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    Is All Well That Ends Well?

    July 29, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: All’s Well That Ends Well.

     

    The young Count Bertram of Rousillon, his mother the Countess, Helena (a gentlewoman and ward of the Countess), and elderly Lord Lafeu converse in the Count’s palace. A feature of a comedy not a ‘history play,’ ‘Rousillon’ isn’t exactly the real Roussillon. Claimed by Charlemagne and his heirs among the French kings during the Middle Ages, by Shakespeare’s time the real Roussillon had been ruled by the Spanish Hapsburgs since 1516 and would remain under their rule until the French king obtained it in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, following a long war. There hadn’t been a count of Roussillon since the twelfth century. Shakespeare’s ‘Rousillon’ anticipates the future French conquest in the sense that the Count in his play owes allegiance to France. Shakespeare’s ‘Rousillon’ serves the purposes of comic semi-fiction.

    As so often in Shakespeare, the play doesn’t begin comically. The Count has been called to the King’s court, and his widowed mother regrets it: “In delivering my son from me, I bury a second husband” (I.i.3). The play begins with a paradox—delivery, a metaphor for birth, described in funereal terms. Lafeu attempts to console her, and her departing son, by saying that the King’s virtue will make of the King a husband to her and a father to the young Count. But the King’s kind step-fatherly status won’t last long, it seems; he is mortally ill; his physicians can do nothing for him. The Countess believes that Helena’s father, a physician “whose skill was almost as great as his honesty,” could have prolonged the King’s life “so far” that he “would have made nature immortal” (I.i.17-18). But this physician evidently could not heal himself, as he too has died, leaving Helena under the Countess’s protection. Lafeu knew the man, saying, “he was skillful enough to have liv’d still, if knowledge could be set up against mortality” (I.i.26-27). Lafeu discreetly reminds the Countess of the limits of what we now call ‘scientific’ knowledge, which can indeed be set up against mortality but not eternally. God might make nature immortal, but physicians cannot.

    The Countess claims another kind of knowledge, moral knowledge. Helena has inherited honesty and, more generally, goodness from her father. “The remembrance of her father never approaches her heart but the tyranny of her sorrows takes all livelihood from her cheek” (I.i.43-44). Perhaps alerted by the word “tyranny,” Lafeu makes bold to correct the Countess and also her protégé. “Moderate lamentation is the right of the dead: excessive grief the enemy to the living” (I.i.48-49). 

    Bertram interrupts their philosophizing. “Madam, I desire your holy wishes” (I.i.52). His mother blesses him, exhorting him to “succeed thy father in manners, as in shape!” (I.i.54-55). “Thy blood and virtue / Contend for empire in thee, and thy goodness / Share with thy birthright!” (I.i.55-57). That is, a young aristocrat’s spirited “blood,” which elevates him above commoners, may rival his moral virtue as he reaches the age of self-rule. Accordingly, she gives him moral advice that will strengthen his virtue against his “blood,” if he chooses to follow it: “Love all, trust a few, / Do wrong to none; be able for thine enemy / Rather in power than use, and keep thy friend / Under thy own life’s key; be check’d for silence, / But never tax’d for speech. What heaven more will, / That thee may furnish, and my prayers pluck down, / Fall on thy head!” (I.i.57-62) Reduced to simple English, her advice is sound. Christianity commands us to love all, but to trust God; humans may be trusted provisionally, after testing. Be just, and match your enemy’s power but not his customs, his habits—the practices that make him your enemy. Guard your friend with your life. Speak but do not chatter. Beyond that, God will do as He will do, and I shall pray that His blessings will fall upon you.

    Countess, Count, and Lafeu depart, leaving Helena alone. We learn that in truth her sentiments align with Lafeu’s wise precept: she “think[s] not on my father” (I.i.73). “I have forgot him; my imagination / Carries no favor in’t but Bertram’s” (I.i.76-77). Her tears and her pallor are for his departure to the royal court, not for her father’s departure from this earth, six months earlier. In her mind she has followed the Biblical injunction to leave her father and join with her husband, but as with ‘Rousillon’ itself, imagination isn’t reality. Nor is it likely to become reality, as Count Bertram is far “above me,” a commoner, like a star above the earth (I.i.81). Her “blood” does not equal his. For this reason, her love, like the funereal “delivery” of the Count to the King by the Countess, contradicts itself. “Th’ ambition in my love thus plagues itself: / The hind that would be mated by the lion / Must die for love” (I.i.84-85). Helena initially takes the “blood” of aristocratic birth to be a part of nature; aristocrats are a different ‘species’ than commoners, and to contradict nature only invites nature to enforce this natural limit by killing the thing which contradicts it. Like her father, Helena has contracted an illness that threatens to be fatal, although in her case she might cure herself by refusing to dream of marrying above her putatively natural limit. Her own nature, however, makes that supremely difficult for her to do, as she loves him.

    The question, then, is, what is her natural limit? Should she love him? Is social and political rank more natural than virtue? Is her beloved’s virtue worthy of her love? Is her virtue worthy of his love? She admits to herself that she loves him for his body, not his soul—for “his arched brows, his hawking eye, his curls” (I.i.88). She knows she indulges in “idolatrous fancy,” idolatry being precisely devotion to bodies instead of souls and worse, the divinization of the inanimate (I.i.91). She calls into question her own virtue, which is now tested.

    Tested in the person of Parolles, Count Bertram’s attendant. Helena says, “I love [Parolles] for his sake”—for Bertram’s sake—yet “I know him a notorious liar” and “think him a great fool, soley a coward” (I.i.93-95). The pun is apt: Parolles’ soul will indeed prove entirely pusillanimous. Parolles’ name means “speech”—highly suspect speech, in Helena’s opinion; in this she follows the Countess’ admonition about the right and wrong use of speech and silence. Parolles immediately proves himself an ironist, addressing her as “fair queen” (I.i.100)—with a likely pun on ‘queen’ as ‘whore,’ a false wish that has fathered the evil thought. He proceeds impudently but not Socratically, asking if she’s “meditating on virginity” (I.i.105). In a way she has been, so she answers by taking up his theme while rejecting his imputation, replying, “Man is enemy to virginity; how may we barricade it against him?” (I.i.107-08). After some punning and suggestive badinage, Parolles speaks his mind: “It is not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve virginity. Loss of virginity is rational increase; and there was never virgin got till virginity was first lost. That you were made of is metal to make virgins. Virginity by being once lost may be ten times found; by being ever kept, it is ever lost. ‘Tis too cold a companion; away with’t,” being “against the rule of nature” (I.i.120-125, 127). All true enough. Scarcely against perpetual virginity, Helena then asks, now speaking her mind, how might a woman “lose [virginity] to her own liking?” (I.i.141). Parolles doesn’t answer her question, instead urging her to abandon her virginity in haste. 

    With perfect equanimity, Helena doesn’t respond to his suggestion, instead turning the conversation to Parolles’ “master” (I.i.154). She worries that when he gets to the King’s court he’ll have “a thousand loves” and therefore a mind whose attention will divide itself in many directions, from friends to enemies and, most pertinently in her own mind, “a mistress,” “a traitress,” and “a dear” (I.i.154-58). He will become self-contradictory, a man of “humble ambition” and “proud humility,” a being of “jarring concord” and “discord dulcet” and “sweet disaster”—in sum, no fit master at all (I.i.159-61). She has given Parolles every reason to suspect that she worries less that the Count will be a fit master for him as that she can never be a fit mistress for his master. The arrival of a page, advising him of his master’s summons to accompany him to the King’s court, has the welcome effect of removing Parolles from her presence and thereby rescuing her from any further unwanted advances. In their farewells she distracts him by ridiculing his self-proclaimed warlikeness, to which he can only rejoin that he intends to “naturalize” her upon his return (I.i.195), unless she gets herself “a good husband” before then (I.i.200-01). Indeed, she will try.

    Helena’s dialogue with oily Parolles, her only true rival for the Count’s affections, has roused her fighting spirit. Alone again, she no longer mopes over impossibility of reaching to the star that is her beloved. The stars do not rule us. “The fated sky / Gives us free scope; only doth backward pull / Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.” (I.i.203-05). The power that “mounts my love so high,” enabling me to see him even when he isn’t here, also enables me to distinguish fortune from nature (I.i.206). The distance between us is a matter of fortune, a thing of the fated sky, but nature enables her not only to imagine but to think. “Who ever strove / To show her merit that did miss her love?” (I.i.212-13). I know how to cure the King’s disease, and therefore can justify my own presence in his Court.  

    At the Court, in Paris, the King of France has made a geopolitical decision. Two Tuscan city-states are at war—Florence and Siena. And indeed they were, throughout the decade of the 1550s. At that time, France was resisting the ambitions of the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, who was also Charles I of Spain. The Hapsburgs ruled Roussillon, although the native Catalans remained restive under their rule. In search of allies, France sided with the Lutherans in Germany and the Ottomans; in 1555 Pope Paul IV tilted toward France, ruining the Hapsburgs’ hopes for a worldwide empire. In the following year, Charles divided his kingdom between the Spanish Hapsburgs (headed by his son, Philip II) and the Austrian Hapsburgs (headed by Charles’s brother, Ferdinand). Siena would lose its war with Florence and be surrendered to Spain, Florence’s ally.

    In the play, the French King knows he will receive a request from his cousin, the Austrian Hapsburg monarch, to deny aid to Florence. This means that the Austrian Hapsburgs are indirectly opposing the ambitions of the Spanish Hapsburgs. The King, who must know that many of the residents of Siena are of French origin, intends to go along with his cousin’s request, but, hedging his bet, will allow French gentlemen to fight on either side, as they choose. As one of the King’s attendants observes, this “may well serve / A nursery to our gentry, who are sick / For breathing and exploit” (I.ii.15-17). That is, the young aristocrats grow restive; abroad, they will hone their battle skills against foreigners and (it might be thought) not against the King at home; those who survive will return better officers in the army of France. 

    Count Bertram, Parolles, and Lafeu arrive at the King’s Court. In terms of the history of the time, this is anomalous not only because there were no more Roussillonian counts but because Roussillon was ruled by the Hapsburgs, owing no allegiance to France and indeed forming part of Spain, France’s rival. However, it may be that these men, all of whose names are French and therefore would number among the substantial French population of Roussillon (as well as ‘Rousillon’) do feel stronger loyalty to the King of France than to any Hapsburg.

    The King greets the young Count cordially but with prudent caution. He is no Helena, his judgment swayed by physical appearance. “Youth, thou bear’st thy father’s face,” a face well formed by “frank nature”—the word “frank” meaning both vigorous and Frankish, French (I.ii.19-20). Nature is “curious”—that is, careful—never working “in haste”; that is why his face is so “well compos’d” (I.ii.20-21). But the King knows that a face is only a face. “Thy father’s moral parts / Mayst thou inherit too!” he hopes (I.i..21-22). Having served in battle with the Count’s father, the King judges him as having been “Discipled of the bravest” (I.ii.28); his wit was equal to today’s “young lords,” but unlike them he exhibited neither “contempt nor bitterness” (I.ii.33,36). “His honor, / Clock to itself, knew the true minute when / Exception bid him speak, and at this time / His tongue obey’d his hand” (I.ii.38-41). In all this, and especially in “his humility,” he “might be a copy to these younger times” (I.ii.44-46). Merely speaking of him is medicine to the ailing King; “it much repairs me” (I.ii.30), even as his example, if followed by young French aristocrats, would considerably improve them and repair France. Unfortunately, the “judgments” of today’s young are often “mere fathers of their garments,” and their “constancies / Expire before their fashions” (I.ii.61-63). Finally, the memory of the long-lived Count reminds the King of the Count’s physician, Helena’s father, who might have cured the King, had he still lived.

    Back at the Count’s palace in Rousillon, the palace clown, Lavache, asks the Countess’s blessing to marry Isbel, a commoner lass with a regal Spanish name. “I am driven on by the flesh” (I.iii.28), and as a sinner “I do marry that I may repent” (I.iii.35-36), as marriage is a sacrament. What is more, marriage may gain him friends, which he has not now. And if cuckolded, why then he will profit, as the lover will cherish his wife, who according to the Christian teaching is of ‘one flesh’ with himself. Cuckoldry unites even Puritans and Catholics, “howsome’er their hearts are sever’d in religion, their heads are one” because their cuckholds’ horns tangle together like jousting deer in a herd. He even has a ballad to celebrate the thought: “Your marriage comes by destiny, / Your cuckoo sings by kind” (I.iii.59-60). Marriage may be destined but cuckoldry is natural; destiny is really chance, as the odds of drawing a good woman in the marriage lottery are, he estimates, one in ten. “La Vache!” in French slang is an expression of astonishment, as in the English phrase immortalized in America by Phil Rizzuto, ‘Holy Cow!’ Offended and amused at this perpetually surprising man, the Countess sends him to fetch Helena. Before he goes, Lavache compares her to Helen of Troy, whose “fair face” may have caused the Greeks to sack Troy, after the young Trojan prince, Paris, had seduced her and carried her off from her husband, King Menelaus of Sparta (I.iii.67). But this Helen has already resisted the advances of Parolles, although she does intend to go to Paris.

    The palace steward reports that he overheard Helena talking to herself about her love for Bertram. The Countess is not surprised, and is in fact pleased, regarding the nature of Helena to be sound. Helena understands her nature to be the nature of youth, when “love’s strong passion is impress’d” (I.iii.124). The Countess calls her in and teases her by saying, “I am a mother to you,” knowing that if she really were Helena’s mother Bertram would be the girl’s brother, and unmarriageable (I.iii.128). It takes some doing, but she extracts the confession, “I love your son” (I.iii.185). Unworthy of him by convention, by social standing, “I follow him not / By any token of presumptuous suit, / Nor would I have him till I do deserve him,” but I “never know how that desert should be,” and so “love in vain” (I.iii.188-92). Why then do you intend to go to Paris and the King’s Court? Because “my father left me some prescriptions / Of rare and prov’d effects, such as his reading / And manifest experience had collected / For general sovereignty” (I.iii.212-15). Among these is a remedy that can cure the King. In curing the King, she might prove herself worthy of the Count. The Countess blesses her mission, possibly suspecting the young lady’s ulterior motive, and approving it.

    In Paris, the King bids farewell to the young and older lords who are off to the Tuscan war; in victory, he assures them, they will be rewarded. “See that you come / Not to woo honor, but to wed it,” so that “fame may cry you aloud” (II.i.14-15,17). And beware “the girls of Italy,” who may make you “captives before you serve” (II.i.22). To his indignity, Bertram is judged too young to go. Parolles urges him to disobey, to “steal away bravely” (II.i.29), and Bertram determines do it, “though the devil lead the measure,” as Parolles somewhat self-revealingly intones.

    The King next receives a different kind of rhetorician, one who would persuade him to be saved, not hazarded. Telling him that the esteemed physician Gerard de Narbon was her father, Helena describes the medicine he had, which can cure his illness. The King doubts this, since his own “most learned doctors” have failed, concluding “that laboring art can never ransom nature / From her inaidable estate” (II.i.115). He knows the peril he faces, and also knows that she has “no art,” only a lesser sort of knowledge passed down from her good father (II.i.132). True, Helena replies, but “what I can do can do no hurt to try, / Since you set up your rest ‘gainst remedy” (II.i.133-34). More, “He that of greatest works is finisher / Oft does them by the weakest minister” (II.i.135-36). Unlike Parolles, Helena appeals to reason—the medicine can do no harm to a dying man—and piety—the God who can make all things end well can readily pour his through a weak vessel. What is more, God is not only omnipotent but all-knowing; therefore, “Of heaven, not me, make an experiment” (II.i.153). I am willing to make it, on pain of death; if I fail, “with vilest torture let my life be ended” (II.i.173). It may well be that her faith is in nature, in the medicine, that her rhetoric of piety originates only from an intention to counteract the King’s skepticism concerning her competence, but that is still more solid, and undoubtedly better-intentioned, than the rhetoric of Parolles, which is mere verbiage. 

    She has persuaded the King. “Methinks in thee some blessed spirit doth speak / His powerful sound within an organ weak; / And what impossibility would slay / In common sense, sense saves another way” (II.i.174-77)—reasoning founded on uncommon premises also persuades. He is especially impressed with her Christlike willingness to sacrifice her life after torture: “Sweet practiser, thy physic I will try, / That ministers thine own death if I die” (II.184-85). He hasn’t reckoned on the serpentine prudence Christ commends along with dovelike innocence. “If I help,” Helena ventures, “what do you promise me?” (II.i.188). And will you “make it even,” repay my life-saving service to you with something equally vital to me? The King agrees. Very well: if my medicine cures you, “Thou shalt give me with thy kingly hand / What husband in thy power I will command” (II.i.192-93)—aside from a man of French royal blood, she assures him. The King again agrees.

