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    Bossuet on “Universal History” as Re-written by Christ

    May 6, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet: Discourse on Universal History. Part II, chapters 19-31, Part III. Elborg Forster translation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 

     

    Bossuet argues that Jesus Christ transformed the course of human events, first of all by the miracles He performed. “His miracles are of a peculiar order and of a new kind”: unlike Jewish miracles, which were “signs from heaven,” Jesus works His miracles directly upon men, “heal[ing] their infirmities”; His miracles “imply kindness rather than power and do not so much surprise the beholders as touch the depths of their hearts”; He performs His miracles “with authority,” making nature and demons alike obey; “the source of the miracles is within himself,” not from God working through Him; and although “none had ever performed either so great or so many miracles,” He “promises that his disciples shall, in his name, do still greater works than these, so fruitful and inexhaustible is the virtue he bears within him.” Yet even with such powers, His children receive no promises of worldly rewards. When he speaks to them, revealing “the secrets of God,” He “tempers the sublimity of his teachings” to His hearers, offering “milk for babes and at the same time bread for the strong.” He “dispenses with measure” His measureless knowledge.

    He similarly measures His power. The Pharisees and priests condemn Him; His disciples forsake Him; the Sanhedrin and the High Priest condemn Him as a blasphemer; the Roman governor, knowing Him to be innocent, nonetheless calls Him guilty and orders His execution. He never resists this evil. That is, “the most heinous of all crimes”—Deicide—is “the occasion for the most perfect obedience that the world ever saw.” “Jesus, master of life and of all things, voluntarily surrenders to the fury of wicked men and offers the sacrifice which was to be the expiation of mankind.” With His death on the Cross, “the Law” of Moses “ceases, its symbols pass away, its sacrifices abolished” by this one supreme sacrifice. [1] “Everything changes in the world” when Jesus, dying, says “It is finished.” Performing yet another miracle upon a human body, he rises from the tomb to be seen, heard, and touched by His followers. With these proofs in their minds, with His command to bear witness to them in their hearts, the preaching of His followers “is unshakable, its foundation a positive fact, unanimously attested to by those who saw it” and their sincerity “vindicated by the strongest proof imaginable, that of torments and of death itself” in imitatio Christi. By promising always to be with them, until the end of the world, “he assures the perpetual continuance of the ecclesiastical ministry.”

    Having confirmed the Sonship of Jesus, Bossuet turns to a discussion of His ‘nature’—His relation to the other Persons of the Trinity and His Incarnation. Just as his defense of miracles aims at the criticisms offered by Spinoza, his theology aims at the philosophy of Descartes.

    In revealing the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation to us, Jesus “makes us find the image of them in ourselves, so that they may always be present with us and so that we may understand the dignity of our nature.” Begin by doing as Descartes recommends. “If we impose silence on our sense and shut ourselves up for awhile in the inmost recesses of our soul, that is, in that part where truth makes its voice heard, we shall see there some image of the Trinity we adore.” Our intelligence gives birth to our thought, which “gives us some idea of the Son of God eternally conceived in the intelligence of the Heavenly Father.” Jesus is God’s Son in the sense that our thought comes forth from our intelligence, not a body “but that inner word which we perceive in our soul when we contemplate the truth.” Further, in our introspection “we love that inner word and the mind in which it is born; and by loving it, we perceive in ourselves something no less precious to us than our mind and our thought, something which is the fruit of both, which united them, which is united with them and constitutes with them but one and the same life.” The Holy Spirit, then, is the divine analogue to this human love. “Thus, I say, is produced in God the eternal love which proceeds from the Father who thinks, and from the Son who is his thought, in order to make with him and his thought one and the same nature equally blessed and perfect.” Just as human intelligence, thought, and love arise simultaneously within us, so “we must not imagine anything unequal or separate in this divine Trinity,” and “however incomprehensible this equality may be, our soul, if we listen, will tell us something about it,” being made in the image of it.” In “these three things” “lie the happiness and dignity of rational nature,” a nature that “knows perfectly what it is,” whose “understanding corresponds to the truth of its being” and “loves it being with its intelligence, as much as both deserve to be loved.” “These three things are never separated and contain one another: we understand that we are, and that we love; and we love to be and to understand. Who can deny this, if he understands himself?”

    The analogy between God and Man extends to the Incarnation. The human soul, “by nature spiritual and incorruptible,” by which Bossuet means eternal not sinless. It has been joined to “a corruptible body.” Taken together, soul and body constitute “a man,” a being “at the same time incorruptible and corruptible, intelligent and totally brutish.” So too with the Son, Word become flesh as the son of Mary as well as the Son of God. “This makes him God and man together.” True, the analogy, like all analogies, is “imperfect.” Jesus’ soul existed before His body did, whereas “our soul does not exist before our body.” The human soul “elevates the body to its own level by governing it,” but “in Jesus Christ, the Word presides over everything,” keeping “everything under its control.” Jesus’ every thought, speech, and action are “worthy of the Word, that is to say…worthy of reason itself, of wisdom itself, ad of truth itself.” When we fail to understand this, we show ourselves human-all-too-human: “the senses govern us too much, and our imagination, which insists on intruding in all our thoughts, does not always permit us to fix our attention upon so pure a light.” As a result, “we do not know ourselves,” remaining “ignorant of the riches we carry deep down in our nature,” visible to “none but the most purified eyes.”

    The mission of Jesus therefore “is infinitely exalted above that of Moses,” who was “sent to rouse sensual and besotted men by temporal rewards,” Bossuet alleges. The only way to elevate such debased men was to “lay hold of them through the senses and to inculcate in them by this means a knowledge of God and an abhorrence of idolatry, which for mankind has such an amazing propensity.” Christ’s mission was “to inspire man with higher ideals and to give him full and evident knowledge of the dignity, immortality, and eternal felicity of his soul.” Philosophy by itself can’t find its way to this truth, as “most of the philosophers could not believe in the immortality of the soul without believing it a portion of the deity; a deity itself, an eternal being, uncreated as well as incorruptible, and having no more beginning than end,” as seen in their doctrine of the transmigration of souls. The Pentateuch “gave man but a first notion of the nature of the soul and its felicity,” showing Man that he was animated by God’s breath. Once man failed to live up to his God-given origin, God gave Moses the Law by which a portion of humanity, made exemplary by that Law and that Law alone, to prevent the worst carnage. Under the dispensation granted to Moses, Judaism acknowledges the future life but doesn’t make belief in it and in God’s supremely self-sacrificing way of guaranteeing it “the foundation of religion,” as Christianity does. 

    Therefore “the most characteristic law of the Gospel is that of bearing one’s cross”—the “true test of faith.” Jesus sets the example, dying “without finding either gratitude in those he serves, fidelity in his friends, or equity in his judges.” He does this “to let upright man see that in the greatest extremities he needs neither human consolation nor even any tangible sign of divine help: let him but love and trust, resting assured that God is mindful of him though he gives no token of it, and that eternal bliss is in store for him.” The cry of Man, even of the God-man in extremis, “My God, my God, why have You forsaken me?” finds its answer in this faith.

    This truth has a moral corollary. Plato’s Socrates tells the story of Gyges, a man who possessed a ring that made him invisible whenever he wanted to be, and so led a life of criminal vice without detection. Socrates argues that the truly virtuous man remains virtuous not only if his actions are unseen by other men but even if his virtues bring down upon him the envy of other men, “even to the point of being” tortured. That is of course exactly what happened to Jesus. “Does it not seem that God put this wonderful idea of virtue into a philosopher’s mind only to have it realized in his Son’s person and to show that the just man has another glory, another rest, in short, another happiness than can possibly be attained upon earth.” “What greater accomplishment could be reserved for a God coming into the world?”

    Perhaps there is one greater: the revolution or regime change Jesus makes against Satan, who had ruled this world. Satanic powers had murdered the one truly innocent man. All men were, and are, guilty of sin and therefore justly turned over to the most sinful of all rulers. But “by attacking the innocent,” Satan’s Hell “shall be obliged to release the guilty whom it held captive” because Satan overstepped the just limit God had placed upon him. “The woeful obligation by which we were delivered over to rebel angels, is wiped out: Jesus Christ has nailed it to his Cross, there to be blotted out by his blood.” In His grace, divine justice “is itself overcome; the sinner, its due victim, is snatched from its hands.” With this sacrifice, “Jesus Christ eternally binds to himself the elect for whom he sacrifices himself: they are his members and his body; henceforth the eternal Father can only see them through the body of Christ; and thus [the Father] extends toward them the infinite love with which he loves his Son.” “The true Promised Land” is not the physical one Moses saw from afar but “the heavenly kingdom” under a “wholly spiritual law,” the Christ-ian law of love, no longer the Mosaic law.

    With this new ruler of the world comes a new ruling body—the Church or assembly of Christ’s people. The original body of the children of God, the Jews, had established the earthly site of God’s kingdom in Jerusalem, “notwithstanding the lack of belief of most of the nation,” for which they were repeatedly punished by their loving Father. Indignant at the Apostles’ preaching to the Gentiles, “the Jews” delivered Paul, the Jewish convert to Christianity, to the Romans. (Bossuet later actually claims that the Jews “crucified Him.”) They revolted against the Romans and were crushed by them; the Romans, unconverted either to Judaism or Christianity, were used by God as instruments of punitive judgment against the Jews, whom Bossuet regards as apostates, and against the Christians of Jewish or Gentile origin, now united as the new people of God, subject to chastising or corrective punishment by those Romans, whose persecution only strengthens the bonds of the new politeuma. “A new people is formed, and the new sacrifice, so much heralded by the prophets, begin to be offered over the whole earth.” As for the Jews, those who did not convert no longer belong to God’s people; “by their infidelity toward the seed promised to Abraham and David, [they] are no longer Jews or sons of Abraham other than in the flesh”; they thereby “renounce the promise by which all nations were to be blessed.” “The Gentiles incorporated with the Jews henceforth become the true Jews and the true kingdom of Judah, opposed to that schismatic Israel cut off from the people of God; they [i.e., both Jewish and Gentile converts] become the true kingdom of David through their obedience to the laws and Gospel of Jesus Christ, the son of David.” Indeed, “there is nothing more remarkable than that separation of the unbelieving Jews from the Jews converted to Christianity.”

    Had Bossuet foreseen the ‘universal history’ of the subsequent three hundred years, he would have understood what dangerous ground he treads, here. He does admit that “the God of mercies has not yet exhausted his mercies toward that patriarch race, despite its faithlessness,” preserving them “outside their country and in their ruin, even longer than the nations that have conquered them.” The ancient Medes, Persians, Greeks, and Romans “have been blended with other nations.” By preserving the Jews, by not enabling them to ‘assimilate,’ God “keeps us in expectation of what he will still do for the unhappy remnant of a people once so highly favored.” At the end of days, Jews shall be redeemed; “they shall return, never again to go astray.” But for now, they are “slaves wherever they are”—as they had been in Egypt—without honor, without liberty, without identity as a people,” by which Bossuet must mean without sovereignty, since he just said God has carefully preserved them.  Their present diaspora “teach[es] us to fear God” and to consider “the judgments he executes upon his ungrateful children, so that we may learn never to glory in the favors shown to our fathers.” 

    All of that notwithstanding, it still is necessary to pause and to consider what Bossuet teaches, here. This isn’t the modern pseudoscience of the ‘anti-Semites.’ Bossuet’s argument does not classify Jewish people as members of a ‘race’ in any biological sense, and therefore does not lead to genocide. In fact, it effectually prohibits it by classifying race-murder as an attempt to thwart God’s providence. But his supercessionist theology does lead to callousness with regard to Jewish subordination in ‘Christian Europe.’ In effect, he claims that Jewish slavery ‘serves them right’ for failing to convert to Christianity. He is explicit on this point. The unconverted Jews’ punishment for “the most heinous of all crimes, a crime until then unheard-of, namely, deicide…resulted in a vengeance such as the world had never seen,” much worse than the destruction of the first Temple by Nebuchadnezzar. “They had to perish,” not as a nation but as a sovereign nation united in one place. This isn’t anti-Semitism, but it is an attempt to justify the old-fashioned ghettoization of Jews, up to and perhaps including pogroms or at very least making pogroms likely. Where is Christian love, the love of the Holy Spirit, in any of this? A few pages later, he condemns the Roman emperor, Julian “the Apostate,” for “stoop[ing] so low as to court the Jews, who were the outcasts of the world.” More, “Jews remain the laughingstock of the nations and the object of their aversion.” Bossuet thus provides a window into the vile practices of many European Christians, crimes committed against innocent people deemed perennially guilty by their persecutors for their refusal to concur with Christian teachings. This sort of anti-Judaism sets up a cycle of self-justifying tyranny by tempting Christians to abuse Jews under the illusion that they, Christians, thereby act as divinely appointed scourges. [2]

    The Biblical (not only New-Testament) humility he does commend makes considerable sense, quite apart from the teachings of the Bible, when Bossuet recounts the course of events in Christendom after the days of the Apostles. The blood of the martyr was indeed the seed of the Church, but the doctrines of the heretics were its herbicide. As it happened, the Church learned that “it has no less to suffer under Christian emperors than it had suffered under infidel emperors and that it must shed blood to defend not only the whole body of its doctrine but even every individual article.” It turned out that the ‘new’ Jews, the Christians, were as vulnerable to idolatry as the ‘old’ Jews. The old idolaters “forgot reason” by attempting to make their own gods. The true God did indeed want men to forget reason but “to forget it in another manner.” No one understands the Cross of Christ by reason alone, by ‘unassisted’ reason; you understand it “by bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ, by casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God.” God’s remedy for the disease of idolatry was faithful and grateful obedience because “it was not through reason that one could destroy an error which reason had not established.” Idolatry isn’t false reasoning, a thing refutable by logic, but the absence of reasoning at all, hence invulnerable to rational argument, “an inversion of good sense” not to be argued with. Reasoning only irritates a frenzied person. Even Plato could not overthrow pagan altars and found himself force to make sacrifices to them in the form of “a lie,” feigned religiosity. “What purpose have you thus served, O philosophy!”

