of the American regime and those who espoused Progressivist historicism. The Progressives’ foreign policy was internationalist. Although Wilson was the most conspicuous proponent of Progressive internationalism, Codevilla identifies Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, then Secretary of State, Elihu Root as “the father of Progressive American statecraft,” just as Adams had been the father of the statecraft of the previous century. Root took care to keep his legacy alive at State, mentoring Henry Stimson, who mentored McGeorge Bundy, who mentored Anthony Lake. 

    Codevilla finds a useful précis of Root’s thought in his Nobel Peace Prize speech of 1912. In it, Root called for “pulling up the roots” of war and even of national selfishness by instituting international tribunals which would settle disputes that might lead to war. The tribunals would adjudicate cases guided by fast-developing international law, including the 113 general treaties of obligation governments had signed since the 1899 Peace Conference at the Hague. Such conferences amounted to international lawmaking bodies that, in Codevilla’s words, could “transform international law from mutual bilateral commitments into commitments to abide by the decisions of multilateral institutions.” With national sovereignty diluted worldwide, war could be bred out of international politics. The many sovereign nations would agree to such disempowerment “because it is the most profitable thing to do.” After all, doesn’t “everyone want economic well-being more than war”? In Root’s words, economic interdependence “will make sure that the peoples will push for peaceful, rational international relations.” They can push effectively, too, given vastly improved means of international communication, “there has come to be a public opinion of the world,” Root said, an opinion which “has set up a new standard of international conduct which condemns unjustified aggression” and “punishes the violation of its standards.” Morality and economic interest perfectly entwine, forming the pattern of a new world order. Human pride and anger? We shall overcome: “There is so much good in human nature that men get to like each other through mutual acquaintance” and, with that, “civilized man is becoming less cruel.” It’s worth noting that we would hear exactly the same sort of blather when the Internet was organized. 

    Eminent Progressives around the country shared Root’s sentiments. Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler averred that “Mankind has been climbing upward and neither standing on a level nor going downhill.” Thanks to history’s happy advance, it’s as easy to do business with Bombay as it once was to do business in a village. Stanford University’s president, David Starr Jordan (“Herbert Hoover’s mentor”) claimed “there is nothing in the world for us to fight for,” anymore, “at least not with sword and gun.” We must instead fight “greed and folly,” with “a tribunal of just men,” drawn from “the cosmopolitan clubs of our universities made up of men of all races.” Despite the Great War, “the utter negation of what these Progressives had lived for,” many Progressives “doubled down on their illusions.” Enter Woodrow Wilson, entering the United States into that war avowedly to claim a place at the coming peace conference and to hasten progress toward international peace under the auspices of a “League to Enforce Peace.”

    “For the Progressives, America belonged to history more than to the American people,” as “America’s establishment had well-nigh agreed that their country was merely at the head of mankind’s common Progressive march.” Codevilla speculates that had Roosevelt won the 1912 election “he would have warned Germany about America’s interest in maintaining Britain’s role in the Atlantic, hence that America could not afford a British defeat by a rising naval power.” Such a warning might have prevented the war, and if the war started anyway, a Roosevelt Administration fought “solely to protect the Atlantic…from becoming a hostile German lake.” As matters happened, the American people fought the war not only in the Atlantic but on European soil, helped to win it, then opposed Wilson’s League of Nations as a dangerous entanglement—that is, on the traditional grounds of U.S. foreign policy. “Wilson blamed his political opponents” for their failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and “to this day, Wilson’s vindictive narrative is ruling class Progressive gospel: the American people’s rejection of the League of Nations and refusal to ‘lead the world’ caused World War II and risks causing the next world war also.”

    The next world war began in Asia. Although it never ratified the Versailles Treaty, the United States did ratify the three treaties negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22. In the Five-Power Treaty, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy agreed to limit their naval tonnage, reduce their navies overall, and to prohibit expansion of existing naval bases in the Asian Pacific. U.S. Navy officers rightly warned that the ban on base expansion would put our forces in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Guam at risk; their advice was overridden. The Four-Power Treaty committed the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France to mutual consultation in the event of a crisis in the region but did not commit the signatories to any military obligations. Finally, the Nine-Power Treaty, which included Belgium, China, Portugal, and the Netherlands, guaranteed respect for China’s territorial integrity while obligating China to maintain the “Open Door” to free trade with all the signatories. When Japan violated the Nine-Power Treaty in 1931, invading China, Secretary of State Stimson cited the treaty in a conversation with President Hoover, who deflected the matter by claiming that the Japanese invasion was primarily a violation of the League of Nations charter, to which the United States had no obligation. Otherwise, the United States might be put in what the president called (in Stimson’s paraphrase) “a humiliating position in case Japan refused to do anything about what he called our scraps of paper or paper treaties.” Thus, Codevilla comments, the “Progressives’ faith in treaties had put America precisely in the position of having to choose between humiliation and war. For the next decade, it chose humiliation. Then war.” Having honored its own treaty commitment to reduce its military capabilities, and thus its capacity to deter war, it could very easily have lost that war, when it came. 

    “No president from J.Q. Adams to TR would have placed America in such a position,” making “a treaty commitment to China’s independence, or to anyone’s, especially as they were depriving themselves of the means to keep the commitment.” According to Codevilla, by “fixat[ing] on America’s own interest and on America’s capacity to security it,” those presidents “likely would have avoided the Pacific War—and possibly even the European tragedy.” This might mean that those presidents, free of the stipulations of the Naval Conference treaties, would have fortified our Pacific bases, deterring Japanese assault on them, leaving Japan with the formidable task of pacifying and then retaining the vast territories and hostile populations of Japan and Korea which they undertook to conquer in the 1930s. But Codevilla makes a grander claim: refusing to sign the treaties and building up our forces in the region would have denied Japan her “uncontested invasion of China.” That is, we might have been able to stop the Japanese or even to deter Japan from attempting the invasion in the first place. In the event, he claims, a militarily weak United States imposed a trade embargo on Japan “without prospects of resuming normal trade relations in case of compromise,” leaving “a starving Japan with only the choice of where to wage war”—eventually, Pearl Harbor. One may doubt whether Japan’s imperial ambitions were so easily manipulated or its policy options so constrained by American actions and inactions.

    Meanwhile, when it came to Europe, “FDR did not indicate that something was wrong with Hitler until after the fall of France,” having before that event “sympathized with Hitler’s statism.” His left-wing constituents within the Democratic Party had “demanded support for Hitler because he had become Stalin’s ally” after the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939. And in any event, “Nazi Germany’s primary interests were eastward,” and would eventually lead Hitler to attack the Soviet Union, anyway, after gobbling up the Central and Eastern European nations between Germany and Russia. But instead of defending their own interests, “France and Britain started a war over Poland without an idea of what these interests might be, without plans for doing any good for themselves or for Poland, and without the intention of doing anything but halfhearted defense.” They should have stood by, gathering their own strength. The war in western Europe was effectively provoked, prematurely, by the democracies. 

    This analysis ignores FDR’s cautious efforts to prepare the United States for the war he thought likely, efforts that began in 1935. It also ignores the outcome of the war itself. It is inconceivable that France would have substantially fortified itself in time for the invasion of 1940 because its rulers seriously believed that they had already done so. And without the crisis of the Nazi invasion of France, no Churchill and no major war preparation in Great Britain, either. Europe would have seen a war between Germany and Russia, anyway; one side might have won that war, with the victor ready to deal with the European democracies, later on. 

    According to Codevilla, John Quincy Adams “would never have made contradictory commitments or pledges that the United States had no means of redeeming,” such as the pledge to restore Poland’s independence while “placing no conditions on [Allied] aid to the Soviet Union, which had collaborated with Nazi Germany to dismember Poland and intended to keep its share—if not the whole thing.” Such an unconditional alliance was foolish because the Soviet Union’s objectives in the war “were, by definition, hostile to America.” “One of J.Q.’s most valuable teachings is that even when an alien regime’s short-term interests line up with America’s, it is essential to separate that regime’s purposes from ours in our own minds.” FDR, his eyes fixed on the Wilsonian vision of international cooperation, failed to see that, instead placing his hopes in that League of Nations redivivus, the United Nations. It has proven to be as much of a sham as its predecessor, but now the U.S. has caught itself up in it.

    But would Adams have supported postwar American efforts at regime change in West Germany and Japan? They were successful and geopolitically beneficial, a point Codevilla prefers to overlook. That regime change itself was no bugbear to George Washington and to subsequent U.S. presidents of that era, we already know, although Codevilla doesn’t have much to say about that, either.

    Since then, American foreign policy has formed in the “intramural clashes of ideology, identity, and interest within an ever-bigger, wealthier, and more independent U.S. establishment” centered in the international affairs division of the Progressivist-inspired, New Deal-enacted administrative state. Presidents no longer set policy; bureaucrats do, and “that is not how a republic is supposed to work.” Our foreign embassies often have large staffs representing various administrative agencies of the United States government, which represent not the America people but “the interests of their constituencies” (agriculture, manufacturing, energy, and so on). No “coherent U.S. policy” can emerge from that alphabet soup. Universities have revamped their degree offerings to prepare students “for careers in this array of constituencies.” At the same time, foreign countries have entrenched themselves in the non-governmental U.S. bureaucracies our embassies represent, especially business corporations and, again, universities. Tiny but rich Qatar, for example, doles out money to fifty-one universities, dozens of foundations, and no small percentage of American Congress members. The champion of dubious influence remains, of course, China, whose money “reaches every part of the U.S. body politic.” U.S. corporations, long mesmerized by the market potential, allow themselves to be led by the nose by Chinese Communist Party commissars.

    The American oligarchs have shown themselves unforgiving to their critics. As early as 1952, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, a serious contender for the Republican presidential nomination and a critic of Progressive internationalism, saw his campaign torpedoed by “corrupt deals,” including “one that substituted one Texas delegation for another.” That was the year when Secretary of State Dean Acheson persuaded President Harry Truman “to fire the establishment’s other bête noire, General Douglas MacArthur”—and founder of Japanese republicanism—from “command of U.S. forces in Korea.” When President Kennedy later considered attending to MacArthur’s admonition not to fight a land war in Asia, “consider[ing] instead his suggestion for a naval-economic strategy reminiscent of J.Q. Adams and TR,” he eventually acceded to the superior political weight of the establishment and increased U.S. troop presence in Vietnam—with decidedly unpleasant results to come.

    As for the overarching circumstance of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, Codevilla regards the two main foreign policy events of 1956 to have been the turning point, when “the foreign policy establishment placed their interest in avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union—as well as their preference for a Europe shorn of its colonies and for a world reshaped in their own image—ahead of anti-communism. Nothing would ever be the same.” When the Soviets put down an anti-communist rebellion in Hungary, NATO did nothing. And when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, provoking armed opposition from Great Britain, France, and Israel, the United States sided with the Soviets and their client, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nassar. A few years later, during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the U.S. supposedly faced down a Soviet naval caravan transporting missiles to Cuba, the establishment secretly brokered a deal whereby we removed U.S. nuclear weapons from Britain, Italy, and Turkey in exchange for a Soviet reversal. Establishment media outlets uniformly celebrated President Kennedy’s supposed heroism. Since these events, “the NATO Alliance has been a bureaucratic reality masked by military pretense,” and U.S./European policy in Europe “consisted of competition to see whose package of concessions could most thoroughly satisfy Soviet demands.” The trend culminated in the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy of détente, the consequences of which the anti-establishment Reagan Administration deflected.

    Whereas West German president Konrad Adenauer and French president Charles de Gaulle proposed a “Europe of the Fatherlands” to consist of self-governing nations loosely confederated for self-defense and trade (de Gaulle even extended the extravagant invitation, “Come, let us build Europe together,” to the nonplussed Soviet ruler and ideologue, Alexei Kosygin), the U.S. government backed the nascent European Union bureaucracy, successfully discouraged the British from building “a truly independent nuclear force,” and failed to dissuade de Gaulle from building France’s nuclear force de frappe. Increasingly, the “habits, minds, hearts, and tastes among America’s Europe’s, and to a lesser extent the Third World’s ruling classes” have prevailed; this “international ruling class” knows that “American voters are the major threat to all that it deems good.”