    Comic piety enters in, in a more obvious way, in dialogue between the Countess and her Clown. The Countess has a mission for him. “I shall now put you to the height of your breeding,” she says (II.ii.1). “I will show myself highly fed and lowly taught,” he promises, anticipating that she will send him to the King’s Court (II.ii.3). The Countess demands to know what “makes you special,” to suppose that he would have business there (II.ii.5). Why, because “I have an answer will serve all men,” the highest as well as the lowest (II.ii.14). You mean “your answer [will] serve all questions,” “an answer of such fitness for all questions?” the Countess inquires (II.ii.18,27). But of course, and he invites her to try him with questions. He answers each with “O Lord, sir!” But what if your impudence leads to your whipping? “I ne’er had worse luck in my life in my ‘O Lord, sir!’ I see things may serve long, but not serve ever.” (II.ii.52-53). Not all appeals to God will answer all questions, especially if the appeal provokes corporal punishment. In this, the Clown is less than Christlike, although not lacking in prudence, either. The irony is that the Countess does have business for him in the King’s Court, namely, to deliver a letter to Helena, for whom she continues to care and whom she will continue to advise.

    There, Helena’s cure has worked, and the remaining personages in the palace marvel at it. Pious Lafeu remarks, “They say miracles are past; and we have our philosophical persons to make modern”—commonplace—and “familiar things supernatural and causeless” (II.iii.1-3). This causes us “to make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear (II.iii.3-5). This, Bertram and Parolles concede (Parolles a bit too volubly), puts into question the authority of the great physicians Galen and Paracelsus. Helena and the audience know that the fated sky gives us free scope, and evidently so does God, since the King’s cure came from nature, carefully searched by man.

    The King in his grace, and according to his contract, grants Helena her choice of bachelors, one of which she takes to be the cure of her own illness, her love-sickness. “This is the man,” she says, indicating Bertram, in an echo of the Gospel announcement of our Savior (II.iii.102). Bertram wants none of it. “Your Highness, / In such a business give me leave to use / The help of mine own eyes” (II.iii.104-06). In this he reveals his rebellious character to the King, apparently preferring his natural judgment to the King’s obligation, but in fact objecting to her inferior social standing (“A poor physician’s daughter my wife! Disdain / Rather corrupt me ever!”) (II.iii.113-14). 

    But the King is the King. He can exalt those of low degree, grant noble status to Helena. It is, after all, only a convention, and one within his power to mend. More seriously, he continues, you mistakenly rate convention over nature. “Strange it is that our bloods, / Of color, weight, and heat, pour’d all together, / Would quite confound distinction, yet stand off / In differences so mighty” (II.iii.116-19). In nature there is no such thing as ‘blue’ blood. “If she be / All that is virtuous—save what thou dislik’st, / A poor physician’s daughter—thou dislik’st / Of virtue for the name; but do not so.” (II.iii.119-22). 

    Why not? “From lowest place when virtuous things proceed, / The place is dignified by the doer’s deed; / Where great additions swell’s, and virtue none, / It is a dropsied honor.” (II.iii.123-26). Being “young, wise, and fair,” Helena is heir to nature, and her natural virtues “breed honor” (II.iii.129-131). To lack virtue is to dishonor honorable parent, and virtue exhibits itself in acts; “the mere word’s a slave,” a “lying trophy”—as Parolles would rather not believe, and as Bertram misleads himself insofar as he follows Parolles’ advice (II.iii.135,137). “If thou canst like this creature as a maid, / I can create the rest. Virtue and she / Is her own dower; honor and wealth from me.” (II.iii.140-42). 

    It is an irrefutable argument, but Bertram rejects it: “I cannot love her, nor will strive to do’t” (II.iii.143). In invoking his own honor as a count, Bertram only provokes the King to invoke his own greater honor. “My honor’s at the stake; which to defeat, / I must produce my power.” (II.iii.147-48). Bertram quickly seems to yield, and the King marries them on the spot.

    Bertram remains obdurate in thought if obedient in action. Married, he determines to go to the wars “and never bed her,” never consummate the marriage (II.iii.266). Parolles, unchastened by a severe scolding by Lafeu, presses him on, offering his version of practical wisdom: “A young man married is a man that’s marr’d. / Therefore away, and leave her bravely; go, / The King has done you wrong.” (II.iii.291-93). He goes next to Helena to inform her that her husband will depart tonight “on very serious business” (II.iv.38). She contents herself to say only, “On everything I wait upon his will” (II.iv.52).

    In the struggle for Bertram’s mind and heart, and thus his will and actions, Parolles seems to have won, twice calling Bertram his “sweetheart” (II.iii.261,264). Just before his departure Bertram, tells the dismayed Lafeu that Parolles is “very great in knowledge, and accordingly valiant” (II.v.6-7). On the contrary, the elderly lord insists, in front of Parolles, Parolles is a liar and a coward. “There can be no kernel in this light nut the soul of this man is his clothes; trust him not in matter of heavy consequence” (II.v.41-43), such as the war you are about to fight in. He walks away, Helena walks in, and Bertram refuses to kiss her goodbye—one last act of contempt, expressive of his mind and heart.

    In Florence, the Duke receives two French lords, who head a troop of soldiers. They are brothers, the captains Dumain. As ‘Parolles’ means speech, words, ‘du main’ means ‘of the hand’; these are men of deeds, not words. Given that “the fundamental reasons of this war” strike the lords as “holy,” the Duke wonders why “our cousin France” does not support him (III.i.2,4). For reasons of state, the lords cannot disclose the reasoning of the King, who prefers not to offend his other cousin, the Austrian monarch who opposes Florence. They content themselves to observe that the young French lords, “that surfeit on their ease” (like the French King, they’ve been described as diseased), “will day by day / Come here for physic” (III.i.17-18). When Bertram arrives a short time later, the Duke makes him the general of his cavalry, whereupon the young Count swears by “Great Mars” to “make me but like my thoughts,” that “I shall prove / A lover of thy drum, hater of love” (III.iii.9-11). Indeed, he has already written to his mother to tell her that while he has deferred to the French King’s command to marry Helena he will never consummate the marriage and instead has gone to war.

    The Countess is not amused. “This is not well,” she tells the Clown, when her “rash and unbridled boy” takes it upon himself “to fly the favors of so good a king,” angering him “by misprizing… a maid too virtuous / For the contempt of empire” (III.ii.26-27,29-30). Bertram has gone so far as to lay down a sort of love-test for the woman who is already his bride: If she can remove the ring from his finger, “which shall never come off, and show me a child begotten of thy body that I am father to, then call me husband; but in such a ‘then’ I write ‘never'” (III.ii.55-58). The Countess blames her son’s corruption on Parolles, “a very tainted fellow and full of wickedness” (III.ii.85). My son “can never win” on the battlefield “the honor that he loses” in turning his back on his King and his wife (III.ii.92-93). 

    Faced with an apparently impossible challenge, Helena first prays (and not to Mars) that her husband will survive the war, feeling guilty at the thought that she has caused him to go (which is not true) and risk his life. She thinks that if she now leaves France he will return to it, and to safely; in this, her love is selfless, a desire for what is good for him. She writes to the Countess, announcing her intention to set out on her own mission as a pilgrim to the shrine of Saint Jaques le Grand “with sainted vow my faults to have amended” (III.iv.7). Bertram “is too good and fair for death and me; / Whom I myself embrace to set him free” (III.iv.16-17). Upon reading this intention in Helena’s letter, the Countess can only hope that this will indeed induce her son to return, and for Helena then to reverse her course and return as well. 

    It turns out that Helena will soon form other plans, if indeed she hadn’t already done so at the time she wrote her farewell letter to the Countess. As before, she does not intend entirely to leave matters up to God. She heads not for the saint’s shrine, west of Rousillon, but in exactly the opposite direction, to Florence. Outside that city, the elderly Widow Capilet, her daughter Diana, and their friend Mariana converse. Parolles has been courting Mariana, who rightly regards him as “a filthy officer” unworthy of her attention (III.v.15). She warns Diana against both Parolles and Bertram, whose words in her judgment are only “engines of lust” (III.v.18). Diana, named after the chaste goddess of the hunt, assures her: “You shall not need to fear me” (III.v.26). Helena approaches them, ostensibly on the way to the shrine, and the widow invites her to lodge at her house. The lady also asks if she knows Count Rousillon and expresses her pity for his new wife, as the Count has been courting Diana, rather in contradiction to his vow to Mars, not to mention his wedding vow. Not knowing that she is speaking with that wife, the Widow suggests that Diana may be able to do the wronged woman “a shrewd turn” (III.v.64). 

    With perfect comic timing, Bertram and Parolles appear, at the head of the army—Parolles in the unheroic role of drummer. Playing along with her disguise, Helena asks her companions which one is “the Frenchman,” that is, the Count. Diana points him out, asking “Is’t not a handsome gentleman?” (III.v.77). “I like him well,” Helena admits; “‘Tis pity he is not honest,” Diana ripostes, not intending to wound anything better than the Count’s reputation. As for Parolles, “Were I his lady / I would poison that vile rascal” (III.v.81). The men march past, the women retire to the Widow’s house.

    Encamped in front of Florence, the French lords warn Bertram of Parolles. “He’s a most notable coward, an infinite and endless liar, an hourly promise-breaker, the owner of no one good quality worthy your lordship’s entertainment” (III.vi.8-11). Bertram agrees to test him with a task less daunting than the one he assigned his wife. Parolles lost his drum during Florence’s victorious battle with the Sejoys and has vowed to recover it. Let him try, but have him intercepted by a troop of Florentines; they will pretend to be Sejoys and interrogate him. “Be but your lordship present at his examination,” at which Parolles will be blindfolded; “if he do not, for the promise of his life and in the highest compulsion of base fear, offer to betray you and deliver all the intelligence in his power against you, and that with the divine forfeit of his soul upon oath, never trust my judgment in anything” (III.vi.23-28). Having settled on this plan, Bertram confides to one of the lords that the fair Diana, though “wondrous cold”—having returned his love-letters—will receive a return visit from him (III.vi.103). The lord is eager to come with him and look her over.

    The women will be ready for them. Helena admits to the Widow that Bertram is her husband. She enlists the lady’s help. Since the Count “woos your daughter,” let her consent to his suit but demand his ring as a token of his love (III.vii.17). This is nothing more than a “lawful” plot, since your daughter will then deliver the ring to me and “herself most chastely absent,” as her namesake the goddess would do (III.vii.33). With the ring in her possession, Helena will then be able to consummate her marriage in a dark bedroom. Her husband will intend wickedly while acting lawfully, prey to his wife’s noble deception. 

    The deceptive plot Bertram is in on proceeds as planned, in Bertram’s absence. On orders from the Second Lord, the men who seize Parolles will speak gibberish, nonsense words that Mr. Words, Mr. Speech, cannot understand. One soldier will act as ‘translator.’ During the stakeout, the men hear Parolles talking to himself, trying to find the words with which he can cover his failure to recover his drum. He wishes he hadn’t promised to retrieve it in the first place. “I find my tongue is too foolhardy; but my heart hath the fear of Mars before, and of his creatures, not daring the reports of my tongue” (IV.i.28-29). He has lied not only to others but even to himself: “What the devil should move me to undertake the recovery of this drum, being not ignorant of the impossibility, and knowing I had no such purpose?” (IV.i.31-33). The Second Lord wonders, “Is it possible he should know what he is, and be that he is?” (IV.i.41). It is. Clever but imprudent, Parolles out-talks himself, deceiving himself more than he deceives anyone other than those (like Bertram) whom he tells what they want to hear. Seized by men who evidently speak some foreign language he doesn’t know, Parolles exclaims, “I shall lose my life for want of language,” although he knows five languages (IV.i.66). For the man who depends upon mere words alone, there are not always words enough; Shakespeare himself was not only a playwright but an actor. “O, let me live,” Parolles pleads with his captors, through the ‘translator,’ “and all the secrets of our camp I’ll show, / their force, their purpose” (IV.i.80-82). The Second Lord considers him a woodcock, a bird easily trapped, synonymous with a fool, a dupe. The con artist is a fool; in trying to fool others with words he won’t live up to, he ends by fooling himself with words he can’t live up to, and getting fooled by others with words that mean nothing at all.

    Meanwhile, Bertram is pursuing his other, romantic, plot. At the Widow Capilet’s house, he tries Diana with Parollian sophistries. “You should be as your mother was / When your sweet self was got” (IV.ii.9-10). “She was then honest,” Diana says, irrefutably (IV.ii.11), adding, “My mother did but duty; such, my lord, / As you owe to your wife” (IV.ii.12-13). Not so, the Count replies: “I was compell’d to her, but I love thee” (IV.ii.15). He vows loyalty based upon that loving consent. Diana ventures to doubt his honesty. “Be not so holy cruel,” Bertram pleads, for “love is holy” and I am in love with you (IV.ii.33). Pretending to yield, the lady demands the ring, which he will lend her, not give her, as it is an heirloom “which were the greatest obloquy i’ th’ world / In me to lose” (IV.ii.44). Yes, well, “Mine honor’s such a ring,” and my chastity “the jewel of our house,” the “greatest obloquy i’ th’ world / In me to lose,” the lady rejoins. At this Bertram gives up: “Here, take my ring; / My house, mine honor, yea, my life, be thine; / And I’ll be bid by thee” (IV.51-53). In mock betrothal, she gives him a ring off her own finger in exchange; it is really Helena’s ring, given her by the King as a marriage gift.

    Springing the trap, she tells him to visit her bedroom at midnight, but to stay absolutely silent. I shall return your ring later on, with an explanation for this strange lack of speech among lovers, which we know is necessary because it will be Helena in the bed. The required silence is not only necessary but fitting. The problem with Bertram and Parolles is that they talk too much. The plot against Parolles takes advantage of that. The plot against Bertram requires him to act silently in a good way, if with bad intent. If Judaism is said to be a religion of law and outward compliance to it, and Christian a religion of release from the consequences of bad actions with the insistence on right intentions, Helena’s plot executes her rightful intention with respect to Bertram while duping him into acting in accordance with the law, against his own wrongful intention. After he leaves, Helena reflects that Mother told me men talk and act this way; quite understandably, she resolves to “live and die a maid” (IV.ii.74).

    Back in the Florentine camp, the French lords have learned that a peace has been concluded. The lords discuss Bertram, who has now received the letter of reprimand from the Countess. “There is something in’t that stings his nature,” the First Lord remarks; “for on the reading it he chang’d almost into another man,” rather as conversion to Christianity changes a sinner into a new man (IV.iii.2-3). This is just, the Second Lord says, as “he has much worthy blame laid upon him for shaking off so good a wife and so sweet a lady,” especially by so incurring “the everlasting displeasure of the King,” the First Lord adds. (IV.iii.5-7). Worse, he has “perverted a young gentlewoman here in Florence,” giving her his ring; worst of all, he has caused his wife to die of grief (one of the lords has heard) at Saint Jaques le Grand. “I am heartily sorry that he’ll be glad of this,” the First Lord laments (IV.iii.60); “how mightily some times we drown our gain in tears!” (IV.iii.63-64). 

    Despite his courage on the battlefield, in love Bertram is as much a traitor as Parolles, and the Second Lord asks if it is not damnable in themselves to continue to cooperate in the plot against his vile adviser. The First Lord suggests that in doing so they serve justice, inasmuch as the Count has farther to fall than Parolles: “The great dignity that his valor hath here acquir’d for him”—something cowardly all-talk Parolles has so conspicuously failed to acquire—shall “at home be encount’red with a shame as ample” (IV.iii.64-65). The Second Lord draws the moral: “The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together. Our virtues would be proud if our faults whipt them not; and our crimes would despair if they were not cherish’d by our virtues” (IV.iii.69-72). 

    The Count arrives, announcing that of his remaining business in Florence, “the greatest” remains unresolved (IV.iii.86); he of course doesn’t specify that this is his recently concluded tryst with Diana—in fact the unwitting consummation of his marriage to Helena—not knowing that the lords know exactly what he means. But now he would hear the continuing interrogation of Parolles. He listens as blindfolded Parolles says he speaks truth regarding his estimate of the number of horsemen under the Count’s command, and indeed he does, the Count confirms, “But I con him no thanks for’t in the nature he delivers it” (IV.iii.144). That is, for once Parolles speaks truly, but the nature of his intent in doing so is false, treasonous. His treachery extends to Bertram’s private affairs, as well; he’s written to Diana, again quite truly, saying “the Count’s a fool, and full of gold” (IV.iii.196).