    “God completely overwhelmed reason by the mystery of the Cross; and, at the same time, he applied the remedy to the roots of the evil.” The Cross could do this because idolatry originates in “that profound attachment we have for ourselves.” Loving ourselves, we “contrive gods like ourselves.” In worshipping them, we really worship our “own thoughts, pleasures, and fancies.” By contrast, Jesus teaches us to “forget ourselves, renounce everything, crucify everything, in order to follow him,” to tear ourselves from ourselves, to love suffering instead of pleasure. “By taking upon himself the pain of sin without sin itself,” Jesus “showed that he was not a guilty person punished but the Just One atoning for the sins of others.” “An apparent folly,” the Cross calls us to a wisdom “so sublime that to our wisdom it appears folly; and its rules are so exalted that the whole seems an aberration.” Yet “the apostle and their disciples, the outcasts of the world, mere nothings, if we look upon them with human eyes, have prevailed over all the emperors and the whole empire of the Romans,” now ruined. In making this happen, God “has laid low all human pride which would come to” the defense of the idols, “perform[ing] this great work as he had created the universe, by the sole power of his word.”

    A Christian shouldn’t take idolatry too literally. It has “diverse forms,” as sensual pleasure, self-interest, ignorance, “a false veneration of antiquity,” politics, philosophy, and heresy “all come to its aid.” In this struggle, the Bishop of Meaux looks to the Catholic Church as the true bulwark against the idols. “Some”—the heretical sects—were “perhaps lost in the by-ways; but the Catholic Church was always the highway taken by most of those who sought Jesus Christ.” Given the tradition it took over from pre-Christian Jews, Bossuet defends the Jewish tradition as authentic and venerable. “The Mosaic tradition is too clear and too persistent to allow the least suspicion of falsehood”; “the Jewish people always showed an invincible repugnance at accepting something they had never heard of before as ancient and as having come from Moses, and at accepting as familiar and established something just recently put into their hands.” They are the least likely people to have corrupted their own tradition. In “her clear victory over all sects,” the Catholic Church evinces the continuity of true religion—a “wonderful sequence of events” which, “through time…leads you to eternity.”

    Bossuet’s account of Christianity teaches the Dauphin and other readers the true justification of humility against human selfishness and the delusions it fosters. In Part III, he teaches them the reasons for humility by presenting the universal history of empires. He doesn’t keep his intention secret, either, titling the first chapter, “The Overthrow of Empires Is Ordered by Providence and Serves to Keep Princes in Humility.” Or so one might well wish.

    “Most of these empires” he will discuss “are by necessity linked with the history of God’s people,” God having used the Assyrians and Babylonians to chastise them, the Persians to restore them, Alexander to protect them. Even the persecuting Romans provided Christians with a framework for proselytizing by maintaining a multinational empire with good roads. In the end, “the Roman Empire yielded” to Christianity, “having found a power more invincible than its own.” After God chastised the Romans by permitting them to succumb to barbarian invasions, today “Rome continues to exist only through Christianity,” through the Roman Catholic Church, the religion it now “brings to the whole world.”

    In light of this course of events, “even from a merely human point of view, it is extremely useful, especially for princes, to contemplate this passing of empires, since the arrogance which so often attends their eminent position is greatly dampened by this sight. For if men learn moderation when they see the death of kings, how much more will it strike the to see even the death of kingdoms!” Because “permanence is not for men,” because “change and unrest are the proper lot of human affairs,” human empire can never match the continuity of God’s religion, or at least not in the same way. The course of human empires has “its own continuity and its own proportion,” which may be seen in the causes “their progress and their decadence”—a topic Bossuet addressed (if in a very different manner) several decades before Montesquieu. “The true science of history consists in uncovering for each age the hidden tendencies which have prepared the way for great changes and the important combinations of circumstances which have brought them about.”

    Unlike subsequent thinkers, Bossuet does not ascribe progress and decadence to impersonal causes. It is “the character of the dominating nations in general, and of princes in particular, as well as that of the outstanding men” who “have contributed for good or evil to the change in empires and the fate of nations.” ‘Fortune’ is not running the show. “By looking at unrelated occurrences we might think that fortune alone decides the rise and fall of empires, but…in reality, taking everything into consideration, the situation is rather akin to gambling, where the most skillful player wins in the long run.” “It is those with the most far-reaching plans, have been the most diligent, have persevered the longest in great efforts and, finally, have known best how to press on or to restrain themselves according to the situation who have, in the end, gained the upper hand and have been able to use fortune itself for their ends.” Neither a Machiavellian, promising the Dauphin that he can master Fortune nor a historical determinist denying that statesmen and other “outstanding men” have any real effect at all, Bossuet points to the interplay between impersonal and personal causes. Of the several empires he considers, Egypt, Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome best illustrate his approach.

    “The Egyptians were the first among whom the rules of government were known,” “the first to recognize the true aim of politics, which is to make life easier and to make the people happy.” To these ends, they made virtue “the foundation of the entire society,” and chief among these virtues was gratitude. Gratitude was reserved for the gods and divinely guided lawgivers, and “ignorance of religion and of the laws of the realm was not tolerated on any social level.” While those laws “were very good, it was even better that everyone was brought up to observe them” ‘to the letter,’ as “the exactitude with which small things were preserved was also the safeguard of the great.” This resulted in extraordinary political continuity: “no people has kept its customs and its laws for a longer time.” In Egyptian courtrooms, no demagogues were permitted to exhibit that “false eloquence which dazzles the mind and stirs the passions,” fomenting change. “The truth could not be exposed in too dry a fashion” in the senate where cases were judged, and where the Egyptians “preserv[ed] their ancient maxims” by “surround[ing] them with certain ceremonies, which impressed them on people’s minds. Most remarkably, the Egyptians extended the reach of the law beyond death. “When we [moderns] die, it is a consolation to leave our name in esteem among men; and of all the worldly goods, this is the only one death cannot take away. but in Egypt it was not permitted to praise the dead indiscriminately. As soon as a man was dead, he was brought to trial,” his final reputation to be established in formal judicial proceedings. Those found worthy won perpetual gratitude from all subsequent generations of the living.

    So, too, with parents. Mummification had a moral and political purpose: to establish perpetual gratitude toward parents. “When children saw the bodies of their ancestors, they remembered their publicly recognized virtue and endeavored to love the laws they had left to them.” Even the kings were bound by the laws, as Egyptians “believed that reproaches would only exasperate them and that the most efficacious way of inspiring them to virtue was to show them their duty in lawful praise, solemnly expressed before the gods.” The kings were accordingly revered, and rightly so. Whereas in most political communities the kings are not the greatest men, in Egypt under the Theban dynasty “the greatest men were the kings.” “The two Hermes, who founded the sciences and all the institutions of the Egyptians—the one living around the time of the Flood, the other, whom they called Trismegistus, or the Thrice Great, living at the time of Moses—were both kings of Thebes.” They invented astronomy, arithmetic, the art of land surveying that developed into geometry, and medicine. Egypt was “the first nation to have libraries,” with which “Egypt cured itself of ignorance, the most dangerous of illnesses and the source of all the others.” No wonder “most kings were so beloved by the people that everyone mourned their death as much as that of a father or a child.” Making sure that the Dauphin doesn’t miss the point, Bossuet encourages him to study the artworks of Thebes and the inventions of Egypt.

    Egyptian architecture, seen most notably in the pyramids, contrasted with the impressive but unstable structure of the Tower of Babel. Of a piece with its laws and the regime behind them, “from the very beginning the taste of the Egyptians was such that they liked solidity and unadorned regularity,” in imitation of the simplicity of “Nature itself”; “once taste has been corrupted by novelty and extravagant boldness” (perhaps as seen in the Palace of Versailles?) it is “hard to recapture.” But “Egypt did not expend its greatest effort on inanimate things. Its most noble labor and its most accomplished art consisted in forming men” with the “art of developing the body as well as the mind” by “frugality and exercise.” “The country was healthy by nature, but philosophy had taught them that nature needs to be helped.” As a result of this “frugal diet and vigorous exercise,” even the bones of the Egyptians, like their monuments, were hard, unlike “the fragile skulls of the Persians” with whom Egyptian remains were mingled on battlefields. And the brains inside those skulls were still more impressive. “Egypt ruled by giving advice, and this rule of the mind seemed to them more noble and more glorious than any rule that can be established by armies.” This brought such Greeks as Homer, Pythagoras, Plato, Lycurgus and Solon “to Egypt to learn wisdom.” And “God wished that Moses himself be learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians; this is how he came to be mighty in words and deeds. True wisdom avails itself of everything; and God does not wish those whom he inspires to neglect human mans, which, in their own way, also come from him.” That is, the two wellsprings of Western civilization, the Greeks and the Hebrews, both flowed from Egypt.

    The Babylonian Empire provides a contrast to Egyptian wisdom. Babylon “had a strange destiny, since it perished through its own inventions.” They had diverted the Euphrates River into an artificial lake in order to build a bridge, giving them control of the entrance to the city against any would-be conqueror. When Cyrus besieged the city, he simply rediverted the river back to its original course and marched through the dry riverbank into Babylon. And even then, had “the slopes been guarded, the Persians could have been overpowered when they passed through the riverbed” below. But the “insane self-confidence” and hedonism of the Babylonians made them neglectful even of establishing a proper military order and chain of command. “This is the downfall not only of the strongest fortifications but even of the greatest empires.” France, take note. 

    Persia’s Cyrus, although indeed great, “well brought up in warlike pursuits,” failed politically by exhibiting less-than-Egyptian wisdom when it came to his successors. He “did not take enough care to give the successor to his empire an education similar to his own; and, as is usual in human affairs, too much greatness was detrimental to virtue.” With the exception of Cyrus, Persia generally lacked the civic virtues, thanks to a defective education. “The respect for royal authority which the Persians were taught from childhood on was carried to excess by its admixture of adoration; and” unlike the Egyptians, “the Persians seem to be slaves rather than subjects who submitted their reason to lawful authority.” Bossuet find a possible excuse for this in “their Oriental temperament,” a “keen and violent nature” which may have “called for a firmer and more absolute government.” The East is not the West; Egypt civilized the Greeks and the Hebrews but the Babylonians and Persians, for all their refinement and all their conquests, lacked the virtues necessary for self-government under their gods.

    Bossuet regards this point as well worth repeating to the Dauphin. “The Greeks, naturally intelligent and courageous, had been educated early by the kings and colonists from Egypt, who, established in various regions of the country from the earliest times on, had widely spread the excellent institutions of the Egyptians,” among which “the best thing taught them was a willingness to learn and to be molded by the law for the public welfare.” As a result, the Greeks learned “to see themselves and their families as parts of a greater body, the state,” which they regarded as “a common mother, to whom they belonged even more than to their parents.” The Greek polis or city-state fostered liberty understood as civility. “To the Greeks the word civility meant more than that graciousness and mutual deference which makes men sociable”—the ‘polite society’ seen in the royal courts of Europe within the vaster boundaries of the centralized modern state. For them, “a civil person was the same thing as a good citizen, who always considers himself as a member of the state, abides by law, and works within it for the public welfare without encroaching on anyone.” By “show[ing] their love of the people, not by flattering them, but by furthering their well-being and upholding the rule of the law” with “uncompromising rectitude,” the ancient Greek monarchs established “a regime” in which “the Greeks gradually came to feel that they were capable of self-government, and most of the cities formed themselves into republics” under the guidance of “wise legislators, such as Thales, Pythagoras, Pittacus, Lycurgus, Solon, Philotas, and many others known to history,” who “prevented liberty from degenerating into license.” Under the republican regimes, “the liberty the Greeks had in mind was a liberty subject to the law, meaning to reason itself as recognized by all the people,” a feature of politics as Aristotle defined it, as ruling and being ruled in turn. “The magistrates, though feared during their tenure, later became private citizens again.” Bossuet carefully states that although “every form of government has its own advantages,” and “the Greeks profited from theirs in the sense that the citizens were all the more attached to their country since they all had a share in its government and since every individual could aspire tp the highest office,” “lawful submission” under a law-abiding monarch presents fewer risks than “the hazards of liberty” in a republic.

    Bossuet judges that philosophy made the Greeks better republicans. “The freer these people were, the more it became necessary to found the rules of behavior and of society upon sound reasoning,” as found in the teachings of Pythagoras, Thales, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Archytas, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, “and an infinite number of others” who “filled Greece with these noble precepts.” “It was a common tenet among the philosophers that a man should either retire from public affairs or consider nothing but the general welfare.” The poets too instructed the Greeks “even more than they entertained them”; Alexander the Great “regarded Homer as a master who taught him how to rule well,” as “this great poet also taught how to obey and to be a good citizen.” “When Greece, nurtured in this manner, saw the Asians in their daintiness, their finery, and their effeminate beauty, it had nothing but contempt for them,” while the Asian “form of government, which was constituted in such a way that the will of the prince was above all the laws, even the most sacred, inspired Greece with horror,” as for them “there was nothing more hatred than barbarism,” whose regime is despotism, the antithesis of ruling and being ruled. They loved Homer’s poetry in part because “it celebrated the victories and advantages of Greece over Asia.” Whereas Asia’s goddess was Aphrodite, the goddess of “pleasure, licentious love, and effeminate manners,” Greece’s goddess was Hera, goddess of “steadiness and conjugal love.” To Hera they added Hermes, god of eloquence, and Zeus, god of “political wisdom.” In Homer’s poems, ” on the side of Asia was the impetuous and brutal Ares, that is, savage warfare; on the side of Greece was Athena, that is, military art and valor controlled by the mind.” Since Homer’s time, then, “Greece had always believed that intelligence and courage were its natural patrimony,” never to be subjugated by Asia, a “yoke that seemed equivalent to subjecting virtue to voluptuousness, the mind to the body and true courage to uncontrolled power, which consists only in numbers,” as seen in the vast Asian armies the Greeks defeated at Salamis.

    Impressive though this was, it wasn’t sufficient in the long run. “Reason alone was incapable of restraining” the “overly spirited and free minds” of the Athenians. Plato, “a wise Athenian who admirably understood the character of his country” suggested that “it was no longer possible to govern them once the victory of Salamis had reassured them as to the Persians.” The overconfidence seen in Babylonian despotism overtook the people of Athens, eventually causing them to lose their war with Sparta. Again, Bossuet implicitly commends a certain reasonable humility to the Dauphin.

