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    Those Incoherent Philosophers

    August 4, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Ghazāli: The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Michael E. Marmura translation. Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2000.

     

    Born in 1058 and trained in Islamic law, al-Ghazāli is famous—in some circles, notorious—for claiming that Allah acts according to his will, not according to reason. He has been interpreted as teaching this by many Muslims, who have been known to abominate reason as the bringer of heresy and atheism. And it is surely true that the will plays a decisive role in al-Ghazāli’s understanding of Allah. As Michael E. Marmura remarks in his excellent introduction, the Asharite school of Islamic theology in which al-Ghazāli was trained regarded not only the original creation of the cosmos as an act of God but “regarded all temporal existents as the direction creation of God, decreed by His eternal attribute of will and enacted by His attribute of power.” That is, “what humans habitually regard as sequences of natural causes and effects are in reality concomitant events whose constant association is arbitrarily decreed by the divine will.” Miracles or divine disruptions of the apparently natural course of things are perennially possible, and the familiar Muslim coda, “God willing,” reflects this mindset. An examination of The Incoherence of the Philosophers suggests that the matter is more complicated than that. What is the status of reason according to al-Ghazāli, in this polemic?

    “I have seen a group,” he writes, “who, believing themselves in possession of a distinctiveness from companion and peer by virtue of a superior quick with and intelligence, have rejected the Islamic duties regarding acts of worship, disdained religious rites pertaining to the offices of prayer and the avoidance of prohibited things, belittled the devotions and ordinances prescribed by the divine law, not halting in the face of prohibitions and restrictions.” For these duties, these rites, and the divine law they substitute “multifarious beliefs” produced by “speculative investigation, an outcome of their stumbling over the tails of sophistical doubts that divert from the direction of the truth”—mere “imaginings akin to the glitter of the mirage.” This group consists of philosophers, men who deny “revealed laws and religious confessions” and reject “the details of religious and sectarian [teaching], believing them to be man-made laws and embellished tricks.” In “disdaining to be content with the religious beliefs of their forebears,” however, they have only “mov[ed] from one [mode of] imitation to another”; that is, far from ascending from the cave of customary opinions where they worshipped the shadows of man-made idols to the daylight of nature, they have merely encamped in another cave. Worse, they have abandoned the true light of divine, not merely natural law, for a cave beneath the cave of mere heresy, the cave of atheism and materialism. There is no lower rank in “God’s world” than that of these men, as “imbecility is… nearer salvation than acumen severed from [religious belief]; blindness is closer to wholeness than cross-eyed sight.” Al-Ghazāli’s stated intention “is to alert those who think well of philosophers and believe that their ways are free from contradiction by showing the [various] aspects of their incoherence.” He does not deny that Muslim theologians also contradict one another, contenting himself with saying that this isn’t his topic here.

    He accuses philosophers of obscurantism, of claiming that “the metaphysical sciences” are esoteric, accessible only to those well versed in the arcana of mathematics and logic. On the contrary, al-Ghazāli replies, mathematics has nothing to do with metaphysics and logical argumentation can be understood by many more than the very few men who become philosophers. He proceeds with twenty “discussions,” sets of arguments similar in form to the writings of Christian Scholastics, who present the arguments of their opponents followed by point-by-point refutations. Discussions 1-16 address metaphysics; discussions 17-20 pertain to physics or nature. The two metaphysical issues in dispute are the philosophers’ claim that the cosmos is eternal and that God knows only universals, not particulars, and therefore does not intervene providentially in the cosmos He has created. The physical or natural issue in dispute is the philosophers’ (but especially Avicenna’s) teaching on the human soul and his denial of the resurrection of the body.

    In arguing that the cosmos is eternal, philosophers offer three proofs. First, they say, if God is eternal and has created a cosmos at some point in time, making a possibility into a reality, this must mean that God Himself changed from a non-creator to a creator. But this is a contradiction, unless religionists pretend that there has been a “proceeding of the temporal from the Eternal without a change of affairs in the Eternal by way of power, instrument, time, purpose, or nature.” To counter this, al-Ghazāli says that there is no contradiction if the world was created in time “by an eternal will that decreed its existence at the time in which it came to be.” To this view is not to think that the “willer” changed to such a degree that He was no longer Himself; eternity isn’t sameness. Nor is creation in, or before, time necessarily impossible, a fact defying reason, if the willer withheld His act of creation—especially if “duration and time are both created.” “It is incumbent on you [philosophers] to set up a demonstrative proof according to the condition of logic that would show the impossibility of this.” When conjoined with power, will “differentiates a thing from its similar.” Light and darkness are opposites; they contradict one another. But to will into existence two opposite things is not to exercise one’s will in a self-contradictory way if the underlying intention behind that act serves some overarching rational purpose. The idea of willed creation would only be a violation of reason if one claimed that the Creator created ‘blackwhite.’ If philosophers were to assert that the inability to create ‘blackwhite’ calls into question divine power, omnipotence, al-Ghazāli answers: “the impossibility of realizing what is not possible does not indicate impotence.”

    Philosophers also claim “that whoever asserts that the world is posterior to God and God prior to it” means either that God is “prior in essence, not in time, in the way that one is prior to two” or that God “is prior to the world and time.” If the former, then the Creator-created relationship is causative in the way a person’s movement causes his shadow to move with him; but these events presume the coexistence both the person and the movement. If the latter, then there must have been a time in which the world did not exist but God did; “before the existence of time, infinite time would have existed, and this is contradictory.” 

    Al-Ghazāli replies that “time is originated and created, and before it there was no time at all,” as “God is prior to the world and time.” “By priority we mean only the appropriation of existence to Himself alone.” God exists with or without the world. In terms of reason, not of will, “a first beginning that is preceded by nothing” is not “disallow[ed],” that is, it is not self-contradictory. This doesn’t prove that ex nihilo creation occurred, only that it is not an irrational concept. When philosophers argue that “it is impossible for [the world] to be impossible and then to become possible,” he answers that he world “is eternally possible” in the sense that God could conceive it at any time, but it only became possible when He made it so.

    Philosophers also observe that every “temporal existent” consists of both form and matter. Matter is prior to form, thus prior to every temporal existent, since existence consists of some form, a form distinguishing it from all other existents, imposed upon matter. Since “matter does not have matter [receptive of it]”—because there is no pre-matter matter, matter must not originate in time. It must be eternal. Al-Ghazāli answers that the question “reverts to a judgment of the mind.” No self-contradictory judgment of the mind is possible, in the sense that no one can form a mental image or idea of ‘blackwhite.’ Why, then, assume that matter is eternal, rather than God? Or vice-versa, one might add, but al-Ghazāli does not need to prove the eternality of God, only the rational possibility of an eternal God rather than eternal matter. He can afford to leave the question of whether matter or God is eternal, so long as he can show that the claim that God is eternal, not matter, is not irrational. “As regards affirming the true doctrine,” instead of merely refuting the philosophers’ doctrine, “we will write another book concerning it after completing this one, if success comes to our aid, God willing, and we will name it The Principles of Belief.“

    “To refer possibility, necessity, and impossibility back to rational judgments is correct.” In that, the philosophers are right. They are also right to say that “the meaning of the mind’s judgment is [its] knowledge and that knowledge requires an object of knowledge.” Their mistake is to assume that this means that this knowledge need be knowledge of matter—that matter is prior to mind. But, for example, “one cannot conceive in existence a color which is neither white nor black nor some other color. The form of being a color, however, is established in the mind without detailing [different species of color], and one says of it that it is a form whose existence is in minds, not in concrete things.” “If this is not impossible, then what we have mentioned”—namely, ex nihilo creation—is “not impossible.” 

    Philosophers also claim that the world is eternal—indeed, “pre-eternal,” if eternity means perpetuity in time ‘going forward.’ That is, they claim that the world not only has “no beginning for its existence” but also has “no end.” It will “continue to be,” always. Al-Ghazāli replies to this claim with the same arguments he used against the anti-creation claim. “The bringing about of existence and annihilation obtains through the will of the one endowed with power”; in both creation and annihilation, God “in Himself does not change, what changes being only the act.” “So long as the occurrence of an event by an eternal will is conceivable, there is no difference in the state of affairs whether what occurs is a privation or an existence.” 

