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    The Roman Cato with the Soul of Washington

    June 1, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Joseph Addison: Cato: A Tragedy, and Selected Essays. Christine Dunn Henderson and Mark E. Yellin, eds. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004.

     

    Legend has it that General George Washington had Addison’s Cato performed for his soldiers at Valley Forge. This should be true, whether it is or not. Addison’s portrayal of Cato depicts the soul of a great Stoic with all its austere nobility but also its limitations and the errors that follow from them. Cato’s gravest error is his suicide when his cause seems hopeless. By presenting the play to his men at the nadir of America’s hopes in the War for Independence, Washington was telling them, ‘I shall not desert you.’ And, by implication, ‘Do not desert me, or your country.’ The play’s epigraph, from Seneca’s On Divine Providence, suggests as much: “A brave man, standing erect amid the ruins of the res publica.” British troops under the command George III and his generals seemed likely to ruin the American republics, to bring the rebellious ‘Whigs’ to heel. Souls steeled for Stoic self-rule informed by a sense of divine providence, which seldom announces its moves in advance, can yet emerge victorious from trials of fire.

    Addison wrote the Cato in 1712, and it enjoyed immediate success on the London stage. In Britain’s North American colonies, it had been performed frequently since 1730s and it would remain popular for another generation after the Revolution. Addison was a Whig, a partisan of the Hanoverian succession seen in the person of Queen Anne and her great general, the Duke of Marlborough, whom the Whigs compared to Cato. The Tories, loyal to the Hanoverian line of English monarchs, regarded Marlborough as a usurping Julius Caesar. By asking the great Tory poet, Alexander Pope, to write the Prologue, Addison made an overture across the parties, asking both sides in Britain’s factitious politics to consider human greatness in a Christian light.

    Cato is Cato the Younger, grandson of the eminent Cato the Elder—both courageous opponents of tyranny and defenders of the Roman republic. The younger Cato had allied with Pompey against Julius Caesar. The republican forces lost the Battle of Pharsalus and fled to north Africa, where Pompey was assassinated. Cato now heads the Roman forces, along with the remnant of the Senate. Now exiled in Utica, he has formed an alliance with King Juba I of Numidia. Pope, too, admires Cato, finding in him a fit hero for the tragic stage, which from the first has been intended “To wake the soul by tender strokes of art, / To raise the genius and to mend the heart, / To make mankind in conscious virtue bold, / Live oe’er each scene and be what they behold.” Not only in the time of the ancient Greeks and Romans but “through every age,” even “tyrants no more their savage nature kept, / And foes to virtue wonder’d how they wept” at such dramas. Neither weak and pitying love nor “wild ambition” finds favor in the tragedies: “Here tears shall flow from a more gen’rous cause, / Such tears as patriots shed for dying laws,” as “ancient ardor” rises in modern, British hearts. “What Plato thought” “godlike Cato was,” namely “a brave man struggling in the storms of fate, / And greatly falling with a falling state!”  but finally honored more than triumphant Caesar. 

    Pope would never overlook the literary dimension of the struggle, concluding with an evocation not only of Cato the Younger but of his grandfather. “Britons, attend”: “With honest scorn the first fam’d Cato view’d / Rome learning arts from Greece, whom she subdu’ed; / Our scene precariously subsists too long / On French translation and Italian song.” Have we not defeated the French and their absolute monarch, Louis XIV? Instead, “Dare to have sense yourselves; assert the stage, / Be justly warm’d with your own native rage. / Such plays alone should please a British ear, / As Cato’s self had not disdain’d to hear.” Not Racine or Petrarch so much as Shakespeare and Marlowe. And surely Mr. Addison’s Roman Cato, seen through English eyes for English men.

    At the Governor’s Palace at Utica, Cato’s sons, Portius and Marcus, deplore Caesar’s military triumphs. “Ye Gods, what havoc does ambition make / Among your works!” Portius exclaims (I.11-12). Yet Marcus finds him too calm, too ‘Stoic’: “Thy steady temper, Portius, / Can look on guilt, rebellion, fraud, and Caesar, / In the calm lights of mild philosophy,” but “I’m tortured” by the image of “Th’insulting tyrant prancing o’er the field” at Pharsalia, “his horse’s hoofs wet with patrician blood,” the blood of Roman senators hurled from their positions of rightful authority (I.12-19). To Marcus’ hope that Heaven will punish the insolent victor, Portius points instead to their father—a man “greatly unfortunate” but still fighting for “the cause / Of honor, virtue, liberty, and Rome” with a sword unstained with any but the blood of the guilty, of tyrannical usurpers (I.30-31). The thumotic brother relies on the gods; the philosophic brother relies on a man who embodies the best of Rome and of human nature understood as ethical and political nature.

    Marcus is having none of it. “What can Cato do / Against a world, a base, degenerate world / That courts the yoke and bows the neck to Caesar?” (I.i.36-38). Trapped at Utica, guarded by Numidians, his own army feeble and the Senate ruined, he presents “a poor epitome of Roman greatness”—so much so that my soul is distracted, tempted “to renounce his precepts” (I.i.40-45). Portius adjures him to “remember what our father oft has told us,” that “the ways of heav’n are dark and intricate” and “our understanding traces ’em in vain” (I.i.46-49). Marcus admits that more than their father’s circumstance torments him. He is in love with Lucia, the daughter of one of the exiled Roman senators, but his passion is “unpity’d” by her, his love “successless” (I.i.56). He does not know that Portius shares his passion for the girl but, knowing his temper, dares not reveal himself as a rival, contenting himself with advising his brother to “call up all thy father in thy soul: / to quell the tyrant love”—the soul’s equivalent to political injustice—and “guard thy heart / On this weak side, where most our nature fails” ((I.74-77). [1] Such Stoic self-rule is not for the impassioned soul of Marcus, who determines instead to throw himself into the quest for honor in war, “to rush on certain death” (I.i.81); “Love is not to be reason’d down, or lost / In high ambition and a thirst of greatness” (I.i.84). Not thought but action can redirect his thumoerotic nature from despair. 

    Prince Juba appears, and Portius reflects on “how much he forms himself to glory / And breaks the fierceness of his native temper / To copy my father’s bright example” (I.i.79-82). He too is an exile, his father having been killed by Caesar at the Battle of Thepsur. The prince, in contrast to the Roman usurper, exhibits a virtue that is Roman but not merely Roman, a virtue unconfined to any particular nation, the virtue of human nature itself. And he stands as an example for brother Marcus in another way: He loves Cato’s daughter, Marcia, but, “no sport of passions,” his “sense of honor and desire for fame” bridle his love for the sake of the nobler aim of political liberty (I.i.86). 

    Juba too has a rival in love, the Roman senator Sempronius, a traitor in their midst. Before Portius heads for the meeting of the Senate-in-exile, he promises to “animate the soldiers’ drooping courage, / With love of freedom and contempt of life,” telling Sempronius that although we cannot “command success,” “we’ll do more, we’ll deserve it.” Sempronius fumes, “Curse on the stripling! how he apes his sire! / Ambitiously sententious!” (I.ii.40-47). Sempronius plans to betray Cato and seize his daughter after Caesar rewards him for handing Cato over.

    There is a traitor among the Numidians, too: Syphax, who is preparing a revolt among his people—who, he claims, “Complain aloud of Cato’s discipline” (I.iii.4). Sempronius wishes that he could turn Juba against Cato, as well, at which urging Syphax laments that the young man is “lost,” his thoughts “full of Cato’s virtues” (I.iii.22). “Of faith, of honor, and I know not what, / That have corrupted his Numidian temper, / And struck th’ infection into all his soul” (I.iii.25-27). Nonetheless, Syphax promises to make another attempt. As for Sempronius, he heads for the Senate as well, scheming to “conceal my thoughts in passion” by “bellow[ing] out for Rome and my country” even as he schemes to ruin the men he will address.

    True to his word, Syphax tries Juba again, appealing to his national pride, his Numidian patriotism, which might be turned to rebellion against Roman rule. Juba will have none of it. He esteems the “Roman soul,” which aims to civilize the world, “lay it under the restraint of laws,” and “make man mild and sociable to man” by means of “wisdom, discipline, and lib’ral arts” (I.iv.30-35). Only “virtues like these” will “make human nature shine, reform the soul, / And break our fierce barbarians into men” (I.iv.37-38). No, Juba, Syphax counters, “this Roman polish” only “render[s] man…tractable and time,” covering over natural passion, “set[ting] our looks at variance with our thoughts” and thereby “chang[ing] us into other creatures / Than the Gods design’d us” (I.iv.41-43, 46-47). Any Numidian better practices Cato’s “boasted virtues” (I.iv.62). Juba has his answer ready: the Numidian hunter’s virtues do not grow from choice, as Cato’s do, from “steadiness of mind,” not ignorance and necessity (I.iv.77). This is why Cato can endure suffering without resentment and even “thank the Gods that throw the weight upon him” (I.iv.80). The foundation of Roman civility is the rule of reason, innate to human beings as such, the right criterion for judging national customs and laws.

