Will Morrisey Reviews

Book reviews and articles on political philosophy and literature.

  • Home
  • Reviews
    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
  • Contents
  • About
  • Books

Recent Posts

  • Russian Military Strategy
  • America’s “Small Wars”
  • Theosis
  • Pascal on Christ and His Offer of Salvation
  • The Greatness and Misery of the ‘Self’

Recent Comments

    Archives

    • April 2026
    • March 2026
    • February 2026
    • January 2026
    • December 2025
    • November 2025
    • October 2025
    • September 2025
    • August 2025
    • July 2025
    • June 2025
    • May 2025
    • April 2025
    • March 2025
    • February 2025
    • January 2025
    • December 2024
    • November 2024
    • October 2024
    • September 2024
    • August 2024
    • July 2024
    • June 2024
    • May 2024
    • April 2024
    • March 2024
    • February 2024
    • January 2024
    • December 2023
    • November 2023
    • October 2023
    • September 2023
    • August 2023
    • July 2023
    • June 2023
    • May 2023
    • April 2023
    • March 2023
    • February 2023
    • January 2023
    • December 2022
    • November 2022
    • October 2022
    • September 2022
    • August 2022
    • July 2022
    • June 2022
    • May 2022
    • April 2022
    • March 2022
    • February 2022
    • January 2022
    • December 2021
    • November 2021
    • October 2021
    • September 2021
    • August 2021
    • July 2021
    • June 2021
    • May 2021
    • April 2021
    • March 2021
    • February 2021
    • January 2021
    • December 2020
    • November 2020
    • October 2020
    • September 2020
    • August 2020
    • July 2020
    • June 2020
    • May 2020
    • April 2020
    • March 2020
    • February 2020
    • January 2020
    • December 2019
    • November 2019
    • October 2019
    • September 2019
    • August 2019
    • July 2019
    • June 2019
    • May 2019
    • April 2019
    • March 2019
    • February 2019
    • January 2019
    • December 2018
    • November 2018
    • October 2018
    • September 2018
    • August 2018
    • July 2018
    • June 2018
    • May 2018
    • April 2018
    • March 2018
    • February 2018
    • January 2018
    • December 2017
    • November 2017
    • September 2017
    • August 2017
    • July 2017
    • June 2017
    • May 2017
    • April 2017
    • March 2017
    • February 2017
    • January 2017
    • December 2016
    • November 2016
    • September 2016
    • August 2016
    • July 2016
    • June 2016
    • April 2016
    • March 2016
    • February 2016
    • January 2016

    Categories

    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
    • Uncategorized

    Meta

    • Log in
    • Entries feed
    • Comments feed
    • WordPress.org

    Powered by Genesis

    The Napoleonic Wars Weren’t Over till Charlotte Bronte Said They Were Over

    September 25, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Charlotte Brontë: Villette. London: The Gresham Publishing Company, n.d.

     

    Clear-sighted, cold-on-the-surface Lucy Snowe, English through-and-through, finds herself in the French-speaking town of Villette, where she has gone to seek gainful employment. There, she fights a civil-social continuation of the Napoleon Wars, nearly four decades after the Battle of Waterloo—themselves a continuation of what one Frenchman in the novel calls “the eternal conflict between France and England.” Villette is located in the country of “Labassecour,” usually understood as a fictionalized stand-in for Belgium, where Brontë herself worked as a teacher for several years in the French quarter of Brussels. In French, “Labassecour” means a poultry-yard, perhaps reflecting the author’s dim view of its inhabitants. More fancifully, to put one’s coeur, one’s heart, à bas means to lower it, to subordinate it, and this Lucy does, with true English self-rule.

    She needs the work. She spent part of her youth at the home of her widowed godmother, “a handsome house in the clean and ancient town of Bretton,” a town possibly named after an ancestor of her godmother’s late husband, a physician whose people evidently came to the British Isles from ‘France,’ specifically Brittainy. As a child, Miss Snowe had visited “about twice a year”; she begins the story she narrates with her last visit, at the age of fourteen. Her godmother’s son, John Graham Bretton, lives there—a “handsome, faithless-looking youth of sixteen,” “spoiled and whimsical”— and they are soon joined by six-year-old Paulina Home, the daughter of a “giddy, careless woman and a “sensitive,” introverted scientist. The mother has died and the father has gone away on a restorative trip. Polly prays for her father with a “monomaniac tendency,” but when it becomes clear that her father’s absence will be extended, she attaches herself to Graham, perhaps a bit to Lucy’s jealous discomfiture. “The league of acquaintanceship thus struck up was not hastily dissolved; on the contrary, it appeared that time and circumstances served rather to cement than loosen it. Ill-assimilated as the two were in age, sex, pursuits, etc. they somehow found a great deal to say to each other”—he, teasing and teaching her, she fussing over him. “With curious readiness did she adapt herself to such themes as interested him. One would have thought the child had no mind or life of her own, but necessarily live, move, and have her being in another; now that her father was taken from her, she nestled in Graham, and seemed to feel by his feeling: to exist in his existence.” Since Graham liked to read, “she proved a ready scholar,” reading Bible stories to him, sympathizing with the people in them, and often turning from them to her favorite topic, Graham. Jacob’s love for his son, Joseph, finds its parallel in her love for him; “if you were to die,” she tells him, “I should refuse to be comforted, and go down into the grave to you mourning,'” as Jacob did to Joseph’s grave. When her father eventually summons her to a new life in France she is heartbroken, “trembling like a leaf when she took leave, but exercising self-command.”

    Lucy leaves, too, a few weeks later, returning home to her family. Eight years later, a series of unspecified “troubles”—they must include the death of her parents—left her with “no possibility of dependence on others: to myself alone could I look”; “self-reliance and exertion were forced upon me by circumstances, as they are upon thousands besides.” With that last phrase, she takes care to bridle pity for herself, either from her reader or in her own soul. The effort will prove characteristic of herself, as it seems to have been for the English in her time, and not only in her time.

    She finds her first employment as the caretaker and companion of an old maid, who still pines over the fiancé who died in a riding accident, thirty years earlier. (On her deathbed she admits, “I still think of Frank more than of God.”) Readers never hear of her again, but her loss foreshadows the theme of lost and unconsummated love that pervades the novel.

    Unemployed again, now aged 23, Lucy determines to try her fortune on the continent, for which she departs without knowing where she will find a job. On the boat to Labassecour she meets a young English lady who is going to school in Villette. Silly and a bit snobbish, Ginevra Fanshawe “tormented me with an unsparing selfishness” and her “entire incapacity to endure” the rolling sea. By contrast, Lucy is the one passenger who can remain on deck throughout the afternoon, upholding England’s honor as a maritime power. But Ginevra does one useful thing, telling her that a Madame Beck, who runs a girls’ school in Villette, is looking for “an English gouvernante.” 

    Modeste Maria Beck turns out to be “a charitable woman” who, Lucy takes care to recall, “did a great deal of good.” However, the turnover among her employees is sobering. It transpires that charitable Mme. Beck rules her establishment by careful surveillance of her staff and students, “glid[ing] ghost-like through the house, watching and spying everywhere, peering through every key-hole, listening behind every door.” “While devoid of sympathy, she had a sufficiency of rational benevolence”; very French, she loved ‘the poor’ as a class, as an abstraction, without loving anyone, rich or poor, as a person. The key to heart wasn’t sympathy but self-interest. She reserves her love for herself and her own, particularly her own children, whom she cares for by meeting their every physical need without wasting an ounce of affection. She surveils them as well. In all, she’s a sort of Comtian without Comte’s theories, combining in her soul the qualifications for “a first minister and a superintendent of police,” combined. “Wise, firm faithless, secret, crafty, passionless; watchful and inscrutable; acute and insensate—withal perfectly decorous,” she quickly sees that Lucy will make a good teacher and wastes no time putting her to that service.

    Gazing at her first class, Lucy “beheld opposite to me a row of eyes and brows that threatened stormy weather” in their own way worse than the English Channel waves—eyes “full of an insolent light, and brows hard and unblushing as marble. The continental ‘female’ is quite a different being to the insular ‘female’ of the same age and class.” Knowing that “madame would at any time throw overboard a professeur or maîtresse who became unpopular with the school” (like many a private-school administrator before and since, Madame knows where her bread is buttered) they expected “an easy victory” over the newcomer. Lucy subordinates the ringleader, “a young baronne” named Mademoiselle de Melcy, by reading her “stupid” composition aloud in front of the class and then tearing it in two. She is still more severe with the one remaining rebel, a girl with “a dark, mutinous, sinister eye,” whom she pushes into a closet and locks the door behind. It transpires that the girl was disliked by the other students, so this display of force enhances rather than diminishes Miss Snowe’s esteem among the students. Mme. Beck, who as a matter of course has been surveilling the classroom all along, pronounces, “C’est bien” when Lucy emerges from the classroom. From then on, her authority is secure; the reasonable but blunt English way of ruling has prevailed over the French revolutionaries, with the approval of the chief surveiller. 

    “Villette is a cosmopolitan city, and in this school were girls of almost every European nation, and likewise of very varied rank in life”—the right place to study comparative politics, one might say.” “Equality is much practiced in Labassecour; though not republican in form, it is nearly so in substance,” as indeed France was in 1853, when Brontë published her book, under Napoleon III.  (A few years later, Tocqueville would publish his book on the French Revolution, maintaining that civil-social equality had prevailed in France since before the French Revolution, thriving under various forms of monarchism and republicanism alike.) “At the desks of Madame Beck’s establishment the young countess and the young bourgeoise sat side by side”; differentiated only by their manners—often “franker and more courteous” among the bourgeoises, with the aristocrats displaying “a delicately balanced combination of insolence and deceit.” As for the citizens of Labassecour, they “had an hypocrisy of their own,” but “of a such coarse order, such as could deceive few.” Among all, when a lie was judged necessary, “they brought it out with a careless ease and breadth altogether untroubled by the rebuke of conscience.”

    As before, Lucy determines as she considers her students, “I must look only to myself” for support in “bring[ing] this stiff-necked tribe under permanent influence.” They “were not to be driven by force” as a general policy. “They were to be humored, borne with very patiently: a courteous though sedate manner impressed them; a very rare flash of raillery did good. Severe or continuous mental application they could not or would not, bear: heavy demand on the memory, the reason, the attention, they rejected point-blank.” English steadfastness was not a resource a teacher could mine in them, but it would serve the teacher very well. “They would riot for three additional lines to a lesson; but I never knew them rebel against a wound given to their self-respect; the little they had of that quality was trained to be crushed, and it rather liked the pressure of a firm heel than otherwise.” Egalitarian, then, but also apt subjects of despotism: Just as Tocqueville would say.

    The reason Ginevra Fanshawe knew about the open position at the school turns out to have been simple: She is a student there. She has two suitors in her thrall, one whom she’s nicknamed “Isidore” (perhaps after the scholarly St. Isidore of Seville) who idealizes her and buys her things, much to her amusement (“he really thinks I am sensible”). But “he is only bourgeois.” “My present business is to enjoy youth and not to think of fettering myself, by promise or vow, to this man or that.” She prefers the attentions of “Le Colonel Alfred de Hamal,” an aristocrat. “À bas les grandes passions et les sévères vertus!” Lucy, then, isn’t the only one who knows how to discipline her passions, to say to them, “À bas,” although Ginevra unfortunately disciplines her virtues as well, all in service of a self-conscious superficiality, a way of life consisting of light pleasures. In her own way, she is an English girl who out-Frenches the French. 

    When one of Mme. Beck’s daughters takes sick, she summons a “Dr. John,” who disappoints Madame by failing to take any interest in her. Initially, Lucy suspects him of carrying on an affair with Rosine Muton, “an unprincipled though pretty little French grisette”—a working-class girl, beneath even Dr. John’s professional but lamentably unaristocratic station in life. Lucy gets caught up in these romantic intrigues, and she soon learns that Mademoiselle Muton is not the object of Dr. John’s affections; Ginevra Fanshaw is, and he is her less-than-respected “Isidore.”

    Before giving an account of this discovery, Lucy remarks on another regime difference between herself and the Labassecourians. They worry about her Protestantism, and she is less than impressed with their Catholicism. “One night a thunder-storm broke; a sort of hurricane shook us in our beds; the Catholics rose in panic and prayed to their saints. As for me, the tempest took hold of me with tyranny: I was roughly roused and obliged to live.” There could hardly be a terser description of the contrast between French and English characters. And beyond this, the school, once a convent, comes with its own “ghost story,” a “vague tale” about a nun of “the drear middle ages” who had been “buried alive, for some sin against her vow.” Lucy considers it all “romantic rubbish,” another instance of Catholic superstition. Catholicism pervades the regime of the school, “a strange, frolicsome, noisy little world,” where “great pains were taken to hide chains with flowers”—exactly the observation Rousseau makes about civil society generally, but which Lucy rather thinks more descriptive of Catholic society especially. “A subtle Romanism pervaded every arrangement: large sensual indulgence (so to speak) was permitted by way of counterpoise to jealous spiritual restrain. Each mind was being reared in slavery; but, to prevent reflection from dwelling on this fact, every pretext for physical recreation was seized and made the most of. There, as elsewhere, the CHURCH strove to bring up her children robust in body, feeble in soul, fat, ruddy, hale, joyous, ignorant, unthinking, unquestioning”—as much as saying, “Look after your bodies; leave your souls to me.” “A bargain in which every true Catholic deems himself a gainer,” Lucy ripostes; “Lucifer just offers the same terms.”