    Al-Ghazāli accuses philosophers of “obfuscation” when they call God “the world’s enactor and maker”; “with them this is metaphor, not reality.” He defines “agent” as “a willer, a chooser, and a knower of what He wills,” but philosophers use that term to mean “not one who wills, but has no attribute at all,” and for them ‘God’ is really the eternal cosmos, which “proceeds by compulsory necessity.” Logic is a form of necessity; to the philosophers ‘God’ acts rationally but without will, and ‘God’-nature-cosmos causes all things to happen by rational necessity. This is why al-Ghazāli emphasizes the will of God, the freedom of God, and it is also one reason why he can be interpreted as considering will to be prior to reason.

    But that is not the claim he makes here. On the contrary, “if we suppose that a temporal event depends for its occurrence on two things, one voluntary and the other not, reason relates the act to the voluntary.” This is why, if one man murders another by throwing him into a fire, we call the man the killer, not the fire; the man has agency. At the same time, unlike men, the creator-God always wills rationally; His acts have a rational necessity backed by His power, which gives them physical necessity, but He chooses what acts He takes freely. Whether before or after the creation of time and space, God chooses among a set of acts, any one of which must be rational because His intention is without self-contradiction. It is true that human beings—created, limited beings—cannot fully understand “the essence of God.” Therefore “do not think on the essence of God” but on His creation. But that doesn’t mean that God has no essence, nor that He is not essentially rational; it means that He is all-knowing, and you are not.

    Having discussed the philosophers’ inability to prove that the creator-God does not exist, and that ‘God’ is really the eternal world or cosmos, al-Ghazāli next denies their ability to prove that God does exist, and that He is one, not many. The ‘God’ of the philosophers is a First Principle, an impersonal, unmoved mover. They argue that without assuming the existence of such a First Principle, one commits the fallacy of infinite regress. While affirming the logical necessity of avoiding an infinite regress, al-Ghazāli simply points out that positing the existence of a creator-God equally avoids it. Further, if the cosmos is eternal and necessarily generates individual things over time, would this not mean that the number of things is infinite? Yet how can physical things, even things as small as atoms, be infinite in number and still increase in number?

    Philosophers attempt to prove the oneness of their ‘God’ by tracing causation back to an origin which necessarily must have been singular, inasmuch as there can be only one causeless Causer. Once causation began, plurality began, but not before that. “The basic point for understanding their doctrine consists in their saying [that] the essence of the First Principle is one, the names becoming many by relating something to it, relating it to something, or negating something of it.” “The existence of [what is] other than Him is from Him.” Their ‘God’ is Intellect; He is a being “aware of Himself” who “apprehends Himself.” “Hence, His essence is an intelligible,” devoid of matter. “The existing order is a consequent of the intelligible order in the sense that [the former] comes through [the latter”; “His knowledge of the whole is the cause of the emanation of the whole from Him,” the consequence of His self-knowledge. He is not really a ‘He,’ a person, at all, but an impersonal, all-powerful, self-knowing and therefore all-knowing power.

    Muslim theologians take a very different view. “Our knowledge” has two “divisions”: “knowledge of a thing that occurs as a result of the form of that thing”; and “knowledge which we invent, as with something whose form we did not perceive but which we formed in our souls, then brought into existence, in which case the existence of the form would be derived from knowledge, not knowledge from [the] existence [of the form].” God’s knowledge is “in accordance with the second division.” Given their “shortcomings,” our lack of supreme power, “our conception is not sufficient to bring about the existence of the form but requires, in addition to that, a renewed will that springs forth from an appetitive power” that “moves the muscles and nerves,” which then attempt to make things happen. It might be said that human beings lack perfect knowledge, perfect power, and indeed perfect will, inasmuch as we do not unfailingly will the good. That is why human beings need God to rule them. 

    By contrast, the philosophers deploy such terms as knowledge, power, and will in describing God only as metaphors, since in their opinion God is not a person. As an impersonal being, their ‘God’ ‘knows’ only universals, not particulars. That is, there is no providence in the Biblical sense, only a set of general laws that prevail in the cosmos as it proceeds in its course. ‘God’ therefore does not intervene on behalf of any individual or set of individuals. But again, al-Ghazāli maintains, they have no proof that this is necessarily the case. “The realities of divine matters are not attained through rational reflection—indeed… it is not within human power to know them.” It is within human power to know His creation, including his revealed law. That is, we know what He has willed, and what His will is, insofar as He has chosen to reveal those things to us. We are entitled, even obligated, to reason about those things. When we attempt to reason about His essence, however, we quickly come to the limit of our reasoning. This doesn’t mean that His essence is unreasonable or arbitrary, nor that His will is unreasonable or arbitrary. 

    It also does not mean that human beings cannot entertain reasonable suspicions about God’s essence. He must have an essence because “existence without quiddity and a real [nature] is unintelligible.” For example, “A rational person would indeed by astonished by a party that claims to delve deeply into [the world of] the intelligibles but whose reflection in the end leads to [the conclusion] that the Lord of Lords and the Cause of Causes has basically no knowledge of what occurs in the world.” If that were true, “What difference is there between Him and the dead, except for His knowledge of Himself? And what perfection is there in His knowledge of Himself, with His ignorance of what is other than Himself?” On the contrary, “all things other than Him” have “originated from His direction through His will”; as an agent in the true sense of the term, God’s will entails God’s knowledge, “for that which is willed must necessarily be known to the willer.” Because all things “are willed by Him and originated in His will,” God is all-knowing. This includes self-knowledge, which is necessary for Him to know what He wills, to know His own will.

    According to the philosophers, “God enacted the world by way of necessity from His essence, by nature and compulsion, not by way of will and choice. Indeed, the whole [of the world] follows necessarily from His essence in the way that light follows necessarily from the sun.”; The ‘God’ of the philosophers “has no power to stop His acts,” which means, as he has emphasized that the ‘acts’ of ‘God’ do “not at all entail knowledge for the agent,” which isn’t really an agent in al-Ghazāli’s fuller definition of the term. But they have no sound proof of that claim which does not assume what they are trying to prove, namely, the existence of ‘God’ as they define ‘Him.’

    Philosophers argue as follows: God is unchanging; particulars change; knowledge of change changes the knower; ergo, God cannot know particulars, only universals. God knows that solar eclipses occur, but knows nothing about any particular eclipse. Such knowledge is ‘beneath’ Him. Similarly, God “does not know the accidents of Zayd, Amr, and Khālid, but only man [in the] absolute [sense] by a universal knowledge.” By this doctrine “they uprooted religious laws in their entirety, since it entails that if Zayd, for example, obeys of disobeys God, God would not know what of his states has newly come about, because He does not know Zayd in his particularity.” God would be incapable of punishing violations of His own law. In response, Al-Ghazāli simply repeats that no one, even a philosopher, can know the limits of God’s knowledge, if in fact there are any.

    Having established the limits of human knowledge of God, al-Ghazāli turns from metaphysics to the natural sciences. These are “rational sciences”; “the religious law does not require disputing them,” but they are within human powers to dispute, to investigate, to reason about. There are eight rational sciences pertaining to nature: physics, astronomy, knowledge pertaining to generation and corruption, meteorology, geology, botany, zoology, and psychology (which includes the science of both human and animal souls). “There is no necessity to oppose [the philosophers] in terms of the revealed law in any of these sciences,” except in four areas: their claim that the relation between observable causes and effects is necessary, making miracles impossible; their claim that “human souls are self-subsisting substances, not imprinted in the body,” and therefore death permanently severs the soul from the body; their claim that souls cannot be annihilated; their claim that “it is impossible to return these souls to bodies.”

    Regarding the first question, philosophers do admit that miracles or disruptions of “the habitual courses of nature do occur” in “three instances”: in prophecy, when the imagination becomes so powerful and accurate that it surpasses ordinary sensual perceptions; in intuition, especially the perception of the several steps of a logical argument before the argument has been fully laid out; and in the “practical faculty,” which induces the body to obey the soul—perhaps as the result of ascetic exercises, for example. 