    Having decided that Bertram is to blame for his predicament (after all, he tells himself, he wouldn’t have been captured if he hadn’t been trying to impress the Count), he is happy to betray him. As he tells his interrogator, “I knew the young Count to be a dangerous and lascivious boy, who is a whale to virginity, and devours up all the fry it finds” (IV.iii.203-05). In calling Parolles a “damnable, both-sides rogue,” Bertram also speaks the truth and not incidentally does not deny the truth Parolles has spoken (IV.iii.206). In learning the truth, the nature, of Parolles, Bertram begins to learn the truth of himself. He also begins to learn the truth about, the nature of, parole, of speech itself, which can be true or false, honest testimony or a both-sides rogue, subject to yet another form of speech, the speech of judgment, the speech of vindication and of damnation.

    As Parolles rattles on, disclosing information on the number of foot soldiers in the army and slandering both of the French lords (cowards, rapists) the Second Lord finds him oddly entertaining. Parolles says of the First Lord,”He has everything that an honest man should not have; what an honest man should have, he has nothing”; “I begin to love him for this,” the Second Lord admits (IV.iii.242-44). The man “hath out-villain’d villainy so far that the rarity redeems him” (IV.iii.255). After assuring his captors that he will readily betray both the Duke of Florence and Count Rousillon, Parolles has his blindfold removed. He sees the Count. “You are undone, Captain,” the soldier-‘translator’ says—”all but your scarf,” which is still knotted around his throat (IV.iii.300-301). The empty suit has nothing left to wear but a sort of noose.

    When his interrogators leave him alone, he soliloquizes. True to his nature, he gives his truest confession yet: “If my heart were great, / ‘Twould burst at this” (IV.iii.307-08). Since it isn’t, it doesn’t. “Simply the thing I am / Shall make me live,” although he does draw a modest moral: “Who knows himself a braggart, / Let him fear this; for it will come to pass / That every braggart shall be found an ass” (IV.iii.310-13). “Parolles,” he advises himself, “live safest in shame. Being fool’d, by fool’ry thrive. / There’s place and means for every man alive” (IV.iii.316). Knowing himself, he concludes that even rogues have their place in the natural order, in his own way echoing the Second Lord’s moral. It isn’t only speech, the distinctively human part of human nature, that’s double-sided; nature is, too, and therein lies its comedy and its tragedy, both.

    Helena sees this, too. Her plot successful, her marriage consummated without her husband’s knowledge—a sort of just and lawful cuckoldry—she thanks her allies at the Widow’s house, who will be rewarded when she receives the King’s promised reward. There will be justice among the women. Not so much among men, however. She reflects: “O, strange men! / That can such sweet use make of what they hate, / When saucy trusting of the cozen’d thoughts / Defiles the pitchy night” (IV.iv.21-24). But with her female allies at hand and their joint mission accomplished, “All’s Well That Ends Well” (IV.iv.35). Reason, in line with nature, can make sense of nature’s apparent self-contradictions and, if it guides human actions, share in its telos, which is served by many means, among them the natural increase that results from mating. The women will travel to Marseilles to meet with the King, who has stopped there on his way to Rousillon.

    At the Count’s palace in Rousillon, the Countess, Lafeu, and the Clown await the return of the prodigal son. They too have heard that Helena has died. Lafeu blames Parolles, whose villainy “would have made all the unbak’d and doughy youth of a nation in his color,” which is the “saffron” yellow of cowardice (IV.v.2-3). The Countess agrees, saying his machinations caused “the death of the most virtuous gentlewoman that ever nature had praise for creating” (IV.v.7-9). Lefeu engages in badinage with the Clown, who plays on the fact that ‘le feu’ means fire by announcing himself to be in the service of the great Prince of this world, a prince even greater than the French King, the prince who “ever keeps a good fire” (IV.v.43). The Clown tells Lafeu that any tricks he plays “are their own right by the law of nature” (IV.v.55)—the concordia discors, the law that admits contraries as servants of its telos, the end that is well.

    Sending the Clown away, Lafeu confides to the Countess that he has asked the King to “speak in the behalf of my daughter,” Maudlin, as a bride for the widower, Bertram (IV.v.64). The Countess approves. The King will arrive at Rousillon tomorrow. Bertram is there now, and they go to see him. For her part, having missed the King in Marseilles, Helena has sent a letter to him, a letter signed by Diana, which will further her plot.

    Parolles is already in Rousillon, hoping that Lafeu will intervene mercifully in his favor. He runs into the Clown and describes himself as “muddied in Fortune’s mood, and smell[ing] somewhat strong of her strong displeasure” (V.ii.3-5). The Clown is more than equal to a battle of words with Mr. Speech. “Fortune’s displeasure is but sluttish, if it smell so strongly as thou speak’st of; stand aside, sir” (V.ii.6-7). “Nay, you need not stop your nose, sir; I spake but by a metaphor,” Parolles protests (V.ii.9-10). “Indeed, sir, if your metaphor stink, I will stop my nose; or against any man’s metaphor” (V.ii.11-12). The Clown, being a comedian, knows the doubleness, the ambiguity, of words very well. He understands Parolles, that living pun, that walking metaphor of the potential duplicity of speech.

    Lafeu comes by, and Parolles turns to him. “I am a man whom Fortune hath cruelly scratched,” he begins, altering his metaphor (V.ii.28). Lafeu is quick to defend Fortune’s honor: “Wherein have you played the knave with Fortune, that she should scratch you, who of herself is a good lady and would not have knaves thrive long under her?” (V.ii.30-32). He knows all about the tale of the drum, mocking Parolles because of it. He does show mercy, however, telling Parolles, “Though you are a fool and a knave, you shall eat” (V.v.50-51). “I praise God for you,” Parolles replies, in a rare show of piety (V.ii.52). 

    Lafeu is off to the Count’s palace, where he meets with the King, the Countess, and the French lords, none of whom know Helena is alive. “Your son,” the King tells the Countess, “as mad with folly, lack’d the sense to know / Her estimation home,” that is, her true worth (V.iii.2-4). The Countess attributes her son’s misjudgment to “natural rebellion, done in the blaze of youth,” when passion overcomes “reason’s force” and burns the one who is impassioned (V.iii.6-7). She had warned her son of exactly this danger, how his “blood” contended with virtue for empire over his soul, but he heeded Parolles’ tempting words instead of her parental ones. The King assures her of his forgiveness, and Lafeu observes that for all the injuries Bertram has done, he did “the greatest wrong of all” to “himself” (V.iii.14-15). And in answer to the King’s query, Lafeu reports that Bertram has consented to marry Maudlin, in submission to the King’s intention. The King mentions the Duke of Florence’s letters of commendation; the young Count’s soul has some important warlike virtues, virtues no king, no defender of the realm, would rightly overlook. This marriage can serve France.

    Bertram enters, repentant, pleading for mercy. The King grants it, and asks if he remembers the daughter of Lord Lafeu. He does, “admiringly,” as she had been his first choice in marriage, so much so, he claims, that he underestimated the beauty of all other women, including Helena. “Thence it came / That she whom all men prais’d, and whom myself, / Since I have lost, have lov’d, was in mine eye / The dust that did offend it” (V.iii.51-54). He thus radically changes his earlier story. Initially, he had argued that Helena was unworthy of him because beneath him in social standing, a mere physician’s daughter. Helena had proved her merit to the King by curing him, by her knowledge of nature, a knowledge more valuable than any convention. Now, if Bertram’s account is to be credited, it transpires that Bertram’s aversion was also natural, not conventional, an attraction to Maudlin’s beauty which “warp’d” his perception of Helena’s beauty, making her seem “hideous” (V.iii.49,52).

    The politic King does credit, or at least says he credits, the Count’s account. “Well excus’d,” he judges (V.iii.55). As always, he draws a moral: “Oft our displeasures, to ourselves unjust, / Destroy our friends, and after weep their dust; / Our own love waking cries to see what’s done, / While shameful hate sleeps out the afternoon. / Be this sweet Helen’s knell.” (V.iii.63-67). But for a king, the dead past must bury its dead, lest those who continue to live under his rule be ruined. “And now forget her” (V.iii.67), he commands, and marry Maudlin. The Count consents, asking for heaven’s blessing on his second marriage to his first love, without which divine blessing he would be better off dead, his “nature ceased” (V.iii.72). To sensibilities steeped in romance, the King’s command and the Count’s consent jar. But the romance in which ‘we’ have steeped ourselves, stemming from the courtly love of the Middle Ages, and branching into modern Romanticism, ignores facts that Shakespeare knew. In the courtly romances, love was a passion pursued outside marriage; married love was at best Christian-agapic, often politic, but seldom erotic-sentimental. For Shakespeare and especially for Shakespeare’s monarchs and aristocrats, married love is less serious in ‘our’ sense, but much more serious in another way, a way ‘our’ modern understanding of politics doesn’t readily understand, except as a form of cynicism. 

    But not so fast. Lafeu asks for “a favor” from Bertram, a token of his love for his daughter, an engagement ring. Bertram gives him the ring Diana had given him in exchange for his own family heirloom. Lafeu and the King immediately recognize it as the wedding gift the King bestowed on Helena. His enraged Majesty demands, How did you despoil Helena of that ring? Not knowing about the gift-ring in the first place, the hapless young Count denies that it belonged to Helena, but his mother sternly corrects him: “I have seen her wear it; and she reckon’d it / At her life’s rate” (V.iii.89-91).

    Afraid to admit his (as he believes) tryst with Diana—one of those ladies in Italy Helena had rightly worried might attract him—Bertram claims that he obtained the ring from a lady in Florence who threw it from her window to him, wrapped in a paper with her name written on it. But I explained my marital condition to her, and although she dropped her infatuation she nobly insisted that he keep her ring. This utterly implausible tale, worthy of Parolles, scarcely convinces the King, who no longer extends his credence to the words of the young Count. He too had heard Helena say “she would never put it from her finger / Unless she gave it to yourself in bed” (V.iii.109-10). You must have murdered her. He orders the guards to take Bertram away; “we’ll sift this matter further” (V.iii.123). In his own defense, Bertram rejoins, “If you shall prove / This ring was ever hers, you shall as easy / Prove that I husbanded her bed in Florence, / Where she never was” (V.iii.124-25). Right on the first part, wrong on the second.

    The comedy sharpens still again, as the King receives a letter from the Widow Capilet, denouncing Bertram as a seducer. The lady and her daughter then enter the King’s presence, Diana claiming that she is Bertram’s wife. Still trying to lie his way out, entangling himself further, Bertram calls her “a common gamester of the camp” (V.iii.186). Why would a prostitute have the ring? With fine irony, Diana calls none other than Parolles as her witness. But the man is “a most perfidious slave,” Bertram sputters, a man “whose nature sickens but to speak a truth” (V.iii.203,205). A man of nothing but empty, deceiving words, Parolles’ nature is so unnatural that it falls ill if forced to speak truly, the lying Bertram truly protests. In the event, Parolles testifies honestly that Bertram was indeed “mad for” Diana, although the King gets little more out of him and quickly dismisses him as worthless (V.iii.255).

    But “she hath that ring of yours,” the King suggests, the heirloom ring you would no more part with than Helena would part with the ring I gave to her (V.iii.207). Thinking quickly, Bertam concocts another word-invention. “Certain it is I lik’d her,” he allows, “and boarded her i’ th’ wanton way of youth” (V.iii.208-09)—the excuse his mother had offered to the King. But it was all her fault. Diana “did angle for me, / Madding my eagerness with her restraint”—truly a creature of “infinite cunning” (V.iii.210-11,214). She received the heirloom in exchange for a commonplace ring such as one might purchase at market. When Diana identifies the ring His Majesty has in his possession, the one he gave to Helena and no ordinary ring at all, the pretense evaporates and Bertram confesses.

    This only leads to a new perplexity: How did Diana come into possession of Helena’s ring? Knowing that Helena is waiting in the wings, Diana answers with riddles—exhibiting for one last time the ambiguity of words, even when deployed honestly. When in frustration the King orders her to prison, she calmly turns to her mother and asks her to post bail, and offers one last riddle— which recalls the play’s opening paradox of the “delivery” that is also a burial, but in reverse: “He knows himself my bed he hath defil’d; / And at that time he got his wife with child. Dead though she be, she feels her young one kick; / So there’s my riddle: the one that’s dead is quick— / And now behold the meaning”—the cue for living Helena to enter, pregnant (V.iii.293-98). 

    The King can only ask, “Is’t real that I see?” (V.iii.299). So much to hear, so many lying, deceptive, metaphorical, words, some empty of content, others pregnant with meaning: Is seeing really believing? As always in this play, yes and no. “No, my good lord,” Helena answers, focusing attention on the meaning the phrase “is’t” (V.iii.300). “‘Tis but the shadow of a wife you see, / The name and not the thing” (V.iii.301-02). I am married legally, in words, but rejected by my husband. Bertram protests, “Both, both,” we are married both in name and in reality, in convention and in nature. “O, pardon!” (V.iii.302). As a matter of fact, Helena, says, you are right: I have your heirloom ring and I also have your words in your letter, promising that when I get the ring from your finger and you have gotten me with child, you can then call me husband, put the word to the thing. Beaten, bewildered Bertram turns to the King. “If she, my liege, can make me know this clearly, / I’ll love her dearly, ever, ever dearly” (V.iii.309-10). She can and doubtless will explain how she pulled them off—both the ring and the plot.

    Critics who complain that the Count may still lack sincerity overlook the fact that this is a comedy; true romance isn’t the point, and it never was. Sure enough, good old Lafeu announces, “My eyes smell onions; I shall weep anon,” and asks Parolles, that man of mere cloth, to lend him a handkerchief (V.iii.314). Does he weep for the reconciliation, for his now-ignored daughter, Maudlin, or both?

    The King too wants a coherent, step-by-step telling of the plot, “to make the even truth in pleasure flow” (V.iii.319). He makes amends to Diana, offering her the same opportunity he’d granted to Helena, to choose her husband; she will soon come over to the side of nature, leaving virginity behind but in legal, verbal propriety while securing her widowed mother’s prosperity too.

    All’s well that ends well? The King remains prudent to the end: “All yet seems well; and if it end so meet, / The bitter past, more welcome is the sweet” (V.iii.326-27). Discord will serve concord, maybe.

    This is the point of the Epilogue. “The King’s a beggar, now the play is done” (E.1). That is, in the penultimate reversal of roles, yet another upending of convention, the King, who lives a life of command, can only hope for the best, having reached the limits of both rule by decree and rule by advice. “All is well if this suit be won, / That you express content; which we will pay / With strife [effort] to please you, day exceeding day” (E.2-4). Shakespeare, ruler of all words, himself depends upon something beyond his control, audience approval. “Ours be your patience, then, and yours our parts; / Your gentle hands lend us, and take our hearts” (E.5-6). We are now the audience to your wordless, unambiguous action, your ‘play,’ which is your applause. With this final reversal of roles, of rulers being ruled, Shakespeare and his players are done. 

    Only if Shakespeare has persuaded his audience with words and plot they deem fitting, only if he has succeeded in ruling their sentiments with his reasoned, playful argument and action will they consent to judge his work as he wishes it to be judged. Judgment first came to sight in the contrast between the authority of elders, with their advice, their piety, and their plans, and the passions and plans (often schemes) of the young, who seek to evade authority. Authority based on the experience won over many years and on piety (the ‘faith of our fathers’) finds its criterion in nature. There is the authority of medical knowledge or ‘physic,’ rightful authority over bodily nature. There is also the authority of moral knowledge, knowledge of the virtues that make men and women human or inhuman. Moral knowledge distinguishes ‘blood’—thumoerotic passion, the fight for love and glory—from virtue. It distinguishes courage (Bertram, Helena) from cowardice (Parolles), prudence (the King, the Countess, Helena) from folly (Bertram, Parolles), justice (the women generally, the King, the French lords) from injustice (the young men, especially Bertram with his failure to form a just estimate of Helena’s worth), and finally moderation (Lafeu, the Countess) from immoderation (the young generally, gripped by their passions). 

