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    Philip Gilbert Hamerton: Man of Letters, Man of Art

    March 15, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Philip Gilbert Hamerton: An Autobiography 1834-1858. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1896.

    Eugénie Gindriez Hamerton: A Memoir by His Wife 1858-1894. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1896.

    John Gross: The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters: A Study of the Idiosyncratic and the Humane in Modern Literature. London: The Macmillan Company, 1969.

     

    Artist and art critic, moralist, political essayist, a Lancashire man who spent much of his life in Scotland and France (where he met his devoted wife), Philip Gilbert Hamerton wrote one indispensable book, The Intellectual Life, and several other good ones. His life spanned the years 1834-1894, nearly coinciding with the reign of Queen Victoria. He thus flourished in the heyday of the English man of letters, the topic of Mr. Gross’s book, which gives a good sense of the ethos of this dimension of the English regime of that time.

    Gross describes how the literary review emerged as “a really powerful institution” in that century, spurred by the regime’s ever-increasing democratization, a trend marked by the great English Reform Acts which arrived at about one per generation. Democratization of course saw “the growing importance of public opinion,” which review editors and the authors they published sought to shape, rather in the manner Tocqueville hoped French aristocrats would do in his own country. Opinion about how public opinion should be shaped predictably varied, from Francis Jeffrey, editor of the Edinburgh Review, where “the chief use he made of his prestige was to uphold the conventional, the anemic, the decorously second-rate” in “his role of spokesman for the approved view of things, the polite consensus,” to Thomas Carlyle, whose long career saw him swing from calling literature “a branch of religion” to a celebration of the hero as man of action and condemnation of Jews as money-changing anti-heroes (he seems to have coined the term “anti-semitic,” and did not use it as a pejorative). In between these extremes, readers of the English reviews saw what one might as well call, with Gross, English liberalism, exemplified by several types: a philosopher, John Stuart Mill, who urgently tried “to reconcile the artist and the philosopher, to heal the breach between thought and feeling” in an attempt to settle what Socrates called the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy; by the “breadth, sanity and thoroughness,” and the “kindliness” of the poet and critic Matthew Arnold, who celebrated high culture while cheerfully admitting that “Doors that open, windows that shut, locks that turn, razors that shave, coats that wear, watches that go. and a thousand more such good things, are the invention of the Philistines,” not the Oxonians; and even that rare thing, a literate political scientist, Walter Bagehot, a Burkean (“famous for talking about stupidity as though it were virtually synonymous with instinctive wisdom”), whose The English Constitution remains a model of its genre. On Bagehot, Gross remarks, “At the most fundamental level, subsequent events have vindicated him: one of the more attractive features of English life remains, as Orwell put it, our habit of not killing one another.” Liberalism, indeed, fostered by a guiding aristocracy of sorts.

    “By subsequent standards the Victorian intellectual aristocracy seems remarkably small and tightly-knit: everyone knew everyone else, and was somebody else’s brother-in-law.” Fissures in the edifice, leading to its decline, can be seen in the writings of John Morley, editor of the Fortnightly Review, a democratic Hegelian who “contrived to give his readers the sense that they were riding a great central wave of Progress, intellectual, scientific and political all in one” (his American contemporaries began to call themselves Progressives). In a word, Morley although Morley “spelt God with a small ‘g'” while the sometime Prime Minister William Gladstone spelled it “with a big ‘G,'” there was little difference between them. Morley promoted writers “chiefly in so far as they can be said to urge forward ‘the central current of thought’ in their society,” what Hegel called the Zeitgeist. “For all things tend toward a final liberation of the spirit,” a liberation to be advanced gradually with “social energy” to change the world tempered by “social patience,” the willingness “to seize the chance of a small improvement, while working incessantly in the direction of great ones”—a lesson American Progressives have more or less taken to heart in the century and a half since Morley taught it. Gladstone road the same tide in politics, albeit with a more decided show of piety.

    Eventually, such democratized Hegelianism would collide with the First World War, scattering the prevailing liberalism of the English literary men, mercury-like, into a hundred globules. Even before that, a George Saintsbury seems to have wanted to pull back a bit from such soaring optimism, preferring connoisseurship to grand historical narrative, and the ebullient Catholic, G. K. Chesterton, would have none of such stuff at all. Nonetheless, the capacious, humane, morally and politically moderate atmosphere of Victorian literary life proved a comfortable point of departure for Hamerton, who nonetheless, proving more restless than his contemporaries, ranged into art (as did the more famous John Ruskin and Walter Pater), continental European culture, and even philosophy—if not so much as a system-builder in the manner of Mill than as a defender of philosophy as a way of life—the best of his generation on that topic. Hamerton also maintained a distinct independence from his generation of literati, staying clear of London and the universities. He lived a life off to one side, giving himself the chance to breathe different air.

    “My principal reasons for writing an autobiography are because I am the only person in the world who knows enough about my history to give a truthful account of it, and because I dread the possibility of falling into the hands of some writer who might attempt a biography with inadequate materials,” a writer tempted to fill the lacunae “with conjectural expressions which he only intends as an amplification, yet which may contain germs of error to be in their turn amplified by some other writer, and made more extensively erroneous.” A few articles by well-intentioned biographers had convinced him of this. As for the autobiographer’s hazard—presenting “an untrue representation of its subject as no man can judge himself correctly,” any autobiographer “must be unconsciously revealing himself all along, merely by his way of telling things.” He promises to maintain “a certain reserve” with respect to others: “My rule shall be to say nothing that can hurt the living, and the memory of the dead shall be dealt with as tenderly as may be compatible with a truthful account of the influences that have impelled me in one direction or another.” After all, “I have all the more kindly feelings towards the dead, that when these pages appear I shall be one of themselves, and therefore unable to defend my own memory as they are unable to defend theirs.” The prospect doesn’t unsettle him. “The notion of being a dead man is not entirely displeasing to me,” inasmuch as no one will be able to inflict “any sensible injury” upon him, and, regarding his reputation, by issuing his memoir d’outre tombe, “with six feet of earth above me to deaden the noises of the upper world, I feel quite a new kind of security.” He guards himself with a comprehensive agnosticism, writing that “it is reasonable to suppose that whatever fate may be in store for us, a greater or less degree of posthumous reputation in two or three nations on this planet can have little effect on our future satisfaction; for if we go to heaven ,the beatitude of the life there will be so incomparable superior to the pleasures of earthly fame that we shall never think of such vanity again; and if we go to the place of eternal tortures they will leave us no time to console ourselves with pleasant memories of any kind; and if death is simply the ending of all sensation, all thought, memory, and consciousness, it will matter nothing to a handful of dust what estimate of the name it once bore may happen to be current amongst the living.”

    Hamerton’s father was an attorney who courted the better-born Miss Anne Cocker, somewhat to the consternation of the young lady’s mother, who had duly noted the aspirant’s “rather dissolute habits.” John Hamerton was “a good horseman, an excellent shot, looked very well in a ball-room,” but “these, I believe, were all his advantages, save an unhappy faculty for shining in such masculine company as he could find in a Lancashire village in the days of George IV.” He was, one might say, a man of the gentry class with the habits of the English aristocracy. As things turned out, Mother had a point, but she bent to the determination of her daughter (“a young lady with a will of her own,” albeit one with “a very sweet and amiable disposition”) and to prudence of the young attorney, who assured her that “at my request your daughter will have all her property settled upon herself, so that I can have no control over it—thus leaving it impossible that I should waste it.” He added a promise to reform himself, which he evidently did, so long as his wife lived. In accordance with his own promise to speak as well as possible of the dead, Hamerton remarks, “It is difficult for us to understand quite accurately the social code of the Georgian era, when a man might indulge in pleasures which seem to us coarse and degrading, and yet retain all the pride and all the bearing of a gentleman.” The rise of ‘the democracy’ coincided with the revival of Christian morality, in his lifetime.

    But his mother died at the age of 24, two weeks after bearing her son, having been weak and perhaps consumptive during her pregnancy. “No portrait of my mother was ever taken, so that I have never been able to picture her to myself otherwise than vaguely,” although as a child he was told he resembled her. “There are no letters of hers except one or two formal compositions written at school under the eye of the mistress, which of course express nothing of her own mind or feelings,” so he is left with the memories of those who described her as “a very lively and amiable, person, physically active, and a good horsewoman.” “The knowledge that my mother had died early cast a certain melancholy over my childhood,” feeling “vaguely that there had been a great loss, though unable to estimate the extent of it.” 

    “The effect of the loss upon my father was utterly disastrous,” ruining his hopes and causing him to lose interest in lawyering and finally to drink himself to an early death. A reader of law books and newspapers (“this absence of interest in literature was accompanied by that complete and absolute indifference to the fine arts which was so common in the middle classes and the country aristocracy of those days”), his loss of any desire to make money (“almost the only recognized object in the place where he lived”), and with his “youth too far behind him for any joyous physical activity,” he “was condemned to seek such amusements as the customs of the place afforded, and these all led to drinking.” “Had they drunk light wines like French peasants, or beer like the Germans, they might have lasted longer, but their favorite drink was brandy in hot strong grogs, accompanied by unlimited tobacco.” Sufficiently well off not to need steady work, “he fell into a kind of life that placed intellectual and moral recovery alike beyond his reach.” He did offer his son a bit of hardheaded advice, to wit, “I should never be a lawyer, on the ground that a man had enough to plague him in his own concerns without troubling his mind about those of other people.”

    It was well that he shipped his son off to live in the town of Burnley with his two unmarried sisters, who lived with their mother at any estate called Towneley Park. Burley was one of Lancashire’s “very aristocratic neighborhoods” at a time when “nobody thought of disputing the supremacy of the old houses.” “There was something almost sublime in the misty antiquity of the Towneley family, one of the oldest in all England, and still one of the wealthiest, keeping house in its venerable castellated mansion in a great park with magnificent avenues.” His doting aunts “remained all their lives aristocratic in their feelings, and rather liked to enjoy the hospitality of the great houses in the neighborhood,” even as his uncles, along with his father, “abandoned all aristocratic memories and aspirations, and entered frankly into the middle class.” Hamerton prefers his aunts’ choice, thinking that they “showed better taste in liking refined society than my father did in lowering himself to associate with men of an inferior stamp in rank, in manners, and in habits.” “I distinctly remember how one of my aunts told me that somebody had made a remark on her liking for great people, and the only comment she made was, that she preferred gentlefolks because their manners were more agreeable. She was not a worshipper of rank, but she liked the quiet, pleasant manners of the aristocracy, which indeed were simply her own manners.”

    At the local Grammar School, Hamerton took to reading English but ran against a wall when “set to Latin,” which was taught, incomprehensibly, by giving the child a Latin grammar written in Latin. Under the circumstances, “my progress in Latin was very slow, and the only result of my early training was to give me a horror of everything printed in Latin, that I did not overcome for many years.” His native language remained his preference for the rest of his life. He could read in it, he explains, whereas he could only conjugate in Latin and Greek.

