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    Hindenburg

    December 11, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    William J. Astore and Dennis E. Showalter: Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism. Washington: Potomac Books, 2005.

     

    Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg was a German aristocrat, it is safe to say. And a Prussian among Germans—a nontrivial distinction, among Germans: the immigrant grandmother of an acquaintance of mine, who spoke almost no English, once perceived that she was being described as a German; “Nein! Nein! Ich bin ein Prusse!” she replied, with due emphasis. Hindenburg, her older contemporary shared the sentiment, saying “I have always felt myself an ‘Old Prussian.‘”

    Born into the Junker class in East Prussia in 1847, Hindenburg reached maturity in a Prussia that not only had recovered from its mauling by Napoleon in 1806 but had undertaken the unification of the 37 sovereign German states into one powerful nation-state, the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm I, Otto von Bismarck, and Helmuth von Moltke. His father was a reserve infantry officer, his mother a Lutheran. Accordingly, “discipline, duty, and obedience to higher authority prevailed in the household, as “even the young Hindenburg’s nurse was known to bark ‘Silence in the ranks!’ to squelch childish complaints.” Already a member of the Prussian Cadet Corps by the age of twelve, he “demonstrated moral uprightness and physical hardiness without showing any particular intellectual qualities.” He rose to the Senior Cadet School in 1863, selected as a page to Queen Elizabeth of Prussia in 1864, and received his first commission in 1865 as a second lieutenant of the Foot Guards, only a year before the Austro-Prussian War. Hindenburg fought bravely at Königgratz in the war’s decisive battle, which left Prussia in the position of fulfilling its ambition to unite the Germanies and to face off against the French, four years later. In the Franco-Prussian War, Hindenburg survived the attack on St. Privat, near Metz, a battle in which his battalion “took heavy casualties.” No chauvinist, he later admired French conduct during the prolonged siege of Paris, also praising the “ruthless postwar suppression of the Paris Commune” after the war was over and the Third Republic had been established. 

    After those wars, Bismarck proceeded step-by-step, winning the Kulturkampf of the 1870s against the Roman Catholic Church, which he stripped of it control over education and authority to make ecclesiastical appointments, powers that had compromised his state-building efforts, especially in the Catholic south. He then made an alliance with Austria-Hungary, avoiding any troubles on his southern border, and attempted a rapprochement with the Russian czar, hoping to secure his eastern flank. For his part, by the end of the decade Hindenburg won appointment to the general staff, was promoted to the rank of captain, and married the daughter of a general. His subsequent elevations in rank in the peacetime army came slowly, but they came; he served under Count Alfred Graf von Schlieffen on the imperial general staff in the second half of the 1880s and was granted command of the Ninety-first Infantry Regiment at Oldenburg in 1893, vowing (as an aristocrat might) “to cultivate a sense of chivalry among my officers, and efficiency and firm discipline,” animated by “the love of work and independence side by side with a high ideal of service.” 

    Kaiser Wilhelm II acceded to the imperial throne in 1888, causing German foreign policy to enter “a more bellicose phase after the new kaiser dispensed with Bismarck in 1890.” Despite his extraordinary achievements, Bismarck had been too cautious for young Kaiser Willy’s taste. Still, for a time, perhaps somewhat to Hindenburg’s disappointment (war being the condition of rapid promotion in military organizations), peace continued. So did the slow but steady pace of promotions: chief of staff of the Eighth Army Corps in Goblenz, then brigadier general, the major general and commander of the Twenty-eight infantry Division of Karlsruhe in 1900. In 1905, “he reached the pinnacle of his peacetime military career” as lieutenant general and commander of the Fourth Army Corps at Magdeburg, making him “one of only twenty-four corps commanders in Germany.” Seeing no prospects for further promotion, he retired in 1911 at the age of sixty-four.

    By then, his political convictions were settled. “The subordination of the individual to the good of the community” was “not only a necessity,” in his eyes, “but a positive blessing,” one that “gripped the mind of the German army, and through it, that of the German nation.” That nation was surrounded by enemies, indeed oppressed by them, as he supposed. The Geist— the spirit, the mind—of that nation would animate its soldiers in the wars of the future, conducted by means of what the author calls “battles of annihilation.” As the historian Heinrich von Treitschke wrote, enthusiastically, war requires “the utter annihilation of puny man in the great conception of the state.” There was a moral claim accompanying German ambition. A popular slogan at the time was “Germanness will cure the world”—cure it of bourgeois money-grubbing, base individualism, and all the other moral niaiseries of liberal democracy. “Anticipating der frishfröhliche Krieg, a short and joyful war, young patriotic Germans answered the call to arms in 1914 with pride and celerity.”

    The authors remark that Hindenburg and his colleagues were also Fachmenschen —literally ‘facts-men’ or specialists. Technically astute, loyal to a fault,” they “confined [themselves] to an operational and Eurocentric perspective that eschewed study and reflection about the wider socioeconomic and political aspects of war.” That is to say that they read Clausewitz, but without understanding, or perhaps without wanting to acknowledge, his core teaching, that war is a continuation of politics, rightly limited by political aims. Thus, “lacking firsthand knowledge of the world outside of Europe, or of the world of business and industry within and without Europe, Hindenburg also had little exposure to military grand strategy,” instead trying to solve “difficult operational problems by fostering tactical excellence and an aggressive spirit”—by treating means as ends. In the First World War, Hindenburg shared the prevailing preference for offensive operations. This worked on the Eastern Front, where he and Ludendorff ran things, while it failed on the Western Front, where the French and their British allies were able to arrest their advance with trench warfare.

    Hindenburg had anticipated a short war. Russia struck first, however, invading East Prussia in August 1914, driving the Eighth Army back. When the Army’s commander, Maximilian von Prittwitz recommended retreat into West Prussia, Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Great General Staff called Hindenburg out of retirement to replace him, adding Erich Ludendorff as Hindenburg’s chief of staff. “Known to be a hothead” who “suffered from nerves when plans went awry,” Ludendorff needed “someone higher ranking…to take command and provide stability and aristocratic presence” to bring out the best in him—that being his “combination of tactical skill, operational insight, and boundless energy.” “In their postwar memoirs, both men celebrated the Hegelian synthesis they had forged during the war,” although as the war went on, Ludendorff became the more dominant partner, quite likely to Germany’s disadvantage. But by the end of August, the two men worked to regroup their forces and counterattack. Meanwhile, the Russians overreached and fell victim to the Eighth Army’s flanking maneuvers at the Battle of Tannenberg—so named by Hindenburg himself, as it was fought in the vicinity of a fifteenth-century Prussian defeat by Polish and Lithuanian forces (not Russians but nonetheless Slavs—close enough for government work). “It is a great joy to me that I was able to wipe out that disgrace,” Hindenburg intoned. “Tannenburg was Hindenburg’s victory,” “a stunning victory” which destroyed the Russian Second Army, induced its commander to commit suicide, and resulted in the capture of 92,000 Russian troops. While this only stiffened Russian determination to fight on, it also buoyed the German Geist and made Hindenburg the nation’s hero.

    Germany’s main problem, however, wasn’t its morale but its overall war strategy. In 1905, General Alfred von Schlieffen wrote a plan for a two-front war, calling for a short (six-week) war on France, which would be overwhelmed by superior German forces attacking through Belgium, followed by a war against Russia. Moltke had modified the Schlieffen Plan, reducing the number of troops in the West. When that offensive failed Wilhelm II sacked him and put Prussian war minister Erich von Falkenhayn in his place. By now, Germany faced a war on two fronts and a naval war with Great Britain. No contingency plan had been written; “there was no consensus about what to do next,” and Falkenhayn persisted in prioritizing the Western Front, despite continued German successes against Russia. Even that effort was hampered by the failure of Germany and its ally, Austria-Hungary, to coordinate their forces. The Austro-Hungarians proceeded to lose catastrophically in Galicia, with 250,000 causalities and 100,000 captured. Ludendorff complained that Germany was “shackled to a corpse”; for their part, the Austro-Hungarian High Command chafed under German contempt. Such “recriminations notwithstanding,” Hindenburg and Ludendorff reinforced their ally’s position in Poland, and Hindenburg was named Field Marshal.