    To confirm the point of this harangue, Lucy offers the spectacle of the annual fête in honor of Mme. Beck, the highlight of which is to be a play directed by M. Paul Emanuel, the “pungent and austere” professor of literature, a man of harsh, “irritable nature.” He lowers himself to beg Lucy for help when one of the girls takes ill a few hours before the play is to go on; “I apply to an Englishwoman to rescue me,” he says through gritted teeth, half to her and half to himself. Playing the role of a foppish man courting a silly flirt in the person of the typecast Miss Fanshawe, she notices that the girl is making eyes at Dr. John, who is in the audience. This goads Lucy to imitate what she sees to be his longing, “rival[ing] and out-rival[ing] him” for attention. “I acted as if wishful and resolute to win and conquer.” Although taking the part “to please another,” she finally “acted to please myself.” Upon reflection, and with a bow to a lesson taught by Jane Austen in Mansfield Park, “I quite disapproved of these amateur performances.” In this instance it revealed “a keen relish for dramatic expression” in her nature, which “would not do for a mere looker-on at life; the strength and longing must be put by; and I put them by, and fastened them in with the lock of a resolution which neither Time nor Temptation has since picked.” À bas….

    At the ball following the play, Ginevra’s flirtations are interrupted by jealous Madame, who, “like a little Bonaparte,” drags Dr. John away from her and to the invited parents. The girl takes out her frustration on Lucy, explaining at some length how much better-born, wealthier, accomplished, prettier, desired, and happier she is, compared to her loveless, unloved teacher. The suggestion that she is vain rolls off, but she does reveal what Lucy wants her to confirm, that Dr. John is the same as ‘Isidore.’ In conversation with the hapless physician, she learns that he imagines her “a simple, innocent, girlish fairy,” indeed a “graceful angel.” She mocks him by praising his rival, Colonel de Hamal (whom she called a monkey to Miss Fanshawe) as a “sweet seraph,” then leaves him to her illusions.

    The school’s next major event is public examination day, two months after the fête. Once again, “the fiery and grasping little man” Paul Emanuel takes charge, and once again needs the Englishwoman to conduct the English exam, the one topic he “could not manage.” She softens his ire when she offers to give no examination on that topic at all. “A constant crusade against the ‘amour-propre’ of every human being, but himself, was the crotchet of this able, but fiery and grasping, little man”; in this, he bears some resemblance to Rousseau. Does he begin to love this English Sophie?

    September vacation arrives, and a nightmare about her dead family, “who had loved me well in life” but now “met me elsewhere, alienated,” galls her “inmost spirit with an unutterable sense of despair about the future”; “quite unendurable was the pitiless and haughty voice in which Death challenged me to engage his unknown terrors,” terrors she has “suffered with a troubled mind” from the time of her youth. Severed from the love of her family members in this life, perhaps frightened that her current life might meet with their disapproval, and therefore rejection, severance from love in the afterlife, and without any known prospects for love in the future (given Graham’s distraction by Ginevra), in desperation she enters a Catholic Church and its confessional. She disrupts the priest’s routine by confessing, “Mon père, je suis Protestante.” He asks her to come not to the church but to his house, tomorrow, a proposal she would have as soon done as to walk “into a Babylonish furnace.” Why? “That priest had arms which could influence me; he was naturally kind with a sentimental French kindness, to whose softness I knew myself not wholly impervious.” Had she acceded to his invitation, “I might just now, instead of writing this heretic narrative, be counting my beads in the cell of a certain Carmelite convent on the Boulevard of Crecy in Villette.” It was enough that the priest “was kind when I needed kindness; he did me good.”

    On the way back to her room she faints. A watchful person, whom she later guesses was the priest, delivers her to Dr. John’s house. She now tells her readers that Dr. John is in fact Graham Bretton, who has followed in his father’s professional footsteps. He still lives with his mother. After more than a week of bed rest she comes down to the sitting room. “How pleasant it was in its air of perfect domestic comfort!” And “to render the picture perfect, tea stood ready on the table—an English tea, whereof the whole shining service glanced at me familiarly,” not only because it is in the English style but because it is the service she remembers from the Bretton’s home in England. One might say that her recovery from an excess of Frenchness requires a dose of Englishness, perhaps a greater contribution to her recovery than Dr. John’s medical care. That night, “When I said my prayers, and when I was undressed and laid down, I felt that I still had friends.” Characteristically, she calls upon “Reason” to moderate her “importunate gratitude” for having recovered them. And she defends her self-rule. “These struggles with the natural character, the strong native bent of the heart, may seem futile and fruitless, but in the end they do good,” making “the general tenor of life… to be better regulated, more equable, quieter on the surface; and it is on the surface only the common gaze will fall. As to what lies below, leave that with God.” A regime like Mme. Beck’s, a regime like that of France, may surveil; show God “the secrets of the spirit He gave” and “ask Him how you are to bear the pains He has appointed,” for “patience in extreme need.” God’s time isn’t human time: “The cycle of one departure and return may clasp unnumbered generations; and departure and return may clasp unnumbered generations; and dust, kindling to brief suffering life, and, through pain, passing back to dust, may meanwhile perish out of memory again, and yet again.” This is indeed a Protestant answer both to ‘Hobbesian’ fear of death and the response to it fashioned in Catholic Church ritual.

    Dr. John persists in his illusions about Miss Fanshawe until he, his mother, and Lucy encounter her at a concert, accompanied by another young lady aristocrat. When Ginevra snubs both the doctor and his mother, he draws the line. “I never saw her ridiculed before.” He confides to Lucy, “As [Ginevra] passed me tonight, triumphant, in beauty, my emotions did her homage; but for one luckless sneer, I should yet be the humblest of her servants”; “she could not in ten years have done what, in a moment, she has done through my mother.” How does my mother seem to you? he asks Lucy. “As she always does—an English, middle-class gentlewoman; well, though gravely dressed, habitually independent of pretense, constitutionally composed and cheerful.” Exactly so, Dr. John agrees: “The merry may laugh with mamma, but the weak only will laugh at her; she shall not be ridiculed with my consent at least, nor without my—my scorn—my antipathy.” And that is that.

    But this doesn’t mean that Dr. John turn his attentions to her. School re-starts; Graham promises to write. But “Reason” forbids her to reveal her feelings for him, to him. “This hag, this Reason, would not let me look up, or smile, or hope: she could not rest unless I were altogether crushed, cowed, broken-in, and broken-down.” For me, Reason “was always as envenomed as a step-mother.” “If I have obeyed her it has been chiefly with the obedience of fear, not of love”; Lucy is no philosopher. “Long ago I should have died of her ill-usage, her stint, her chill, her barren board, her icy bed, her savage, ceaseless blows, but for that Kinder Power who hold my secret and sworn allegiance,” “a spirit softer and better than human Reason.” It is in that kind of love, agapic love, that “divine, compassionate, succourable influence” that she finds solace for the lovelessness she has found in the world. In the event, Dr. John does write, and Lucy discerns that his “blithe genial language” was intended “not merely to content me” but also “to gratify himself.” The fact that he writes her because he wants to gives Lucy a moment that “had no pain, no blot, no want; full, pure, perfect, it deeply blessed me,” and she will forgive him for turning from her once again “for the sake of that one dear remembered good!” 

    While reading the letter, a figure resembling the ghostly nun appears to her. In their next conversation, Dr. John will explain it away as an illusion “resulting from long-continued mental conflict.” When he prescribes happiness as the cure and a “cheerful mind” as the preventive,” Lucy quite rightly rejoins that “happiness is not a potato, to be planted in mold and tilled with manure,” but a blessing. In effect taking that rebuke to heart, at least in part, he invites to his home every week, “to keep away the nun,” as he puts it with his characteristic kind jocularity. “He regarded me scientifically in the light of a patient, and at once exercised his professional skill, and gratified his natural benevolence, by a course of cordial and attentive treatment.” It is a response unlikely to satisfy a woman. He is not unthoughtful. On the contrary, “Dr. John could think, and think well, but he was rather a man of action than of thought; he could feel, and feel vividly in his way, but his heart had no chord for enthusiasm: to bright, soft, sweet influences his eyes and lips gave bright, soft, sweet welcome, beautiful to see as dyes of rose and silver, pearl and purple, imbuing summer clouds.” But as for the other half of Burke’s dichotomy, the sublime as distinguished from the beautiful, “what belonged to storm, what was wild and intense, dangerous, sudden and flaming,” for that “he had no sympathy, and held with it no communion.” This “cool young Briton” looked down on the sublime as “the pale cliffs of his own England” look down on the tides of the Channel. It is Lucy, for all her superficial coldness, who responds to the sublime, to the Biblical more than to the classical. In this she is closer to Dostoevsky than to Jane Austen, despite her Englishness. Unlike Austen or Austen’s heroines, unlike Dr. John, for her Reason is a heavy bridle, a yoke, a burden only assuaged by the divine, agapic love which, regardless of the comfort it offers, issues from the supremely sublime God of the Bible.

    A man of moderation, a ‘classical’ man, Dr. John can act decisively in response to the sublime when it appears, quite literally sudden and flaming. A fire breaks out in the theater: “Reader, I can see him yet, with his look of comely courage and cordial calm” while most of the crowd panicked and began to stampede. He sees one woman “braver than some men”; he helps her guardian rescue her from being trampled by terrified crowd. The girl turns out to be a Miss Bassompierre, formerly known as Paulina Home; her father recently inherited the estate of his late mother, a French aristocrat, along with the aristocratic ‘de’ that comes with the family fortune. Miss Fanshawe is quite beside herself with jealousy, inasmuch as Dr. John and his mother strike up a social connection with father and daughter, in the aftermath of the emergency. As Paulina tells Lucy, the Graham she knew at Bretton was smaller and wasn’t yet shaving, “yet he is Graham, just as I am little Polly, or you are Lucy Snowe.” This sense of the continuity of individual identity over time exactly fits Lucy’s mindset: “I thought the same,” namely, that “the child of seven was in the girl of seventeen,” “but I wondered to find my thoughts hers: there are certain things in which we so rarely met with our double that it seems a miracle when that chance befalls.” Paulina is indeed her double in another sense, as she will soon take the place at Dr. John’s side that Lucy had wished for herself. Lucy watches as their intimacy in conversation grows: “There are certain natures of which the mutual influence is such that the more they say the more they have to say. For these, out of association grows adhesion, and out of adhesion, amalgamation.” There is of course nothing for her to do, and she returns to the school. “Though stoical, I was not quite a stoic; drops streamed fast on my hands, on my desk I wept one sultry shower, heavy and brief. But soon I said to myself, The Hope I am bemoaning suffered and made me suffer much: it did not die till it was full time: following an agony so lingering, death ought to be welcome. Welcome I endeavored to make it. Indeed, long pain had made patience a habit.” She puts Dr. John’s letters away, in a hole in an old pear tree on the school grounds. “I was not only going to hide a treasure” (Mme. Beck has been reading them, and showing them to M. Emanuel); “I meant to bury a grief. If lie be a war, it seemed my destiny to conduct it single-handed.” 

    She continues her friendship with Paulina, who has been pestered by jealous cousin Ginevra, who brags about her admirers and denigrates Dr. John while claiming to have him as her admirer. “She is insolent; and I believe, false,” Paulina tells her. Lucy knows this to be true, but they agree to test his feelings at a dinner party.

    Meanwhile, Ginevra’s falseness stems from her inability to see the difference between nature and convention. “Who are you, Miss Snowe?” she asks, not understanding how a woman who was first hired as a nursery-governess now enjoys the respect of Mme. Beck and the company of the young Countess de Bassompierre. She means “who” in the sense of social status; “her incapacity to conceive how any person not bolstered up by birth or wealth, not supported by some consciousness of name or connection, could maintain an attitude of reasonable integrity.” There is some sense in this, “the world’s wisdom,” as “an accumulation of small defenses” in the form of conventional respectability can serve as a “safeguard from debasement”; human beings are social animals, after all. Ginevra’s error consists in taking this too far, in overlooking the natural character of both the sanguine Dr. John and self-reflective, often melancholy Lucy. The courtship between Dr. John and Paulina proceeds, quite apart from Miss Fanshawe’s verbal sniping when, at the party, he approaches Paulina, not Ginevra. (Ginevra will recover from her disappointment, soon enough; later on, she will elope with Colonel de Hamal, shallow calling to shallow.)