    Syphax insists that Cato’s “rank pride” and “haughtiness of soul” mesmerized Juba’s father, leading him to an inglorious death at the hands of a slave (I.iv.81-85). You should “abandon Cato” (I.iv.89). You don’t really esteem him at all, nor do you honor your father; you merely wish to marry his daughter. You are not man of honor, only a boy in love. Yes, I do love her, the young man admits, but for honorable reasons and indeed for her honorableness: “The virtuous Marcia towers above her sex” in her “inward greatness,” her “unaffected wisdom,” and her “sanctity of manners” (I.iv.150-151). That is, he loves her for her natural virtues, as these have been cultivated by her family and her country.

    We soon see Marcia and Lucia for ourselves. Of her two suitors, Lucia prefers Portius, the philosophic brother, to Marcus. As for Marcia, she of course prefers Juba to Semponius, but she remains very much Cato’s worthy daughter, telling her beloved Juba to go off to the war in support of her father and advising Lucia to wait until after the war to confer her love on Portius, lest she spread disarray in Cato’s household by openly favoring one brother over the other. “Let us not, Lucia, aggravate our sorrows, / But to the Gods permit th’ event of things,” as “the pure limpid stream, when foul with stains / Of rushing torrents and descending rains, / Works itself clear, and as it runs, refines” (I.vi.78-79, 82-84). 

    Act II begins with Cato before the Utican Senate, warning of Caesar’s advancing army. Sempronius makes his calculatedly fiery speech, only to have Cato reprove him. “Let not a torrent of impetuous zeal / Transport thee thus beyond the bounds of reason,” as “true fortitude is seen in great exploits, / That justice warrants, and that wisdom guides; / All else is tow’ring frenzy and distraction” (II.i.43-47). Lucius then makes a pacific speech, claiming that the gods oppose us, that Caesar is only their chosen scourge, than no more Roman blood should be shed. Cato positions himself as the virtuous mean between the extremes of Sempronius’ apparent “immodest valor” and Lucius’ “fear” (II.81-82). His moderation should not be mistaken for mediocrity, however. “A day, an hour, of virtuous liberty / Is worth a whole eternity in bondage” (II.i.100)—a judgment said to have inspired Patrick Henry’s “Give me liberty or give me death.” And in answer to a peace overture from Caesar himself, Cato replies to his ambassador, “My life is grafted on the fate of Rome”; if Caesar would save Cato, “bid him spare his country” (II.ii.8-9). As for himself, I “disdain a life” that “your dictator” “has pow’r to offer” me (II.ii.8-10). Asked what terms he will accept, Cato accordingly replies, “Bid him disband his legions, / Restore the commonwealth to liberty, / submit his actions to the public censure, / And stand the judgment of a Roman senate. Bid him do this, and Cato is his friend.” (II.ii.29-33). But for now, I am no friend of Caesar but “a friend to virtue”—the truly Roman characteristic that Romans share with human nature itself, bringing their civilizing empire of liberty to those they conquer (II.ii.41). Caesar’s conquests have only “made Rome’s senate little”—the Senate, lynchpin and moderating balance wheel of the republic (II.ii.47). “By the Gods I swear, millions of worlds / Should never buy me to be like that Caesar” (II.ii.57).

    To Juba, Cato confides his understanding of divine providence. The “misfortune and affliction” the gods impose “are not ills; else would they never fall / On heav’n’s first fav’rites, and the best of men” II.iv.51-53). No, “The Gods, in bounty, work up storms about us, / That give mankind occasion to exert / Their hidden strength, and throw out into practice / Virtues that shun the day, and lie conceal’d / In the smooth seasons and the calms of life” (II.iv.54-58). He disappoints his young ally by refusing his daughter’s hand in marriage; Roman, all-too-Roman, he does not think a Numidian a worthy suitor, despite Juba’s evident ‘Romanness,’ which is really humanitas. Syphax swoops in, attempting once again to turn the prince against Cato, urging him to eschew honor as a “fine imaginary notion” and to kidnap the girl, even as the early Romans seized the Sabine women (II.v. 89). But Juba calls him “a false old traitor,” intending to redeem the Carthaginians’ reputation for faithlessness and to vindicate his honor in the eyes of Cato (II.v.61). Furious at the insult, perhaps because it is true, Syphax returns to Sempronius, who assures his that factious Roman troops “will bear no more / This medley of philosophy and war,” Stoicism and Achilles, from Cato. Syphax vows to rally his Numidian troops to aid the revolt.

    The third Act begins where the play began, with the sons of Cato in dialogue. Portius knows that Marcus loves his beloved, Lucia, but Marcus does not know of Portius’ love for her. He asks Portius to plead his cause to her, “With all the strength and heats of eloquence / Fraternal love and friendship can inspire” (III.i.34-35). When he leaves and Lucia arrives, he does just that (“Oh, Lucia, language is to faint to show / His rage of love; it preys upon his life; / He pines, he sickens, he despairs, he dies,” his “noble soul” ravaged (III.ii.3-5, 10). Kind Lucia, who knows of Portius’ love for her, and who requites it, worries that if Marcus knew of their love it “might perhaps destroy” him (III.29). For his part, Portius counsels her not to reject Marcus’ suit outright but “hold him up in life, and cheer his soul / With the faint glimm’ring of a doubtful hope” (III.ii.24-25). Lucia refuses. She vows to the gods to refuse them both, denying her own love to prevent “thy sister’s tears, / Thy father’s anguish, and thy brother’s death” (III.ii.28-29). She offers him the faint glimmering of a doubtful hope, saying that she will hold fast in her decision “while such a cloud of mischiefs hangs about us” (III.ii.34). Understandably “thunderstruck” at first, philosophic Portius then sees her virtue, her prudential foresight of the evils his suit would have incurred, had it succeeded (III.ii.37). That does little to console him, but Lucia holds firm in her vow. When she leaves and Marcus returns, Portius tells him that she “compassionates your pains, and pities you”—no comfort to the passionate brother, who regrets what a “fool that I was to choose so cold a friend / To urge my cause!” (III.iii.13-17). 

    The noise of Sempronius’ mutiny interrupt them. He has decided to carry Marcia off and join Caesar, frustrated at the continued loyalty of Juba and his Numidians—Romans in the core of their nature, after all. But Cato overawes the Roman rebels, shaming them, reminding them of his virtue, and telling to go join Caesar, if that is what they desire. [2] Ever-perfidious Sempronius recommends the death penalty for the rebels, which Cato, changing his mind, mistakenly agrees to inflict, never suspecting his colleague’s treachery. Sempronius immediately has them executed, irate at their uselessness to his scheme. He continues to desire Sempronius, and when Syphax cannot understand how he could “turn a woman’s slave” (III.vii. 11), he assures her that he only intends to kidnap and rape her (“bend her stubborn virtue to my passion”), then “cast her off” (III.vii.15-16). This reassures his henchman: “Well said! that’s spoken like thyself, Sempronius.” (III.vii.17). Syphax recommends that he dress himself as Juba to get past the Numidians who guard her. In his own way, Sempronius emulates the gods—specifically, Pluto, who seized Proserpine and carried “to hell’s tremendous gloom the affrighted maid, / There grimly smiled, pleas’d with the beauteous prize, / Nor envy’d Jove his sunshine and his skies” (III.vii.31-34).

    Not suspecting this vile scheme, Marcia fears rather that her father will give her in marriage to Sempronius. She too is a Stoic, however: “While Cato lives, his daughter has no right / To love or hate, but as his choice directs” (IV.i.20-21). She refuses to trust her passions, telling Lucia, “When love once pleads admission to our hearts, / (In spite of all the virtue we can boast) / The woman who deliberates is lost” (IV.i.29-31). Her own reason will not suffice in that circumstance, so her father’s reason ought to prevail. When Sempronius arrives, deceiving the guards, and prepares to play out his sinister version of the rape of the Sabine women, a deus ex machina in the person of Juba discovers him and kills the “proud, barbarous man” (IV.ii.19), who dies in fury “by a boy’s hand,” attired in “a vile / Numidian dress, and for a worthless woman,” one he desired chiefly to spite Cato and Juba (IV.ii.21-22). He is the real barbarian, the false Roman, Juba the true one. 

    Marcia remains steadfast in her civic Stoicism. When she and Juba discover their love for one another, she nonetheless continues to insist that Juba “prosper in the paths of honor” (IViii.88)—go off to fight Caesar at her father’s side. But Cato himself has begun to despair, telling Lucius, “The torrent bears too hard upon me: / Justice gives way to force: the conquer’d world / Is Caesar’s: Cato has no business in it.” (IV.iv.22-24). On the contrary, his friend insists, “While pride, oppression, and injustice reign, / The world will still demand her Cato’s presence” (IV.25-26). To Cato’s objection, that he will never submit to be ruled by a tyrant, however, Lucius can only respond that Caesar will not impose “ungen’rous terms” upon the defeated rival, as “the virtues of humanity are Caesar’s” (IV.33-34). This earns him the riposte, “Such popular humanity is treason” (IV.iv.33-36). Cato’s Stoic willingness to suffer draws the line at submission to tyranny. That is, the clementia of Caesar, whether sincere or feigned, bespeaks the superiority of a man who acts like a god toward a fellow man and citizen. Cato is, finally, a citizen-Stoic, not a philosopher-Stoic. The problem will turn out to be not so much Cato’s morality but his misunderstanding of providence. He expects defeat because precisely because he does not foresee the providential plan. He does not foresee the providential plan because it is given to no one to see that.