    They urged Falkenhayn to send them the troops they needed to finish the war in the East. “Much of the strategic plot of 1915 and 1916 on the German side revolved around the debate and infighting between ‘Westerners’ led by Falkenhayn and ‘Easterners’ led by Hindenburg and Ludendorff.” In this struggle, “Falkenhayn prevailed in part because he had the kaiser’s confidence.” Eventually, however, Hindenburg’s ascendency continued. “Whereas the kaiser was flighty, insecure, and vain (Viennese wags wrote that he ‘insisted on being the stag at every hunt, the bride at every wedding and the corpse at ever funeral’) Hindenburg exuded confidence and spoke with dignified modesty.” Wilhelm II was quietly and gradually cordoned off from military matters by the military officers themselves. “Hindenburg became ‘the savior of the fatherland,’ a man who had selflessly answered his country’s call to duty well after most men his age had retired,” a symbol of “mature masculinity to thousands of German men,” a “loyal husband and loving father,” combined, to German women, a courageous and just leader to the soldiers. “Larger than life, he nevertheless exhibited proper humility and modesty before God,” “character, rather than intellectual brilliance,” being his “core strength.” In a republican regime, he would have been a latter-day George Washington, but Germany was no republic. And it wouldn’t be long before the young, impetuous Ludendorff would come to dominate the older, more cautious Hindenburg, even as Hindenburg had sidelined the young, impetuous kaiser.

    “His directness and devotion to duty endeared him to his soldiers and to the German people.” The esteem was mutual, as he told an American interviewer, the former U.S. senator Albert J. Beveridge (famous for his 1900 speech, “The March of the Flag”): “Our knowledge that we are right; the faith of the nation that we shall win [NB: “shall”]; their willingness to die in order to win; the perfect discipline of our troops; their understanding of orders; their greatest intelligence, education and spirit; our organization and resources” guarantee German victory. It is, of course, not inconceivable that Hindenburg talked that way in the hope of persuading Americans not to intervene on the side of France and Great Britain, but there is no reason to doubt that he meant it, or most of it.

    In 1916, Falkenhayn doubled down on his bet that the French would fold. His new strategy, the Ermattungsstrategie, aimed at defeating France in a “war of wearing-down.” It didn’t work: Falkenhayn not only failed to coordinate strategy with the Austro-Hungarians, he failed to share it “with his own army commanders.” The result was the Battle of Verdun, where “Germans gave better than they got” but the French held them off. “Like Tannenberg,” the Battle of Verdun “spawned its own sustaining mythology,” as General Philippe Pétain’s resolute insistence, “They shall not pass!” became the watchword of the French for the remainder of the war. Now, Germany’s campaign on the Eastern Front also faltered, as Russia retook Galician and the Bukovina, capturing half a million Austro-Hungarians while doing so. Had Falkenhayn not gone into Verdun but instead had aided the Austro-Hungarian campaign against Italy, Italy might well have been knocked out of the war, Austria-Hungary could have brought his forces out of Italy in time to halt the Russian offensive in Galicia. These “uncoordinated actions wet the stage for Russia’s greatest victory of the war” and for the success of the British offensive at the Somme River.

    By September 1916, with war prospects looking increasingly desperate, Ludendorff’s energy had overcome Hindenburg’s moderation, as the younger man demanded equality in command. Recognizing that the war “had become a colossal Materialschlacht, or material struggle, waged by modern industrial juggernauts,” they conceived the “Hindenburg Program,” a “concerted attempt to mobilize fully, if somewhat belatedly, for total war.” Registering the ethos of the German regime, they supposed that “an economy could be commanded like an army.” It can, but with bad consequences. The long-range consequences should have been obvious: deficit spending leading to inflation, commercial sclerosis caused by the removal of voluntary incentives to work. The medium-range consequence affected the course of the war itself; “the sacrifices required and incurred by modern warfare’s destructive industrialism drove Germany, as well as the Entente powers, to inflate strategic goals to justify national sacrifice.” Even as the “war of wearing-out” slowly exhausted all sides, even as military production goals dislocated the elements of the German political economy, leading to food shortages, rulers needed to make ever more “grandiose political and territorial demands, ruling out opportunities for a compromise peace, which Hindenburg and Ludendorff rejected anyway.” Nor did their mass deportation of Belgian workers to Germany, where they were dragooned into working in factories in order to keep German men on the front lines, make the German regime seem an attractive partner in negotiations. Worse, the average German didn’t fare much better than the hapless Belgians, as his rulers “treat[ed] citizens as subjects who had to put up or shut up.” For example, women were told to pitch in to the war effort or “expect to go hungry”; “barking commands to grieving widows was not the way to win hearts and minds.” Hindenburg and Ludendorff assumed that German hearts and minds had already been won (true) and that they would remain won by dint of an unwavering sense of moral duty, however German persons were treated (false).

    Anticipating an Anglo-French offensive in 1917, Hindenburg and Ludendorff prudently put their forces in a defensive posture, withdrawing several miles, leaving booby traps in their wake, constructing a battle zone consisting of pillboxes, trenches, barbed wire, and tank traps, then positioning mobile troops behind all these structures, establishing an “elastic system of defense in depth.” Unfortunately for German fortunes, the wisdom of these military measures was not equaled by their political strategy in the east. Ludendorff pushed for the revival of the kingdom of Poland, expecting to constitute a powerful Polish army to invade Russia. Not only did Poles “not relish serving as cannon fodder for German ambitions,” the policy steeled the weakening czarist regime against any compromise peace. Russia soon “collapsed into Bolshevism,” whose leaders promised to sue for peace, and that “contagion…soon spread to the German army in 1918.” 

    Things looked no better at sea, where an effective Entente blockade “continued to bite into the German home front.” Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Admiral Henning von Holzendorff successfully urged “unrestricted” submarine warfare against the blockade and against American shipping to the Entente countries. No longer would German sailors board civilian ships to search for contraband; they would simply sink them. Hindenburg and Ludendorff understood that this could goad the Americans into declaring war, but they gambled that the navy could cripple the Entente “before U.S. soldiers reached France in significant numbers,” a decision that “cost Germany the war.” British exposure of the Zimmerman telegram, an appeal to the Mexican government for “alliance and financial support in return for a Mexican offensive to recover Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona,” only further fueled American outrage and hardly persuaded Mexicans. “The Second Reich needed a second Bismarck to emerge, a master diplomat possessing the guile and force of will” to reign in the generals, but it was stuck with Wilhelm II, who averred, “The soldiers and the army, not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded the German Empire together. I put my trust in the army.” Hindenburg “found himself becoming an erstatz kaiser.” He and Ludendorff put the blame for Germany’s declining prospects not on themselves but on the hapless Chancellor of the Empire, Theobold von Bethmann Hollweg, whom Ludendorff charged with abetting “German Radical Social Democracy,” with its pusillanimous “longing for peace.” They replaced him with a cipher. Wilhelm II had “essentially granted Hindenburg and Ludendorff the power to fire and hire chancellors at will.” The parliamentary parties fell into line and the military commanders stepped up their implausible propaganda, pretending that war casualties were low, and no shortages of food or other consumer goods existed. 

    All this notwithstanding, “with Russia’s collapse, prospects for victory brightened,” and on the occasion of a national celebration of his seventieth birthday Hindenburg “issue[d] a ringing manifesto,” telling Germans to give no thought to the aftermath of the war (“this only brings despondency into our ranks and strengthens the hopes of the enemy”) but to “trust that the German oak will be given air and light for its free growth,” and that “God will be with us to the end!” True enough, God being with all sincere Christians—but He is with us when we suffer and die as much as when we live and succeed. In all, for the political landscape of postwar Germany, with a citizenry accustomed to the regime of militarist monarchy, not commercial republicanism, “the barren soil they left behind was far more hospitable to the hardy weeds of fascism than to the fragile flowers of parliamentary democracy.”

    At the beginning of 1918, with victory on the Eastern Front secured and the French army weakening, Germany’s prospects on land looked fairly good. If they could secure the Slavic countries, bring them under German hegemony, they might rival or even surpass the United States as a continental power. But unrestricted submarine warfare hadn’t taken out the British navy, enabling Great Britain to continue to reinforce France. With no “grand strategy to win the war,” and no intention to negotiate a settlement, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, especially Ludendorff, determined to launch a mass offensive in the spring, hoping to win the war before the Americans could arrive, that summer. “They were infected by victory disease.” All of this only “confirmed in Western eyes the insatiable appetite of German militarism.” They had reversed the teachings of Bismarck and Clausewitz, prioritizing military over political aims. Whereas tactical and operational war policies “admitted rational solutions by diligent soldier-specialists” such as themselves, strategic and political policy “required collaboration with allies and statesmen, both of whom Hindenburg and Ludendorff held in contempt.”