    Speech aimed at persuasion, rhetoric, may be true or false. Speech to oneself, soliloquy, may also be true or false, insightful or self-deceptive. Speech ‘meets’ or ‘courts’ action especially in love, in courtship. Helena deceives in her actions but usually speaks the truth, and for virtuous ends. Parolles speaks lies at the service of passions, finding a ready audience in Bertram. Helena and Parolles are love-rivals, seeking to win the heart of their Count. Helena asks him the crucial, comic question: How to lose one’s virginity to one’s own liking? (And therefore to one worthy of your liking, else your liking will soon turn to disliking.) This is a question concerning bodies and passions but also a moral question concerning good and bad. To answer it, you will need to confront the problem of appearance and reality, deception and unmasking, revealing. As a wise ruler, the King knows that already, but the young lovers need to learn it.

    Nature also raises the question of free will, and especially reasoned choice, against fatality (fortune, chance) and perhaps divine providence. The clown Lavache sees this in his cynical or ‘reductionist’ way, by calculating the odds of a good marriage as one in ten. Helena sets her prudent plotting not so much against fate as within its framework. She is right to see that her beloved is ‘above her’ in conventional social standing, but the overarching question is to know one’s place within the order of nature, to have self-knowledge. More, as the French lord asks, as he considers vile Parolles, is it possible to know that one is a coward, a liar and a fool, and still to be all those things? Evidently so, as Parolles illustrates. But he too knows his place in nature. If nature is a concordia discors, an order encompassing disorder, conflict, then even a knavish fool has his place. Virtue, a kind of strength, needs vice to test it, to ‘prove’ itself in both senses of the term. 

    All’s well that ends well insofar as reason out-plots passion, bringing the convention of marriage into line with natural passion, in a condition of mutual correction. But reason’s victories are temporary because the discors remains—as it must, if the virtue aiming at the good end will not weaken. The comedy of All’s Well That Ends Well sustains itself throughout, because the audience knows that the wise plotters have the foolish scoundrels firmly under their rule. Any utopian tendency to suppose that this will always be so is wisely deprecated by the King, who has ruled too long, learned the limitations of wise rule too well, to think otherwise.

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Royal Dreaming

    July 1, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: A Midsummer Night’s Dream.

     

    At the palace of Theseus in Athens, Duke Theseus speaks with his betrothed, the Amazon queen Hippolyta, whom he will marry four days hence. According to the ancient Greek story, Hippolyta was the daughter of the war god, Ares, who gave her a magical belt which was supposed to protect her in battle. Theseus captured her, anyway, and she became the only Amazon ever to marry. “I woo’d thee with my sword,” Theseus tells her, “And won thy love doing thee injuries; / But I will wed thee in another key, / With pomp, with triumph, and with reveling” (I.i.16-19). If love is akin to war, marriage provides the foundation of civil peace. Though a god, and a warrior-god at that, her father couldn’t or at least wouldn’t defend Hippolyta from the love-suit of the Athenian statesman. The god evidently knows that war’s purpose is the re-establishment of civil peace.

    Civil peace also brings disputes under the law. Egeus arrives before the duke with his daughter, Hermia, and her two suitors, Lysander and Demetrius. Egeus, whose name means ‘shield,’ ‘protection,’ wants to shield his daughter from Lysander, whose name means ‘free man,’ ‘liberator.’ Hermia, whose name is the feminine form of Hermes, the messenger-god, has been giving her father a message he doesn’t want to hear, namely, that she loves Lysander and wants him to be the one who liberates her from fatherly edicts. Egeus prefers Demetrius, whose name means ‘devoted to Demeter,’ the goddess of agriculture and harvest, Demeter ‘Law-Giver,’ bringer of civilization. Egeus would rather marry his daughter to a man devoted to the household instead of a man devoted to the city, to citizenship. But in fact he depends upon the city to enforce his parental authority. Invoking “the ancient privilege of Athens” (I.i.41), whereby the city can require his daughter to marry the suitor the father chooses, upon pain of death “according to our law” (I.i.44), Egeus would overrule the love his daughter feels for Lysander. While there is a glance here at the ‘Old Law’ of the Bible as distinguished from the ‘New Law’ of love enunciated by Jesus as the sum and substance of the old, the primary distinction is the one between family and city, both liable to disruption by nature in the form of love. Egeus, the ‘old man’ of the law, and Demetrius, the young man of immature and flighty love, turn out to be allies in an attempt to subvert the natural love that is the right foundation of families that form the right foundation of cities.

    “What say you, Hermia?” Duke Theseus asks (I.i.46). Your father “should be as a god” to you, being “one to whom you are but as a form in wax, / By him imprinted, and within his power / To leave the figure or disfigure it” (I.i.50-52). Hermia admits that Demetrius is a worthy gentleman, but Lysander is no less so; she wishes her father “look’d but with my eyes” (I.i.56). Theseus sides with her father: “Rather your eyes with his judgment must look” (I.i.57); as Athens’ ruler, he will enforce the law, finding her guilty of having neglected her father’s mature judgment as well as his patriarchal authority. At this, spirited Hermia wants to know the penalty for disobedience; Theseus cites the death penalty her father had mentioned, adding that the alternative is a life of virginity in service at the temple of Diana, the virgin goddess of the pale moon. Since “my soul consents not to give sovereignty” to either her father or her father’s choice of her husband, she chooses the temple over the household (I.i.82). Temporizing, the duke gives her four days to deliberate—to “examine well your blood,” your nature (I.i.68)—ending on the day of his own nuptials, when Diana’s new moon will appear. 

    Demetrius appeals to Hermia to relent and implores Lysander to yield “thy crazed title”—love—”to my certain right”—paternal authority, as recognized by the law of the city in which Lysander is a free man, a citizen (I.i.92). Lysander jibes, “You have her father’s love, Demetrius; / Let me have Hermia’s; do you marry him” (I.i.94). Egeus intervenes to grant that yes, Demetrius does have my love, “and what is mine my love shall render him”; since Hermia “is mine,” I lovingly give my daughter to him, not to you (I.i.96-97). Against this, Lysander charges that his rival previously had courted another lady, Helena, “and won her soul”; even now she “dotes in idolatry, / Upon this spotted and inconstant man” (I.i. 109-110). The nature of the man to whom you give your daughter is defective, whatever his social condition may be. 

    The duke halts the dispute. Conceding that before this he had been “over-full of self-affairs” to speak with Demetrius about this matter (I.i.113)—concerned more with the foreign war to win his bride, establish his family, than tending to his city—he summons Egeus and Demetrius for “some private schooling” (I.i.116). But whatever this private conference may entail, he doesn’t change his ruling. “For you, fair Hermia, look you arm yourself / To fit your fancies to your father’s will, / Or else the law of Athens yields you up” (I.i.117-19). It appears that he intends to reprimand father and intended son-in-law ‘in chambers,’ as a modern judge would say, without openly breaking the law of the city which, as judge, he must uphold. His bride-to-be is a foreign queen, whose father, being the god of war, evidently had no objection to the winning of his daughter in a display of military prowess. But Hermia is a child of peace, of civil society, and unless some equitable out-of-court settlement can be reached, not the law of love but the rule of law must govern her.

    Or must it? Only if the lovers remain in the city. Hermia faces two unnatural choices: marriage to a man she does not love or a life of virgin austerity in service of a goddess. After the others depart, Lysander and Hermia remain to formulate a plot. Since “the course of true love never did run smooth,” as Lysander famously puts it (I.i.134)—nature faces conventional roadblocks laid down by men—and since it is “hell” “to choose love by another’s eyes,” as Hermia says (I.i.140), let us flee the city, Lysander proposes, go to the home of his “widow aunt” who has no natural children and so regards him as her own; there “may I marry thee; / And to that place the sharp Athenian law / Cannot pursue us” (I.i.156-163). Hermia agrees to the plan, which requires them to leave the city and plunge into the woods surrounding Athens, into the nature their love bespeaks, away from the city that denies nature. The free man, the citizen, faced with laws and rulers that are contra natura, has no choice but to retreat to the pre-political life of the bridegroom’s family, outside the city.

    Helena arrives, looking for Demetrius. The two ladies are friends from childhood, and she understands that Hermia has in no way encouraged his suit except by being beautiful, by her nature (“would that fault were mine!”) (I.i.201). That fault will no longer be on display to Demetrius, Hermia explains, telling her of their impending self-exile and trusting that their lifelong friendship will ensure that Helena will respect the confidence. This proves a false expectation. When the lovers leave to their separate homes, Helena stays, telling herself and the audience that she will inform Demetrius of their plot. She explains that, like fickle Cupid himself, a mere child, a frivolous game-player, Demetrius first vowed “that he was only mine” and then ran off in pursuit of beautiful Hermia (I.i.243). Demetrius, she predicts, will pursue the lovers into the woods, but her pain at his departure out of her sight, she hopes, will be recompensed by his gratitude upon returning to the city with the deserving informant who will follow him, still hoping to convince him to repent of his unfaithful love. This seems a desperate plot because Helena cannot know what will happen in the woods, what will result from Demetrius’ pursuit. But it’s the only one she can devise, betraying her friendship to regain her beloved.

    Still another plot must coincide with these: preparations for the duke’s nuptials. Some local tradesmen intend to perform a play to entertain the Court on the wedding day. A weaver, Nick Bottom, joins a carpenter, a joiner, a bellows-mender, a tinker, and a tailor to discuss a play with a self-contradictory title, “The most Lamentable Comedy and Most Cruel Death of Pyramus and Thisbe.” Ovid tells the story of Pyramus and Thisbe in the Metamorphoses. As scholars have noticed, those two lovers resemble Romeo and Juliet more than Lysander and Hermia, as the barrier to their marriage is the hatred of their two rival families; they do share with the Athenian couple a plan to elope, which ends tragically when Pyramus commits suicide after mistakenly thinking Thisbe has been killed by a lion. Ovid’s story is thus lamentable without being comic, but it’s sure to become so in the hands of these players. It transpires that Bottom’s theatrical ambitions know no bounds and want none, as he wants to play several parts—a changeling, a metamorphosis-man, indeed. Shakespeare will leave him, and his colleagues, to their own devices until the third Act of his own comedy, which as always is far from lamentable.

    Other than beasts of prey, what else lives in the woods outside Athens? Fairies do. One of them, who “wander[s] every where” in the service of the Fairy Queen (II.i.6), derides Puck as the lout among the spirits, “that shrewd and knavish sprite” also known as Robin Goodfellow, a trickster-spirit who delights in petty annoyance of rustic households—curdling cream, chipping dishes (II.i.34-35). Puck serves not the queen of the fairies but their king, which makes him no good fellow at all to the queen’s attendant. Worse, the royal couple are estranged. Queen Titania has angered King Oberon by taking into her entourage “a lovely boy, stolen from an Indian king” (II.i.22), whom he covets for himself. This makes the queen’s attendant doubly dubious of the spirit who plays court jester to Oberon, and does his bidding.

    Oberon and Titania enter and quarrel, jealous of each other’s lover, real or imagined. Titania accuses Oberon of having caused climate change; the seasons themselves are mixed up, as Midsummer’s Eve (the late-June night when fairy tricksters roam freely, tormenting honest human households) is coming in May, the month of lovers. She denies any love for the Indian boy, who is the orphan of a mortal friend of hers and now under her protection. In revenge, jealous and unbelieving Oberon plots with Puck to use an herbal potion which will cause Titania to fall in love with the first creature she sees, upon awakening from her next sleep. The fairies live outside the city, in all the woods of the world, but they delight in pranking households in city and countryside; they also exercise some control over the nature in which they reside, a control that depends not on magic so much as knowledge of nature and a consequent ability to rule the minds of humans and fairies alike. 

    When the fairies depart, the humans wander in. Demetrius searches for Hermia and Lysander but can’t shake Helena. “I love thee not, therefore pursue me not,” he tells her, rather in contradiction of his own conduct toward Hermia (II.i.188). “Where is Lysander and fair Hermia? / The one I’ll slay, the other slayeth me” (II.i.189-90). Helena is no less self-contradictory, in her own way, telling him her heart is “true as steel” (II.i.197) but then averring, “I am your spaniel,” and “the more you beat me, I will fawn on you” (II.i.203-04)—completing the mixture of images by comparing herself to a deer pursuing a tiger and a dove pursuing a griffin. Demetrius’ infidelity has caused this couple to be the one unnatural being in nature.

    Oberon intends to fix that. He’s listened in on their quarrel and decides to treat Demetrius with the same nature-cure he has in mind for Titania. He tells Puck to apply the herbal potion to Demetrius’ eyes, even as he, Oberon, will apply it to hers. Since Puck has never seen Demetrius and Oberon doesn’t know that there are any other Athenians in the woods, Oberon commands him to dose the next sleeping man he sees who wears “Athenian garments” (II.i.264). Puck mistakenly treats sleeping Lysander, who awakens, sees Helena, falls in love with her, and now determines to kill Demetrius, who had betrayed and insulted his new beloved. Completing the delusion, he announces that “the will of man is by his reason sway’d; / And reason says you,” Helena, “are the worthier maid” (II.ii.115-16). When I was young, he continues, he was “ripe not to reason,” but now “reason becomes marshal to my will” (II.ii.119-20). Lysander’s bizarre change, and his even more bizarre explanation of it, make sense to Helena only as mockery, an unjust attempt to “flout my insufficiency” (II.ii.128). She runs off; when Hermia awakens, she cries out, “What a dream was here! / Lysander, look how I do quake with fear. / Methought a serpent eat my heart away, / And you sat smiling at his cruel prey” (II.ii.147-50). But Lysander has already left, chasing after Helena.

    The would-be players have also entered the woods, perhaps in a prudent effort to spare civilization from their rehearsing. This enables Puck to transform Bottom’s head into an ass’s head (thus revealing Bottom’s true nature), and to ensure that he will be the one Titania first sees in the morning. When she declares her love for him, the ass nonetheless speaks truer of reason than Lysander had done: “Methinks, mistress you should have little reason for that. And yet, to say the truth, reason and love keep little company together now-a-days” (III.i.131-132). “Thou art as wise as thou art beautiful,” Titania sighs—true enough (III.i. 135). Like a mortal woman, she would take the one she loves and transform him into what she wants, promising to “purge thy mortal grossness” and to turn him into a spirit (III.i.146). 

    Oberon has accomplished his mission, with Puck’s help, but Puck’s mistake now comes to his master’s attention: “Of thy misprision must perforce ensue / Some true love turned, and not a false turn’d true” (III.ii.90-91). Puck can only appeal to the underlying rule of fate. No fatalist, Oberon acts to right matters, quickly, ordering Puck to find Helena and bring her here, then to apply the potion—compacted of a flower of “purple die,” the royal color—to sleeping Demetrius (III.ii.102). Puck reconnoiters and returns, announcing the lady’s imminent arrival, pursued by Lysander. He proposes more fairy sport: “Shall we their fond pageant see? / Lord, what fools these mortals be!” (II.ii.114-15). Oberon evidently doesn’t mind toying with the mortal fools a bit, allowing the mad show to proceed. It will be a comedy of errors, with the fairies behaving like merry wives of Windsor.

    Demetrius awakens at the noise, falls in love with Helena, who once again assumes that she’s being mocked by both, who have conspired against her. “If you were civil and knew courtesy, / You would not do me thus much injury…. You both are rivals, and love Hermia; / And now both rivals, to mock Helena.” (III.ii.147-48, 155-56) When Hermia catches up with them and Lysander rejects her for Helena, Helena simply assumes that even her former friend is in on “this confederacy” (III.ii.192), much to Hermia’s bewilderment. But it is precisely the impossibility of civility in this woods that renders Helena’s indignation vain. The moonlit woods are nature’s darker side. The woods are ruled by the fairies, who include trickster Puck, a trickster even when he faithfully follows the benevolent if imprecise commands of the Fairy King. Misdirected, the natural love potion brings out the worst nature of the human lovers. Helena’s timid and suspicious side, Demetrius’ fickleness, Lysander’s sharp temper, and Hermia’s equally sharp temper, coupled with insecurity (when Helena calls her a puppet, she takes it as a jibe at her shortness of stature, despite her acknowledged beauty): all these bring the two men to the edge of violence against each other, urged on by the women. Whether ginned up by herbal medicine or not, the passion of love itself matters less than who or what it’s aimed at. [1]

    Unlike his court jester, Puck, Lord Oberon has a fundamentally just nature, and now moves to intervene, Theseus-like, lest the comedy turn tragic. [2] “This is thy negligence,” he tells Puck, unless you arranged this out of willful knavery (III.ii.345). Puck truthfully protests that he was only following a too-vague command, while admitting he’s enjoyed the results. Very well, then, what I can see clearly, Oberon replies, is the brewing fight, and you shall put a stop to it by calling forth a black fog, which “will lead these testy rivals so astray / As one come not within another’s way” (III.ii.358-59). You will then dose Lysander with the herb, the “virtuous property” of which will remove from his eyes “all error” and “make his eyeballs roll with wonted sight” for his real love, Hermia (III.ii.367-69). “When they next wake, all this derision / Shall seem a dream and fruitless vision; / And back to Athens shall the lovers wend / With league whose date till death shall never end” (III.ii.370-73). Their natural loves restored, the lovers will be fit to re-enter civil society and marry. As for already-married Lord Oberon, “I’ll to my queen, and beg her Indian boy; / And then I will her charmed eye release / From monster’s view, and all things shall be peace” (III.ii.375-77). Knowing better than to disobey his lord’s command, and now knowing the man who is its object, Puck applies the juice to the eyes of sleeping Lysander, incanting a precept of natural right, “the country proverb known”: “That every man should take his own, / In your waking shall be shown: / Jack shall have Jill; / Nought shall go ill” (III.ii.458-462). At his lord’s direction, the trickster does the right thing, bridling his preference for misrule.