    As to his father, he seldom could conjugate with him, either. An exception was a trip to Wales, in the company of his favorite Aunt, Mary, in the summer of 1842. Aunt Mary, who had become a mother to him, required him to keep a journal; reading it in the 1850s, he’s struck by the way he expressed himself. “Being accustomed to live with grown-up people, and having no companions of my own age in the same house, I had acquired a way of talking about things as older people talk, so that the journal in question contains many observations that do not seem natural for a child,” likely repetitions of comments made by the adults who accompanied him. But he was also “very observant on my own account,” leaving the first recorded impressions of his love of “old castles and cathedrals” and of landscapes. “I had a topographic habit of mind even in childhood, which made every fresh locality interesting to me and engraved it on my memory.” He also took the future artist and arts connoisseur’s interest in the “beautiful materials” things were made of—the wool on the furniture in the great houses, the ebony chairs in the Penrhyn Castle dining room and “the old oak in the dining-room at Trelacre.” “The interest in materials is a special instinct, a kind of sympathy with Nature showing itself by appreciation of the different qualities of her products,” an “instinct [that] has always been very strong in me,” which “I have often noticed in others, especially in artists” and craftsmen. As for his father, “whilst we were in Wales together he conducted himself as a man ought to do who is travelling with a lady and a child.” This year, 1842, was “absolutely the last year of my life in which I could live in happy ignorance of evil and retain all the buoyancy of early boyhood.” The next year, “quite the most important of my early boyhood, have had a most powerful and in some respect a disastrous influence over my whole life.” 

    “Notwithstanding my father’s kindness to me during our Welsh tour, my feelings towards him were not, and could not be, those of trust and confidence.” His father was a mean drunk; “when inflamed with brandy he became positively dangerous, and I had a well-founded dread of his presence.” The boy needed the protection of his aunts when he went to visit the man at his home, Ivy Cottage, in Shaw, but in June 1843 that protection was abruptly withdrawn. “Declaring, in terms which admitted of no discussion, that although a child might live with ladies it was not good for a boy,” and so “he had determined to have me for the future under his own roof.” [1] This “separation from [Aunt Mary] in childhood was the most bitter grief that could be experienced by me.” This notwithstanding, given over to his father’s “Spartan severity,” a discipline sharply contrasting to the man’s own perfect indiscipline, Hamerton sees that this “was not ill-calculated for the formation of a manly character,” which might not have developed under the kind tutelage of his beloved aunts. And his father imparted one habit of his old legal training, understanding “the importance of applying the mind completely to the thing which occupied it for the moment.” “If he saw me taking several books together that had no connection with each other, he would say, ‘Take one of those books and read it steadily, don’t potter and play with half-a-dozen.'” “A Philistine in neglecting his own culture, he had not the real philistine’s contempt for culture in others and desired to have me well taught.” He also “accustom[ed] me to money matters” by “plac[ing] gold and silver in my keeping” and demanding an account of his use of it. “In this way money was not to be an imaginary thing for me, but a real thing, and I was not to lose the control of myself because I had my pocket full or sovereigns.” Although Hamerton takes this to have been “a very original scheme in its application to so young a child,” it is actually quite like the method commended by Locke in his book on the education of “the young Gentleman,” published a century and a half earlier. 

    But nothing could really compensate for the alcoholism. “My existence at Ivy Cottage was one of extreme dullness varied by dread.” He recalls a night when the full moon illuminated the garden’s trellis work. “My father’s cruelty had then reached its highest point,” in the aftermath of yet another beating. “The situation had become absolutely intolerable, the servants were my only protectors and though devoted they never dared to interfere when their master was actually beating me.” He had those sovereigns in his pocket; he could have mounted a horse and made his escape. But he had nowhere to go and would have been disinherited at the age of ten. He seems not to have thought of returning to his aunts, perhaps because they would have little choice but to return him to his father, who retained the legal knowledge that would have been necessary to make that happen. 

    What law and custom could not do, nature did. After his father succumbed to a fit of paranoid delusion, his Aunt Mary arrived. “I did not even know she had been sent for; but the sweet reality entered into my heart like sunshine, and throwing my arms about her neck I burst into a passion of tears…. It had only been six months in all, but it had seemed longer than any half-dozen years gone through before or after.” His father died of “apoplexy” a short time later, at the age of 39.

    Aunt Mary was named his guardian. She had her own plans for him—far kinder but not a fit for his character. She wanted him to become a clergyman, sending him to Doncaster School as the first step towards entering Oxford. This was not to be, but his initial feeling was that “it seemed rather hard” to be separated from her at a boarding school. “But she thought the separation necessary, as there was nothing in the world she dreaded more than that her great affection might spoil me”—a worry that probably had afflicted his father, too—evincing her “remarkable firmness of character,” enabling her to “act, on due occasion, in direct opposition both to her own feelings and to mine, if she believed that duty required it.” 

    An usher at the school delivered himself of the opinion that “the establishment of religious toleration in England had been a deplorable mistake, and that Dissent ought not to be permitted by the Sovereign.” Although “my principal feeling about the matter was the prejudice inherited by young English gentlemen of old Tory families, that Dissent was something indescribably low, and quite beneath the attention of a gentleman,” the policy of “compel[ling] Dissenters by force to attend the services of the Church of England did seem to me rather hard.” Some years later, this sensibility would take him in a firmer direction, away from the Church of England and indeed from Christianity altogether. But for the time, he was “extremely religious, having a firm belief in providential interferences on my behalf, even in trifling matters.” His required summaries of Sunday sermons were supplemented by some of his own thoughts, to the point that he once “produced a complete original sermon, which cost me a reprimand, but evidently excited the interest of the master.”

    He found the beautiful church at Doncaster “a powerful stimulus to an inborn passion for architecture.” He considered the school’s ruling amusement, the game of cricket, a bore (“I hated the game from the very beginning, and it was pure slavery to me”), and the poems of Sir Walter Scott compensatorily exciting. “Nothing in the retrospect of life strikes me as more astonishing than the rapid mental growth that must have taken place between the date of my father’s death and its second or third anniversary. When my father died I was simply a child, though rather a precocious one, as the journal in Wales testifies; but between two and three years after that event the child had become a boy, with a keen taste for literature, which, if it had been taken advantage of by his teachers, ought to have made his education a more complete success than it every became.” The problem was that the Greek and Latin classics were taught philologically, “dissected by teachers who were simply lecturers on the science of language, and who had not large views even about that.” Literature was lost in its wrong-headed study. For relief from his consequent headaches, he came into the habit of taking long walks. 

    Doncaster was a prep school for Cambridge. After the death of the headmaster, Hamerton transferred to Burley, a prep school for Oxford, likely to the satisfaction of Aunt Mary, but he interrupted his studies to care for her during the last months of incurable heart disease.  This hiatus put the last nail in the coffin of his attempts to learn the classical languages, a deficiency which “at the same time left my mind more at liberty to grow in its own way.” He was happily encouraged to write poetry by one of his teachers, “a practice that I followed almost without intermission between the ages of twelve and twenty-one.” “The best that can be expected from the poetry of a boy is that he should give evidence of a liking for the great masters, and in my case the liking was sincere.” 

    Thanks to his reading of Scott, “in those days I lived, mentally, a great deal in the Middle Ages,” a habit “also due in some measure to a romantic interest in the history of my own family, and of the other families in the north of England with which mine had been connected in the Past.” He learned about heraldry, drawing and coloring “all the coats of arms that had borne by the Hamertons in their numerous alliances” and dreamed of taking up falconry (he bought all the accoutrements, but his family never got round to giving him a falcon). “For the Greeks and Romans I cared very little; they seemed too remote from my own country and race, and the English present, in which my lot was cast, seemed too dull and unpicturesque, too prosaic and commonplace.” He indulged his tastes in the school library, “which is rich in old tomes that few people ever read,” and in the library of his uncle’s brother-in-law. Edward Alexander had taken a near-paternal interest in the boy and guided him to a highly useful lifelong habit. “He rigorously exacted order in his library; I might use any of his books, but must put them all back in their places. Perhaps my present strong love of order may be due in a great measure to Mr. Alexander’s teaching and example. Among the friends of my youth there are very few whom I look back to with such grateful affection.”

    “The reader will see that up to this point my tastes had been conservative and aristocratic. Then there came a revolution which was the most important intellectual crisis in my life.” At Burley, he listened to the sermons of James Bardsley, “a man of very strong convictions of an extreme Evangelical kind,” a “really eloquent” man who “possessed in a singular degree the wonderful power of enchaining the attention of his audience.” “His longest sermons were not felt to be an infliction; one might feel tired after they were over, but not during their delivery”—praise, indeed. The Reverend Bardsley’s “power was best displayed in attack, and he was very aggressive, especially against the doctrines of the Church of Rome, which he declared to be ‘one big Lie.'” For her part, Aunt Mary, “with her usual good sense, did not approve of this controversial spirit” when her ward brought it home on break; “she was content to be a good Christian in her own way and let the poor Roman Catholics alone.” In order better to combat Catholic doctrine and to prevent the prospect “that the power of the Pope might one day be re-established in our country,” Hamerton began to inquire into the controversy. He learned, in time, a disappointing lesson: “The spirit of inquiry is not considered an evil spirit so long as it only leads to agreement with established doctrines,” a limitation that tends to blunt the spirit of inquiry. Exposed to the teachings of “German neology”—the claim that Scripture is not inspired by God—he began to think that “Protestantism is an uncritical belief in the decisions of the Church down to a date which I do not pretend to fix exactly, and an equally uncritical skepticism, a skepticism of the most unreceptive kind, with regard to all opinions professed and all events said to have taken place in the more recent centuries of ecclesiastical history,” and that “the Church of Rome, on the other hand, seemed nearer in temper to the temper of the past, and was more decidedly a continuation, though evidently at the same time an amplification, of the early Christian habits of thinking and believing.” (To say nothing of the Roman Church’s superior cathedral architecture.) “If devotional feelings had been stronger” in him “than the desire for mental independence, I should have joined the Church of Rome.” “My decision, therefore, for some time was to remain in a provisional condition of prolonged inquiry”—a prayerful condition, he carefully adds. At the time, the English Protestant “believe[d] his religion as firmly as he believe[d] in the existence of the British Islands,” a “matter-of-fact temper” that “in more recent times” has been largely replaced by “a more hazy religion.” The young Hamerton was in this instance ahead of his time. “The reader is to imagine me as a youth who no longer believed in the special inspiration of the Scriptures, or in their infallibility, but who was still a Christian as thousands of ‘liberal’ Church people in the present day are Christians.”

    Adding to his determination to remain independent in his judgments was his acquaintance with an atheist, a man whose good character “enabled me to estimate the vulgar attacks on infidels at their true worth.” Although “my own theistic beliefs were very strong, I knew from this example that an atheist was not necessarily a monster.” Mr. Utley based his atheism on what he considered the probabilistic argument that “the self-existence of the universe” was easier to believe than the notion that “a single Being,” equally “without a beginning,” “could create millions of solar systems.” As for himself, Hamerton found it “much easier to refer everything to an intelligent Creator than to believe in the self-existence of all the intricate organizations that we see.” At the same time, it also “seemed to me quite natural that thoughtful men should hold different opinions on a subject of such infinite difficulty.” To this lesson in religious toleration, he eventually added the thought that both Protestant and Catholic clergy have “take[n] up and consecrate[d] popular beliefs that may be of use, and that they drop and discard, either tacitly or openly, those beliefs which are no longer popular.” As remarked above, Hamerton’s life coincided with England’s social and political democratization, so the thought may have been suggested by the ongoing regime change itself.

    The year 1851 saw the opening of the Great Exhibition in London, that celebration of modern science and its technology that the City exemplified, along with the spirit of commerce. “My first impression of London was exactly what it has ever since remained”: “the most disagreeable place I had ever seen.” “I wondered how anybody could live there who was not absolutely compelled to do so.” Indeed, despite his patriotic feelings, “the real exile for me would be to live in a large town.” Admittedly, there is one, and only one, “reason for living in London, which is the satisfaction of meeting with intelligent people who know something about what interests you and do not consider you eccentric because you take an interest something that is not precisely and exclusively money-making,” but the noise, hurry, and dirt of a big city tend to overwhelm that attraction. During this tour, he did see some pictures by the Pre-Raphaelite artist John Everett Millais, then on exhibit at the Royal Academy. “I distinctly remember the exact sensation with which my young eyes saw these works; so distinctly that I now positively feel those early sensations over again in thinking about them. All was so fresh, so new!” Against his resolution never to return to London weighed that excitement, and of course he would return once his interest in painting intensified.