    A major difficulty resulted from their victory in the East. Germany had taken half of Russia’s industrial base and almost 90 percent of its coal mines; the Bolsheviks plotted revenge. The continued threat from Russia, along with the treaty that made Rumania a vassal of Germany and Austro-Hungary, required Germany to maintain three dozen divisions in the regions, with no possibility of shifting them in time for the planned offensive in the West. “In coercing sweeping concessions from Russia and Rumania, Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s reach exceeded their grasp.” They “placed their trust in battle,” hoping for “a larger Tannenberg” to be obtained “through higher levels of frontline effectiveness.” But they simply lacked the means to win on the Western Front, where national armies backed by the resources of their empires opposed them. “This was not Prussia fighting Austria in 1866 or France in 1870.” Once the French and British commanders “accepted the wisdom of a unified Entente command” under General Ferdinand Foch, “total victory by feats of arms was unattainable” for the Germans. A series of “costly offensives” in spring-summer 1918 failed “to shatter the Entente’s will”; the German army was “conquering itself to death.” By now, the Americans had arrived, under the command of General John Pershing. Ludendorff’s lunges at Paris failed, thanks to continued French valor, American reinforcements and, during the final offensive, the Italians. Although the offensives gained substantial territories, they came at the expense of almost a million casualties, with no replacements, anymore.

    In addition, Hindenburg resisted the very concept of machine warfare; against the Entente’s 800 tanks the Germans fielded eighteen; they had one-third the number of trucks than the Entente forces. “It is always bad,” Hindenburg intoned, “when an army tries through technical innovation, to find a substitute for the spirit. That is irreplaceable.” The difficulty is that the human spirit is embodied, and the bodies of the German soldiers were being ground up. This fact never quite got through to Hindenburg or Ludendorff, isolated as they kept themselves from the conditions at the front and refusing to believe bad reports. Exhausted German troops faced an Entente counter-offensive along the Marne River, losing another 420,000 in battlefield deaths and 340,000 to injury and capture. That powerful Geist upon which Hindenburg depended evaporated, replaced by German Zerrisenheit, “profound disorientation, dissonance, and despair.” Scapegoats were needed, and they weren’t to include the German High Command, if the commanders could help it. “Far easier to believe a big lie—that radical socialists and war profiteers (especially of Jewish extraction) had betrayed Germany—rather than to accept the disturbing truth that Germany’s betrayers were its most renowned and respect leaders.” Hindenburg and Ludendorff didn’t scruple to encourage this misdirection, preferring to “shift blame from themselves to Germany’s new civilian leaders,” after the surrender and the collapse of the monarchic regime. (He shrewdly “left the armistice negotiations to the new government,” so that “the brush of total defeat…tarred Germany’s nascent parliamentary government instead of the army.”) And while after the war Ludendorff soon discredited himself by allying with Hitler, “Hindenburg’s reputation survived Germany’s collapse largely intact,” “a testament to Hindenburg’s gravitas, as well as the German people’s need for a noble figure who could uphold the nation’s dignity in defeat.” The authors praise Hindenburg for his “invaluable service” in overseeing the demobilization of what remained of the army, “prevent[ing] a military coup.” He also helped to defeat the Communist uprising in Berlin in January 1919, which would have destroyed the Weimar Republic at its outset.

    The harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty exacted punishment for the generals’ misjudgment, although most now would say that its punitive terms themselves constituted both an overreach and an underreach, setting up the next world war. Even at the time, General Pershing, “among others, had warned that leaving the German army intact without its experiencing the humiliation of a final defeat would delude Germany into thinking it had been perfidiously sold out rather than physically whipped”; that was the underreaching. Hindenburg himself propagated the stab-in-the-back lie, as it “freed him from blame” for his conduct of the war. The overreaching consisted of the punitive character of the peace, “highlighted and exploited” by the German Right, poorly complemented by the Entente’s complacent failure to enforce those terms. 

    The authors remark something now mostly forgotten: that the Weimar Republic was a success, initially. The regime consolidated after fending off the Hitler-Ludendorff ‘Beerhall Putsch’ in 1923, and “by early 1925, political stability and economic prosperity reduced radical parties such as Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) to nuisances,” with the Nazis winning a paltry “less than 3 percent of the parliamentary vote in 1924 and 1928.” In those years, it was rather from Left that the main threat to republicanism came, but in April 1925 Hindenburg’s election to the presidency (having by now dissociated himself from Ludendorff’s Jewish conspiracy claims) stabilized the political atmosphere mostly by simply occupying this largely symbolic office. “Craving stability and national unity, Germans rallied behind Hindenburg as an ersatz kaiser and father to a ‘fatherless generation.'” As president, he toured the country giving speeches in favor of “a policy of strict constitutionalism that did him credit.” He went on to defeat Hitler for the presidency in 1932. But parliamentary dithering and a nearly constant reshuffling of cabinets (twenty in the thirteen years of the regime’s existence), along with hyperinflation, followed by the worldwide financial collapse, ruined the regime and enabled the Nazis to win a plurality of Reichstag seats, voters being more alarmed by the Communists.

    Although French commander Ferdinand Foch and Charles de Gaulle (in his first book, La Discorde chez l’ennemi) praised Hindenburg as a patriot, distinguishing him from the younger, more militant Ludendorff, the authors here disagree, characterizing him instead as the embodiment of “militarism gone mad.” A Prussian patriot, yes, but one who refused “to work sincerely for a republican Germany” after the war, allowing himself “to be co-opted by rightist elements and, eventually, by Hitler, through bribes, flattery, and promises of a return to glory for the army.” (For example, Hitler added five thousand acres to Hindenburg’s family estate, after Hindenburg, as president of the Weimar Republic, chose him as chancellor in 1933.) In his partial defense, the authors grant that by the early Thirties Hindenburg was 85 years old, “worn down and fed up.” They guess that he expected his German conservative allies to contain Hitler, still another example of his wishful thinking. At this point, even Ludendorff had more sense, saying of Hindenburg’s handover of the chancellorship to Hitler, “Future generations will damn you in your grave for what you have done.”

    This and much that preceded it indicates that Hindenburg’s patriotism was not so much in question throughout his life. His judgment was the problem. Politics is a better school of prudence than the military, and Hindenburg was schooled in the army.

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Political Philosophy in Beijing, III: A Consideration of Nietzsche

    December 4, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    Laurence Lampert: Strauss, Plato, Nietzsche. Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2024. 

    Lecture 5: “Nietzsche Becomes Nietzsche.”

    Lecture 6: “Nietzsche’s Philosophic Poetry.”

     

    In the spirit of full disclosure, Lampert writes, “My Nietzsche lectures reflect my debt to Nietzsche and my alignment with Nietzsche, and the way that both Strauss and Plato further that alignment.”

    Like Plato and Plato’s Socrates, Nietzsche “laid claim to an ontology, an understanding of the being of beings,” and crafted an exoteric philosophic poetry. Nietzsche became Nietzsche, the philosopher Nietzsche as it were, in consultation with eight previous philosophers: Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, Pascal and Schopenhauer. “Whatever I decide,” he wrote at the end of Human, All Too Human, “think through for myself and others, upon these eight I fix my eyes and find theirs fixed on me.” Lampert cautions that Nietzsche “does not mean that he takes his thinking from them”; his thinking “through” them, before coming to his own philosophic decisions, for “Nietzsche’s thinking is wholly his own.” Nietzsche (and Lampert) count themselves among those rare thinkers “who want to know exactly how they differ from everyone else in their thinking: they ‘go down’ to examine others and they ‘go inside’ to know themselves”—that is, “they do what Socrates did.” For example, the philosopher does “not feel the standard effects of tragedy, which are pity and fear” and, while understanding that “tragedy remains tragedy,” that life itself remains tragic, tragedy strikes the soul of the philosopher differently than it does in the souls of others, causing a different sound in him.

    As to the philosopher’s public response to the tragic character of life, Nietzsche judges that modern men need a new teaching, a new philosophic poetry. This teaching “will not lie about suffering by inventing or endorsing some comedy of a purpose to existence that gives suffering meaning,” as Plato did. “The philosophic tradition of exoteric noble lying comes to a self-conscious end with Nietzsche,” even or perhaps because “the eyes of his underworld judges,” his eight philosophic companions remained fixed upon him. 