    Small wonder, since the ruling class’s interests, like those of all oligarchies, prefer to squeeze the wages of workers in order to extract more wealth for themselves—something that’s been noticed at least as far back as Aristotle. As a result of Alexander Hamilton’s policies—more or less continued even in the years after the Second World War—American workers were well paid for producing manufactures in their own country, a policy that had enabled America to be what FDR bragged it was, the “arsenal of democracy.” But gradually, U.S. corporations “began to use the lower labor costs in their overseas facilities to produce for U.S. markets as well,” turning our trade policy “against the American people’s historic prosperity and independence.” This “effectively de-industrialized America” and enhanced the regime change initiated by Progressives. One part of any regime is its way of life. “A society of people who make things is very different from one dominated by managers and financiers, served by a vast service sector.” For one thing, it takes political power and moral self-respect away from those not in the oligarchy. For their part, American politicians began to see the American people “strictly as consumers of products”—including, one might add, substantial income transfers in the form of welfare payments, ‘social security,’ and similar ‘programs’—rather “than as producers who live certain kinds of lives because of what they produce at a given price.” But to see Americans that way and to accept the erosion of our manufacturing is to sacrifice “the indispensable ingredient for international independence.” And “nobody voted against it, either, because the U.S. foreign policy establishment and educational establishment—and, of course, politicians—did not think of sovereignty over essential materials, products, processes, and skills as an issue.” Why would they, if they assumed that a new international order would make political sovereignty go away, and good riddance to it?

    Oddly, this generated a circumstance in which America’s small overseas wars became frequent, not to say perpetual, while both elected and bureaucratic politicians took war and preparation for war less seriously. This has “blur[red] distinctions between war and peace themselves,” as “U.S. military forces at all levels have been planned and used in ways that have left them unable to secure victory, and therefore peace, on any level.”

    For example, in books such as Bernard Brodie’s The Absolute Weapon, establishment academics claimed that “fear of nuclear weapons must be equally prohibitive for peoples everywhere forevermore,” making “major war virtually impossible.” Ergo, America mustn’t prepare to fight a nuclear war, as such preparation might provoke one. ‘Small wars’ are o.k., but nothing else. This notwithstanding, “the U.S. military generation of World War II” didn’t buy into these claims, arguing that America should deter and, “if necessary,” fight, survive, and win a nuclear war. This was called the “counterforce” strategy; as technology advanced, enabling militaries to target foreign militaries while minimizing civilian casualties and to shield their own civilian populations with air and missile defenses, this strategy became increasingly plausible. Codevilla judges that “any Soviet bomber or missile could have reached America in the 1960s,” not because the Soviets lacked intercontinental reach but because our defenses would have prevented their weapons from landing. Unfortunately, the Democratic Party, firmly in control of U.S. foreign policy at the time, preferred to deter Soviet nuclear attacks by threatening counter-strikes on cities. “Henry Kissinger, as secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford, codified all this and made it into the ruling class’s default paradigm that endures in our time.” Unfortunately, Soviet, later Russian, and Chinese militaries didn’t play along, and continued to deploy counterforce weapons along with missile defenses, which include hardening the silos of their land-based missiles to make them invulnerable to anything but a direct hit. Today, “it is difficult if not impossible today to explain how America might use its nuclear forces in battle to its own advantage.” In effect, we have deterred ourselves more than anyone else. “Official policy remains not even to try to defend against missiles from Russia or China.” 

    De Gaulle understood this as early as 1962. When the Cuban Missile Crisis began, knowing that the United States enjoyed an “overwhelming military edge” over its enemy, he signaled his support “in war as in peace” to Kennedy. But when he saw the way Kennedy shrank from using American superiority, instead weakening NATO’s nuclear capabilities, “this wise statesman uttered the most damning of his judgments: ‘They are not serious.'” Not only his move to build an independent French nuclear force but his eventual withdrawal from NATO followed. De Gaulle proved an equally acerbic critic of American involvement in the Vietnam War. And no wonder, when President Lyndon Johnson identified the enemy not so much as the Vietnamese communists as (in his own words) “poverty, ignorance, hunger, and disease,” dangling the prospect of turning the Mekong Delta into an Asian version of FDR’s Tennessee Valley Authority project in exchange for peace with the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh, no esteemer of bourgeois economics. Not only in Vietnam but in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere in Asia, American officials “aimed to conquer hearts and minds, to birth and build nations according to their imagination of what America should be”—all the while signally failing in that domestic vision, too, as they declared wars on poverty and racism, illiteracy and terrorism, all with more impressive unintended than intended consequences, not the least of which have been abridgement of Americans’ civil liberties and ever-increasing moral and intellectual decline. “In sum, a half century of skirmishes has left Americans less respected abroad, more divided at home, and rightly wary of getting into more wars, but ill equipped morally an politically, as well as militarily, for any other kind of relations with the rest of the world.”

    On the diplomatic side, “Progressive statesmen have used diplomacy to try accomplishing things inherently impossible”—specifically, to “‘rise above’ the very real differences between cultures and among sovereign nations” by appealing to “interests that they incorrectly presumed all nations had in common.” Accordingly, in negotiating peace agreements and other treaties, they have often worked “to find common language that admits of varied interpretations”—what they ever-ingenious Dr. Kissinger has called “creative ambiguity.” Hence the fatal vagueness of his missile limitation agreements with the Soviets and his ‘peace’ settlement with the Vietnamese Communists in the 1970s. While Codevilla absurdly continues to claim that the Americans of the Founding and their heirs “intended no conquest, except of the wilderness” (pretending that they limited themselves to purchasing Indian lands), he’s right about Kissinger and the interests he embodied. “Whenever Americans have confused America’s interests with those of mankind at large, they have done so in a way that rationalizes their own assumption of the right to lead, to teach, to help, to act as sheriff, and to provide world order,” all in the name of “progress.” 

    What to do? In the third and most successful part of his book, Codevilla asks how John Quincy Adams would understand our contemporary circumstances and what policies he might recommend to us. It is of course impossible to tell how much of this is Adams, how much Codevilla, but whatever the ration of A to C may be, the results are worth considering.

    He begins by rehearsing the familiar but no less lamentable facts about the decline in American morals, literacy, and comity, asking, “What foreign policy is possible for a people who hate each other?” The divide between the elites or “ruling class” and the rest of us lies not along a geographic line, as it did in the 1860s; the two groups find themselves marbled together throughout the country, if in different neighborhoods. What a nation disunited along ‘cultural’ lines can accomplish in foreign policy is “by no means clear.” Given the absence of moral consensus among us, Codevilla wisely suggests appealing not so much to principles, which simply are no longer shared, but to consequences. Christian or atheist, ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive,’ you are not likely to want to die thanks to some blunder in foreign policy.

    Given Adams’s aims of defending the self-government of Americans and of making policy consistent with our “real military forces” and “diplomatic realities,” Codevilla recommends abandoning Europe and befriending Russia, concentrating our attention on China, upholding commercial reciprocity, treating enemies in the Middle East the way Jefferson treated the Barbary pirates, and getting out of the many international organizations we’ve joined. America should return to unilateralism—that is to say, independence of action—except when we undertake treaties ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, as the Constitution stipulates. This contrasts with the elite consensus stated by President Barack Obama in an address to the United Nations in 2009: “Giving up freedom of action…binding ourselves to international rules over the long term—enhances our security.” “Truth, Adams would argue, is exactly the reverse.” We should reserve our international commitments for “specific interests in specific circumstances.” Far from devaluing our commitments, this means “making only the ones that we must and intend to keep.”

    Codevilla’s Adams would see that the size of the American military is greater than its warmaking capacity. Our military forces should be reduced and reconfigured. Instead of spreading them out over the globe, they should be concentrated for the task of homeland defense. That consists of “firm control of the North Atlantic, of the eastern and central Pacific, as well as assured access to the rest of the oceans.” It also “means control of orbital space over America,” defense of American territory “against all missiles from anywhere,” and space-based defense of our satellites. The Roosevelt strategy of a network of naval bases around the world should be maintained but reduced to those essential to the purposes mentioned. We should regroup “American forces now scattered and vulnerable all over the globe, mostly back onto U.S. soil.” Get them out of Europe, Korea, and Japan, as the countries in those places “have abundant resources to take care of themselves.” Taiwan, however, excepted: located in “the geographic and political bull’s eye of China’s drive to control the Western Pacific,” it should be fortified “military and politically” in order to keep the South China Sea open to American shipping. As for Iran, we should “kill this enemy for its enmity to America and…do it in exemplary fashion,” not with military force but with rigorous economic sanctions.

    Codevilla’s remarks on Taiwan are an important concession to contemporary geopolitical reality. Adams would have no interest in stationing U.S. military personnel and weaponry in such a remote place. TR would, and so has Codevilla.

    Remarking the political use of U.S. intelligence agencies by operative within the agencies themselves, Codevilla attributes these vagaries to bureaucrat bloat and the consequent loss of “their republican character.” “Restoring that character—insofar as that may be possible—requires shrinking them” and “stripping them of the prestige that they are weaponizing” against critics of the “partisan oligarchy” to which they have come to belong. Most of the CIA’s functions (for example) could be transferred to the Pentagon and the Foreign Service. Statesmanship requires not so much ‘top-secret intel’ but straightforward summaries of publicly available information and careful observation of actions taken, “informed by the statesmen’s own knowledge, experience, and good diplomatic reporting.”

    As for trade policy, Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 Report on Manufactures remains a sound guide. Hamilton understood that political independence requires economic independence, and “to some extent, economic rationality”—most notably the practice of free trade—must be “sacrificed to the ratio of statesmanship.” His support of protective tariffs laid the cornerstone of American economic policy for generations, pursued by Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln, among others. China’s thus-far successful manipulation of American capitalists into putting the country into a position of dependence on Chinese manufactures is the principal case in point. With its “dictatorial control over the world’s biggest reservoir of intelligent, disciplined labor,” the Chinese Communist Party has ratcheted itself into the position of chief supplier of basic pharmaceuticals, electronics, and materials for batteries for the U.S. Why allow this to continue?

    Codevilla devotes a chapter each to Adamsonian responses to Latin America, the Muslim world, Europe, Russia, and China. Adams “would judge Latin America more consequential than ever”; not only is it connected to American territory by land, its young, poor, “mal-governed” and “restless” population, “over twice our number,” inclines to move northward. This migration poses an “existential threat” to the United States, as those who come here no longer seek temporary, seasonal work but move “from Central America’s welfare rolls to ours.” Expecting a new pool of voters, the Democratic Party welcomes them, despite “the danger of deculturation and increased criminality” they present. Codevilla recommends making our southern border impenetrable and rejecting moves to decriminalize drugs. In addition, we should boycott the enemy regimes of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, imposing secondary sanction on all governments and corporations that continued doing business with them. The U.S. government should invoke the Monroe Doctrine against Chinese and Russian penetration into the region.

    With regard to Muslims, Codevilla regards their civilization as “sick” “beyond the reach of foreigners to cure.” American involvement in the region made some sense during the Cold War and “as along as we depended upon Middle East oil, but neither of those conditions exists now”. The terrorists of today should be treated as Founding-generation Americans treated the Barbary pirates: “exterminate them physically as mankind’s common enemy.” Regime change strategies will remain fruitless because “Western standards of material comfort and civil freedom” cannot be sustained “while adhering to the Koran’s moral and social prescriptions.” As for the secularized segments of the population, in the past century “they have tried socialism and dallied with Nazism, aligned themselves with Americans and with Russians,” but “corruption and despotism are the main things they have delivered to their peoples.” Americans have frustrated themselves in the Middle East because we haven’t focused “on what we want for ourselves from the region—which is not much,” any more. Once again, secondary sanctions are his preferred weapon against regimes that sponsor terrorism against the U.S. Muslims “lived peaceably alongside the West when the West had left it no alternative to doing so”; ergo, leave it no alternative.

    There has been much talk of bringing India into closer alliance with the United States as a counter to China’s increasing power in Asia. Codevilla doubts that this can go very far. Indian statesmen already know very well that they need to oppose Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean, “but nothing could persuade India to send its navy through the straits of Malacca into the South China Sea to back up the U.S. Navy in a confrontation with China.” Trade with both India and its enemy, Pakistan, should continue, as it has since the eighteenth century. As is so often the case, “where interests align, little if any effort to coordinate them is necessary,” and “where they do not, attempting to make them so is largely futile.”

    What about Europe? First, Americans should recognize that “no part of Europe can possibly remain European unless it walls itself off from the Muslim flood.” “Europeans serious about reviving a dying civilization” will need “to restore their relationship with Christianity”—a task Americans have become singularly unlikely to be useful in assisting. De Gaulle understood that, and sought to supplement it with the patriotism secular Frenchmen have long embraced. Codevilla judges that patriotism has declined even faster than Christianity in Europe, whose “very capacity to marshal people for any common purpose whatever has well-nigh disappeared.” Europeans today will never “hazard comfort, let mind lives, for their national governments,” much less for the “supranational elites” of the European Union, “whom they increasingly despise.” “The Europe of states with structured, responsive societies and high-quality educational systems…is past history and can never return.” The only exceptions are Poland and Hungary; given more recent events, he might add Ukraine. But as for Western Europe, in Codevilla’s acerbic turn of phrase, “the establishment deplores the voters in the name of democracy.” Given all this, “America should not modify its policies to please European governments or elite opinion,” instead negotiating trade agreements on a country-by-country basis. If Europeans want to assert their independence, they should shift from Russia to America as their supplier of natural gas.