    There is another courtship going on, an unexpected one between Lucy and Paul Emanuel. As both these souls tend toward the sublime, not the beautiful, this one cannot go smoothly: “Never was a better little man, in some points, then M. Paul: never in others, a more waspish little despot,” by turns Corneille and Napoleon. Gradually, even torturously, he gains in her esteem. At a holiday ceremony at the local college she listens as he gives the featured speech. “The collegians he addressed, not as school-boys, but as future citizens and embryo patriots. With all his fire he was severe and sensible: he trampled Utopian theories under his heel; he rejected wild reams with scorn—but, when he looked in the face of tyranny—oh, then there opened a light in his eye worth seeing; and when he spoke of injustice, his voice gave no uncertain sound, but reminded me rather of the band-trumpet, ringing at twilight from the park.” Not all, “but some of the college youth caught fire”—that image of the sublime—as “he eloquently told them what should be their path and endeavor in their country’s and in Europe’s future.” In a later conversation, he tells her he wishes her to be “mon ami.” Here again, the difference between France and England appears. She agrees to call him “my friend,” a word with a less intimate connotation than the French “ami.” He doesn’t know that, and he rewards her with a previously unexampled “smile of pleasure, or content, or kindness.” His “visage changed as from a mask to a face.” Diplomatic relations have been established, indeed a human one. He will continue to call her “une Anglaise terrible,” but in a more playful manner than before. They begin to know and understand one another, although not without what increasingly look like lover’s quarrels. Whereas the courtship of Dr. John and Paulina proceeds beautifully, by proper stages, the sublime courtship of M. Paul and Lucy begins, proceeds, and culminates in storm.

    For example, the time for M. Paul’s annual fête arrives, the counterpart of the one for Mme. Beck. Almost predictably, Monsieur will deliver the keynote address on his own day of honor. From the podium, baits her, and plays to the crowd, with an attack on “les Anglaises”—their “minds, morals, manners, [and] personal appearance,” and more specifically “their tall stature, their long necks, their thin arms, their slovenly dress, their pedantic education, their impious skepticism”—quite the charge, Miss Snowe evidently thinks, coming from a countryman of Voltaire—their “insufferable pride, their pretentious virtue.” “For some time the abuse of England and the English found and left me stolid.” But after fifteen minutes or so “this hissing cockatrice” began to abuse “not only our women, but our greatest names and best men; sullying the shield of Britannia, and dabbling the union-jack in mud.” All to the amusement of the girls, “for it is curious to discover how these clowns of Labassecour secretly hate England.” Out of patience, she matches his French patriotism with her English, in French: “Vive l’Angleterre, l’Histoire et les Héros! À bas la France, la Fiction et les Faquins!” Against French myths and indeed lies, English history; against French scoundrels, English heroes. Having achieved his purpose of drawing her out, he rewards her with a smirk, infuriating her still further. But back in her room, her rage subsided, she “smiled at the whole scene.” Things are getting to the point where she can’t stay angry with him for long. “I was losing the early impulse to recoil from M. Paul,” and as for himself, he later meets her in a manner “both indulgent and good-natured.” True, “he had points of resemblance to Napoleon Bonaparte,” with his “shameless disregard of magnanimity”; “he would have exiled fifty Madame de Staëls, if they had annoyed, offended, outrivaled, or opposed him,” but Lucy has begun to learn how to negotiate the sharp rocks of his shoreline, without quite being able to overcome his imperial libido dominandi. She does not yet clearly see that M. Paul, a master classroom teacher, delights in testing, in this case testing her loyalty to her country. (And not without reason: How much can one trust a person who despises his own country?) She has passed. 

    Lucy is about to discover what drives this odd little man. This becomes possible because she has more the temperament of a research professor than that of a teacher. (As for M. Paul, he “was not a man to write books.”) Alone in the garden of the school, she begins her discoveries with introspection, a quest for self-knowledge few of the other persons she has encountered trouble themselves to undertake. “Courage, Lucy Snowe!” she tells herself. “With self-denial and economy now, and steady exertion by-and-by, an object in life need not fail you.” For now, “labor for independence until you have proved, by winning that prize, your right to look higher.” For now, an émigré among unfriendly foreigners, “is there nothing more for me in life—no true home—nothing to be dearer to me than myself? Nothing, at whose feet I can willingly lay down the whole burden of human egotism, and gloriously take up the nobler charge of laboring and living for others?” Perhaps not: “for you the crescent-phase must suffice,” and so it is with “a huge mass of my fellow creatures in no better circumstances,” and “I find no reason why I should be of the few favored.” Since “this life is not all, neither the beginning nor the end,” I shall continue “to believe while I tremble” and “trust while I weep.” And she concludes with a blessing: “Good-night, Dr. John; you are good, you are beautiful; but you are not mine. Good-night, and God bless you!”

    Enter M. Paul, who interrupts her musings. He explains that, like Mme. Beck, he has been surveilling her, along with everyone else in the school, for months, from his apartment window with the aid of a looking-glass. “My book is this garden; its contents are human nature—female human nature.” He dismisses her objections to his spying as mere Protestantism, remarking that his tutor was a Jesuit, who would make no objection at all to what Lucy calls his “discoveries made by stealth.” He tells her he never once would “trouble my head about my dignity,” being a more modest man that she has supposed. In his observations, he too has seen the apparition of the nun, and together, that night, they see it again.

    Whatever his methods of discovery, his discoveries favor her. A few weeks later, at a school picnic in the country where he leads the group in prayer, he allows that the two of them “worship the same God, in the same spirit, though by different rites.” This is something, not only a gesture of religious toleration but a self-revelation, and Lucy appreciates what he’s revealed. “Most of M. Emanuel’s brother professors were emancipated free-thinkers, infidels, atheists; and many of them men whose lives would not bear scrutiny: he was more like a knight of old, religious in his way, and of spotless fame,” his “vivid passions” and “keen feelings” kept in check, for the most part, by “his pure honor and his artless piety.” They read Corneille together, and he found in it “beauties I never could be brought to perceive”—the beauties of French neo-classicism, of Christianity and Aristotelianism combined. Be that as it may, she begins to perceive the beauties of Corneille in him.

    He continues to test her. If you were my sister, would you “always be content to stay with a brother” such as I? Yes, she answers. But would she would remember him if he voyaged overseas? “Monsieur, how could I live in the interval?” she answers, with a touch of defensive ambiguity, leaving her sincerity open to affirmation or to doubt. “Pourtant j’ai été pour vous bien dur, bien exigeant”—yet I was for you very hard, very demanding. She hides her face behind the volume of noble Corneille, as tears cover her face. She has passed his love-test, and for the rest of the day he treats her with a gentleness that “went somehow to my heart.” Still on guard, she “would rather he had been abrupt, whimsical, and irate as was his wont.” She doesn’t like being vulnerable, a disposition her experiences have engrained in her.

    She does well to be on guard. On an errand into town for Mme. Beck, she begins to see the design behind all the surveillance, the truth of M. Paul. She learns that Mme. Beck and M. Paul both know the priest, Père Silas, the one to whom she had confessed and who had delivered her to Dr. John on the night of her breakdown. She learns from the priest that M. Paul, his former student, had been engaged to a young woman, Justine Marie. The match was opposed by her grandmother “with all the violence of a temper which deformity”—she is a hunchback—made “sometimes demoniac.” Marie broke the engagement, went into a convent, and died there; since then, M. Paul has supported Marie’s widowed mother and the vile grandmother, taking on (in Père Silas’s words) “their insolent pride the revenge of the purest charity.” [1] Indeed, he also keeps his old tutor in the household, as well. “By this arrangement he has rendered it impossible to himself ever to marry”; he can’t afford it. Père Silas is mostly telling her the truth, but the Jesuit is telling her the truth with a plan in mind, she sees: He continues to want to bring her into the Church. As he soon admits, “I envy Heresy her prey.” She will resist the plot, but she now sees that, for all his theatrics, which made M. Paul “seem to me to lack magnanimity in trifles, yet how great he is in great things!” Not only that, the priest confides, given his continued to devotion to the memory of Marie, “the essence of Emanuel’s nature is—constancy.” That is what he was testing in her, whether it was constancy to the teaching vocation, constancy to her country or constancy to him. “He had become my Christian hero, under that character I wanted to view him.”

    But heroes may not be available for marriage. Three questions “were at once the deepest puzzle, the strongest obstruction, and the keenest stimulus, I had ever felt.” Was the ghost of his dead fiancée “an eternal barrier” to marriage, for M. Paul? “And what of the charities which absorbed his worldly goods”—that is, could he support a wife in addition to his fiancée’s remaining family? And “what of his heart, sworn to virginity?” She reduces these three questions to two, presumably the first and the third, since Lucy can and does support herself (although perhaps jealous, disappointed Mme. Beck might have something to say about that). And so she turns the tables and tests him. For starters, exactly where do you live, M. Paul? He admits that his study at the school is his home, and he keeps no servants beyond his own hands. “I pass days laborious and loveless; nights long and lonely; I am ferocious, and bearded, and monkish; and nothing now living in this world loves me, except some old hearts worn like my own, and some few beings, impoverished, suffering poor in purse and in spirit, whom the kingdoms of this world own not, but to whom an dwell and testament, not to be disputed, has bequeathed the kingdom of heaven.” At this, she tells him the results of her own research, based partly on her own surveillance but mostly on the testimony of the priest. After overcoming his surprise, he wants to know, given this knowledge, can you be my ami, or in English “a close friend,” “intimate and real,” “a sister”? She hesitates, and so he invites her to continue her research, to test him further. Meanwhile, he has another test question for her. Recalling the figure of the nun they saw in the school garden, he asks, “You did not, nor will you fancy, that a saint in Heaven perturbs herself with rivalries of earth? Protestants are rarely superstitious; these morbid fancies will not beset you?” On the contrary, she answers: “I know not what to think of this matter; but I believe a perfectly natural solution of this seeming mystery will one day be arrived at.” He has answered the first question, along with the second. And her expectation will be confirmed a short time later, when she learns from a letter from Ginevra that the nun apparition was none other than Colonel de Hamal in disguise, on one of many visits to his lover at the school.

    Then there is one last religious test. He leaves a religious tract in her desk at school, written by Père Silas. “He that had written it was no bad man, and while perpetually betraying the trained cunning—the cloven hoof of his [Jesuit] system—I should pause before accusing himself of sincerity.” She surmises that M. Paul placed the tract with her in order to satisfy the importunities of his friends, worried over his “fraternal communion with a heretic.” When he asks her about it, she ventures, “I thought it made me a little sleepy.” After he leaves, she overhears him praying to the Virgin Mary for her salvation in the Church. “Strange! I had no such feverish wish to turn him from the faith of his fathers. I thought Romanism wrong, a great mixed image of gold and clay; but it seemed to me that this Romanist held the purer elements of his creed with an innocency of heart which God must love.” She considers Romanism defective because its priests are “mitered aspirants for this world’s kingdoms,” without sufficient longing for the kingdom of the next world. “There is a Mercy beyond human compassions, a Love stronger than this strong death which even you [priests] must face, and before it, fall: a charity more potent than any sin, even yours; a Pity which redeems world’s—nay, absolves Priests.” As she tells M. Paul, “the more I saw of Popery the closer I clung to Protestantism”; Protestants keep “fewer forms between us and God; retaining, indeed, no more than, perhaps, the nature of mankind in the mass rendered necessary for due observance.” Given that nature, Protestants eschew confession to priests and go directly to God, praying the Sinner’s Prayer, “God be merciful to me, a sinner.” With this, she has met his final test of constancy, her constancy to Protestantism. “‘Whatever say priest or controversialists,’ murmured M. Emanuel, ‘God is good, and loves all the sincere”; as a Catholic, he too prays the Sinner’s Prayer. “It may be that the constancy of one heart, the truth and faith of one mind according to the light He has appointed, import as much to Him as the just motion of satellites around their planets, of planets about their suns, of suns around that mighty unseen center, incomprehensible, irrealizable, with strange mental effort only divined.” And so “God guide us all! God bless you, Lucy!” It is a blessing parallel to the one Lucy whispered to her mental image of Dr. John, just before M. Paul’s crucial intervention. Whether he knows it or not, M. Paul has enunciated the terms of the English religious settlement, the Anglican Church establishment of course abstracted. France and England have reached an Entente Cordiale. Later on, Lucy will reflect, “All Rome could not put into him bigotry, nor the Propaganda itself make him a real Jesuit. He was born honest, and not false—artless, and not cunning—a freeman, and not a slave.” A real French republican who remains faithful to French Catholicism in a spirit of true catholicity can treat with an equally free, unslavish English Protestant.