    As the ruler of the night, Oberon tempers his justice with mercy. Considering his Fairy Queen as she sleeps, he “begin[s] to pity” her “dotage” on the human ass (IV.i.44). Having already confronted her with her with the act of infidelity he had caused her to commit, having exacted from her the Indian boy with whom he suspected of having committed real infidelity, and with the boy now transported to his own “bower in fairy land,” he will release her from the delusive spell (IV.i.58). He chants: “Be as thou wast wont to be; / See as thou was wont to see. / Dian’s bud o’er Cupid’s flower / Hath such force and blessed power” (IV.i.68-71). Invoking the chastity of Diana, which to follow would have given Hermia an unnatural life, restores the married queen of Fairy Land to her rightful place at the side of its king. And it does so by restoring her natural sight, so that she will again recognize a human ass for a human ass. In symbolic terms, he restores her capacity for noesis, for intellectual insight and, with it, the right classification of natural beings. Upon awakening, Titania believes that the reality she experienced under the spell was only a vexatious dream, but Oberon immediately points to the sleeping Bottom. She wonders, questions—the beginning of wisdom, as a philosopher might say. Oberon, the one who can answer her question, has won the battle Theseus has already won over the Amazon queen, establishing his authority. He intends to “dance in Duke Theseus’ house triumphantly” tomorrow night, “and bless it with all prosperity,” as it will now see the weddings of “faithful lovers,” lovers brought together then divided by Cupid, corrected by reason not law, and now prepared for a lifetime of Diana-like chastity under the bond of marriage, the bond of lawful love, the love that’s right for civil society.

    Daybreak impends. The night-rule of the fairies evanesces; the day-rule of Theseus returns. Theseus, Hippolyta, and Egeus have pursued the lovers into the woods, and now discover them. The youths have some explaining to do, and Lysander honestly relates what he and Hermia intended to do—much to the outrage of Egeus, who demands capital punishment under the law. But Demetrius comes to his friend’s defense. Oberon’s royal potion has corrected his passion, restoring it to fidelity. By “some power” he does not know, “my love to Hermia, / Melted as the snow”: “All the faith, the virtue of my heart, / The object and the pleasure of mine eye, / Is only Helena. To her, my lord, / Was I betroth’d ere I saw Hermia. / But, like a sickness, did I loathe this food; / But, as in health, come to my natural taste.” (IV.i.162-171). Oberon’s herbal potion, his nature cure, acted as a poison when Puck dosed the wrong person with it, but acted as a restorative, an agent returning the young man to his true nature, when applied to the right person, according to the reason of the just monarch-physician. 

    This is enough for Theseus. “Egeus, I will overbear your will,” return to Athens, and bring the two couples, with himself and Hippolyta, to wed (IV.i.176). “Our purpos’d hunting,” an act of what had seemed a just war, “shall be set aside” (IV.i.180). On what grounds? Does Egeus not still have Athenian law on his side, the law that enforces fatherly authority over daughters? 

    Yes, but the duke had won his own beloved by overcoming the power of the Amazon queen’s father’s chastity belt. A wise and just ruler will enforce the laws of the city; but the initial sin, the one that deranged the civil order, was Demetrius’ betrayal of his vow of betrothal. Egeus is attempting to enforce a law that did not justly apply to the circumstance, inasmuch as a violation of the suitor’s legal oath invalidates the betrothal the father would impose. Theseus’ ruling parallels that of Oberon. Just as Oberon corrected Puck’s misapplication of the nature-cure, which works rightly only when given according to the circumstance, so Theseus applies his law-cure rightly by adjusting it to the circumstances at hand Bot  natural and civil law require the reasoned, prudential rule of the statesman-judge who is there to see things for himself.

    All are now awake, poor Bottom the last. “I have had a most rare vision,” he tells himself. “I have had a dream, past the wit of man to say what dream it was. Methought I was—there is no man can tell what. Methought I was, and methought I had, but man is but a patch’d fool, if he will offer to say what methought I had.” (IV.i.203-08). His friend and fellow-player Peter Quince will write “a ballad of this dream. It shall be call’d ‘Bottom’s Dream,’ because it hath no bottom” (IV.i.212-213). Wrong on all counts, Ass Bottom. The vision was no dream; the wit of man can explain it quite readily; the ‘dream’ has a bottom, and it is himself, his nature as a fool. He intends to sing the ballad over the dead body of Thisbe, at the end of his play at the wedding. In that one thing he’s right, in his own goofy way, inasmuch as the song is a fitting coda for a lamentable comedy. He returns to Athens and to his worried friends, back in his right place, in his right role.

    The next day, at the palace, Theseus and Hippolyta discuss the lovers’ story. Theseus dismisses it. “I never may believe / These antique fables, nor these fairy toys. / Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, / Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend / More than cool reason ever comprehends” (V.i.3-7). Lunatics (‘luna’ means moon, the light of the woods), lovers, and poets “are of imagination compact,” making ‘somethings’ that are really ‘nothings’ out of nothing but their joys and fears (V.i.8). For her part, Hippolyta isn’t so sure that the lovers’ tale must be some midsummer night’s dream. She considers the unanimity of the testimony, the unlikelihood that “all their minds transfigur’d so together” (V.i.24). Reason, thought governed by the principle of non-contradiction, lends support to their story, however implausible its perceptual premises may be. Less dogmatically ‘rationalistic’ than Theseus, she attends to the preponderance of the evidence, and in terms of the play she is right. After all, has the play’s audience not witnessed the players? Have the onlookers not been transfigured together?

    The governing irony, of course, is that this is Theseus deliberating with an Amazon queen—both figures in an antique fable, lately translated to a London stage by a poet. Theseus, the mythological Athenian statesman, here echoes Socrates’ critique of poetry in the Ion. But he is no Socrates. Acting together as the ruling couple of Athens, Hippolyta’s socially-oriented practical wisdom will supplement the practical wisdom of Theseus, which leans toward hasty generalization. Theseus draws his practical wisdom from observation of human types; Hippolyta draws her practical wisdom from attending to opinion. Both kinds are needed to rule well, and it is the playgoing audience that sees the whole truth, with Shakespeare.

    As Oberon answers Puck, so Theseus answers Hippolyta, by directing attention away from the dubious and towards what’s in front of their eyes—in this case, the righted lovers, “full of joy and mirth” (V.i.28), after the marriage ceremony. The wedding revelers have three hours until bedtime, and in reviewing the several entertainments proffered, Theseus chooses what’s described as “A tedious brief scene of young Pyramus / And his love Thisby; very tragical mirth” (V.i.56-57). Rationalist as he is, he expects diversion from such a self-contradictory show. When he learns that men who have “never labor’d in their minds till now” will be the players (V.i.73), this confirms his choice—not, however, because he wants to laugh at the men who work with their hands but because “never anything can be amiss / When simpleness and duty tender it” (V.i.83-84). He may not be a man of theoretical wisdom, but he has a statesman’s practical wisdom, earned by observing men. “The kinder we, to give them thanks for nothing. / Our sport shall be to take what they mistake; / And what poor duty they cannot do, noble respect / Takes it in might, not merit”—that is, the intention of the deed. (V.i.89-92) This magnanimity is the opposite of Helena’s and Hermia’s small-souled mindset, which makes mortal insults out of trifles. Sure enough, in the prologue to the play-within-the-play, Quince announces, “If we offend, it is with our good will” (V.i.108). 

    The workers’ play parodies the regime of the woods, with the players as fairies without power. Lamentably comic Pyramus and Thisbe duly dispatch themselves, completing the laughable tragedy wherein no fairies rule the night by (in the end) wisely exerting the powers of nature. With kind irony, Theseus excuses Bottom from speaking an epilogue (“for your play needs no excuse”) and thanks the players for their “notably discharged” effort (V.i.345, 350). He then bids the members of the wedding party to retire to their marriage beds—the end of comedy, even as graves are the end of tragedy. Without knowing it, the players have reminded the lovers of the bad turn their once-disordered love might have taken.

    Theseus doesn’t have the last word, however. That is left to the rulers of the night, who re-emerge when the married couples retire. Oberon and Titania chant blessings on them—”ever true in loving be” (V.i.397), their families nature perfected. Puck speaks the epilogue/apologia Bottom did not need to offer, asking the audience’s pardon for any offense “we shadows” may have given (V.i.412), and reminding them of the greater pardon all Christians enjoy: our “unearned luck / Now to scape the serpent’s tongue,” the same serpent that had threatened Hermia in her true dream about Lysander’s infidelity (V.i.421-22) but more immediately the hissing disapproval of an audience at the end of a bad play. As human beings depend on God’s grace, so do the ruled depend upon the grace of their rulers, whether they are subjects of monarchs or players in front of play-goers who sit in  judgment. 

    Although routinely regarded as a well-wrought farce, A Midsummer Night’s Dream is as politic a comedy as Shakespeare ever wrote. A charming play about charms, it also shows how the loves of young lovers can and should be directed away from impassioned fickleness of Demetrius while protected from the soul-deadening legalism of Egeus. That young love needs sound direction is easy to show, although not so easy to show to the young, who are the ones who need it, and sometimes difficult to show the old, who try. This can be done by Shakespeare, whose comedies are love-potions applied to sleeping eyes, which he opens and directs to love the right kinds of persons.

     

    Notes

    1. C. L. Barber isn’t quite right in calling love, as understood in this play, an “impersonal force beyond the persons concerned” (Barber: Shakespeare’s Festive Comedies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 130). The young are likely subject to it, but the mature (Theseus, Hippolyta, Oberon, Titania) can directly it rightly, even if one of them (Egeus) would misdirect it.
    2. C. L. Barber cites Shakespeare’s Puritan contemporary, Philip Stubbes, who regards Oberon as a Satan-figure [Ibid. 119]. As a Puritan, Stubbes inclines to regard all spirit-beings other than angels as devilish; in our own time, many Christians in the Puritan tradition similarly frown over the antics of A. J. Rowling’s Harry Potter, although C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien usually get a pass. Shakespeare’s woods, even in the moonlight, are still nature, not Hell. Oberon keeps Puck in check there.

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    The Wisest Beholder

    May 15, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: The Winter’s Tale.

     

    Produced by the Michigan Shakespeare Festival. July 2011. Directed by Janice L. Blixt.

     

    The Winter’s Tale is a play about kings first presented before the King’s Court in November 1611, after a run at the Globe Theater beginning earlier that year.

     

    At the palace of Leontes, king of Sicilia, a Sicilian lord, Camillo, and a Bohemian lord, Archidamus, compare their countries. “If you chance, Camillo, to visit Bohemia, on the like occasion whereon my services are now on foot”—namely, an extended visit to Sicilia by the Bohemian king, Polixines—”you shall see, as I have said, great difference betwixt our Bohemia and your Sicilia” (I.i.1-3), namely, that Bohemia is far less wealthy. At the planned reciprocal visit to Bohemia next summer by Leontes, you will never see such “magnificence” as we Bohemians have seen here (I.i.12). Archidamus playfully suggests that we will need to give all of you Sicilians “sleepy drinks, that your senses, unintelligent of our insufficience, may, though they cannot praise us, as little accuse us” (I.i.13-14). Camillo assures him that a stronger bond than expense in hospitality binds the two kings. It is the natural bond of a friendship close to brotherhood. As boys, they shared the same education and planted a seed of “affection which cannot choose but branch now” (I.i.22), separated even as they have been by “their more mature dignities and royal necessities” (I.i.23). They are loving brothers, and Archidamus agrees that “there is not in the world either malice or matter to alter” their love (I.i.31-32).

    This amity in their foreign policy matches the amity King Leontes enjoys at home. His young son, Prince Mamillius, “is a gentleman of the greatest promise that ever came into my note,” Archidamus says (I.i.33-34). And the king’s subjects love both father and son. Sicilia enjoys the blessing of a sound regime and the civil peace it fosters.

    Elsewhere in the palace, the two kings discuss King Polixenes’ departure. Unlike King Leontes, faction may be arising in Bohemia. He fears “sneaping winds at home” (I.ii.13)—biting, rebuking criticism by his subjects for his nine-months’ absence. Nor does he wish “to tire your royalty” by prolonging his visit (I.ii.14). “My affairs / Do drag me homeward” (I.ii.23-24). When his liberal request to his friend to extend his stay still further fails, King Leontes turns to his queen, Hermione, to plead his case. Addressing her guest through her husband, she says to tell him that all in Bohemia is well, and that she grants Leontes permission to stay a month longer when he visits Bohemia. She good-humoredly threatens to take Polixenes prisoner. 

    He yields. Reminiscing to her of the childhood he shared with her husband, he tells her that each then supposed he were “to be boy eternal” (I.ii.64). “We knew not / The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dream’d / That any did.” (I.ii.69-71). Had the “stronger blood” of sexual maturity not overtaken them, they could have stood before God in complete innocence (I.ii.72). 

    This friendly dialogue, slightly suggestive of possessiveness and eroticism, causes what could only have been a deep reserve of jealousy in King Leontes’ soul to erupt. “My heart dances,” he tells himself in an aside, “But not for joy, not joy” (I.ii.110-11). Considering his son, he reassures himself that Mamillius looks “like me” (I.ii.135). No adultery went into his making. But his wife is pregnant, nearing childbirth, which corresponds agonizingly with the nine months his brother has been in his palace. Does he linger in Sicilia only to witness the birth of a child who is really his own? Is that why Hermione wants him to stay a month longer? 

    Leontes casually asks Polixenes if he’s as fond of his own son as Leontes is of Mamillius. Indeed so: “If at home, sir, / He’s all my exercise, my mirth, my matter; / Now my sworn friend, and then mine enemy; / My parasite, my soldier, statesman, all.” (I.ii.165-68). A true son. But Leontes has used his question only to set up his friend and his wife for surveillance; as he prepares to take his own son for a walk and leaving them alone, he confides to the audience, “I am angling now” (I.ii.180). He watches as they converse, taking ordinary gestures of two friends in conversation as proof of adultery, and even universalizing them: “It’s a bawdy planet” (I.ii.201). This inverts the Christian theme that God created the universe in the spirit of agapic love; in the eyes of jealousy, the world consists instead of erotic anarchy. When Camillo refuses to confirm his suspicions of the queen, even going so far as to defend her honor, Leontes puts him on the traitor list, too. To Leontes, slender evidence weighs heavily: “Is whispering nothing?” (I.ii.284). If their many gestures of affection are nothing, “then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing; / The covering sky is nothing; Bohemia nothing; / My wife is nothing; nor nothing have these nothings, / If this be nothing.” (I.ii.292-95). The answer is that yes, all these tokens are not-nothings, literally, but nothing much when it comes to grounds for reasonable suspicion. Small ‘somethings’ may or may not add up to a bigger one. Only prudence and moderation will tell the difference. But that isn’t an answer Leontes would hear. In making something out of nothings, he apes God while throwing his regime into chaos. The king is a creative un-creator, about to unmake his family and hazard the unmaking of his family’s rule.

    In Leontes’ mind, Camillo can redeem himself from the charge of treason by passing a kind of love test or loyalty test. He must agree to poison Polixenes—a lethal version of the sleeping potion with which Archidamus had playfully proposed to dope Camillo and the rest of next-year’s Sicilian visitors in Bohemia. This is the only way Leontes can eliminate his imagined rival while maintaining Hermione’s reputation, which he needs to keep inviolate so as not to call the royal succession into question.