    Al-Ghazāli begins with a critique of our understanding of causation, a critique that anticipates the critique David Hume advanced nearly seven centuries later. “The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary.” We suppose that fire is necessary to burn cotton, but that is only because we have seen this occur so many times that we assume a cause-and-effect relationship. But “a thing’s existence with a thing does not prove that it exists by [the thing].” “The continuous habit of their occurrence repeatedly, one time after another, fixes unshakably in our minds the belief in their occurrence according to past habit.” But God might have caused the cotton to burn. “He knew that He would not do it at certain times, despite its possibility, and… He creates for us the knowledge that He will not create it at that time.” But that is all.

    Al-Ghazāli’s choice of occurrences that are naturally uncaused are unfortunate, as he supposes that some animals are spontaneously generated from the earth, and not by sexual reproduction. He goes so far as to claim that such matters are “beyond human power to know.” He retreats to firmer ground by defining the impossible as that which “is not within the power” of being enacted. He offers several examples of genuine impossibilities, things impossible even for God. “Combining blackness and whiteness” is impossible. For an individual to put himself in two places at once is impossible. To truly will something without knowing what one is willing is impossible. And it is impossible “to create knowledge in inanimate matter” inasmuch as “we understand by the inanimate that which does not apprehend.” That is, a self-contradictory action is impossible. But if we read in sacred Scripture that God moved the hand of a dead man, this is against nature but not impossible, since although the previous willer of movement is dead the current willer is alive, knowledgeable, and powerful.

    Nor is the human soul necessarily self-subsistent, a substance that does not occupy space—as suggested in the Platonic dialogues, for example. Al-Ghazāli makes no objection to the philosophers’ description of the attributes of the human soul into “motive” and “apprehending” parts. The “motive” parts, the ones that ‘make things happen,’ include the desires, the power to activate nerves and muscles, and the “discerning” part, which can consider theoretical and prudential matters. The “apprehending” parts of the soul include the imaginative faculty, which perceives forms and the “estimative” faculty, which perceives meanings; so, for example, a baby goat perceives the form of a wolf along with its meaning, that is, the fact that it is dangerous to baby goats. The third “apprehending” part of the soul is the “cogitative” faculty, which combines the forms the imagination perceives to envision a flying horse or a flying machine. It is the “discerning” part of the soul which discovers whether a flying horse or a flying machine is possible in principle and, if possible, how one might come into existence. The practical dimension of the discerning part also can be made to rule the bodily faculties; when it does so we say that the soul has virtues.

    Notice that none of this assumes that God treats human beings as if they are puppets whose every movement He directs, as per Ash’arite doctrine. Rather, we Muslims only “object to their claim of their knowing through rational demonstrations that the soul is a self-subsistent substance.” “We deny… their claim that reason alone indicates” that this is so, that a human being could know this without the guidance of revelation, “the religious law.” At best, their proofs indicate probabilities. They cannot demonstrate such claims. Nor can they demonstrate the immortality of the human soul. It is indeed immortal, but we know this with certitude only by revelation, not by reason. 

    As to the disposition of the human soul after death, philosophers hold that souls endure “everlastingly” in a condition either of indescribable pleasure or pain, the life of pleasure having been reserved for “perfect, pure souls,” the life of pain for “imperfect, tarnished souls.” A soul attains perfection in this life through knowledge, purity through action. Knowledge leads to perfection because it perfects the rational faculty, whereas “preoccupation with the body makes [one] forget himself,” fail to cultivate the distinctively human characteristic of his soul. We know that “the intellectual pleasures than bodily pleasures” because “ferocious animals and pigs” seek only bodily pleasures, and because men are ashamed when caught in the commission of acts of adultery or cowardice. Action—works and worship—are needed for “the soul’s purification,” as the undisciplined body will cause the soul to become preoccupied with bodily desires, pleasures, and pains.

    Muslims do not disagree with “most of these things.” The soul survives the separation from the body; certain pleasures are superior to others. “But we know this through the religious law,” not “by reason alone.” What Muslims deny is the philosophers’ contention that bodies are not resurrected along with souls. Life in God’s Paradise will offer “both kinds of happiness, the spiritual and bodily”; Hell will impose both kinds of misery. The one will be the more perfect pleasure, the other the more perfect pain. “What the religious law has conveyed [as true must be believed” if the soul would enjoy eternity in Paradise, avoid eternity in Hell. As usual, philosophers cannot disprove the possibility of the religious law’s teachings and commands by convicting it of self-contradiction.

    In conclusion, al-Ghazāli calls the philosophers infidels on three main grounds. They claim that the world is eternal. They deny that God’s knowledge encompasses “temporal particulars”—i.e., they deny God’s providential rule. And they deny the resurrection of bodies on Judgment Day. He also calls philosophic doctrine “close to that of the Mu’tazila,” the main Islamic sect rivaling the Asharites.

    With regard to the incoherence of philosophic doctrines—that they are not merely diverse but contradictory—al Ghazāli’s charge cannot be denied, any more than he would deny the countercharge that the doctrines of pious Muslims contradict on another. He shows the difficulty in formulating a logical proof of the existence either of God or of ‘God,’ leaning conspicuously on Koranic assertions to tip his argument in the direction of piety. Averroës replied in defense of Aristotelianism with his own polemic, The Incoherence of the Incoherence. 

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Is All Well That Ends Well?

    July 29, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: All’s Well That Ends Well.

     

    The young Count Bertram of Rousillon, his mother the Countess, Helena (a gentlewoman and ward of the Countess), and elderly Lord Lafeu converse in the Count’s palace. A feature of a comedy not a ‘history play,’ ‘Rousillon’ isn’t exactly the real Roussillon. Claimed by Charlemagne and his heirs among the French kings during the Middle Ages, by Shakespeare’s time the real Roussillon had been ruled by the Spanish Hapsburgs since 1516 and would remain under their rule until the French king obtained it in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, following a long war. There hadn’t been a count of Roussillon since the twelfth century. Shakespeare’s ‘Rousillon’ anticipates the future French conquest in the sense that the Count in his play owes allegiance to France. Shakespeare’s ‘Rousillon’ serves the purposes of comic semi-fiction.

    As so often in Shakespeare, the play doesn’t begin comically. The Count has been called to the King’s court, and his widowed mother regrets it: “In delivering my son from me, I bury a second husband” (I.i.3). The play begins with a paradox—delivery, a metaphor for birth, described in funereal terms. Lafeu attempts to console her, and her departing son, by saying that the King’s virtue will make of the King a husband to her and a father to the young Count. But the King’s kind step-fatherly status won’t last long, it seems; he is mortally ill; his physicians can do nothing for him. The Countess believes that Helena’s father, a physician “whose skill was almost as great as his honesty,” could have prolonged the King’s life “so far” that he “would have made nature immortal” (I.i.17-18). But this physician evidently could not heal himself, as he too has died, leaving Helena under the Countess’s protection. Lafeu knew the man, saying, “he was skillful enough to have liv’d still, if knowledge could be set up against mortality” (I.i.26-27). Lafeu discreetly reminds the Countess of the limits of what we now call ‘scientific’ knowledge, which can indeed be set up against mortality but not eternally. God might make nature immortal, but physicians cannot.

    The Countess claims another kind of knowledge, moral knowledge. Helena has inherited honesty and, more generally, goodness from her father. “The remembrance of her father never approaches her heart but the tyranny of her sorrows takes all livelihood from her cheek” (I.i.43-44). Perhaps alerted by the word “tyranny,” Lafeu makes bold to correct the Countess and also her protégé. “Moderate lamentation is the right of the dead: excessive grief the enemy to the living” (I.i.48-49). 