    Militarily, Europe has no real need of U.S. military assistance to defend it against Russia, since “conquering and occupying Ukraine, never mind Germany, France, Italy, etc., is beyond Russia’s physical as well as political capacity.” Besides, “Europeans have even less interest in defending themselves than Russia does in attacking them.” In this, one sees again the limitations of Codevilla’s strictures. Just as in the 1930s, when British university boys averred they would never fight for king and country, so contemporary Europeans sober up fast when a real threat looms. As always, or at least intermittently, Russia stands ready to provide that kind of threat. 

    “What is Russia to us?” Codevilla asks. It was the Bolshevik Revolution that turned it into an enemy, and Russia still resents its defeat and retreat in the Cold War. Although its population continues to decline and its regime still “lacks the sort of entrepreneurship, trust, and cooperation that produces widespread wealth,” its neo-czarist government successfully appeals to nationalism (indeed revanchisme) and moreover wields “fearsome, intelligently built” military forces in the form of nuclear weapons systems. Republicanism won’t happen, there. Codevilla claims that when America “pushed NATO to Russia’s borders in the Baltic states and interfered massively in Ukraine” during the 1990s, “Russians came to see America as an enemy” and chose Putin as their instrument of resistance. But U.S. withdrawal of missile defenses from Eastern Europe didn’t satisfy President Putin, who has proved a man difficult to appease with concessions. His successful conquest of Crimea “has exposed the West’s incapacity to interfere militarily in the former Soviet Empire”—a rather large claim, inasmuch as that empire extended into Germany. This notwithstanding, Codevilla assures his readers that “Putin is painfully aware of Russia’s limits,” although his own chapter recounts how fluid those limits can be. “With Ukraine (and the Baltic states), Russia is potentially a world power. Without it, much less.” True, but Putin aspires to Russian greatness. Codevilla counters that it was Communist ideology that made a Soviet Russian empire possible, and that Russia owes its influence in Western Europe to its natural gas, which produces money from Europe useful in corrupting European officials. Eastern Europe continues to detest its former master, but “America cannot possibly guarantee” its independence. This is because Russia “can safely conduct military operations on its borders, even with nukes, because it possesses missile and anti-missile weapons superior in number and quality to those of America and China combined.” “The U.S. military has no way of dealing with this.” Although “Ukraine is the greatest practical limitation on Russia’s ambitions,” and “its independence is very much a U.S. interest,” that independence “is beyond our capacity to secure.” Evidently, that remains to be seen. To secure it by ourselves, yes; to secure it by backing the Ukrainians, who’ve proven themselves ready to fight, maybe. 

    Codevilla identifies China as America’s most formidable rival. He dismisses its Communist ideology as “Marxist gobbledegook, the only intelligible aspect of which is to justify the Party’s rule.” This is very much in line with his ‘realist’ assumption that ideational structures only mask libido dominandi, whether they are seen in Progressive ‘idealists’ pursuing postwar containment of Communism to the Communists themselves. Unfortunately, he is wrong. Mao used that Marxist gobbledegook to justify murdering tens of millions of Chinese; his successors today use it to justify a Leninist New Economic Policy as a weapon against the commercial republics.

    This error doesn’t prevent Codevilla from seeing that China’s rulers pay “for unfettered access to American markets, schools, corporations, and political systems with money from their people’s cut-rate labor.” This “outright economic warfare” aims at “subordinat[ing] America” in order to position China as the center of the CCP’s own new world order—the “most thoroughgoing mercantilism ever conceived.” Codevilla’s Adams would observe that Chinese nationalism, even racism, lacks the attraction that Marxism, including Maoism, once exerted: “money and power” cannot substitute for the “universal claims” of Marxism-Leninism. Similar to the Russian czars, China’s rulers claim rule on the basis of a new version of the traditional Mandate of Heaven, but this “emphasizes rather than transcends China’s particularity and foreignness.” 

    Therefore, the United States should concentrate its attention on “China’s straightforward military-geopolitical challenge in the Western Pacific.” They have already completed an effective extension of their borders by occupying international waters by constructing islands in the South China Sea for the support of their military personnel and weapons. This is “a slow-moving borderline act of war,” and “round one has gone to China.” Unlike the United States, it has real strategists at the helm, their objective being “to dominate the Western Pacific eastward, and nearby Eurasia to the West, with power that radiates out from Zung Guo, the center country.” Nor have they neglected war preparations in space, placing an unmanned probe on the far side of the moon, away from the prying eyes of Americans. This proves that “China can do anything in space that America can do—and that it may do or have already be doing things that America has chosen not to do,” such as inserting laser weapons into space, weapons designed to destroy U.S. satellites, which afford command and control over U.S. naval and ground operations. 

    Codevilla would respond, as indicated before, by backing Taiwan. Seizing it remains “China’s foremost symbolic political-military objective.” But “Taiwan’s people, with per capita GDP 250 percent of mainland China’s fiercely guard their independence from Beijing. Their mountains are ideal for placing modern sensors, as well as missiles, defensive and offensive.” Denying China the possibility of a successful assault on Taiwan “may be the key to persuading Beijing that it has no sane alternative to peace,” if Americans supplement this policy by deploying missile defenses in the United States itself and by strengthening our own military bases in the Pacific. To prevent the Chinese from controlling the geopolitically crucial Straits of Malacca, the United States should support other nations to “fortify their land approaches to the straits” without “try[ing] to substitute for locals’ commitments.” On China’s other ocean border, Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons and North Korea, China’s pawn, should be ruined with economic sanctions.

    Codevilla devotes his last two chapters to summarizing the principles of John Quincy Adams’s foreign policy as they can be applied to our contemporary circumstance. We can no longer rely on the natural-rights Christianity Adams knew. But we can still attend to the consequences of continuing in our present course. As “the world’s primary economic power,” America’s most effective weapon now is the secondary economic sanction, refusal to trade with anyone who trades with a target country. “Compared to that measure of war, bombing a few ports is nothing.” In the Middle East, Iran would then need to choose “between starving and ending their government’s war on America.” Also, the Kurds deserve our support (although he doesn’t admit it, Kurdish independence resulted from America’s forced regime change in Iraq). A Kurdish state “would be in America’s interest because, in our time, America’s enemies are the ones who benefit from its absence,” namely, Turkey, Iran and its allies in other sections of Iraq, and Syria (along with the regime’s Russian backers). Codevilla is understandably shy about admitting what he failed to admit about Adams’s (and Washington’s) America—that carefully chosen regime changes in foreign nations are not such a bad idea.

    He is more forthright in laying down the other principles of a revived version of “America First.” Inasmuch as “precision of speech is a precondition for responsible thought,” and responsibility (as Madison argued) is the moral precondition of representative government or republicanism, Americans should practice such speech much more often than they have been in the habit of doing. Not only will this shore up the American regime, it will enable American statesmen “to deal without pretense with diverse foreign regimes regardless of their differences with ourselves.” And of course those statesmen must back up their words with actions.

    Next, we should mind our own business in the sense first of all of understanding ourselves, knowing “what we need and what we should fear from others.” Not only self-respect but self-knowledge is indispensable for self-defense, and self-defense requires to define how what happens relates to us, to our own interests as citizens in a commercial republican regime. For example, which foreign powers are making themselves our business? Iran, North Korea, China, and Qatar all qualify; Codevilla leaves Russia off the list, rather too optimistically. 

    Having understood the moral need of responsibility, we should shoulder it. “Too many people performing too many functions physically prevent presidents from exercising control as they did a century ago,” thanks to Progressives’ state-building throughout those years. “The CIA has long contended that intelligence, properly done, would leave the president only command’s ceremonial function.” Its pretensions to oligarchy should be bridled. “The point here is not that presidents are likelier to make better judgments than bureaucrats, but to reiterate that the logic of operations requires unity of conception and consistency of execution, while the logic of representative government demands that the persons responsible for conception and execution be answerable to the people.”

    Finally, Americans need to relearn the art of matching means with ends. “Solvency is the basis of business.” Such Progressive tropes as ‘world order,” ‘rules-based environment,’ ‘international democratic values,’ ‘international comity,’ and ‘international norms’ sound impressive, but what, exactly, do they mean, and what will it take to achieve them? Progressivist historicism puts the burden of working that out its grandest and haziest notion of all, ‘historical progress.’ But “who would have to be killed to remove [the] obstacles” to that? “Who would do the killing. At what point would it stop?” The questions such men as Lenin, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao faced forthrightly are the questions Progressives prefer to wave away. “Trying to fulfill Progressive dreams would require far more power, knowledge, and virtue than is available to human beings,” whose nature ‘historical progress’ has yet to alter. “The past century’s foreign policy of semi-forceful global meliorism has been based on pretense. It is time to get back to reality.” Progressives will resist that return because they will prove reluctant to give up their de facto bureaucratic oligarchy, now well-entrenched. On the other hand (and here Codevilla puts his own optimism on display) “it should not be difficult, even for Americans who hate one another, to agree that the consequences of foreign wars, especially of wars unsupported by the public, are not good for anyone.”

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Bossuet on “Universal History” as Re-written by Christ

    May 6, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet: Discourse on Universal History. Part II, chapters 19-31, Part III. Elborg Forster translation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 

     

    Bossuet argues that Jesus Christ transformed the course of human events, first of all by the miracles He performed. “His miracles are of a peculiar order and of a new kind”: unlike Jewish miracles, which were “signs from heaven,” Jesus works His miracles directly upon men, “heal[ing] their infirmities”; His miracles “imply kindness rather than power and do not so much surprise the beholders as touch the depths of their hearts”; He performs His miracles “with authority,” making nature and demons alike obey; “the source of the miracles is within himself,” not from God working through Him; and although “none had ever performed either so great or so many miracles,” He “promises that his disciples shall, in his name, do still greater works than these, so fruitful and inexhaustible is the virtue he bears within him.” Yet even with such powers, His children receive no promises of worldly rewards. When he speaks to them, revealing “the secrets of God,” He “tempers the sublimity of his teachings” to His hearers, offering “milk for babes and at the same time bread for the strong.” He “dispenses with measure” His measureless knowledge.

    He similarly measures His power. The Pharisees and priests condemn Him; His disciples forsake Him; the Sanhedrin and the High Priest condemn Him as a blasphemer; the Roman governor, knowing Him to be innocent, nonetheless calls Him guilty and orders His execution. He never resists this evil. That is, “the most heinous of all crimes”—Deicide—is “the occasion for the most perfect obedience that the world ever saw.” “Jesus, master of life and of all things, voluntarily surrenders to the fury of wicked men and offers the sacrifice which was to be the expiation of mankind.” With His death on the Cross, “the Law” of Moses “ceases, its symbols pass away, its sacrifices abolished” by this one supreme sacrifice. [1] “Everything changes in the world” when Jesus, dying, says “It is finished.” Performing yet another miracle upon a human body, he rises from the tomb to be seen, heard, and touched by His followers. With these proofs in their minds, with His command to bear witness to them in their hearts, the preaching of His followers “is unshakable, its foundation a positive fact, unanimously attested to by those who saw it” and their sincerity “vindicated by the strongest proof imaginable, that of torments and of death itself” in imitatio Christi. By promising always to be with them, until the end of the world, “he assures the perpetual continuance of the ecclesiastical ministry.”

    Having confirmed the Sonship of Jesus, Bossuet turns to a discussion of His ‘nature’—His relation to the other Persons of the Trinity and His Incarnation. Just as his defense of miracles aims at the criticisms offered by Spinoza, his theology aims at the philosophy of Descartes.

    In revealing the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation to us, Jesus “makes us find the image of them in ourselves, so that they may always be present with us and so that we may understand the dignity of our nature.” Begin by doing as Descartes recommends. “If we impose silence on our sense and shut ourselves up for awhile in the inmost recesses of our soul, that is, in that part where truth makes its voice heard, we shall see there some image of the Trinity we adore.” Our intelligence gives birth to our thought, which “gives us some idea of the Son of God eternally conceived in the intelligence of the Heavenly Father.” Jesus is God’s Son in the sense that our thought comes forth from our intelligence, not a body “but that inner word which we perceive in our soul when we contemplate the truth.” Further, in our introspection “we love that inner word and the mind in which it is born; and by loving it, we perceive in ourselves something no less precious to us than our mind and our thought, something which is the fruit of both, which united them, which is united with them and constitutes with them but one and the same life.” The Holy Spirit, then, is the divine analogue to this human love. “Thus, I say, is produced in God the eternal love which proceeds from the Father who thinks, and from the Son who is his thought, in order to make with him and his thought one and the same nature equally blessed and perfect.” Just as human intelligence, thought, and love arise simultaneously within us, so “we must not imagine anything unequal or separate in this divine Trinity,” and “however incomprehensible this equality may be, our soul, if we listen, will tell us something about it,” being made in the image of it.” In “these three things” “lie the happiness and dignity of rational nature,” a nature that “knows perfectly what it is,” whose “understanding corresponds to the truth of its being” and “loves it being with its intelligence, as much as both deserve to be loved.” “These three things are never separated and contain one another: we understand that we are, and that we love; and we love to be and to understand. Who can deny this, if he understands himself?”