    As befits his name, which means ‘freeborn,’ or ‘noble,’ Camillo will have nothing to do with the murder. To obey such a master would be to obey “one who, in rebellion to himself, will have / All that are his so too” (I.ii.354-55). He hints of the plot to Polixenes, who appeals to him to disclose it fully: “I conjure thee, by all the parts of man; / Which honor does acknowledge, whereof the least / Is not this suit of mine, that thou declare / What incidency thou dost guess of harm / Is creeping toward me; how far off, how near; / Which way to be prevented, if to be; / If not, how best to bear it.” (I.ii.401-06). That is, your obligation to human nature overrides your obligation to your master. Camillo does yield to the higher obligation, asking only that when Polixenes embarks for Bohemia he take Camillo with him. Polixenes rightly believes the lord’s story, as he saw for himself a malignant glance his friend cast at him when last he saw him. “This jealousy / Is for a precious creature; as she’s rare / Must it be great; and, as his person’s mighty, / Must it be violent; and as he does conceive / He is dishonor’d by a man which ever / Profess’d to him, why, his revenges must / In that be made more bitter.” (I.ii.451-57). Love and honor rightly comport with one another, but here their combination has turned lethal.

    The two men have been ‘brothers’ not in birth-nature but in the more refined natural relation of friendship. Yet they are also kings, and kings must concern themselves with conspiracies against their rule. They will hear rumors of such conspiracies, or even suspect conspiracies without hearing rumors but by observing the behavior of possible rivals. King Leontes invents a conspiracy against himself by ‘over-reading’ the behavior of his brother and his wife. When a trusted advisor disagrees with his misinterpretation, he not only rejects his testimony but commands him to murder the man he wrongly accuses. King Polixenes observes hostile behavior but only puzzles at it; when told of a possible conspiracy by a man subordinate to the conspirator, he carefully tests his testimony, confirming it by comparing it to his prior observation. The clinching evidence is Camillo’s willingness to exile himself, to join Polixenes in fleeing Sicilia. Living up to the meaning of his name, which means ‘hospitable,’ Polixenes tells the older man, “I will respect thee as a father, if / Thou bear’st my life off hence” (I.ii.461-62). Given Leontes’ jealousy-sparked, lethal madness, Polixenes is glad to ‘adopt’ a new father in place of his natural, deceased father. His brotherly friend has made himself unnatural by rebelling against his own nature and his own rule, causing faction in Sicilia where there had been unity both in the ruling household and among the elders, and sundering the alliance between Sicilia and Bohemia. Obsession with loyalty ruins the union the obsession demands.

    At the palace, Hermione temporarily hands off her son to the ladies in attendance: “He so troubles me, / ‘Tis past enduring” (II.i.1-2). Judging from the boy’s badinage with the lady, he is indeed something of an insolent little wiseacre, and a pregnant mother might well find him taxing. When Hermione returns, she tries to settle him down by asking him to tell her a tale. “A sad tale’s best for winter,” the boy replies, foreshadowing more than he knows; he proposes a story about “sprites and goblins” (II.i.26). Before he begins, Leontes enters the room, along with Lord Antigonus and several other courtiers. He will prove the greater goblin than any the boy might imagine.

    Having heard the report that Polixenes and Camillo have fled, confirming to him that they must have been plotting against him, he continues to believe that Hermione was a co-conspirator and is now pregnant with his brother’s child. “She’s an adultress,” a “bed-swerver,” and a traitor (II.i.78,93)—a royal home-wrecker who, because royal, has betrayed her country, as well. He orders her imprisoned. Hermione takes his decree stoically: “There’s some ill planet reigns. / I must be patient till the heavens look / With aspect more favorable.” (II.105-07). She will not weep, adjuring the onlooking lords and ladies not to weep, either. Weep only if you “know your mistress / Has deserved prison” (II.i.119-20). As for Leontes, “Adieu, my lord. / I never wish’d you sorry; now / I trust I shall.” (II.i.123-24).

    Lord Antigonus remonstrates, and Leontes rejects his criticisms as he had rejected those of Archidamus. “Why, what need we / Commune with you of this, but rather follow / Our forceful instigation? Our prerogative / Calls not your counsels; but our natural goodness / Imparts this….” (II.i.162-66). In the mind of the jealousy-addled tyrant, his will trumps his counselors’ reason because his will bespeaks the mind of a natural superior. “We need no more of your advice” because the whole matter “is all properly ours” (II.i.168-70). Jealousy registers love of one’s own; overweening jealousy registers a love of one’s own that spurns reason, including rational advice, for the solipsism of fury. He recognizes only one authority above himself. He’s sent to Apollo’s temple at Delphi for the word of the oracle, which he expects to confirm his charges not in his own mind but in the minds of his subjects.

    Paulina, wife of Antigonus, attempts to visit Hermione in prison. She is allowed to see only the queen’s attendant, Emilia. Hermione has given birth to a daughter. Paulina would bring the infant to King Leontes in the hope of softening his heart at the sight of the child. When the jailor worries that he might be punished for letting the child out of jail, Paulina appeals to nature: “You need not fear it, sir. / This child was prisoner to the womb, and is / By law and process of great Nature thence / Freed and enfranchis’d—not a party to / The anger of the King, nor guilty of, / If any be, the trespass of the Queen.” (II.ii.48-53). What is more, “I will stand betwixt you and danger” (II.ii.66). That is, the child was imprisoned by natural necessity because her mother was, but now that she has been born she cannot justly be imprisoned any longer, being as innocent of wrongdoing as any human being can be. To this argument in principle, this rational argument from natural right, Paulina prudently adds a promise of political protection, inasmuch as arguments from principle can have no purchase in the world as it is without political security.

    With his Polixenes the “harlot king” out of reach, King Leontes plans capital punishment for Hermione, the imagined accomplice and traitor. Meanwhile, sleepless and without appetite since hearing of his mother’s “dishonor” (II.iii.13), Mamillius has taken ill. Completing the derangement of nature within the royal household, the king too has been unable to sleep. But that hasn’t prevented him from strategizing. Calculating that King Polixenes’ throne is too secure and his alliances too strong for a successful attack on Bohemia, King Leontes reserves revenge on him for another time. This speech provides two important insights into the king’s mind: first, he isn’t so thoroughly insane as to have lost his ability to reason altogether; second, his jealousy isn’t a mere pretext for making war on Bohemia. His irrationality is limited to one dimension of his soul and his rule, albeit a dimension that threatens to ruin both his soul and his rule.

    Paulina approaches the king’s court with Hermione’s baby in her arms. Delayed by one of the attending lords, she tells him not to fear the king’s “tyrannous passion” more than “the Queen’s life” (II.iii.27-28). Her “gracious, innocent soul” is “more free than he is jealous” (II.iii.28-29). When he persists, she tells him “I do come with words as medicinal as true, / Honest as either, to purge him of that humor / That presses him from sleep.” (II.iii.37-39). Hearing the disputants, the king comes forth to command his men to remove her. A woman of spirit, Paulina threatens to scratch their eyes out if they try, provoking the king to call her a masculine witch, to accuse his attendants of treason, and to charge “thou dotard” Antigonus with fearing his wife (II.iii.74). “This brat is none of mine” (II.iii.92). He commands that mother and daughter both be burned.

    Knowing that the king can’t commit this act of judicial murder without accomplices, Paulina turns to the attendants. Look at the evidence: The infant’s features are miniature copies of the king’s. Appealing to “the good goddess Nature,” she suggests that not only the shape of the body but “the ordering of the mind, too,” is under Nature’s rule, and that yellow, the color of jealousy, has no rightful part in her natural order. This only enrages Leontes further, as he tells Antigonus he deserves to be hanged for failing to “stay her tongue”—to which the good lord coolly replies, “Hang all the husbands / That cannot do that feat, you’ll leave yourself / Hardly one subject” (II.iii.109-11). Threatened by the king with burning, Paulina professes to “care not,” since “it is an heretic that makes the fire, / Not she which burns in’t” (II.iii.113-15). You, king, in an attempt to defend your honor, and therefore the crown that depends upon its maintenance, make yourself instead “scandalous to the world” (II.iii.120). Your rule has become the derangement of the honor upon which your authority depends.

    Paulina catches the king in another contradiction. Having called his passion tyrannical, she stops short of calling him one: “I’ll not call you tyrant,” only cruel and daft, a ruler whose acts that savor of tyranny which “will ignoble make you” (II.iii.115, 119). Leontes sputters at his courtiers, “Were I a tyrant, / Where were her life? She durst not call me so, / If she did not know me one” (II.iii.121-24). But she did in fact not call him so, and therefore, by the logic of his own charge, she must know him one. She hands the infant to her husband and issues a parting insult to all the king’s attendants: “You that are thus so tender” of the king’s “follies will never do him good, not one of you” (II.iii.127-28). Obedience is not enough, when dealing with the anti-natural, the tyrannical. She effectively calls for civil disobedience by the king’s men, and unknowingly prophecies the ruin of her own husband.

    After accusing Antigonus of setting his wife to this action, King Leontes initially commands that he burn the child, or he will dash out her “bastard brains” with “these my proper hands” (II.iii.136-37). When his fellow lords attest to Antigonus’ innocence, Leontes cries, “You’re liars all” (II.iii.145). In his insane jealousy he has constructed an entirely fictional world around himself, all founded upon the initial fiction that his wife and brother have committed adultery against him.

    King or rather Tyrant Leontes hasn’t lost every vestige of sanity, however. Evidently seeing that he faces a palace revolt, he tells Antigonus that he will pardon his wife in exchange for his vow to carry the child out of Sicilia and leave her exposed, “Where chance may nurse or end it” (II.iii.182). Thus the end of Act II echoes the beginning of Act I, when the Bohemian Lord Archidamus told his Sicilian counterpart, Camillo, that he would see the “great difference” between Bohemia and Sicilia if chance were to bring him to Bohemia. Chance has brought Camillo to Bohemia, fleeing in the company of the Bohemian king; the important difference between the two countries has turned out not to be an ‘economic’ difference, the difference in wealth, but the political difference between kingship and tyranny, between a just and reasonable natural ruler and an unjust, irrational, unnatural one.

    Leontes now learns that Cleomenes and Dion, his messengers to the Delphic oracle will arrive in an hour. Having failed to hear the voices of natural reason, even when Nature is described as a goddess, what will the voice of the god tell him? And how will he respond to its ruling?

    On the road to the Sicilian capital, the messengers discuss the beauties of Delphi—its delicate climate, its sweet air, its fertile soil, and its impressive temple. In describing the oracle, Cleomenes moves from the beautiful to the sublime: “The ear-deaf’ning voice o’ th’ oracle, / Kin to Jove’s thunder, so surprised my sense / That I was nothing.” (III.i.9-11). Dion affirms that when the sealed contents of the oracle’s answer are revealed, “something rare even then will rush to knowledge” (III.i.20-21). In precise contrast to Leontes’ attempt to make something out of nothings, something significant out of human-all-too-human trifles, the Delphic oracle’s teachings make human beings feel insignificant in comparison to the wisdom and power of Jove’s son, Apollo. What Leontes has deranged the oracle would set right, substituting divine knowledge for the king’s baseless surmise.

    Meanwhile, the tyrant Leontes wants to be “clear’d of being tyrannous” in Sicilia’s law court (III.ii.4-5). Submitting to the rule of law gives the appearance of constitutionalism to his rule. Hermione stands charged with treason on three counts: as queen, she has committed adultery; she has conspired to murder the king; she has aided the flight of her co-conspirators. The murder charge is a new invention, derived from the first invention; it was of course King Leontes, and only King Leontes, who conspired to have a king murdered. 

    Hermione points out the lawless character of the king’s appeal to the law. “Mine integrity / Being counted falseness,” she is being considered guilty until proven innocent (III.ii.24-25). She nonetheless makes her defense, appealing to three authorities: the “pow’rs divine” (III.ii.26); “my past life” (III.ii.31); and the king’s own conscience. With respect to her past life, she says she loved Polixenes “as in honor he requir’d” as a visiting king and as “yourself,” Leontes, “commanded” (62, 65). In her central answer, the evidence of her good character, she cites her chaste and true previous conduct, her status as a royal wife, herself the daughter of “a great king,” the emperor of Russia, and mother of a prince, and, finally, her integrity, the evidence for which she brings out by saying she prizes her honor, not her life (III.ii.31-43). “My life stands in the level”—the gunsight—”of your dreams, / Which I’ll lay down” (III.ii.78-79). Now deprived of her husband’s favor and of both her children, she is unafraid to die, but will continue to defend her honor. As for the king’s conscience, he has replaced proofs with “surmises,” exhibiting “rigor, and not law” (III.ii.110,112). 

    The only appeal among these that might sway the king is the appeal to powers divine. Accordingly, Hermione asks for the oracle of Apollo, which she expects will vindicate her honor. Leontes agrees to her request, sure of his own charges. When the messengers appear and are duly sworn, the court officer breaks the seal and reads a message from Delphi that not only exonerates Hermione but calls the king “a jealous tyrant” and prophesies that “he shall live without an heir” (III.ii.131-33). To this, Leontes proves his tyranny by denying the authority of the god: “This is mere falsehood”; let the trial continue (III.ii.139). He would make the oracle from Delphi a nothing.

    But the god is not to be mocked. One of Leontes’ servants reports that Mamillius has died of sickness brought on by worrying over his mother’s peril. Leontes immediately understands this to be evidence of Apollo’s anger at “my injustice” (III.ii.143). His line of succession has been destroyed. He was quite willing to deny the words of the god, but he cannot deny the action of the god. He confesses, “I have too much believ’d mine own suspicion” (III.ii.149). He speaks one of the very rare prayers in all of Shakespeare’s writings, asking Apollo to pardon “my great profaneness ‘gainst thy oracle” (III.ii.151) and promising to atone by reconciling himself with Polixenes, “new woo my queen,” and recall “the good Camillo,” a “man of truth, of mercy” (III.ii.151-53). He confesses that his several jealousies led him “to bloody thoughts and to revenge” (III.ii.156) against persons who unfailingly acted with humanity, honor, self-sacrifice, and piety. 

    But Apollo has not done acting. The queen has collapsed, and Paulina pronounces her dead. She condemns Leontes, telling him that the gods will not forgive him, however contrite he may be, or seem to be. “Therefore betake thee / To nothing but despair” (III.ii.206-07). This would be the final “nothing” for him; nothing came of nothing.

    But the king shows that he really is contrite. “Go on, go on,” he tells her; “thou canst not speak too much,” as “I have deserved / All tongues to talk their bitt’rest” (III.ii.212-14). When Paulina herself repents and asks his forgiveness, he replies with humility, “Thou didst speak but well / When most the truth; which I receive much better / Than to be pitied of thee” (III.ii.229-31). After burying his queen and his son in one grave, he will continue to rule Sicilia “in shame perpetual” “so long as nature” will let him live, visiting the chapel where the grave will be (III.ii.235,237). Nature, the true ‘something,’ which he had spurned and deformed with his passion and the acts deriving from that passion, will have the last word.

    On the seacoast of Bohemia, Antigonus, with the king’s infant daughter in his arms, hears the mariner who has escorted him say that the area is “famous” for its “creatures of prey” (III.iii.12-13). Antigonus fears rather the spirit of Hermione, who appeared to him in his sleep last night;”ne’er was dream / So much like waking” (III.iii.18-19). “Good Antigonus,” the spirit told him, “Since fate against thy better disposition, / Hath made thy person for the thrower-out / Of my poor babe, according to thine oath,” call her Perdita, meaning ‘lost.’ (III.iii.27-30). As punishment, you will never see your wife Paulina again. Antigonus obeys the spirit, whom he takes as having been sent by Apollo. He places the infant on the ground, “either for life or death” on the ground ruled by the one he mistakenly supposes to be her father, King Polixenes (III.iii.45). He puts a bundle down beside her; if she is found, its contents will pay for her support. “Most accurs’d am I / To be by oath enjoin’d to this” (III.iii.52-53). He is indeed: As a storm blows up, one of the local creatures of prey, a bear, attacks him. “I am gone for ever” (III.iii.57), a victim of nature at its most violent, driven into it by a tyrant whose name means ‘lion.’

    Not so, Perdita. A shepherd finds her and, believing some “waiting-gentlewoman in the scape” abandoned her, determines to “take it up for pity” (III.iii.72-75). His son arrives to report that the ship which had carried Antigonus has capsized in the storm and Antigonus has been mortally wounded by the bear. Their mood brightens considerably when they discover that the infant comes equipped with a sack of gold and jewels. The shepherd is suddenly rich.