    Bertram interrupts their philosophizing. “Madam, I desire your holy wishes” (I.i.52). His mother blesses him, exhorting him to “succeed thy father in manners, as in shape!” (I.i.54-55). “Thy blood and virtue / Contend for empire in thee, and thy goodness / Share with thy birthright!” (I.i.55-57). That is, a young aristocrat’s spirited “blood,” which elevates him above commoners, may rival his moral virtue as he reaches the age of self-rule. Accordingly, she gives him moral advice that will strengthen his virtue against his “blood,” if he chooses to follow it: “Love all, trust a few, / Do wrong to none; be able for thine enemy / Rather in power than use, and keep thy friend / Under thy own life’s key; be check’d for silence, / But never tax’d for speech. What heaven more will, / That thee may furnish, and my prayers pluck down, / Fall on thy head!” (I.i.57-62) Reduced to simple English, her advice is sound. Christianity commands us to love all, but to trust God; humans may be trusted provisionally, after testing. Be just, and match your enemy’s power but not his customs, his habits—the practices that make him your enemy. Guard your friend with your life. Speak but do not chatter. Beyond that, God will do as He will do, and I shall pray that His blessings will fall upon you.

    Countess, Count, and Lafeu depart, leaving Helena alone. We learn that in truth her sentiments align with Lafeu’s wise precept: she “think[s] not on my father” (I.i.73). “I have forgot him; my imagination / Carries no favor in’t but Bertram’s” (I.i.76-77). Her tears and her pallor are for his departure to the royal court, not for her father’s departure from this earth, six months earlier. In her mind she has followed the Biblical injunction to leave her father and join with her husband, but as with ‘Rousillon’ itself, imagination isn’t reality. Nor is it likely to become reality, as Count Bertram is far “above me,” a commoner, like a star above the earth (I.i.81). Her “blood” does not equal his. For this reason, her love, like the funereal “delivery” of the Count to the King by the Countess, contradicts itself. “Th’ ambition in my love thus plagues itself: / The hind that would be mated by the lion / Must die for love” (I.i.84-85). Helena initially takes the “blood” of aristocratic birth to be a part of nature; aristocrats are a different ‘species’ than commoners, and to contradict nature only invites nature to enforce this natural limit by killing the thing which contradicts it. Like her father, Helena has contracted an illness that threatens to be fatal, although in her case she might cure herself by refusing to dream of marrying above her putatively natural limit. Her own nature, however, makes that supremely difficult for her to do, as she loves him.

    The question, then, is, what is her natural limit? Should she love him? Is social and political rank more natural than virtue? Is her beloved’s virtue worthy of her love? Is her virtue worthy of his love? She admits to herself that she loves him for his body, not his soul—for “his arched brows, his hawking eye, his curls” (I.i.88). She knows she indulges in “idolatrous fancy,” idolatry being precisely devotion to bodies instead of souls and worse, the divinization of the inanimate (I.i.91). She calls into question her own virtue, which is now tested.

    Tested in the person of Parolles, Count Bertram’s attendant. Helena says, “I love [Parolles] for his sake”—for Bertram’s sake—yet “I know him a notorious liar” and “think him a great fool, soley a coward” (I.i.93-95). The pun is apt: Parolles’ soul will indeed prove entirely pusillanimous. Parolles’ name means “speech”—highly suspect speech, in Helena’s opinion; in this she follows the Countess’ admonition about the right and wrong use of speech and silence. Parolles immediately proves himself an ironist, addressing her as “fair queen” (I.i.100)—with a likely pun on ‘queen’ as ‘whore,’ a false wish that has fathered the evil thought. He proceeds impudently but not Socratically, asking if she’s “meditating on virginity” (I.i.105). In a way she has been, so she answers by taking up his theme while rejecting his imputation, replying, “Man is enemy to virginity; how may we barricade it against him?” (I.i.107-08). After some punning and suggestive badinage, Parolles speaks his mind: “It is not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve virginity. Loss of virginity is rational increase; and there was never virgin got till virginity was first lost. That you were made of is metal to make virgins. Virginity by being once lost may be ten times found; by being ever kept, it is ever lost. ‘Tis too cold a companion; away with’t,” being “against the rule of nature” (I.i.120-125, 127). All true enough. Scarcely against perpetual virginity, Helena then asks, now speaking her mind, how might a woman “lose [virginity] to her own liking?” (I.i.141). Parolles doesn’t answer her question, instead urging her to abandon her virginity in haste. 

    With perfect equanimity, Helena doesn’t respond to his suggestion, instead turning the conversation to Parolles’ “master” (I.i.154). She worries that when he gets to the King’s court he’ll have “a thousand loves” and therefore a mind whose attention will divide itself in many directions, from friends to enemies and, most pertinently in her own mind, “a mistress,” “a traitress,” and “a dear” (I.i.154-58). He will become self-contradictory, a man of “humble ambition” and “proud humility,” a being of “jarring concord” and “discord dulcet” and “sweet disaster”—in sum, no fit master at all (I.i.159-61). She has given Parolles every reason to suspect that she worries less that the Count will be a fit master for him as that she can never be a fit mistress for his master. The arrival of a page, advising him of his master’s summons to accompany him to the King’s court, has the welcome effect of removing Parolles from her presence and thereby rescuing her from any further unwanted advances. In their farewells she distracts him by ridiculing his self-proclaimed warlikeness, to which he can only rejoin that he intends to “naturalize” her upon his return (I.i.195), unless she gets herself “a good husband” before then (I.i.200-01). Indeed, she will try.

    Helena’s dialogue with oily Parolles, her only true rival for the Count’s affections, has roused her fighting spirit. Alone again, she no longer mopes over impossibility of reaching to the star that is her beloved. The stars do not rule us. “The fated sky / Gives us free scope; only doth backward pull / Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.” (I.i.203-05). The power that “mounts my love so high,” enabling me to see him even when he isn’t here, also enables me to distinguish fortune from nature (I.i.206). The distance between us is a matter of fortune, a thing of the fated sky, but nature enables her not only to imagine but to think. “Who ever strove / To show her merit that did miss her love?” (I.i.212-13). I know how to cure the King’s disease, and therefore can justify my own presence in his Court.  

    At the Court, in Paris, the King of France has made a geopolitical decision. Two Tuscan city-states are at war—Florence and Siena. And indeed they were, throughout the decade of the 1550s. At that time, France was resisting the ambitions of the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, who was also Charles I of Spain. The Hapsburgs ruled Roussillon, although the native Catalans remained restive under their rule. In search of allies, France sided with the Lutherans in Germany and the Ottomans; in 1555 Pope Paul IV tilted toward France, ruining the Hapsburgs’ hopes for a worldwide empire. In the following year, Charles divided his kingdom between the Spanish Hapsburgs (headed by his son, Philip II) and the Austrian Hapsburgs (headed by Charles’s brother, Ferdinand). Siena would lose its war with Florence and be surrendered to Spain, Florence’s ally.

    In the play, the French King knows he will receive a request from his cousin, the Austrian Hapsburg monarch, to deny aid to Florence. This means that the Austrian Hapsburgs are indirectly opposing the ambitions of the Spanish Hapsburgs. The King, who must know that many of the residents of Siena are of French origin, intends to go along with his cousin’s request, but, hedging his bet, will allow French gentlemen to fight on either side, as they choose. As one of the King’s attendants observes, this “may well serve / A nursery to our gentry, who are sick / For breathing and exploit” (I.ii.15-17). That is, the young aristocrats grow restive; abroad, they will hone their battle skills against foreigners and (it might be thought) not against the King at home; those who survive will return better officers in the army of France. 

    Count Bertram, Parolles, and Lafeu arrive at the King’s Court. In terms of the history of the time, this is anomalous not only because there were no more Roussillonian counts but because Roussillon was ruled by the Hapsburgs, owing no allegiance to France and indeed forming part of Spain, France’s rival. However, it may be that these men, all of whose names are French and therefore would number among the substantial French population of Roussillon (as well as ‘Rousillon’) do feel stronger loyalty to the King of France than to any Hapsburg.