    For Lucy, however, there will be no entente with life in this world. She has a presentiment of that as she watches the happy continuation of Dr. John’s courtship of Paulina. They are among “Nature’s elect,” as distinguished from God’s; “often, these are not pampered, selfish beings” but “harmonious and benign” souls, “men and women with charity, kind agents of God’s kind attributes. Dr. John “was born victor, as some are born vanquished”—including Lucy Snowe. She confirms this, once again, as M. Paul undertakes to do what he had hinted at doing—proceed to leave Europe and take care of an estate at Basseterre (literally, ‘low earth’), Guadeloupe, owned by the old grandmother and in need of looking-after “by a competent agent of integrity” so that it may produce a decent stream of income. M. Paul is such an agent, and the woman has offered him a deal: Do this for two or three and “after that, he should live for himself,” since she and her daughter, a reliable income assured, then will no longer need his financial assistance. Père Silas is happy, as his former student now “runs risk of apostacy” with his Protestant ami; Mme. Beck is happy to destroy (as she hopes) that friendship, even if she no longer can hope to make M. Paul her own. The self-interest of each of M. Paul’s associates will be satisfied.

    She must endure one more test, this unintended. M. Paul delays his departure for a few days, and Lucy happens upon him, along with those he supports. One of these is an attractive young woman, his ward. Their obvious affection for one another alarms her; unseen by his party, she retreats to her room in despair. Fortunately visits her at the school, just before departing. Having been surrounded by women rivals more physically attractive than herself—Ginevra, Paulina, even (as she has mistakenly supposed) his ward—she needs one last, crucial, reassurance: “Do I displease your eyes much?” His “short, strong answer” gave her to know “what I was for him,” and “what I might be for the rest of the world, I ceased painfully to care.” More, and unexpectedly, he has provided for her in his absence, setting her up with a school-room attached to an apartment, so that she can have her own students and get away from the surveilling and by unbenignant eye of Mme. Beck. Do the others know this? she asks. “‘Mon ami,’ said he, ‘none knows what I have done save you and myself: the pleasure is consecrated to us two, unshared and unprofaned.'” When she confesses her doubts of him, respecting his intentions toward his young ward, “he gathered me near his heart. I was full of faults; he took them and me all home.” Any Christian will recognize in this an imitatio Christi. But this savior is wholly a man, one who now proposes marriage.

    The three years ensuing “were the happiest of my life.” This implies that there will be no happy marriage, and there is none. A seven-day but destructive, anti-creative Atlantic storm takes his boat down on the return voyage. “Here pause,” Lucy tells herself. “There is enough said.” She will not share this last agony with her readers. M. Paul’s work for the others completed, “Madame Beck prospered all the days of her life; so did Père Silas.” The grandmother lived to be ninety. All profited from his stewardship of the estate. Lucy’s legacy is the story itself, her Christian testimony. 

    That testimony is the core of Charlotte Brontë’s novel. Dr. John and Paulina are beautiful, blessed by nature and by nature’s God for lives lived harmoniously, pictures of the classical virtues. Lucy and M. Paul are sublime, persons who will never ‘fit in’ with nature, with ‘this world.’ God harrows them for the next world, for His world, providentially. Human beings imitate divine providence by exercising surveillance. Unlike God, they cannot see all; unlike God, they cannot understand all they see; unlike God, they lack the power to do everything they want, and they lack the perfect justice to want everything they should. True, some are better than others. The innocent and justifiable inquiries of Lucy, and even the secretive surveillance of M. Paul, serve just and even loving purposes. The surveillance of Mme. Beck and of the French Catholic Church in the person of Père Silas, not so much. M. Paul is an apparent Bonaparte; Mme. Beck is a real one, if on a decidedly smaller scale. Lucy fights a war of Napoleonic proportions in her soul, and her victory consists partly of the rule of natural reason over her heart but most essentially of the attunement of her heart to the love of God.

    Surveillance aims at ruling; it is a technique of ruling. In the civil-social regime of the French, “sensual indulgence” is allowed, so long as it remains subordinate to the Catholic Church and (often) a monarchic regime. The French may care for their own bodies so long as they leave their souls to their rulers, who rule their souls as much as human beings can do, by keeping a close watch on actions. The French are equal, under monarchy both religious and civil. English civil society is aristocratic—foolishly so, when embodied by a Ginevra Fanshawe, more seriously when embodied by a John Graham Bretton, a bourgeois professional man who marries into a newly-aristocratic family. The virtues of the current and future rulers of England will be found in such as he, and his bride. In Lucy, the English regime shows a soul that will never enter the ruling class but will form its civil-social foundation. Lucy sternly imposes reason on her conduct. This leaves her soul, the part of her no human can directly see, to God’s love, not to the human-all-too-human rule of the Church. An onlooker in life, a ‘loser’ not a ruler, disciplined by reason but rewarded by agapic love, Lucy is providentially directed to pin her hopes on the next life, the Kingdom of God. This is indispensable to the welfare of the English regime and the people its ruling class rules. The majority of people in any regime will not live humanly fulfilled lives. Their charity, their kindness, their ‘other-worldliness’ gives them, and their country, a way of life worth defending. Vive l’Angleterre, l’Histoire et les Héroes, indeed, Charlotte Brontë gives her heroine to say, on the way to this final settlement of the Napoleonic Wars. 

     

    Note

    1. As M. Paul’s apostolic namesake puts it in Romans 12:20, “If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink: for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head.” The Apostle Paul is quoting Proverbs 25: 21-23.

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    How to Read Tocqueville’s “The Old Regime and the Revolution”

    September 18, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Alexis de Tocqueville: L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution. Paris: Éditions AOJB, n.d.

    Alexis de Tocqueville: The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Arthur Goldhammer translation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

     

     

    In each of his major books, Tocqueville presents his reader with a mass of carefully observed detail and carefully researched information. One might easily be overwhelmed, lost in these forests of fact-trees. Complicating matters further, Tocqueville’s literary style conveys nuance of judgment, subtlety, even a certain reserve. Like his admired Montesquieu, he wants not only to make you read; he wants to make you think. Tocqueville understands the risks to which he exposes his reader, and always works to minimize them when he introduces his book to him. And so, at the beginning of Democracy in America, he carefully points out that the title is exact; this is a book about democracy, not about America. He takes America as the “sample democracy,” the best example of a civil society no longer ruled by persons who claim to be ‘born to rule’ the mass of men who lack such title. Democracy means civil-social equality; the regime that rules such a society may be republican, as in America, or despotic, as in France under Napoleon. But in either case the society is egalitarian, and America exemplifies democracy, in that sense of the term. Those who ignore Tocqueville’s guidance characteristically complain that there’s not enough in the Democracy about natural rights, that he never mentions the Declaration of Independence, and so on. But he isn’t writing about America, fundamentally, at all. As he tells you, if you read his introduction.

    For the same reason, the Foreword to The Old Regime and the Revolution offers indispensable guidance to understanding a shorter but in some respects more complex book, a book written by a Frenchman about France, primarily if far from exclusively for the French. For such a task, discretion is de rigeur. Tocqueville must provide his fellow-citizens with exactly the right point of entry.

    He tells them what his book is, in three ways. He identifies its genre; he states its purpose; and he formulates its problématique—both the problem it addresses and the solution it offers. An important part of the solution is to bring the reader to understand that there is no permanent solution to the problem of politics, and why that is a good thing. 

    What his book is, I. Respecting the genre of his book, Tocqueville says it isn’t a history of the French Revolution but a “study” of it. This recalls his call in the Democracy for “a new political science for a world altogether new,” a civil-socially democratized world. “Democracy” or civil-social equality causes things to happen, and is itself a cause; a study in political science begins with a search for the causes of political things.

    The causes of the French Revolution are difficult to find. In 1789, he recalls, the French attempted to sever their past from their future. “Unbeknownst to themselves,” they failed, but they did succeed in obscuring the causes of the revolution by that attempted severance. As a “study” of the revolution, his book aims at removing this ignorance and replacing it with knowledge—a more sober ‘enlightenment,’ as it were, than the original one, which contributed so much to the ill-judged ambition of historical severance, in the effort to sweep away all that was old in the old regime and to make the world anew. The most radical of the revolutionaries eventually produced a new regime and a new civil Society. However, the sentiments, habits, and ides that constituted this new civil society were materials gleaned, unintentionally, from the debris of the old civil society of the old regime. In considering the laws, the customs, and the spirit “of the government and the nation” under the old regime, Tocqueville will show how its institutions actually worked, how the social classes related to one another, the conditions and feelings of “unseen” elements of the population, and the true basis of French opinions and customs. The primary sources for his inquiry are the cahiers de doléances, the ‘grievance books’ wherein the complaints of the French people were collected by government officials of the old regime. In undertaking this study, “Everywhere I found the roots of today’s society firmly implanted in this old soil.”

    What his book is, II. The purpose of the book is to show why this “great Revolution” erupted in France, not elsewhere in Europe, where it was also “in gestation.” Further, why did the revolution “emerg[e] fully formed from the society that it was to destroy”? And how could the old monarchy have fallen so suddenly and completely? 

    What his book is, III. Tocqueville does not intend his study to be merely descriptive. The revolution had causes, including its purposes, but so does his book. He intends to identify a problem and to solve it. The book’s  ‘problématique‘ consists of the contradiction between the revolutionaries’ original intent—to destroy privileges but also to “recognize and consecrate rights,” an intent animated both “the love of equality and that of liberty”—and its result—a nation whose “single wish” was “to become equal servants of the master of the world,” Napoleon, who offered them equality without liberty. That is, the French went from monarchy to republicanism back to monarchy, now a monarchy tricked out with false popular sovereignty expressed by fraudulent votes. The goal of Tocqueville’s consideration of this problem is “a portrait that would be not only strictly accurate but also perhaps educational”—indeed, civic-educational. He will call attention to the “manly virtue” seen in the republicans who revolutionized the old regime, “a true spirit of independence, a yearning for greatness” animated by French faith in themselves. A serious consequence of the revolution, however, was to weaken that spirit and that yearning. Under Napoleon, France became bigger, temporarily, but the French became smaller, and have stayed that way. Can the French make France great, again? Tocqueville would inspire them to try, even as Charles de Gaulle would do, a century later. 

    The principal impediment to the restoration of French greatness is “narrow individualism,” that tool of despotism which inclines men to stop being citizens, to devote themselves exclusively to enriching themselves and so to “divert attention from public affairs.” However unjust, the castes, the classes, the guilds, and the families of the old regime taught civic virtue by placing every French man and woman within civic associations that required them to think beyond themselves. Tocqueville does not imagine that the French of the old regime, of any regime anywhere, will not feel all the passions connected with self-interest. But only despotism “furnishes the secrecy and the shadow which allow cupidity to thrive and permits one to amass dishonest profit in defiance of dishonor.” “Without despotism these [debilitating passions] would be strong; with it they rule.” 

    The civic education Tocqueville offers his readers teaches that only political liberty can counteract narrow individualism, by what he calls in the Democracy the art of association, and also by a sense of, and pride in, the nation, patriotism. Political liberty educates and elevates what Plato’s Socrates identifies as the three parts of the human soul. Political liberty brings citizens to substitute higher passions for the love of material comfort; it thereby moderates the bodily desires. Political liberty supplies ambition with higher goals than those of mere ‘captains of industry’; it thereby directs thumos, the spirited part of the soul, toward the common good. And only political liberty “can create the light by which it is possible to see and judge the vices and virtues of mankind.” By this he means that you can see people clearly, see them for what they are, only if they are free to speak and to act in public hearing and in public view. Political liberty benefits logos, the reasoning part of the soul, allowing it to take its bearings in its inquiries into human nature and sharpening its dialectical powers in public debate.

    By strengthening all three parts of the human soul, political liberty alone can form the great citizens who comprise a great people. Despotism can have good private citizens and even good Christians, inasmuch as Christians amass their treasure not in this world but in heaven. But “the common level” of minds and hearts will steadily diminish so long as civil-social equality and a regime of despotism remain conjoined. “I thought and said as much twenty years ago,” when he wrote Democracy in America.

    Proponents of despotism, Bonapartists then and now, share one thing with himself, Tocqueville astringently suggests. “What man is there, by nature, with soul so base as to prefer depending on the caprices of another man, the same as himself, instead of obeying laws which he himself contributed to establishing, if his nation seems to have the virtues necessary for making good use of liberty?” And indeed even “the despots themselves do not deny that liberty is excellent; only they want it solely for themselves, insisting that all the other are unworthy of it.” The difference lies not “in the opinion one ought to have of liberty,” but “in the greater or lesser estimation one makes of men.” Thus “it is rigorously accurate to say that the taste one shows for absolute government is in exact proportion to the contempt one professes for his country.” Tocqueville asks for more time before “converting myself to this sentiment” about France.

    The second and third sections of the study, Books II and III, address the purpose of the book as stated in the foreword: why the revolution occurred in France, not elsewhere (beginning in II.i, continued throughout); why it emerged fully formed from the old civil society (beginning in II.ii, also continued throughout; and why the monarchy collapsed so rapidly and completely (beginning in III.4, continuing to the end of the study). Linking the Foreword to those longer, main sections, Book I consists of five chapters which describe the key elements of the revolution, the causes of which he will identify and analyze in Books II and III.