    The first step of Nietzsche’s “turn to the philosophic life” occurred in 1876, and consisted of freeing his mind from conventional opinions, including opinions that had become conventions by the art of philosophers. Five years later, in the fourth chapter of The Gay Science, he took the next step, which consisted no longer so much of a critique of human culture, the history of philosophy, and modern science as an effort to show “what the free mind can come to know,” what it can bind itself to, rightly. In his 1881 notebook, and indeed in his earlier book, Daybreak, he had rejected the moral claim that egoistic actions are bad, altruistic actions good. Rather, he claimed that “all human actions, including moral actions, are based on drives or passions that are in principle egoistic or self-serving.” Love (for example) amounts to “a passion to possess and to possess all of the desired object”; this suggests that the agapic love of the Christians and the erotic love of the pagans are at root identical. But all drives are not equal, as “the highest of the drives is the passion for knowledge,” the passion that Nietzsche “recognized as his own most powerful passion,” the most intellectual one. Further, “within the individual soul the drives exist in a constant war with one another for supremacy, or for rule.” As in Plato, what holds for the individual soul holds for “the actions of all things”; psychology (at its best, self-knowledge) “expands” to biology (to “all aliveness”) and to physics, since “the same common property is the ultimate explanation of what is at work” in everything. This common property is the will to power. The will to power encompasses not only the desire to have but the desire to overcome; in Socratic-Platonic terms it is both appetitive and thumotic or spirited—rational, too, but only at the highest level, in some human souls. “What is ultimately at work in all things is force that always exists within a field of forces.” Nietzsche calls this force the will to power “because what it is is its need to discharge the excess of force against resistance which is itself force.”

    Nietzsche compares the will to power to sea-waves. “The waves are an image for what we are.” But how so? What is the “secret” that we share with the waves? Nietzsche highlights two words he did not publish: Habsüchtigen, German for “possession addicts,” and Wissensgierigen, those who are “greedy to know.” The waves are “greedy” for the shore; if sufficiently powerful, they devour it, overcome it, causing a new shoreline to appear. This is the waves’ “way of being.” Even knowing is a kind of overcoming, an overcoming of ignorance, “the highest or supreme drive of the human way of being.” “The two words name the drive of all beings and of the highest being.” 

    In The Gay Science, Nietzsche publishes his discovery of the will to power and adds his second discovery, the eternal return. In introducing a new instance of philosophic poetry, Nietzsche “knew that he faced the founder’s abstract problem of introducing novelty into a culture that had already incorporated a different view,” a different poem. By “incorporating” Nietzsche means “taking in” to the corpus, the body. He extends the scope of the word to include geistig, which means “spiritual and intellectual.” “To be a mature human being is always already to be formed or stamped by the inescapable processes of incorporation that have made us,” body and soul. Nietzsche’s first step in the philosophic life, freeing his mind from conventional opinions, was precisely the arduous act of freeing himself from “the necessary errors of cultural incorporation”—necessary because they culture is for all those who live within its sway, most of whom are not philosophers, and none of whom begins as a philosopher. These errors “can be changed because they have all been taught, and it is possible to teach different ideals and values.” The eternal return consists of thinking a new moral principle, one that “says to the world now known: that’s what I want, I want that world, the world as it is, and I want it again, and I want it all an infinite number of times again exactly as it is—because I want my life just as it is again.” The eternal return reorients human desire, redirecting it from resentment of the evils of this world, its ineluctable tragedy, and longing for a different world, whether the Bible’s Heaven, Plato’s City in Speech, or any of the moderns’ utopias, toward the most intense “Yes to life”—to life as it is. The steadfast, impassioned longing for life, which is at its core the will to power, provides a moral/poetic, exoteric doctrine that will affirm the philosopher’s more fundamental discovery and the way of life that enabled him to discover it. The exoteric, poetic account thus may be said to register the esoteric, philosophic insight, protect the philosopher and his insight from censorious eyes by fitting non-philosophers with opinions that are not the same as, but do not contradict, the insight.

    In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche shows the transition that he wants the free spirits, the contemporary atheists to make when he has his prophet sing “The Dance Song,” “abandon[ing] his skeptical ‘Wild Wisdom,'” his belief that “life or being is unfathomable,” for the conviction that life is indeed fathomable as will to power. Having learned this, Zarathustra calls upon the free spirits to join him, armed with the exoteric doctrine of the eternal return, to build “the house yet to be built,” the one that will “house future human beings, or be incorporated into future human beings.” The will to power is the insight for the few, “those with the most powerful passion to know”; the eternal return is the teaching for all. Will to power is philosophy, eternal return philosophic poetry. 

    Both doctrines “assert the sovereignty of becoming,” not timeless Ideas or the eternal God. “Both assert that there is direction “in ever-self-renewing activity“—that the will to power is not random or aimless. And both assert that the “discharging of energy or force” of each individual, each particular part of nature, encounters similar discharges of energy from all other parts, which strive to overcome one another in the “total field of such relations,” which is “all that is.” This means that the striving to overcome honest human souls, requires self-overcoming, a grinding-off of weaknesses.

    Whereas “Plato’s language of eros is attractive and affirmative,” Nietzsche’s “language of will to power is less attractive,” harsher because he would overcome Platonic-Christian “word-tinsel,” which has by now covered over the reality of the world, softening human souls, rotting them with sentimentality. Lampert says that this difference obscures “the fundamental kinship of understanding shared by Plato and Nietszche,” since “genuine philosophers are genuine kin.” At this, the end of Lampert’s first lecture on Nietzsche, an auditor might think of Platonic dialectic—driven by love, a passion for truth but hardly soft or sentimental—as this possible underlying understanding.

    Lampert then turns, however, not to Nietzsche’s philosophy but to his philosophic poetry as the basis of this kinship. “Genuine philosophy generates philosophic poetry, a teaching that can be lived.” Plato and Nietzsche, genuine philosophers, each generated philosophic poetry is intended to enable human beings to live under the circumstances of the times and places in which those philosophers lived. In Nietzsche’s time, the “free mind” had arrived at “epistemological skepticism,” the Kantian skepticism concerning the conviction “that anything can really be known.” Nietzsche charges that the “hidden motive” behind that skepticism is moralism, Voltaire’s “seek[ing] the true only to do the good” or perhaps, to stay with Kant, to live by the “categorical imperative.” But this assumes that “the true and the good must coincide,” an assumption that “curbs” those philosophers’ “search for the true, making skepticism about knowledge an appealing fallback position protecting their view of the good,” which now consists, in their mind, with equal rights and the end of suffering. You may not know the true, but “you can keep on believing in the good, the modern good”; “skepticism gives permission to place morality above knowing.”

    Free minds should become skeptical about their skepticism, re-open the quest for the true. Modern men do in fact claim to have some knowledge of the true, however tentative; this is the truth gained by the scientific method, which begins with hypothesis, tests the hypothesis with experiment, then arrives at a provisional conclusion, the proviso being that further experimentation may disprove the conclusion. Nietzsche challenges free minds with his own hypothesis, namely, that mechanistic physics (Newton, Descartes) are “effects of will.” That is, the “mechanics of cause and effect” upheld by modern physics may exist within an overall field of force. To test his hypothesis, he further challenges free minds to an act of Cartesian introspection, a sure Cartesian method will not offend the modern free minds, supplemented by close observation of other persons and things, again a method that modern science endorses. Can the “instinctual life” of human beings, be explained, first, “as different forms of Habsuch, the addiction for having?” Can this addiction or drive then explain all life forms, or “organic functions”? If, then, the will to power does indeed explain the whole realm of living things, “then” [Nietzsche writes] one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as—will to power.” The investigator will find that the hypothesis of the will to power offers him the most comprehensive explanation of all living phenomena. Without undertaking these experiments of introspection and observation, free mind will remain unfree, stuck in modern moralism. If they do undertake these experiments, they will recognize that “their good of perpetual peace at the end of history in a paradise of equality of rights and the end of suffering is neither attainable nor true.”