    The analogy between God and Man extends to the Incarnation. The human soul, “by nature spiritual and incorruptible,” by which Bossuet means eternal not sinless. It has been joined to “a corruptible body.” Taken together, soul and body constitute “a man,” a being “at the same time incorruptible and corruptible, intelligent and totally brutish.” So too with the Son, Word become flesh as the son of Mary as well as the Son of God. “This makes him God and man together.” True, the analogy, like all analogies, is “imperfect.” Jesus’ soul existed before His body did, whereas “our soul does not exist before our body.” The human soul “elevates the body to its own level by governing it,” but “in Jesus Christ, the Word presides over everything,” keeping “everything under its control.” Jesus’ every thought, speech, and action are “worthy of the Word, that is to say…worthy of reason itself, of wisdom itself, ad of truth itself.” When we fail to understand this, we show ourselves human-all-too-human: “the senses govern us too much, and our imagination, which insists on intruding in all our thoughts, does not always permit us to fix our attention upon so pure a light.” As a result, “we do not know ourselves,” remaining “ignorant of the riches we carry deep down in our nature,” visible to “none but the most purified eyes.”

    The mission of Jesus therefore “is infinitely exalted above that of Moses,” who was “sent to rouse sensual and besotted men by temporal rewards,” Bossuet alleges. The only way to elevate such debased men was to “lay hold of them through the senses and to inculcate in them by this means a knowledge of God and an abhorrence of idolatry, which for mankind has such an amazing propensity.” Christ’s mission was “to inspire man with higher ideals and to give him full and evident knowledge of the dignity, immortality, and eternal felicity of his soul.” Philosophy by itself can’t find its way to this truth, as “most of the philosophers could not believe in the immortality of the soul without believing it a portion of the deity; a deity itself, an eternal being, uncreated as well as incorruptible, and having no more beginning than end,” as seen in their doctrine of the transmigration of souls. The Pentateuch “gave man but a first notion of the nature of the soul and its felicity,” showing Man that he was animated by God’s breath. Once man failed to live up to his God-given origin, God gave Moses the Law by which a portion of humanity, made exemplary by that Law and that Law alone, to prevent the worst carnage. Under the dispensation granted to Moses, Judaism acknowledges the future life but doesn’t make belief in it and in God’s supremely self-sacrificing way of guaranteeing it “the foundation of religion,” as Christianity does. 

    Therefore “the most characteristic law of the Gospel is that of bearing one’s cross”—the “true test of faith.” Jesus sets the example, dying “without finding either gratitude in those he serves, fidelity in his friends, or equity in his judges.” He does this “to let upright man see that in the greatest extremities he needs neither human consolation nor even any tangible sign of divine help: let him but love and trust, resting assured that God is mindful of him though he gives no token of it, and that eternal bliss is in store for him.” The cry of Man, even of the God-man in extremis, “My God, my God, why have You forsaken me?” finds its answer in this faith.

    This truth has a moral corollary. Plato’s Socrates tells the story of Gyges, a man who possessed a ring that made him invisible whenever he wanted to be, and so led a life of criminal vice without detection. Socrates argues that the truly virtuous man remains virtuous not only if his actions are unseen by other men but even if his virtues bring down upon him the envy of other men, “even to the point of being” tortured. That is of course exactly what happened to Jesus. “Does it not seem that God put this wonderful idea of virtue into a philosopher’s mind only to have it realized in his Son’s person and to show that the just man has another glory, another rest, in short, another happiness than can possibly be attained upon earth.” “What greater accomplishment could be reserved for a God coming into the world?”

    Perhaps there is one greater: the revolution or regime change Jesus makes against Satan, who had ruled this world. Satanic powers had murdered the one truly innocent man. All men were, and are, guilty of sin and therefore justly turned over to the most sinful of all rulers. But “by attacking the innocent,” Satan’s Hell “shall be obliged to release the guilty whom it held captive” because Satan overstepped the just limit God had placed upon him. “The woeful obligation by which we were delivered over to rebel angels, is wiped out: Jesus Christ has nailed it to his Cross, there to be blotted out by his blood.” In His grace, divine justice “is itself overcome; the sinner, its due victim, is snatched from its hands.” With this sacrifice, “Jesus Christ eternally binds to himself the elect for whom he sacrifices himself: they are his members and his body; henceforth the eternal Father can only see them through the body of Christ; and thus [the Father] extends toward them the infinite love with which he loves his Son.” “The true Promised Land” is not the physical one Moses saw from afar but “the heavenly kingdom” under a “wholly spiritual law,” the Christ-ian law of love, no longer the Mosaic law.

    With this new ruler of the world comes a new ruling body—the Church or assembly of Christ’s people. The original body of the children of God, the Jews, had established the earthly site of God’s kingdom in Jerusalem, “notwithstanding the lack of belief of most of the nation,” for which they were repeatedly punished by their loving Father. Indignant at the Apostles’ preaching to the Gentiles, “the Jews” delivered Paul, the Jewish convert to Christianity, to the Romans. (Bossuet later actually claims that the Jews “crucified Him.”) They revolted against the Romans and were crushed by them; the Romans, unconverted either to Judaism or Christianity, were used by God as instruments of punitive judgment against the Jews, whom Bossuet regards as apostates, and against the Christians of Jewish or Gentile origin, now united as the new people of God, subject to chastising or corrective punishment by those Romans, whose persecution only strengthens the bonds of the new politeuma. “A new people is formed, and the new sacrifice, so much heralded by the prophets, begin to be offered over the whole earth.” As for the Jews, those who did not convert no longer belong to God’s people; “by their infidelity toward the seed promised to Abraham and David, [they] are no longer Jews or sons of Abraham other than in the flesh”; they thereby “renounce the promise by which all nations were to be blessed.” “The Gentiles incorporated with the Jews henceforth become the true Jews and the true kingdom of Judah, opposed to that schismatic Israel cut off from the people of God; they [i.e., both Jewish and Gentile converts] become the true kingdom of David through their obedience to the laws and Gospel of Jesus Christ, the son of David.” Indeed, “there is nothing more remarkable than that separation of the unbelieving Jews from the Jews converted to Christianity.”

    Had Bossuet foreseen the ‘universal history’ of the subsequent three hundred years, he would have understood what dangerous ground he treads, here. He does admit that “the God of mercies has not yet exhausted his mercies toward that patriarch race, despite its faithlessness,” preserving them “outside their country and in their ruin, even longer than the nations that have conquered them.” The ancient Medes, Persians, Greeks, and Romans “have been blended with other nations.” By preserving the Jews, by not enabling them to ‘assimilate,’ God “keeps us in expectation of what he will still do for the unhappy remnant of a people once so highly favored.” At the end of days, Jews shall be redeemed; “they shall return, never again to go astray.” But for now, they are “slaves wherever they are”—as they had been in Egypt—without honor, without liberty, without identity as a people,” by which Bossuet must mean without sovereignty, since he just said God has carefully preserved them.  Their present diaspora “teach[es] us to fear God” and to consider “the judgments he executes upon his ungrateful children, so that we may learn never to glory in the favors shown to our fathers.” 

    All of that notwithstanding, it still is necessary to pause and to consider what Bossuet teaches, here. This isn’t the modern pseudoscience of the ‘anti-Semites.’ Bossuet’s argument does not classify Jewish people as members of a ‘race’ in any biological sense, and therefore does not lead to genocide. In fact, it effectually prohibits it by classifying race-murder as an attempt to thwart God’s providence. But his supercessionist theology does lead to callousness with regard to Jewish subordination in ‘Christian Europe.’ In effect, he claims that Jewish slavery ‘serves them right’ for failing to convert to Christianity. He is explicit on this point. The unconverted Jews’ punishment for “the most heinous of all crimes, a crime until then unheard-of, namely, deicide…resulted in a vengeance such as the world had never seen,” much worse than the destruction of the first Temple by Nebuchadnezzar. “They had to perish,” not as a nation but as a sovereign nation united in one place. This isn’t anti-Semitism, but it is an attempt to justify the old-fashioned ghettoization of Jews, up to and perhaps including pogroms or at very least making pogroms likely. Where is Christian love, the love of the Holy Spirit, in any of this? A few pages later, he condemns the Roman emperor, Julian “the Apostate,” for “stoop[ing] so low as to court the Jews, who were the outcasts of the world.” More, “Jews remain the laughingstock of the nations and the object of their aversion.” Bossuet thus provides a window into the vile practices of many European Christians, crimes committed against innocent people deemed perennially guilty by their persecutors for their refusal to concur with Christian teachings. This sort of anti-Judaism sets up a cycle of self-justifying tyranny by tempting Christians to abuse Jews under the illusion that they, Christians, thereby act as divinely appointed scourges. [2]

    The Biblical (not only New-Testament) humility he does commend makes considerable sense, quite apart from the teachings of the Bible, when Bossuet recounts the course of events in Christendom after the days of the Apostles. The blood of the martyr was indeed the seed of the Church, but the doctrines of the heretics were its herbicide. As it happened, the Church learned that “it has no less to suffer under Christian emperors than it had suffered under infidel emperors and that it must shed blood to defend not only the whole body of its doctrine but even every individual article.” It turned out that the ‘new’ Jews, the Christians, were as vulnerable to idolatry as the ‘old’ Jews. The old idolaters “forgot reason” by attempting to make their own gods. The true God did indeed want men to forget reason but “to forget it in another manner.” No one understands the Cross of Christ by reason alone, by ‘unassisted’ reason; you understand it “by bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ, by casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God.” God’s remedy for the disease of idolatry was faithful and grateful obedience because “it was not through reason that one could destroy an error which reason had not established.” Idolatry isn’t false reasoning, a thing refutable by logic, but the absence of reasoning at all, hence invulnerable to rational argument, “an inversion of good sense” not to be argued with. Reasoning only irritates a frenzied person. Even Plato could not overthrow pagan altars and found himself force to make sacrifices to them in the form of “a lie,” feigned religiosity. “What purpose have you thus served, O philosophy!”

    “God completely overwhelmed reason by the mystery of the Cross; and, at the same time, he applied the remedy to the roots of the evil.” The Cross could do this because idolatry originates in “that profound attachment we have for ourselves.” Loving ourselves, we “contrive gods like ourselves.” In worshipping them, we really worship our “own thoughts, pleasures, and fancies.” By contrast, Jesus teaches us to “forget ourselves, renounce everything, crucify everything, in order to follow him,” to tear ourselves from ourselves, to love suffering instead of pleasure. “By taking upon himself the pain of sin without sin itself,” Jesus “showed that he was not a guilty person punished but the Just One atoning for the sins of others.” “An apparent folly,” the Cross calls us to a wisdom “so sublime that to our wisdom it appears folly; and its rules are so exalted that the whole seems an aberration.” Yet “the apostle and their disciples, the outcasts of the world, mere nothings, if we look upon them with human eyes, have prevailed over all the emperors and the whole empire of the Romans,” now ruined. In making this happen, God “has laid low all human pride which would come to” the defense of the idols, “perform[ing] this great work as he had created the universe, by the sole power of his word.”

    A Christian shouldn’t take idolatry too literally. It has “diverse forms,” as sensual pleasure, self-interest, ignorance, “a false veneration of antiquity,” politics, philosophy, and heresy “all come to its aid.” In this struggle, the Bishop of Meaux looks to the Catholic Church as the true bulwark against the idols. “Some”—the heretical sects—were “perhaps lost in the by-ways; but the Catholic Church was always the highway taken by most of those who sought Jesus Christ.” Given the tradition it took over from pre-Christian Jews, Bossuet defends the Jewish tradition as authentic and venerable. “The Mosaic tradition is too clear and too persistent to allow the least suspicion of falsehood”; “the Jewish people always showed an invincible repugnance at accepting something they had never heard of before as ancient and as having come from Moses, and at accepting as familiar and established something just recently put into their hands.” They are the least likely people to have corrupted their own tradition. In “her clear victory over all sects,” the Catholic Church evinces the continuity of true religion—a “wonderful sequence of events” which, “through time…leads you to eternity.”

    Bossuet’s account of Christianity teaches the Dauphin and other readers the true justification of humility against human selfishness and the delusions it fosters. In Part III, he teaches them the reasons for humility by presenting the universal history of empires. He doesn’t keep his intention secret, either, titling the first chapter, “The Overthrow of Empires Is Ordered by Providence and Serves to Keep Princes in Humility.” Or so one might well wish.