    Bossuet turns finally to Rome, “the empire whose laws we still respect and which we consequently should know like any other.” “The very essence of a Roman, so to speak, was his attachment to his liberty and to his country. These feelings reinforced each other; for because he loved his liberty, he also loved his country as a mother who constantly fostered his generosity and his liberty” under the laws. The Romans further reinforced their attachment to liberty and country by refusing to “consider poverty an evil.” “On the contrary, they saw it as a means of preserving their most complete liberty; for who is freer or more independent than a man who is able to make do with very little and who, not expecting anything from anyone’s protection or liberality, counts only on his own industry and his own work for his livelihood?” As Livy observes, “there never was a people to hold frugality, thrift, and poverty in esteem for so long a time”; and so, for example, “when the Samnites offered Carius gold and silver dishes, he replied that his pleasure was not to have them but to give orders to those who did.” “Nothing could be further” from the Roman regime, the Roman “way of life,” than Samnite “effeminacy.”

    The Roman way was the way of a military, not a commercial, republic. Conquer or die was “the inviolable law” of the Roman soldier. Nor was that soldier dependent on his personal virtue, alone. He was a part of a prudently designed military structure, an army divided into small units that could adjust to any terrain, “be united or separated as required,” ready for “separate or concerted actions and to all sorts of deployments and changes, which are executed by the whole army or parts of it, as the need made be.” This organization enabled the Romans to defeat the Macedonians and many others. And you, Dauphin, “see practiced under the command of Louis the Great” exactly such military organization, which lends itself to the flexible tactics prudence or practical reasoning requires, and which the exigencies of warfare demand. [3] Thanks to their superior virtue and organization, the Romans “triumphed over  courage when they defeated the Gauls, over courage and art when they defeated the Greeks, and over both of these qualities, sustained by the most artful strategy, when they triumphed over Hannibal.” “Therefore, nothing in their government gave them as much pride as their military discipline. They always considered it the cornerstone of their empire. Military discipline was the first thing their state brought forth and the last thing it lost, and this shows how closely it was connected with the organization of their republic.” 

    Bossuet now draws the explicit lesson for France and its Dauphin. Here is how you can win the statesman’s gamble against fortune in the long run: “If a government can give its people a taste for glory, patient labor, the greatness of the nation, and patriotism, it can claim that it ha constituted tis state in such a way that it will surely bring forth great men,” who are “an empire’s strength.” “Nature does not fail to endow all nations”—and that must include Asian or ‘Oriental’ nations—with “lofty minds and hearts, but it needs help in developing them.” The French nobility “is so valiant in battle and so bold in all its ventures…because it was taught from childhood on and confirmed in this opinion by the unanimous feeling of the nation, that lack of courage degrades a gentleman and makes him unworthy of the light of day.” Likewise, “in the best days of Rome, even children were trained for war; the greatness of the Roman name was all that counted,” and a father’s failure so to raise his boys was “brought to trial by the magistrates and convicted of an offense against the public.” Thus Rome’s great men brought forth others; Rome’s regime thus “engender[ed] many heroes.” Its rival, Carthage, a commercial republic, inadequately trained for war, hired foreign troops, preferring money to virtue. Carthage lost. [4]

    Rome declined, however, partly because its extensive conquests were unjust, consequences of “the desire to dominate,” and “therefore justly condemned by the rules of the Gospel” and also the teachings of philosophy—notably those of her own Cicero who, following Aristotle, taught that the purpose of war is a just peace, that martial courage must be tempered with civil justice. “The sweet taste of victory and domination soon corrupted the rectitude which natural equity had given the Romans.” Their empire lasted as long as it did because although they were “cruel and unjust” in war, “they governed conquered nations with moderation,” partially following philosophic precept. Indeed, conquered subjects eventually could become citizens, eligible to serve in the Roman senate. “Rome came to be looked upon as the common fatherland.” Ultimately, Rome’s truly fatal flaw was not its injustice in wars beyond its boundaries but its injustice within, its factionalism, its inability “to find a middle course” between patricians and plebeians. “Weary and exhausted by this long period of civil war and in need of tranquility, Rome was forced to renounce its liberty” and to adopt Caesarist despotism. As long as Romans under the republic had external enemies, they remained somewhat united; when their empire was well established, fear no longer united them and their jealous passions destroyed their regime. Moreover, “the character of war is such that the command had to fall into the hands of a single man” and the armies under such men saw that “the empire was at their disposal.” Having “created so many new citizens” in the aftermath of its far-flung conquests, Rome “could hardly recognize itself in the throng of naturalized foreigners.” In the end, the patrician ‘few’ lost to “men of great ambition, together with the wretched poor, who have nothing to lose”; such ambitious men, allied with such wretched men, “have nothing to lose” and so “always favor change” of regime,” in this case away from the mixed-regime, military republican empire to the despotic military empire of the Caesars. Bossuet suggests: Don’t let that happen to France, and to its monarchy, which by his time had a military monarchy that was corrupting its aristocratic element by drawing them into the hedonist society of Versailles.

    Bossuet concludes his book with a Christian message. “Let us no longer speak of coincidence or fortune,” since “God alone can subject everything to his will.” “While you will see almost all [great empires] falling of their own weakness, you will see religion upheld by its own strength; and you will discern without difficulty where solid greatness lies, and where a man of understanding is to place his hopes.”

     

    Notes

    1. This isn’t quite accurate. The Apostle Paul explains to the Galatians that “a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified” (Galatians 2:15-16). Christians receive “the Spirit” not by “the works of the law” but by “the hearing of faith” (Galatians 3:2). This in no way exempts Christians from God’s law, the sum of which is to love God and love your neighbor as yourself. It rather puts law in its rightful place, subordinate to the Spirit of God.
    2. Bossuet would have benefited from revisiting Ephesians 2:11-22, in which passage Paul explains that Jesus has “broken down the dividing wall, that is, the hostility” between Jews and Gentiles, having “abolished in His flesh the enmity” between the two, “that he might reconcile both unto God” and make them “fellowcitizens with the saints, and of the household of God.” 
    3. Charles de Gaulle took the same lesson, as seen in his book, Vers l’armée de métier. Decades later, he said to André Malraux, “I understand Rome.”
    4. Famously, Montesquieu will commend the peaceful commercial republican regime, not military republicanism or military despotism, as a means of overcoming Europe’s chronic civil and international wars, wars spurred not only by aristocratic pride but by Christian zealotry.

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Bossuet on “Universal History” before the Advent of Jesus

    April 27, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet: Discourse on Universal History. Elborg Forster translation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

     

    Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, published his book in 1682. Louis XIV was king; Bossuet had tutored his eldest son, Louis’ presumptive heir, who predeceased his father and whose own son eventually reigned as Louis XV. Bossuet dedicated the book to the Dauphin, continuing the long tradition of courtesy books and mirrors for princes dating back to Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, a tradition revived and adapted to Christian teachings in the thirteenth century by several English, French, and German writers. The Renaissance saw two of the most eminent contributions to the genre, one by Castiglione and another (with a very different twist) by Machiavelli. The Bourbons had founded the modern state in France, inclining to deploy the Catholic Church as a civil religion; at the time of the Discourse‘s publication, Louis was quarreling with Pope Innocent XI over the extension of the droit de régale, whereby the king could claim revenues from vacant dioceses and abbeys. The most prominent French clergymen, beginning with Cardinal Richelieu, who had served as Foreign Secretary under Louis’ father, were suspected of some degree of Machiavellianism, and Machiavelli’s philosophic inheritors, Descartes and Spinoza, were widely read. Bossuet opposes them, reminding the king and especially his son that the divine right of kings can scarcely sustain itself without belief in divinity. As Elborg asks in his helpful introduction, “Is it significant that, regardless of edition, Bossuet’s history of Jesus comes almost exactly in the middle of the book?” Quite possibly so. 

    In his dedication to the Dauphin, Bossuet states his intention: “to explain the history of religion and the changes of empires.” While religion is unitary and perpetual, thanks to God’s continuous direction, empires are plural and changeable, human-all-too-human. Moreover, “even if history is useless to other men, princes should be made to read it,” as it shows them the effects of passion and interest, time and circumstance, good advice and bad advice. “If they need experience to acquire the prudence of a good ruler, nothing is more useful for their instruction than to add the examples of past centuries to the experiences they have every day,” at no risk to themselves or to their people. This should have a salubrious moral effect. “Seeing even the most hidden vices of princes exposed to everyone’s sight, despite the spurious praise they receive during their life, they will be ashamed of the vain pleasure they take in flattery and will understand that true glory comes only with merit.”

    History’s effect of moral and straitening complements its intellectual effect, the ability to make distinctions. “He who has not learned from history to distinguish different ages will represent men under the law of Nature or under written law as they are under the law of the Gospel.” Spinoza attempts precisely to bring men to accept a new form of the law of nature; the ability to distinguish pagan natural law from the law of the Gospel, and both from the law of Moses, will guard the prince against such beguilement. Central to Bossuet’s list of distinctions is the one between the time of liberty under Themistocles and the time of Macedonian rule under Philip. Is it significant that Bossuet places a lesson on liberty in this place, even as he places he places the distinction of France during its civil wars and France “united under that great king,” Louis XIV, in which “France alone triumphs over all of Europe,” last on the list? Does he suggest that liberty leads to factional strife, empire to peace? Or is he, on the contrary, thinking of Catholic Christian liberty, threatened by the imperial monarch?

    However this may be, religion and empire are “the two points around which human affairs revolve.” “To discover their order and sequence is to understand in one’s mind all that is great in mankind and, as it were, to hold a guiding line to all the affairs of the world”—no small thing for any prince to discover. History identifies “epochs” in the course of events, stops or resting places, great events “to which we an relate all the rest.” Of these twelve epochs, the sixth is Solomon’s founding of the Temple in Jerusalem, the seventh Romulus’ founding of Rome; that is, in keeping with the two points of human affairs, there is no one central epoch but a pair. A third and truly crucial turning point in terms of empire is Charlemagne’s founding of the new, Christian empire, ending ancient history. It is noteworthy that Bossuet so often marks the beginning of new epochs in the course of events with a founding, beginning with God’s founding of the human race.

    Bossuet titles the first epoch “Adam, or the Creation.” It lasted from the Creation in 4004 BC to the Flood in 2348 BC. As related by Moses, author of the Pentateuch and therefore “the first historian, the most sublime philosopher”—pace Spinoza—and “the wisest of legislators,” in Adam God fashioned “all men within one man,” as even his wife “was fashioned from him.” The formation of Eve out of Adam indicates God’s intention to establish “harmony in marriage and human society.” After the expulsion from Eden, God’s providential care nonetheless continued, as he taught men the arts indispensable to their survival: agriculture, animal husbandry, weaving, and “perhaps that of finding shelter. For his part, beginning the second epoch, Noah preserved those arts after having preserved mankind itself by the art of carpentry. The Epoch of Noah, or the Flood, lasted 426 years until 1921 BC. It saw the first three founders of nations: Japheth, who established the peoples of the East, Ham, who established the peoples of the South, and Shem, ancestor of the Hebrews. Acting in contradiction to these builders, Nimrod’s “violent nature,” consonant with the way of hunting, made him into the first conqueror, beginning his destructive work at Babylon, the symbol of human pride. In both their constructive and destructive efforts, peoples “were going their separate ways, forgetful of their Creator.” Human learning also began to flourish, as the Chaldeans invented astronomy, which they gave to Callisthenes in Babylon, then by him to Aristotle.

    God’s calling of Abraham, “the beginning of God’s people and the Covenant,” began in 1921 BC and lasted until 1491 BC. God chose Abraham “as the stem and father of all believers,” and Bossuet cleverly adds “It was Jesus Christ whom Abraham honored in the person of the high priest Melchizedek, who represented him”—an elegant way of inserting the authority of the Christian clergy into an Old Testament story. Under this interpretation, the Catholic Church goes back a long way, indeed. And, like Christians in many times and in many places, “the Hebrews were unjustly hated and persecuted without mercy,” enslaved in Egypt. There, the great prophet, Moses, learned “all the wisdom of the Egyptians,” having been “brought up by Pharaoh’s daughter.” 

    During this epoch, Cecrops founded twelve Egyptian colonies in Greece, colonies which eventually became the Kingdom of Athens. The Deucalion flood, “which the Greeks take to be the universal flood,” wiped it out. Deucalion’s son, Hellen, escaped, reigning in the Thessalian city of Pythia; hence the term “Hellenes.” In Thebes, a non-Egyptian set of Gods were introduced by Cadmus, the gods of Syria and Phoenicia. Thus, Greece became polytheistic and (to deploy an anachronism) multicultural, even as the Israelites were monotheists who integrated and subordinated foreign wisdom under divine law.

    The exodus from Egypt and the establishment of that written law by Moses inaugurated the fourth epoch, which lasted from 1491 BC to 1184 BC. Previous to the receipt of God’s law, natural law, consisting of reason and ancestral tradition, guided human conduct. But God’s tabernacle among the Israelites now became the “symbol of the future” of humanity. Jewish history during this epoch consists of events, often violent, by which God “slowly mold[ed]” His people, an education and habituation recounted in Moses’ Pentateuch, in which he recorded these “foundations of our religion.” Elsewhere, Pelops ruled what is now called the Peloponnesus, beginning in 1322; the first Assyrian empire was founded in 1267. Hercules and Theseus came “later,” Theseus founding the city of Athens.

    The fall of Troy occurred in 1184 BC, inaugurating the fifth epoch, which concluded with the completion of Solomon’s Temple in 1004. In the Gentile world, this epoch comes down to us in the form of legends and heroes. In sacred history, Samson, Eli, Samuel, and Saul ruled Israel, followed by David, the “pious warrior.” Athenians “abolished kingship and declared Zeus the only king of the people of Athens,” as the archons or rulers were made accountable to the people of the city. In Greece, then, monotheism was associated with popular rule, not monarchy, whereas in Israel monotheism issued led to a popular call for monarchy.

    The first of the two central epochs began slightly more than a millennium before the birth of Jesus. With perhaps a glance at the French monarchy of his own time, Bossuet relates that Solomon’s reign “ended in shameful weakness,” as “he indulged in the love of women; his spirit grew base, his courage weakened, and his piety degenerated into idolatry.” This brought down God’s judgment, with the kingdom divided after Solomon’s death. Around 890 BC, Dido enlarged and fortified Carthage, a “warlike and commercial republic” with “aspirations for domination of the sea.” If Solomonic Israel parallels seventeenth-century France, ancient Carthage parallels seventeenth-century England. 