    This will leave them directionless, and therefore incapable of directing the permanently unfree minds of ‘the many.’ They will become nihilists, free minds who think “that nothing is truly of worth.” But such a “world-denying” mindset only reprises the world-denying mindset of Plato and of Christianity; it is the last vestige of moralism. Nietzsche counters (to use the language of Christian morality) that what you thought of as God is evil, anti-life, and what you thought of as the Prince of Darkness, the Lord of this world, symbolizes the divine, the life-force, the will to power that animates everyone and everything. Nietzsche “makes his free-minded atheist friends ask, What is a god?” More, why speak in Biblical terms, “in the popular way,” at all? Aren’t you free thinkers, free minds? As Lampert puts it, Nietzsche “stays with religion while suggesting that, no, his philosophic view does not refute God but vindicates God, properly understood”—God understood as will to power. A religion based upon a doctrine consistent with the will to power is necessary because “religions are good for, necessary for, any social order,” incorporating into the young “guidance to what is good and bad, noble and base, what is worth living for and what is necessary to reject.” “The problem is not gods as such, the problem is the god of revelation,” the eternal changeless ‘Platonic’ God of the Bible. The doctrine consistent with the will to power Nietzsche offers is the eternal return, a “transvaluation of values,” the values of the older morality. In so offering, Nietzsche “is not driven by a need for a new morality or a new religion.” As a philosopher, he is driven by “the need to understand,” not the drives of the moralist or the prophet. But the comprehensive affirmation of ‘this world’ by human beings “makes the philosopher possible, because the world generated a spectator who is rational, self-conscious, knowing fragment of the knowable whole.”

    To replace Jesus, the God of the Bible, Nietzsche recommends Dionysus, the “tempter-god,” the “philosophizing god” of antiquity, and his mate, Ariadne, “the god of femaleness or womanliness,” who “does not philosophize” because “in some more fundamental sense she already knows,” possessing “the thread that leads out of the mystery at the heart of the labyrinth,” and being the one who actually gives birth. Dionysus and Ariadne are “the universal gods of earthly reproduction given local or Greek names.” This mated pair generate life, “belong[ing] together in their difference” as both “the war between the sexes and the love between the sexes.” If Dionysus is the tempter-god, he resembles Satan more than Adam; it is as if Eve rejected that dull fellow the God of the Bible matched her with and preferred the bad boy (as women are sometimes known to do). 

    So, you freethinking atheists, see “the necessity of religion,” a necessity that your Voltaire completely misses, and which his epigoni tried to meet with their inane ‘Cult of the Supreme Being’; instead of that niaiserie, see “the universal naturalness of Dionysus and Ariadne as gods of life,” then build your religious institutions for ‘the many’ upon them. One way to do that, Lampert argues, is to embrace what’s now called ‘ecology.’ “Nietzsche is the first Western philosopher to teach a comprehensive ecological philosophy; his is a comprehensive moral and political teaching based fundamentally on love of the earth.” As we now notice, an ethics of ecology ‘goes down’ more easily into modern throats, digests better in their stomachs, and can be incorporated readily into their bodies and minds. Ecology also teaches something of the limits that of the modern scientific project, the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate, a conquest for which modern science can set no limits. Modern science’s inability to set limits for its own activity threatens the nature it seeks to understand in order to ‘conquer’ or manipulate. Leo Strauss “warns against the conquest of nature as the conquest of human nature through the modern ideals of equality of rights and the end of suffering,” and (Nietzsche would add) the unreality of both those ideals. Nietzsche sees that “modern conquest of nature would mean the end of philosophy on earth, because philosophy depends upon the recognition and encouragement of an order of rank and the continuation of suffering properly understood, understood as the human struggle to attain the high, most especially knowledge; that known suffering from a lack can be remedied only through sacrificial struggle—subordination of every drive to the drive for knowledge.” The “ministerial” character of Nietzsche’s philosophic poetry “assigns limits to the modern conquest of nature out of the love of nature, a love expressed in the highest ideal that the whole of nature return just as it is an infinite number of times.”

    The Cartesian-introspective dimension of the Nietzschean challenges works through a characteristic feature of modern philosophy, individualism, while “mov[ing] out beyond the exclusiveness of egoism and out beyond the feeling of altruism and to broader fields beyond the I and the other.” Only this can bring “progress in morality by aligning it with the true,” being a “better reorganization of the drives,” one that “fosters stronger and more noble specimens of the human species,” more alive, and therefore more consistent with all of nature. Human beings strive; they have drives. “Drives always strive for something.” “Incorporation” or enculturation “train[s] us to strive in this direction and not that direction.” Nietzsche’s “new process of incorporation” aims to “redirect striving in order to foster the new I-feeling, leading to the new feeling for the you and for the all.” It redirects us away from mere possessiveness (British-all-too-British), away from the prestige found in commanding others (will-to-power in the vulgar sense), toward (in Nietzsche’s words) “Letting us be possessed by the things (not by persons) and by the largest possible range of true things,” “to let the true things be the things they are” in us, “in their continuous becoming and decaying, in their natural order of rank, and in all the other facets of their naturalness.” The conquest of nature can be limited by nature, if human beings incorporate as much of it as they can into themselves—ultimately, possessed neither by God or Satan and his demons. If possessed by things, not persons, Nietzsche writes, “we become farmland for the things”—fertile, generative, fulfilling the Biblical God’s command to be fruitful not by obeying a command ‘from above’ but by integrating nature, the ‘ecosystem’ into ourselves. From this fertility, human beings, by nature “the making beings,” will forge the “images of existence” of philosophic poetry, “within which human beings will dwell on the earth.” “Philosophers rule by legislating the images”—Nietzsche’s version of one activity of Plato’s philosopher-kings, but evidently intended without the irony Plato deploys. In Nietzsche’s judgment, it was Christianity that overlooked the irony of Platonism, attempting to enforce otherworldliness. Continuing to block any return of Platonic irony while sweeping a weakened Christian civilization aside, Nietzsche rejects any image of “eternal fixity” or of monotheism or of Christian virtues or of the virtues of secularized Christianity. In their place he puts change, the cyclical change of the eternal return and a “transvaluation” of Platonic, Christian, and ‘christian’-Kantian virtues. 

    Thus, Nietzsche’s “story ends in the human love of the earth as it naturally is and a love of the human as it naturally is, or as it can be, beyond the rule of images of existence that teach unnatural ideals wreaking vengeance on life as it is. His whole story ends in ecology, in knowledge of the interconnectedness of life on earth that generates the human imperative to be true to the earth.” Lampert happily predicts that “seeing” Nietzsche as “the founding thinker of an already popular movement that appeals to late modern people,” the ecology movement that “is bound to get stronger as the evidence becomes ever more undeniable that environmental disasters are caused by human-initiated climate change” will be good for politics and good for philosophy.

    Leaving aside the claim that humans have initiated climate change and considering Lampert’s more important observations, it is noteworthy that he has replaced the will to power, with which Nietzsche replaced both Platonic and Christian love, with love—this time, love of the world, love of the earth. Nietzsche’s ‘realism’ has been softened. Why? It might be that, looking back on the catastrophic political consequences of the will to power, which was not so nearly esoteric a doctrine as he has said it is, Lampert considers it judicious to push it into the background more thoroughly than Nietzsche did. A doctrine that was so easily discerned, and so readily vulgarized, by the German military officers in the run-up to the First World War, by Benito Mussolini, and by throngs of warrior-spirits, Right and Left—a supposedly esoteric doctrine that has achieved far more ‘popularity’ than its intended exoteric cover, the eternal return—bespeaks a massive failure of philosophic poetry. Nor does the ‘ecological’ interpretation or application of the doctrine impress; yes, ecology sets limits on the conquest of nature, but in reality, Nietzsche’s predicted ruling class, his “global aristocracy” (unmentioned by Lampert), which would run the ecological show will never be aristocratic in any Nietzschean sense. It will be administrative, bureaucratic, which is to say dull and graceless. Not very Nietzschean.

    More generally, Lampert’s approach to philosophy—that political philosophy is ‘politic,’ only, a form of poetry, that political regimes may teach citizens ‘out of’ philosophic discoveries but have nothing to teach philosophers—may be questioned. If human beings are political animals, political in their nature, then political life does not simply impede philosophic noēsis. It provides a window, if a far from transparent window, through which  a philosopher might approach the truth. 

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Political Philosophy in Beijing, II: A Consideration of Plato’s Socrates

    November 26, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    Laurence Lampert: Strauss, Plato, Nietzsche: Philosophy and Its Poetry. Lectures 3 and 4: “Socrates Philosophic Poetry” and “Socrates Becomes Socrates.” Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2024.

     

    In his first two lectures, Lampert, following Leo Strauss, distinguishes between philosophy and philosophic poetry. In times of religious crisis, when the gods of the polis are no longer credible, especially among the youth, the future rulers of the polis, the activity of philosophy itself might come under threat. Under this circumstance, a philosopher might make a ‘politic’ intervention, proposing a new or at least reformed or reinterpreted myth, one that will convince the young and incline them to friendship toward philosophy and philosophers. In his second pair of lectures, Lampert considers Plato’s strategy in more detail, to some extent still through a ‘Straussian’ lens but very much with his own eyes.