    “Most of these empires” he will discuss “are by necessity linked with the history of God’s people,” God having used the Assyrians and Babylonians to chastise them, the Persians to restore them, Alexander to protect them. Even the persecuting Romans provided Christians with a framework for proselytizing by maintaining a multinational empire with good roads. In the end, “the Roman Empire yielded” to Christianity, “having found a power more invincible than its own.” After God chastised the Romans by permitting them to succumb to barbarian invasions, today “Rome continues to exist only through Christianity,” through the Roman Catholic Church, the religion it now “brings to the whole world.”

    In light of this course of events, “even from a merely human point of view, it is extremely useful, especially for princes, to contemplate this passing of empires, since the arrogance which so often attends their eminent position is greatly dampened by this sight. For if men learn moderation when they see the death of kings, how much more will it strike the to see even the death of kingdoms!” Because “permanence is not for men,” because “change and unrest are the proper lot of human affairs,” human empire can never match the continuity of God’s religion, or at least not in the same way. The course of human empires has “its own continuity and its own proportion,” which may be seen in the causes “their progress and their decadence”—a topic Bossuet addressed (if in a very different manner) several decades before Montesquieu. “The true science of history consists in uncovering for each age the hidden tendencies which have prepared the way for great changes and the important combinations of circumstances which have brought them about.”

    Unlike subsequent thinkers, Bossuet does not ascribe progress and decadence to impersonal causes. It is “the character of the dominating nations in general, and of princes in particular, as well as that of the outstanding men” who “have contributed for good or evil to the change in empires and the fate of nations.” ‘Fortune’ is not running the show. “By looking at unrelated occurrences we might think that fortune alone decides the rise and fall of empires, but…in reality, taking everything into consideration, the situation is rather akin to gambling, where the most skillful player wins in the long run.” “It is those with the most far-reaching plans, have been the most diligent, have persevered the longest in great efforts and, finally, have known best how to press on or to restrain themselves according to the situation who have, in the end, gained the upper hand and have been able to use fortune itself for their ends.” Neither a Machiavellian, promising the Dauphin that he can master Fortune nor a historical determinist denying that statesmen and other “outstanding men” have any real effect at all, Bossuet points to the interplay between impersonal and personal causes. Of the several empires he considers, Egypt, Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome best illustrate his approach.

    “The Egyptians were the first among whom the rules of government were known,” “the first to recognize the true aim of politics, which is to make life easier and to make the people happy.” To these ends, they made virtue “the foundation of the entire society,” and chief among these virtues was gratitude. Gratitude was reserved for the gods and divinely guided lawgivers, and “ignorance of religion and of the laws of the realm was not tolerated on any social level.” While those laws “were very good, it was even better that everyone was brought up to observe them” ‘to the letter,’ as “the exactitude with which small things were preserved was also the safeguard of the great.” This resulted in extraordinary political continuity: “no people has kept its customs and its laws for a longer time.” In Egyptian courtrooms, no demagogues were permitted to exhibit that “false eloquence which dazzles the mind and stirs the passions,” fomenting change. “The truth could not be exposed in too dry a fashion” in the senate where cases were judged, and where the Egyptians “preserv[ed] their ancient maxims” by “surround[ing] them with certain ceremonies, which impressed them on people’s minds. Most remarkably, the Egyptians extended the reach of the law beyond death. “When we [moderns] die, it is a consolation to leave our name in esteem among men; and of all the worldly goods, this is the only one death cannot take away. but in Egypt it was not permitted to praise the dead indiscriminately. As soon as a man was dead, he was brought to trial,” his final reputation to be established in formal judicial proceedings. Those found worthy won perpetual gratitude from all subsequent generations of the living.

    So, too, with parents. Mummification had a moral and political purpose: to establish perpetual gratitude toward parents. “When children saw the bodies of their ancestors, they remembered their publicly recognized virtue and endeavored to love the laws they had left to them.” Even the kings were bound by the laws, as Egyptians “believed that reproaches would only exasperate them and that the most efficacious way of inspiring them to virtue was to show them their duty in lawful praise, solemnly expressed before the gods.” The kings were accordingly revered, and rightly so. Whereas in most political communities the kings are not the greatest men, in Egypt under the Theban dynasty “the greatest men were the kings.” “The two Hermes, who founded the sciences and all the institutions of the Egyptians—the one living around the time of the Flood, the other, whom they called Trismegistus, or the Thrice Great, living at the time of Moses—were both kings of Thebes.” They invented astronomy, arithmetic, the art of land surveying that developed into geometry, and medicine. Egypt was “the first nation to have libraries,” with which “Egypt cured itself of ignorance, the most dangerous of illnesses and the source of all the others.” No wonder “most kings were so beloved by the people that everyone mourned their death as much as that of a father or a child.” Making sure that the Dauphin doesn’t miss the point, Bossuet encourages him to study the artworks of Thebes and the inventions of Egypt.

    Egyptian architecture, seen most notably in the pyramids, contrasted with the impressive but unstable structure of the Tower of Babel. Of a piece with its laws and the regime behind them, “from the very beginning the taste of the Egyptians was such that they liked solidity and unadorned regularity,” in imitation of the simplicity of “Nature itself”; “once taste has been corrupted by novelty and extravagant boldness” (perhaps as seen in the Palace of Versailles?) it is “hard to recapture.” But “Egypt did not expend its greatest effort on inanimate things. Its most noble labor and its most accomplished art consisted in forming men” with the “art of developing the body as well as the mind” by “frugality and exercise.” “The country was healthy by nature, but philosophy had taught them that nature needs to be helped.” As a result of this “frugal diet and vigorous exercise,” even the bones of the Egyptians, like their monuments, were hard, unlike “the fragile skulls of the Persians” with whom Egyptian remains were mingled on battlefields. And the brains inside those skulls were still more impressive. “Egypt ruled by giving advice, and this rule of the mind seemed to them more noble and more glorious than any rule that can be established by armies.” This brought such Greeks as Homer, Pythagoras, Plato, Lycurgus and Solon “to Egypt to learn wisdom.” And “God wished that Moses himself be learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians; this is how he came to be mighty in words and deeds. True wisdom avails itself of everything; and God does not wish those whom he inspires to neglect human mans, which, in their own way, also come from him.” That is, the two wellsprings of Western civilization, the Greeks and the Hebrews, both flowed from Egypt.

    The Babylonian Empire provides a contrast to Egyptian wisdom. Babylon “had a strange destiny, since it perished through its own inventions.” They had diverted the Euphrates River into an artificial lake in order to build a bridge, giving them control of the entrance to the city against any would-be conqueror. When Cyrus besieged the city, he simply rediverted the river back to its original course and marched through the dry riverbank into Babylon. And even then, had “the slopes been guarded, the Persians could have been overpowered when they passed through the riverbed” below. But the “insane self-confidence” and hedonism of the Babylonians made them neglectful even of establishing a proper military order and chain of command. “This is the downfall not only of the strongest fortifications but even of the greatest empires.” France, take note. 

    Persia’s Cyrus, although indeed great, “well brought up in warlike pursuits,” failed politically by exhibiting less-than-Egyptian wisdom when it came to his successors. He “did not take enough care to give the successor to his empire an education similar to his own; and, as is usual in human affairs, too much greatness was detrimental to virtue.” With the exception of Cyrus, Persia generally lacked the civic virtues, thanks to a defective education. “The respect for royal authority which the Persians were taught from childhood on was carried to excess by its admixture of adoration; and” unlike the Egyptians, “the Persians seem to be slaves rather than subjects who submitted their reason to lawful authority.” Bossuet find a possible excuse for this in “their Oriental temperament,” a “keen and violent nature” which may have “called for a firmer and more absolute government.” The East is not the West; Egypt civilized the Greeks and the Hebrews but the Babylonians and Persians, for all their refinement and all their conquests, lacked the virtues necessary for self-government under their gods.

    Bossuet regards this point as well worth repeating to the Dauphin. “The Greeks, naturally intelligent and courageous, had been educated early by the kings and colonists from Egypt, who, established in various regions of the country from the earliest times on, had widely spread the excellent institutions of the Egyptians,” among which “the best thing taught them was a willingness to learn and to be molded by the law for the public welfare.” As a result, the Greeks learned “to see themselves and their families as parts of a greater body, the state,” which they regarded as “a common mother, to whom they belonged even more than to their parents.” The Greek polis or city-state fostered liberty understood as civility. “To the Greeks the word civility meant more than that graciousness and mutual deference which makes men sociable”—the ‘polite society’ seen in the royal courts of Europe within the vaster boundaries of the centralized modern state. For them, “a civil person was the same thing as a good citizen, who always considers himself as a member of the state, abides by law, and works within it for the public welfare without encroaching on anyone.” By “show[ing] their love of the people, not by flattering them, but by furthering their well-being and upholding the rule of the law” with “uncompromising rectitude,” the ancient Greek monarchs established “a regime” in which “the Greeks gradually came to feel that they were capable of self-government, and most of the cities formed themselves into republics” under the guidance of “wise legislators, such as Thales, Pythagoras, Pittacus, Lycurgus, Solon, Philotas, and many others known to history,” who “prevented liberty from degenerating into license.” Under the republican regimes, “the liberty the Greeks had in mind was a liberty subject to the law, meaning to reason itself as recognized by all the people,” a feature of politics as Aristotle defined it, as ruling and being ruled in turn. “The magistrates, though feared during their tenure, later became private citizens again.” Bossuet carefully states that although “every form of government has its own advantages,” and “the Greeks profited from theirs in the sense that the citizens were all the more attached to their country since they all had a share in its government and since every individual could aspire tp the highest office,” “lawful submission” under a law-abiding monarch presents fewer risks than “the hazards of liberty” in a republic.

    Bossuet judges that philosophy made the Greeks better republicans. “The freer these people were, the more it became necessary to found the rules of behavior and of society upon sound reasoning,” as found in the teachings of Pythagoras, Thales, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Archytas, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, “and an infinite number of others” who “filled Greece with these noble precepts.” “It was a common tenet among the philosophers that a man should either retire from public affairs or consider nothing but the general welfare.” The poets too instructed the Greeks “even more than they entertained them”; Alexander the Great “regarded Homer as a master who taught him how to rule well,” as “this great poet also taught how to obey and to be a good citizen.” “When Greece, nurtured in this manner, saw the Asians in their daintiness, their finery, and their effeminate beauty, it had nothing but contempt for them,” while the Asian “form of government, which was constituted in such a way that the will of the prince was above all the laws, even the most sacred, inspired Greece with horror,” as for them “there was nothing more hatred than barbarism,” whose regime is despotism, the antithesis of ruling and being ruled. They loved Homer’s poetry in part because “it celebrated the victories and advantages of Greece over Asia.” Whereas Asia’s goddess was Aphrodite, the goddess of “pleasure, licentious love, and effeminate manners,” Greece’s goddess was Hera, goddess of “steadiness and conjugal love.” To Hera they added Hermes, god of eloquence, and Zeus, god of “political wisdom.” In Homer’s poems, ” on the side of Asia was the impetuous and brutal Ares, that is, savage warfare; on the side of Greece was Athena, that is, military art and valor controlled by the mind.” Since Homer’s time, then, “Greece had always believed that intelligence and courage were its natural patrimony,” never to be subjugated by Asia, a “yoke that seemed equivalent to subjecting virtue to voluptuousness, the mind to the body and true courage to uncontrolled power, which consists only in numbers,” as seen in the vast Asian armies the Greeks defeated at Salamis.

    Impressive though this was, it wasn’t sufficient in the long run. “Reason alone was incapable of restraining” the “overly spirited and free minds” of the Athenians. Plato, “a wise Athenian who admirably understood the character of his country” suggested that “it was no longer possible to govern them once the victory of Salamis had reassured them as to the Persians.” The overconfidence seen in Babylonian despotism overtook the people of Athens, eventually causing them to lose their war with Sparta. Again, Bossuet implicitly commends a certain reasonable humility to the Dauphin.

    Bossuet turns finally to Rome, “the empire whose laws we still respect and which we consequently should know like any other.” “The very essence of a Roman, so to speak, was his attachment to his liberty and to his country. These feelings reinforced each other; for because he loved his liberty, he also loved his country as a mother who constantly fostered his generosity and his liberty” under the laws. The Romans further reinforced their attachment to liberty and country by refusing to “consider poverty an evil.” “On the contrary, they saw it as a means of preserving their most complete liberty; for who is freer or more independent than a man who is able to make do with very little and who, not expecting anything from anyone’s protection or liberality, counts only on his own industry and his own work for his livelihood?” As Livy observes, “there never was a people to hold frugality, thrift, and poverty in esteem for so long a time”; and so, for example, “when the Samnites offered Carius gold and silver dishes, he replied that his pleasure was not to have them but to give orders to those who did.” “Nothing could be further” from the Roman regime, the Roman “way of life,” than Samnite “effeminacy.”