    Juba arrives, confessing his shame at being a Numidian—that is, a prince of a nation whose soldiers were ready to desert their ally. No matter, Cato assures him: “Thou hast a Roman soul” (IV.iv.43). What is more, “Falsehood and fraud shoot up in every soil, / The produce of all climes–Rome has its Caesars” (IV.iv.45-46). Juba “has stood the test of fortune” (IV.iv.49).

    Learning next that his son Marcus has died in battle, though not before killing Syphax, Cato pronounces himself “satisfied,” as “my boy has done his duty” (IV.iv.70). Upon seeing the corpse, he simply remarks, “How beautiful is death, when earn’d by virtue” and “what pity is it / That we can die but once to serve our country!” (IV.iv.80-83). The first aphorism is Stoic, the second Roman. He turns to his surviving son, the philosophic one, telling him to remember that “thy life is not thy own, when Rome demands it” (IV.iv.87). It is Rome, “not a private loss,” that “requires our tears” (IV.iv.89-90). Rome had subdued the world thanks to her virtue, but with her virtue gone, having submitted tamely to its rapist, Caesar—who has reversed one of the original founding acts of Rome, the so-called rape which in fact brought wives to young Roman men—the Empire has fallen, “fall’n into Caesar’s hands” (IV.iv.105). He calmly grants Lucius the right to sue for peace from ‘humane’ Julius and advises his son to retire to “thy paternal seat, the Sabine field,” where he may live virtuously in a private life, which is “the post of honor” under a tyrannical regime (IV.iv.135, 142). If the kidnapping of the Sabine women enabled the earliest Romans to sustain themselves as a civil society, perhaps a retreat to the family, a retreat to the Sabine field, will form the foundation of a new Rome, if such can be restored after the barbarous tyrant, the criminal rapist, has had his day.

    But Cato has a different plan for himself. Having satisfied himself that he foresees the intention of Providence, he reads the Phaedo, what Addison in his stage direction calls “Plato’s book on the immortality of the soul”; “Plato,” Cato says, “thou reason’st well!” (V.i.1). Plato’s Socrates had reasoned that the prospect of the soul’s immortal life on the Isles of the Blessed removes the sting of death. Given what he takes to be the equally certain prospect of Caesar’s tyranny in this world, a “world made for Caesar,” Cato pronounces himself “weary of conjecture,” weary of philosophizing, ready to the action of suicide, which will end conjecture (V.i.19-20). “Let guilt or fear / Disturb man’s rest. Cato knows neither of ’em, / Indifferent in his choice to sleep or die,” given Plato’s proof that we awaken from death as surely as we awaken from sleep (V.i.38-40). Addison’s Christian audience might well think the same thing, under similar circumstances. If God’s Providence ordains life in Paradise after death, why prolong life in this world, known to be a vail of tears? This would become Nietzsche’s charge against Christianity, that it loves an imagined life and therefore real death more than real life. By Addison’s time, Machiavelli had already anticipated that thought.

    Portius joins his father, who assures him that all is well, as “I’m master of myself,” never to be mastered by Caesar (V.ii.13). Having convinced his son that he won’t commit suicide, having allowed Portius, Lucia, and Lucius that he retires to sleep—what he must regard as an instance of the noble lie—Cato prepares to execute himself, even as Lucius assures the women, “While Cato lives—his presence will protect us” (V.iv.38). His presence is needed, as Juba brings news of an impending battle with Caesar’s forces. Portius joins them with the news that Pompey’s son has unexpectedly brought reinforcements from Spain. “Call[ing] out for vengeance on his father’s death”—the very filial piety that Cato understands to be the foundation of Roman civil order—he “rouses the whole nation up to arms” (V.iv.55-57). “Were Cato at their head, once more might Rome / Assert her rights and claim her liberty” (V.iv.58-59). 

    There will be no human version of a deus ex machina, this time. They hear the death-cry of Cato in the next room. Mortally wounded, he blesses his friend, Lucius, his son and his son’s future wife, Marcus and Lucia, and his daughter and her future husband, Marcia and Juba. Of Juba, he says, “A senator of Rome, while Rome surviv’d, / Would not have match’d his daughter with a king,” were the king a foreigner, “but Caesar’s arms have thrown down all distinction,” all conventional distinction: “Whoe’er is brave and virtuous, is a Roman.” (V.iv.88-91). In his civic despair, he has made two philosophic discoveries, the first a distinction, the distinction between convention and nature, the second the uncovering of a just filial and political order in light of a criterion set by nature, the criterion of virtue, of human nature undisfigured by passion. “Methinks a beam of light breaks in / On my departing soul” (V.iv.94-95). Dying, what he cannot do is to act in accordance with that beam of light. His ascent from the cave of convention isn’t comic, as it is in Plato’s Republic, but tragic. “Alas, I fear / I’ve been too hasty” (V.iv.95-96), he admits, with Stoic understatement. He can only ask forgiveness. Forgiveness, above all, for his failure to do what he wanted most to do, to save Rome from a regime of tyranny. Forgiveness also, perhaps, for his failure to heed his own advice to his sons, which Portius had remarked in the play’s first scene: We do not know what heaven has traced out for us; the ways of heaven are dark and intricate.

    It is left to the ranking surviving Roman in his camp, his friend Lucius, to set the new policy. With Cato, they might have won. Without him, no one believes they can. 

    “Let us bear this awful corpse to Caesar,

    And lay it in his sight, that it may stand

    A fence betwixt us and the victor’s wrath; 

    Cato, though dead, shall still protect his friends.” (V.iv.103-106).

    And Lucius adds a properly Stoic, sententious final thought, saying that these events show the malign effects of “civil discord” not only to Romans but “to all nations,” namely, “fraud, and cruelty, and strife,” along with what is not the least evil, “rob[bing] the guilty world of Cato’s life,” the life of one of the best in the world, one of the best examples of human nature his countrymen had ever seen (V.iv.108, 111-112). 

     

    Notes

    1. George Washington will counsel his niece in exactly the same way. See his letter to letter to Eleanor Parke Custis, January 1, 1795.
    2. In facing down the rebellious officers at Newburgh, New York, Washington was enacting a similar scene in real life, supremely imitating Addison’s art in his life. See his Speech to the Officers of the Army, March 15, 1783.

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Grand Strategy for the Philippines

    May 26, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Chester B. Cabalza, Joshua Bernard B. Espeña and Don McLain Gill: The Rise of Philippinedization: Philippinedization Is Not Finlandization. Manila: International Development Security Cooporation, 2021.

     

    The authors [1] define “Philippinedization” as “the process whereby a weaker state” (in this case, the Philippines), “backed by a powerful country” (the United States), “goes to great lengths in temporarily refraining from opposing a neighboring great power” (China) “by resorting to economic and diplomatic rapprochements at the strategic level but strengthening its national security infrastructure on the operational level with an eye for potential conflict in the foreseeable future” (such as attempts by China to dominate the seas of Southeast Asia). This can be accomplished, if the weaker state strengthens and diversifies both its domestic economic and military capacity and its international alliances, especially with other states in the region which are also threatened by China. This resembles but is not identical to ‘Finlandization,’ a policy whereby a weaker state retains self-government, its own regime, while agreeing not to oppose a stronger, neighboring state’s foreign policy. The senior co-author conceived of the idea of Philippinedization while visiting Finland in 2019, having become impressed by Finland’s “success story” in resisting Russian expansion while recognizing that the term ‘Finlandization” bears a pejorative connotation among the Western republics. As the book’s cautionary subtitle announces, he and his co-authors do not intend either the connotation or the substance of Finlandization to take hold in the Philippines.

    As an archipelago (hence the Philippines) separated from China by more than a thousand nautical miles of ocean, with a commercial republican regime near strategic chokepoints within that ocean, the country will always find itself in contention with stronger Asian powers—China today, Japan yesterday. Its relations with China have become especially vexed in this generation. Geography dictates that the Philippines, if it is to maintain its territorial integrity and political sovereignty, must protect itself with naval and air forces. 

    This it did. After U.S. military forces under the command of General Douglas MacArthur liberated the Philippines from Japan in World War II, the two countries signed a Military Bases Agreement, which established a major American naval base at Subic Bay and the Clark Air Base in Luzon Province. These bases put teeth into the Mutual Defense Treaty signed by the two countries in 1951. For many years, the local strongman, Ferdinand Marcos, maintained a strong alliance with the United States. So long as Communist China remained largely self-isolated, preoccupied by Mao Zedong’s genocidal machinations and then by post-Maoist economic development, these arrangements sufficed to defend the Philippines against any encroachments from the naval forces of the Soviet Union. Marcos felt sufficiently confident to normalize bilateral relations with the Chinese regime in 1975, as the United States had done in the waning years of the Nixon Administration.