    The King greets the young Count cordially but with prudent caution. He is no Helena, his judgment swayed by physical appearance. “Youth, thou bear’st thy father’s face,” a face well formed by “frank nature”—the word “frank” meaning both vigorous and Frankish, French (I.ii.19-20). Nature is “curious”—that is, careful—never working “in haste”; that is why his face is so “well compos’d” (I.ii.20-21). But the King knows that a face is only a face. “Thy father’s moral parts / Mayst thou inherit too!” he hopes (I.i..21-22). Having served in battle with the Count’s father, the King judges him as having been “Discipled of the bravest” (I.ii.28); his wit was equal to today’s “young lords,” but unlike them he exhibited neither “contempt nor bitterness” (I.ii.33,36). “His honor, / Clock to itself, knew the true minute when / Exception bid him speak, and at this time / His tongue obey’d his hand” (I.ii.38-41). In all this, and especially in “his humility,” he “might be a copy to these younger times” (I.ii.44-46). Merely speaking of him is medicine to the ailing King; “it much repairs me” (I.ii.30), even as his example, if followed by young French aristocrats, would considerably improve them and repair France. Unfortunately, the “judgments” of today’s young are often “mere fathers of their garments,” and their “constancies / Expire before their fashions” (I.ii.61-63). Finally, the memory of the long-lived Count reminds the King of the Count’s physician, Helena’s father, who might have cured the King, had he still lived.

    Back at the Count’s palace in Rousillon, the palace clown, Lavache, asks the Countess’s blessing to marry Isbel, a commoner lass with a regal Spanish name. “I am driven on by the flesh” (I.iii.28), and as a sinner “I do marry that I may repent” (I.iii.35-36), as marriage is a sacrament. What is more, marriage may gain him friends, which he has not now. And if cuckolded, why then he will profit, as the lover will cherish his wife, who according to the Christian teaching is of ‘one flesh’ with himself. Cuckoldry unites even Puritans and Catholics, “howsome’er their hearts are sever’d in religion, their heads are one” because their cuckholds’ horns tangle together like jousting deer in a herd. He even has a ballad to celebrate the thought: “Your marriage comes by destiny, / Your cuckoo sings by kind” (I.iii.59-60). Marriage may be destined but cuckoldry is natural; destiny is really chance, as the odds of drawing a good woman in the marriage lottery are, he estimates, one in ten. “La Vache!” in French slang is an expression of astonishment, as in the English phrase immortalized in America by Phil Rizzuto, ‘Holy Cow!’ Offended and amused at this perpetually surprising man, the Countess sends him to fetch Helena. Before he goes, Lavache compares her to Helen of Troy, whose “fair face” may have caused the Greeks to sack Troy, after the young Trojan prince, Paris, had seduced her and carried her off from her husband, King Menelaus of Sparta (I.iii.67). But this Helen has already resisted the advances of Parolles, although she does intend to go to Paris.

    The palace steward reports that he overheard Helena talking to herself about her love for Bertram. The Countess is not surprised, and is in fact pleased, regarding the nature of Helena to be sound. Helena understands her nature to be the nature of youth, when “love’s strong passion is impress’d” (I.iii.124). The Countess calls her in and teases her by saying, “I am a mother to you,” knowing that if she really were Helena’s mother Bertram would be the girl’s brother, and unmarriageable (I.iii.128). It takes some doing, but she extracts the confession, “I love your son” (I.iii.185). Unworthy of him by convention, by social standing, “I follow him not / By any token of presumptuous suit, / Nor would I have him till I do deserve him,” but I “never know how that desert should be,” and so “love in vain” (I.iii.188-92). Why then do you intend to go to Paris and the King’s Court? Because “my father left me some prescriptions / Of rare and prov’d effects, such as his reading / And manifest experience had collected / For general sovereignty” (I.iii.212-15). Among these is a remedy that can cure the King. In curing the King, she might prove herself worthy of the Count. The Countess blesses her mission, possibly suspecting the young lady’s ulterior motive, and approving it.

    In Paris, the King bids farewell to the young and older lords who are off to the Tuscan war; in victory, he assures them, they will be rewarded. “See that you come / Not to woo honor, but to wed it,” so that “fame may cry you aloud” (II.i.14-15,17). And beware “the girls of Italy,” who may make you “captives before you serve” (II.i.22). To his indignity, Bertram is judged too young to go. Parolles urges him to disobey, to “steal away bravely” (II.i.29), and Bertram determines do it, “though the devil lead the measure,” as Parolles somewhat self-revealingly intones.

    The King next receives a different kind of rhetorician, one who would persuade him to be saved, not hazarded. Telling him that the esteemed physician Gerard de Narbon was her father, Helena describes the medicine he had, which can cure his illness. The King doubts this, since his own “most learned doctors” have failed, concluding “that laboring art can never ransom nature / From her inaidable estate” (II.i.115). He knows the peril he faces, and also knows that she has “no art,” only a lesser sort of knowledge passed down from her good father (II.i.132). True, Helena replies, but “what I can do can do no hurt to try, / Since you set up your rest ‘gainst remedy” (II.i.133-34). More, “He that of greatest works is finisher / Oft does them by the weakest minister” (II.i.135-36). Unlike Parolles, Helena appeals to reason—the medicine can do no harm to a dying man—and piety—the God who can make all things end well can readily pour his through a weak vessel. What is more, God is not only omnipotent but all-knowing; therefore, “Of heaven, not me, make an experiment” (II.i.153). I am willing to make it, on pain of death; if I fail, “with vilest torture let my life be ended” (II.i.173). It may well be that her faith is in nature, in the medicine, that her rhetoric of piety originates only from an intention to counteract the King’s skepticism concerning her competence, but that is still more solid, and undoubtedly better-intentioned, than the rhetoric of Parolles, which is mere verbiage. 

    She has persuaded the King. “Methinks in thee some blessed spirit doth speak / His powerful sound within an organ weak; / And what impossibility would slay / In common sense, sense saves another way” (II.i.174-77)—reasoning founded on uncommon premises also persuades. He is especially impressed with her Christlike willingness to sacrifice her life after torture: “Sweet practiser, thy physic I will try, / That ministers thine own death if I die” (II.184-85). He hasn’t reckoned on the serpentine prudence Christ commends along with dovelike innocence. “If I help,” Helena ventures, “what do you promise me?” (II.i.188). And will you “make it even,” repay my life-saving service to you with something equally vital to me? The King agrees. Very well: if my medicine cures you, “Thou shalt give me with thy kingly hand / What husband in thy power I will command” (II.i.192-93)—aside from a man of French royal blood, she assures him. The King again agrees.

    Comic piety enters in, in a more obvious way, in dialogue between the Countess and her Clown. The Countess has a mission for him. “I shall now put you to the height of your breeding,” she says (II.ii.1). “I will show myself highly fed and lowly taught,” he promises, anticipating that she will send him to the King’s Court (II.ii.3). The Countess demands to know what “makes you special,” to suppose that he would have business there (II.ii.5). Why, because “I have an answer will serve all men,” the highest as well as the lowest (II.ii.14). You mean “your answer [will] serve all questions,” “an answer of such fitness for all questions?” the Countess inquires (II.ii.18,27). But of course, and he invites her to try him with questions. He answers each with “O Lord, sir!” But what if your impudence leads to your whipping? “I ne’er had worse luck in my life in my ‘O Lord, sir!’ I see things may serve long, but not serve ever.” (II.ii.52-53). Not all appeals to God will answer all questions, especially if the appeal provokes corporal punishment. In this, the Clown is less than Christlike, although not lacking in prudence, either. The irony is that the Countess does have business for him in the King’s Court, namely, to deliver a letter to Helena, for whom she continues to care and whom she will continue to advise.

    There, Helena’s cure has worked, and the remaining personages in the palace marvel at it. Pious Lafeu remarks, “They say miracles are past; and we have our philosophical persons to make modern”—commonplace—and “familiar things supernatural and causeless” (II.iii.1-3). This causes us “to make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear (II.iii.3-5). This, Bertram and Parolles concede (Parolles a bit too volubly), puts into question the authority of the great physicians Galen and Paracelsus. Helena and the audience know that the fated sky gives us free scope, and evidently so does God, since the King’s cure came from nature, carefully searched by man.