    Book I’s first chapter shows why a genre other than a history, why a study founded on the new political science, is necessary. He describes the contradictory judgments of the revolution observers ventured at its inception; even in their confusion, all agreed that it was “extraordinary.” But a topical approach, an attempt to gather facts and even judge a complex course of events during or immediately after it takes place, will not only miss important facts unavailable to contemporary observers, it will usually lack an adequate analytical framework for understanding the facts, even when a larger collection of them has been assembled by the researcher. More, without such an analytical framework, the distinguishing feature of a “study” not a history, the task of selecting the relevant facts will be fatally handicapped. Even a man of Edmund Burke’s genius, Tocqueville will argue, didn’t quite ‘get it right,’ because he could not.

    In the second chapter Tocqueville links the genre of his book—a “study” aiming at determining the causes of the revolution—to the purposes of the revolution itself, the ends the revolutionaries pursued. Eliminated one of the causes of confusion about the revolution he had alluded to in the previous chapter, he denies that the fundamental purpose of the revolution was either to destroy religious authority or to weaken political authority. Although the revolutionaries were indeed in the grips of “irreligious passion,” this was “incidental.” The Enlightenment philosophes who gave the revolutionaries their ideas propounded “the natural equality of human beings”; this was the “substance” of the revolution. Its anti-religious passion therefore aimed at the inegalitarian institutions of the Church, its hierarchy, not at Christianity itself. Since then, Christianity has revived, precisely because democracy comports with it. As readers of the Democracy know, Tocqueville identifies Christianity as the first way in which the idea of human equality penetrated the opinions of the generality of men, beyond the coteries of philosophers. As for political authority, in the end the revolution didn’t issue in anarchy. On the contrary, it enhanced governmental centralization, “replac[ing] the aristocrats with functionaries,” with administrators drawn from the bourgeoisie.

    In the third, central chapter of Book I, Tocqueville shows how this religiosity and this statism combined. That is, having established that the revolution was not irreligious but religious in its own way, and having remarked its statist character, he shows how the revolutionaries combined these two features into the new French civil society and regime. The French revolution was a political revolution that proceeded in the manner of a religious revolution. Like the newer, universalist religions—Christianity and Islam—although the revolution began in France it finally had “no territory of its own”; it provided men with “a common intellectual fatherland.” He compares it to the Protestant Reformation, which also proceeded by preaching and propaganda. Unlike the ancient religions, described a few decades earlier by Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, universalist religions “are rooted in human nature”—in man as such. Indeed, there had been “no great religious revolution before Christianity” because all religions were local, tied to places, lands and temples held sacred by their adherents. The French Revolution did in this world what Christianity did for ‘the other world’ or ‘the next world,’ making it a place every soul yearned to be, a place for “the regeneration of the human race.” The “new kind of religion” proposed by the revolutionaries demanded the worldly equivalents of heavenly bliss and the terrors of hellfire. It is in view of the universalist ambition of this creed that Tocqueville titles his book L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, not L’Ancien Régime et la Revolution Française.

    The book’s purpose, as stated in the Foreword, is to explain why the Revolution occurred in France, not elsewhere.  Before the revolution, Tocqueville observes in I.iv., Europeans had the same ruling institutions, the institutions of feudalism, and they were now weak and listless, lacking vitality or spirit. Aristocracy suffered from “senile dementia”; political liberty had become “sterile.” A new “spirit of the times” prevailed, as feudalism lost its “grip on the hearts of the people.” Civil society remained vital, but not feudal institutions and laws. The modern state had drained these of their life, increasingly placing all its subjects into a condition not of feudal hierarchy but of equality before the law. The monarchic regime drew the aristocrats off the land and into Paris, the capital of the ever-centralizing French state, distracting them with frivolities while forging the administrative ligatures designed to rule the land and the people on it from that capital.

    The fifth and final chapter of Book I describes the “essential achievement” of the revolution. Here, Tocqueville points to the problématique, especially the solution the revolution proffered to France, Europe, indeed the world. As both “a social and political revolution,” its initial anarchy masked increased state power, a continuation of the Old Regime’s statist centralism not a rupture with it. The revolution did entail changes in “ideas, sentiments, habits, and mores,” turning them even further against from aristocratic civil society and feudal political institutions. Democracy in France revealed itself suddenly and dramatically, not piece-by-piece, as in England. In explaining why this was so, Tocqueville turns to the substantive, analytical portions of his study, beginning in Book II. 

    This leaves his reader with the task of working through his analysis of the causes of the revolution that began in France. In a letter to his friend M. de Corcelle, Tocqueville wrote, “I think that the books which have most roused men to reflection and have had the most influence upon their opinions and their actions, are those in which the author does not tell them dogmatically what they are to think, but puts them into the way of finding the truth for themselves.” This is as true for citizens as it is for philosophers. “I am convinced that the excellence of political societies does not depend upon their laws, but upon what they are prepared to become by the sentiments, principles, and opinions, the moral and intellectual qualities given by nature and education.” Tocqueville cannot change the nature of the French, the nature of human beings, or the nature of the modern man, the democrat, the man who began to take shape with the advent of Christianity. But he can contribute to the civil education of the French citizen and the modern democrat. “Without pretending to teach” in the sense of dogmatic instruction, Tocqueville would “show to him in every page what are the sentiments, opinions, and morals which lead to prosperity and freedom, and what are the vices and errors infallibly opposed to those blessings.” This is indeed “the chief, and I may say the only, object I have in view.” [1] Throughout, it is indispensable for Tocqueville’s reader to keep in mind the guidance Tocqueville provides, at the outset.

     

    Note

    1. Letter to M. de Corcelle, September 17, 1853, in Memoirs, Letters, and Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville. Two volumes. London: Macmillan and Company, 1861. Volume II, pp. 235-39. I am indebted to Robert Eden for drawing my attention to this letter.

    Filed Under: Nations

    China in the 1990s

    July 22, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Xudong Zhang: Postsocialism and Cultural Politics: China in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.

     

    Between the massacres at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the people of China endured what Zhang calls a “tense process of relaxation,” “a silent revolution in every domain of Chinese life as the People’s Republic transformed from a centrally planned economy to the world’s new workshop and its most coveted market for international capital.” A “boisterous, disorienting social sphere underscored by a carnivalesque consumer mass culture equipped with new information technology from the cell phone to the Internet” appeared to herald “economic prosperity, cultural diversity, institutional rationalization, and even political stability”— likely to hasten Chinese integration “into the global system,” albeit with a concurrent “deepening of social divisions and tensions in the space of the nation-state.” 

    Some two decades later, we know that the Chinese Communist Party had other plans, which included a comprehensive system of surveillance, a state-controlled alternative ‘internet,’ and imperialist geopolitical extension throughout the world targeted ultimately at the United States. Zhang wants to prevent the realization some of this. He knows he may not succeed, writing, “my central observation on the 1990s is that the perceived dissolution and degeneration of the totality of a purported socialist reality opens a narrow gate on the reconfiguration of economic, social political, and cultural powers in a moment of danger.”  A ‘postmodernist’ scholar tutored by the lit-crit scholar Fredric Jameson, he would advance some sort of socialism under the usual rubric of ‘cultural’ neo-Marxism. Hobbled by the cumbersome clogs of ‘postmodernist’ jargon, his book stands as a forlorn of embodiment of a dream opposed by a disciplined oligarchic regime that knows what it wants to do and steadily goes about doing it. If ever there was a narrow gate for such a thing to limp through, China’s rulers have closed it firmly. This notwithstanding, Zhang does know a lot about China, and one can learn from him. 

    China in the 1980s, he writes, featured “the unfreedom of the total state” in China. But this “total” (dare one say ‘tyrannical’?) regime preserved two kinds of freedom. It “maintained a tightly woven collective life” of “mutual dependency, whose internal socioeconomic equality and political-ideological homogeneity ensured initiative and possibilities available only in a ‘mass democracy’ or an ‘enlightened despotism.'” I think that means a centralized state controlled by an oligarchy kept ‘the ruled’ down, but not atomized; the ruled helped one another. “Second, the state and its socialist infrastructure acted both as a mediator with and a buffer against the capitalist world market, thus effectively protecting a fledgling national market of economic and cultural production/consumption.” 

    By the 1990s, “the sweeping marketization in anticipation of China’s full entry into the capitalist global economy seems to have strengthened the Chinese economy and in particular benefited the new ruling elite of a bureaucratic capitalism.” But China’s new middle class, non-ideological and pragmatic, did not act in the manner of Western liberals, esteeming individual freedom. It sought the “deterriorialized” world of “postmodernity,” by which Zhang means (among other things) “globalization.” How then does ‘postmodernism’ correlate with ‘postsocialism’? How do global capitalism and “the revolutionary and socialist legacies of Mao’s China” interact? Zhang takes the side of ‘postsocialism’ in this confrontation, asking his readers to think about, “how it can address the complexity of Chinese reality, above all the fascination with/resistance to the capitalist commodity economy and the attachment to/forgetfulness of the revolutionary and socialist experience.” He wants to avoid any recurrence to the “Hegelian/Marxist” rationalism, which purported to describe a linear (if dialectical) historical progress toward what Zhang calls “a forever postponed and forever abstract Messianic world revolution.” A bit like a left-wing version of President Donald Trump, he insists on the need for national sovereignty. Unlike Trump, however, he hopes that this nationalism will remain socialist in a regime “whose semiautonomy (or semidependency on a larger totality) is a crucial, indispensable condition of the possibility for systematic opposition and resistance” to the “capitalist global economy.” He wishes this sovereignty could be “endowed” by “the community of the people.” He imagines that this is possible if one takes on the ‘postmodernist’ project, eschewing “abstract and essentialized cultural truth-claims” (e.g., ‘all men are created equal’) and embracing “individual and communal perceptions and experience of the epochal material-technological determinations by capitalism as a natural-historical setting and not an ontological self-understanding of human beings”—”an emergent culture or form of life.” “Life” is indeed the criterion here, as it is with ‘postmodernists’ generally, who have taken Nietzsche’s aristocratic vitalism and made it egalitarian. Post-socialism rightly understood “transcends the dogmas of capitalism and socialism to get in touch with the productive forces of the world of life with all its social and cultural specificities and complexities.” 

    Zhang divides his book into three parts. The first part describes and comments on (‘critiques,’ as ‘postmodernists’ like to say) “the convoluted intellectual discussion during the 1990s, with Beijing as the epicenter.” Here Zhang “confront[s] central contradictions or conflicts around which the major battles of intellectual and cultural-political engagements of the Chinese 1990s played out.” These contradictions included that between “neoliberal forces of market fundamentalism” and “the socialist state”; “the global postmodern turn” and “Chinese political and cultural subjectivity”; and “democracy” in the sense of a “mass society” based on a market economy and “Chinese intellectual discourses and institutions.” Overall, these contradictions embodied both the conflict between, and the intertwining of, nationalist and socialist ideas. 

    In the second part of the book Zhang addresses these matters in terms of “literary representations of the new global space anchored or embedded in the particular narrative discourse of modern Chinese ‘subjectivity’—as identity, selfhood, interiority, and self-image (or rather self-imaging).” In these representations Zhang finds the “melancholy of the urban middle class detached from its personal and collective identity defined historically in the project of Chinese revolution and socialism.” The book’s third part “analyzes different ways of formulating the national situation and national self-identity in the truly international space: art film.” 

    In the 1990s, “the only thing the Chinese government does not readily take from the U.S. model is it political structure.” The regime wanted economic development, “turn[ing] to authoritarian capitalist societies in East Asia—Singapore, South Korea, and, until very recently, Taiwan—for political inspiration.” The regime’s “cynical pragmatism and opportunism” served as “the sole source of its legitimacy,” a “legalistic, administrative, and technocratic blanket” with which it attempted to muffle “the public articulation of the political vision of an actually existing but internally differentiating socialism.” It hadn’t fully succeeded. “The oppressiveness of the Chinese state in some areas is paralleled by unprecedented freedom and anarchism in other parts of the social domain.” But not for long, the rulers hoped. “Under the cover of Marxist philosophy, the Chinese state, rooted in a Leninist party organization, becomes a ruthless promoter of capitalist-style development, and of the market revolution as it has prevailed in the Western world since the Reagan-Thatcher era,” a “giant interest group” in its own right: “a CCP Inc.” The self-interest, the “unchecked power and corruption” of this oligarchy “puts it in direct confrontation with the society at large,” “pos[ing] a direct threat to the economic growth and social stability that the state depends on so desperately for its own political survival.” The “rising proto-middle class demand[s] more clarity and rationality in terms of rights and positive law,” but the “state bureaucracy” wants to such things. 