    “In these times Homer flourished, and Hesiod flourished thirty years before him. The venerable old ways they depict for us and the vestiges of ancient simplicity they preserve with such nobility are most useful in making us understand much more remote times and the divine simplicity of the Scriptures.” For Bossuet’s modernity, French and English, the sixth epoch holds up the contrast between the decadence of rulers and purity of ancient poetry and the way of life it shows us, to some extent neatly harmonizing those pagan practices with the God-given way seen in the Bible. 

    The reestablishment of the Olympiads, founded by Hercules but long discontinued, in 776 BC “marks the end of what Varro calls the legendary times—since up to that date secular histories were full of confusion and legend—and the beginning of historical times—in which world events in more faithful and precise reports,” thanks to the exact chronology those annual events made possible. Generally, in this chapter Bossuet impresses upon his reader the increasingly unruly character of the Hebrew nation, ruled by kings, and the corresponding improvement and democratization of the Greeks—especially of the Athenians.

    Romulus’ founding of Rome in 754 BC began the seventh epoch, the second of the epochs Bossuet makes central to his book. Rome “was to become the mistress of the world and the seat of religion,” a city dedicated by its founder to the god of war, “whom he called his father.” Bossuet makes no mention of Romulus’ murder of Remus, which would parallel Cain’s murder of Abel and recall Bossuet’s strictures against violence. If France under the Bourbons has become the modern Rome, Bossuet wants no suggestion of crime at the founding of its ruling dynasty. And even in his version of Rome, after Romulus the lawgiver Numa “gave form to religion and softened the barbarous manners of the Roman people.” Gradually, Romans learned to restrain their warlike character without losing it. In the 670s, “as its conquests extended further, Rome established the rules for its militia; and it was under Tullus Hostilius that it began to learn that magnificent discipline which was to make it mistress of the world” and, not incidentally, to “make citizens of its enemies” after mastering them in battle.

    Away from the proto-French Romans, several potential rival empires emerged during this epoch. Weakened by the misrule of an “effeminate prince,” Sardanapalus, the first Assyrian empire fell to the “warlike Medes.” After this event, the Medean empire, the second Assyrian empire, and the Babylonian empire rose and fell in succession. By 600 BC, “Babylon was threatening to enslave the world” and Solomon’s temple was burned. In 562, Nebuchadnezzar died in Babylon, not after foreseeing “the coming ruin of his superb city” while on his deathbed. Indeed, Cyrus the Great of Persia would conquer Babylon not long afterwards. By joining the Kingdom of Persia with that of the Medes, Cyrus “became the uncontested master of the East and founded the greatest empire the world had ever seen.” Under his rule, he ordered the “restoration of God’s Temple in Jerusalem and of the Jewish people in Judaea.” 

    Bossuet draws his account of Cyrus from the Bible and from Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Among the several Gentile historians, he regards “the wise philosopher and skillful captain,” who served in Persia, as the most reliable. “What determines me in my choice is the fact that Xenophon’s history, more coherent and more probable in itself, has the added advantage of being more consistent with the Scriptures, which, because of their antiquity and the relations of the affairs of the Jewish people with others in the East, would merit being preferred to all Greek histories, if we did not know that they were dictated by the Holy Spirit.” As for Greek historians generally, he judges them to have been “more eloquent in their narrations than painstaking in their research.”

    The years between 536 BC—the year the Jewish people returned to Jerusalem—and Rome’s conquest of Carthage in 202 saw the beginning of the hostility between the Jews and the Samaritans, who mixed worship of false Gods with Jewish observances and were on that account denied participation in rebuilding the Temple. “Irreconcilable hatred sprung up between the two nations, and there is no greater opposition than that between Jerusalem and Samaria.” Among the Gentiles, the year 510 saw Athens liberated from tyranny, with the Romans overthrowing the Tarquins a year later. The invasion of Greece by the Persians was defeated at the battles at Marathon and Thermopylae early in the fifth century.

    “Meanwhile, the new magistrates that had been given to the Roman people exacerbated the divisions within that city. Having been shaped by kings, Rome lacked the laws necessary for the proper functioning of a republic.” The Romans sent delegates to Athens to study the laws there, resulting in the rule of the decemvirs, who wrote the Laws of the Twelve Tables, “the foundation of Roman law.” Simultaneously, in Jerusalem Ezra and Nehemiah “reformed abuses and enforced the Mosaic Law, which they were the first to obey,” making all the Jewish people, “and especially the priests” to divorce the foreign women they’d married in violation of that law. The Old Testament books named for those men “complete the long history begun by Moses and continued by subsequent authors without interruption until the restoration of Jerusalem.” “Thus the last authors of sacred history meet with the first author of Greek history; and when it began, the history of God’s people—to take it only since Abraham—already comprised fifteen centuries” when Herodotus first began to write. 

    The Peloponnesian War began in 431 BC, raging on until 404. After the Spartans won they supported Cyrus the Younger in his revolt against Artaxerxes. When Cyrus was killed, the 10,000 Greek soldiers in his service retreated under the command of Xenophon, who chronicled this in his Hellenica. It was Thebes, under King Epaminondas, which broke Sparta’s hegemony in Greece, and this weakened the nation sufficiently to enable Philip of Macedon to conquer it. His son, Alexander, caused “all of the East [to come] to know Greece and {to] learn its language,” since although he died at the age of thirty-three, his fellow Macedonian generals founded the Seleucid Empire in Syria in 312 and the Ptolemaic Dynasty in Egypt in 305.  As a result of these interrelations between East and West, “the Jewish religion and the Jewish people came to be known among the Greeks,” who translated the Hebrew Bible into Greek in 277. Centuries later, the New Testament would be written in “the Hellenistic language,” that is, “Greek interspersed with Hebraisms.” “All during this time, philosophy was flourishing in Greece.” Bossuet mentions the outstanding natural philosophers but emphasizes Socrates, who “brought philosophy back to the study of proper living and became the father of moral philosophy.” Of the several schools of moral philosophy, Bossuet deprecates only the Epicureans—if, indeed, “we can call philosophers those who openly denied the existence of Providence and who, not knowing what duty is, defined virtue by pleasure.” The Romans, too, began to delve into philosophy “of another kind,” one “which had nothing to do with disputations or discourses but consisted of frugality, poverty, and the hardships of rustic life and war.” This befits a people who had fought wars for some five centuries, “found themselves masters of Italy,” and went on to defeat the Carthaginians and their great general, Hannibal.

    Scipio’s final defeat of Carthage in 202 BC marks the beginning of the ninth epoch. By now, “the Romans were feared throughout the world and no longer wanted to tolerate any power but their own.” In 173, “the persecutions of God’s people began,” not under the Romans but under Antiochus the Illustrious, a Syrian who “ruled like a maniac” and provoked a Jewish revolt against his tyranny. A few years later, after Antiochus’ death, however, Rome placed the Jewish people under their protection, “delighted with the opportunity to humiliate the kings of Syria.” In the course of their conquests, the Romans destroyed Corinth, “the most beautiful and voluptuous of all Greek cities,” taking care to remove “its incomparable statues” and to bring them to Rome, albeit “without knowing their value.” In general, “the Romans knew nothing about the arts of Greece, being satisfied with their knowledge of war, politics, and agriculture.” But by 133, Rome saw a major slave revolt against its rule at home; the Romans “were becoming too wealthy.” They continued to press their conquests, “but though the aspect of the republic was made resplendent on the outside by these conquests, it was marred by the unbridled ambition of its citizens and internal struggles.” “Everyone wanted to rule,” none to be ruled. “Even a man like the gladiator Spartacus believed that he could aspire to the command,” leaving a second slave revolt in 103. 

    The republic was slowly failing. By 58 BC, a supremely ambitious general, Gaius Julius, conquered Gaul, “the most useful conquest [Rome] ever made,” the patriotic Bossuet remarks. Julius defeated the rival general, Pompey, in 49, ended the republic by becoming emperor in 44, died by assassination a year later. Twelve years later, Octavianus defeated Marcus Antonius at the Battle of Actium. “Forsaken by all his friends, including Cleopatra, for whom he had ruined himself,” Marcus Antonius committed suicide, as did Cleopatra, the last of the Ptolemaic line. In 27, Octavianus became the Emperor Augustus.

    It was under Augustus’ long and largely peaceful rule that Jesus Christ was born, beginning the tenth epoch of human history, approximately 4,000 years after Creation. Bossuet saves his considerations of Jesus for Part Two; in this chapter, he focuses his reader’s attention on Rome. In 66 AD, the Emperor Nero became “the first emperor to persecute the Church.” But this didn’t prevent the Church’s advance throughout the empire, which proceeded throughout the second and third centuries AD. “The purity of its ways was so striking that it was praised even by its enemies.” A series of invasions by Germans and Goths in the West, Scythians and Persians in the East, weakened the Western Roman Empire and eventually overran and divided it. “Still hostile to Christianity,” Rome “made a last effort to smother it but, in the end, established it definitively” under Galerius. “New tortures were invented every day” and “the modesty of Christian virgins was attacked as much as their faith.” But “the Christians exasperated” the Romans “by their patience,” and “other nations, impressed by their saintly way of life, converted in large numbers.” The frustrated Galerius “lost all hope of vanquishing them,” dying a few years later. “But Constantine the Great, a wise and victorious prince, publicly converted to Christianity” in 312 AD and ruled the Eastern Roman Empire for the next twenty-five years—thirty-one in all. 

    In accordance with this emphasis on Rome, Bossuet places the two men he considers its finest rulers in the center of this chapter. Antoninus Pius, who ruled from 138 to 161—patron of religion, the arts and sciences, who fought no wars of conquest—and Marcus Aurelius—who ruled from 161 to 180 as that rarest of men, the philosopher-king—defended the empire and persecuted no Christians.

    Bossuet titles his chapter on the eleventh epoch “Constantine, or the Peace of the Church.” The Peace of Constantine lasted until the accession of Charlemagne to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, the new Rome, in 800. Constantine’s reign saw the condemnation of the Arians, who denied the divinity of Jesus, at the Nicaean Council in 325, followed five years later by the reconstruction of Byzantium, renamed Constantinople. A century later, Macromeres founded “the monarchy of France, the most ancient and noble of all the monarchies in the world.” But the fifth century, “so unfortunate for the empire, and in which so many heresies sprung up, was nevertheless a fortunate one for Christianity. No discord was able to shake it, no heresy to corrupt it. The Church, rich in great men, confounded all doctrinal errors.” And so, while the Western Roman Empire was “irretrievably lost” in the 470s, the French king, Clovis, converted to Christianity two decades later and the great Christian emperor Justinian ruled in the East, beginning in 527. Later in the sixth century, St. Gregory the Great became pope, sending Augustine to England to convert the pagans there.

    Gazing further to the East, Bossuet describes the failure of the Persian Empire. With what is likely another allusion to Louis XIV’s Versailles and the character of the Dauphin, Bossuet comments, “debauchery is often more harmful to princes than cruelty.” The Persians captured, then lost, the True Cross and, their power broken, Mohammad “posed as a prophet among the Saracens,” “subjugating all Arabia by fair means or foul, thus laying the foundation for the empire of the caliphs” and threatening Constantinople itself. By the second third of the seventh century, “the East was going to its ruin.” “While the emperors were consuming themselves in religious disputes and inventing heresies,” the Saracens invaded and occupied Syria, Palestine, Persian, parts of Africa, and Cyprus. It remained for a French general, Charles Martel, to defeat them in the Battle of Tours in 725. “Powerful in peace as in war, and absolute master of the kingdom,” Charles “ruled under a number of kings, whom he made and unmade as he saw fit, without daring to assume that great title.” His son, Pepin, did assume the throne as king of France; Pepin’s son, the future Charlemagne, defeated the Lombards, “enemies of Rome and its popes,” in a three-year series of campaigns ending in 776. 

    Charlemagne inaugurated the twelfth and final epoch of world history, being elected Emperor of the Romans in 800. At this point, however, Bossuet ends his chronological narrative. In order to understand the history of God’s people and the history of the great empires, “it is sometimes necessary to separate them and to examine in detail the things which are peculiar to each.” He devoted Part II to Church history, Part III to imperial history.

    Bossuet titles Part II “The Continuity of Religion.” It consists of 31 chapters. The seventeenth, central chapter consists of a critique of Judaism; the center of the book as a whole comes a few pages later and consists of a statement of what has come to be called ‘supersession theology’—the claim that Christianity became the true Judaism, and that what is now called Judaism has deviated from its origins. In Bossuet’s terms, the continuity of religion means that religion has been “always the same since the Creation of the world” but that human beings have consistently deviated from God’s way. This is also the claim of the Old Testament, and therefore of orthodox Jews to this day, who regard Christianity as anything but the true Judaism. The question, then, is how political regimes should address this principled disagreement between Christians and Jews. Bossuet’s formula opens Jewish citizens (or subjects, as in the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV) to vile persecution. To recount his argument is profoundly offensive but also useful in the sense that it opens a window into the minds of those who inflicted pogroms upon innocent persons precisely because they were deemed guilty of the most heinous crime by the highest religious authorities of those times and places, men like the Bishop of Meaux.

    “Religion and the continued existence of the people of God throughout the centuries is the greatest and most useful of all things a man can study,” Bossuet begins. This continuity “shows clearly God’s sustaining hand,” His providential rule over his creatures. Creation itself bespeaks that care; although He could have done it in an instant, God took six days to create the world “to show that he does not act out of necessity or blind impetuosity, as some philosophers have imagined.” On the contrary, “the account of the Creation as given by Moses shows us this great secret of true philosophy: that fecundity and absolute power dwell in God alone,” and not, he implies, in the ‘absolute’ monarchy of Louis XIV or any other human ruler. 

    When God says, “Let us make man,” his use of “us” deserves note, Bossuet remarks. “Nowhere in the entire Scriptures does anyone but God speak of himself in the plural,” and He does so “only two or three times,” using this “extraordinary language for the first time when it is a question of creating man.” That is because when God creates man “he speaks to someone who creates as well as he, to someone of whom man is the creature and image; he speaks to another self; he speaks to him by whom all things were made, to him who says in his Gospel, What things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.” Not only does God speak to Jesus, “he speaks at the same time with the almighty Spirit, equal and coeternal with both of them.” The trinitarian God has existed since before “the beginning.”