    By now, entrance to Oxford University and the fulfillment of Aunt Mary’s ambition for him as a clergyman loomed. “That was her plan; and a very good scheme of life it was, but it had one defect, that of being entirely inapplicable to the human being for whom it was intended.” He was, as it were, saved by Oxford’s requirement that entering freshmen sign the Church of England’s Thirty-nine Articles of faith,” an act Hamerton “could not do conscientiously, and would not do against the grain of my conviction.” Against Oxford there was also “a difficulty in my own nature, which is a rooted dislike to everything which is done for social advancement.” Nor did he relish the thought of further study of the classics, and his tutorship under a clergyman from Yorkshire reinforced his aversion, the man having “the usual characteristic of the classical scholars of his generation, a compete ignorance and misunderstanding of the fine arts.” “The extreme narrowness of his literary tastes led me to place a higher value on my own increasing knowledge of modern literature, and conclusively proved to me, once for all, that a classical education does not necessarily give a just or accurate judgment,” lacking “the virtue of opening the mind which is ascribed to it.” Nor did his tutor’s “injustice towards Dissenters and unbelievers” do more than arouse “in me a profound sympathy for these aligned and despised people.” “In a word, my tutor made me dislike the very things that it was his business to make me like.” By the end of the year, Hamerton’s guardian also saw “that it was useless to prepare me any further for Oxford.” In that time in England, among persons “of our class in society,” “education and the clergy were looked upon as inseparable, even by myself.” Soon, he returned to education “with fresh energy on my own account, and I am still working at it, in various directions, at the mature age of fifty-two.”

    The religious way of life foreclosed, what way of life would he choose? Not the law: by precept and by example, his father had warned him off that. Despite the mill on the family property, “the cotton trade required a larger disposable capital than I possessed, to start with any chance of success.” Worldly success in general seemed unlikely, inasmuch as “it seemed to me that the liberty of thought which I valued above everything was incompatible, in England, with any desire to rise in the world, as unbelievers lay under a ban, and had no chance of social advancement without renouncing their opinions.” (In social gatherings, “I had one merit, that of being an excellent listener, and that has been a great advantage to me through life.”) He might, as so many men of his class in fact did, “have made use of the Church as an instrument, have given himself the advantages of Oxford, married for money, offered his services to the Conservative party, and gone into Parliament.” But how dishonest, and how tedious. Fortunately, he “had independent means,” along with membership in “one of the oldest and best-descended families in the English untitled aristocracy.” This being so, a life devoted to the two things he really liked, literature and painting, required no more armature than that. “I decided to try to be a painter and to try to be an author and see what came of both attempts.” Looking back on his choice, he concedes that “I have been sometimes represented as an unsuccessful painter who took to writing because he had failed as an artist,” but so what? “The exact truth is that a very moderate success in either literature or art would have been equally acceptable to me, so that there has been no other failure in my life than the usual one of not being able to catch to hares at the same time.”

    His misjudgment came not so much in his underlying choice but in overestimating his ability to paint. “Constantly attempting what was far too difficult for me in art,” unable “to find any one ready and willing to put me on the right path,” he turned to John Ruskin’s Modern Painters for guidance and corresponded with him for a time. Ruskin proved an excellent literary influence, “as anything Mr. Ruskin has to say is sure to be well expressed,” and Ruskin did direct his readers’ “attention to certain qualities and beauty in nature.” “But in art this influence was not merely evil, it was disastrous,” as Ruskin “encourag[ed] the idea that art could be learned from nature,” an “immense mistake” since “nature does not teach art, or anything resembling it; she only provides materials.” His future wife concurred in this judgment, writing that “the main reason for his failing to express himself in art, is that he was too much attracted by the sublime in Nature, and that the power to convey the impression of sublimity has only been granted to the greatest among artists.” 

    Attraction to the sublime in nature led him to the Scottish Highlands and Loch Lomond. Approaching the mountains by steamer “was a revelation of Highland scenery.” “A rugged hill with its bosses and crags was one minute in brilliant light, to be in shade the next, as the massive clouds flew over it, and the colors varied from pale blue to dark purpose and brown and green, with that wonderful freshness of tint and vigor of opposition that belong to the wilder landscapes of the north. From that day my affections were conquered; as the steamer approached nearer and nearer to the colossal gates of the mountains, and the deep water of the lake narrowed tin the contracting glen, I felt in my heart a sort of exultation like the delight of a young horse in the first sense of freedom in the boundless pasture.” He made sketches and kept a journal, which he now pores over with wonder at “how a youth with so little manifest talent as may be found in these sketches and journal could indulge in any artistic or literary ambition.” And “besides this, I was living, intellectually, in great solitude.” A well-meaning uncle prevailed upon his guardian to buy him a set of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Aunt Mary prevailed upon him to join the local militia, likely in the hope of curtailing his dreamy self-indulgence. As of age nineteen, “I had not found my path, and was always dissatisfied with my studies”—not surprising, as “young men both overestimate and underestimate their own gifts”; “they do not know themselves, as indeed how should they?” 

    At the end of 1853 he ventured to London to study landscape painting. But of course, he selected for a tutor a man who shared his devotion to nature studies, one who moreover “had no education, either literary or artistic, and very little imaginative power.” Knowing “little of those necessities and conditions that make art a different thing from nature,” he led Hamerton “to nature instead of leading me to art and this was a great misfortune for me, as my instincts were only too much in the same direction already.” “Mr. Pettit taught me to draw in a hard, clear, scientific manner…. The ideas of artistic synthesis, of seeing a subject as a whole, of subordination of parts, of concentration of vision, of obtaining results by opposition in form light and shade, and color, all those ideas were foreign to my master’s simple philosophy of art.” Several years later, his young French wife, accustomed to viewing the masterpieces in the Louvre, looked at the Pre-Raphaelites her husband admired; “I did not understand it as art,” and “it was for my eyes what unripe fruit is for the teeth.” “The most famous specimens” of the Pre-Raphaelite style “only awoke an apprehension as to what I might think of his own pictures when they were shown to me.” Indeed, a wife well chosen.

    The benefit of attending to nature inhered in his writing, not his painting. After meeting R. W. Mackey, author of The Progress of the Intellect, a fairly typical product of nineteenth-century English liberal faith in the advancement of science at the expense of religion, Hamerton concluded that there was no sense in “going painfully over the whole theological ground and explaining every belief and phase of belief historically and rationally,” rather in the manner of Hegel, but that “the true liberation must come from the enlargement of the mind by wider and more accurate views of the natural universe,” whereby “medieval beliefs must drop away of themselves.” That is, Mr. Mackey was a victim of his own “excessive culture,” having “withdrawn [himself] to much from commonplace reality” and instead seeming “to be moving in a dream.” “All the culture in the world, all the learning, all the literary skill and taste put together, are not so well worth having as the keen and clear sense of present reality that common folks have by nature.” In his own books, most notably The Intellectual Life, a topic that lends itself to Mackeyism, he resists by staying close to practical matters. This inclines him to a certain tough-mindedness. Upon being told by the painter C. R. Leslie that geniality “is of great value to a poet,” that Byron might have been another Shakespeare had he “possessed the geniality of Goldsmith,” Hamerton judges that “Leslie probably underestimated the literary value of ill-nature,” as “much of Byron’s intensity and force is due to the energy of malevolence.” He agrees with the classical scholar Watkins Lloyd, who replied to his thought that “undeserved diseases seemed to me clear evidence of imperfection in the universe,” that “we receive many benefits from the existing order of things that we have not merited in any way, so we may accept those evils that we have not merited either.” “This struck me as a better reason for resignation than the common assertion that we are wicked enough to deserve the most frightful inflictions. We do not really believe that our wickedness deserves cancer or leprosy.”

    Polite society punished him for such heterodox thoughts by imposing a degree of social ostracism, among neighbors and even family. Invitations to dine decreased in number, and he worried that this might “indirectly be injurious to my guardian,” Aunt Mary, “and her sister, and I began to feel that I had become a sort of social disgrace and impediment for them.” When it transpired that Aunt Mary shared the general view, her complaints “were infinitely painful to me, as coming from the person I most loved and esteemed in all the world.” The good woman went so far as to regret that he had a close friend in town, “not for any harm that my friend was likely to do me but because with my ‘lamentable opinions’ I might corrupt his mind.” This “cut me to the quick, and then I knew by cruel experience what a dreadful evil religious bigotry is.” Years later, another family member ventured to tell his wife that “she hoped my books had not an extensive sale, so that their evil influence might be as narrowly restricted as possible.”

    In the case of his first book, published on his twenty-first birthday, the lady need not to have worried. Out of a run of two thousand copies, “exactly eleven were sold in the real literary market.” Looking back, he recommends that “poetic aspirants” have one hundred copies printed and sent to publishers, who either accept or (more likely) reject the collection. “If they all declined, my loss would be the smallest possible, and I should possess a few copies of a rare book.” He headed off to Paris, later that year, to give painting another go.

    There, a military officer gave him a ticket to a ball in honor of Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel of Italy. “We who saw the sovereigns of France and Sardinia walking down that ball-room together, little imagined that would be the ultimate consequences of their alliance—the establishment of the Italian kingdom, then of the German Empire, with the siege of Paris, the Commune, and the total destruction of the building that dazzled us by its splendor, and of the palace where the sovereigns slept that night.” More lasting but no less predictable was the result of a chance meeting back at the hotel with a man who had been a member of the French General Assembly and opposed the coup d’etat that brought the lesser Napoleon to the throne. M. Gindriez had fled to Belgium but was allowed to return to Paris “on condition that he did not actively set himself in opposition to the Empire.” Gindriez “had in the utmost strength and purity the genuine heroic nature,” and invited him to dine with his family. His eldest daughter, then sixteen, eventually became his wife, although “it did not occur to me that we were likely ever to be anything more than friends,” an “international marriage” seeming quite implausible to him at the time. “She, with a woman’s perspicacity, knew better.” His main evident benefit from his brief stay in France came not in his painting (he was still laboring under the illusion that he might make a good landscape artist) but in improving his French. “The best French criticism on the fine arts is the most discriminating and the most accurate in the world, at least when it is not turned aside from truth by the national jealousy of England and the consequent antipathy to English art.” And then “there are qualities of delicacy and precision in French prose which it was good for me to appreciate, even imperfectly.”

    Upon returning, “I remained working in the north of England, discouraged, as to literature, by the failure of the book of verse, and without much encouragement for painting either.” He began to find his way when he took it into his head to spend the autumn on moors in Yorkshire. “The physical work attendant upon encamping, and the constant attention that must be given to such pressing necessities as shelter and food, give exactly that contact with reality that educates us in readiness of resource, and they have the incalculable advantage of making one learn the difference between the necessary and the superfluous.” Solitude and silence amidst “leagues of fragrant heather” cheered him (“towns are depressing to me—even Paris”), and it reinforced his sense of the distinction between “the natural and the artificial in landscape.” Yorkshire was also the place his ancestors had lived, with the home of Richard de Hamerton, the first known member of the family, still partially intact after seven centuries. “The Hamertons do not seem to have distinguished themselves in anything except marrying heiresses, and in that they were remarkable successful.” They lost many a fortune so gained thanks either to confiscation or imprudence, and in the end “they have not kept their lands.” 