    Economic growth armed with political power “creates astounding disparities in distribution of wealth, ranking China today among the most unequal nations in the world”—”worse than the United States,” Zhang shudders, rivaling such oligarchies as Russia and Indonesia. “All this has been done not through the demise of a strong central government, but under the close watch and constant guidance of a socialist regime” via “rent-seeking, insider trading, or stealing of public property,” activities made easier by “the lack of press freedom” to expose them. “The rapid erosion of the basic rights of the working people established under Chinese socialism makes them powerless vis-à-vis capital and the new managerial class.” In view of the fact that the (supposedly secured) basic rights of the working people did not prevent the deliberate extinction by famine of millions of Chinese peasants under Mao, it’s hard to read that last locution with a straight or even a somewhat composed face, but Zhang prefers not to think that state socialism aiming at social equality may ‘need’ to kill a lot of people to get there, only to lead the killers to corruption and enrichissesez-vous-ing after the bloodbath is over. Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising to learn that in China “private enterprise… lacks the legal protection it enjoys in the West.” Money-making is for the oligarchs, not the ruled. “Eighty percent of national private savings is in the hands of a tiny nouveau riche class,” while “China’s rural inhabitants—still more than seventy percent of the population—are left to fend for themselves.” That is a bit better than being slaughtered by Maoist ideologues, but Zhang has more immediate issues to consider.

    In the 1980s it still had been possible to think that Chinese intellectuals and the bureaucratic state were “natural, inseparable partners in herding the people through social change while maintaining order,” that “intellectuals are the moral conscience of the people and have the ability and right to speak for the people’s desires and longings,” and that the Chinese people want “modernity, understood as a set of unquestionable universal institutions and values.” Tiananmen Square exposed both the “parasitic and symbiotic relations” between intellectuals and the state. The modernizing adaptation of the ancient Confucian model of the wise emperor and his learned administrators, benevolently setting the moral tone for the Chinese people—an adaptation which oscillated between aspirations for “Western-style democracy” and “enlightened despotism” in China—proved illusory. The oligarchy didn’t even recognize those aspirations, “crush[ing] the popular protest as a threat to ‘stability,’ not as a crusade against neoliberalism” with all “the ruthlessness of a rising technocratic regime.” 

    Regrouping after this debacle ‘Nineties neoliberals redefined themselves. They shared the “neoauthoritarian legacy” of the ‘Eighties neoliberalism—by which Zhang means that both versions “profoundly distrust[ed] social democracy (particularly mass democracy) while searching for an efficient and radical way to establish a new socio-ideological order based on the market and private ownership.” However, the earlier neoliberals were reformers “within the movement of Chinese socialism” in the sense that they concerned themselves “with political democratization and maintaining a socially just distribution of wealth”; ‘Nineties neoliberals “not only openly challenge[d] the very existence of Chines socialism but also [took] issue with the notion of the Western welfare state from an orthodox neoliberal standpoint.” As part of “a massive deintellectualization of Chinese cultural life in the 1990s,” Chinese neoliberals turned away from Marxism and ‘postmodernism’ toward exegesis, positivism, and empiricism, evidently hoping to pass through the ideological filters of the oligarchic regime. (“State censorship plays a role in shaping the coded language of intellectual debate, of course.”) Indeed, “the post-Mao Chinese ‘public sphere’ is a sham whose only existence and festivities are in and of the ideology and fantasy,” something one might say of the Maoist Chinese ‘public sphere’ as well, although Zhang is too discreet to suggest it. Chinese neoliberals were thinking about “how to secure the freedom of a few”—themselves—against “the demands for equality by the many.” “The Chinese government’s behavior in 1989 was more effective in cracking down on the democratic initiative for economic equity, social justice, and political participation by the working people than in weeding out ‘bourgeois liberalism,’ which surged back into the domestic mainstream in the form of neoliberal economics, and into the global context with the rhetoric of freedom and rights.”

    Zhang maintains that the voices against neoliberalism belonged broadly to what was called China’s “New Left.” One part of the New Left stance was nationalism, triggered by the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, precipitated by Chinese missile tests near the coast of Taiwan. When the United States responded by deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups outside the Strait, many intellectuals recalled the history of Western imperialism in China from the 1840 Opium War to the 1945 Japanese surrender. “Human rights rhetoric… came to be viewed cynically in China as cover for political or geopolitical concerns,” part of the “clash of civilizations” discussed by Samuel Huntington in his widely-read contemporaneous book. This view was confirmed in 1999 during the Kosovo War, when U.S. cruise missiles hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; the Chinese rejected the American explanation that the attack was an error based on the use of old maps, taking the incident as an “exercise of raw power out of sheer self-interest by an integrated West led by the United States,” although Zhang leaves the definition of the supposed self-interest in destroying a Chinese embassy undefined.

    With this renewed nationalism came a critique of neoliberalism provoked by the failure of capitalist ‘shock therapy’ in Russia. “The Russian path became a living reminder of the road China must not go down.” The New Left thus presents a renewal of national socialism, long discredited for its linkage to Nazism.

    Zhang doesn’t put it that way. “The central debate” in 1990s China was “about how to engage in the process of social modernization in a relatively efficient and just way, or, to be blunt, how to avoid a major human disaster while embarking on this journey.” Zhang condemns the neoliberal side of the debate as “not so much a pursuit of freedom but a wishful and egoistic attempt to carve out a self-enclosed, indeed barricaded bourgeois haven out of an unstable reality of irreducibly uneven development.” Meanwhile, nationalism “takes shape on an after-image of the vanishing medium that is the traditional nation-state,” now seriously compromised by globalization. Zhang doesn’t mind nationalism at all, however, so long as it “makes itself available to a populist and even socialist vision of a sound national economy combined with a sound national politics”; “it is the socialist potential of this nationalist discourse that [kept] it as a meaningful position in the Chinese intellectual field in the 1990s.” As a ‘postmodern,’ Zhang would attempt to “de-colonize and de-essentialize the mind from Western metaphysics in general and from the predominant Western discourses of modernity in particular,” while retaining the “Marxist critique of the capitalist colonial system and its internal hierarchy,” not to mention socialism itself and “the Chinese state-form.” One might describe this set of aspirations as incoherent, but ‘postmodernism’ never claimed to esteem reason.

    It soon transpires that the New Left is just as ‘internationalist’ or ‘globalist’ as neoliberals, and even more ideological, but in a different way. The Chinese New Left is “a cluster of loosely connected intellectual discourses and tendencies” owing “its existence to a truly international and historically embedded conceptual framework, theoretical arsenal, and symbolic power.” “Many of the best Chinese students became raging ‘New Leftists’ by the time they complete their much envied education at, say, Berkeley or Duke.” But no worry, it is “no longer possible or meaningful to distinguish the ‘Chinese’ from the ‘un-Chinese’ elements in the New Left, which are intimately connected to Chinese reality.” The “critical intellectuals in China today embark on a systematic and open-ended questioning of both the socialist and capitalist assumptions of modernity,” breaking “the straitjacket of socialism and capitalism as two reified and fetishized social, political, and theoretical institutions.” This seems to mean that the Chinese New Left rejects a civil society in which market relations dominate all other social relations (the straitjacket of capitalism) while affirming a civil society of communitarian mutual aid. It isn’t clear, however, in what way New Leftist differ from other socialists (except for their nationalism). They do not think the time is ripe to get rid of the state, as American and European New Leftists did in the 1960s. On the contrary, they endorse the view of Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein in their book The Cost of Rights, which argues that “all rights, including the so-called ‘negative rights,’ depend on the state and its taxation; that all rights are public goods whose protection requires the government to make socially responsible and morally satisfying choices; and that, in view of the sorry reality in ‘free’ Russia, ‘statelessness spells rightlessness.” This is of course quite consistent with the American Declaration of Independence, which affirms that governments are instituted to secure unalienable natural rights, although it is clear that neither Holmes nor Sunstein nor Chinese New Leftists regard rights as natural but rather as historical, changeable, ever-evolving. 

    The Chinese New Left would oppose the “global imperial order” of the United States and its “bourgeois ideology” with a “Chinese way” of “constantly historicizing and contextualizing the particularities, arbitrariness, and intellectual closures of all these circulating universal claims while keeping the future-oriented utopian horizons of history open.” This isn’t really a Chinese way at all, but the Western ‘postmodernist’ way instantiated in China. It is indeed as utopian as ‘postmodernism’ generally, which is why ‘postmodernism’ gets play primarily within universities and other schools, sometimes with an assist from mass media companies and political parties, when they find it useful to do so. Zhang admits the universalist ambition of the New-Left Chinese way when he stipulates that “Chinese strivings must be defined in a way that speaks to other peoples in other parts of the world” by “articulat[ing] the national dilemma [of China] as a universal problematic, and vice-versa,” “transcend[ing] simultaneously the mythology of a self-contained Chinese culture and the closure of historical horizons in bourgeois civilization,” the rival universalism. In this, it should be noticed, Chinese New Leftism dovetails rather well with the geopolitics of those soulless bureaucrats in Beijing that they deplore.

    The 1990s saw “a thriving, omnipresent market and a retreating, decentralized state power.” If the latter claim is true, it was very much a matter of taking one step back in order to position oneself for two steps forward, but for the time the new middle class managed to form “semiautonomous social and cultural spaces of its own,” wherein they cultivated nationalism, private property ownership, and a cosmopolitanism understood as a desire to bring China out into the world as China. Nationalist and consumerist sentiments largely replaced the “universalistic high culture of humanism and modernism” of the 1980s. The “new terrain” in Chinese society established itself “outside the institutions of the state and intellectuals.” So, for example, the 1996 collection of “crude journalistic writing” titled China Can Say No, abominated America but did so without state sponsorship (although not without state “blessing”). 

    Beyond anti-Americanism, what did Chinese nationalism consist of? In the “new round of economic liberalization” undertaken in 1992, “the state itself was by far the biggest shareholder, stakeholder, and employer in an already diversified, mixed economy”; “combined with a modernizing socialist bureaucracy,” this “allowed the state to be an integral, indeed omnipresent part of the new image of the nation.” However, nationalism as understood in Chinese society differed from “the state rhetoric of patriotism.” It was more visceral. Such powerful sentiments might circle around to challenge the regime, and so were kept “tightly controlled by the government.” An oligarchic regime may foment nationalism, but it must remain alert to the risk of a nationalism that morphs into calls for popular sovereignty. The Chinese Communist Party has remained vigilant about such a prospect throughout its decades in power, and the ‘Nineties were no different. 

    Zhang rightly distinguishes “this new image of the nation” from the traditional, Confucian motif of tianxia. “Literally meaning ‘under the heaven,’ tianxia stands as a pre- or protonationalist notion of an empire, civilization, and universe, and thus runs against the grain of modern nationalism as a rational ideology of individual rights and change.” Very oddly, Zhang entirely omits the longstanding rivals of Confucianism in traditional Chinese politics and culture—not only Taoism and Buddhism but (more pertinently) the set of views often called ‘Legalism’—a sort of Realpolitik discourse that emerged in the ‘Hobbesian’ Warring States period of 453-221 BC. Modern Chinese intellectuals struggled for a century “to make China great again” after its loss of power, and of ‘face,’ to modern empires. This “painstaking shift of loyalty and identity from the cultural codes of Confucianism to the modern nation-state” ranged from republicanism to the ‘authoritarianism’ of Chiang Kai-Shek to the Marxism-Leninism of Mao Zedong; the Chinese oligarchy of the ‘Nineties had no taste for such variety of opinion in the civil society it oversaw. What would China’s “quiet yet aggressive new nationalism” become, be allowed to become?

    Zhang shares its anti-Americanism. “In today’s international community, the United States is probably the only nation to believe that, or act as if, it has the right and moral obligation to impose its standards on other nations while at the same time fiercely promoting its own national interest, often under the same banner of American exceptionalism and supremacy,” he sniffs. He is sufficiently honest to admit that “the tension between universal principles and national boundaries is by no means unique to liberalism,” the Marxism-Leninism promoted in Mao’s widely distributed ‘Little Red Book’ being a conspicuous instance thereof. The departure from Maoism begun in 1979 and continued throughout the ‘Eighties, a departure based on pragmatism and the desire for economic development, appeals to Zhang for its non-universalist character, but worries him because the bureaucracy which implemented it opposes “any attempt to redeem or appropriate the Maoist notion of mass democracy and participation.” Zhang’s ‘postmodernist,’ pick-and-choose Maoism—a neo-Maoism pretending that Marxism tolerates popular sovereignty as a sound feature of state socialism—wants “the emergent discourse on Chinese nationalism and mass culture” to “achieve its ultimate historical and political meaning,” a somewhat vague prospect which he quite sensibly fears the oligarchs may block. 

    Here is where intellectuals like, well, Zhang himself come in. “Without the full participation of its attendant ‘high culture,’ the newly emerging social experience is hampered by a lack of cultural vision, ideological articulation, and political legitimacy; instead, it is forced into a probational state of namelessness and wordlessness, even though it is clearly the field in which the dazzling vocabulary of historical change reaches or, better still creates a mode of language and representation.” This is nothing less, or more, than a new vanguardism, albeit one animated by ‘postmodernism’ instead of ‘scientific socialism.’ With the cleverly-designed tools of ‘deconstructionism’ in hand, ‘postmodern’ intellectuals like Zhang intend to guide the masses not by dictatorship according to the ‘iron laws of History’ but by rhetoric according to the great unquestioned universalist assumption of our contemporary ‘postmodernists’: egalitarianism or ‘democracy’ camouflaged by the rigorously anti-universalist valorization of “locality, difference, relativism, and a ‘deconstructive’ mode of thinking.” Such intellectuals can pummel pro-capitalist, ‘neoliberal’ intellectuals as universalizing, aristocratic pawns of the bureaucratic state, paying “only sporadic lip service” to civil rights in their striving for “a new authoritarianism.” Given the tendency of ‘authoritarian’ capitalist regimes in some other countries to ‘liberalize’ the political sphere as well, bringing in the regimes of commercial republicanism ‘postmodernists’ detest, such a pummeling is de rigeur.  