    The Roman way was the way of a military, not a commercial, republic. Conquer or die was “the inviolable law” of the Roman soldier. Nor was that soldier dependent on his personal virtue, alone. He was a part of a prudently designed military structure, an army divided into small units that could adjust to any terrain, “be united or separated as required,” ready for “separate or concerted actions and to all sorts of deployments and changes, which are executed by the whole army or parts of it, as the need made be.” This organization enabled the Romans to defeat the Macedonians and many others. And you, Dauphin, “see practiced under the command of Louis the Great” exactly such military organization, which lends itself to the flexible tactics prudence or practical reasoning requires, and which the exigencies of warfare demand. [3] Thanks to their superior virtue and organization, the Romans “triumphed over  courage when they defeated the Gauls, over courage and art when they defeated the Greeks, and over both of these qualities, sustained by the most artful strategy, when they triumphed over Hannibal.” “Therefore, nothing in their government gave them as much pride as their military discipline. They always considered it the cornerstone of their empire. Military discipline was the first thing their state brought forth and the last thing it lost, and this shows how closely it was connected with the organization of their republic.” 

    Bossuet now draws the explicit lesson for France and its Dauphin. Here is how you can win the statesman’s gamble against fortune in the long run: “If a government can give its people a taste for glory, patient labor, the greatness of the nation, and patriotism, it can claim that it ha constituted tis state in such a way that it will surely bring forth great men,” who are “an empire’s strength.” “Nature does not fail to endow all nations”—and that must include Asian or ‘Oriental’ nations—with “lofty minds and hearts, but it needs help in developing them.” The French nobility “is so valiant in battle and so bold in all its ventures…because it was taught from childhood on and confirmed in this opinion by the unanimous feeling of the nation, that lack of courage degrades a gentleman and makes him unworthy of the light of day.” Likewise, “in the best days of Rome, even children were trained for war; the greatness of the Roman name was all that counted,” and a father’s failure so to raise his boys was “brought to trial by the magistrates and convicted of an offense against the public.” Thus Rome’s great men brought forth others; Rome’s regime thus “engender[ed] many heroes.” Its rival, Carthage, a commercial republic, inadequately trained for war, hired foreign troops, preferring money to virtue. Carthage lost. [4]

    Rome declined, however, partly because its extensive conquests were unjust, consequences of “the desire to dominate,” and “therefore justly condemned by the rules of the Gospel” and also the teachings of philosophy—notably those of her own Cicero who, following Aristotle, taught that the purpose of war is a just peace, that martial courage must be tempered with civil justice. “The sweet taste of victory and domination soon corrupted the rectitude which natural equity had given the Romans.” Their empire lasted as long as it did because although they were “cruel and unjust” in war, “they governed conquered nations with moderation,” partially following philosophic precept. Indeed, conquered subjects eventually could become citizens, eligible to serve in the Roman senate. “Rome came to be looked upon as the common fatherland.” Ultimately, Rome’s truly fatal flaw was not its injustice in wars beyond its boundaries but its injustice within, its factionalism, its inability “to find a middle course” between patricians and plebeians. “Weary and exhausted by this long period of civil war and in need of tranquility, Rome was forced to renounce its liberty” and to adopt Caesarist despotism. As long as Romans under the republic had external enemies, they remained somewhat united; when their empire was well established, fear no longer united them and their jealous passions destroyed their regime. Moreover, “the character of war is such that the command had to fall into the hands of a single man” and the armies under such men saw that “the empire was at their disposal.” Having “created so many new citizens” in the aftermath of its far-flung conquests, Rome “could hardly recognize itself in the throng of naturalized foreigners.” In the end, the patrician ‘few’ lost to “men of great ambition, together with the wretched poor, who have nothing to lose”; such ambitious men, allied with such wretched men, “have nothing to lose” and so “always favor change” of regime,” in this case away from the mixed-regime, military republican empire to the despotic military empire of the Caesars. Bossuet suggests: Don’t let that happen to France, and to its monarchy, which by his time had a military monarchy that was corrupting its aristocratic element by drawing them into the hedonist society of Versailles.

    Bossuet concludes his book with a Christian message. “Let us no longer speak of coincidence or fortune,” since “God alone can subject everything to his will.” “While you will see almost all [great empires] falling of their own weakness, you will see religion upheld by its own strength; and you will discern without difficulty where solid greatness lies, and where a man of understanding is to place his hopes.”

     

    Notes

    1. This isn’t quite accurate. The Apostle Paul explains to the Galatians that “a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified” (Galatians 2:15-16). Christians receive “the Spirit” not by “the works of the law” but by “the hearing of faith” (Galatians 3:2). This in no way exempts Christians from God’s law, the sum of which is to love God and love your neighbor as yourself. It rather puts law in its rightful place, subordinate to the Spirit of God.
    2. Bossuet would have benefited from revisiting Ephesians 2:11-22, in which passage Paul explains that Jesus has “broken down the dividing wall, that is, the hostility” between Jews and Gentiles, having “abolished in His flesh the enmity” between the two, “that he might reconcile both unto God” and make them “fellowcitizens with the saints, and of the household of God.” 
    3. Charles de Gaulle took the same lesson, as seen in his book, Vers l’armée de métier. Decades later, he said to André Malraux, “I understand Rome.”
    4. Famously, Montesquieu will commend the peaceful commercial republican regime, not military republicanism or military despotism, as a means of overcoming Europe’s chronic civil and international wars, wars spurred not only by aristocratic pride but by Christian zealotry.

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Bossuet on “Universal History” before the Advent of Jesus

    April 27, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet: Discourse on Universal History. Elborg Forster translation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

     

    Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, published his book in 1682. Louis XIV was king; Bossuet had tutored his eldest son, Louis’ presumptive heir, who predeceased his father and whose own son eventually reigned as Louis XV. Bossuet dedicated the book to the Dauphin, continuing the long tradition of courtesy books and mirrors for princes dating back to Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, a tradition revived and adapted to Christian teachings in the thirteenth century by several English, French, and German writers. The Renaissance saw two of the most eminent contributions to the genre, one by Castiglione and another (with a very different twist) by Machiavelli. The Bourbons had founded the modern state in France, inclining to deploy the Catholic Church as a civil religion; at the time of the Discourse‘s publication, Louis was quarreling with Pope Innocent XI over the extension of the droit de régale, whereby the king could claim revenues from vacant dioceses and abbeys. The most prominent French clergymen, beginning with Cardinal Richelieu, who had served as Foreign Secretary under Louis’ father, were suspected of some degree of Machiavellianism, and Machiavelli’s philosophic inheritors, Descartes and Spinoza, were widely read. Bossuet opposes them, reminding the king and especially his son that the divine right of kings can scarcely sustain itself without belief in divinity. As Elborg asks in his helpful introduction, “Is it significant that, regardless of edition, Bossuet’s history of Jesus comes almost exactly in the middle of the book?” Quite possibly so. 

    In his dedication to the Dauphin, Bossuet states his intention: “to explain the history of religion and the changes of empires.” While religion is unitary and perpetual, thanks to God’s continuous direction, empires are plural and changeable, human-all-too-human. Moreover, “even if history is useless to other men, princes should be made to read it,” as it shows them the effects of passion and interest, time and circumstance, good advice and bad advice. “If they need experience to acquire the prudence of a good ruler, nothing is more useful for their instruction than to add the examples of past centuries to the experiences they have every day,” at no risk to themselves or to their people. This should have a salubrious moral effect. “Seeing even the most hidden vices of princes exposed to everyone’s sight, despite the spurious praise they receive during their life, they will be ashamed of the vain pleasure they take in flattery and will understand that true glory comes only with merit.”

    History’s effect of moral and straitening complements its intellectual effect, the ability to make distinctions. “He who has not learned from history to distinguish different ages will represent men under the law of Nature or under written law as they are under the law of the Gospel.” Spinoza attempts precisely to bring men to accept a new form of the law of nature; the ability to distinguish pagan natural law from the law of the Gospel, and both from the law of Moses, will guard the prince against such beguilement. Central to Bossuet’s list of distinctions is the one between the time of liberty under Themistocles and the time of Macedonian rule under Philip. Is it significant that Bossuet places a lesson on liberty in this place, even as he places he places the distinction of France during its civil wars and France “united under that great king,” Louis XIV, in which “France alone triumphs over all of Europe,” last on the list? Does he suggest that liberty leads to factional strife, empire to peace? Or is he, on the contrary, thinking of Catholic Christian liberty, threatened by the imperial monarch?

    However this may be, religion and empire are “the two points around which human affairs revolve.” “To discover their order and sequence is to understand in one’s mind all that is great in mankind and, as it were, to hold a guiding line to all the affairs of the world”—no small thing for any prince to discover. History identifies “epochs” in the course of events, stops or resting places, great events “to which we an relate all the rest.” Of these twelve epochs, the sixth is Solomon’s founding of the Temple in Jerusalem, the seventh Romulus’ founding of Rome; that is, in keeping with the two points of human affairs, there is no one central epoch but a pair. A third and truly crucial turning point in terms of empire is Charlemagne’s founding of the new, Christian empire, ending ancient history. It is noteworthy that Bossuet so often marks the beginning of new epochs in the course of events with a founding, beginning with God’s founding of the human race.

    Bossuet titles the first epoch “Adam, or the Creation.” It lasted from the Creation in 4004 BC to the Flood in 2348 BC. As related by Moses, author of the Pentateuch and therefore “the first historian, the most sublime philosopher”—pace Spinoza—and “the wisest of legislators,” in Adam God fashioned “all men within one man,” as even his wife “was fashioned from him.” The formation of Eve out of Adam indicates God’s intention to establish “harmony in marriage and human society.” After the expulsion from Eden, God’s providential care nonetheless continued, as he taught men the arts indispensable to their survival: agriculture, animal husbandry, weaving, and “perhaps that of finding shelter. For his part, beginning the second epoch, Noah preserved those arts after having preserved mankind itself by the art of carpentry. The Epoch of Noah, or the Flood, lasted 426 years until 1921 BC. It saw the first three founders of nations: Japheth, who established the peoples of the East, Ham, who established the peoples of the South, and Shem, ancestor of the Hebrews. Acting in contradiction to these builders, Nimrod’s “violent nature,” consonant with the way of hunting, made him into the first conqueror, beginning his destructive work at Babylon, the symbol of human pride. In both their constructive and destructive efforts, peoples “were going their separate ways, forgetful of their Creator.” Human learning also began to flourish, as the Chaldeans invented astronomy, which they gave to Callisthenes in Babylon, then by him to Aristotle.

    God’s calling of Abraham, “the beginning of God’s people and the Covenant,” began in 1921 BC and lasted until 1491 BC. God chose Abraham “as the stem and father of all believers,” and Bossuet cleverly adds “It was Jesus Christ whom Abraham honored in the person of the high priest Melchizedek, who represented him”—an elegant way of inserting the authority of the Christian clergy into an Old Testament story. Under this interpretation, the Catholic Church goes back a long way, indeed. And, like Christians in many times and in many places, “the Hebrews were unjustly hated and persecuted without mercy,” enslaved in Egypt. There, the great prophet, Moses, learned “all the wisdom of the Egyptians,” having been “brought up by Pharaoh’s daughter.” 

    During this epoch, Cecrops founded twelve Egyptian colonies in Greece, colonies which eventually became the Kingdom of Athens. The Deucalion flood, “which the Greeks take to be the universal flood,” wiped it out. Deucalion’s son, Hellen, escaped, reigning in the Thessalian city of Pythia; hence the term “Hellenes.” In Thebes, a non-Egyptian set of Gods were introduced by Cadmus, the gods of Syria and Phoenicia. Thus, Greece became polytheistic and (to deploy an anachronism) multicultural, even as the Israelites were monotheists who integrated and subordinated foreign wisdom under divine law.

    The exodus from Egypt and the establishment of that written law by Moses inaugurated the fourth epoch, which lasted from 1491 BC to 1184 BC. Previous to the receipt of God’s law, natural law, consisting of reason and ancestral tradition, guided human conduct. But God’s tabernacle among the Israelites now became the “symbol of the future” of humanity. Jewish history during this epoch consists of events, often violent, by which God “slowly mold[ed]” His people, an education and habituation recounted in Moses’ Pentateuch, in which he recorded these “foundations of our religion.” Elsewhere, Pelops ruled what is now called the Peloponnesus, beginning in 1322; the first Assyrian empire was founded in 1267. Hercules and Theseus came “later,” Theseus founding the city of Athens.