    The next summer, now aged twenty-three, he spent “encamping,” this time along Loch Awe in the Scottish Highlands with “only one servant.” He seems to have done nothing artistically memorable—he makes his excuse, that the weather was too changeable to capture on canvas, that he should have fitted himself out for sketching, not painting—but he wrote up the experience and the result was his first literary success: A Painter’s Camp. In the 1850s, no one ‘camped out’ for recreation’s, or creation’s, sake. “The novelty of camp life by choice seems to have interested many readers, though they must have been already perfectly familiar with camp life by necessity in the practice of armies and the experience of African travelers.” Like sailing, hunting, and fishing, camping is deeply connected “to the memory of the race”—the human race—as such, exerting an “intense attraction” to the human spirit. And for himself, although his ‘Romantic’ fondness for Sturm und Drang weather further delayed his artistic development, “what is called dreary, wild, and melancholy scenery afforded me, at that time, a kind of satisfaction more profound than that which is given by any of the human arts.” In his mature years he would come to prefer the brighter landscape of southern France.

    Aunt Mary could not bring herself to approve. “My guardian, like all women, had an objection to what was not customary, and as my camp was considered a piece of eccentricity, she wanted me to take a house on Lockaweside,” which he did. She also wanted him to marry. “Though she had prudently avoided marriage on her own account, she thought it very desirable for me,” contending that since she wouldn’t live forever, her beloved ward ought “to have the stay and anchorage of a second affection that might make the world less dreary for me after she had left it.” She also “may be suspected” of having “looked to marriage as the best chance of converting me to her own religious opinions, or at least of obtaining outward conformity.” As for himself, he remained unenthusiastic, primarily because Aunt Mary was right: “So far as I could observe married men in England, they enjoyed very little mental independence, being obliged, on the most important questions, to succumb to the opinions of their wives, because what is called ‘the opinion of Society’ is essentially feminine opinion.” True, “no mother was ever loved by her son more devotedly than my guardian was by me, and yet her intolerance would have been hard to bear in a wife”; “I determined that if I married at all it should not be to live under perpetual theological disapprobation.” Plus, he would have needed a bigger income, the acquisition of which would have precluded a life lived in front of a canvas or at a writing desk. 

    A solution occurred to him. Marriage to an Englishwoman being so unattractive, why not a foreigner? He remembered Mlle. Eugénie Gindriez, who “had read more and thought more than other girls her age,” which by now had reached the marriageable point. Not only did she ‘have conversation,’ but she had been running the household for several years in lieu of her mother, who suffered from bad health. He booked passage for France, returning with the bride who had in the meantime “waited patiently” for him to come to her own conclusion. She being Catholic, he being agnostic, the wedding in France proved a disappointment to the guests, who “expected a grand ceremony in the church” instead of “a brief benediction in the vestry.” Upon the couple’s return to England, Aunt Mary was pleasant but Aunt Susan much less so, disgruntled at any family tie with a Papist. For her part, Mrs. Hamerton was fortunate to cross the Channel in fine weather, “all a wonderful play of pale greens and blues, like turquoise and pale emerald,” but “she had lived in a great artistic center” and to her eye English painting was too bright, London too dingy. Back at Loch Awe, “I set myself to do what had never been done—to unite the color and effect of nature to the material accuracy of the photograph.” 

    There Hamerton’s autobiography breaks off. Whether intentionally unfinished or not, it stands as a guide and encouragement to any young person who prefers to live a bit to the side. His wife took up the narrative after he died, and carried it from the year of their marriage, 1858, to his sudden death in 1894.

    He had been quite honest with her. The Scottish Highlands are not the boulevards of Paris; this will be a drastic change, he told her. And “already his devotion to study was such that he requested me to promise not to interfere with his work of any kind that he deemed necessary—were it camping out, or sailing in stormy weather to observe nature under all her changing aspects, either of day or night.” These sober cautions notwithstanding, “he was so sensitive to the different moods of nature that his descriptions gave to a town-bred girl like me an intense desire to witness them with my own eyes, and when I did see them there was no désillusion, and the effect was so overpowering that it seemed like the revelation of a new sense in me.” Once settled, she set to work organizing the household. She even managed, eventually, to win over Aunt Susan, who seems to have found a real Catholic girl far less appalling than such a creature contemplated in the abstract. Eventually, she “became my most faithful friend.”

    The American Civil War and the consequent interruption of the trade in cotton caused economic depression in England; the Hamerton family mill had nothing to work on. They decided to move to France, with Hamerton to partner with her father in the family wine business. They would need more income, as the first two of three children had already been born in England. When her father died shortly after their arrival, Hamerton partnered with a family friend but that business, too, collapsed a few years later. 

    The “almost unexpected” financial success of A Painter’s Camp saved them from ruin. As it happened, its setting in the Highlands caught the eyes of Mr. Macmillan, the eminent publisher; “being a Scotsman, he was in immediate sympathy with so fervent an admirer of the Highlands as my husband, and had at once agreed to publish the book.” The American firm, Roberts Brothers, perhaps in consideration of the substantial Scottish population in that country, won an audience for it there, and publishing contracts for subsequent manuscripts followed. 

    His family prospects improved, Hamerton refused to give up on art. He took up etching—of all the visual arts aside from sculpture the best adapted to the precision he aspired to achieve. “His main thought, as I thought”—and one is inclined to trust her judgment—was “attempting too much finish and effect, and I used to tell him so.” To this he gave verbal assent, but he simply could not resist retouching and retouching until the picture was ruined. “The amount of labor bestowed upon etching by my husband was stupendous, as he had to seek his way without help or advice” from any etcher. Once again, his literary skills averted the family from bankruptcy, as he was appointed art critic for the Saturday Review and won a contract for his second (real) book, Etching and Etchers. Now in his mid-thirties, he moved with, and introduced his wife to, several of the literary lions and lionesses of the time, including George Eliot (très aimable“) and Tennyson (“I was greatly impressed by the dignity of his simple manners and by the inscrutable expression of the eyes, so keen and yet so calm, so profound yet so serene”), Louisa May Alcott, who reported that Emerson was among her husband’s American readers, and Robert Louis Stevenson (“What a bright, winning youth he was!” even if he smoked too many cigarettes). Hamerton became so busy that he began to suffer occasional bouts of nervous exhaustion, so he cut back on work and railway travel. It must be said that he was a highly productive writer, nonetheless, producing two novels and a dozen or so books on art, literature, and politics, while editing (beginning in 1870) The Portfolio, which he founded and made into the preeminent English-language arts journal of the time. “It was indeed difficult to give rest to a mind incessantly thirsting for knowledge.” 

    The most jarring political and military event in France in their lifetimes was the Franco-Prussian War. “Just at the beginning of the hostilities, my husband had deprecated the rashness of the French people, which was blinding them to the unprepared state of their army and to its numerical inferiority when compared with the German force. But when he saw that, although the King of Prussia had said that the war was not directed against the French people, he was still carrying it on unmercifully after the fall of Napoleon III, his sympathies with the invaded nation grew warmer every day, and he did all that was in his power to spare from invasion that part of the country where we lived, and which we knew so well.” He wrote to one of the French generals to explain how the German camp at Autun could best be approached and attacked. In the event, the family watched the battle from the garret window of their house, watching as the German forces gradually fell back. 

    In anticipation of continued threats from now-united Germany, and with respect to his happy marriage and the future of his two sons, especially the two sons, he became increasingly concerned by the “jealous hostility between France and England,” which had never disappeared since the Napoleonic Wars. He hoped to found “an Anglo-French Society or League, the members of which should simply engage themselves to do their best on all occasions to soften the harsh feeling between the two nations.” Matthew Arnold’s complaints about the French as a nation “sunk in immorality” had particularly offended him: “The French expose themselves very much by their incapacity for hypocrisy—all French faults are seen.” Although he had no stomach for “the heavy correspondence” such an enterprise would impose upon him, he wrote, “peace and war hang on such trifles sometimes, [and] a society such as I am imagining might possibly on some occasion have influence enough to prevent a war.” Staying more within his métier, he was moved to write a book, French and English, in which he gave “an impartial comparison of the habits, institutions, and characteristics of the two nations, on account of his sympathies with both, and his intimate knowledge of the French language and long residence in France.” He wanted no two-front war, and by 1887 he wrote to a friend, saying “we are rather troubled by the possibility of a war between France and Germany,” as “my sons would probably both volunteer into the French army in defense of their mother’s country, as it would be a duel of life and death between German and France this time,” not only a territorial dispute over the governance of Alsace and Lorraine. Without foreseeing the mass wars and mass murders of the next century, he anticipated the beginnings of them clearly enough.

    The 1870s and 1880s saw a continuous production of books. One of them, Human Intercourse, a commercial success “in spite of its cold reception by the Press,” drew the criticism that he “had no genius.” He groused, with equanimity, “I don’t pretend to have genius; I never said I had; then why make it a reproach?” Not for him the preening of his younger contemporary, Mr. Wilde. “He certainly cared infinitely and incomparably more for his reputation—such as he wished it to be, pure, dignified, and honored—than for wealth, his only desire about money, often expressed, was ‘not to have to think about it.'” By now, he seldom needed to. The family suffered the loss of their younger son, Richard, who committed suicide in 1888. He designed Richard’s grave marker, inscribing it with the word, “Peace,” which was the wish the young man had expressed to him in their last serious conversation.

    He wrote to a friend, “For my part, I don’t know what to think of the future. Long ago I used to hope for a true religion, but now I see that if it is to be freed from mythology, it ceases to be a religion altogether, and becomes only science, which has nothing of the heating and energizing force that a real religion certainly possesses. Neither has science its power of uniting men in bonds of brotherhood, and in giving them an effective hostile action against others as religious intolerance does.” He died of a heart attack in 1894, “still in the full possession and maturity of his talents, and in the active use of them” and “conscious of a useful and blameless life.”

     

     

     

    Note

    1. The contemporary distinction between a “child” and a “boy,” equivalent to today’s distinction between a boy and a youth, or adolescent, or ‘teenager,’ evidently registers the assumption that children before puberty are innocent because supposedly sexless, whereas nature then differentiates them more clearly between boys and girls.

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Teaching as Distinct from Educating

    December 9, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Jacques Barzun: Teacher in America. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1945.

     

    “We have latterly had too much educational discussion,” Barzun remarks, and it must be said that the situation has not improved. (He says the same thing about political theory and, given the level of political theory in the first half of the twentieth century, who can blame him?) “A lifelong discipline of the individual by himself, encouraged by a reasonable opportunity to lead a good life” and “synonymous with civilization,” education may come “because of the teaching [a person] has had, sometimes in spite of it,” as Henry Adams shows in own somewhat wayward way. Parents and teachers (much less school administrators) don’t educate; they teach, and usually the administrators don’t even do that. The grand ambitions of self-styled ‘educators’ therefore have “practical limits.” You can’t become a civilized person just by learning stuff, even true stuff. Citizen virtues and other features of the cultivated soul “occur as by-products” of teaching. They are “connected with good teaching,” to be sure, but not the same as it.