    With the end of the Marcos regime, the 1987 Constitution stipulated that the Philippines would “pursue an independent foreign policy”; with the end of the Cold War a few years later, the United States became amenable to lessening its military presence in the country. This arrangement might have worked well over time, had China not begun to loom larger. As long as Communist China had remained preoccupied with domestic roils (Mao’s genocidal policies of the 1950s and 1960s) and toils (the post-Mao efforts at economic development), neither the Philippines nor the United States had any cause for alarm. At the end of the Cold War, the United States closed Clark Air Base and reduced its military presence in the Philippines generally, at the behest of the Philippine Senate. China wasn’t slow to react, however. As early as 1992, China passed its Law on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and enforcing it by occupying the Mischief Reef in 1995. The Philippines responded quickly, moving to modernize its “neglected navy and air force.” It also negotiated a new Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States in 1998. This failed to deter Chinese advances, as the ruling Communist Party announced the Nine-Dash line in 2009. With this, China effectively claimed sovereignty over approximately ninety percent of the South China Sea in an area encompassing the Paracel Islands in the northwest, the Spratly Islands in the southwest, and a few miles off the west coast of the Philippines in the east. (Indeed, some of what China calls the South China Sea the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea.) “China cleverly seeks anti-access / area denial through the grey zone where Beijing operates between the war an peace spectrum, enabling China to achieve its objectives without resorting to a regional strategic war with the US and regional states. This endeavor would make it difficult and costly for the US and its allies to deploy their militaries” in the South China Sea.

    Under the Benigno Aquino administration, the Philippines answered these claims by publishing a new national security policy, a strategy intended to back up its intention to defend its coastline against Chinese claims, keeping it free for its maritime commerce and fishing interests, as well as maintaining its territorial integrity. “Convinced” that “China has relentless ambitions to revise the status quo regional order,” the Philippines “used every available option to stand up” to China’s “heavy-handed behavior.” Meanwhile, although U.S. President Barack Obama announced a foreign-policy ‘pivot to Asia’ in 2011, China went ahead and took de facto control over the Scarborough Shoal. President Aquino called upon what the authors (perhaps with some irony) call “the international community” to resist such “Chinese assertiveness,” comparing the seizure to Hitler’s occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938. He was gravely disappointed by the Obama Administration’s declaration of neutrality in that conflict. However, he did win a major juridical victory in 2016, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled that China’s maritime claims were illegal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This provided small comfort, however, as the Chinese regime simply declared the ruling “null and void,” continuing its policy of constructing artificial islands for its military operations in the South China Sea, a policy it had begun in 2013. 

    The election of Roderigo Duterte to the presidency brought a new strategy into play. Distrusting American reliability, Duterte imagined that “befriending Beijing and not rocking the boat would save Manila from the hegemonic rivalry of the two superpowers in the region and protect some features in the West Philippine Sea.” He downplayed the Court’s ruling and moved to strengthen bilateral ties with China, hoping to begin a joint exploration in the Sea’s seabed and to attract Chinese investments in Philippine infrastructure—a “defeatist” stance “that is tantamount to complete surrender of Manila’s claims” to its territorial waters, as recognized internationally. He understood this policy as a concession to geopolitical reality. As is so often the case, Chinese action hasn’t matched Chinese verbiage and, as anyone who takes a look knows, when the Chinese Communist Party actually does get around to ‘investing’ in a foreign country, it bakes political infiltration and self-interest into the cake. 

    Accordingly, the authors propose a new strategy. They base it on a comprehensive view, combining considerations of “the geopolitical setting of the nation-state,” its military and political history, current military technologies and, above all, its regime: the rulers, ruling institutions, way of life, and its purposes. China fields an increasingly powerful array of naval, ground, and air forces, aiming at control of “the busiest sea lanes of communications in the South China Sea.” It also deploys “finesse wolf diplomacy” (as Mr. Cabalza well phrases it) along with economic influence. That is, like the Germans and the Russians before them, modern Chinese rulers have read their Clausewitz. Given President Duterte’s previous overtures, the Chinese were surprised in Spring 2021 when he revived military relations with the United States. This makes the authors’ proposals timely. 

    To defend itself against China, the Philippines needs more than a strengthened alliance with America, however. It needs additional allies, some beyond the borders of the South China Sea, the “Asia-Pacific” region. Philippine strategists should think rather of the “Indo-Pacific,” considering an alliance (most notably) with India itself. And given “the interdependence of sea power and land power,” “the emerging strategic architecture in the Indo-Pacific cannot ignore the developments on the Asian landmass.” Chinese rulers assume “that promoting the Indo-Pacific region will serve as a platform used to contain its rise.” They are not wrong. Given the unbenevolent intentions of China’s regime, that is exactly what such republics as Taiwan, Japan, India, Australia, and the Philippines need to do.

    Four factors affect the Philippines’ strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific. First, the strategic partnership with the United States will continue, regardless of what President Duterte may say in his speeches. Reality is reality. Second, some sort of economic relations with China, a huge market, should be undertaken, if cautiously and without high expectation that the Chinese will necessarily follow through on their contractual commitments. Third, China’s expansive claims regarding the South China Sea should be resisted, as China “continues to maintain artificial islands in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone,” as determined by the 2019 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) cannot be relied on to back the Philippines, given China’s economic influence over so many of its member states.

    How can the Philippines strengthen these somewhat weak reeds? The authors suggest that the solution may be found in geography. Their country is “a natural gateway to the East Asian economies,” located at “the crossroads of eastern and western businesses.” “Maintaining robust relations with Manila is thereby crucial for major states that seek to maximize their economic gains.” Further, the same goes for military operations, as “the strategic location of the Philippines serves as a tipping point in the great power rivalry between the US and China.” The Philippines “can play a critical role in forwarding US strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China,” especially in view of American “economic and military decline,” which has forced it to rely more on such allied states as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India in the region. 

    Given the fact of China’s rise, simultaneous with American decline, the Philippines will need to balance the two powers more skillfully than Duterte has done. Fortunately, Filipino military and media elites have criticized Duterte’s tilt toward China. Indeed, military officers consider it their duty under the Constitution to “secure the state’s sovereign rights” against hostile foreign forces. Given the recent election of Ferdinand Marcos’s son to the presidency, these groups may stand ready to implement a tougher policy in conjunction with the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, all governed by commercial-republican regimes, as is the Philippines. Although this is true, the authors do not want such an alliance to go so far as to “upset the balance between Manila and Beijing.” They prefer bilateral relations with those countries, whereby Filipino statesmen could determine the mixture of economic, military, and diplomatic ties with each, severally. For example, “forging closer cooperation with Japan and India can serve as a formidable middle ground between balancing China and not risking any backlash or pressure on its behalf, since the multidimensional Indo-Japanese partnership is a significantly softer and more indirect version of a confrontational and exclusive China-containment strategy between the US and its traditional allies.” That is, if the Philippines established the same ‘hard’ military relationship with Japan and India that it has had with the United States, China might indeed complain of ‘encirclement.’ By calibrating its relations with those countries (which in any event are not militarily impressive powers) toward primarily economic and diplomatic actions, the Philippines might walk a safer path. And also a more lucrative one, as Japan and India might serve to enhance the Philippines’ other links in the region, particularly in light of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a venture intended to serve “as an inclusive counterweight to the notorious Belt and Road Initiative” undertaken by China. The presidents of Japan and India have both pointed to the regime similarities between their two countries as the political basis for this project; China may call itself the “People’s Republic” of China, but it isn’t a republic and the Chinese people don’t rule it. [2]

    The challenge posed by the Chinese regime remains formidable, and it will intensify in the decades to come. The People’s Liberation Army (as it is called) is on the path for a thorough modernization by 2035. It’s estimated that “by 2049, the PLA together with the People’s Armed Police, coast Guard, and Maritime Militia [will] become a ‘world class’ armed force,” giving China the capacity “to compete with the US military in a future scenario.” This will mean a ‘blue water’ navy—one capable of projecting power on the high seas, as the British imperial navy once did and as the United States now does—along with the ability to seize Taiwan, the one remaining Chinese republic and therefore an enemy of the Communist regime in Beijing. Finally, as noted, the Chinese intend to control the South China Sea, as they have been visibly moving to do since the mid-1990s. China’s grand strategy is “to reassert China’s international status in the principle of tianxia or ‘everything under the heavens'”—surely a grand thing, if not necessarily a good one.