    To speak this way also indicates “a new order of things,” a founding. “The Trinity manifests itself for the first time when it creates a creature whose intellectual operations are an imperfect image of those eternal operations whereby God is fruitful in himself.” And this is itself a new kind of creating. Prior to Man, God had never touched the “corruptible matter” he created, “but to form the body of man, God himself takes earth; and that earth, molded by such a hand, receives the most beautiful form that has yet appeared in the world,” a creature whose “body is straight, his head…held high, and his sight…turned toward Heaven”—a form which shows this new being “whence he has come and whither he must go.” Again: providential. Even “more wonderful” is way God ensouled man with “a breath of life that proceeds from God himself.” “Let us not,” Bossuet cautions, “believe that our soul is a portion of the divine nature, as some philosophers have dreamed.” It proceeded from God, but it was a new act of creation; God is not immanent in Man, whose soul, and particularly his intellect, are rather created in the image of God. “Woe to the creature that delights in itself and not in God!” That is why the angels who fell, fell.

    Man’s imperfection manifests itself rapidly. The successful temptation of Eve by the Serpent “is the beginning of the spirit of revolt” in Man: “first, the command is discussed, and then obedience is brought into doubt.” Adam wants intellectual satisfaction—knowledge of good and evil—and sensuous pleasure—his wife convinces him that the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge is good to eat. The result is that “the rebellion of his senses” against God’s command. It is impossible not to see in this a tacit critique of Bossuet’s contemporary, Descartes, who makes so much of doubt as the pathway to knowledge, a method by which the human mind can clear itself of everything we have been told, including anything we’ve been told not to do. Such efforts fail, Bossuet thinks, because doubting God’s commands leaves the human mind defenseless against the power of the passions. “For Adam, “the rebellion of the senses makes him observe in himself something shameful,” requiring him to clothe himself, covering up the physical being God made because he knew he was no longer worthy of his God-breathed original being. The Serpent’s “You shall be as gods” tempted Eve, then Adam, to attempt to overcome, irrationally, the distinction god had delineated, the distinction between Creator and created. This soon leads Adam’s progeny to another form of sensualism—idolatry, whereby men begin to worship physical objects they themselves have ‘created.’ this is the final derangement of man’s God-breathed reason. Having been formed by God, Man absurdly “thought he could make a God.” All of this shows that there is “no power more inescapable or tyrannical than the power of vice and passion.”

    Each generation of men degenerated further—so much so that God lost His patience with His creatures, destroying all but the relatively decent few in the worldwide Flood. Even after receding, the waters left all of nature weakened, as the lingering moisture accelerated decomposition and the human lifespan shortened. Enfeebled human beings began to supplement the vegetarian diet with meat, fueling warfare. 

    The simple Noachide commandments God imposed upon mankind proved insufficient to hold human attention. To counteract men’s continued failure to follow in God’s way, His regime, God gave Moses not another set of verbal commands but a system of written laws to a people He chose to bind “with fearful strictness” and thereby improve, providing (for example) “stronger barriers against idolatry.” In choosing the Israelites he did not reward them for any merit; they “were as vulgar and rebellious as any other people, or more so.” And in preventing Moses from entering the Promised Land, God offered Israelites and the rest of mankind an indispensable lesson: “His Law made nothing perfect.” Like Moses, thanks to God’s lawful guidance we can see His promises “from afar”; the Law “conducts us at most, as it were, to the gateway of our inheritance.” It was Joshua, whose “true name” is Jesus, who brings God’s people into the Promised Land itself.

    Bossuet draws many such parallels between the Old and New Testaments. The warrior-king David fights God’s wars but Solomon, the man of peace and wisdom, is the king God permits to build His Temple in His city, Jerusalem. “David’s wars showed how much toil it takes to attain [the glory of Heaven], and Solomon’s reign showed how peaceable is its enjoyment.” For their part, Bossuet asserts, the prophets who spoke truth to the Israelite kings saw Jesus; this may be why he spends so much effort in retelling stories from Hebrew Scripture to the heir apparent to the French throne. One day, “Under [Jesus’] admirable reign the Assyrians and the Egyptians shall form with the Israelites but one and the same people of God. Everything becomes Israel, everything becomes holy. Jerusalem is no longer an individual city: it is the image of a new society, in which all nations are gathered together.” Throughout all the vicissitudes to come, “God never permitted his voice to become extinct among his people.”

    His power never ceased to enforce what His voice said, and that power was not uniformly gentle. “When the royal sons of David follow their father’s good example”—Dauphin, take note—God “works surprising wonders on their behalf; but when they degenerate, they feel the invincible strength of his arm.” God eventually allowed the Assyrians to destroy His Temple, to let Israelites “see that he was not confined to an edifice of stone, but that he would find his habitation in faithful hearts.” Nonetheless, “the overthrow of the cities and empires which harassed God’s people or profited by their destruction were written in the prophecies,” enabling (for example) the Jewish people to escape Babylon, “having timely warning.” To His chosen people, God administers fatherly chastisement, “merciful judgment,” punishing them for their own good; to the Babylonians and other nations he administers “rigorous judgment” and chastisement, ruining them. “God left no appeal” for the Babylonians. “But not so with the Jews. God chastened them like disobedient children, whom he returns to their duty by correction, and then, moved by their tears, he forgets their faults.”

    As always, however, God sets limits to His patience, as seen in the promises and warnings of the last prophets. Daniel foresees the life and death of Jesus. Jacob had taught the future advent of the Messiah; he did not “tell us that his death should be the cause” of Judah’s downfall. “God revealed this important secret to Daniel and declares to him that the ruin of the Jews shall be the consequence of the death of Christ and of their rejection of the Messiah.” That is, Daniel learns that many Jews will become like Gentiles, rejecting their Messiah, and will afterwards be judged and chastised as Gentiles had been judged and chastised. The prophecies of Zechariah and Haggai foretell the betrayal of Jerusalem “by her own children”; the last prophet, Malachi, looks forward to John the Baptist and Jesus. After these prophets, prophecy ceased. There was no more need for them. “The proofs [the Jewish people] had received were sufficient, and once their incredulity had been not only overcome by events but also frequently punished, they at last became docile,” eschewing idolatry and the words of false prophets for a long time. 

    In secular terms, “instructed by their prophets to obey the kings to whom God had subjected them,” they found those kings to be “their protectors rather than their masters,” living under their own laws with “the sacerdotal power…preserved in its entirety.” “The priests guided the people; the public council, first established by Moses, enjoyed its full authority.” This was in fact the way most ancient empires ruled their subject peoples. Limitations of transportation and communications enabled rulers to rule no other way. “For 300 years they…enjoyed this rest, so often foretold by their prophets, when ambition and jealousy arose among them and came near to undoing them.” They began to imitate Greek ways, “prefer[ring[ that vain pomp to the solid glory which the observance of the laws of their ancestors acquired for them among their countrymen.”

    The Jews’ “whole history, everything that happened to them from day to day, was but one continued unfolding of the oracles which the Holy Spirit had left them.” As for the Greeks, who ruled the Jewish people at that time, even what took place among them “was a preparation for knowledge of the truth.” Greek philosophers understood “that the world was ruled by a God very different from those whom the populace worshiped and whom they themselves worshiped with the populace,” albeit mostly for the sake of safety from ridicule or even (in the case of Socrates) persecution. [1] But this should not be taken as an independent discovery. “The Greek histories show that this excellent philosophy came from the East and from places to which the Jews had been dispersed.” Whether this claim of origins is true or false, mankind “began to awaken” to teachings that “furnished beforehand certain proof to those who were one day to rescue [the Gentiles] from their ignorance,” namely, the Apostles of Christ, who would cite the doctrine of ‘the god of the philosophers’ when teaching who that god really is. Philosophy, however, is not quite enough. “The most enlightened and wisest nations, the Chaldeans, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, were the most ignorant and the most blind in matters of religion, which only proves that one must be brought to wisdom by a special grace and by a more than human wisdom.” 

    In the end, and as per the original Satanic temptation, the Jewish people “succumbed to ambition.” By now, they were under the Roman Empire, wherein they enjoyed a substantial degree of self-government. “The Pharisees wanted power and accordingly assumed absolute power over the people, setting themselves up as arbiters of learning and religion.” Their “presumption went so far as to arrogate to itself the gift of God.” Under their regime, “the Jews…forgot that [God’s] goodness alone had set them apart from other nations, and they looked upon this as their due,” confusing divine grace for divine justice. They “thought themselves of a different species from other men, whom they considered deprived of the knowledge” of God, “look[ing] upon the Gentiles with an unbearable disdain.” “They fancied themselves holy by nature”—a contradiction, given nature’s postlapsarian corruption. “It was the Pharisees who, priding themselves on their own lights and on their strict observance of the ceremonies of the Law, introduced this opinion in the latter days.”

    Factionalism resulted. In search of a cure, the Jewish people allowed “all public power” to pass “into the hands of Herod and the Romans, whose slave he [was], and he shook the foundations of the Jewish state,” hitherto self-governing if not sovereign within the Roman Empire. The Pharisees and the people alike chafed under “the yoke of the Gentiles,” their “contempt and hatred” intensified. They yearned for a Messiah who would be a David, not a Solomon, a man of war not of wisdom and peace. “Forgetting the many prophecies which told them so specifically of [the Messiah’s] humiliations, they no longer had eyes or ears for any prophecies but those which announced triumphs.” The triumphal entry of Jesus into Jerusalem on an ass was not what they anticipated.

    Readers of the Hebrew Scripture know that God’s prophets do not hesitate to denounce the bad behavior of God’s people. In his retelling of the times before Jesus’ birth, however, Bossuet sometimes inclines to identify corrupt priests with the Jewish people as a whole. This is a dangerous thing to do, and one must watch closely as he proceeds, next, to give his account of the life of Jesus, having now reached the center of his book.

     

    Note

    1. “Plato, speaking of the god who had formed the universe, says that it is hard to find him and that it is forbidden to declare him to the people. He protests that he never speaks of him but enigmatically, for fear of exposing so great a truth to ridicule.” Thus “mankind was plunged into such an abyss that it could not bear the least idea of the true God!” Bossuet places this account of Greek philosophy in the sixteenth, central chapter of Book II.

     

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Cicero’s Defense of Politics

    April 20, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Cicero: On the Republic. David Fott translation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.

     

    Written around 54 BC, De re publica (literally, ‘On the Public Thing’) presents readers with a dialogue set some seventy-five years earlier, in the aftermath of a factional struggle in Rome between the many who were poor and the few who were rich. In 134 BC, Tiberius Gracchus, tribune of the plebs, ignored the Senate’s role in lawmaking and redistributed land to the poor. When he sought reelection in order to avoid a charge of treason and the incumbent consul refused to stop him from doing so, some senators and their clients killed him. His brother, Gaius Gracchus, would be murdered also, thirteen years later, eight years after the time of Cicero’s dialogue. This consists of six books, two each for one day; no one now can offer a serious interpretation of it because it survives only in mutilated form. There are things to learn here, nonetheless, beginning with Cicero’s preface to Book I.

    Tension between families and ‘the public thing’—polis, empire, modern state—occurs because the political community insists on its authority over families, restricting their liberty, while at the same time meeting the needs of families, not least of which is the need to regulate feuds among families. Cicero follows Aristotle in siding firmly with the political community: “Because the fatherland secures more benefits and is an older parent than he who begot, surely a greater gratitude is owed to it than to a parent” (I. fragment). But a more formidable challenge to the authority of the community arises from certain philosophers who turn their backs on public life. Cicero condemns them as “madmen” who could never help Rome in its wars, including its civil wars (I.1.). Why “madmen”? Because such men behave contra natura. “Nature has given to the human race such a necessity for virtue and such a love of defending the common safety that this force will overcome all allurements of pleasure and leisure,” unless one’s mind is deranged (I.1). That is, the ‘natural philosophers’ irrationally fail to understand human nature, and so do the apolitical moral philosophers—Epicureans and some Stoics. To understand human nature, nearer to us, more accessible to reasoning than the far reaches of the cosmos, one must think carefully about the political thing.

    Against the apolitical moralists, Cicero remarks that “it is not enough to have virtue, as if it were some sort of art, unless you use it”; indeed, “virtue depends wholly upon its use” (I.1). The “greatest use” of virtue is “the governance of the city and the completion in fact, not in speech, of the same things as these men shout about in corners” (I.1.). Here, Cicero criticizes not only the apolitical moral philosophers but ‘theorizing’ political philosophers, first and foremost the author of the earlier dialogue titled The Republic. “Philosophers say nothing—at least of what may be said correctly and honorably—that was [not] accomplished and strengthened by those who have configured law [jus] for cities,” those who have established religion as the practice of piety and both the law of nations and the civil law (I.1-2). Without lawgivers, where would justice, fidelity, fairness, a sense of shame, self-control, avoidance of disgrace, desire for praise and for honorableness, courage, if not “from those men who gave form to those things by training and who strengthened some of them by customs and consecrated others by laws”? (I.2). “Therefore, that citizen who compels of all persons, by official command and by penalty of laws, what philosophers by speech can scarcely persuade a few persons [to do], should be given precedence even over the teachers themselves who debate those things,” inasmuch as the lawgivers have put virtue fully to use, making of it more than a topic for leisured speech (I.2). 

    Yet Cicero may not be so far from Plato as it seems. In the Republic, Socrates drew thoroughly ‘politicized’ men—Thrasymachus, Glaucon—away from action and into speech. The Athenians of that time were political without being especially thoughtful, lawgivers who had no clear idea of what justice is. Cicero sees a Rome in which philosophers tempt men away from politics altogether, off into Epicurean gardens and the groves of academe. If Socrates needs to save philosophy from politics, Cicero needs to save politics from philosophy. “Let us not listen to the horns sounding the retreat to call back even now those who have already gone ahead” (I.3). Both men aim at moderating if not resolving the old quarrel between politics and philosophy.

    Cicero knows the objections to such a political philosophy, the kind of philosophy Plato and Aristotle insisted upon. It is laborious, some will say. And so it is. But this is “a trifling impediment to the vigilant and diligent man” (I.4). It is dangerous. Yes, that too: but such “dread of death” is “disgraceful,” as Socrates himself evidently thought. As for Cicero, even in exile he has “reaped greater joy from respectable men’s longing than grief from wicked men’s joy” (I.8). As Socrates argues in the Crito, “our fatherland has neither given us birth nor educated us according to law without expecting some nourishment, so to speak, from us” (I.8).