    Teaching consists of the art of showing a pupil how to do things for himself. A pupil has his own moral and intellectual structure, which must be attended to. Souls can be induced to learn so long teachers relate the facts they convey to principles and persons—Washington, D.C. to George Washington. “All valuable learning hangs together and works by associations which make sense.” At the same time, this intellectual side of the thing requires moral supplement, habituation. “There are only two such habits”: thinking and attention. Both can be fostered by example, whether the teacher lectures, leads a discussion, or tutors; “the effective agent is the living person,” teacher and pupil alike. In this, the live person has an advantage over a book, although Barzun does not of course scant books, recommending that they be read by oneself, away from those sections of libraries that buzz with whispers. (“Reading, true reading, is the solitary vice par excellence.”) And avoid the sort of books given to pupils in teachers’ colleges, written in the “ghoulish Desperanto” of people who miscall themselves educators. It may be worth noting that John Dewey, master of clunky Germanish English, was Barzun’s older contemporary at Columbia. Columbia Teachers’ College, at that.

    As to reading itself, “the child who is a born reader will of course go through phases of continuous reading, which has a way of getting on the nerves of family and friends.” Reading is nonetheless good, rereading even better, as it fosters thought. Teachers can help by concentrating their pupils’ attention on select passages from the books assigned—the “French explication de texte.” This will enable, if not guarantee, that the pupil becomes a student, “gaining an idea of what can be done by applying one’s mind and using others’ ideas,” by “begin[ning] to discover the need for interpreting, the ways of testing a preference for one interpretation over another, and the desirability of checking doctrinaire inclinations in an uncertain world.” And he will learn, not so much from the teacher as from the writers they study together, that “in the realm of mind as represented by great men, there is no such thing as separate, isolated ‘subjects,'” that Shakespeare knows a thing or two about medicine, psychology, history, and can integrate what he knows into a comprehensive understanding of the whole. Only such integration can come to ‘make sense’ to a person. And so the one who attempts to teach algebra shouldn’t neglect to say what algebra is for, “what exponents mean apart from their handling.” Indeed, “being part of the logical sciences, it should be taught in conjunction with informal elementary logic,” as that can engage the students in “the fascination of the mind’s ability to test its own inward workings.” There is a moral dimension to such a fascination, as “the ability to feel the force of an argument apart from the substance it deals with is the strongest weapon against prejudice.” 

    Moving through the academic ‘disciplines’ from reading and mathematics to the sciences, Barzun recalls that at the turn of his century science replaced Latin and Greek in the curricula of American schools. This happened because classicists attempted to imitate science, reducing “their field to a wasteland of verbal criticism, grammar, and philology” and neglecting the substance of the Latin and Greek writers, the wisdom they offer, which modern science cannot match. “Naturally the classics were exterminated, for science could beat them at their own game,” which had exchanged theoretical and practical wisdom for ‘pragmatism.’ Young man, do you want to be practical? Very well, chemistry can offer you a better-paying job than any of the schools still offering Latin classes. “That is what invariably comes of trying to put belles-lettres into utilitarian envelopes.” Better to treat the sciences “as humanities.” Making them fields for specialists alone “made possible the present folly in Germany” (that would be Nazism) by splitting its people into “three groups: the technicians, the citizens, and the irresponsible rabble,” a regime in which “the rabble together with the technicians can cow the citizenry.” “Such principles will hardly give long life and happiness to a democracy,” the regime that must “have more citizens than anything else.” Without that preponderance, citizens “will find not only that representative government has slipped out of their fingers, but that have also lost their commanding position,” enslaved to their new masters.

    “All this clearly depends on teaching our easygoing, rather credulous college boys and girls what science is. If they leave college thinking, as they usually do, that science offers a full, accurate, and literal description of man and Nature; if they think scientific research by itself yields final answers to social problems; if they thin scientists are the only honest, patient and careful workers in the world”; that “theories spring from facts and that scientific authority at any time is infallible”; and that, accordingly, “science steadily and automatically makes for a better world”; then “they have wasted their time in the science lecture rule” and have become “a menace,” believing either that their mastery of science bestows authority upon them or that their failure to master science disqualifies them from positions of authority altogether. To avoid this, Barzun recommends not a ‘survey course’ in science but an “intelligent introduction” to “the principles of physical science,” demarcating science’s powers and limitations.

    What’s now called science was once a part of philosophy. But by the 1880s in America, scientists had convinced many academic philosophers that science could bring certain answers to their ponderings—rather in in the manner that Paul the Apostle ridiculed the philosophers (or perhaps sophists) of his own time that Christianity showed the straight way that obviated the zetetic practice of always searching, never finding. Against this, Barzun urges that “the classics, philosophy, and science are at once overlapping and complementary disciplines,” and their history ought not to be neglected. He knows that ‘history’ means not the course of events but a narrative of a course of events, that “history as such does not exist,” as it’s “always the history—the story—of something,” an “account of man in society.” Its intrinsic interest lies in being about ourselves, “men being by definition interested in themselves.” Action, thought, chance: history consists of an account of these; good history should not however “be treated as a moral tale until the student knows a fair quantity of facts,” ballast against the errant sailing that comes from airy moralizing. The art of teaching history “consists in making the student see” that the actions and thoughts of men, and in particular their motives for acting, “resemble his own, at the same time as they are subtly modified by conditions and ideas and hopes now beyond recall.” Absence of teaching means that an American who knows what the Monroe Doctrine is, very much including its original purpose, will better understand, and perhaps better respond to, today’s Latin American who objects to it. The student who possesses this “historical sense” will understand “his neighbors, his government, and the limitations of mankind much better,” less inclined to “being taken in…by panicky fears [or] by second-rate Utopias.” The historical sense, so understood, becomes “a moderator which insists on knowing conditions before passing judgments”; in this, “the historical sense is above all political-minded,” tending “to make men tolerant, without on that account weakening their determination to follow the right,” inasmuch as “they know too well the odds against it.”

    As to the fine arts, Barzun cautions against “trying to approach the professional standard of performance,” which makes it “necessary to concentrate on doing at the expense of thinking,” to musically illiterate specialists. “A knowledge of the history of art is ultimately necessary for the best kind of enjoyment and performance—even and especially by the master.” “The very reason why art is worth teaching at all is that it gives men the best sense of how rich, how diverse, how miraculous are the expressions of the human spirit through the ages”—the theme of André Malraux’s writing at that time, as well. In this, again, “the college does not pretend to ‘educate,'” as “it can only furnish the means of later self-education” by having students see pictures and sculptures, listen to music, and by giving them a sense of the history of what they are looking at and hearing. “The aim is not to make picture dealers or musical stenographers, but to teach to future ‘educated’ citizens two new and special languages—visual and auditory,” thereby “mak[ing] sensations more accurate and inward reflection richer by associations with these concrete experiences.” This “break[s] down self-will for the sake of finding out what life and its objects may really be like,” as “most esthetic matters turn out to be moral ones in the end”—great art offering “a choice” of “preferring strength to weakness, truth to softness, life to lotus-eating.” Barzun’s identification of fine arts with languages points to the benefit of learning foreign languages, which “lets you into the workings of other human minds, like and unlike your own,” introducing you to “real things [that] are untranslatable: gemütlich, raison d’être, dolce far niente, high life, and so on.” 

    Having addressed each of the subject areas of teaching, drawing out the relations among them, Barzun returns to a consideration of the great books whose authors show that they have done that better than he can claim to do. “A great book is in effect a view of the universe, complete for the time being. You must get inside it to look out upon the old familiar world with the author’s unfamiliar eyes.” For his part, a teacher must remember that his pupils are reading the book “for the first time,” that “the discussion of any classic” in the classroom “must be superficial” for that reason. “Fortunately there are connections between one great book and another, which enable us to capitalize on our reading experience,” enabling readers to learn not only from each book itself but from what one book says about the others. Interest in reading the great books revived in the 1920s, in the wake of the scientistic takeover of higher education, with the publication of John Erskine’s The Moral Obligation to Be Intelligent. St. Johns College and the University of Chicago then attempted to ‘institutionalize’ such study with their great-books curricula. Barzun demurs. “St. Johns tries to do in college what the educated man should be expected to do for himself ten or fifteen years after his graduation.” And institutionalization inclines to methodization, which will not do when inquiring into works that resist methodical treatment. Rather, “a teacher who wants to read a series of books with his students will be well advised to show a kind of willing discipleship shifting ground from book to book. He must be a Christian moralist with Dante a skeptic with Lucretius, and a pantheist with Goethe” since, “if he wants the reader to lend their minds, he must himself be able to do it.” Above all, “Don’t talk to me about the Greeks: read them!”

    How, then, shall teaching, if not education, be institutionalized? Barzun is rather partial to the approach taken by his own institution, Columbia College. During the First World War, Columbia teachers and administrators understood the conflict to involve a challenge not only to the American regime but to Western civilization. They introduced a compulsory course for freshmen titled “An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West,” eventually extended to two years, then supplemented by courses in the Humanities and the Sciences. With those (again, necessarily superficial) courses completed, the Columbia student “not only fills his head with fair pictures of reality, but…begins to think with tolerable good sense about what he himself wishes to do, both in his next two college years and later on.” To accomplish this, the College needs “a good staff, willing to work like dogs with small discussion groups,” teachers supported by administrators who can “make the three required courses fit into the time available.” Ultimately, “either the basic, required collegiate preparation will be seriously breached, or the basic required vocational preparation will have to yield.” Barzun is inclined to insist on the collegiate preparation, as it gives students the chance to become whole men and real citizens.

    What about those administrators? “Nothing so strikes the foreign observer with surprise as the size and power of American collegiate administration”—and bear in mind that Barzun writes this in 1945, innocent of subsequent elaborations, many imposed by the overarching administrative states, federal and ‘state,’ which regulate and subsidize colleges and universities at the price of requiring teaching institutions to imitate the institutions of modern statism. Even then, administrators had organized themselves into a “planetarium of deans with the President of the University as a central sun.”  Despite occasional eclipses within such systems, “usually more sympathy obtains among fellow administrators than between them and the teaching personnel,” and “if it came to a pitched battle, I feel sure that the ore compact executive troops, animated by a single purpose, besides being better fed and self-disciplined, could rout the more numerous but disorderly rabble that teaches.” Disorderly, because faculty meetings prove stages of contention; “it would take a philosopher-king to rule over such a roost.” Therefore, the best practicable regime is the one “laid out so as to guarantee a reasonable freedom” to teach, research, write. When lost, “the battle for academic freedom” takes on “the grimness of an execution by the secret police,” as “a teacher is dropped, silently, callously, with the clear intent of an unfrocking and of an attainder against his dependents” against which “there is no redress, for it occurs usually too low in the world of educational institutions, it concerns too small a post, and it can command no publicity.”

    Barzun suggests a remedy. Faculty members and administrators should ask themselves three questions about the accused: “Has the teacher the right to express his opinion on the mooted subject in the classroom” Has he the right to express it outside? And finally, “has he the right to use class time to convert students to his opinion?” The answer to the last question should be a firm ‘no,’ as students, “who are perhaps compelled to listen to him, have every right to complain if they are preached at instead of instructed.” With respect to the first question, the teacher has the right to express his opinion on topics within his sphere of authority, “no matter who disapproves and for what reason.” Admittedly, “the cost of this freedom may be a good deal of crackpot error, but nothing good goes unpaid for: this is the price.” As to topics beyond his sphere, the teacher properly enjoys “not academic freedom, but academic responsibility,” observing “the same tact that he would in good society.” Similarly, his students “have no right to publish what is said in class, or they kill its informality.” As to opinions expressed outside the university, he has a citizen’s freedom to speak freely, so long as he “make[s] it clear to his hearers or readers when he is speaking as a citizen and when as a University expert on some special branch.” If his reader would think about these matters further, Barzun recommends “the classic and definitive” statements on academic freedom made by Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell during the First World War, in defense of the socialist Harold Laski. [1] And finally, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure: “The important thing is to be sure you are hiring a teacher and not a wolf wrapped in a sheepskin.” Once hired, a teacher’s popularity or lack of same should have no bearing on his treatment. “Let those who dislike him drop his course.”