    The fall of Troy occurred in 1184 BC, inaugurating the fifth epoch, which concluded with the completion of Solomon’s Temple in 1004. In the Gentile world, this epoch comes down to us in the form of legends and heroes. In sacred history, Samson, Eli, Samuel, and Saul ruled Israel, followed by David, the “pious warrior.” Athenians “abolished kingship and declared Zeus the only king of the people of Athens,” as the archons or rulers were made accountable to the people of the city. In Greece, then, monotheism was associated with popular rule, not monarchy, whereas in Israel monotheism issued led to a popular call for monarchy.

    The first of the two central epochs began slightly more than a millennium before the birth of Jesus. With perhaps a glance at the French monarchy of his own time, Bossuet relates that Solomon’s reign “ended in shameful weakness,” as “he indulged in the love of women; his spirit grew base, his courage weakened, and his piety degenerated into idolatry.” This brought down God’s judgment, with the kingdom divided after Solomon’s death. Around 890 BC, Dido enlarged and fortified Carthage, a “warlike and commercial republic” with “aspirations for domination of the sea.” If Solomonic Israel parallels seventeenth-century France, ancient Carthage parallels seventeenth-century England. 

    “In these times Homer flourished, and Hesiod flourished thirty years before him. The venerable old ways they depict for us and the vestiges of ancient simplicity they preserve with such nobility are most useful in making us understand much more remote times and the divine simplicity of the Scriptures.” For Bossuet’s modernity, French and English, the sixth epoch holds up the contrast between the decadence of rulers and purity of ancient poetry and the way of life it shows us, to some extent neatly harmonizing those pagan practices with the God-given way seen in the Bible. 

    The reestablishment of the Olympiads, founded by Hercules but long discontinued, in 776 BC “marks the end of what Varro calls the legendary times—since up to that date secular histories were full of confusion and legend—and the beginning of historical times—in which world events in more faithful and precise reports,” thanks to the exact chronology those annual events made possible. Generally, in this chapter Bossuet impresses upon his reader the increasingly unruly character of the Hebrew nation, ruled by kings, and the corresponding improvement and democratization of the Greeks—especially of the Athenians.

    Romulus’ founding of Rome in 754 BC began the seventh epoch, the second of the epochs Bossuet makes central to his book. Rome “was to become the mistress of the world and the seat of religion,” a city dedicated by its founder to the god of war, “whom he called his father.” Bossuet makes no mention of Romulus’ murder of Remus, which would parallel Cain’s murder of Abel and recall Bossuet’s strictures against violence. If France under the Bourbons has become the modern Rome, Bossuet wants no suggestion of crime at the founding of its ruling dynasty. And even in his version of Rome, after Romulus the lawgiver Numa “gave form to religion and softened the barbarous manners of the Roman people.” Gradually, Romans learned to restrain their warlike character without losing it. In the 670s, “as its conquests extended further, Rome established the rules for its militia; and it was under Tullus Hostilius that it began to learn that magnificent discipline which was to make it mistress of the world” and, not incidentally, to “make citizens of its enemies” after mastering them in battle.

    Away from the proto-French Romans, several potential rival empires emerged during this epoch. Weakened by the misrule of an “effeminate prince,” Sardanapalus, the first Assyrian empire fell to the “warlike Medes.” After this event, the Medean empire, the second Assyrian empire, and the Babylonian empire rose and fell in succession. By 600 BC, “Babylon was threatening to enslave the world” and Solomon’s temple was burned. In 562, Nebuchadnezzar died in Babylon, not after foreseeing “the coming ruin of his superb city” while on his deathbed. Indeed, Cyrus the Great of Persia would conquer Babylon not long afterwards. By joining the Kingdom of Persia with that of the Medes, Cyrus “became the uncontested master of the East and founded the greatest empire the world had ever seen.” Under his rule, he ordered the “restoration of God’s Temple in Jerusalem and of the Jewish people in Judaea.” 

    Bossuet draws his account of Cyrus from the Bible and from Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Among the several Gentile historians, he regards “the wise philosopher and skillful captain,” who served in Persia, as the most reliable. “What determines me in my choice is the fact that Xenophon’s history, more coherent and more probable in itself, has the added advantage of being more consistent with the Scriptures, which, because of their antiquity and the relations of the affairs of the Jewish people with others in the East, would merit being preferred to all Greek histories, if we did not know that they were dictated by the Holy Spirit.” As for Greek historians generally, he judges them to have been “more eloquent in their narrations than painstaking in their research.”

    The years between 536 BC—the year the Jewish people returned to Jerusalem—and Rome’s conquest of Carthage in 202 saw the beginning of the hostility between the Jews and the Samaritans, who mixed worship of false Gods with Jewish observances and were on that account denied participation in rebuilding the Temple. “Irreconcilable hatred sprung up between the two nations, and there is no greater opposition than that between Jerusalem and Samaria.” Among the Gentiles, the year 510 saw Athens liberated from tyranny, with the Romans overthrowing the Tarquins a year later. The invasion of Greece by the Persians was defeated at the battles at Marathon and Thermopylae early in the fifth century.

    “Meanwhile, the new magistrates that had been given to the Roman people exacerbated the divisions within that city. Having been shaped by kings, Rome lacked the laws necessary for the proper functioning of a republic.” The Romans sent delegates to Athens to study the laws there, resulting in the rule of the decemvirs, who wrote the Laws of the Twelve Tables, “the foundation of Roman law.” Simultaneously, in Jerusalem Ezra and Nehemiah “reformed abuses and enforced the Mosaic Law, which they were the first to obey,” making all the Jewish people, “and especially the priests” to divorce the foreign women they’d married in violation of that law. The Old Testament books named for those men “complete the long history begun by Moses and continued by subsequent authors without interruption until the restoration of Jerusalem.” “Thus the last authors of sacred history meet with the first author of Greek history; and when it began, the history of God’s people—to take it only since Abraham—already comprised fifteen centuries” when Herodotus first began to write. 

    The Peloponnesian War began in 431 BC, raging on until 404. After the Spartans won they supported Cyrus the Younger in his revolt against Artaxerxes. When Cyrus was killed, the 10,000 Greek soldiers in his service retreated under the command of Xenophon, who chronicled this in his Hellenica. It was Thebes, under King Epaminondas, which broke Sparta’s hegemony in Greece, and this weakened the nation sufficiently to enable Philip of Macedon to conquer it. His son, Alexander, caused “all of the East [to come] to know Greece and {to] learn its language,” since although he died at the age of thirty-three, his fellow Macedonian generals founded the Seleucid Empire in Syria in 312 and the Ptolemaic Dynasty in Egypt in 305.  As a result of these interrelations between East and West, “the Jewish religion and the Jewish people came to be known among the Greeks,” who translated the Hebrew Bible into Greek in 277. Centuries later, the New Testament would be written in “the Hellenistic language,” that is, “Greek interspersed with Hebraisms.” “All during this time, philosophy was flourishing in Greece.” Bossuet mentions the outstanding natural philosophers but emphasizes Socrates, who “brought philosophy back to the study of proper living and became the father of moral philosophy.” Of the several schools of moral philosophy, Bossuet deprecates only the Epicureans—if, indeed, “we can call philosophers those who openly denied the existence of Providence and who, not knowing what duty is, defined virtue by pleasure.” The Romans, too, began to delve into philosophy “of another kind,” one “which had nothing to do with disputations or discourses but consisted of frugality, poverty, and the hardships of rustic life and war.” This befits a people who had fought wars for some five centuries, “found themselves masters of Italy,” and went on to defeat the Carthaginians and their great general, Hannibal.

    Scipio’s final defeat of Carthage in 202 BC marks the beginning of the ninth epoch. By now, “the Romans were feared throughout the world and no longer wanted to tolerate any power but their own.” In 173, “the persecutions of God’s people began,” not under the Romans but under Antiochus the Illustrious, a Syrian who “ruled like a maniac” and provoked a Jewish revolt against his tyranny. A few years later, after Antiochus’ death, however, Rome placed the Jewish people under their protection, “delighted with the opportunity to humiliate the kings of Syria.” In the course of their conquests, the Romans destroyed Corinth, “the most beautiful and voluptuous of all Greek cities,” taking care to remove “its incomparable statues” and to bring them to Rome, albeit “without knowing their value.” In general, “the Romans knew nothing about the arts of Greece, being satisfied with their knowledge of war, politics, and agriculture.” But by 133, Rome saw a major slave revolt against its rule at home; the Romans “were becoming too wealthy.” They continued to press their conquests, “but though the aspect of the republic was made resplendent on the outside by these conquests, it was marred by the unbridled ambition of its citizens and internal struggles.” “Everyone wanted to rule,” none to be ruled. “Even a man like the gladiator Spartacus believed that he could aspire to the command,” leaving a second slave revolt in 103. 

    The republic was slowly failing. By 58 BC, a supremely ambitious general, Gaius Julius, conquered Gaul, “the most useful conquest [Rome] ever made,” the patriotic Bossuet remarks. Julius defeated the rival general, Pompey, in 49, ended the republic by becoming emperor in 44, died by assassination a year later. Twelve years later, Octavianus defeated Marcus Antonius at the Battle of Actium. “Forsaken by all his friends, including Cleopatra, for whom he had ruined himself,” Marcus Antonius committed suicide, as did Cleopatra, the last of the Ptolemaic line. In 27, Octavianus became the Emperor Augustus.

    It was under Augustus’ long and largely peaceful rule that Jesus Christ was born, beginning the tenth epoch of human history, approximately 4,000 years after Creation. Bossuet saves his considerations of Jesus for Part Two; in this chapter, he focuses his reader’s attention on Rome. In 66 AD, the Emperor Nero became “the first emperor to persecute the Church.” But this didn’t prevent the Church’s advance throughout the empire, which proceeded throughout the second and third centuries AD. “The purity of its ways was so striking that it was praised even by its enemies.” A series of invasions by Germans and Goths in the West, Scythians and Persians in the East, weakened the Western Roman Empire and eventually overran and divided it. “Still hostile to Christianity,” Rome “made a last effort to smother it but, in the end, established it definitively” under Galerius. “New tortures were invented every day” and “the modesty of Christian virgins was attacked as much as their faith.” But “the Christians exasperated” the Romans “by their patience,” and “other nations, impressed by their saintly way of life, converted in large numbers.” The frustrated Galerius “lost all hope of vanquishing them,” dying a few years later. “But Constantine the Great, a wise and victorious prince, publicly converted to Christianity” in 312 AD and ruled the Eastern Roman Empire for the next twenty-five years—thirty-one in all. 

    In accordance with this emphasis on Rome, Bossuet places the two men he considers its finest rulers in the center of this chapter. Antoninus Pius, who ruled from 138 to 161—patron of religion, the arts and sciences, who fought no wars of conquest—and Marcus Aurelius—who ruled from 161 to 180 as that rarest of men, the philosopher-king—defended the empire and persecuted no Christians.

    Bossuet titles his chapter on the eleventh epoch “Constantine, or the Peace of the Church.” The Peace of Constantine lasted until the accession of Charlemagne to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, the new Rome, in 800. Constantine’s reign saw the condemnation of the Arians, who denied the divinity of Jesus, at the Nicaean Council in 325, followed five years later by the reconstruction of Byzantium, renamed Constantinople. A century later, Macromeres founded “the monarchy of France, the most ancient and noble of all the monarchies in the world.” But the fifth century, “so unfortunate for the empire, and in which so many heresies sprung up, was nevertheless a fortunate one for Christianity. No discord was able to shake it, no heresy to corrupt it. The Church, rich in great men, confounded all doctrinal errors.” And so, while the Western Roman Empire was “irretrievably lost” in the 470s, the French king, Clovis, converted to Christianity two decades later and the great Christian emperor Justinian ruled in the East, beginning in 527. Later in the sixth century, St. Gregory the Great became pope, sending Augustine to England to convert the pagans there.

    Gazing further to the East, Bossuet describes the failure of the Persian Empire. With what is likely another allusion to Louis XIV’s Versailles and the character of the Dauphin, Bossuet comments, “debauchery is often more harmful to princes than cruelty.” The Persians captured, then lost, the True Cross and, their power broken, Mohammad “posed as a prophet among the Saracens,” “subjugating all Arabia by fair means or foul, thus laying the foundation for the empire of the caliphs” and threatening Constantinople itself. By the second third of the seventh century, “the East was going to its ruin.” “While the emperors were consuming themselves in religious disputes and inventing heresies,” the Saracens invaded and occupied Syria, Palestine, Persian, parts of Africa, and Cyprus. It remained for a French general, Charles Martel, to defeat them in the Battle of Tours in 725. “Powerful in peace as in war, and absolute master of the kingdom,” Charles “ruled under a number of kings, whom he made and unmade as he saw fit, without daring to assume that great title.” His son, Pepin, did assume the throne as king of France; Pepin’s son, the future Charlemagne, defeated the Lombards, “enemies of Rome and its popes,” in a three-year series of campaigns ending in 776. 