    By the 1990s, the Chinese state had begun “neutraliz[ing] the moral appeal of liberal thinking by buying off the population, above all, the technocratic-managerial class,” aiming “to win back popular support” in the wake of Tiananmen “with rapid economic growth.” On the coercive side of the equation, “tighter state control of ideology forced liberal intellectuals into a state of perpetual, although silent, dissent.” The Communist Party’s state “took the lead in an all-out embrace of the market and global capital,” suspending “the commitment to the people as a whole, and to the historical experiment to create a new kind of democracy, freedom, and equality that supersedes the bourgeois model.” “As long as the tensions or disagreements” between state and society “remain manageable,” the two spheres could “pursue and formulate their interests and ideologies separately.” But “what risked being lost” was “a collective passion for political and cultural democracy.” In the years since Zhang has published his book, the regime has ‘managed’ dissent with fair success and with little interest in indulging any collective passion for democracy, if such exists. “Throughout the 1990s… the People’s Republic was swiftly mutating into but another nation-state defined by not the twentieth but the nineteenth century, and this tendency was consolidated both by the internal rationalization of the state and with the blessing of a homogenizing global ideology that presides over the withering of meaningful political life everywhere.” Post-socialist or not, modernity’s most recent turn has led not to the withering away of the state but the withering away of politics, suffocated by the knee of administrative (that is to say, oligarchic) states which tolerate capitalism insofar as it provides them with revenue and, in the West, tolerates ‘postmodernism’ insofar as it is congenitally incapable of exercising anything resembling rule in the real world.

    Zhang exemplifies the latter mentality, hoping that somehow Chinese nationalism might turn democratic. He distinguishes “postmodernism in China”—the “global discourse of postmodernism and postmodernity, which entered China via the intellectuals who seek theoretical inspiration from, and discursive synchronization with, the West, and which is largely limited to small circles of literary and art criticism”—from “Chinese postmodernism”—which “pertains to Chinese everyday life as a producer of a culture of the postmodern,” in opposition to “economic, bureaucratic, and social rationalization.” As mentioned, Zhang numbers among those intellectuals who are eager to describe and define that democratic “everyday life,” maybe not so much on its own terms but on the terms of the “global discourse of postmodernism and postmodernity.” He divides his discussion into “four steps”: the “stylistic features of Chinese postmodernism”; the shift from modernism to postmodernism; the “political stakes” involved in the debates resulting from that shift; and the achievement of “a historical understanding of Chinese postmodernism as the cultural logic of a postsocialist society.” Notice that ‘postmodern’ historicism adds to the Marxist dialectical logic of socioeconomic class conflict a “cultural logic” that emphasizes art criticism of a certain kind as a supplement to, even a partial displacement of, the social ‘sciences.’ How logical will “cultural logic” turn out to be?

    Regarding the “style” of Chinese postmodernism, Zhang nods to his teacher, Fredric Jameson, who links postmodernism to “consumer society.” Jameson is well known in American lit-crit circles for his attempt to understand literature as a means of encoding political and social commands and demands; in this, he led the charge in American New Left discourse as it held up ‘the young Marx’—the more Hegelian/’idealistic’ Marx—against the mature Marx who propounded ‘scientific socialism’ and spawned what was, by the 1960s, the ‘old’ Left lumbering toward its international extinction in the next generation. “Postmodernism is seen by its Chinese students as primarily a sociohistorical change articulated culturally.” That is, the cultural “logic” the course of social events, although that course may not be described fully by Marxian dialectic, which would give the enterprise a bit more rationalism than ‘postmoderns’ like. Be this as it may, in China ‘postmodernity’ features the undermining of high modernism by mass culture and the nation’s “rapid economic growth, its decidedly mixed modes of production, and its incomplete but intensifying integration into the global capitalist market.” The situation is complex, not only because socialism and capitalism have renewed their rivalry in post-Mao China but because “truly ‘premodern’ elements in Chinese society” haven’t gone away: “poverty, ignorance, superstition, chaos, repression, and the backlash of the ultraconservative” (by which Zhang means Confucianism). “To see how China receives postmodernism one has to show how China produces it”; Chinese postmodernity is “an admittedly unfinished project but one whose legitimacy, validity, and universal claims have already, for better or for worse, come under fire.” 

    As in Europe and America, where the “high modernism of James Joyce, Le Corbusier, Vassily Kandinsky, etc.” was challenged by the cultural-political revolution typified by ‘May ’68’ in France, ‘Nineties China saw a similar ‘democratization’ or vulgarization, sometimes by “a journalistic genre designed for quick media exposure and consumer gratification,” sometimes by an attempt to establish a Western-style academia, complete with scholarly production and regularized promotion. Zhang argues that since ‘history’ (conceived as the course of events) accelerates with democratization, shifting with popular sentiments, an analytical approach emphasizing quick construction of cultural products and their equally quick critical deconstruction will track the permutations of Chinese society better than more traditional scholarly practices, such as ‘comparative literature,’ which requires stable bodies of work to compare and contrast with one another. At least as pertinently for his purposes, ‘postmodernism’ “may carry a revolutionary message in an era when October-style revolutions”—efforts of the ‘old’ Left—now “seem all but impossible and undesirable,” given the massive power of the oligarchic surveillance state. ‘Postmodernism’ and it alone “points to a horizon beyond socialism as we know it.” Before the Maoist regime was founded in 1949, “revolution, socialism, and mass democracy” served as the Marxist “negation of the bourgeois project of industrialization and nation building”; Deng’s “New Era” pragmatism was “a negation of the Maoist paradigm by means of Weberian rationalization,” leading “logically to a market economy under the supervision of the bureaucratic state.” Chinese postmodernism now aspires to be the negation of the negation, as Marxists like to say, thanks to the wedding of the ‘young Marx’ to a democratized Nietzscheism. It “historicizes the ideological and simplistic opposition between socialist modernity and its bourgeois or counterrevolutionary alternative” by ‘deconstructing’—”reveal[ing] and destabiliz[ing]”—the “ideological assumptions embedded in the premodern-modern order around which the foundational discourse of modern China evolves.” This, Zhang hopes, will “break the Eurocentric grip on the notion of the modern, which makes it possible for non-Europeans to imagine a native or modern in which one feels both contemporary and at home,” protected from the “ruthless force of global standardization” and defending a worldwide (but not universalistic) pluralism. It is of course a question whether relativism holds up against ‘local’ cultures such as those seen in Muslim countries or indeed in China, neither of which seems any less expansionist in ambition than the United States of today or the Europe of yesterday. ‘Clash of civilizations,’ indeed. Zhang wants ‘postmodernism’ to subvert globalism, the clash of civilizations it engenders, and the contemporary Chinese statism which purports to face off against globalism and foreign civilizations. Waxing eloquent, he avers, “One could argue that it is only amid the postmodern, postsocialist ruins or prosperity (depending on one’s perspective) that Mao’s China obtains its afterlife as an epic monument, an empire with all its sublime grandeur.”

    This suggests that what Zhang calls the “political stakes” entailed in the struggle of Chinese postmodernism might be substantial. Chinese post-modernism “can only be experienced and measured against the established, dominant institutions” of the Chinese regime. Like modernism, postmodernism consists of “an endless and sometimes self-defeating struggle to become and remain the ever new”; like modernism, “postmodernism encompasses radically different social ideals and political ideologies”; “unlike modernism, however, postmodernism does not see everything as cosmologically, heroically new; rather, its concept of newness or creation hinges on a sophisticated, almost cynical sense that all good and evil, in their most extreme forms, have been somewhere, somehow, and sometimes before, tried, and what is left for contemporary men and women is nothing more than shrewd and occasionally breathtaking eclecticism, synthesis, reproduction, and representation.” Postmodernism takes ‘history’ to be “fundamentally cyclical,” not progressive. Zhang suspects that even if ‘postmodern’ egalitarians prevail in China against “the Old Left and the New Right” (the latter being the neoliberals), “new power elites in new national and international class reconfigurations” may result. This is a welcome touch of sobriety, although one might regret that it took the detour of ‘postmodernism’ to arrive at it. 

    One might regret this because it’s obvious that ‘postmodernism’ will prove a feeble weapon against something like the Chinese regime. The “core assumption” of ‘postmodernism’ is “that politics, ideology, human experience, and history itself no longer matter, indeed, no longer exist, an assumption which underscores the rise of a variety of postmodern cultural identity (of ethnic or sexual varieties), or academic politics, often in the void of classically political categories such as class and nation.” Not surprisingly, Chinese nationalism “attacks postmodernism as a discourse of phantasmagoria,” while ‘postmodernists’ attempt to undermine the regime with the denial that realist epistemology has validity. An epistemological realist will refute these latter-day Berkeleys in much the same way as Dr. Johnson did, although in this case the stone they kick may be aimed at the shins of ‘postmodernists.’ Deconstruct that.

    Zhang contends that Chinese postsocialism and Chinese postmodernism go together. A ‘money’ economy enhances ‘postmodernity’ because “money is a great equalizer which unifies an uneven socio-economic terrain.” When the new economy collides and entwines with China’s “residual socialism” it “keep[s] Chinese society in a permanent state of economic mobilization and ideological agitation,” with the “frustrations, fears, resentments” of “the rising consumer masses,” their “newly achieved freedoms and sense of power, their obsessions with the here and now, as well as their need for a new collective identity and social ideal” all percolating amidst “a dazzling variety of modes of production, social structures, political lexicons, ideological courses, and value systems.” This should provide “conditions of possibility for Chinese postmodernism,” he hopes, by suggesting that socialism can be “understood as an ongoing historical experiment” rather than a fixed concept in support of a fixed institutional system. Zhang cites the Chinese scholar Cui Zhiyuan’s “call for ‘intellectual liberation’ and critique of ‘institutional fetishism'” as way forward toward the construction of “a collective, cooperative model of economic development” with special emphasis on the much-neglected and indeed much-abused rural population. Zhiyuan envisions an economics and a politics of fluidity instead of institutionalism, a sort of historicist Heracliteanism. This, Zhang bravely insists, comports with “the Chinese economy and everyday life” of today, which “have already outgrown the bureaucratic control and ideological tutelage of the Reform regime, whose popular support if not political legitimacy was damaged by the tragedy of Tiananmen in 1989.” What is needed is “a new theory for a new social system, a new democracy, and a new cultural-intellectual program.” Zhang deplores any “rigid understanding of Maoism as a utopian totalitarianism,” insisting that it too can be deployed ‘postmodernly,’ as in its simultaneous legitimation and distortion “during the commercial Mao craze of the early 1990s,” wherein Mao’s image became a popular imprint on merchandise. The real Mao was a mass-murdering tyrant, but the magic wand of postmodernism can deconstruct and reconstruct him as the fairy godfather of a future Chinese democracy.

    Good luck with that.

    Given his ‘postmodernist’ predilections, it makes sense that Zhang turns away from politics (recall that it no longer exists) to contemporary Chinese literature and film. He begins with the fiction of Wang Anyi, who sets her plots in Shanghai. Prior to World War II, Shanghai was China’s most cosmopolitan city, ‘the Paris of Asia,’ “the epitome of Chinese urban modernity.” Since then, the Maoist revolution has come and gone, and in Wang’s account the city now “threaten[s] to outsmart and outlive its peasant conquerors and the brutal system they imposed on it.” She nonetheless retains the Marxist framework of “class analysis,” as “Shanghai residents remain deeply embedded in consumerism and nostalgia for a consumer’s life-world despite Shanghai’s metamorphosis from a city of urban middle-class consumers to one of producers and from a cultural to a political center.” Shanghai’s “anticollective, apolitical” sensibility can find no resources in a pre-modern past, having “no significant past or memory prior to its founding as a treaty port, an event marking the global expansion of capitalism and colonialism in the nineteenth century.” Shanghai residents have long associated “the rest of the country with darkness, backwardness, and chaos,” even as residents of the rest of the country think of Shanghai as the place where the mercantile “foreign devils” were allowed well-contained access to China. Pre-Mao, the city regime “was made and reinforced by a self-governing, self-regulating city council that consisted of wealthy, predominantly foreign taxpayers who took full advantage of the power vacuum of the semicolon and wasted no time in creating a petit État dans l’État.” The regime and those it governed thought of Shanghai “as a dynamic vanguard of history, an island of civilization, and the ultimate embodiment of the true present of modernity,” set “to forcibly yank China… out of the vicious cycle of tradition.” The Maoist defined the vanguard of history rather differently; they won, but not simply and not permanently. 