    As to the institutional qualifications of faculty members, Barzun deems the doctoral degree to have become an “initiation into the most expensive and least luxurious club in the world.” It “shows nothing about teaching ability” and, “as a ritual, it is one of those unlucky importations from Europe—largely due to the influence of Daniel Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins,” the first American university modeled on German academic institutions. Barzun concedes that the Ph.D in science makes some sense, “represent[ing] good sound experimental work.” Doctorates in education, on the other hand, “cover such a wide range of indefinite subject matter that they have been repeatedly and deservedly ridiculed.” Their bearers have learned teaching “methods”; “by racking his wits and the dictionary, an educator,” as he is called, “can devise methods for subjects he does not know and for subjects that have no matter in them,” producing textbooks “almost as large and medical and law books” which “seldom do more than pad out statistical matters of fact ” in “the educators” lingo” Barzun had scored earlier. More generally, he deplores the conflict between teaching and scholarship seen when candidates for advanced degrees are required to research and write while meeting students. “Writing a first book and learning to teach are almost always incompatible occupations; and attempting both under a superior’s eye adds to the strain.” “The octopus has him in its grip and does not let him go.” 

    By 1945, American schools had begun the now-familiar practice of standardized testing for ‘aptitudes.’ But if “every college should…be dedicated to Intellect”—that is, to “Mind, free and restless in its desire to experience, comprehend, and use reality,” such tests “should go.” “Unless we recognize Intelligence as the general quality I tried to define, we shall all bow down in a morass of ill-defined virtues, aptitudes, and accomplishments,” inasmuch as “the only yardstick fit to measure an Intelligence with is another Intelligence.” Is this objective, scientific? Well, no. “Objectivity applies, as its name suggests, to objects,” and “science cannot help us classify the things we care about when we enter the realm of mind.” Intelligence belongs to persons, not objects. (And, one now must add, objects that are artifacts; there is no such thing as artificial intelligence, although there is intelligent artfulness).

    Teaching is by and for persons. A teacher with any sense of this reality at all will know that “students are in college solely to pass courses, and that they are moved exclusively by zest for learning.” This reality has implications for conduct. “Friendship between an instructor and a student is impossible” because “friendship has strict prerequisites, among them, freedom of choice and equality of status,” neither of which “can exist in thee teacher-student relation.” That goes especially for teacher-student romances, as it’s “bad for love-making to combine it with a desire to improve and be improved.”

    Nor should colleges worry too much about what students want. It will always be something. “The customer is always right, perhaps, but not so the student,” and with students “reproof and encouragement must be administered together.” Don’t pay too much attention to student demands for special treatment. “The blind boys tend to think their achievement so remarkable that they should earn Phi Beta Kappa with B’s when others need A’s.” Their achievement is remarkable, but it is not a Phi Beta Kappa-worthy achievement. These are two separate kinds of achievement. In dealing with students, “partiality and pity are fatal.” If you bend the rules for a student laboring under difficult circumstances, bend them only with regard to “practical details—an extension of time, a special examination, extra hours of tutoring missed—anything of this kind and nothing that damages the prize worked for.” Moreover, “the meaning of this hard leniency must be pointed out as a lesson in itself.” 

    When he turns to women in college, Barzun misses something, namely, the parenting he’d initially mentioned. With women, he laments, five years after graduation, “where has all the philosophy and English literature and mathematics gone to?” In the 1940s, to be sure, most of it went into the nursery, where it lent no expertise in the tasks of comforting infants and changing their diapers. College-educated women “are probably handicapped by four years of leisure and learning for the battle of life over crib and stove.” This would be true if crib and stove were the only tasks mothers undertake. But if, as Barzun has stipulated, parents are the first teachers of children, do they not also engage them in conversation? Even absent the careers essayed by women inspired two decades later by Second Wave Feminism, surely a devoted ‘stay-at-home’ mother has always had more to do than shop for food, clean the house, prepare meals, and wash dishes. Contra Barzun, “their imagination about the distant or the abstract” need not be “completely atrophied.” And even he relents, maintaining that qualified women should be in college but need a somewhat different type of pedagogy than the men. Most women are less prone to abstract thinking (for better or for worse), “less interested than boys in theory, in ideas, in the logic of things and events.” College teachers should go against that grain, indirectly. “If the teacher takes pains to show repeatedly that concrete harm, good, suffering, pleasure or profit follows from some belief or truth in question, a beginning can be made of substituting reason for memory.” With women, “every event or proposition must be related to human motives, lest it be automatically discounted as one of those wild things that men do or say and that count for nothing.” The reward goes beyond the parenting that Barzun scants. “The highest form of sociability is the conversation of educated men and women.”

    “The right to education must remain on an equal footing with every other right, namely, the footing of being available insofar as the claimant shows the power to deserve it.” Barzun insists that this in no way contradicts democracy, as “the existence of superior brains does not touch in the slightest the theoretical bases of democratic government,” as “the true notion of equality is not identity but equivalence of treatment”—equal things to equals, as Aristotle puts it. In any classroom there will be some students better at the work than others, and this can be made good if “the more gifted learn to appreciate other men’s difficulties” and the less gifted “to gauge other men’s powers.” “No tampering with either [the college’s] ingredients or its standards of quality” should be countenanced.

    So, yes, do require students to read great books, not only to listen to the teacher’s summaries and comments. “For a man to find his way through to the real Nietzsche or Darwin is a laborious task. He must forget what he ‘knows'”—that is, what he’s heard about the author—and “read Nietzsche himself, not one book merely but perhaps as many as three, lending his mind to each, while comparing and assimilating.”

    That is the real business of the college, but since the business of America is business money will be needed to support it, and money talks. It seldom speaks intelligently, preferring to subsidize athletic scholarships, projects designed to ameliorate social and medical ills, and grand buildings instead of college business. As things then stood, the ratio of donations was “two to one in favor of serving animal needs—and the distribution of cash makes it more like one hundred and fifty to one.” Scholarships should go to students who show evidence of “talent, achievement, and promise,” not poverty or alumni connections. Barzun offers a compromise: “If the alumni must have invincible teams, let them continue to send promising athletes to their alma mater, but since this often requires stead ‘co-operation’ on the part of the admitting authorities as well as the teaching staff, let the alumni clubs be told that every second recipient of their support be a genuine student.”

    This is to acknowledge what politic philosophers have understood for millennia, that “the teacher and thinker must constantly bear in mind special conditions that define his craft,” as Barzun delicately puts it. “He has on his side only mankind’s desire for light—the light that gives all other things their shape; and this, though a strong motive, is easily obscured by more immediate demands. The teacher must consequently sustain it most steadfastly in the very persons who neglect or forget it easily.” The example of Socrates, and of thinkers and teachers in the contemporary regimes of fascism and communism, have made that point more starkly, but as a teacher in America Barzun can concentrate on the need for decent salaries. “If the Field Marshall is not ashamed to admit that money is the sinews of war, the teacher should feel no qualms in proclaiming that alma mater means first of all the nourishing mother.” That is a form of motherhood Barzun does indeed esteem.

    This brings Barzun to his final topics, family and polity. In a display of his excellent judgment, he begins with the chapter on marriage in Philip Gilbert Hamerton’s The Intellectual Life. As Hamerton sees, “the world is not organized for the life of the mind” but for “business and domesticity.” In marriage, “people who are not systematically broken in to living with a professional thinker cannot overcome their ingrained disbelief in the reasonableness of so irregular an existence.” Most “brain workers” do not “know how to protect their vigils,” how to ignore telephone calls and ringing doorbells in order to preserve “the will-o’-the-wisp of mental effort,” a thought which, “if postponed may be lost forever.” Hamerton’s recommendation, marrying a nice peasant girl, was already a fading prospect in the 1880s when he wrote his book, “the afterglow of a golden age.” “There are no peasant girls,” anymore; “the man of thought must face the educated woman of the twentieth century—if he finds one to his taste—and work out his intellectual salvation with her or against her.” That “thinking is inwardly a haphazard, fitful, incoherent activity” is “perhaps the least suspected fact of the intellectual life,” and its vulnerability to persecution intended or unintended has proven itself a perennial dilemma.

    Moving from the household to the city, Barzun discommends any overall ‘ideological’ or religious orientation of intellectual life. The old universities of the West organized themselves around Christianity, an organizing principle Barzun deems to be unavailable in practice today. He firmly refuses its contemporary substitutes, fascism and communism, whose advocates imagine that they “know what learning is for.” He is reduced to hoping that “our intellectual life” will somehow muddle itself together under the auspices of “the great architect,” “History.” Reading him decades later, we can doubt even that wan hope.

    Recurring to Barzun’s esteem for A. Lawrence Lowell and his defense of Laski’s presence on the Columbia campus, there is a danger that neither Barzun nor Lowell distinctly foresaw. The Marxist claim to have in its possession the first and only scientific socialism, a science not only of physical nature but of human life tout court, will claim for its devotees a title to rule the university, along with all other social institutions. It is one thing to extend tolerance to a Marxist lecturer, quite another to offer him tenure in a liberal arts institution, with full voting rights respecting educational policies. Such a teacher will not only seek to indoctrinate his students but will incline to either rule or ruin, neither of which will enhance the liberality of the liberal arts. In the years since Barzun wrote and Lowell ruled, progressives and their fellow-travelers have proven susceptible to ignoring that.

     

    Note

    1. A. Lawrence Lowell: At War with Academic Tradition in America (1934) and What a University President Has Learned (1938). Lowell was a political scientist and a leading Progressive, in these respects similar to his contemporary, Princeton College president Woodrow Wilson. Laski became a Marxist in the 1930s, guest lecturing at Columbia under the auspices of the Institute for Social Research, drawing criticism for his suggestion that the establishment of socialism might require violent revolution.

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    The Roman Cato with the Soul of Washington

    June 1, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Joseph Addison: Cato: A Tragedy, and Selected Essays. Christine Dunn Henderson and Mark E. Yellin, eds. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004.

     

    Legend has it that General George Washington had Addison’s Cato performed for his soldiers at Valley Forge. This should be true, whether it is or not. Addison’s portrayal of Cato depicts the soul of a great Stoic with all its austere nobility but also its limitations and the errors that follow from them. Cato’s gravest error is his suicide when his cause seems hopeless. By presenting the play to his men at the nadir of America’s hopes in the War for Independence, Washington was telling them, ‘I shall not desert you.’ And, by implication, ‘Do not desert me, or your country.’ The play’s epigraph, from Seneca’s On Divine Providence, suggests as much: “A brave man, standing erect amid the ruins of the res publica.” British troops under the command George III and his generals seemed likely to ruin the American republics, to bring the rebellious ‘Whigs’ to heel. Souls steeled for Stoic self-rule informed by a sense of divine providence, which seldom announces its moves in advance, can yet emerge victorious from trials of fire.

    Addison wrote the Cato in 1712, and it enjoyed immediate success on the London stage. In Britain’s North American colonies, it had been performed frequently since 1730s and it would remain popular for another generation after the Revolution. Addison was a Whig, a partisan of the Hanoverian succession seen in the person of Queen Anne and her great general, the Duke of Marlborough, whom the Whigs compared to Cato. The Tories, loyal to the Hanoverian line of English monarchs, regarded Marlborough as a usurping Julius Caesar. By asking the great Tory poet, Alexander Pope, to write the Prologue, Addison made an overture across the parties, asking both sides in Britain’s factitious politics to consider human greatness in a Christian light.