    The King in his grace, and according to his contract, grants Helena her choice of bachelors, one of which she takes to be the cure of her own illness, her love-sickness. “This is the man,” she says, indicating Bertram, in an echo of the Gospel announcement of our Savior (II.iii.102). Bertram wants none of it. “Your Highness, / In such a business give me leave to use / The help of mine own eyes” (II.iii.104-06). In this he reveals his rebellious character to the King, apparently preferring his natural judgment to the King’s obligation, but in fact objecting to her inferior social standing (“A poor physician’s daughter my wife! Disdain / Rather corrupt me ever!”) (II.iii.113-14). 

    But the King is the King. He can exalt those of low degree, grant noble status to Helena. It is, after all, only a convention, and one within his power to mend. More seriously, he continues, you mistakenly rate convention over nature. “Strange it is that our bloods, / Of color, weight, and heat, pour’d all together, / Would quite confound distinction, yet stand off / In differences so mighty” (II.iii.116-19). In nature there is no such thing as ‘blue’ blood. “If she be / All that is virtuous—save what thou dislik’st, / A poor physician’s daughter—thou dislik’st / Of virtue for the name; but do not so.” (II.iii.119-22). 

    Why not? “From lowest place when virtuous things proceed, / The place is dignified by the doer’s deed; / Where great additions swell’s, and virtue none, / It is a dropsied honor.” (II.iii.123-26). Being “young, wise, and fair,” Helena is heir to nature, and her natural virtues “breed honor” (II.iii.129-131). To lack virtue is to dishonor honorable parent, and virtue exhibits itself in acts; “the mere word’s a slave,” a “lying trophy”—as Parolles would rather not believe, and as Bertram misleads himself insofar as he follows Parolles’ advice (II.iii.135,137). “If thou canst like this creature as a maid, / I can create the rest. Virtue and she / Is her own dower; honor and wealth from me.” (II.iii.140-42). 

    It is an irrefutable argument, but Bertram rejects it: “I cannot love her, nor will strive to do’t” (II.iii.143). In invoking his own honor as a count, Bertram only provokes the King to invoke his own greater honor. “My honor’s at the stake; which to defeat, / I must produce my power.” (II.iii.147-48). Bertram quickly seems to yield, and the King marries them on the spot.

    Bertram remains obdurate in thought if obedient in action. Married, he determines to go to the wars “and never bed her,” never consummate the marriage (II.iii.266). Parolles, unchastened by a severe scolding by Lafeu, presses him on, offering his version of practical wisdom: “A young man married is a man that’s marr’d. / Therefore away, and leave her bravely; go, / The King has done you wrong.” (II.iii.291-93). He goes next to Helena to inform her that her husband will depart tonight “on very serious business” (II.iv.38). She contents herself to say only, “On everything I wait upon his will” (II.iv.52).

    In the struggle for Bertram’s mind and heart, and thus his will and actions, Parolles seems to have won, twice calling Bertram his “sweetheart” (II.iii.261,264). Just before his departure Bertram, tells the dismayed Lafeu that Parolles is “very great in knowledge, and accordingly valiant” (II.v.6-7). On the contrary, the elderly lord insists, in front of Parolles, Parolles is a liar and a coward. “There can be no kernel in this light nut the soul of this man is his clothes; trust him not in matter of heavy consequence” (II.v.41-43), such as the war you are about to fight in. He walks away, Helena walks in, and Bertram refuses to kiss her goodbye—one last act of contempt, expressive of his mind and heart.

    In Florence, the Duke receives two French lords, who head a troop of soldiers. They are brothers, the captains Dumain. As ‘Parolles’ means speech, words, ‘du main’ means ‘of the hand’; these are men of deeds, not words. Given that “the fundamental reasons of this war” strike the lords as “holy,” the Duke wonders why “our cousin France” does not support him (III.i.2,4). For reasons of state, the lords cannot disclose the reasoning of the King, who prefers not to offend his other cousin, the Austrian monarch who opposes Florence. They content themselves to observe that the young French lords, “that surfeit on their ease” (like the French King, they’ve been described as diseased), “will day by day / Come here for physic” (III.i.17-18). When Bertram arrives a short time later, the Duke makes him the general of his cavalry, whereupon the young Count swears by “Great Mars” to “make me but like my thoughts,” that “I shall prove / A lover of thy drum, hater of love” (III.iii.9-11). Indeed, he has already written to his mother to tell her that while he has deferred to the French King’s command to marry Helena he will never consummate the marriage and instead has gone to war.

    The Countess is not amused. “This is not well,” she tells the Clown, when her “rash and unbridled boy” takes it upon himself “to fly the favors of so good a king,” angering him “by misprizing… a maid too virtuous / For the contempt of empire” (III.ii.26-27,29-30). Bertram has gone so far as to lay down a sort of love-test for the woman who is already his bride: If she can remove the ring from his finger, “which shall never come off, and show me a child begotten of thy body that I am father to, then call me husband; but in such a ‘then’ I write ‘never'” (III.ii.55-58). The Countess blames her son’s corruption on Parolles, “a very tainted fellow and full of wickedness” (III.ii.85). My son “can never win” on the battlefield “the honor that he loses” in turning his back on his King and his wife (III.ii.92-93). 

    Faced with an apparently impossible challenge, Helena first prays (and not to Mars) that her husband will survive the war, feeling guilty at the thought that she has caused him to go (which is not true) and risk his life. She thinks that if she now leaves France he will return to it, and to safely; in this, her love is selfless, a desire for what is good for him. She writes to the Countess, announcing her intention to set out on her own mission as a pilgrim to the shrine of Saint Jaques le Grand “with sainted vow my faults to have amended” (III.iv.7). Bertram “is too good and fair for death and me; / Whom I myself embrace to set him free” (III.iv.16-17). Upon reading this intention in Helena’s letter, the Countess can only hope that this will indeed induce her son to return, and for Helena then to reverse her course and return as well. 

    It turns out that Helena will soon form other plans, if indeed she hadn’t already done so at the time she wrote her farewell letter to the Countess. As before, she does not intend entirely to leave matters up to God. She heads not for the saint’s shrine, west of Rousillon, but in exactly the opposite direction, to Florence. Outside that city, the elderly Widow Capilet, her daughter Diana, and their friend Mariana converse. Parolles has been courting Mariana, who rightly regards him as “a filthy officer” unworthy of her attention (III.v.15). She warns Diana against both Parolles and Bertram, whose words in her judgment are only “engines of lust” (III.v.18). Diana, named after the chaste goddess of the hunt, assures her: “You shall not need to fear me” (III.v.26). Helena approaches them, ostensibly on the way to the shrine, and the widow invites her to lodge at her house. The lady also asks if she knows Count Rousillon and expresses her pity for his new wife, as the Count has been courting Diana, rather in contradiction to his vow to Mars, not to mention his wedding vow. Not knowing that she is speaking with that wife, the Widow suggests that Diana may be able to do the wronged woman “a shrewd turn” (III.v.64). 

    With perfect comic timing, Bertram and Parolles appear, at the head of the army—Parolles in the unheroic role of drummer. Playing along with her disguise, Helena asks her companions which one is “the Frenchman,” that is, the Count. Diana points him out, asking “Is’t not a handsome gentleman?” (III.v.77). “I like him well,” Helena admits; “‘Tis pity he is not honest,” Diana ripostes, not intending to wound anything better than the Count’s reputation. As for Parolles, “Were I his lady / I would poison that vile rascal” (III.v.81). The men march past, the women retire to the Widow’s house.

    Encamped in front of Florence, the French lords warn Bertram of Parolles. “He’s a most notable coward, an infinite and endless liar, an hourly promise-breaker, the owner of no one good quality worthy your lordship’s entertainment” (III.vi.8-11). Bertram agrees to test him with a task less daunting than the one he assigned his wife. Parolles lost his drum during Florence’s victorious battle with the Sejoys and has vowed to recover it. Let him try, but have him intercepted by a troop of Florentines; they will pretend to be Sejoys and interrogate him. “Be but your lordship present at his examination,” at which Parolles will be blindfolded; “if he do not, for the promise of his life and in the highest compulsion of base fear, offer to betray you and deliver all the intelligence in his power against you, and that with the divine forfeit of his soul upon oath, never trust my judgment in anything” (III.vi.23-28). Having settled on this plan, Bertram confides to one of the lords that the fair Diana, though “wondrous cold”—having returned his love-letters—will receive a return visit from him (III.vi.103). The lord is eager to come with him and look her over.