    How did “Socrates become Socrates,” a philosopher but also a political philosopher? This occurred in two steps: Socrates first became a philosopher, one who understands “the fundamental truths of being and knowing, nature tout court and human nature, and only then a political philosopher, “a teacher of a theological-political view” that will prove edifying in his time and place. Lampert takes these matters in reverse order, devoting his first of the two lectures to “how Socrates became the political philosopher he became.”

    Of the 35 Platonic dialogues, 26 are performed, amounting to scholars now call ‘closet dramas,’ plays intended to be read, not performed. Nine dialogues are narrated or reported, six by Socrates, three by others. Lampert selects three of the Socrates-reported dialogues: the Protagoras, the Charmides, and the Republic. These dialogues reveal not only what Socrates was thinking at the time he wrote the dialogue but what Athens, his polis, was doing in Socrates’ time, and what Athenians were thinking and feeling. That is, they show the philosopher thinking about what philosophic poetry he might make that would prudently address the political circumstances of Athens, very much in view of how those circumstances might injure those few Athenians who love wisdom so much that they devote their lives to that love.

    The arguments and actions Socrates reports in the Republic (in the Greek, Politeia or Regime) occur in early June of 429 BCE, the third year of what would become a twenty-year war between Athens and Sparta, the second summer of the devastating plague described so graphically by Thucydides. One of the participants in the dialogue refers to the feast of Bendideia; this feast honored Bendis, a foreign goddess whose consort was a healer-god. In the experience of all those alive at the time, this was the first time a foreign god was honored by Athens. What is worse, under the pressures of war and disease, but not only of war and disease, some Athenians suffer from “a spiritual crisis” that Thucydides also described. Plato sets the Charmides only a month earlier, upon Socrates’ return from a foreign polis, having spoken not to a healer-god but to a doctor who taught him “new things.” Finally, the Protagoras‘ dramatic date is before the war, about 434 BCE, when “the great city of Athens [was] at the very height of its power and glory.” Lampert accordingly begins with an interpretation of the Protagoras.

    In his dialogue with the 65-year old Protagoras, then called Greece’s wisest man, “the founder of the Greek enlightenment,” Socrates, nearly thirty years his junior. “steps forward to restrain and redirect” the great man. In Socrates’ estimation, Protagoras is “too outspoken,” “not cautious enough.” Being so, he “puts the whole enlightenment at risk with his inadequate exotericism,” his “failure to hide adequately his own skeptical views,” which “has led the younger generation to mistrust their gods.” In leading the young to mistrust their gods, Protagoras “seem[s] to them to destroy the reasons for living a moral life, a life of justice.” What is more, Socrates hopes to “attract and win as his own student the young Alcibiades,” one of the witnesses to the dialogue, who is “the most promising young Athenian of all those who aspire to political glory and greatness.” [1] If he abandons morality, and especially if he abandons justice, very bad consequences could ensue for Athens and possibly for philosophers in Athens. Recognizing that Alcibiades will never become a philosopher, Socrates intends to win his political friendship, thereby “maintain[ing] in Athens a public spirit friendly to philosophy.” 

    Five years later, Socrates returns to Athens after serving in the Athenian army during the early years of the war. In the Charmides, Plato refers to Homer’s Odyssey, the story of another return, “the return of the wise king Odysseus” to his home in Ithaka. During his odyssey, Odysseus has learned many things, including things about nature (specifically, the nature of the moly root) and the many regimes that rule the poleis. Following the interpretation offered by Seth Benardete in The Bow and the Lyre, Lampert writes that Homer’s odyssey is “his gradual learning of the wisdom that is philosophy and the wisdom that is political philosophy”—theoretical and practical wisdom. The two are distinct but related. The moly root is given to Odysseus by the god Hermes in order to protect him from the magic of the witch, Circe, who has imprisoned Odysseus’ friends in her palace. One might say that men are readily ‘bewitched’ by the unnatural, by the spells cast by rhetoricians, priests, and sophists, but knowledge of nature can save them, if they or a friend of theirs has such knowledge and uses it for that purpose. After this adventure, Socrates returns to his home, prudently disguised as a beggar. After observing the circumstances prevailing in his household, in which his enemies, the suitors, have been held at bay by his wife’s own prudent policy, “Homer has Odysseus reveal himself in a series of recognition scenes, thereby winning the allies he needs to kill his enemies and restore his rightful household regime.” In founding or refounding his regime, Odysseus needs to consider not only how to regain his rule but to consider how to perpetuate the regime, how to establish an orderly succession in the future, a succession that will provide “wise rule without wise rulers,” wise men like Odysseus being exceedingly rare. To do so, he must “establish a new teaching about the gods,” a “religious founding” which will back up his political founding by reinforcing his succession plan. 

    In Athens, Socrates is “the new returning Odysseus.” By this parallel, Plato invites his reader “to think of Socrates as returning with a founding deed that is a theological-political program.” In the dialogue, the handsome young wrestler Charmides needs Socrates as a physician—a physician of the soul, not the body. As it happens, Socrates himself had consulted a physician “of Zalmoxis,” who was “a god who teaches that to cure the body the soul must also be treated and that the soul can be treated only with incantations which are ‘beautiful speeches'”; more, the doctors of Zalmoxis also “teach that the soul is immortal” and that there is only one God. The doctrines of monotheism and the immortal soul have made the people who believe these teachings, the Getae, “the most courageous and most just of people, the only people to effectively resist the Persian invaders”—exactly the virtues Athenians will need if they are to trust one another, unite, and win the war against Sparta. What Hermes is to Odysseus, the doctor of Zalmoxis has been to Socrates; what the doctor has been to Zalmoxis, Socrates intends to be to young Charmides and to other Athenian youths with whom he will dialogue. The topic of the Charmides is moderation. Before the war, Socrates had taught Critias, who is actually his main interlocutor in the Charmides. During the course of his conversation with him now, Socrates sees that he had earlier taught Critias “a view that would eventually turn him into a notorious Athenian criminal, a most immoderate sophist and tyrant in the Athenian civil war.” Socrates inadvertently had corrupted Critias; now and in the future, he must alter his exoteric teaching. Corrupting the youth will be one of the charges laid against Socrates, years later, at his trial before the Athenian jury. Socrates was indeed guilty as charged, if unintentionally. Well before the trial, he acts to correct his own actions.

    In the Republic, a few days later, readers hear that, according to the myth Socrates proposes, in the afterlife the soul of Odysseus chooses “the life of Socrates” for his next life. That is, he chooses “the business of philosophy and everything it entails to protect itself and advance itself.” “Plato in the Republic makes the returned Socrates of the Charmides the thinker who recognized in himself the soul of Odysseus,” the soul that “carries on and advances the tradition of Greek wisdom that began before wise Odysseus, before Homer, and was passed on after improvements by Homer, and is passed on to Socrates, that ‘son’ of Homer who improves,” or, rather, adapts and adjusts, “Homeric wisdom and passes it on to his ‘sons’ after him.” Plato suggests that “a wise man knows who he is and he knows where he is and he learns what he must do because of who he is and where he is.” Whereas the Athenians are introducing a foreign god whose consort is a healing-god, Socrates, “on that very night,” introduces his own teachings, his own “incantations” or philosophic or natural religion, which he says he learned from another foreign god. The young gentlemen in this dialogue, Adeimantus and Glaucon, “have been exposed to the Greek enlightenment and learned the teaching of teachers like Protagoras, teachings that seem to them to destroy the reasons for living a moral life, a life of justice.” They are experiencing “the crisis of the death of the gods,” a crisis “similar to what Nietzsche would call nihilism.” His rival in this dialogue is another sophist, Thrasymachus, who is even less moderate in his teaching than Protagoras was, openly asserting that justice is only the advantage of the stronger—the “real and radical position of enlightenment teachers.” The sophists have shaken the young gentlemen’s belief in the gods; what will happen if they spoil their sense of justice, upon which the survival of any polis depends? 