    Will the average Filipina consent to the authors’ proposed counter-strategy? Possibly so. President Duterte thought he had worked out some 24 billion U.S dollars’ worth of deals with Beijing. “Only a trickle of those deals has been seen to take shape on the ground.” Before the outbreak of COVID-19 in Manila, opinion polls showed that more than half of Filipinos regarded China as “a good ally,” but that has changed since a Chinese tourist brought the virus to their country in February 2020. This, along with environmental damage caused by Chinese activities in fishing grounds worked by Filipinos, “certainly has helped galvanize tough anti-Chinese sentiments among Filipinos.” Another source of legitimate vexation is the proliferation of Chinese-controlled offshore gambling operations (gambling is illegal on mainland China); the foreign workers engage in criminal and espionage activities—a “Trojan horse” or more accurately a Chinese dragon in the Philippines. As in the United States, Beijing has also set up a number of its “Confucius Institutes” on university campuses in the Philippines. These too serve as cells of espionage and of influence throughout the country. “To be sure, Beijing intends to fill the vacuum that America” left during the COVID crisis. 

    In light of all this, the Philippines faces the imperative of strengthening its own military defenses. Military cooperation with the United States remains “important,” but “there are concerns about whether [America’s] commitments are hollow because of the geographical constraints and the capacity to rapidly deploy the needed number of forces” during a crisis. Although 80% of Filipinos view the U.S. favorably, especially since America was the main supplier of COVID vaccines in the past two years, President Trump’s neo-isolationism and President Biden’s withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan quite understandably make them nervous. “The Philippines must continue to prioritize its own capacity building in order to lessen its dependence on the alliance,” undertaking a vigorous campaign to arm its sailors and soldiers in order “to achieve a respectable territorial defense strategy to save the archipelagic nation’s undefended features in the west Philippine Sea and maritime domains from the Philippine Rise to the Sulu Sea.” The Philippines has already put in place the Philippine Air Force Flight Plan 2028, which aims at establishing air bases at key geographic points in the country. None of these tasks will be easy. “The Philippine [military] capability notably lacks air capability, sea and air transport, and command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.” The authors cite as a precedent South Korea’s successful military buildup after the Nixon Administration reduce U.S. troop presence in that country in the 1970s. This has “inspired the Philippines to come up with the same plan of self-reliance.”

    Thanks to the United States, “an unprecedented era of wealth and peace has been created by free and open access to the world’s oceans. Unfortunately, the system is now in danger. The US Maritime Strategy targets the two major threats to maintain[ing] global peace and prosperity: China and Russia.” The US “needs to be aggressive to compete with China,” which is “rapidly expanding militarily and poised to alter the global order.” It can no longer “be assumed that the US has control of the unrestricted access operations [in] the world’s oceans during times of conflict” requires. For this reason, the Philippines should foster a “long-term vision and nationalistic mindset in developing its [own] self-reliant navy,” a force indispensable “for an archipelagic country.” Accordingly, the Philippines should diversify its arms suppliers, purchasing high-tech equipment from India and France as well as the U.S. This will require “massive investments.” They will be worth it. ASEAN has diplomatic utility but “the international system is anarchic,” with “no global government to protect weaker states from the more powerful ones.” Member states have different regimes and different interests as a consequence, including different policies regarding China. No solid unity is likely. “Self-help” is “the name of the game.” 

    The authors foresee three likely scenarios in world politics during the decades to come. There might be a “dichotomy of power and influence between the US. and its allies and China, where other states will have to pick a side.” There might also be a world in which China and Russia collaborate to dominate the Eurasian land mass (including Africa)—what Halford Mackinder called the World Island—with the United States isolated or ‘contained’ within the Americas, and eventually within North America. Or the United States might ally with Russia and Europe in opposition to China. Whichever scenario prevails, “the Philippines can be taken to account as a rising middle power if given the right direction for statecraft.” The Philippines must strengthen its military without abandoning its republican regime; this will give needed heft to its regional diplomatic efforts in countering the Chinese threat. For this to happen, weapons purchases from foreign countries, however friendly those countries may be, cannot serve as a long-term substitute for a domestic defense industry. In the meantime, junior and mid-level officers of the Philippines’ military “should become familiar with the strategic value of the alliance with the US.” Finally, the Philippines must also enhance its strategic intelligence operations “to provide real-time and effective information on adversaries.” Too many of China’s hostile activities of recent decades to Filipino officials by surprise. That needs to stop.

    Mssrs. Cabalza, Espeña, and Gill have provided a valuable, realistic analysis of the strategic circumstances faced by the Philippines today. It must be said that their book would have benefited from better editing, especially with a view toward organization (there is considerable repetition) and English grammar. If they continue their collaboration in subsequent books, as I hope they do, they should avail themselves of one of the many expatriates now living in the Philippines for whom English is the native language. Their insights are too important to be obscured by their prose. 

    The people of the Philippines emerged from Spanish and American colonial rule, then from Japanese occupation, and finally from an overbearing domestic regime as a proud and independent people who have earned the respect of all those acquainted with them. They continue to struggle with infrastructure development, political factions, and with yet another imperialist presence avid to control their strategic location in the South Pacific. With prudent strategic thinkers to advise them, they may yet prevail in their intention to govern themselves.

     

    Note

    1. Chester B. Cabalza is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Philippines, Diliman Campus; he also teaches at the National Defense College of the Philippines. Joshua Bernard B. Espeña is a defense analyst at the Office of Strategic Studies and Strategy Management for the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Don McLain Gills is Resident Fellow at International Development and Security Cooperation in Manila and Director for South and Southeast Studies at the Philippine-Middle East Studies Association (PMESA) in Quezon City.
    2. Regarding India, a cautionary note: While it can surely maintain a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it is perennially constrained from substantial further power projection by the presence of Pakistan on its western border. It is unlikely to be capable of very substantial naval assistance to any South China Sea country.

    Filed Under: Nations

    The Dialogue between Machiavelli and Shakespeare

    May 18, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Michael Platt: Mighty Opposites: Machiavelli and Shakespeare Match Wits. Privately published, 2021. First published in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy (Volume 48, Number 2, Winter 2022).

     

    What if playwrights Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) and William Shakespeare (1564-161) had met, corresponded, even conversed, thanks to the Florentine’s acquisition of the Makropulos Elixir, mixed by the court alchemist of Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II—a potion imagined by still another playwright, Karel Capek (1890-1938), granting those who drink it a long-extended life? And what if Shakespeare wrote an unfinished dialogue based on the encounter, completed by his fellow player and trusted friend Nicholas Tooley? (After all, did not a promising young Plato scholar named Seth Benardete once muse, “Shakespeare could have written dialogues,” to the delight of his teacher, Leo Strauss?) Michael Platt has imagined it so, bringing together “the founder of modern political philosophy” with “the greatest modern poet” in a book animated by the question, can there be a Christian prince?”

    The year is 1598. Machiavelli is secretary of state for the “Right, Re-Risen, Roman Republic,” having inspired the unification of northern Italy under a regime that has built itself into a naval power in the Mediterranean. He is on a diplomatic mission in England, perhaps to counter Spain, which still controls the Kingdom of Naples. Always looking to enlist “new captains in his unarmed army,” he also seeks an alliance with Shakespeare, whose writings surpass Machiavelli’s own works (Machiavelli admits to himself) in beauty. “In spiritual warfare nothing is more effectual,” and in his declared war on the regnant form of spirituality, Christianity, “the greatest calumny on life,” Machiavelli can use all the allies he can get. Having read Shakespeare’s Roman plays, he detects, or supposes he detects, a potential officer.

    This is to say that Platt indicates the partial fulfillment of Machiavelli’s intention in a sort of afterlife made possible not by God but by medicine, an intention suggested in his books: in place of the risen Christ, the Galilean who defeated the Roman emperors, the Roman res publica will be resurrected, transfigured by the spirit of ‘the prince’—that is to say, the spirit of Machiavelli himself, who is no Cicero, no ‘ancient’ Roman.

    Shakespeare replies to Machiavelli’s self-written letter of introduction, pleased with the Florentine’s flattering but true observation that Shakespeare writes both tragedy and comedy. He invites Machiavelli to attend performances of his Richard III and his three plays on Henry VI. He also recommends that Machiavelli read and reread them.

    In due course, Machiavelli replies, observing that the English plays complement the Roman plays, with their shared themes of honor and calumny, the violence of political founding, and civil disorder. He is quick to spot a new source of controversy in modern England, “the new division of Christianity” between Catholics and Protestants. He criticizes monarchic regimes because they are dynastic: since “most families are awful to grow up in,” “why give rule of public things to a family,” which only “magnifies vices more than virtues”? It may be that he brings these themes together, with an eye on the ‘family’ seen in the Trinity. “I do see, howbeit faintly, the coming of a better regime,” as the English people exhibit the capacity to discern virtue in their rulers and demand justice when those rulers commit crimes. “Would that their common sense were instituted in a stronger Commons, and if a ruling circle sprang up in it.”