    The Epicureans, who cite trouble and danger as supposedly sound reasons for their “evasions” of politics, “so that they may more easily take great enjoyment in leisure, should be listened to certainly least of all” (I.9). They denigrate politicians as “worthless men,” futilely attempting to “restrain the raving, uncontrolled attacks of the crowd”; they claim that “the free man” will never stoop to “contending with vile, monstrous adversaries” who wield the weapons of slander and unjust force (I.9). They assure themselves, and their listeners, that they nevertheless stand ready to intervene if the republic faces some grand crisis. On the contrary, Cicero argues, those “who are good, courageous, and endowed with a great mind” should not evade public life, not allow worthless men “to tear the republic to pieces” (I.9). I myself have endured such hardship, he says, without fear of contradiction. And how can such men promise to engage in politics in times of supreme necessity when they shrink from politics in ordinary times? Have we any reason to suppose that they who have never proved themselves in the vicissitudes of everyday public life will—or, if willing, can—stand firm in amidst these storms?

    If the later Greek philosophers shirk political responsibilities, Cicero notes that “almost all” of the ancient ‘seven wise men’ of Greece “were engaged at the center of public affairs” (I.12). (All but Thales, a ‘natural philosopher,’ the sort Plato’s Socrates criticized.) For “there is nothing in which human virtue more nearly approaches the majesty of the gods than either founding new cities or preserving ones that are already founded” (I.12). 

    Approaching the majesty of the gods is all very well, but what about approaching the truths the gods are said to know, including the truth about the gods? There is no necessary contradiction, here. “I achieved something memorable in managing the republic and a certain ability to expound the meaning [ratio] of political things,” having become “an authority through not only experience but also eagerness for learning and teaching” (I.12). Reasoning about politics, finding the meaning of political things, requires a certain “kind of reasoning that I must introduce” to Rome, even as Plato and Aristotle introduced it to Athens. This kind of reasoning “is neither new nor discovered nor invented by me.” I shall “recall to memory an argument among the most famous and wisest men in our city belonging to a single generation,” a memory given to Cicero and his brother by Publius Rufus Rutilius, who participated in that conversation (I.12). “I think that almost nothing of great importance pertaining to the consideration of political affairs was omitted from it” (I.13).

    The principal discussant is Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (“Africanus” in honor of his victorious leadership of Roman armies in Carthage and Numantia). He is at his suburban estate—neither fully in the city nor fully in the countryside, nature as conceived by the natural philosophers. He celebrates the “Latin holidays,” that is, the event marking the alliance between ancient Rome and the Latins, from whom the Roman men had seized women they needed for wives if Rome was to survive (I.14). The Romans quickly made peace with the justly aggrieved Latin rulers; this political marriage of necessity provided a new and stable foundation for Rome, preserving a city that had already been founded; godlike majesty entails godlike prudence or practical reasoning. This proved to be the indispensable alliance, enabling Rome to withstand attacks from rivals and eventually to defeat them and to establish their empire. 

    Scipio’s sister’s son has joined him. Unlike his eminent uncle, Quintus Tubero seems a bit lazy. Scipio tells the young man that even now, at leisure, on holiday, he works “in mind” if not in action (I.14). For emphasis, Scipio swears “By Hercules!”—that hero of labor (I.14). Very well, then, Uncle Scipio, if we want to exercise our minds, let’s work out the nature of “the other sun” that was reported recently to the senate (I.15). What is the reason for it? (We now know that when ice crystals reflect the light, the optical illusion of a second sun appears, but to Romans this was still an object of speculation.) As Tubero’s gracious host, Scipio wishes aloud that “we had with us our friend Panaetius, who inquires regularly and most eagerly about these celestial matters” (I.15). Yet to tell the truth, “I do not agree much with our close friend on this kind of thing”; as a Stoic, a philosopher concerned first of all with the ‘cosmopolis,’ the order of the universe, Panaetius “holds such firm conclusions on the sorts of matters we can scarcely guess about that it seems he notices them with his own eyes or handles them distinctly with his own hand. I am still inclined to judge Socrates wiser, who put aside all care of this kind and said either things sought about nature are greater than human reason can achieve or they hold no concern at all for human life” (I.15). 

    But why, then, uncle, did Plato himself study not only with Socrates but with the Pythagoreans? In his dialogues, Plato has Socrates speak “in such a way that even when he is debating morals [mos], virtues, and even the republic, he is nonetheless eager to combine numbers, geometry, and harmony in the manner [mos] of Pythagoras”? (I.16). (1) Scipio has his answer ready: Plato “wove together the Socratic wit and subtlety of conversation with Pythagoras’s obscurity and weight in many arts” (I.16). That is, in his own artfully constructed dialogues, Plato combined nature, but more specifically human nature, distinguished by its power of logos, of speech and reason, with mathematically symmetrical art. He thus combined two forms of knowledge in an unmatched portrayal of the philosophic quest and of those who undertake it. 

    Romans, take note. Do not hesitate to combine Romanness with Latinity in a more refined, but still political way. Several of them now arrive, ready to enjoy the Latin holiday. Publius Rufus Rutilius, “our authorial source for this conversation” (I.17), appears first, followed by Lucius Furius Philus, who proves to be a man of both moral and intellectual virtue, then Gaius Laelius, a former consul and close friend of Scipio, Spurius Mummius, a favorite of Laelius and fellow Stoic, Gaius Fannius and Quintus Scaevola, both educated young men in their late twenties, thus old enough to be quaestors. A mixture of experienced statesmen steeped in philosophy and young men eager for learning: Scipio invites them to move their conversation to a sunny meadow, closer to nature, placing Laelius in the center of group. Because Laelius is the elder of the two men, in Rome, in the city, Scipio treats him as if he were a father; outside Rome, Laelius treats Scipio “as a god,” in honor of his “glory in war” (I.18). Here, neither in the city at peace nor outside the city in war but just outside the city but now outside the household, they will continue the conversation begun indoors. They are joined at last by the oldest man of them all, Manius Manilius, a “prudent man” under whom Scipio served in Carthage in the 140s and who returned to Rome to serve as consul immediately after that. Scipio seats him next to Laelius.

    So, “what conversation did we interrupt?” Laelius wants to know (I.19). Upon being told about the two suns, Laelius wonders if we should not first explore “matters relevant to our homes and the republic” (I.19). Not necessarily, convinced Stoic Philus replies, since our real home is the universe itself, the “domicile” and “fatherland” the gods gave us “in common” (I.19). “Everyone eager for wisdom” should investigate and consider the natural things, which are the true public things, he avers, swearing by Hercules as Laelius had done, presumably ready for such heroic labors (I.19). Laelius relents, “since we are on holiday” (I.20).

    Philus proceeds not to discuss the heavens themselves but a model of them, originally designed by Archimedes. In some respects, the artfulness of Archimedes impresses him more than the universe his model depicted: “I judged that there was more talent in that Sicilian than it seemed human nature could provide” (I.22); to Philus, the natural philosopher is as nearly divine as the lawgiver is to Scipio. In both cases, however, it is human nature that is the real wonder. This perhaps inadvertent pointing back to human nature gives Scipio a dialectical opening. He recounts how the owner of the model, who had seized it as war booty, used it to show his soldiers that a solar eclipse was not an evil open concerning the coming battle but a natural event, explicable in human terms by the artifact. The practical use of science “banished the empty superstition and fear from the disturbed men, fear that would sabotage the soldierly courage needed for victory, doing so by reason (I.24-25). Well used, art can serve as an intermediary between reasoning and unreasoning men, for good military and perhaps political purposes. Why else write those artifacts, dialogues?

    As it happens, it wasn’t Archimedes but Thales of Miletus, a natural philosopher, who first understood the lunar eclipse. The natural philosopher learned something about the cosmos, our natural home and republic; the artist-philosopher Archimedes built a model of it; the military commander Gallus then put it to moral use against the immoral effect of superstition. Perhaps, then, Scipio in fact sees that the philosophers’ discoveries come before those of lawgivers, but they require artist-philosophers and military statesmen (Gallus also served as a consul) to bring out the nature that matters most to human beings—their own nature. Scipio does not fail to see the implication of philosophic investigation when it comes to the founding of Rome itself. “Although in fact nature snatched away Romulus” during a solar eclipse, “it is said that his virtue carried him off to heaven” (I.25). 

    Not that this should make human beings preen themselves on mere glory. “What should someone who has examined these kingdoms of the gods consider splendid in human affairs? Or what is long lasting to someone who knows what is eternal,” one who sees “how small the earth is,” how small the Roman Empire is on the small earth? (I.26). It is not human opinion or even the civil law, but “the common law of nature” which “forbids that anything belongs to anyone except to him who knows how to handle and use it” (I.27). Artifacts modeling the universe, the universe itself insofar as it is within our reach, rightly belong, rightly are the property of, the prudent, the men of practical wisdom. Positions of command and consulships are “necessary things, not things to be desired,” not for profit or glory but for right use (I.27).

    In this, “those who, when no one is watching, either speak with themselves or act as if they were present in an assembly of highly educated men, delighting themselves with their discoveries and writings” excel those who speak “in the forum and in a mob” (I.27). “Who can think that anyone is richer than he who lacks nothing that nature requires, or more powerful than he who attains everything he desires, or happier than he who has been free from all disturbance of mind, or of steadier fortune than he who possesses things that (as they say) he can carry away with himself from a shipwreck?” (I.27). The ability to reason is the true sign of human nature.

    Laelius deems Scipio to have gone too far in his concessions to natural philosophy. Astronomers gaze at the heavens but don’t watch what’s in front of their feet, stumbling like the philosopher the slave girl laughed at. By Hercules, “I think that the things appearing before our eyes should be inquired about more” (I.31). Ask not why there are two suns, Tubero; ask why there are two senates and (alluding to the restive Gracchi and their followers) “almost two peoples in our republic” (I.31). At the head of the many who are poor, the Gracchi undermined the Rome unified when the Latins were conciliated. Consider that. “Young man, if you will listen to me, do not fear another sun” (I.31). Even if we could understand the cosmos, “we cannot be better or happier because of this knowledge” but we can be better and happier if we have one Rome (I. 32). We should therefore learn “the arts useful the city,” devoting this holiday “above all to conversations most advantageous to the republic” (I. 33). “Let us ask Scipio to explain what he thinks is the best form of the city”—which is none other than Plato’s theme, Socrates’ inquiry in the Republic (33).

    Following Aristotle, Scipio calls “the management and administration of a republic” the “greatest art” (I.41). By ‘republic,’ he means a political community, “an assemblage of a multitude” a “‘thing’ of the people,” under a regime of one kind or another—either “one man or certain select men” or “the multitude” (I.42), the many who are poor, called in Rome the “proletarians,” the “child-givers,” men and women who have nothing to give the city but children (II.42). Whether a king, a set of aristocrats, or the people, the ruler or rulers must rule “by a kind of deliberation so that [the city] may be long lasting” (I.41). This deliberation “should always be measured by the cause that gave birth to the city,” the purpose intended by those who founded it, “the bond that first bound human beings among themselves in the fellowship of a republic,” which is what keeps the political union together (I.42). Any of the three regime types might maintain that bond; the one that does, “though it is not perfect,” is nonetheless “tolerable” (I.42). 

    Problems will arise because none of the three regimes readily maintains the bond. Even if “no unfairness or greed” corrupts the regime, “in kingdoms the others”—the aristocratic few and the many ‘commoners’—have “too small a part in common justice [ius] and deliberation,” which is what Cicero means by liberty (I.43). In aristocracies, the many are excluded. “And when the people manages all things, although it may be just and moderate, the equality [aequabilitas] itself is unfair [iniquus] because it recognizes no degrees of rank” (I.43). By this, Scipio evidently means that wealth should not be equalized, as democrats incline to attempt; the attempt threatens the aristocrats or oligarchs with demotion in rank, turning them into enemies of the democratic regime. And the attempt to equalize wealth must fail, since “the natural abilities of all person cannot be equal” (I.49)—including, obviously, the natural ability to acquire wealth. Each regime thus tends to exclude or injure some elements of the community and thereby to undermine it, to generate enemies of the regime. This is why there are “cycles” or “revolutions” of regimes in republics. “While it is for the wise man to know them”—a philosopher like Aristotle—it is “for some great citizen and almost divine man, while governing the republic, to foresee those that threaten and to direct its course and keep it in his power” (I.46). That is, the theoretical or philosophic man cannot do what the supremely prudent man can do: not only understand political typology but to use it, rather as Gallus used the philosopher’s knowledge of the cosmos, to defend a real, flawed, but good regime from its weaknesses. To truly preserve a republic, however, it is best not to institute any of the three simple regimes but instead to mix them in such a way as to moderate each element, restraining each from exaggerating its characteristic flaw.

    This mixed regime sounds like the one Aristotle describes as the best practicable regime, except that Aristotle doesn’t expect the mixture to consist of good elements. He recommends that two bad regimes, oligarchy and democracy, be combined in such a way so that the few who are rich and the many who are poor can do nothing without cooperating with one another. At this point, however, Laelius cuts short any discussion of exactly what Scipio has in mind with his own idea of a mixed regime by saying that he wants to know which of the three simple regimes Scipio “judge[s] best” (I.46). We don’t know why Laelius insists on this point, as the next two pages of the book have been lost. It might be that he wants to know which element of the three, if any, should be preeminent in the mixed regime; in Rome, the example he has before his eyes, the senate, the institution representing the few, usually enjoyed such preeminence. 

    The dialogue as we have it resumes with Scipio remarking that “every republic is such as either the nature or the will of him who rules it” (I.48). It’s a good thing that this portion of the text survives because it states the reason why regimes are crucial to understanding a ‘republic’ or political community. Initially, Scipio considers the democratic republic the best of the simple regimes. It alone provides liberty to the most people, and nothing “can be sweeter than liberty” (I.48). Why so? Because liberty means political rule, ruling and being ruled, and serves as a spur to deliberation. Deliberation exercises the distinctively human characteristic, reason; genuinely political rule or liberty thus brings out human nature to the fullest. In deliberating together, the people frame laws. “Law is a bond of political fellowship”—a shared purpose is indispensable, but it needs reinforcement—and “justice is equality under law”; equality under law in turns enhances the “fellowship of citizens,” making them more likely to deliberate amicably, keeping the political union together (I.49). Since there will never be equality of wealth or of natural abilities, equality in a republic can only be based on legal rights, what the United States Constitution calls equal protection under the laws. “For what is a city if not a fellowship in justice”? (I.49).