    Cato is Cato the Younger, grandson of the eminent Cato the Elder—both courageous opponents of tyranny and defenders of the Roman republic. The younger Cato had allied with Pompey against Julius Caesar. The republican forces lost the Battle of Pharsalus and fled to north Africa, where Pompey was assassinated. Cato now heads the Roman forces, along with the remnant of the Senate. Now exiled in Utica, he has formed an alliance with King Juba I of Numidia. Pope, too, admires Cato, finding in him a fit hero for the tragic stage, which from the first has been intended “To wake the soul by tender strokes of art, / To raise the genius and to mend the heart, / To make mankind in conscious virtue bold, / Live oe’er each scene and be what they behold.” Not only in the time of the ancient Greeks and Romans but “through every age,” even “tyrants no more their savage nature kept, / And foes to virtue wonder’d how they wept” at such dramas. Neither weak and pitying love nor “wild ambition” finds favor in the tragedies: “Here tears shall flow from a more gen’rous cause, / Such tears as patriots shed for dying laws,” as “ancient ardor” rises in modern, British hearts. “What Plato thought” “godlike Cato was,” namely “a brave man struggling in the storms of fate, / And greatly falling with a falling state!”  but finally honored more than triumphant Caesar. 

    Pope would never overlook the literary dimension of the struggle, concluding with an evocation not only of Cato the Younger but of his grandfather. “Britons, attend”: “With honest scorn the first fam’d Cato view’d / Rome learning arts from Greece, whom she subdu’ed; / Our scene precariously subsists too long / On French translation and Italian song.” Have we not defeated the French and their absolute monarch, Louis XIV? Instead, “Dare to have sense yourselves; assert the stage, / Be justly warm’d with your own native rage. / Such plays alone should please a British ear, / As Cato’s self had not disdain’d to hear.” Not Racine or Petrarch so much as Shakespeare and Marlowe. And surely Mr. Addison’s Roman Cato, seen through English eyes for English men.

    At the Governor’s Palace at Utica, Cato’s sons, Portius and Marcus, deplore Caesar’s military triumphs. “Ye Gods, what havoc does ambition make / Among your works!” Portius exclaims (I.11-12). Yet Marcus finds him too calm, too ‘Stoic’: “Thy steady temper, Portius, / Can look on guilt, rebellion, fraud, and Caesar, / In the calm lights of mild philosophy,” but “I’m tortured” by the image of “Th’insulting tyrant prancing o’er the field” at Pharsalia, “his horse’s hoofs wet with patrician blood,” the blood of Roman senators hurled from their positions of rightful authority (I.12-19). To Marcus’ hope that Heaven will punish the insolent victor, Portius points instead to their father—a man “greatly unfortunate” but still fighting for “the cause / Of honor, virtue, liberty, and Rome” with a sword unstained with any but the blood of the guilty, of tyrannical usurpers (I.30-31). The thumotic brother relies on the gods; the philosophic brother relies on a man who embodies the best of Rome and of human nature understood as ethical and political nature.

    Marcus is having none of it. “What can Cato do / Against a world, a base, degenerate world / That courts the yoke and bows the neck to Caesar?” (I.i.36-38). Trapped at Utica, guarded by Numidians, his own army feeble and the Senate ruined, he presents “a poor epitome of Roman greatness”—so much so that my soul is distracted, tempted “to renounce his precepts” (I.i.40-45). Portius adjures him to “remember what our father oft has told us,” that “the ways of heav’n are dark and intricate” and “our understanding traces ’em in vain” (I.i.46-49). Marcus admits that more than their father’s circumstance torments him. He is in love with Lucia, the daughter of one of the exiled Roman senators, but his passion is “unpity’d” by her, his love “successless” (I.i.56). He does not know that Portius shares his passion for the girl but, knowing his temper, dares not reveal himself as a rival, contenting himself with advising his brother to “call up all thy father in thy soul: / to quell the tyrant love”—the soul’s equivalent to political injustice—and “guard thy heart / On this weak side, where most our nature fails” ((I.74-77). [1] Such Stoic self-rule is not for the impassioned soul of Marcus, who determines instead to throw himself into the quest for honor in war, “to rush on certain death” (I.i.81); “Love is not to be reason’d down, or lost / In high ambition and a thirst of greatness” (I.i.84). Not thought but action can redirect his thumoerotic nature from despair. 

    Prince Juba appears, and Portius reflects on “how much he forms himself to glory / And breaks the fierceness of his native temper / To copy my father’s bright example” (I.i.79-82). He too is an exile, his father having been killed by Caesar at the Battle of Thepsur. The prince, in contrast to the Roman usurper, exhibits a virtue that is Roman but not merely Roman, a virtue unconfined to any particular nation, the virtue of human nature itself. And he stands as an example for brother Marcus in another way: He loves Cato’s daughter, Marcia, but, “no sport of passions,” his “sense of honor and desire for fame” bridle his love for the sake of the nobler aim of political liberty (I.i.86). 

    Juba too has a rival in love, the Roman senator Sempronius, a traitor in their midst. Before Portius heads for the meeting of the Senate-in-exile, he promises to “animate the soldiers’ drooping courage, / With love of freedom and contempt of life,” telling Sempronius that although we cannot “command success,” “we’ll do more, we’ll deserve it.” Sempronius fumes, “Curse on the stripling! how he apes his sire! / Ambitiously sententious!” (I.ii.40-47). Sempronius plans to betray Cato and seize his daughter after Caesar rewards him for handing Cato over.

    There is a traitor among the Numidians, too: Syphax, who is preparing a revolt among his people—who, he claims, “Complain aloud of Cato’s discipline” (I.iii.4). Sempronius wishes that he could turn Juba against Cato, as well, at which urging Syphax laments that the young man is “lost,” his thoughts “full of Cato’s virtues” (I.iii.22). “Of faith, of honor, and I know not what, / That have corrupted his Numidian temper, / And struck th’ infection into all his soul” (I.iii.25-27). Nonetheless, Syphax promises to make another attempt. As for Sempronius, he heads for the Senate as well, scheming to “conceal my thoughts in passion” by “bellow[ing] out for Rome and my country” even as he schemes to ruin the men he will address.

    True to his word, Syphax tries Juba again, appealing to his national pride, his Numidian patriotism, which might be turned to rebellion against Roman rule. Juba will have none of it. He esteems the “Roman soul,” which aims to civilize the world, “lay it under the restraint of laws,” and “make man mild and sociable to man” by means of “wisdom, discipline, and lib’ral arts” (I.iv.30-35). Only “virtues like these” will “make human nature shine, reform the soul, / And break our fierce barbarians into men” (I.iv.37-38). No, Juba, Syphax counters, “this Roman polish” only “render[s] man…tractable and time,” covering over natural passion, “set[ting] our looks at variance with our thoughts” and thereby “chang[ing] us into other creatures / Than the Gods design’d us” (I.iv.41-43, 46-47). Any Numidian better practices Cato’s “boasted virtues” (I.iv.62). Juba has his answer ready: the Numidian hunter’s virtues do not grow from choice, as Cato’s do, from “steadiness of mind,” not ignorance and necessity (I.iv.77). This is why Cato can endure suffering without resentment and even “thank the Gods that throw the weight upon him” (I.iv.80). The foundation of Roman civility is the rule of reason, innate to human beings as such, the right criterion for judging national customs and laws.

    Syphax insists that Cato’s “rank pride” and “haughtiness of soul” mesmerized Juba’s father, leading him to an inglorious death at the hands of a slave (I.iv.81-85). You should “abandon Cato” (I.iv.89). You don’t really esteem him at all, nor do you honor your father; you merely wish to marry his daughter. You are not man of honor, only a boy in love. Yes, I do love her, the young man admits, but for honorable reasons and indeed for her honorableness: “The virtuous Marcia towers above her sex” in her “inward greatness,” her “unaffected wisdom,” and her “sanctity of manners” (I.iv.150-151). That is, he loves her for her natural virtues, as these have been cultivated by her family and her country.

    We soon see Marcia and Lucia for ourselves. Of her two suitors, Lucia prefers Portius, the philosophic brother, to Marcus. As for Marcia, she of course prefers Juba to Semponius, but she remains very much Cato’s worthy daughter, telling her beloved Juba to go off to the war in support of her father and advising Lucia to wait until after the war to confer her love on Portius, lest she spread disarray in Cato’s household by openly favoring one brother over the other. “Let us not, Lucia, aggravate our sorrows, / But to the Gods permit th’ event of things,” as “the pure limpid stream, when foul with stains / Of rushing torrents and descending rains, / Works itself clear, and as it runs, refines” (I.vi.78-79, 82-84). 

    Act II begins with Cato before the Utican Senate, warning of Caesar’s advancing army. Sempronius makes his calculatedly fiery speech, only to have Cato reprove him. “Let not a torrent of impetuous zeal / Transport thee thus beyond the bounds of reason,” as “true fortitude is seen in great exploits, / That justice warrants, and that wisdom guides; / All else is tow’ring frenzy and distraction” (II.i.43-47). Lucius then makes a pacific speech, claiming that the gods oppose us, that Caesar is only their chosen scourge, than no more Roman blood should be shed. Cato positions himself as the virtuous mean between the extremes of Sempronius’ apparent “immodest valor” and Lucius’ “fear” (II.81-82). His moderation should not be mistaken for mediocrity, however. “A day, an hour, of virtuous liberty / Is worth a whole eternity in bondage” (II.i.100)—a judgment said to have inspired Patrick Henry’s “Give me liberty or give me death.” And in answer to a peace overture from Caesar himself, Cato replies to his ambassador, “My life is grafted on the fate of Rome”; if Caesar would save Cato, “bid him spare his country” (II.ii.8-9). As for himself, I “disdain a life” that “your dictator” “has pow’r to offer” me (II.ii.8-10). Asked what terms he will accept, Cato accordingly replies, “Bid him disband his legions, / Restore the commonwealth to liberty, / submit his actions to the public censure, / And stand the judgment of a Roman senate. Bid him do this, and Cato is his friend.” (II.ii.29-33). But for now, I am no friend of Caesar but “a friend to virtue”—the truly Roman characteristic that Romans share with human nature itself, bringing their civilizing empire of liberty to those they conquer (II.ii.41). Caesar’s conquests have only “made Rome’s senate little”—the Senate, lynchpin and moderating balance wheel of the republic (II.ii.47). “By the Gods I swear, millions of worlds / Should never buy me to be like that Caesar” (II.ii.57).

    To Juba, Cato confides his understanding of divine providence. The “misfortune and affliction” the gods impose “are not ills; else would they never fall / On heav’n’s first fav’rites, and the best of men” II.iv.51-53). No, “The Gods, in bounty, work up storms about us, / That give mankind occasion to exert / Their hidden strength, and throw out into practice / Virtues that shun the day, and lie conceal’d / In the smooth seasons and the calms of life” (II.iv.54-58). He disappoints his young ally by refusing his daughter’s hand in marriage; Roman, all-too-Roman, he does not think a Numidian a worthy suitor, despite Juba’s evident ‘Romanness,’ which is really humanitas. Syphax swoops in, attempting once again to turn the prince against Cato, urging him to eschew honor as a “fine imaginary notion” and to kidnap the girl, even as the early Romans seized the Sabine women (II.v. 89). But Juba calls him “a false old traitor,” intending to redeem the Carthaginians’ reputation for faithlessness and to vindicate his honor in the eyes of Cato (II.v.61). Furious at the insult, perhaps because it is true, Syphax returns to Sempronius, who assures his that factious Roman troops “will bear no more / This medley of philosophy and war,” Stoicism and Achilles, from Cato. Syphax vows to rally his Numidian troops to aid the revolt.