    Shakespeare concurs with some of this. “How could I not study disorder? After all, there is so much of it. And it is always waiting to rush in. All it takes is one generation to lose the good times, and then slide on to worse,” although “in the worst of times, when all seems lost, a rebound occurs,” often beginning, as Machiavelli hopes, “with the people” As to Shakespeare’s downplaying of Parliament, he calls Machiavelli’s attention to the theater in which he puts on his plays. It “give[s] the audience the experience of an ideal Parliament in eternal session, in which all the important features of a political situation, together with their connection to everything above and below politics are brought into speech, so that deliberation about the nation, sometimes even about the world, goes on in the mind of the audience, as it should in Parliament, in the Privy Council, in the Monarch, and in the soul of every English man facing his public choices”—more than only a Parliament but a mixed regime, consisting of both aristocrats and commoners, “all drawn together in our Theatre, and by my theatre, all made into one audience, all laughing, weeping, trembling, cheering together, and accordingly understanding,” in what is now nearly a modern commercial ‘nation-state.’ He concludes by wondering if, even with a commercial way of life, men “can live together who do not worship together, as Jew and Christian do not, or at least look up to something beautiful and loft together?” Where Machiavelli envied the beauty of Shakespeare’s literary style, his art, Shakespeare himself considers beauty in nature, and perhaps in God.

    In their next exchange of letters, Machiavelli begins by condemning the conspicuously Christian Henry VI, who “wishes to be loved not feared” and is rewarded only with contempt. Indeed, on further consideration, Machiavelli concludes that Henry wants to be loved only by God, remaining indifferent to the love, the hate, and even the contempt of his fellow men, a ruler who “puts himself above politics” even to the extent of restoring titles and estates to his dynastic enemy, Richard Plantagenet. Unfitted for war, Henry never played sports, practiced with weapons, or learned horsemanship; for Machiavelli, ‘horse’ means warfare and, given Richard’s famous battlefield cry, “My kingdom for a horse!”—a line that will reappear for further discussion later—Machiavelli is rehearsing his theme from The Prince that princes of war must replace princes of peace. With “reviling relish,” Machiavelli lists Henry’s many “sins of political omission,” from his failure to defend his (few) political friends (especially his failure to protect his Lord Protector, Duke Humphrey) to his failure as a royal husband to punish his foreign-born queen for her infidelity. “All these omissions add up to omitting to rule,” to leaving rule of human things to the wisdom and power of God and His providence.

    Shakespeare largely concurs with this analysis, while cautioning against taking it too far. “I have qualified our contempt” for Henry. He may not know horses, “but surprise, he knows hawking,” a sport that figures in his comedy the Taming of the Shrew, in which “my hawker Petruchio gentles a mature wild female, named Kate, and with the same means” a falconer would use, “deprivation of sleep and meat.” Moreover, Henry “never had the benefit of a father,” only “the image of his great father,” Henry V—in “everyone’s mind for comparison”—and a “nefarious uncle,” the Duke of Bedford, as his tutor. The “ever-widening span” between young Henry’s “sight and his might makes him something like a Fool in court,” seeing and saying things impermissible to others but unable to act, “or even to take care of himself.” Rulers do need toughness, since “not all the anointment in Christendom can change a soul never born to rule.” But Henry does have compassion for his people, and this is what leads to his “one political success,” his quelling of a popular rebellion “through clemency and through the recollection of his father.” Shakespeare adds, tellingly, “No wonder you missed it; clemency is not a trick of the fox.” More, we see that while Machiavelli blames Henry’s incapacity on Christianity, Shakespeare attributes that incapacity to the king’s nature. This allows Shakespeare to judge him with clemency, as Machiavelli does not and will not.

    That last rapier thrust induces Machiavelli to pull back, offering a qualification of his own. “Not that too much vice is virtuous,” he cautions, criticizing Henry’s queen, Margaret, for her excessive “spirit of revenge.” After all, “murder must have a purpose,” a political purpose; “she is all fury, no cunning.” But here, too, Shakespeare points to a certain subtlety Machiavelli overlooks. Margaret is “not all revenge.” When Henry banishes her lover, “we see some tenderness in her, however adulterous,” and when her son is stabbed in front of her, “we feel as she feels,” never having “expected to suffer with her.” “Often that happens in my works. Suddenly someone who could have hardened into a profile, even a cartoon, shows another side or feature, or a downright about-face. As you get to know human beings that happens. As you get to know yourself, that happens.” Platt follows Shakespeare’s lead here, even as he has Shakespeare deliver that lesson; just when it seemed that the exchange between the two men might turn into a simple battle of wits, he has Shakespeare offer the childless older man some fatherly advice.

    There is a larger moral and political problem that Machiavelli also does not see. If Duke Humphrey attempted to overthrow Henry, “as his wife and you urge,” he would no longer be himself, no longer “the man we rightly…think most fit of all the magnates to be a king.” That is, “he would lose his eligibility in our eyes, and as important, his worthiness in his own eyes.” As Plato’s Socrates argues, “the same virtue that makes a man best for an office excludes him”; the one “most worthy to rule, the philosopher, is least interested in doing so.” A ruler by the apparently natural but actually conventional right of heredity may therefore be preferable to the ruler by the natural right of virtue. After all, so many persons suppose themselves naturally fitter to rule than whoever it is that wears the crown. To make partly invisible, counterfeitable virtue the criterion for ruling in practice would be to invite endless civil disorder. Better that the wise man advise the king, serve as Lord Protector, guarding him against such enemies as Humphrey’s ambitious wife and the ever-conniving Cardinal Winchester. “It is ambition within bound and in service of the good that is to be lauded, not the over-reaching acquisitiveness you urge in recommending Humphrey seize the Crown, or the infinity you desire. That way madness in the soul lies, and chaos in the state.”

    After Richard Plantagenet’s son Edward kills Henry’s capable son, also named Edward, on the battlefield, and his ally Gloucester murders Henry (by then Edward’s prisoner in the Tower of London), England is left with a king whose sexual desires lead him into an injudicious marriage. Machiavelli sniffs, “The lust of Edward IV unfitted him to be a prince.” More politic choices had been available. Upon reading this, Shakespeare thinks, “Though in your Prince you warn not to touch the women, in your plays you teach every man to ‘touch’ all he can.” For you, Machiavelli, “neither fortune nor woman can resist man,” but in the world you envision there can be no stable families to uphold the city. “Families start with sight, not touch, with the ardent looks of the young, of Romeo and Juliet.” “Machiavelli in love, impossible.” And so Machiavelli makes the first genuinely political relationship, the reciprocal rule of husband and wife, also impossible. If Machiavelli were ever to watch Romeo and Juliet, “I’m afraid he’d set himself to teach one lover to murder the other, and thus effectually prove that love does no, cannot exist, just as he would prove ideal republics are no guides to better states, and even no measure of extant ones.”

    Shakespeare keeps most of these thoughts to himself. In his answering letter, he contents himself with making a different remark, one aimed at moderating his correspondent’s claims. “One consequence of the free will my characters manage to exercise…is that others cannot predict it; even the sagacity of the sage is limited by that reality; that’s a hard fact those who are proud of penetrating hard things do not like to acknowledge.” The news of his Lord Protector’s death first makes King Henry faint. But then his realization of his unintentional responsibility for that death “fills him, for once, with spirit,” a possibility neither his enemies nor the play’s audience anticipate. “My characters are always doing something a bit ‘out of character,’ very much like the men and women I know, like myself.” His point to Machiavelli: conscience does not invariably make cowards of us all. Sometimes it makes some of us courageous. “A sense of guilt is not always a disadvantage, and its absence not always an advantage.” Equally, the attempt to conquer fate, Fortuna, to satisfy an unlimited desire to acquire by somehow getting ‘behind’ one’s character, manipulating it, ‘using’ one’s virtues and vices, makes too much of freedom. Machiavelli, how well do you know yourself? How well do you know other men, whom you are so sure you see right through? And how well do you know Fortuna, whom you expect to master?

    Shakespeare thus agrees that Henry and Edward are no fit kings, although for different reasons. What of the tyrant who succeeds them, Edward’s younger brother, Richard III? Machiavelli applauds. “In these Histories so far, I most esteem this man most,” he exclaims, with redundant emphasis. “I positively exult in Richard’s polite employment of Christian scripture and sentiments,” seen in his seduction of Lady Anne, widow of Edward’s son, “right beside her husband’s coffin,” no less. Machiavelli delights in Richard’s “witty expression” of his prideful contempt for his inferiors, phrases Shakespeare turns that are even better than his own clever formulations in The Prince.  Still, he faults Richard for being a bit too open in his blasphemies, a mistake symptomatic of an overall lack of prudence. What is more, “other than gaining the crown, he has no purpose, no plan.” In this, his anti-Christian stance apes the Christian’s inclination to gaze at the lilies of the field, which neither toil nor spin because the joys of the day suffice to him who expects still greater, permanent joys in eternity, needing no plan for that future time, already prepared for him by his Savior. By contrast, Machiavelli does have a plan. While hoping to rid the world of the ‘moderns’ or Christians while radically revising the teachings of the ‘ancients,’ Machiavelli himself would take care to salvage pieces of ancient wisdom, including prudential wisdom, even as he directs them to purposes the ancients did not understand.