    The women will be ready for them. Helena admits to the Widow that Bertram is her husband. She enlists the lady’s help. Since the Count “woos your daughter,” let her consent to his suit but demand his ring as a token of his love (III.vii.17). This is nothing more than a “lawful” plot, since your daughter will then deliver the ring to me and “herself most chastely absent,” as her namesake the goddess would do (III.vii.33). With the ring in her possession, Helena will then be able to consummate her marriage in a dark bedroom. Her husband will intend wickedly while acting lawfully, prey to his wife’s noble deception. 

    The deceptive plot Bertram is in on proceeds as planned, in Bertram’s absence. On orders from the Second Lord, the men who seize Parolles will speak gibberish, nonsense words that Mr. Words, Mr. Speech, cannot understand. One soldier will act as ‘translator.’ During the stakeout, the men hear Parolles talking to himself, trying to find the words with which he can cover his failure to recover his drum. He wishes he hadn’t promised to retrieve it in the first place. “I find my tongue is too foolhardy; but my heart hath the fear of Mars before, and of his creatures, not daring the reports of my tongue” (IV.i.28-29). He has lied not only to others but even to himself: “What the devil should move me to undertake the recovery of this drum, being not ignorant of the impossibility, and knowing I had no such purpose?” (IV.i.31-33). The Second Lord wonders, “Is it possible he should know what he is, and be that he is?” (IV.i.41). It is. Clever but imprudent, Parolles out-talks himself, deceiving himself more than he deceives anyone other than those (like Bertram) whom he tells what they want to hear. Seized by men who evidently speak some foreign language he doesn’t know, Parolles exclaims, “I shall lose my life for want of language,” although he knows five languages (IV.i.66). For the man who depends upon mere words alone, there are not always words enough; Shakespeare himself was not only a playwright but an actor. “O, let me live,” Parolles pleads with his captors, through the ‘translator,’ “and all the secrets of our camp I’ll show, / their force, their purpose” (IV.i.80-82). The Second Lord considers him a woodcock, a bird easily trapped, synonymous with a fool, a dupe. The con artist is a fool; in trying to fool others with words he won’t live up to, he ends by fooling himself with words he can’t live up to, and getting fooled by others with words that mean nothing at all.

    Meanwhile, Bertram is pursuing his other, romantic, plot. At the Widow Capilet’s house, he tries Diana with Parollian sophistries. “You should be as your mother was / When your sweet self was got” (IV.ii.9-10). “She was then honest,” Diana says, irrefutably (IV.ii.11), adding, “My mother did but duty; such, my lord, / As you owe to your wife” (IV.ii.12-13). Not so, the Count replies: “I was compell’d to her, but I love thee” (IV.ii.15). He vows loyalty based upon that loving consent. Diana ventures to doubt his honesty. “Be not so holy cruel,” Bertram pleads, for “love is holy” and I am in love with you (IV.ii.33). Pretending to yield, the lady demands the ring, which he will lend her, not give her, as it is an heirloom “which were the greatest obloquy i’ th’ world / In me to lose” (IV.ii.44). Yes, well, “Mine honor’s such a ring,” and my chastity “the jewel of our house,” the “greatest obloquy i’ th’ world / In me to lose,” the lady rejoins. At this Bertram gives up: “Here, take my ring; / My house, mine honor, yea, my life, be thine; / And I’ll be bid by thee” (IV.51-53). In mock betrothal, she gives him a ring off her own finger in exchange; it is really Helena’s ring, given her by the King as a marriage gift.

    Springing the trap, she tells him to visit her bedroom at midnight, but to stay absolutely silent. I shall return your ring later on, with an explanation for this strange lack of speech among lovers, which we know is necessary because it will be Helena in the bed. The required silence is not only necessary but fitting. The problem with Bertram and Parolles is that they talk too much. The plot against Parolles takes advantage of that. The plot against Bertram requires him to act silently in a good way, if with bad intent. If Judaism is said to be a religion of law and outward compliance to it, and Christian a religion of release from the consequences of bad actions with the insistence on right intentions, Helena’s plot executes her rightful intention with respect to Bertram while duping him into acting in accordance with the law, against his own wrongful intention. After he leaves, Helena reflects that Mother told me men talk and act this way; quite understandably, she resolves to “live and die a maid” (IV.ii.74).

    Back in the Florentine camp, the French lords have learned that a peace has been concluded. The lords discuss Bertram, who has now received the letter of reprimand from the Countess. “There is something in’t that stings his nature,” the First Lord remarks; “for on the reading it he chang’d almost into another man,” rather as conversion to Christianity changes a sinner into a new man (IV.iii.2-3). This is just, the Second Lord says, as “he has much worthy blame laid upon him for shaking off so good a wife and so sweet a lady,” especially by so incurring “the everlasting displeasure of the King,” the First Lord adds. (IV.iii.5-7). Worse, he has “perverted a young gentlewoman here in Florence,” giving her his ring; worst of all, he has caused his wife to die of grief (one of the lords has heard) at Saint Jaques le Grand. “I am heartily sorry that he’ll be glad of this,” the First Lord laments (IV.iii.60); “how mightily some times we drown our gain in tears!” (IV.iii.63-64). 

    Despite his courage on the battlefield, in love Bertram is as much a traitor as Parolles, and the Second Lord asks if it is not damnable in themselves to continue to cooperate in the plot against his vile adviser. The First Lord suggests that in doing so they serve justice, inasmuch as the Count has farther to fall than Parolles: “The great dignity that his valor hath here acquir’d for him”—something cowardly all-talk Parolles has so conspicuously failed to acquire—shall “at home be encount’red with a shame as ample” (IV.iii.64-65). The Second Lord draws the moral: “The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together. Our virtues would be proud if our faults whipt them not; and our crimes would despair if they were not cherish’d by our virtues” (IV.iii.69-72). 

    The Count arrives, announcing that of his remaining business in Florence, “the greatest” remains unresolved (IV.iii.86); he of course doesn’t specify that this is his recently concluded tryst with Diana—in fact the unwitting consummation of his marriage to Helena—not knowing that the lords know exactly what he means. But now he would hear the continuing interrogation of Parolles. He listens as blindfolded Parolles says he speaks truth regarding his estimate of the number of horsemen under the Count’s command, and indeed he does, the Count confirms, “But I con him no thanks for’t in the nature he delivers it” (IV.iii.144). That is, for once Parolles speaks truly, but the nature of his intent in doing so is false, treasonous. His treachery extends to Bertram’s private affairs, as well; he’s written to Diana, again quite truly, saying “the Count’s a fool, and full of gold” (IV.iii.196).

    Having decided that Bertram is to blame for his predicament (after all, he tells himself, he wouldn’t have been captured if he hadn’t been trying to impress the Count), he is happy to betray him. As he tells his interrogator, “I knew the young Count to be a dangerous and lascivious boy, who is a whale to virginity, and devours up all the fry it finds” (IV.iii.203-05). In calling Parolles a “damnable, both-sides rogue,” Bertram also speaks the truth and not incidentally does not deny the truth Parolles has spoken (IV.iii.206). In learning the truth, the nature, of Parolles, Bertram begins to learn the truth of himself. He also begins to learn the truth about, the nature of, parole, of speech itself, which can be true or false, honest testimony or a both-sides rogue, subject to yet another form of speech, the speech of judgment, the speech of vindication and of damnation.

    As Parolles rattles on, disclosing information on the number of foot soldiers in the army and slandering both of the French lords (cowards, rapists) the Second Lord finds him oddly entertaining. Parolles says of the First Lord,”He has everything that an honest man should not have; what an honest man should have, he has nothing”; “I begin to love him for this,” the Second Lord admits (IV.iii.242-44). The man “hath out-villain’d villainy so far that the rarity redeems him” (IV.iii.255). After assuring his captors that he will readily betray both the Duke of Florence and Count Rousillon, Parolles has his blindfold removed. He sees the Count. “You are undone, Captain,” the soldier-‘translator’ says—”all but your scarf,” which is still knotted around his throat (IV.iii.300-301). The empty suit has nothing left to wear but a sort of noose.