    The third Act begins where the play began, with the sons of Cato in dialogue. Portius knows that Marcus loves his beloved, Lucia, but Marcus does not know of Portius’ love for her. He asks Portius to plead his cause to her, “With all the strength and heats of eloquence / Fraternal love and friendship can inspire” (III.i.34-35). When he leaves and Lucia arrives, he does just that (“Oh, Lucia, language is to faint to show / His rage of love; it preys upon his life; / He pines, he sickens, he despairs, he dies,” his “noble soul” ravaged (III.ii.3-5, 10). Kind Lucia, who knows of Portius’ love for her, and who requites it, worries that if Marcus knew of their love it “might perhaps destroy” him (III.29). For his part, Portius counsels her not to reject Marcus’ suit outright but “hold him up in life, and cheer his soul / With the faint glimm’ring of a doubtful hope” (III.ii.24-25). Lucia refuses. She vows to the gods to refuse them both, denying her own love to prevent “thy sister’s tears, / Thy father’s anguish, and thy brother’s death” (III.ii.28-29). She offers him the faint glimmering of a doubtful hope, saying that she will hold fast in her decision “while such a cloud of mischiefs hangs about us” (III.ii.34). Understandably “thunderstruck” at first, philosophic Portius then sees her virtue, her prudential foresight of the evils his suit would have incurred, had it succeeded (III.ii.37). That does little to console him, but Lucia holds firm in her vow. When she leaves and Marcus returns, Portius tells him that she “compassionates your pains, and pities you”—no comfort to the passionate brother, who regrets what a “fool that I was to choose so cold a friend / To urge my cause!” (III.iii.13-17). 

    The noise of Sempronius’ mutiny interrupt them. He has decided to carry Marcia off and join Caesar, frustrated at the continued loyalty of Juba and his Numidians—Romans in the core of their nature, after all. But Cato overawes the Roman rebels, shaming them, reminding them of his virtue, and telling to go join Caesar, if that is what they desire. [2] Ever-perfidious Sempronius recommends the death penalty for the rebels, which Cato, changing his mind, mistakenly agrees to inflict, never suspecting his colleague’s treachery. Sempronius immediately has them executed, irate at their uselessness to his scheme. He continues to desire Sempronius, and when Syphax cannot understand how he could “turn a woman’s slave” (III.vii. 11), he assures her that he only intends to kidnap and rape her (“bend her stubborn virtue to my passion”), then “cast her off” (III.vii.15-16). This reassures his henchman: “Well said! that’s spoken like thyself, Sempronius.” (III.vii.17). Syphax recommends that he dress himself as Juba to get past the Numidians who guard her. In his own way, Sempronius emulates the gods—specifically, Pluto, who seized Proserpine and carried “to hell’s tremendous gloom the affrighted maid, / There grimly smiled, pleas’d with the beauteous prize, / Nor envy’d Jove his sunshine and his skies” (III.vii.31-34).

    Not suspecting this vile scheme, Marcia fears rather that her father will give her in marriage to Sempronius. She too is a Stoic, however: “While Cato lives, his daughter has no right / To love or hate, but as his choice directs” (IV.i.20-21). She refuses to trust her passions, telling Lucia, “When love once pleads admission to our hearts, / (In spite of all the virtue we can boast) / The woman who deliberates is lost” (IV.i.29-31). Her own reason will not suffice in that circumstance, so her father’s reason ought to prevail. When Sempronius arrives, deceiving the guards, and prepares to play out his sinister version of the rape of the Sabine women, a deus ex machina in the person of Juba discovers him and kills the “proud, barbarous man” (IV.ii.19), who dies in fury “by a boy’s hand,” attired in “a vile / Numidian dress, and for a worthless woman,” one he desired chiefly to spite Cato and Juba (IV.ii.21-22). He is the real barbarian, the false Roman, Juba the true one. 

    Marcia remains steadfast in her civic Stoicism. When she and Juba discover their love for one another, she nonetheless continues to insist that Juba “prosper in the paths of honor” (IViii.88)—go off to fight Caesar at her father’s side. But Cato himself has begun to despair, telling Lucius, “The torrent bears too hard upon me: / Justice gives way to force: the conquer’d world / Is Caesar’s: Cato has no business in it.” (IV.iv.22-24). On the contrary, his friend insists, “While pride, oppression, and injustice reign, / The world will still demand her Cato’s presence” (IV.25-26). To Cato’s objection, that he will never submit to be ruled by a tyrant, however, Lucius can only respond that Caesar will not impose “ungen’rous terms” upon the defeated rival, as “the virtues of humanity are Caesar’s” (IV.33-34). This earns him the riposte, “Such popular humanity is treason” (IV.iv.33-36). Cato’s Stoic willingness to suffer draws the line at submission to tyranny. That is, the clementia of Caesar, whether sincere or feigned, bespeaks the superiority of a man who acts like a god toward a fellow man and citizen. Cato is, finally, a citizen-Stoic, not a philosopher-Stoic. The problem will turn out to be not so much Cato’s morality but his misunderstanding of providence. He expects defeat because precisely because he does not foresee the providential plan. He does not foresee the providential plan because it is given to no one to see that.

    Juba arrives, confessing his shame at being a Numidian—that is, a prince of a nation whose soldiers were ready to desert their ally. No matter, Cato assures him: “Thou hast a Roman soul” (IV.iv.43). What is more, “Falsehood and fraud shoot up in every soil, / The produce of all climes–Rome has its Caesars” (IV.iv.45-46). Juba “has stood the test of fortune” (IV.iv.49).

    Learning next that his son Marcus has died in battle, though not before killing Syphax, Cato pronounces himself “satisfied,” as “my boy has done his duty” (IV.iv.70). Upon seeing the corpse, he simply remarks, “How beautiful is death, when earn’d by virtue” and “what pity is it / That we can die but once to serve our country!” (IV.iv.80-83). The first aphorism is Stoic, the second Roman. He turns to his surviving son, the philosophic one, telling him to remember that “thy life is not thy own, when Rome demands it” (IV.iv.87). It is Rome, “not a private loss,” that “requires our tears” (IV.iv.89-90). Rome had subdued the world thanks to her virtue, but with her virtue gone, having submitted tamely to its rapist, Caesar—who has reversed one of the original founding acts of Rome, the so-called rape which in fact brought wives to young Roman men—the Empire has fallen, “fall’n into Caesar’s hands” (IV.iv.105). He calmly grants Lucius the right to sue for peace from ‘humane’ Julius and advises his son to retire to “thy paternal seat, the Sabine field,” where he may live virtuously in a private life, which is “the post of honor” under a tyrannical regime (IV.iv.135, 142). If the kidnapping of the Sabine women enabled the earliest Romans to sustain themselves as a civil society, perhaps a retreat to the family, a retreat to the Sabine field, will form the foundation of a new Rome, if such can be restored after the barbarous tyrant, the criminal rapist, has had his day.

    But Cato has a different plan for himself. Having satisfied himself that he foresees the intention of Providence, he reads the Phaedo, what Addison in his stage direction calls “Plato’s book on the immortality of the soul”; “Plato,” Cato says, “thou reason’st well!” (V.i.1). Plato’s Socrates had reasoned that the prospect of the soul’s immortal life on the Isles of the Blessed removes the sting of death. Given what he takes to be the equally certain prospect of Caesar’s tyranny in this world, a “world made for Caesar,” Cato pronounces himself “weary of conjecture,” weary of philosophizing, ready to the action of suicide, which will end conjecture (V.i.19-20). “Let guilt or fear / Disturb man’s rest. Cato knows neither of ’em, / Indifferent in his choice to sleep or die,” given Plato’s proof that we awaken from death as surely as we awaken from sleep (V.i.38-40). Addison’s Christian audience might well think the same thing, under similar circumstances. If God’s Providence ordains life in Paradise after death, why prolong life in this world, known to be a vail of tears? This would become Nietzsche’s charge against Christianity, that it loves an imagined life and therefore real death more than real life. By Addison’s time, Machiavelli had already anticipated that thought.

    Portius joins his father, who assures him that all is well, as “I’m master of myself,” never to be mastered by Caesar (V.ii.13). Having convinced his son that he won’t commit suicide, having allowed Portius, Lucia, and Lucius that he retires to sleep—what he must regard as an instance of the noble lie—Cato prepares to execute himself, even as Lucius assures the women, “While Cato lives—his presence will protect us” (V.iv.38). His presence is needed, as Juba brings news of an impending battle with Caesar’s forces. Portius joins them with the news that Pompey’s son has unexpectedly brought reinforcements from Spain. “Call[ing] out for vengeance on his father’s death”—the very filial piety that Cato understands to be the foundation of Roman civil order—he “rouses the whole nation up to arms” (V.iv.55-57). “Were Cato at their head, once more might Rome / Assert her rights and claim her liberty” (V.iv.58-59). 

    There will be no human version of a deus ex machina, this time. They hear the death-cry of Cato in the next room. Mortally wounded, he blesses his friend, Lucius, his son and his son’s future wife, Marcus and Lucia, and his daughter and her future husband, Marcia and Juba. Of Juba, he says, “A senator of Rome, while Rome surviv’d, / Would not have match’d his daughter with a king,” were the king a foreigner, “but Caesar’s arms have thrown down all distinction,” all conventional distinction: “Whoe’er is brave and virtuous, is a Roman.” (V.iv.88-91). In his civic despair, he has made two philosophic discoveries, the first a distinction, the distinction between convention and nature, the second the uncovering of a just filial and political order in light of a criterion set by nature, the criterion of virtue, of human nature undisfigured by passion. “Methinks a beam of light breaks in / On my departing soul” (V.iv.94-95). Dying, what he cannot do is to act in accordance with that beam of light. His ascent from the cave of convention isn’t comic, as it is in Plato’s Republic, but tragic. “Alas, I fear / I’ve been too hasty” (V.iv.95-96), he admits, with Stoic understatement. He can only ask forgiveness. Forgiveness, above all, for his failure to do what he wanted most to do, to save Rome from a regime of tyranny. Forgiveness also, perhaps, for his failure to heed his own advice to his sons, which Portius had remarked in the play’s first scene: We do not know what heaven has traced out for us; the ways of heaven are dark and intricate.

    It is left to the ranking surviving Roman in his camp, his friend Lucius, to set the new policy. With Cato, they might have won. Without him, no one believes they can. 

    “Let us bear this awful corpse to Caesar,

    And lay it in his sight, that it may stand

    A fence betwixt us and the victor’s wrath; 

    Cato, though dead, shall still protect his friends.” (V.iv.103-106).

    And Lucius adds a properly Stoic, sententious final thought, saying that these events show the malign effects of “civil discord” not only to Romans but “to all nations,” namely, “fraud, and cruelty, and strife,” along with what is not the least evil, “rob[bing] the guilty world of Cato’s life,” the life of one of the best in the world, one of the best examples of human nature his countrymen had ever seen (V.iv.108, 111-112). 

     

    Notes

    1. George Washington will counsel his niece in exactly the same way. See his letter to letter to Eleanor Parke Custis, January 1, 1795.
    2. In facing down the rebellious officers at Newburgh, New York, Washington was enacting a similar scene in real life, supremely imitating Addison’s art in his life. See his Speech to the Officers of the Army, March 15, 1783.

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

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