    Shakespeare takes up the theme of the ancients—specifically, the Romans. “Between us, I do not see Rome, either republic or empire, as wholly superior to our modern Christendom.” Because “the deepest desire of a Roman is to become a statue of himself,” Rome undertook the monumental task of world conquest. Having achieved this, Julius Caesar did indeed “achieve a statuesque immortality.” But “in becoming a god” he lost his humanity. (As Christians would add, a statue-god is an idol, no real god.) To “despise human life” leads to a reduction of the man to a slab of marble or, if still living, a beast. Caesar’s idolatrous divinity contrasts with Christ’s everlasting life, whereby God became human, died, but continued to live and even to rule. Why is this not the superior ideal?

    Ideal it may be, but is it true? Machiavelli replies that the reasoning behind the Earl of Warwick’s autopsy of Duke Humphrey, proving that the Lord Protector was murdered (2 Henry VI 3.2.168ff.) should be extended to consideration of claims based on “the body of Christ allegedly crucified and allegedly risen from the dead.” Christians point to miraculous stigmata on their hands, where painters depict nails driven into Christ’s hands, attaching Him to the Cross. But “only nails through the wrists will hold a body to a cross—unless you believe in miracles. So much for all later stigmata! I and Leonardo know if anatomy were queen of the sciences there would be no theology.” Morally, too, Christianity hangs on dubious assumptions. “What a terrible idea, of a God who would punish whole innocent generations for the deeds of their grandfathers, but this God does not exist.” Fortuna, on the other hand, “hard but not interested in retribution,” shows that men “need princes not saviors,” as “men punish themselves” with their crimes of ignorance and the mental weakness induced by false religion. Shakespeare, Machiavelli confidently or perhaps wishfully asserts, rightly teaches the English to “abhor infamy, dare to reason, and be a man.”

    “You say things that other men do not say, only do,” Shakespeare observes. Yet what you say is only “part of knowledge.” “Sometimes, even in politics, men do good things, and sometimes, if rarely, they aspire, even in political life, to the lofty good above them, and thus deserve to be remembered, as Good Duke Humphrey, a statesman though he failed, should be.” Your Prince amounts to “the unintended exhibition of your noble soul,” inasmuch as “you aspire to lasting glory, but you do not know yourself”; “I see all your desires in strife, the desire to know the truth, the desire to effect something, and the desire to win immortal fame, all there struggling in you.” Reread your own book and if by that “you come to understand yourself, you would soon be able to order yourself.”

    As for the way you would order the world, into large, centralized states, this too will lead to self-contradiction. Before Henry VIII and his successful instantiation of your kind of state in England, a rich man gave to a poor man out of charity, a poor man felt gratitude in return. Now, “those taxed to provide will always feel it is too much, and the poor receiving it will feel it is too little”; with such “resentment in both and humiliation of the receiving poor,” will not your strong state weaken?

    When Machiavelli pointedly ignores this “challenge to self-examination,” Shakespeare indignantly writes that the teacher of evil lives on, all right, but in the malign effects of his teachings. Scoundrels “will cite your authority for their low crimes, their base betrayals, and even their savage atrocities.” Exercising his own virtue of prudence, however, he decides not to send this letter and rather to wait for a better opportunity to engage Machiavelli at his core, so to speak, “perhaps face to fact, on a visit to Stratford.”

    He instead more cautiously writes to “suggest that much escapes you.” In “grasping for the effectual,” you blind yourself to “noble failures, and complain of fortune, yours and Cesare Borgia’s and you do not know who to marry”—a theme of the Odyssey—”and I doubt you know how to die”—a theme of the Iliad. That is, although Machiavelli writes comedies, tragedies and epics remain beyond his reach. And even his most famous comedy, Mandragola, is “devoid of merriment,” more smutty than funny.

    One of the things Machiavelli admits has escaped him is the reason why crafty Richard III lost his crown so soon after he took it. Shakespeare explains. Having murdered the two young princes in the Tower, Richard seeks an heir; hence his intention to marry Edward’s widow. He can conceive only of a father who will guard his heir, perpetuate his family on the throne, not one who might risk his son for the good of his country. But this is what his enemy, Lord Stanley, does, “risking [his] own son for the greater good of England,” as “one of those Romans you admire” would do. Richard dies in the battle that ensues.

    More profoundly, Richard fails as a man. “Feared not loved you say. Well, the truth is Richard like every man wishes to be loved.” But “he finds he cannot love himself, only fear himself.” He grew up “with everyone around him, including his mother, interpreting his shape”—his hunchback—as “a mark of God and expecting evil of him, until he does too.” Despite his ridicule of Christianity, he “swears by St. Paul five or six times,” a sign of misery beneath the mockery. He “thinks himself unloved by God, brought into existence to do evil, to be God’s scourge and minister, and yet notwithstanding, damned for being so, damned from birth exactly as some Protestants hold omniscient God to providentially rule this world, electing few, damning the many.” You, Machiavelli, “share his hatred of God, but not how it began in him. He thought God hated him. He hated God for that” and came to “hate himself.” In his last battle “he was seeking death, as an end to his wretched life.” Is your life any less miserable, Machiavelli?

    But to send such a letter would be to go too far, too soon. Shakespeare “sends only a trim draft of the letter he’s rushed into.”

    In his reply, Machiavelli denies that he recognizes no noble failures. “I recognized Cesare Borgia.” “His failure to unite Italy, at least Northern Italy and Rome, and drive out the barbarians, was the noblest failure of modern times.” It is this failure that I now seek to expunge, as secretary of state of the Right, Re-Risen Roman Republic. As for the devotees of the Risen God, “No fools are more senseless than those who burn with Christian piety; they make no distinction between friend and foe, allow themselves to be deceived, and ignore injuries; they shudder at pleasure, actually find it in fasts, vigils, penances, scourges, and ordeals; in short, they shrink form life, and prefer death. This is insane.” I admire your works, Will, because I find “no good Christians in them,” except for Henry VI, “an utter disaster.” “He who would not hurt a fly, destroys a kingdom.” As for Richard, his pangs of conscience do indeed bring him down, and that is precisely the problem. If he hates himself, who is responsible for that other than his God? Or rather himself, for believing in that God. “Christianity is the cause of  a tyranny as never before on earth,” of tyrants who “must hate every well-formed human being and even hate human life itself. No previous tyrants, wicked as their deeds were, ever did so.” The ancients knew nature; the Christians deny it and in that denial ruin everything they touch.

    Shakespeare continues to find Machiavelli’s interpretation of his plays too narrow. It is as if Machiavelli were a latter-day Xenophon, but one who never wrote Socratic dialogues. “Xenophon knew Socrates, Xenophon looked up to Socrates. You’re no Xenophon.” If you were, you would see that Richard’s restless night before his last battle, when he is visited in his dreams by the ghosts of all those he’s murdered, amounts to “a Socratic self-examination.” Machiavelli does not imagine “how a poet might oppose tyranny, working from within, getting the tyrant to confess his misery,” as I hope to do “in a play about the Scottish usurper Macbeth.” Steeling himself to murder the king, Macbeth will tell himself, “To do this deed, I must not know myself.” Do you, Machiavelli, in your intention to murder God, really know yourself? “In hating God you are in some danger of hating the good.” If you have concluded from reading Richard III that I therein prove the lethality of Christian belief, wait until you have read my second English history tetralogy, the one in which I portray Henry IV, Henry V, and Falstaff. I send you the manuscripts and I also invite you to “resume our conversation, but face to face, in Stratford.”

    Upon receiving the manuscript, Machiavelli is only the more convinced that he needs to enlist “this vivacious English captain to my cause.” Had Henry V “lived only ten years more,” he writes, “his reputation would have been glorified by additional conquests, his realm enlarged, his hold on it firmer, his son better educated, and the prospect of his son’s rule fairer.” Henry’s very statements against my teachings and my disciples merely indicate his adherence to those teachings and his status among my disciples, since “those who declare themselves Machiavels have not understood the first thing about my teaching.” He is very happy to accept Shakespeare’s invitation to dine.

    In their dialogue over dinner, speaking of the second Henriad, Machiavelli continues his complaints about Christianity. When Shakespeare observes that Richard II is the only king in his Histories to compare himself to Christ, Machiavelli repeats his criticism of Henry VI: that that is exactly the problem with him. He chose the wrong model. “Christ was no ruler. All he teaches is how to lose and then be pitiful, passionate, and poetical about it.” This is true of Richard, Shakespeare agrees, “but the question who should rule is not as deep or as deeply engaging as how should we die and dying, live”—the question addressed by Jesus in His crucifixion and resurrection. In his attempt to come to terms with that issue, Richard wins and deserves the audience’s sympathy. Having effectively dismissed both Jesus’s crucifixion and resurrection as myths, and so passionately that he never notices that the question of death remains real even if Jesus is not, Machiavelli ignores Shakespeare’s argument and continues to speak about ruling. In ruling, “only effectual truths yield benefits,” not poetic images. Richard’s belated Christian maunderings leave the English no choice but to side with Henry Bolingbroke, the future Henry IV, who replaces the Plantagenet line with his own.