    Charlemagne inaugurated the twelfth and final epoch of world history, being elected Emperor of the Romans in 800. At this point, however, Bossuet ends his chronological narrative. In order to understand the history of God’s people and the history of the great empires, “it is sometimes necessary to separate them and to examine in detail the things which are peculiar to each.” He devoted Part II to Church history, Part III to imperial history.

    Bossuet titles Part II “The Continuity of Religion.” It consists of 31 chapters. The seventeenth, central chapter consists of a critique of Judaism; the center of the book as a whole comes a few pages later and consists of a statement of what has come to be called ‘supersession theology’—the claim that Christianity became the true Judaism, and that what is now called Judaism has deviated from its origins. In Bossuet’s terms, the continuity of religion means that religion has been “always the same since the Creation of the world” but that human beings have consistently deviated from God’s way. This is also the claim of the Old Testament, and therefore of orthodox Jews to this day, who regard Christianity as anything but the true Judaism. The question, then, is how political regimes should address this principled disagreement between Christians and Jews. Bossuet’s formula opens Jewish citizens (or subjects, as in the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV) to vile persecution. To recount his argument is profoundly offensive but also useful in the sense that it opens a window into the minds of those who inflicted pogroms upon innocent persons precisely because they were deemed guilty of the most heinous crime by the highest religious authorities of those times and places, men like the Bishop of Meaux.

    “Religion and the continued existence of the people of God throughout the centuries is the greatest and most useful of all things a man can study,” Bossuet begins. This continuity “shows clearly God’s sustaining hand,” His providential rule over his creatures. Creation itself bespeaks that care; although He could have done it in an instant, God took six days to create the world “to show that he does not act out of necessity or blind impetuosity, as some philosophers have imagined.” On the contrary, “the account of the Creation as given by Moses shows us this great secret of true philosophy: that fecundity and absolute power dwell in God alone,” and not, he implies, in the ‘absolute’ monarchy of Louis XIV or any other human ruler. 

    When God says, “Let us make man,” his use of “us” deserves note, Bossuet remarks. “Nowhere in the entire Scriptures does anyone but God speak of himself in the plural,” and He does so “only two or three times,” using this “extraordinary language for the first time when it is a question of creating man.” That is because when God creates man “he speaks to someone who creates as well as he, to someone of whom man is the creature and image; he speaks to another self; he speaks to him by whom all things were made, to him who says in his Gospel, What things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.” Not only does God speak to Jesus, “he speaks at the same time with the almighty Spirit, equal and coeternal with both of them.” The trinitarian God has existed since before “the beginning.”

    To speak this way also indicates “a new order of things,” a founding. “The Trinity manifests itself for the first time when it creates a creature whose intellectual operations are an imperfect image of those eternal operations whereby God is fruitful in himself.” And this is itself a new kind of creating. Prior to Man, God had never touched the “corruptible matter” he created, “but to form the body of man, God himself takes earth; and that earth, molded by such a hand, receives the most beautiful form that has yet appeared in the world,” a creature whose “body is straight, his head…held high, and his sight…turned toward Heaven”—a form which shows this new being “whence he has come and whither he must go.” Again: providential. Even “more wonderful” is way God ensouled man with “a breath of life that proceeds from God himself.” “Let us not,” Bossuet cautions, “believe that our soul is a portion of the divine nature, as some philosophers have dreamed.” It proceeded from God, but it was a new act of creation; God is not immanent in Man, whose soul, and particularly his intellect, are rather created in the image of God. “Woe to the creature that delights in itself and not in God!” That is why the angels who fell, fell.

    Man’s imperfection manifests itself rapidly. The successful temptation of Eve by the Serpent “is the beginning of the spirit of revolt” in Man: “first, the command is discussed, and then obedience is brought into doubt.” Adam wants intellectual satisfaction—knowledge of good and evil—and sensuous pleasure—his wife convinces him that the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge is good to eat. The result is that “the rebellion of his senses” against God’s command. It is impossible not to see in this a tacit critique of Bossuet’s contemporary, Descartes, who makes so much of doubt as the pathway to knowledge, a method by which the human mind can clear itself of everything we have been told, including anything we’ve been told not to do. Such efforts fail, Bossuet thinks, because doubting God’s commands leaves the human mind defenseless against the power of the passions. “For Adam, “the rebellion of the senses makes him observe in himself something shameful,” requiring him to clothe himself, covering up the physical being God made because he knew he was no longer worthy of his God-breathed original being. The Serpent’s “You shall be as gods” tempted Eve, then Adam, to attempt to overcome, irrationally, the distinction god had delineated, the distinction between Creator and created. This soon leads Adam’s progeny to another form of sensualism—idolatry, whereby men begin to worship physical objects they themselves have ‘created.’ this is the final derangement of man’s God-breathed reason. Having been formed by God, Man absurdly “thought he could make a God.” All of this shows that there is “no power more inescapable or tyrannical than the power of vice and passion.”

    Each generation of men degenerated further—so much so that God lost His patience with His creatures, destroying all but the relatively decent few in the worldwide Flood. Even after receding, the waters left all of nature weakened, as the lingering moisture accelerated decomposition and the human lifespan shortened. Enfeebled human beings began to supplement the vegetarian diet with meat, fueling warfare. 

    The simple Noachide commandments God imposed upon mankind proved insufficient to hold human attention. To counteract men’s continued failure to follow in God’s way, His regime, God gave Moses not another set of verbal commands but a system of written laws to a people He chose to bind “with fearful strictness” and thereby improve, providing (for example) “stronger barriers against idolatry.” In choosing the Israelites he did not reward them for any merit; they “were as vulgar and rebellious as any other people, or more so.” And in preventing Moses from entering the Promised Land, God offered Israelites and the rest of mankind an indispensable lesson: “His Law made nothing perfect.” Like Moses, thanks to God’s lawful guidance we can see His promises “from afar”; the Law “conducts us at most, as it were, to the gateway of our inheritance.” It was Joshua, whose “true name” is Jesus, who brings God’s people into the Promised Land itself.

    Bossuet draws many such parallels between the Old and New Testaments. The warrior-king David fights God’s wars but Solomon, the man of peace and wisdom, is the king God permits to build His Temple in His city, Jerusalem. “David’s wars showed how much toil it takes to attain [the glory of Heaven], and Solomon’s reign showed how peaceable is its enjoyment.” For their part, Bossuet asserts, the prophets who spoke truth to the Israelite kings saw Jesus; this may be why he spends so much effort in retelling stories from Hebrew Scripture to the heir apparent to the French throne. One day, “Under [Jesus’] admirable reign the Assyrians and the Egyptians shall form with the Israelites but one and the same people of God. Everything becomes Israel, everything becomes holy. Jerusalem is no longer an individual city: it is the image of a new society, in which all nations are gathered together.” Throughout all the vicissitudes to come, “God never permitted his voice to become extinct among his people.”

    His power never ceased to enforce what His voice said, and that power was not uniformly gentle. “When the royal sons of David follow their father’s good example”—Dauphin, take note—God “works surprising wonders on their behalf; but when they degenerate, they feel the invincible strength of his arm.” God eventually allowed the Assyrians to destroy His Temple, to let Israelites “see that he was not confined to an edifice of stone, but that he would find his habitation in faithful hearts.” Nonetheless, “the overthrow of the cities and empires which harassed God’s people or profited by their destruction were written in the prophecies,” enabling (for example) the Jewish people to escape Babylon, “having timely warning.” To His chosen people, God administers fatherly chastisement, “merciful judgment,” punishing them for their own good; to the Babylonians and other nations he administers “rigorous judgment” and chastisement, ruining them. “God left no appeal” for the Babylonians. “But not so with the Jews. God chastened them like disobedient children, whom he returns to their duty by correction, and then, moved by their tears, he forgets their faults.”

    As always, however, God sets limits to His patience, as seen in the promises and warnings of the last prophets. Daniel foresees the life and death of Jesus. Jacob had taught the future advent of the Messiah; he did not “tell us that his death should be the cause” of Judah’s downfall. “God revealed this important secret to Daniel and declares to him that the ruin of the Jews shall be the consequence of the death of Christ and of their rejection of the Messiah.” That is, Daniel learns that many Jews will become like Gentiles, rejecting their Messiah, and will afterwards be judged and chastised as Gentiles had been judged and chastised. The prophecies of Zechariah and Haggai foretell the betrayal of Jerusalem “by her own children”; the last prophet, Malachi, looks forward to John the Baptist and Jesus. After these prophets, prophecy ceased. There was no more need for them. “The proofs [the Jewish people] had received were sufficient, and once their incredulity had been not only overcome by events but also frequently punished, they at last became docile,” eschewing idolatry and the words of false prophets for a long time. 

    In secular terms, “instructed by their prophets to obey the kings to whom God had subjected them,” they found those kings to be “their protectors rather than their masters,” living under their own laws with “the sacerdotal power…preserved in its entirety.” “The priests guided the people; the public council, first established by Moses, enjoyed its full authority.” This was in fact the way most ancient empires ruled their subject peoples. Limitations of transportation and communications enabled rulers to rule no other way. “For 300 years they…enjoyed this rest, so often foretold by their prophets, when ambition and jealousy arose among them and came near to undoing them.” They began to imitate Greek ways, “prefer[ring[ that vain pomp to the solid glory which the observance of the laws of their ancestors acquired for them among their countrymen.”

    The Jews’ “whole history, everything that happened to them from day to day, was but one continued unfolding of the oracles which the Holy Spirit had left them.” As for the Greeks, who ruled the Jewish people at that time, even what took place among them “was a preparation for knowledge of the truth.” Greek philosophers understood “that the world was ruled by a God very different from those whom the populace worshiped and whom they themselves worshiped with the populace,” albeit mostly for the sake of safety from ridicule or even (in the case of Socrates) persecution. [1] But this should not be taken as an independent discovery. “The Greek histories show that this excellent philosophy came from the East and from places to which the Jews had been dispersed.” Whether this claim of origins is true or false, mankind “began to awaken” to teachings that “furnished beforehand certain proof to those who were one day to rescue [the Gentiles] from their ignorance,” namely, the Apostles of Christ, who would cite the doctrine of ‘the god of the philosophers’ when teaching who that god really is. Philosophy, however, is not quite enough. “The most enlightened and wisest nations, the Chaldeans, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, were the most ignorant and the most blind in matters of religion, which only proves that one must be brought to wisdom by a special grace and by a more than human wisdom.” 

    In the end, and as per the original Satanic temptation, the Jewish people “succumbed to ambition.” By now, they were under the Roman Empire, wherein they enjoyed a substantial degree of self-government. “The Pharisees wanted power and accordingly assumed absolute power over the people, setting themselves up as arbiters of learning and religion.” Their “presumption went so far as to arrogate to itself the gift of God.” Under their regime, “the Jews…forgot that [God’s] goodness alone had set them apart from other nations, and they looked upon this as their due,” confusing divine grace for divine justice. They “thought themselves of a different species from other men, whom they considered deprived of the knowledge” of God, “look[ing] upon the Gentiles with an unbearable disdain.” “They fancied themselves holy by nature”—a contradiction, given nature’s postlapsarian corruption. “It was the Pharisees who, priding themselves on their own lights and on their strict observance of the ceremonies of the Law, introduced this opinion in the latter days.”

    Factionalism resulted. In search of a cure, the Jewish people allowed “all public power” to pass “into the hands of Herod and the Romans, whose slave he [was], and he shook the foundations of the Jewish state,” hitherto self-governing if not sovereign within the Roman Empire. The Pharisees and the people alike chafed under “the yoke of the Gentiles,” their “contempt and hatred” intensified. They yearned for a Messiah who would be a David, not a Solomon, a man of war not of wisdom and peace. “Forgetting the many prophecies which told them so specifically of [the Messiah’s] humiliations, they no longer had eyes or ears for any prophecies but those which announced triumphs.” The triumphal entry of Jesus into Jerusalem on an ass was not what they anticipated.

    Readers of the Hebrew Scripture know that God’s prophets do not hesitate to denounce the bad behavior of God’s people. In his retelling of the times before Jesus’ birth, however, Bossuet sometimes inclines to identify corrupt priests with the Jewish people as a whole. This is a dangerous thing to do, and one must watch closely as he proceeds, next, to give his account of the life of Jesus, having now reached the center of his book.

     

    Note

    1. “Plato, speaking of the god who had formed the universe, says that it is hard to find him and that it is forbidden to declare him to the people. He protests that he never speaks of him but enigmatically, for fear of exposing so great a truth to ridicule.” Thus “mankind was plunged into such an abyss that it could not bear the least idea of the true God!” Bossuet places this account of Greek philosophy in the sixteenth, central chapter of Book II.

     

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