    Socrates adopts three strategies for dealing with the Athenian crisis of the death of the death of the gods. First, he attempts to make the sophist Thrasymachus his friend, despite Thrasymachus’ attempt to compete with Socrates for the allegiance of the young gentlemen. Socrates had “learned a new strategy,” replacing the one that “did not succeed with Protagoras” or with Alcibiades. He offers teachings on the soul, on ‘epistemology,’ and on the gods—all “anti-Homeric teachings foreign to the Greek tradition, teachings meant to persuade and cure young men like Adeimantus and Glaucon.” Socrates teaches them that the soul has three “parts”: logos or reason; thumos or spiritedness; and the appetites. If reason exercises its rightful rule over spiritedness, and spiritedness exercises its rightful rule over the appetites, the young gentlemen will learn civic or political courage, not the raging, Achilles-like warlike courage that has entangled Athens in a war they will not win. He also teaches them that the soul is immortal, with Hades a place of reward and punishment for acts committed in this life. “The returned Socrates’ teaching on the soul’s afterlife is most clearly a teaching that he learned while he was away, from the doctor of Zalmoxis—or, Plato suggests, perhaps from Herodotus, the Greek historian who reports the teachings of Zalmoxis and their salutary or beneficial effects, and who says that the people of Zalmoxis are most courageous and most just.”

    Socrates’ new teaching on knowing reality or ‘being,’ his ‘epistemology,’ consists of his doctrine of the ideas. Strauss forthrightly contends that “no one has ever succeeded in giving a satisfactory or clear account of this doctrine of ideas,” showing that “the doctrine is an exoteric teaching that can easily persuade non-philosophers who have been raised to believe in glorious gods like Nike and Dike, the gods of victory and justice.” But Socrates aims not at a rigorous philosophic proof; he rather intends to persuade young Athenian skeptics that while the goddess, Justice, does not literally exist, the idea of justice “has a permanent independent reality that can be known by humans.” Such a notion assuages their disappointment in no longer being able to believe in the existence of eternal gods, gives them instead an account of a principle of justice that is at least rationally conceivable if not rationally demonstrable as an idea, as an eternal thing, an idea easily acceptable to souls inculcated by religious doctrines about eternal gods. That is, “Socrates’ teaching on the eternal, transcendent ideas is a teaching consciously tied to its time, the time of the death of the Homeric gods.” It is poetic, a making, not a proof, but it is philosophic poetry.

    Strauss placed his account of Socrates’ new teaching on the gods in the center of the chapter on the Republic in The City and Man. The philosophic lawgiver of the City in Speech “lays down two new laws for the gods”: they only cause good, never evil; they never change shape or lie. In each instance, the gods are quite unlike Homer’s Olympians. “A crucial part of making the gods more moral than Homer had made them is what Socrates adds in Book 10: he makes the gods ultimately responsible for punishing or rewarding the soul after death in Hades.” After all, the soul is immortal and receives reward or punishment for its actions in this life, and if the standard of good and bad (for political men, and young political aspirants, especially justice and injustice) is impersonal, an idea or set of ideas, then who will enforce the ideas, who will make them rule the immortal souls? 

    Socrates adds another novelty about the gods. If the idea of the good is the sovereign idea, the idea that sets the standard for all others, including justice, then “Socrates moves toward the monotheism of Zalmoxis.” This is one reason why Nietzsche regarded Plato’s account of Socrates as a teaching that “opened the way for the successful introduction of Christianity,” a religion about which Nietzsche expresses some well-known reservations, indeed animadversions. While “the Athenian introduction of Bendis failed to do anything to change the ultimate fate of Athens, Socrates’ introduction of his new teachings succeeded in changing the fate of philosophy in Athens and, ultimately, in changing the fate of Western civilization,” making him into “what Nietzsche said he was, ‘the vortex and turning point of so-called world history.'” And just as Homer’s Odysseus needed to kill the 108 suitors of Penelope in order to re-found his regime in Ithaka, just as Socrates “kills” Homer by “taking Homer’s place as the ultimate authority,” so too will Nietzsche, in this way following the lead of Machiavelli, ‘kill’ Plato in order to found a new spiritual regime adapted, as Nietzsche supposed, to the new circumstance in which both the transcendent God and the transcendent ideas are ‘dead,’ no longer believed, in need of substitution. Although Socrates ‘kills’ Homer exoterically, he “honors Homer as his own teacher” esoterically. Nietzsche ‘kills’ Plato, but only “the exoteric Plato whose teaching ultimately led to a cultural disaster,” Christianity. The esoteric Nietzsche “honors Plato as Plato honored Homer,” as what Nietzsche calls “the most beautiful growth of antiquity.” “Times change, gods die, and politic wisdom must change with the times by teaching new gods.” 

    Before turning to a fuller discussion of Nietzsche, Lampert devotes his fourth lecture to how Socrates became Socrates—a philosopher. That Socrates changed, that he changed his exoteric teaching, he has shown. How he changed may be seen not so much in the Protagoras, the Charmides, and the Republic as in a second trio of dialogues, dialogues reported by witnesses, not by Socrates himself. These are the Phaedo, reported by Phaedo, the Parmenides, reported by Cephalus, and the Symposium, reported by Apollodorus. These are the only ‘reported’ dialogues in which Socrates appears that Socrates himself does not report. [2] Lampert remarks that these dialogues form not only a sequence in time but a logical sequence, Plato’s way of depicting “Socrates’ progress in thought” toward “the deepest insight that a philosopher can attain.” His “calculated presentation of the exoteric Socrates is intended to lead his most interested reader to the esoteric Socrates” even as he makes it possible “to date these steps in the life of Socrates against the background of the life of Athens.” One might say that he thus beckons his young Chinese listeners to think for themselves, just as Socrates thought for himself.

    The Phaedo is named after its narrator, who is telling the story of Socrates’ last day to Pythagoras in the polis of Philia—a conveniently named site for such a story, if ever there was one. On that day, Socrates had been talking to two young Pythagoreans who had begun to doubt the Pythagorean doctrine of the immortality of the soul. One of them, Kebes, has raised an objection to that doctrine which requires Socrates to reconsider “the cause at work in the whole of nature, the whole of becoming.” This will be “the last argument of his life,” but before he makes it, he recurs “to his first philosophic experiences in order to tell the story of his becoming a philosopher from its very beginning.” As a young man, he began with wonder, animated by the intellectual eros that desires knowledge of nature. Early and then-contemporary Greek philosophers had explained natural causes naturalistically, that is, without recourse to explanations depending upon claims about the gods. He found none of these explanations satisfactory, he recalls, until he heard the theory that Mind causes natural changes, that “everything in nature is what it is because it was for the best that it be that way, as judged by mind.” Strauss calls this Socrates’ “teleotheology.” But in examining the works of Anaxagoras, the philosopher who proposed the theory, Socrates found that the doctrine of Mind was an “exoteric and salutary teaching” that “cover[ed]” Anaxagoras’ “esoteric naturalism.” So, Socrates remained dissatisfied, thinking that natural/material causes “cannot explain human things.” As proof of this, he argues that the cause of his sitting in prison, awaiting death, cannot be fully explained by the actions of his body; the “human opinion” that commanded his death sentence as more important. But if natural causes do not suffice to account for causation, and Anaxagoras himself didn’t believe that Mind accounts for it, what then? This led to the philosophic adventurer’s “second sailing” under the banner of thinking that if the things to be explained don’t explain themselves, if that wind doesn’t fill the sails of the philosophic boat, then you, the philosopher, must row, turning to speeches (logoi) and ideas in order to attempt to understand causation.

    The ideas he discusses in this dialogue, the Beautiful, the Good, and Bigness are themselves unchanging. Change occurs, however, in the natural phenomena according to whether or not the “participate” in one or more of the ideas. Socrates then “uses the ideas to prove that the soul is immortal,” and Kebes accepts the proof. Since no one has ever quite explained what it means for a thing to participate or fail to participate in an idea, the whole doctrine is suspect. Lampert simply remarks that this was Socrates’ next step in his philosophic odyssey, and that he was content if young gentlemen like Kebes took it as their last step. 