    Suddenness is a recurring motif in the play. Leontes veers from apparent contentment to raging jealousy to just and humble penitence. Paulina too goes from severe judge to pleader for forgiveness. Suddenness is a form of the interaction of thought, speech, and/or action with time, and Act IV opens with Time himself speaking to the audience in the role of a chorus. I “please some, try all”; I bring “joy and terror,” “good and bad”; perhaps above all, Time “makes and unfolds error” (IV.i.1-2) (as Viola sees in Twelfth Night). Therefore, Time continues, it is no crime in me if I violate the laws of the classical ‘unities,’ which decree that all actions in a play occur within a twenty-four-hour span. After all, “it is in my pow’r / To o’erthrow law, and in one self-born hour / To plant and o’erwhelm custom” (IV.i.7-9). And so I shall now “slide o’er sixteen years” (IV.i.6) and return you to Bohemia, where King Polixenes still lives with his son, Florizel, and Perdita has “now grown in grace / Equal with wond’ring” (IV.i.24-25).

    At the palace, plots are being formed. Camillo laments the loss of his country, which he hasn’t seen since he fled with the King. A faithful lover of his own, he wants to be buried there, and now it is safe for him to return, as in the intervening time King Leontes has shown himself as penitent in action as he had been in speech. In contrast, King Polixenes still doubts the sincerity of his friend’s longstanding shows of remorse, having seen how quickly the man’s mood can turn. He has another task for his trusted courtier; he wants him to accompany him to the house of the wealthy shepherd, whose daughter Florizel has been courting, according to reports the king has received from his spies. Even in childhood Florizel was changeable, Polixenes had told Leontes, back in Sicilia. So he has longstanding reasons to keep his eyes on him. The ing and Camillo will disguise themselves and investigate, as Polixenes remains a cautious man when it comes to his own suspicions. This mission is far more urgent than Camillo’s natural but private longing, as the prince’s alleged action implicates the royal succession in Bohemia.

    Bohemia, land of predators, features at least one human specimen of the breed. A rogue named Autolycus (literally, ‘wolf-self’) ambles along a road near the shepherd’s house singing of spring, when “the red blood reigns in the winter’s pale” (IV.iii.4). The sixteen years’ shift in chronology accompanies a one-season shift in the natural season, from winter in Sicilia to spring in Bohemia. Red blood hints at both love and predation; while the prince walks in the spirit of the first, Wolf-Self walks in the spirit of the second. He was once a servant of Florizel, but has been let go, from the Bohemian court to the Bohemian wilds, where a self-made wolf belongs. 

    He finds his next prey in the shepherd’s son, who’s been sent to purchase food, spices, and flowers for a feast Perdita is planning. Pretending to have been beaten and robbed, Autolycus picks the youth’s pocket, relieving him of money the youth would have given him, in pity. Enjoying his sport, Autolycus blames a man named ‘Autolycus’ for the beating. He is a true lord of misrule, but unfit for Twelfth Night celebrations, fit only for the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ avant la lettre—shammer, liar, law-breaker. 

    At the shepherd’s cottage, Florizel and Perdita also play with role reversal, but for love, not profit; he’s dressed as a shepherd swain, she as a queen. Perdita worries that the king, “by some accident,” might discover them and object to their play (IV.iv.19), but Florizel tells her that it’s only done in “jollity,” that the gods themselves condescend to take the forms of beasts, for love (IV.iv.19,25). Apollo himself transformed himself into “a poor humble swain, / As I seem now” (IV.iv.30-31). Such an allusion to Ovid’s tales, which suggest a rather bawdy planet indeed, might well unsettle a virtuous shepherdess, but Florizel assures her that unlike the gods, “my desires / Run not before mine honor, nor my lusts / Burn hotter than my faith” (IV.iv.33-35).

    Yes, but what of the real difference in rank between the prince and the shepherdess? She remarks that “Your resolution cannot hold, when ’tis / Oppos’d, as it must be, by the pow’r of the King” (IV.iv.36-37). One of us must change, for real. Florizel brushes her worries aside; “prithee, darken not / The mirth of the feast” (IV.iv.41-42). If forced to choose, “I’ll be thine” and “not my father’s” because “I cannot be / Mine own, not anything to any, if / I be not thine” (IV.iv.42-45). He will be constant in this purpose, even if “destiny say no” (IV.iv.46). Think of today’s feast as the precursor to the celebration of that nuptial which “We two have sworn shall come” (IV.iv.50-51). Perdita can only hope that Lady Fortune will “stand you auspicious” (IV.iv.52). Very well, he says, the guests approach, so “let’s be red with mirth” (IV.iv.54), with the rising blood of the Bohemian springtime.

    To whom does the prince belong? His father considers him his own, by nature. As ruler, and as future ruler, both belong to Bohemia, and it to them. The prince considers himself more fundamentally his own, by an even more elemental nature; having vowed to marry his beloved, he anticipates becoming ‘one flesh’ with his bride, and has made this a matter of honor. Marriage is the natural foundation of the political community, but this marriage seems to challenge the natural foundation of the ruling family, the regime of that community. Perdita sees the tension, even contradiction, between the ruling intentions of father and son, king and prince. The prince, ardent for her, prefers not to think about it.

    The shepherd wants to prepare his adopted daughter for rule, in his own more limited domain. You, Perdita, are “hostess of the meeting” (IV.iv.64). The guests include shepherds and shepherdesses, but also King Polixenes and Camillo, in disguise. Welcome these “unknown friends” to the feast; in the absence of your mother, whom Perdita assumes to be the shepherd’s late wife, put away your girlish blushes “and present yourself / That which you are, Mistress o’ th’ Feast” (IV.iv.65-68). And she does so, greeting king and courtier with gifts of rosemary and rue, dried flowers that keep “all the winter long,” representing “grace and remembrance” (IV.iv.75-76).

    The king wants to know her better. Complimenting her beauty, he graciously remarks her gifts of “the flowers of winter” fits the old age of his uninvited but welcomed guests (IV.iv.78). She tells him that the springtime flowers, carnations and gillyvors, are hybrids, “nature’s bastards,” and she will not grow them in “our rustic garden” (IV.iv.83-84). They are products of art, not nature. The king corrects her, however, arguing that “nature is made better by no mean / But nature makes that mean; so over that art / Which you say adds to nature, is an art / That nature makes.” (IV.iv.89-92). Marrying “the gentlest scion to the wildest stock” “does mend nature—change it rather; but / The art itself is nature” (IV.iv.93-97). Given her own vows, she cannot but agree. The king seems to bless the union: “Make your garden rich in gillyvors, / And do not call them bastards” (IV.iv.98-99). Bastardy had been exactly the issue respecting her own birth, unbeknownst to her; unbeknownst to him, he is teaching the girl he was falsely accused of siring. Both understand nature; neither knows the other.

    She distributes more flowers, always in accordance with the nature of the flowers and the age of her guests, matching nature with time. She flirts with Florizel, whose name means ‘flower.’ In turn he calls her royal by nature. Polixenes stands amazed at “the prettiest low-born lass that ever / Ran on the green-sward; nothing she does or seems / But smacks of something greater than herself, / Too noble for this place” (IV.iv.156-59). Camillo can only agree: “She is / The queen of curds and cream,” queen of the natural (IV.iv.160-61). The lovers dance.

    Autolycus prowls in, now disguised as a piper, avoiding recognition by any of the three men who know him from the king’s court. Ever ready to separate others from their money, he sings of the trinkets he would like to sell. The lovers have other goods in mind. Florizel professes his love for Perdita in front of his disguised father, saying he loves her more than any other of his gifts: beauty, force, or knowledge. The shepherd happily gives his daughter to the man he takes for another shepherd. 

    The king, however, has a few questions for his unsuspecting son. “Soft swain,” he begins, “Have you a father?” (IV.iv.383). Yes, “but what of him?” (IV.iv.384). Not an auspicious beginning. Does he know of your plans to wed? “He neither does nor shall” (IV.iv.385). Ahem. “Methinks” (Polixenes opines) “a father / Is at the nuptial of his son a guest / That best becomes the table. Pray you, once more, / Is not your father grown incapable / Of reasonable affairs?” (IV.iv.386-90). Not at all, he is quite healthy. But then surely there is something “wrong” and “unfilial” about your conduct; a man should use reason to choose his wife, “but as good reason / The father—all whose joy is nothing else / But fair posterity—should hold some counsel / In such a business.” (IV.iv.398-402). Florizel agrees, but insists that “for some other reasons… I do not acquaint / My father of this business” (IV.iv.403-04). He means that he has already pledged himself to Perdita, although he may also be thinking of Perdita’s warning about his father’s likely objections to their difference in rank.

    It is indeed both understandable yet astonishing that Florizel and Perdita have formed no plan, conceived of no plot, beyond marriage. What exactly do they intend to do after the ceremony and the wedding night? This is understandable in view of their ardor, but astonishing in view of the remarkable circumstance which they both see so clearly, the incongruity of a prince marrying a shepherdess—however rich the bride’s father may be. Father Time, whom we met at the beginning of Act IV, cannot be on their side. In this, the dilemma of springtime in Bohemia, the season of red blood in the land of natural riches and civil-social poverty, parallels the dilemma of winter in Sicilia, land of civil-social riches of natural poverty. In Sicilia, the king’s love of his own ruins itself with marital jealousy; in Bohemia, the king’s love of his own threatens to ruin itself with filial and patriotic jealousy.

    The enraged king rips off his disguise, excoriating first his son, “whom son I dare not call,” as “too base to acknowledge”; then the shepherd, an “old traitor,” whose hanging, unfortunately, would only shorten his life for a week; and finally Perdita, “thou fresh piece / Of excellent witchcraft” who has taken advantage of his fool of an unworthy son (IV.iv.410-15). Polixenes behaves exactly as his brother had done in his succession crisis, although in this case he has command of the facts. Disowning his son, barring him from succeeding to the throne, he threatens Perdita with death if she ever contrives to see his son again. With that, he stalks out, leaving not only the lovers but Camillo behind. In his rage he has forgotten his own teaching on nature, which he had delivered to Perdita—that purity of breeding is no more, and perhaps somewhat less natural than intermixing of breeds by the art that is itself natural, including the natural arts of family formation and even politics, the founding and maintenance of cities.

    “Even here undone!” Perdita says (IV.iv.433)—here in the countryside, far from the court. She remains a woman of spiritedness, saying she would have liked to tell the king that the same sun which shines on his court shines on this cottage. And she doesn’t forget to remind her beloved that “I told you what would come of this” (IV.iv.439). For his part, the shepherd blames both Florizel and Perdita for bringing ruin upon him.

    The prince remains happy to relinquish his future throne for her: “I am heir to my affection” (IV.iv.473), heir to his truest nature, the nature that aims at reasonable and artful ‘hybridization.’ Camillo objects: “This is desperate, sir” (IV.iv.477). You may call it so, Florizel replies, “but it does fulfill my vow,” uphold my honor (IV.iv.478). “Not for Bohemia, nor the pomp that may / Be thereat glean’d, for all the sun sees or / The close earth wombs, or the profound seas hides / In unknown fathoms, will I break my oath / To this my fair belov’d.” (IV.iv.480-85). He intends to put to sea with her; he does not say whereto, because he doesn’t know. He announces that he and his future bride will be “slaves to chance” (IV.iv.532). And so he must be, having failed to respect old father Time any more than he respected his father the king, conveiving no erious plan for the future, for the day after the wedding.

    And that’s the problem. Florizel is full of noble sentiments, but unlike his betrothed, and (fortunately, as it happens) the prudent Camillo, he never thinks more than one moment ahead. Old Father Time knows him, but he doesn’t know Old Father Time; he lives entirely in the present and the immediate future. Camillo sees how his own intention, to return to Sicilia, and Florizel’s intention, to escape Bohemia with Perdita, may unite for the benefit of all. Citing his loyal services to his father, he suggests that he can be equally devoted to his son, the one “nearest to him” (IV.iv.514). If you will but “embrace my direction,” I can contrive a better plot than whatever Fortune likely will impose. “You know / Prosperity’s the very bond of love, / Whose fresh complexion and whose heart together / Affliction alters.” (IV.iv.564-65). Perdita objects, saying that “affliction may subdue the cheek / But not take in the mind” (IV.iv.568-69)—another worthy sentiment, to which Camillo gives due praise, but not a thought that addresses the problem at hand.

    Camillo proposes that they embark for Sicilia, where King Leontes will treat you as a son, having lost his own son as one consequence of his jealous rage, sixteen years ago. Once again, the couple will disguise themselves. Florizel will wear the clothes of Autolycus, which he obtains in exchange for his fine court-garments. For his part, Camillo will return to King Polixenes, report the escape, then accompany the king in his chase after them, to Sicilia—effectively hitching a free ride on the royal train.

    As for Autolycus, he never lacks a scheme of his own, never lacks a way to exploit time. He has just returned from picking the pockets of a crowd gathered to hear the shepherd’s son sing to his two favorite shepherdesses, which is “the time that the unjust man doth thrive” (IV.iv.662). He doesn’t so much plan ahead as he seizes immediate opportunities, “smell[ing] out work for th’ other senses” (IV.iv.664).  Just as Leontes defined the world in terms of bawdry, Autolycus defines it in terms of theft. The young prince is stealing himself from his father. The gods themselves are thieves, and Mercury, the god-thief, is Autolycus’ model. Although he could disclose Camillo’s plot to the king, he won’t. “I hold it the more knavery to conceal it; and therein am I constant to my profession” (IV.iv.672). A person whose wit is all in his senses, his knowledge is the cunning of the ‘con’ artist, his morality the honor among thieves.

    The times provide him with another ripe opportunity for gain. The shepherd’s son advises his father to tell King Polixenes that Perdita isn’t his daughter but a foundling. He can prove this by showing the king the “secret things” he found in the bag next to the infant (IV.iv.684). Now dressed in the finery he acquired from the prince, Autolycus overawes the rubes, frightens them into giving him some of their gold as protection money, then accompanies them on their mission to catch up with the king before he leaves for Sicilia. Autolycus pauses to praise himself: Fortune is courting him now “with a double occasion and a means to do the prince my master good, which who knows how that may turn back to my advancement?” (IV.iv.816-18). 

    By far the longest scene in the play, Scene iv of Act IV takes more time because in it Shakespeare portrays the intricate patterns human beings can weave into time, and have been woven into by it, and by the nature that weaves its own patterns, in time. Human beings can improve nature by their art, especially by prudent ‘breeding’ of flowers and of themselves, through marriage. Good marriages can perpetuate a good regime, through time. Human beings can also corrupt nature by their art, by thinking of nature and the gods as their partners in crime. Human beings, and especially rulers, can corrupt nature by letting their natural passions, especially their love of their own, override their natural reason. What King Leontes did to himself, to his family, and to Sicilia in letting his love for his own wife run beyond any reasonable limits King Polixenes has begun to do in his love for his own son, and his son has begun to do in his love for his own beloved. Camillo, who also loves his own, his own native country and king, is the only one who has the prudence to plot a good end to the badly plotted plans of the others.

    At the palace in Sicilia, Cleomenes would persuade King Leontes that he has done his penitence, performing it with “saint-like sorrow” for many years, more than repaying his trespass (V.i.2). “Do as the heavens have done: forget your evil; / With them forgive yourself” (V.i.5-6). Cleomenes speaks rather like a twenty-first-century therapist or New-Age ‘Christian’ pastor. The King will not forgive himself for making his kingdom “heirless” and for causing the death of his wife, “the sweet’st companion that e’er man / Bred his hopes out of” (V.i.10-12).

    Concurring with the king, not the counselor, Paulina speaks like her namesake, the Apostle Paul, one who never overlooked human guilt. You killed your wife, she reminds him—a woman superior to the amalgamation of all the virtues of all the other women in the world. Leontes can only ask Paulina for mercy, if in the kingly manner of commanding: “Say so but seldom” (V.i.19). 

    Cleomenes persists. You, Paulina “might have spoken a thousand things that would / Have done the time more benefit, and grac’d / Your kindness better” (V.i.21-23). Here, time means circumstances, the conditions prevailing at this time—more specifically, the political circumstances, which Cleomenes would have Paulina consider in accordance with nature (kindness) and grace, which might be a human enhancement of nature or a gift of God. Dion unfolds the political consideration more fully, saying that the king should marry again. In refusing to consider such an act, Paulina shows no pity “for the state” of Sicilia, and no “remembrance” of the king’s “sovereign name” (V.i.25-26). You “consider little / What dangers, by his Highness’ fail of issue, / May drop upon his kingdom and devour / Incertain lookers-on” (V.i.27-29). Given this time, what could be more holy than a new marriage for the king, a new heir to his throne for his kingdom?