    When it comes to day-to-day ruling, whatever the regime, “nature has provided not only that the highest men in virtue and mind should”—should—be “in charge of the weaker, but also that the latter should be willing to obey the highest men” (I.51). That is, in exercising their political liberty the people should freely entrust themselves to the men of moral and practical-intellectual virtue. Unfortunately, “the crowd” confuses wealth with virtue while the rich “cling to the title of ‘the best men,'” although “they lack the substance” of true aristocrats, being “full of dishonor and insolent haughtiness” (I.51). Indeed, “there is no more deformed species of a city than that in which the most prosperous men are considered the best” (I.51). This popular error, which may come about because the many who are poor wish they were rich, means that equality under the law, “which free peoples cling to, cannot be preserved” (I.53).

    By contrast, “what can be more splendid than virtue governing a republic? Then he who commands others is a slave to no desire; then he has embraced all the things in which he instructs his fellow citizens and to which he summons them; and he does not impose laws on the people that he does not obey himself, but he puts forward his own life as a law for his own citizens” (I.51). If any of the the three simple regimes could find such a ruler or rulers, it would be the best. But they can’t, at least not for long. Which of the simple regimes does Scipio then prefer? Upon reflection, “none of them in itself separately,” as he has said before (I.53). Each has its means of winning consent: “Kings captivate us by affection” (the fascination of today’s Americans with the English monarchy being a case in point); aristocrats captivate us by “judgment” (as Tocqueville much later sees, an aristocracy is a prudent man who never dies); democracies captivate us by “liberty” (I.55). Kings win our hearts; aristocrats win our heads, our ‘better judgment’; democracies should win our heads, too, but democrats seldom keep them, descending instead to following their desires.

    Specifically, kings win our hearts through the sentiment of piety. Many nations favor kingship, Scipio observes, “because they think that all gods are ruled by the majesty of one royal [god],” which a human king resembles more than the few or the many (I.56). But if, thanks to the natural philosophy the conversation began by considering, some of us reject the belief that Jupiter rules as “the error of the ignorant,” a matter of hearsay, we should consider the teachings of those who learn by seeing—Thales, Archimedes—who say that “this entire universe [is ruled] by a mind” (I.56). If so, the rightly ordered human soul resembles the rightly ordered cosmos; human nature resembles cosmic nature. Scipio affirms the opinion of “the famous Archytas of Tarentum,” who “rightly regarded anger as a certain sedition of the mind—that is, in opposition to reason” (I.59-60). If the cosmic regime is a kingship, if the rightly ordered soul is, too, and so is the rightly ordered household, then why not the city? Democracy suffices for survival when the republic is “in peace and leisure” (“you may be lascivious while you fear nothing”). But just “as both he who sails when the sea suddenly begins to grow rough and he who is ill with a worsening sickness implore the assistance of one man,” so our people readily obey those same magistrates as if they were royals, when war erupts. In Rome, under such circumstances, the people even consent to the rule of the dictator, safety being “worth more than lust” (I.63). 

    What if the dictator prefers not to relinquish his ruler, once the crisis has passed? And even when there is no crisis, “from this uncontrolled or rather monstrous people someone is usually chosen as leader against those leading men,” the aristocrats, “who have already been struck and driven from their place” by the licentious many. The popular leader is typically “someone daring, vile, often impudently hunting those who have deserved well of the republic, someone making presents to the people of both others’ things and its own.” Such men “emerge as tyrants over the same men who brought them forth” (I.68). This is how the liberty of the democratic republic, having declined into licentiousness, leads to tyranny “born from this excessive licentiousness” (I.68). And this kind of thing is true of all the simple regimes; although each has its characteristic excess, “all excesses” in one regime cause it to change into its opposite (I.68). “The form of the republic, as if it were a ball, is seized from kings by tyrants, then from them by leading men or peoples, then from them by either factions or tyrants. The same mode of republic is never maintained very long.” (I.69). 

    Although he began by claiming that the democratic republic is best, Scipio finally answers Laelius’ question about the best of the simple regimes the way Aristotle answers it, although not exactly on Aristotelian grounds. “The kingly one excels the others by far” because, as a product of human art, and indeed of the master art, the architectonic art, politics, it rules the same way as the cosmos, the soul, and the family are rightly ruled (I.69). But, as Aristotle maintains, the mixed regime “exel[s] the kingly one itself” (I.69). “It seems good for there to be something preeminent and regal in the republic, for something else to be shared with and assigned to the authority of leading men, for certain things to be saved for the judgment and will of the multitude” (I.69). The mixed regime features the civil equality or liberty “which free men can scarcely be without for very long,” along with “a firmness” that none of the simple types can achieve (I.69). “For there is no cause for a revolution where each man has been firmly placed in his own station and there is nothing beneath him into which he may plunge and sink” (I.70).

    By the end of Book I, it is clear why Scipio placed Laelius physically in the center of his dialogic circle. As a prudent, that is to say far-seeing, man, Scipio knew he could depend upon his old friend to keep the discussion down to earth, giving Scipio the chance to show what Socrates showed Plato’s readers—that philosophers must know that, and what, they do not know, and that they do not know as much as they would like to know about the cosmos, although they can know some things. What they can know better, and must know better, given their physical location in a political community or ‘republic,’ is how to use the reason that only takes them so far in their investigations into cosmic nature to better understand what they can come to know a lot about—human nature, its social and political character, and the way in which various regimes deflect and distort the reasoning power of the human mind, the preeminent or ruling power of the philosopher’s mind. If Socrates introduced political philosophy to Athens, Cicero assumes the role of Plato, with Scipio as his Socrates, in Rome, against the Epicureans and Stoics who either retreat to their gardens or imagine themselves swept up even beyond those (Aristophanic) clouds and into the stars. And by demanding, later on, that Scipio reveal which of the simple regimes he prefers, perhaps hoping that Scipio will argue in favor the aristocratic regime that both he and Scipio represent, Laelius gives his friend the opportunity to tie the argument into a knot that only Scipio can unweave, then re-weave into the mixed regime.

    Aristotle claims that the mixed regime is the best practicable regime. The proof that it’s practicable is nearby: it is Rome itself. In Book II, the account of the second half of the conversation’s first day, Scipio turns to Rome—specifically, its political history. Whereas Socrates’ city in speech has one man as its real founder, a philosopher who extracts the best regime from his younger interlocutors, Scipio’s practicable regime in an existing, earthly city took much longer to perfect and was the work of many minds over time. This is why it is not only more practicable than the city in speech but superior to other mixed regimes in practice, regimes which had such lone founders as Minos of Crete and Lycurgus of Sparta. Prudent Cato the Elder told Scipio that “there had never been anyone at any time whose intellect had been so excellent that nothing escaped it, and that all the intellects at one time, brought together as one, could not foresee enough to comprehend everything without experience in things and the passage of time” (II.2). It’s as if Cato had read Edmund Burke.

    When Romulus founded Rome, he exercised prudence in selecting its location. He avoided the seacoast, which would have made the city vulnerable to quick attacks, vulnerable to the corruption and destabilizing change of customs which a people engaged in maritime trade incline, importing new customs along with merchandise. Too, such citizens wander in search of goods—often luxury goods, the desire for which corrupts them. Scipio cites the example of the Greek islands, which “almost float [in the sea] along with the institutions and customs of [their] citizens” (II.8). True, such places enjoy “great convenience” in the transport of goods, compared with landlocked cities, which suffer from much higher carrying costs (II.9). Romulus’ solution was the same as Aristotle’s (Politics VII.6). He located Rome on a river with access to the sea, where access to it by marauders and traders alike could be controlled. 

    Having solved his geopolitical problem, he then addressed his population problem. There were too few Romans, so he invited Sabine “maidens” to a festival, had his young men seize them for wives, then made peace with the understandably indignant Sabine king by sharing rule of their joint territories with him (II.12). (The Sabine king later died, leaving Romulus, who had prudently not provided for joint Roman-Sabine rule into the future, in firm control of the expanded monarchic republic.) To accommodate the few, he founded the senate, adding the authority of “each excellent man” to his own (II.15). He also founded a civil religion with regular use of the auspices, giving prudent rulers a way of (as it were) sanctifying their foresight. In his penal system he used fines, not force, avoiding the sharper forms of resentment toward his policies. “Do you see,” Scipio asks, “that by means of the judgment of one man, not only did a new people arise, but it was already adult and almost of ripe age—not like one left crying in a cradle,” or under a fig tree as, the story goes, Romulus himself had been left (II.21). As a foundling as well as a founder, Romulus was free of the family ties that might have made him suspect to most of the families who joined together to found the ‘republic.’ His death enhanced his legend as much as his birth. Scipio notes that Romulus was deified in an age in which people were no longer as superstitious, no longer as unlearned, as in earlier times. This claim registered a sense that the mind of a great founder participates in the divine mind, the mind that organizes and rules the regime of the cosmos. The founder’s reason is in a sense divine, that is, part of the larger nature, the nature of the natural philosophers, while at the same time practical, reasoning about public things occurring on a real river leading out to a real sea.

    Laelius sees what Scipio is doing. “You have begun a new plan of arguing, which is nowhere in the books of the Greeks” (II.21). “That leading man [Plato], to whom no one was superior in writing, took a piece of ground for himself on which he built up a city according to his own choice—admittedly splendid, perhaps, but inappropriate for human life and customs,” a city fit for speech only, a regime in theory never to be brought into practice (II.21). The other political philosophers, if not Aristotle then his followers, the Peripatetics, “have discussed the types and principles of cities without any certain pattern and shape of republic” (II. 22). “You seem about to do both,” crediting the great founders and lawgivers “with what you find instead of fabricating as Socrates does in Plato’s work” while nonetheless “ascrib[ing] to reason those things concerning the site of the city that Romulus established by chance or necessity” (II.22). And unlike the Peripatetics, “you argue not in a roaming speech but about one fixed republic,” Rome (II.22). This is Cicero’s distinct contribution to political philosophy, an examination of one best regime but one that exists in practice. This is why he pretends from the beginning of his discourse that philosophers merely ‘follow’ lawgivers.

    Continuing this way of interpreting Roman political history as if it were a collaboration of great minds over the centuries, Scipio announces that “this new people saw what had escaped the Spartan Lycurgus,” who had made the Spartan monarchy hereditary (II.24). “Those rustics of ours”—they are ‘our own,’ and so the republic they advanced deserves the attachment the natural love of one’s own brings to it—saw that “regal virtue and wisdom, not family, ought to be sought,” saw also that the true title to rule is the natural rule of reason, not the natural rule of bodies as points along a ‘royal line’ (II.24-25). The Roman aristocrats even took their next king from the Sabines, not from themselves; they did not love their own in a foolish way. Numa Pomilius saw that Romans “were kindled with eagerness for war because of Romulus’ instruction”—not the least of which was his scheme to seize by force the Sabine maidens (II.25). “He thought they should be turned back from that habit to a slight extent,” moderated (II.25). 

    Numa began by dividing among the citizens the lands Romulus had seized in war, teaching them “that by cultivating the fields they could abound in all conveniences without pillaging and booty” (II.26)—the same policies American commercial republicans would attempt, albeit with mixed success, with the warlike Amerindian nations and tribes. He thus gave them the economic foundation for “a love of leisure and peace, through which justice and trust most easily grow strong, and under the protection of which the cultivation of fields and the reaping of their fruits are maximally defended” (II.26). He established new and more elaborate religious rites befitting a people so relieved of warlike temperament and further “softened through religious ceremonies the spirits that were burning with the habit of, and the desire for, making war” (II.26). He designed marketplaces, games, and celebration—peaceful occasions for bringing the people together, away from the brotherhood of military camps. In sum, Numa “restored to humanity and tameness human spirits, which were then monstrous and wild with eagerness for making war,” reigning for thirty-nine years “in utmost peace and concord” (II.27). 

    Scipio refutes the legend that Numa was a Pythagorean. As Manilius understands, this betokens the fact that we Romans “are accomplished not in arts that have been imported from overseas but in native, domestic virtues” (II.29), a claim Scipio the philosopher-statesman says nothing to discourage. Indeed, he adds that “many things taken from somewhere else have been done much better by us,” likely including political philosophy (II.30). Prudence, practical wisdom, prevails here, as “the Roman people has been strengthened not by chance but by deliberation and training, yet not when fortune opposes” (II.30). As with the natural cycle of regimes, so with the course of events; prudential deliberation and habituation can meet what fortune dishes out, prevent a bad circumstance from worsening and sometimes reverse things. Scipio is neither a fatalist, like a Greek tragedian, nor a Florentine playwright, like Machiavelli, who supposes he can conquer Fortuna, beat her into submission.

    The next king, Tullus Hostilius, excelled at war but also set down a law requiring all wars to be declared and condemning undeclared wars “unjust and impious” (II.31). Declaration of war were to be made by the people, showing “how wisely our kings even then saw that certain things should be granted to the people” (II.31). Scipio emphasizes how Roman political history is as Cato said it was, “not the work of one time or of one man,” but a succession of additions of “good and advantageous things…made with each successive king” (II.37). But he immediately presents a massive qualification to this lesson, already suggested by his earlier warnings about the weakness of kings, their propensity to tyrannize. The last three kings were the Tarquins, each worse than the next, ending with Tarquinius “Superbus”—superb indeed in his murderous tyrannizing. “No animal more horrid, foul, or hated by gods and human beings can be thought of” than a tyrant (II.48).

    “At this point,” Scipio teaches, the cycle of regimes “will now come round—the natural motion and revolution of which you must learn to recognize from the beginning” (II.45). “The source of political prudence, with which this entire speech of ours deals, is to see the paths and bends of republics so that when you first know how each thing inclines, you can hold it back or run to meet it first” (II.45). Cicero never endorses anything like modern ‘historicism’ or ‘historical determinism.’ He speaks of natural cycles, not events determined by alleged historical laws, and while these cycles cannot be mastered, they can be foreseen and sometimes redirected by statesmen. And because “the fortune of the people is fragile when it depends on the will or habits of one man,” a sound regime will last longer if more men share rule (II.50). The succession of good kings in Rome amounts to such a regime when it is considered over time as the rule not of one but of several kings.