    The Parmenides takes Plato’s readers back to Socrates in 450 BCE, at age 19, when the philosophers Parmenides, then 65 years old, and Zeno, then 40 years old, visited Athens and conversed with him. By then, Socrates had already rejected materialist naturalism, discovered and questioned the adequacy of teleology, and turned “to the speeches and to the ideas as cause.” Socrates was “a philosophic prodigy, a young genius in philosophy who by age nineteen had thought through the whole history of Greek philosophy before him and arrived at his own novel solution to the problem of cause, his view of the ideas.” In arguing for it, he presents it “in the way a nineteen-year-old philosophic innovator would present it: he is proud, competitive, victory-loving; he is eager to prove that these two famous philosophers are wrong and that he, only he, solved their great problem, the problem of cause.” Far from being indignant at the upstart, Parmenides and Zeno very much like the young man, for “they saw in the young Socrates a man of their own kind, a great rarity of the kind a philosopher always seeks.” Parmenides gently “suggests” to Socrates “that there is way too much love of victory riving him” because he cares too much about the “opinions of men.” He has nonetheless “made the fundamental step of philosophy and learned for himself that things have natures“—even as Odysseus had learned the nature of the moly root—that “each thing belongs to a kind, a natural kind: that is what the ‘idea’ of a thing means.” If no such thing as a “kind” exists in nature, then understanding itself, the telos of philosophic inquiry, is impossible and nature is unknowable. The philosopher himself exemplifies a “kind” of the human, itself a “kind” in nature. Parmenides effectively challenges Socrates to show whether or not he can “discover and show others the grounds of the possibility of philosophy.” 

    Lampert suggests that in the Parmenides Plato has written a dialogue that “is only for the passionately interested few, nameless future travelers from afar, potential philosophers.” “This is how Plato thinks the tradition of philosophy works, how Socratic philosophy will be passed down: the essential esoteric Socrates is embedded in the preserved conversations of the exoteric Socrates.” Further, a comparison of the Parmenides with the Phaedo shows how, “on the last day of his life, at age seventy, in the last argument of his life, Socrates teaches young Pythagoreans the very view of the ideas that he himself, fifty years earlier, learned from Parmenides was rationally indefensible.” He does this because Phaedo and Socrates’ other young friends are not philosophers; “they are not of Socrates’ kind.” He gives them the doctrine of the ideas in order to save them from their doubts about the gods and their fears of death, and perhaps even more to make philosophy “publicly defensible as morally trustworthy.” It is political philosophy, philosophic poetry, ministerial poetry. (In modern China, too, surely philosophy needs to be seen as morally trustworthy.)

    The last dialogue in this series is the Symposium. Strauss calls it the only dialogue that takes “praise of a God,” who happens to be Eros, Love, as its topic and the only dialogue named for the occasion upon which it takes place—a “drinking party at which wine loosens tongues and things are said that might otherwise not be said.” In this dialogue, those things are profanations of the religious mysteries; “it tells what it is a crime to tell, a secret about the gods and what they know.” It was Alcibiades who had been accused of having profaned the mysteries in 416 BCE, seventeen years before this party, just prior to the time of Socrates’ trial. Socrates was accused of corrupting the young, including Alcibiades. This year, 399 BCE, “was a time of fervent religious purification” in Athens, a movement or change, a change of public opinion, “to which Socrates fell victim.” It was also the year when the oracle at Delphi supposedly said that there was no wiser man than Socrates, effectively designating him as a worthy successor of Protagoras. That is, the religious purification of Athens, leading to the death of a most eminent philosopher, contradicted the judgment of the highest religious authority in Greece. This must mean that Athenian public opinion must not understand the judgment of the religious authority it acknowledges as authoritative. How so?

    And if Socrates is indeed wise, how did he become so, what caused his change from unwisdom (where we all begin and most of us end) to wisdom? “In the Symposium we hear Socrates tell the genuine story of his wisdom.” The Symposium profanes not the Delphic mysteries, as Alcibiades was accused of doing, but reveals “the most hidden truths of philosophy that Plato will ever reveal, an unveiling of the mystery of Socrates’ being as a philosopher that is at the same time an unveiling of the mystery of being itself.” Like the Delphic mysteries, hidden by human beings from human beings, nature itself hides, as pre-Socratic Heraclitus revealed. Although the mystery of being or nature “can be divined,” it can be divined only “in a way that is itself mysterious, true to the hidden ways of nature.” At this point, we know from the Protagoras that Socrates “had already completed his philosophic education” before the year of the dialogue, 434. His philosophic education predated his political-philosophic education. Now, in 416, he claims to be ignorant, except for “the things of eros,” things more likely to be revealed during the course of a drinking party, as the inhibitions ingrained by conventions weaken. 

    Socrates converses with Agathon, a young poet who writes tragedies, and introduces a memory of Diotima, whom he met in 440. “Diotima” means “honor the god”; a prophetess, she was said to have delayed the onset of the plague in Athens by recommending that they make a sacrifice. In her discussion with Socrates, she refuted Socrates’ opinion, shared by Agathon, “that Eros is good and beautiful and wise.” On the contrary, Eros is none of those things. But neither is Eros bad, ugly, or ignorant. Eros “is a between.” Eros desires what a soul takes to be good, beautiful, wise. Diotima leads the young philosopher to self-knowledge, to recognition of his own nature as an erotic being of a certain kind, one passionate for wisdom. The philosopher begins his inquiry with “correct opinion”; his soul must at least be pointed in the direction of the good, beautiful, and wise; it not be misled by incorrect opinion, which points the soul to the bad, ugly, and ignorant. This is why philosophers take care to craft philosophic poetry, not only to incline the polis to a regime that will let philosophers philosophize but to give the few potential philosophers a better chance of becoming real ones. Socrates recognized himself in Diotima’s portrait as an erotic man of the type she described.

    Philosophy, “driven erotically” in the right direction and knowing itself as erotic, “can best think the reality that lies between those abstractions of permanence and flow”; he recognizes nature as a whole within himself as a particular instance of nature. “The philosopher can come to know by knowing himself.” When Socrates asks Diotima what kind of power eros has, she calls it the power of “ferrying,” of “mediating or carrying things between the immortals and the mortal.” One is reminded also of the god who ferries souls from life to the realm of the dead.

    And who, Socrates asks, are Eros’ father and mother—that is, “what are the origins of eros?” Shockingly, Eros is not a god at all and it has no parents. It turns out that eros is self-making, self-generating; “eros as self-generating power never simply is but is always coming into being as a result of its own activity and always slipping out of being as a result of its self-expenditure, its dying away in [is?] its expressing itself.” Intellectual eros and physical eros behave exactly the same way because they are both part of nature. “The deep structure of eros always disappears into the concrete experience that it enables,” “masked in the particular that it always disappears into.” It is dynamic, relational, temporal, “directed by its very nature to fulfillment or satisfaction, and its fulfillment always drains away and revives seeking fulfillment.” And that is what nature as a whole is, too. So, when Socrates says he is ignorant of everything but eros, “he seems to make a modest or moderate knowledge claim” but in fact makes “the largest of all possible knowledge claims,” that he knows “the character or way of all that is,” what Strauss calls “the nature of nature.” The nature of nature may be seen at the top of Diotima’s famous ladder, which the philosopher and the philosopher alone reaches. At the top of the ladder is a beholding, a beholding of the erotic character of being, but, like eros itself, the beholding also engenders, makes; it makes philosophic poetry. This is the coming into being and the slipping out of being, the slipping out of being involving what Socrates in the Republic calls the return to the Cave, the polis, the place of convention, where philosophic poetry can replace the shadows of idols no longer taken as real by the citizens. 

    Lampert calls attention to the rational character of the knowing the prophetess reveals. The trajectory of Socrates’ philosophic way of life, his regime. He wanted to know the answer to “the question of cause concerning generation and destruction as a whole,” not only of the human things but of all things. His second sailing brought him to the idea of the Ideas as the cause of generation and destruction, but Parmenides refuted this with his “proof of the rational impossibility of transcendent ideas.” The third stage came when Diotima taught him that causation lies between the “pure flow” (asserted by Heraclitus) and the permanence of what are often miscalled Platonic ideas. Rather, “everything that is has the dynamic, relational, temporal character of eros.” The Delphic command, “Know yourself,” is exactly what the philosopher must do, if he is to know the nature of nature. In this way, Socrates may be said to ‘profane’ the mysteries not in the sense of betraying them but in the sense that he “prepares an initiation into them” which is “available for all future Agathons, for you and me,” my Chinese auditors. 

    As Strauss remarks, Nietzsche replaces Platonic eros with the will to power. The way in which Nietzsche became Nietzsche is the topic of the final two lectures.

     

    Notes

    1. The importance of Alcibiades’ presence is remarked by Patrick J. Coby: Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1987). See “Plato’s ‘Protagoras'” on this website under the category, “Philosophers.”
    2. The “Young Socrates” or Socrates the Younger, also a philosopher, whom Plato’s readers meet in the Statesman. 

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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