    Paulina has a ready answer to this politic consideration: God disagrees. Apollo’s oracle has decreed that Leontes shall not have an heir until his lost child has been found. This, she adds, is as unlikely as the chance that her husband Antigonus, long missing and rightly presumed dead, will rise from the grave. And she reminds the king that even Alexander the Great left his crown not to an heir (his wife was pregnant with his only son) but to “th’ worthiest” man in his empire, “so his successor / Was like to be the best” (V.i.98-99); she refers to one version of Alexander’s last words, “I bequeath my kingdom tôi kratikôi“—to the strongest. Stopping short of imitating Alexander, whom Paulina has turned into a man who thinks of honor and goodness, the king agrees that there are “no more such wives” as Hermione, and “therefore no wife” for him (V.i.56). If I were to take another wife, Hermione’s spirit, he says, would arise to rebuke him, and he swears never to marry without Paulina’s permission, which she tells him she will not grant unless another “as like Hermione as is her picture” appears (V.i.74), or rather “when your first queen’s again in breath” (V.i.83).

    As in so much here, such a one will appear suddenly, accompanying the son of his childhood friend. Leontes himself so remarks: Florizel’s arrival is “out of circumstance”—untimely—and “sudden,” which suggests to the experienced king that “‘Tis not a visitation framed, but forced / By need and accident,” especially in view of the few attendants accompanying the couple (V.i.91-92). For her part, Paulina is skeptical in another way. To the servant who announces their approach, praising Perdita as “the most peerless piece of earth, I think, / That e’er the sun shone bright on,” she laments, “O Hermione / As every present time doth boast itself / Above a better gone, so must thy grave / Give way to what’s seen now” (V.i.93-98). True enough, but the servant insists, that this woman—well, “Women will love her that she is a woman / More worth than any man; men that she is / The rarest of all women” (V.i.110-11). When the couple does arrive, Leontes sides with the servant, calling Perdita a goddess, while expressing his regret, misery and remorse for “mine own folly” in ruining his family and his friendship with his childhood friend, Florizel’s father (V.i.136).

    Florizel has prepared his covering lies. His father commanded him to come to Sicilia with the message that he remains Leontes’ friend, that only infirmity prevents him from making the trip himself, and that Florizel’s ‘wife’ is from Libya. Their retinue is modest because he has ordered several of his attendants to return home to assure King Polixenes of his son’s safe arrival. Again suddenly, news arrives that the supposedly home-ridden king has arrived with Camillo, whom Florizel assumes has betrayed him. 

    Having caught the young man in his lies, King Leontes at first gravely admonishes him: “I am sorry / Most sorry, you have broken from his liking / Where you were tied in duty; and as sorry / Your choice is not so rich in worth as beauty, / That you may enjoy her” (V.i.210-214). Florizel can only plead faithful love as his defense. Fortune may have proved an enemy, bringing the king of Bohemia so soon behind his own arrival, but Fortune has the power “to change our loves” (V.i.218). This being so, King Leontes, remember when “you ow’d no more to time / Than I do now,” when you were young, with few years behind you (V.i.219-20). Be “mine advocate” with my father; he will listen to his old friend (V.i.221). Leontes quite reasonably doubts that he will do so, and (the very Pauline) Paulina chimes in to chide the king for looking too intently at the beauteous Perdita, and to tell him to remember something else, namely that Hermione “was more worth such gazes / Than what you look on now” (V.i.226-27). After excusing himself to his own accuser by remarking the astonishing resemblance of Perdita to his wife, he tells Florizel that, in light of her beauty, he will defend him to his father on the grounds that “Your honor [was] not o’erthrown by your desires” in choosing her (V.i.230). 

    Shakespeare does not present the discovery of Perdita’s true identity. He the description of the scene to observers. In front of the palace Autolycus, who very much wants to know what has happened, asks a gentleman who witnessed the scene from a distance, having been ordered out of the room along with all who were not principals in the matter. When shown the contents of the bag the shepherd found with the infant, the gentleman reports, Leontes and Camillo “look’d as they had heard of a world ransom’d, or one destroyed. A notable passion of wonder appeared in them; but the wisest beholder that knew no more but seeing could not say if th’ importance were joy or sorrow—but in the extremity of the one it must needs be” (V.ii.14-18). The wisest beholder cannot know the human things only by seeing; he must hear human speech, as Socrates taught by going to the marketplace instead of gazing at the stars (then supposed to be the rulers of human destinies) as Plato taught in the dialogues he wrote after following his teacher  to the marketplace, listening silently to his conversations with the persons he meets there. So Shakespeare teaches in every play.

    A second gentleman arrives; he has heard them speak. “The oracle is fulfill’d: the king’s daughter is found” (.ii.23-24). This satisfies their wonder at what’s been seen; the first gentleman saw joyful not sorrowful men. But who is the king’s daughter? A third gentleman, the king’s steward, emerges to tell them that it is Perdita, and that the royal families have reconciled, and that Paulina’s sorrow at hearing the suspected death of her husband, many years earlier, has found a countervailing joy in the fulfillment of the oracle, the return of Hermione’s daughter. 

    The third gentleman concludes his report by saying that Perdita and her newfound families have gone to see a statue of her mother “which is in the keeping of Paulina—a piece many years in doing and now newly performed by that rare Italian master, Julio Romano, who, had he himself eternity and could put breath into his work”—as God had, and as God did—would “beguile Nature of her custom, so perfectly is he her ape.” (V.ii.90-94). A pupil of Raphael, a contemporary of Shakespeare’s grandparents, Romano was an extraordinarily versatile artist—painter, architect, sculptor, and, perhaps dearest to the playwright’s heart, a costume and scenery designer for comedies. And like his master, Romano combined Christian and classical motifs in his works, furthering the same dialogue between the ‘ancients’ and the (Christian) ‘moderns’ Shakespeare himself engaged in.

    The gentlemen leave to witness the viewing, leaving Autolycus, the shepherd and the shepherd’s son (newly ennobled by the prince for their services to himself and the royal families) to perform their own parody of a reconciliation, which depends not on true speech but empty words, when the son promises to pronounce Autolycus “as honest a true fellow as any in Bohemia” when presented to the royals (V.ii.150-51). After all, if shepherds can become nobles by being pronounced to be such by a prince, surely a rogue may be pronounced honorable by the newly ennobled. Wiser beholders of the scene will consider that while words are indispensable supplements to sights, when it comes to insight, their mere incantation has no power at all (independent of consent, obedience) unless pronounced by a supremely powerful god whose words themselves constitute the power of action. Both kings learned this. Leontes learned that thinking and calling his wife an adulteress didn’t make her one; Polixenes learned that commanding his son to obey didn’t make him obedient. 

    At the chapel on Paulina’s property, the two kings, their children, Camillo and Paulina wonder at the statue of Hermione. Before the unveiling, Leontes and Paulina exchange graceful blessings; Paulina especially, knowing the harshness with which she has treated the king for so long, welcomes his coming here: “It is a surplus of your grace, which never / My life may last to answer (V.iii.7-8). 

    When she unveils the statue, all wonder at its lifelikeness, its likeness to nature, even to the detail of new wrinkles on her skin, wrinkles Romano is said to have added, revising her face in accordance with time—in Paulina’s words, “mak[ing] her as she liv’d now” (V.iii.31). Leontes marvels at the statue’s appearance of “warm life,” shamed once more “for being more stone than it” (V.iii.35,38). The statue is “royal,” magical in its “majesty,” because it has “my evils conjured to remembrance” and caused Hermione’s living daughter to stand still, like a statue, transfixed (V.iii.38-42). Her father’s words reawaken Perdita’s power of speech and action. “Do not say ’tis superstition that I kneel” before this statue (V.iii.43); it is so lifelike, I do not commit idolatry. She addresses the statue as if were her mother, asking, “Give me that hand of yours to kiss” (V.iii.46). 

    Paulina interrupts to warn that the statue is newly-painted, not yet dry; do not touch it. She would like to re-veil it, lest Leontes think it really moves, and indeed Leontes does so think, saying its eyes seem to move, its veins pulse blood. When he moves forward to kiss the statue, Paulina again warns against staining oneself “with oily painting” (V.iii.83). Obeying the command not to touch, Leontes and Perdita nonetheless refuse to leave off gazing. This forces Paulina to make a crucial choice. 

    “If you can behold it”—if you are strong enough to bear it—I’ll “make the statue move indeed, descend, / And take you by the hand” (V.iii.88-90). But then you will think not that I am an idolater but a witch—the accusation Polixenes had leveled against Perdita, perhaps unbeknownst to Paulina. To do so, therefore, I require you to “awake your faith” or, if you refuse, to leave (V.iii.95). No one leaves; each passes the test set by Pauline Paulina.

    “Music, awake her,” she commands (V.iii.98). Music, which had enlivened and given harmony to the dancing shepherds in Bohemia—music, the sound which keeps time, and to which human beings keep time—accompanies Paulina’s command to the statue. “‘Tis time; descend; be stone no more; approach; / Strike all that look upon with marvel…. Bequeath to death your numbness, for from him / Dear life redeems you.” (V.iii.99-103). It is time: words and actions now fit the circumstance not only of the king’s contrition but of the daughter’s return, the redemption of the mother’s hope. And to the living witnesses: “Start not; her actions shall be holy as / You hear my spell is lawful” (V.iii.104-05). Hermione is no less good than she was when falsely accused, but from ‘standing accused’ she now moves, living, among the living. “O, she’s warm!” Leontes exclaims (V.iii.110)—alive as she had seemed to him when looking but disallowed from touching. “If this be magic, let it be an art / Lawful as eating” (V.iii.111-12). He had obeyed Paulina’s command not to touch the ‘statue’ as a king respecting the property of a citizen. He now issues a royal command to legalize good magic. 

    If it is magic. The king may well doubt it. The funeral of wife and son which he attended but Shakespeare did not describe; the claim that an Italian artist had painted wrinkles on a statue to make the figure appear to have aged; his own perception of life and movement in the figure as he stood beholding it; Paulina’s prudent caution in speaking truth (I am not a witch) even as she maintains a pious lie: all this points to the truth, that Hermione has been living in seclusion at her friend’s house, all along. And Hermione’s words confirm this. To her daughter she says, “Thou shalt hear that I, / Knowing by Paulina that the oracle / Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserv’d / Myself to see the issue.” (V.iii.125-28). If she had been a statue, she could have known nothing, heard nothing; if she had been a statue, she did not preserve herself. Statues don’t make themselves, although some of Shakespeare’s Romans might be said to aspire to make themselves into statues. [1] 

    “There’s time enough for that” hearing of the story, Paulina interrupts—again discreetly, knowing that the elaborate ruse she and Hermione have now completed ought to be disclosed opportunely, at the right time (V.iii.128). But first she laments, all of you are “precious winners” in this plot, but “I, an old turtle[dove] / Will wing me to some wither’d bough,” with no living mate (V.iii.131-33). Good-humored King Leontes puts an immediate stop to her understandable self-pity. “O peace, Paulina! / Thou shouldst a husband take by my consent / As I by thine a wife” (V.iii.135-37). Camillo shall be your “honorable husband” (V.iii.143). The honor of every member of the royal party has been vindicated. 

    Calling Polixenes again his brother, asking his pardon, and Hermione’s, “that e’er I put between your holy looks / My ill suspicion” (V.iii.148-49), King Leontes concludes, “Good Paulina, / Lead us from hence where we may leisurely / Each one demand and answer to his part / Perform’d in this wide gap of time since first / We were dissever’d. Hastily lead away.” (V.iii.152-55). The king has learned to use time well: slowness for discussion, haste for executive action. Seeing is the knowledge reason brings, insight; hearing is the knowledge faith brings by taking someone at his word; touch is the knowledge action brings, the only knowledge that affects both knower and known at the same time. Leonine Leontes has learned how to rule rightly by coordinating all these senses, and all the ways of knowing they represent. 

    The royal succession of both regimes has been secured, along with the alliance of Sicilia and Bohemia, founded upon the renewed brotherly friendship of the kings. Paulina’s rapid action in leading the royal party—in her leading, her Pauline character is acknowledged by the king—will lead to leisured discussion, the prerequisite of learning. They each will learn of the parts performed by the others. By fusing the fiction of the characters’ many plots with the reality of actors playing roles on a stage, Shakespeare returns his audience to reality, having invited them better to understand nature and convention, truth-telling and lies, seeing, hearing, and touching—the portals of understanding—better than they had before.

    Love, especially the love of one’s own, and honor stand at the core of the play. Each can be perverted into jealous passion that dismisses any evidence contrary to the suspicions of the lover. The remedy for restoring the lover to reason, to bringing the honor-lover back from the dishonor incurred by his passion cannot be philosophy if the lover is no philosopher, and has no prospect of becoming one. The remedy must be another form of love. This is where the Christian themes of humility and agapic love come in. Paulina’s love for King Leontes is Pauline—harsh and exacting on the sinner but for his own good, and open to mercy and forgiveness when true repentance has been demonstrated. This partly explains her patience, another distinctively Christian virtue, seen in the long endurance of her plot to conceal the queen’s survival. In keeping with the theme of time, and timing, throughout, Paulina understands that ‘only time will tell.’

    Paulina’s plot also bespeaks her patient faith in the oracle of Apollo. The mixture of classical-pagan and Christian themes in the play has led to disputes over when the action occurs. Clearly, given the specific reference to Giulio Romano, it must be set in Christian-modern times, at the height of the Renaissance. Renaissance Italy extended the familiar practice of typology—of seeing Old-Testament figures as ‘types’ or precursors of Christ—to figures in classical antiquity. Apollo was often represented as one such; Michelangelo gives the Christ in his painting “The Last Judgment” the face of the Apollo Belvedere. In this play, Apollo is described as the son of Jove, and in English the pun on ‘son’ and ‘sun’ can be deployed in allusion to the pagan god’s association with the sun, carried daily in a chariot across the sky. In Italian Renaissance literature, in Dante and Ficino, this association was well-established; more, Apollo was understood to be the enemy of Aphrodite, a god of reason not of passion. Jesus, who commands his followers to be as prudent as serpents and harmless as doves, who firmly opposes eroticism in favor of agape, can thus be considered as having been foreshadowed by the pagan god, now considered as entirely mythical. Both natural sun and the Son of God do indeed shine on courts and cottages alike, as Perdita once remarked.

    Christianity also enters into Shakespeare’s treatment of time. In the New Testament, time does not always march steadily, as old Chronos does. Time is not only chronos but kairos. It can overthrow laws and either plant or overwhelm customs, not only by wearing them down over the years but suddenly, in an hour as it were, in the moment of God’s creation or in the resurrection of Christ. The suddenness of so many events in the play registers this dimension of time. Hence also the importance of memory, necessary in a world in which time brings changes, slow or instantaneous; without remembrance, timeless nature and timeless divinity cannot be respected.

    It is the Christian aspect of the play that confuses playgoers and readers accustomed to Shakespeare’s comedies and tragedies. In his comedies, Shakespeare often presents an incipiently tragic circumstance, happily resolved. In his tragedies, Shakespeare always brings in fools, clowns, and loveable rogues, often showing the tragic folly of his heroes. Nonetheless, the genres are clear-cut. The Winter’s Tale points to Christ, Christian love—to the tragic death of the Man of Sorrow which nonetheless has a supremely happy ending in His Resurrection, and looks ahead, with patience, to the final happy ending prophesied in the Book of Revelation. In this play, Shakespeare first separates tragic Sicilia from comic Bohemia, then marries them. In this he is quite Christian.

    It is also true that to represent Apollo as a ‘type’ of Christ can go in the other direction. Many atheists conclude that Apollo isn’t the type of Christ but the prototype, that Christianity merely takes up Jewish and pagan motifs. Such ambiguity may be seen in the play. Is Hermione first a woman, then a statue magically or miraculously transformed into a woman again? Or is she rather the natural Hermione, all along? In the first case, the wonder of the royal party is religious; in the second, it is philosophic or, more precisely, proto-philosophic.

    When Shakespeare leaves his stage, he always leaves such wonder behind. He sees his characters and he sees his audience, hears them and speaks to them, and acts out of knowing them and loving what is best for them. He is the wisest beholder. 

     

    Notes

    1. This is a point made by Michael Platt in his fine study, Rome and Romans According to Shakespeare, reviewed elsewhere on this website.

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

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