    He does it by what Shakespeare calls “the deliberately accidental murder of Richard,” an act “inseparable from the justice of the monarchy,” even as Elizabeth I’s beheading of Mary Queen of Scots was inseparable from the justice of her monarchy. Although Richard himself posed no threat to the new dynasty, his adherents did. There are “two goods” which must “be held together, justice and peace,” and “two principles that all rulers must keep together, and all monarchs must keep together, namely, inheritance and virtue.” Shakespeare disagrees with Machiavelli in denying that legitimacy and the authority it lends too power serve merely as covering for power, a fraud that veils force. “Some will remember the piteous and yet desirable passing of the Crown” from Richard to Henry “as an impeachment and removal, some will remember it as an abdication that left the throne unoccupied, and others will remember it as a simple gift from one cousin to another but all will remember that Richard did participate in it. And that makes it somewhat legitimate and will somewhat obstruct any later claims of wrongful usurpation. Ceremonies matter. One might even call them effectual.” As for Richard’s murder, whereas Machiavelli considers Henry responsible for it (the new king complained about the former king in front of a courtier who took the complaint as a command issued in the form of a hint), Shakespeare reminds him that Henry does not “admire himself” for his cousin’s death, “as you do him.”

    This brings them to the next, great, Henry. They agree that while spirited Hotspur is a lion, sly Falstaff a fox, Prince Hal is both. By (as Shakespeare puts it, in Machiavelli’s phrase) using the lion and the fox, Hal proves himself the true prince. Yet Shakespeare sees virtues rather than virtù in this: “prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.” That “smells of Socrates,” Machiavelli sneers, the man whose imagining of republics disabled him from founding a real one. “I hope you don’t carry hemlock with you” to our dinner, Shakespeare replies, in mock alarm. Machiavelli zeroes in: Your Henry is not “quite enough of a lion and a fox, he was not cruel enough.” Had he allowed his father to be killed on the battlefield instead of rescuing him, Prince Hal could have been king five years earlier, “started for France five years earlier,” and then, having conquered and absorbed it, set out for Italy, uniting Europe and ruining the papacy for good.

    No, Shakespeare says, “I can hear” Henry V replying to such a suggestion: “What, are we turned Turk, that for our advantage we would see our fathers murdered by our committing omission?” Indeed we should, Machiavelli insists (never the one to overlook a cross-cultural borrowing), “for greatness.” No, again, Shakespeare’s Henry answers: “We doubt that greatness comes without some goodness We know that it does not come from such evil.” Seeing his father in deadly peril, he defends him without hesitation, rightly winning his father’s confidence in his loyalty, at least in the aftermath of the moment. Then and subsequently, Prince Hal proves he can “wait to become king,” although his father begins to doubt it. “Son Hal knows his father better than father Henry IV knows him, his own son.” But this makes your second Henry IV play a bit boring, Machiavelli complains. Shakespeare concedes that this is so. The play is about tired old age, undramatic but natural, a condition sons must eventually deal with, as they consider their fathers. Price Hal will not force nature.

    Machiavelli (and his true English captain, Francis Bacon) would. They look for physical means of prolonging physical life—Bacon with his experiments involving the refrigeration of chickens, Machiavelli with his Makropulos potion. Machiavelli tempts Shakespeare by offering him a dose, which Shakespeare declines, saying, “Life would not better without death. Truly, it would no longer be life.” Perpetual life is what would be tiresome. Machiavelli seems not to appreciate the implications of his own atheism; he denies the God Who offers eternal life while still yearning for such a life. To Machiavelli’s temptation, Shakespeare effectively offers a counter-temptation: Have the courage of your own conviction, if those really are your convictions.

    The dialogue ends with a consideration of Henry V, a man who overcame temptations. Shakespeare cites Henry’s first soliloquy, which begins with the claim, “I know you all”—Falstaff, Poins, and the rest of his drinking buddies (1 Henry IV, I.2.188-209). This is “plain truth not juvenile excuses.” Henry has “learn[ed] nothing from Falstaff”; he spent time with him because he was biding his own time, waiting to enter the public realm with éclat. Indeed, the Marshall of France and Welsh Fluellen “have some inkling of what henry of England is up to.” And Henry knows something even they, even Machiavelli himself, do not: that “the spirit of the men” wins wars, a spirit animated “not so much by their fear of the prince, but their love of him.” To be sure, like founding, war means blood; there will be winners and losers, and that is not simply a matter of power but of the good in the real world, wherein “seeking some good always sacrifices some other.” If “the beautiful, the true and the good seldom coincide,” then Machiavelli’s attempted use of Shakespeare as a means of lending beauty to his ugly (half) truth amounts to a highly unlikely project, even if, perhaps especially if, Shakespeare were to play along with it.

    “Yes,” Machiavelli remarks, “we need to talk of good war, not just war.” Henry, Shakespeare explains, wants to retake France not as a means of reuniting the shards of the Roman Empire but to avoid the evil of civil war in England by redirecting the thoughts and actions of England’s restive aristocrats overseas and to render his foot soldiers obedient. Machiavelli claims that, too, is Machiavellian, but Shakespeare rejoins that civil war is an evil greatly to be avoided, and that steadying troops “in the fact of a fearful adversary”—a danger he faces with them—hardly qualifies as cynicism. Neither “poetic and deluded like Richard II,” nor “malicious and deluded like Richard III,” nor “provoked by injustice like his father, nor by love of fame like Hotspur” (nor, one might add, love of sack like Falstaff), and above all not by acquisition, like you, Machiavelli, Henry’s only possible motivation is duty.

    In that case, Machiavelli says, “I don’t understand him.” “Not even Socrates might,” Shakespeare suggests, because Socrates associates political life with convention, mere opinion, which potential philosophers ought to put their strength into overcoming in rational ascent from those borrowed lights. “According to Socrates there is no reason for a philosopher to rule,” and no obligation, either. “To become who you are, you had to fight all opinions.” But Henry is no ‘ancient,’ any more than he is a ‘modern’ or Machiavellian. “He is the inheritor of a potent model of nobility, one unknown to the ancients, princes and philosophers, of the highest serving the low, of an immortal who not only seeks the good of mortals, like Prometheus, but who suffers for them, even unto joining them in death.”

    Machiavelli does not like the sound of that. It sounds like Christ to him, and Shakespeare readily admits it—with a proto-Nietzschean turn, at that. “Though Christ refused to rule, and even seemed to leave ruling to the Caesars, still he provided a pattern for rulers. Let them be Caesars, but Caesars with something of the soul of suffering Christ.” Ready to sacrifice themselves for the good of their people. Henry is “the greatest man of deeds I can imagine”; “though I love others more, I admire none more than him”—a “great prince, which we are not, and what is more, he was a greater man” superior to me not in writing, in wit, or in thinking but in the “single-minded active pursuit of the good.”

    Shakespeare thus denies Machiavelli’s central claim about Christianity, that it unfits men for rule. Shakespeare claims instead that Christianity can make politics better and politicians more effective. Against this, Machiavelli has one last temptation up his antitheological sleeve. “Shakespeare, you are a great prince, but of shadows. You could be one of nations, peoples, and states, indeed of the world.” “No, it is not for me,” Shakespeare quickly answers. It is not my nature. Unlike Henry VI, Shakespeare can choose what to do with his lie. No royal inheritance burdens him. He bears only a natural inheritance, to which he intends to give full scope. He chosen a life of inquiry undertaken through observing men and women and writing plays about them. Many of those persons say not only rue and false things but true things at odds with one another. In this, his plays resemble the Gospel: “Everyone who arrives sure of something will find something to keep him sure,” as Machiavelli has done, but “only by being alert to contrary truths, might you ever later make your way to unity” by “wrest[ling] like Jacob with the angel.” In the Gospel, “Christ himself is responsible for his bounty and the difficulty arising from it,” with some aphorisms saying one thing—it is “harder for a camel to pass through the eye of the needle” to get into heaven—and others saying the opposite—become like a trusting child, and you will be on the way there. Jesus leaves it to His listeners to bring such things together. Jesus poses His own version of the Socratic challenge to undertake philosophizing. To pose such difficulties to his audience is Shakespeare’s vocation, his imitatio Christi.

    Shakespeare has withheld something from the manuscript of Henry V he gave Machiavelli to read. It is Henry’s prayer on the eve of the Battle of Agincourt, where he prays first to “the God of Battles” to “steel my soldiers’ hearts,” but then to the Lord, asking forgiveness for his father’s part in Richard II’s death (“I have built / Two chantries, where the sad and solemn priests / Sing still for Richard’s soul” (Henry V, 4.1.285-301). Reading this, Machiavelli storms out, “losing forever the chance not only to enjoy lofty things, but from that coign of vantage, come to know all the low things, which he thought he already knew.” 

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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