    Zhang takes Wang’s fiction itself as a sort of vanguard. In her “allegories of Shanghai one will not find any utopian gesture of redemption”—as one finds in partisans of capitalism and communism alike—and “not even a guarded optimism for a rising everyday sphere in a China that may be well on its way to creating a new urban and political culture precisely by incorporating a reinvented past into the undefined present.” Firmly anti-utopian, she holds herself open to the way in which the present may define itself in the future, so long as China resists the too-rigid over-defining ideologies of the past, and their sometimes brutal practices. ‘Postmodern,’ indeed. In his discussion of Shanghai’s ‘minor literature’ of the ‘Nineties, Zhang leans heavily on such ‘postmodernists’ as Raymond Williams, Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno, claiming that “Shanghai may be a privileged site to witness the central dilemma of modernity,” defined by those writers as “a historical process which enlightens by mythologizing,” sweeping aside previous mythologies while producing its own “intricate network of signs, images, and narratives.” Modernity contradicts itself, not merely in the dialectics of class struggle, as Marxists say, but in language, symbols, sentiments. Modernity’s constant change, seen in Shanghai, frustrates hierarchies: “None is exhausted or ready to settle, which hints at the beginning of a long existence whose meaning must be read against and redeemed from all the chaos and meaninglessness of the now.” 

    What might that meaning be? Zhang turns to ‘Nineties filmmakers for suggestions. He selects several that “share the postrevolutionary assumption and seek to deconstruct the ‘grand narrative’ of social revolution and idealism by constructing a counternarrative of national trauma and traumatized individual life.” As not only post-revolutionary but post-Tiananmen films, films made after the regime halted its apparent liberalization of the ‘Eighties stopped, they also register “the end of the so-called New Era and all its popular and intellectual euphoria about modernity, progress, and subjectivity.” The regime’s crackdown on dissent “was viewed by liberals inside and outside China as moving against the global wind of change which completed the destruction of the Soviet Empire”; therefore, “the Chinese situation was and must be viewed as a shocking and painful anomaly,” as Chinese liberals went down to “disastrous defeat” and attempted to recover through “renewed association with international ideological and symbolic orders.” 

    For their part, filmmakers sought “an authentic experience of time and history, an ontological meaning of existence amid change (or no change).” But “as long as the Chinese government is constantly on guard against ‘peaceful evolution’—a code word for subverting the socialist system in China through internal mutation—’liberal intellectuals’ in China remain prime suspects of a ‘fifth column’ in the eyes of an ideologically besieged state.” The regime “now grounds its legitimacy solely and defensively on economic growth, social rationalization, and its own monopolistic role in order maintenance”—in sum, “growth without democracy” or “market socialism,” a strategy which Zhang supposes has been “forced” upon the regime because it is “compet[ing] with international capitalism on the latter’s terrain.” In the ‘Nineties, “the socialist state [took] the lead in a massive integration with global capitalism,” he writes, although a generation later it has become obvious that “integration” was the beginning of a play for dominance. But Zhang could see that “the twin forces of commodification and state intervention [were] closing up a real or imagined public sphere which once existed for the liberal intellectuals of the New Era,” who turned to “neo-Sinology and neo-Confucianism” in “an eternal Quixotic battle against totalitarian repression.” 

    Zhang prefers the filmmakers’ strategy, which comports with his ‘postmodernist’ sensibilities. In Tian Zhuangzhuang’s The Blue Kite, three episodes in the film correspond to moments of recent Chinese history: Mao’s 1957 purge of intellectuals; the “Natural Disaster, code word for the massive famine resulting from the Great Leap Forward,” the Second Five Year Plan imposed by the Maoist regime between 1958 and 1962; and the Cultural Revolution of the late ‘Sixties. Tian presents each of these events “in a way irreconcilable with orthodox historiography,” deconstruction “the myth of national history” by “accounting for the traumatic experience of innocent individuals.” Titling his three episodes “Father,” “Uncle,” and “Stepfather,” Tian hopes to overcome “the oppressive nature of fatherhood”—under Chairman Mao it was Saturnine—with “the youthful power authorized by a higher authority, namely the Father or the Name of the Father, which solely determines the meaning of history.” But despite the presence of this Father of fathers, what makes The Blue Kite a compelling film is the fact that it offers no ready catharsis, no instant relief, no psychological drama or cultural exoticism which channels shock to its articulation in the world of commodities.” In this, Tian captures the way in which Chinese postmodernism reversed the teaching of Maoist Marxism by using a Maoist-Marxist technique. He shows the contrast between the old and the new, as the Maoists did, but “for opposite ideological and political effects.” “In reading the cinematic rewriting of the national history of modern China, we can argue that the trauma of modern China is not so much the ennui of history, nor even the melancholy of revolution and modernity, but, rather, the anxiety that history has not yet truly begun,” that the true intentions of the true Father have yet to be revealed. Although Zhang doesn’t mention it, one should notice that many Chinese of the next generation would establish underground Christian churches consisting of persons who hold that the true Father has indeed revealed Himself. Whether Tian may share this conviction is impossible to say; he does show why it might find ready listeners in contemporary China.

    Zhang devotes his main interpretive energies to The Story of Qiu Ju by the well-known filmmaker Zhang Yimou. This film, and Zhang Yimou’s films generally, demand to be ‘read’ on their own terms, resisting ‘deconstruction.’ Xudong Zhang nonetheless determines to soldier on, intending to interpret the film in accordance with the (‘postmodernist’) “logic of historical analysis.” He will make The Story of Qiu Ju a reflection of “the emergent mainstream ideology of the everyday world framed by Chinese society’s massive transition into the market system guided by an authoritarian party-state.” “It is precisely the fantastic absolutism, demonstrated in both the planners of socialist modernity and the visionaries of global capitalist homogeneity, that is cast in doubt by Zhang Yimou’s films about the commoners in the postsocialist Chinese everyday world.”

    As in The Blue Kite, in The Story of Qiu Ju the filmmaker insists that there is something more than the existing Chinese regime and its ‘laws’ (such as they are). There is “something prior to” these laws, to any laws, and even to the regime, to any regime. Qiu Ju is a young woman seeking justice in the broader sense, and the film narrates “the comic ways by which a simple-minded peasant woman” persistently misunderstands the Chinese legal system, “missing its point in the same way as she keeps getting lost in the modern big city.” 

    “The keywords in the film are ‘justice’ and ‘apology,’ two things Qiu Ju is so determined to obtain and around which the film narrative unfolds.” The two English words translate the same Chinese word, shuofa. “Shuofa means the way things are discussed, talked about, and eventually, understood and accepted without coercion”—more, “the way things are must be accepted by those to whom it is explained; the politicolegal order must rest on a tacit agreement,” on what Americans would call the consent of the governed, reasonable assent. But Qiu Ju doesn’t seek justice in the American or Western sense, either; she seeks not “an abstract general law” that applies “to all equally and indifferently,” but for a way to make sense of things, a way of “ensur[ing] the coherence and integrity of the world of meaning and value, of understanding and, indeed of being. She is there not so much to litigate as to heal, above all her own peace of mind.” Her husband had gotten into a fight with the village chief over the hazy property rights that prevail in rural China, “a gray area between the government and the written law, on one hand, and peasant culture, everyday practice, and the plebian sense of right and wrong” that persists despite the Communist regime’s assiduous efforts to erase it. The dispute had escalated into a (mis)perceived challenge to the reputation, the ‘face,’ of the chief, who kicked Qiu Ju and (it eventually transpires) broke one of his ribs. Despite being in the third trimester of pregnancy, Qiu Ju embarks on her quest.

    The film thus “runs against the grain of the notion of ‘rule of law’ introduced by the modernizing state for its political legitimacy, but whose philosophical justification lies historically in the bourgeois pursuit of indifferent abstract generality,” a “generality based on exchange-value and the universal individual as the social figure of property rights.” It equally challenges the regime that has been flirting with such a conception of rights. As Qiu Ju stubbornly works her way up the legal-administrative Chinese food chain, she exhibits something like “a peasant’s belief in the good and benevolent emperor,” to whom she feels entitled to appeal, as per the practice of classical imperial China. And indeed under Mao, the “notion of mass democracy and proletarian dictatorship” hovered “above the law.” Qiu Ju “seeks the rule of law at the highest level of government, that is, the realm of the sovereign, which is, by definition outside and above the law but defines its moral-political constitution.” 

    There are three reasons “why Qiu Ju’s repeated trips are doomed to fail.” “First, the peasant fails the state by not understanding its efforts to modernize its legal system, which alone protects the peasant’s rights.” That is, even insofar as the post-Maoist Chinese state really does attempt to protect property rights, the peasant whose rights it seeks to protects doesn’t understand what it’s trying to do. Second, “the state fails the peasantry by not understanding their inarticulate moral and political codes that constitute and underscore any real, substantial order.” It doesn’t know what it would take to win the consent of the peasants. Third, “Qiu Ju’s quest for justice is bound to fail because a general, indifferent, legalistic justice is not what she wants and does not solve her problem, and yet it is all that the modern rational social and state organization has to offer.” The drama of the film consists a sort of dialectical examination of shuofa. Starting “with a question regarding the law, in terms of a perceived injustice,” it moves to “a persistent demand for an explanation,” but culminates in “a commentary, a reflection on law and its limits.” “The difficulty the heroine encounters in this film is not so much the difficulty of the legal order understood as an abstract and general norm, but the value system of everyday life in contemporary China struggling with its own fundamental and political self-understanding.” 

    Whereas the most obvious conflict the film portrays consists of the confrontation between “the unwritten moral-ethical codes of the peasantry tinged with the political legacy of Chinese socialism”—including “but not limited to conventional rubrics such as ‘popular habit,’ ‘social custom,’ ‘natural right,’ or ‘tradition'”—and “modern rationality” instantiated in “the bureaucratic-legalistic machinery of the modernizing state” as it “tries to show itself in abstract yet specific, impersonal, yet socially ‘responsible’ terms,” the genuine healing, “the solution in real ethical and moral senses, is attainable only within the parameters of village life.” There, neither habit nor custom nor tradition but nature prevails, as Qiu Ju goes into labor on New Year’s Eve. The village chief intervenes and gets her to the hospital, saving her life and the life of her boy. “For the village chief, that is merely the right thing to do as a fellow and elderly village,” quite apart from his dispute with Qiu Ju and her husband. In the village, conventional behavior looks to nature as its guide. In the final comic twist, as a gesture of reconciliation the family invites the chief to the traditional party celebrating the one-month anniversary of the child’s birth, but he’s nowhere to be found. Belatedly, the legal system has caught up with him, arresting and imprisoning him for a short period as punishment for his assault. Tellingly, the regime’s verdict isn’t too little, too late but too late and no longer necessary.

    “The film situates its dramatic intensity squarely in the structural gap between the legal and the political,” and especially the political understood as “judgment based on a particular form of life,” justified and defended with “moral courage and assertiveness.” This “invisible and inarticulate framework is prior to the legal and the legalistic order, yet it constitutes the very foundation of the latter,” the consent of the governed based not on “justice done in legalistic terms” but “‘right-and-wrong’ in terms of ‘natural right’ rooted in the singularity (not generality) of a peasant community,” a form of right or justice that governs the peasants’ “world of everyday life and informs their moral and political behavior.”

    Here is where Zhang seizes the opportunity to extract a socialist-‘postmodern’ lesson from what is quite evidently a pre-modern understanding of right. Qiu Ju “is still not happy at the end of the film”—she had reconciled with the village chief, no longer wanted him punished—but “that is not a problem” because “as long as the subject here is not a bourgeois individual but something embedded in and constituted by a collective,” the problem disappears. The right to life of the individual person, the right to the individual’s liberty, the right of the individual to his property and to pursue happiness—none of these matter in a tight-knit village community. And how could the world of the peasant village somehow overcome the impersonal power of the modern state and become the world of some post-post-socialist society? “The subversion of the Kantian notion of law and the Hegelian notion of mediation”—the philosophic preludes to Marxism and ‘progressive’ contemporary liberalism alike—may “thus open up a theoretical vista for the imagination of a revolutionary form of collectivity which unites the universal and the singular in the contemporary context of capitalist globality and its discontent”—the “possibility of the impossible.”

    Or not. Zhang’s ‘postmodern’ politics does indeed recall the communitarianism of the American New Left of the ‘Sixties, when the first wave of American ‘postmodernism’ gathered the strength it took to flood the schools with its doctrines of anti-statist and utopian egalitarianism. More interesting is his recognition of the interplay between natural right (without the scare quotes) and convention. This recognition eventually led him to political philosophy as understood by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and to such commentators on that philosophy by Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss. 

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    • « Previous Page
    • 1
    • …
    • 24
    • 25
    • 26
    • 27
    • 28
    • …
    • 50
    • Next Page »