    It was a consul, Publius Valerius, not a king, who prudently fortified the regime of the few that replaced the monarchic republic by giving “moderate liberty to the people” (II.55). Publius was the one who removed the axes symbolizing absolute rule over the people from the rods of the fasces. (A later Roman, Benito Mussolini, took care to replace them.) “Therefore, in those times the senate maintained the republic in this form, so that while the people was free few things were managed by the people, more things were managed through the authority of the senate by plan and by custom, and the consuls held only annual power that was royal in its very type and in its right” (II.56). No vote of the popular assembly could become law or policy unless the senators approved it. Rome had become an aristocratic republic, but one enjoying popular consent. It is true that in “the nature of things” the people began to take “to itself a somewhat greater measure of rights”; “reason was perhaps lacking in this, but the nature of republics itself often overcomes reason” (II.57). At best, a prudent ruler or rulers may direct the people as you and I, Laelius, saw in Africa, when a man would sit on an elephant, “a monstrous, immense beast,” ruling it “by a gentle command or touch” (II.68). It is with elephants and the people as it is in the passions of the soul. “The part of the spirit that is called the mind, bridles and tames not merely one beast or one easy to subdue,” but the many fierce passions (II.68). The prudent man has “almost only one” duty: to “never cease instructing and contemplating himself, that he call others to the emulation of himself, that he show himself to his fellow citizens as a mirror through the brilliance of his spirit and life” (II.69). In this, he can help to harmonize the city “in the agreement of very dissimilar persons through reason moderated by the intermingling of the highest, lowest, and middle orders,” as with the notes in a harmonious song (II.69). This well-ordered mixed regime is “the closest and best bond of safety in every republic,” impossible to sustain without justice, the thing Socrates and his interlocutors searched for in Plato’s Republic (II.69).

    Book III apparently contained a conversation on justice conducted at the outset of the second day. Unfortunately, at this point, and for most of the remainder of the six books of Cicero’s On the Republic, the text becomes too fragmentary to understand, except if approached as a series of aphorisms. (Many of the fragments were preserved precisely because subsequent writers who did have the full text in front of them extracted lines that served as concise statements of points they wanted to make in their own books.) 

    Philus challenges the natural law theory of justice in two ways. He first cites the variety of “law, institutions, customs, and habits” not only across the nations but “in one city, even in this very one” (III.10). Does this undeniable phenomenon not suggest that justice is merely arbitrary and conventional? “Why shouldn’t a woman have property? why should she be heir to a Vestal Virgin but not to her own mother?” (III.10). He or another critic of natural law then deploys the argument made by Glaucon in Plato’s Republic: If a good man were falsely vilified as a criminal and a vicious man held to be a paragon, and if the good man were tortured and exiled while the bad man honored and heaped with wealth, “who in the world will be so mad as to doubt which man he would prefer to be?” (III.13). More, “what goes for individuals also goes for peoples: no city is so foolish that it does not prefer unjustly commanding to serving justly” (III.13). The analogy is inexact, inasmuch as the good man with the false bad reputation wasn’t merely serving his city but being abused by it; the right way to make the argument would be to say that it is better to command unjustly than to serve unjustly, to be subject to the injustices of an unjust commander. That is, the tortured and exiled man wasn’t serving the city justly, as his fellow citizens didn’t deserve his services. Plato’s Socrates stands firm, saying that a truly just man prefers bodily torture to the ruin of his soul, given the soul’s unquestioned superiority to the body. Aristotle in effect replies to Glaucon’s argument by citing the mitigating force of circumstances. A Christian would agree; Jesus’ torture and death on the Cross were not just but the supreme act of grace.

    Scipio apparently prefers a different counterargument. A city ruled unjustly no longer deserves the name, ‘city.’ “Who would call that ‘a “thing” of a people” (that is, a republic) “at the moment when all together were oppressed by cruelty of one man, and there was neither the single bond of right nor the agreement and fellowship of an assemblage, which is a people?” (III.35). For example, Syracuse, “the greatest of the Greeks’ cities and the most beautiful of all” was no genuine republic when Dionysius ruled it (III.35). “Where there is a tyrant, there is not a defective republic…but, as reason now compels, it must be said that there is no republic at all” (III.35). This is true not only of place ruled by a tyrant but one ruled by any faction. It is no longer a political community, a public thing at all, but a thing ruled for the private interests of the one, the few, or the many. It has abandoned its status as a civitas. It no longer features ruling and being ruled, reciprocally; it is no longer a political thing.

    In the second half of the dialogue’s second day, Scipio appears to be holding the conventions Philus had cited to the bar of the natural law as it concerns cities. He criticizes several Greek customs: the gymnastic training of youth encourages homosexual behavior; in Sparta, the custom of thievery is wrong and so is the custom of putting prefects in charge of women instead of husbands. Even Plato deserves censure, as he “orders everything to be in common, so that no citizen can say of anything that is special to him or his own” (IV.18). That is, yes, customs do vary from city to city and even in the same city, over time, but the natural law provides the standard for judging them because the natural law begins with a definition of human nature and, by logical deduction, the republics consistent with that nature. Like Socrates, Scipio doesn’t hesitate to censure “wicked, popular men in the republic who were seditious”—demagogues—along with scurrilous poets who defame decent citizens (IV.20b). “We ought to have life set up by the judgments of magistrates and legal rulings, not by the talents of poets, nor ought we listen to a reproach except from a law that one is allowed to respond to and to defend oneself against in a court of law” (IV.20c).

    Like Socrates, Cicero would not ban all poets from the city. He prefaces Book V with a quote from the poet Ennius: “The Roman Republic stands upon ancient customs and men” (V.1). There is reason, and thus natural law, in this. “Neither men, unless the city had been so accustomed, nor customs, unless such men had been in charge, could have either founded or held for so long such a commanding republic and one so widely extended” (V.1). The problem with “our generation” of Romans is that, having “received the republic just like an extraordinary picture, but one already fading in the passage of time, not only did we neglect to renew it in the same colors in which it had existed, but we did not even take care of it so as to preserve at least its shape and, so to speak, its outlines” (V.1). Today, the customs are unknown, having “perished for lack of men” (V.1). This has nothing to do with chance, everything to do with “our own vices” (V.1). In the dialogue, now in its third and final day, Scipio reaffirms the natural justice of a city-sustaining custom of ancient Greece, brought to Rome by Numa: “no private man was an umpire or arbitrator of a lawsuit, but everything was accomplished by royal judgments” in the king’s court (V.3). “The long-lasting peace of Numa was the mother of law [ius] and religion in this city,” and peace could last because Numa had written such laws (V.3). Cicero has Scipio recur to his teaching about the priority of lawgivers to philosophers who explicate and statesmen who carry out conventional laws founded upon the natural law, laws shown to be natural by their endurance over time.

    This passage provides a gateway to the second half of the dialogue’s last day. The lawgiver is the “guide” of the city, a man of “complete prudence,” the virtue animated by foresight (VI.1). The duty of the citizen is to follow the founding laws, “prepar[ing] himself so that he is always armed against things that upset the form of the city,” that is, its regime (VI.2). By contrast, sedition breaks the citizens apart, spoiling that form. Sedition acts in the city as lusts act in the soul. “Lusts are grave mistresses over thoughts,” “compel[ling] and command[ing] innumerable things” without limit and therefore without form (VI.5). Because lusts “cannot in any way be satisfied or satiated, they impel to every crime those whom they have kindled with their enticements” (VI.5). They render souls, and seditions render cities, formless—one no longer human, the other no longer public things. Nature sets down those limits or laws; lusts and seditions violate nature, ruining human beings and their republics.

    Lawgivers or guides who are themselves guided by the natural law desire and deserve “not statues anchored in lead or triumphs with withering laurel leaves, but some more stable and more robust kinds of rewards” (VI.12). This impels Scipio to end this conversation in the same way as Plato’s Socrates did in his Republic, with a story upholding the immortality of the soul. In Socrates’ story, a man named Er dies in battle but returns to life with a report of the afterlife, in which just and unjust souls alike find their proper rewards, choosing their next life in accordance with the way they lived their most recent one. Scipio puts a similar lesson in terms of his own prophetic dream he experienced while in Africa, a dialogue within the dialogue in which he conversed with Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, victor over Hannibal at Zama in the Second Punic War. This first Scipio Africanus served as a priest of Mars and was renowned for his ability to foresee, which some take to be prophetic, others a matter of natural foresight or prudence—a ‘divine’ capacity in one or another sense of the word.

    The first Africanus predicts the victory of the second: “you will finish a very great war” (VI.15). You will also return to a Roman republic in turmoil, threatened by exactly the sort of factional misrule that would end Rome as a true republic, the threatened rule of Africanus’ grandson, the populist Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. “Here, Africanus [as that will be the younger man’s title, by then], it will be proper for you to show to your fatherland the light of your mind, talent, and judgment” (VI.16). This you will do, as “the one man with whom the safety of the city rests,” the man who can rightly serve as dictator “to set the republic on firm footing” (VI.16). But only “if you escape the impious hands of your relatives,” the brothers Gracchi (VI.16). Your age, 56, consists of the number eight multiplied by the number seven. In Pythagorean terms, each of those numbers “is held to be complete for different reasons” (VI.16): eight is an auspicious number, seven a number denoting completion, an end. You may reach an auspicious end if you “recognize this: For all those who have preserved, assisted, increased their homeland, there is a certain place marked out in heaven where happy persons enjoy everlasting life. That is to say, nothing that happens on Earth is more welcome to the leading god, who rules the whole universe, than the assemblies and assemblages of human beings united in right, which are called cities.” (VI.17). That is, God loves ‘the political.’ 

    “At this point,” Scipio tells his listeners, “I was thoroughly frightened not so much by fear of death as by fear of a plot by my own relatives” (VI.18); sedition within his family, sedition that threatened the Roman republic, concerned him more than his own demise. The death of a person ends the life of an individual, but the destruction of a family or of a republic ends a thing of lasting honor. What of my natural family, my father? Is he here with you, Africanus?

    Yes, your relatives, including your father, still live, having “sprung out of the chains of their bodies as if out of prison. What is called life among you is truly death. Don’t you observe your father Paullus coming toward you?” (VI.18). After their tearful reunion, Scipio Aemilianus asks Paullus, if death is the portal to such a blessed life, why continue to live on earth, with its murderous betrayals and ruinous factions? 

    Paullus replies, “Until the god, whose sacred zone is everything you have sight of, frees you from the wardens of your body, the entrance to this place cannot be open to you” (VI.19). Under this law, which is the law of nature, the task of human beings is to “protect the globe you see in the middle of this sacred zone, which is called Earth” (VI.19). Given this “human task,” you must remain within your body to protect your family and, even more important, “your fatherland” (VI.20). Therefore, “you must not depart from human life without the order of him by whom your soul has been given to you, so that you will not seem to flee” that god-given, nature-given task (VI.19). Only if you take up that task, “cultivat[ing] justice and piety,” will you walk the “way to heaven and to this assemblage of those who have already lived” (VI.20). Yes, the majesty of the cosmic regime far surpasses that of the Roman Empire, but your duty is to fulfill your task as a father and as a citizen, first.

    Scipio not only sees the eight cosmic spheres, the ever-circling domains of the stars and planets, above the immobile ninth sphere, Earth, but he also hears the music of the eight mobile spheres, which consists of seven sounds, as two of them emit he same sound. Eight and seven, again: the cosmic harmony parallels Scipio’s age at this moment. 

    The lesson taken from this cosmic view is simple to state, hard to enact. Earth is small, compared to the cosmos as a whole, but it is part of that cosmos. Human ambitions, even in the great Roman Empire, are also small. “What renown can you attain from the conversation of human beings, or what glory can you attain that should be desired?” (VI.24). Fame on Earth is limited in both in both its territorial and temporal extent. “Therefore, if you wish to look on high and consider attentively this seat and eternal home, if you will not give yourself to the conversations of the crowd nor put hope in human rewards for your deeds, virtue itself may properly draw you to true honor through its own enticements” (VI.29). To put human esteem in its rightful place is not to denigrate politics but to understand political life not as a field of vaunting ambition but as a just duty, here and now. Natural philosophers, along with Epicurean and Stoic moralizers, attempt to jump up to Heaven too soon, failing to recognize the place of Earth’s regimes within the cosmic regime, and failing to recognize the place of the regime of Earth within the cosmic regime. Neither ambition nor suicide can be just, given the natural law.

    Scipio takes the lesson. “Truly, Africanus, if a lane, so to speak, opens an entrance to the heaven for those who have deserved well of their fatherland, although I have walked in your tracks and those of my father from boyhood and have not lacked your glory, nevertheless, ow that such a reward has been explained, I will exert myself much more vigilantly” (VI.30). Political virtue yields heavenly reward, being consonant with the regime of the cosmos.

    Africanus approves. “The mind of each person is each person” (VI.30). In that sense, “you are a god,” inasmuch as the supreme god moves the cosmos even as your mind moves the other parts of your soul and, through them, your body (VI.30). The supreme god is the unmoved mover whose existence Aristotle deduced. Let your mind, your reason, be your unmoved mover. “This is the special nature of the soul” (VI.32). “You should employ it in the best matters! And the best cares are for the safety of the fatherland” (VI.33).

    Cicero defends politics by putting it in its place, between the unthinking ambition of tyrants and demagogues, those who believe that ‘everything is political’ on earth, and the unthinking ‘intellectualism’ of many philosophers, who believe that what happens on earth, including politics, is trivial, no concern of an intelligent person. There is a larger, indeed comprehensive order or regime, the regime of nature and its law. In that regime, human politics has its rightful, lawfully delimited place. 

     

    Notes

    1. The translator helpfully indicates that the Latin mos denotes both manners and morals, rather in the way, more familiar to ‘we moderns’ and readers of Montesquieu and Tocqueville, of the French moeurs.
    2. ‘Our’ Scipio is Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, who crushed Carthage once and for all in the Third Punic War. His father was Aemilianus Paullus, but his adopted father was Cornelius Scipio, son of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus; he thus converses with his grandfather-by-adoption as a fellow-victor in a war against Carthage.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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