    When his interrogators leave him alone, he soliloquizes. True to his nature, he gives his truest confession yet: “If my heart were great, / ‘Twould burst at this” (IV.iii.307-08). Since it isn’t, it doesn’t. “Simply the thing I am / Shall make me live,” although he does draw a modest moral: “Who knows himself a braggart, / Let him fear this; for it will come to pass / That every braggart shall be found an ass” (IV.iii.310-13). “Parolles,” he advises himself, “live safest in shame. Being fool’d, by fool’ry thrive. / There’s place and means for every man alive” (IV.iii.316). Knowing himself, he concludes that even rogues have their place in the natural order, in his own way echoing the Second Lord’s moral. It isn’t only speech, the distinctively human part of human nature, that’s double-sided; nature is, too, and therein lies its comedy and its tragedy, both.

    Helena sees this, too. Her plot successful, her marriage consummated without her husband’s knowledge—a sort of just and lawful cuckoldry—she thanks her allies at the Widow’s house, who will be rewarded when she receives the King’s promised reward. There will be justice among the women. Not so much among men, however. She reflects: “O, strange men! / That can such sweet use make of what they hate, / When saucy trusting of the cozen’d thoughts / Defiles the pitchy night” (IV.iv.21-24). But with her female allies at hand and their joint mission accomplished, “All’s Well That Ends Well” (IV.iv.35). Reason, in line with nature, can make sense of nature’s apparent self-contradictions and, if it guides human actions, share in its telos, which is served by many means, among them the natural increase that results from mating. The women will travel to Marseilles to meet with the King, who has stopped there on his way to Rousillon.

    At the Count’s palace in Rousillon, the Countess, Lafeu, and the Clown await the return of the prodigal son. They too have heard that Helena has died. Lafeu blames Parolles, whose villainy “would have made all the unbak’d and doughy youth of a nation in his color,” which is the “saffron” yellow of cowardice (IV.v.2-3). The Countess agrees, saying his machinations caused “the death of the most virtuous gentlewoman that ever nature had praise for creating” (IV.v.7-9). Lefeu engages in badinage with the Clown, who plays on the fact that ‘le feu’ means fire by announcing himself to be in the service of the great Prince of this world, a prince even greater than the French King, the prince who “ever keeps a good fire” (IV.v.43). The Clown tells Lafeu that any tricks he plays “are their own right by the law of nature” (IV.v.55)—the concordia discors, the law that admits contraries as servants of its telos, the end that is well.

    Sending the Clown away, Lafeu confides to the Countess that he has asked the King to “speak in the behalf of my daughter,” Maudlin, as a bride for the widower, Bertram (IV.v.64). The Countess approves. The King will arrive at Rousillon tomorrow. Bertram is there now, and they go to see him. For her part, having missed the King in Marseilles, Helena has sent a letter to him, a letter signed by Diana, which will further her plot.

    Parolles is already in Rousillon, hoping that Lafeu will intervene mercifully in his favor. He runs into the Clown and describes himself as “muddied in Fortune’s mood, and smell[ing] somewhat strong of her strong displeasure” (V.ii.3-5). The Clown is more than equal to a battle of words with Mr. Speech. “Fortune’s displeasure is but sluttish, if it smell so strongly as thou speak’st of; stand aside, sir” (V.ii.6-7). “Nay, you need not stop your nose, sir; I spake but by a metaphor,” Parolles protests (V.ii.9-10). “Indeed, sir, if your metaphor stink, I will stop my nose; or against any man’s metaphor” (V.ii.11-12). The Clown, being a comedian, knows the doubleness, the ambiguity, of words very well. He understands Parolles, that living pun, that walking metaphor of the potential duplicity of speech.

    Lafeu comes by, and Parolles turns to him. “I am a man whom Fortune hath cruelly scratched,” he begins, altering his metaphor (V.ii.28). Lafeu is quick to defend Fortune’s honor: “Wherein have you played the knave with Fortune, that she should scratch you, who of herself is a good lady and would not have knaves thrive long under her?” (V.ii.30-32). He knows all about the tale of the drum, mocking Parolles because of it. He does show mercy, however, telling Parolles, “Though you are a fool and a knave, you shall eat” (V.v.50-51). “I praise God for you,” Parolles replies, in a rare show of piety (V.ii.52). 

    Lafeu is off to the Count’s palace, where he meets with the King, the Countess, and the French lords, none of whom know Helena is alive. “Your son,” the King tells the Countess, “as mad with folly, lack’d the sense to know / Her estimation home,” that is, her true worth (V.iii.2-4). The Countess attributes her son’s misjudgment to “natural rebellion, done in the blaze of youth,” when passion overcomes “reason’s force” and burns the one who is impassioned (V.iii.6-7). She had warned her son of exactly this danger, how his “blood” contended with virtue for empire over his soul, but he heeded Parolles’ tempting words instead of her parental ones. The King assures her of his forgiveness, and Lafeu observes that for all the injuries Bertram has done, he did “the greatest wrong of all” to “himself” (V.iii.14-15). And in answer to the King’s query, Lafeu reports that Bertram has consented to marry Maudlin, in submission to the King’s intention. The King mentions the Duke of Florence’s letters of commendation; the young Count’s soul has some important warlike virtues, virtues no king, no defender of the realm, would rightly overlook. This marriage can serve France.

    Bertram enters, repentant, pleading for mercy. The King grants it, and asks if he remembers the daughter of Lord Lafeu. He does, “admiringly,” as she had been his first choice in marriage, so much so, he claims, that he underestimated the beauty of all other women, including Helena. “Thence it came / That she whom all men prais’d, and whom myself, / Since I have lost, have lov’d, was in mine eye / The dust that did offend it” (V.iii.51-54). He thus radically changes his earlier story. Initially, he had argued that Helena was unworthy of him because beneath him in social standing, a mere physician’s daughter. Helena had proved her merit to the King by curing him, by her knowledge of nature, a knowledge more valuable than any convention. Now, if Bertram’s account is to be credited, it transpires that Bertram’s aversion was also natural, not conventional, an attraction to Maudlin’s beauty which “warp’d” his perception of Helena’s beauty, making her seem “hideous” (V.iii.49,52).

    The politic King does credit, or at least says he credits, the Count’s account. “Well excus’d,” he judges (V.iii.55). As always, he draws a moral: “Oft our displeasures, to ourselves unjust, / Destroy our friends, and after weep their dust; / Our own love waking cries to see what’s done, / While shameful hate sleeps out the afternoon. / Be this sweet Helen’s knell.” (V.iii.63-67). But for a king, the dead past must bury its dead, lest those who continue to live under his rule be ruined. “And now forget her” (V.iii.67), he commands, and marry Maudlin. The Count consents, asking for heaven’s blessing on his second marriage to his first love, without which divine blessing he would be better off dead, his “nature ceased” (V.iii.72). To sensibilities steeped in romance, the King’s command and the Count’s consent jar. But the romance in which ‘we’ have steeped ourselves, stemming from the courtly love of the Middle Ages, and branching into modern Romanticism, ignores facts that Shakespeare knew. In the courtly romances, love was a passion pursued outside marriage; married love was at best Christian-agapic, often politic, but seldom erotic-sentimental. For Shakespeare and especially for Shakespeare’s monarchs and aristocrats, married love is less serious in ‘our’ sense, but much more serious in another way, a way ‘our’ modern understanding of politics doesn’t readily understand, except as a form of cynicism. 

    But not so fast. Lafeu asks for “a favor” from Bertram, a token of his love for his daughter, an engagement ring. Bertram gives him the ring Diana had given him in exchange for his own family heirloom. Lafeu and the King immediately recognize it as the wedding gift the King bestowed on Helena. His enraged Majesty demands, How did you despoil Helena of that ring? Not knowing about the gift-ring in the first place, the hapless young Count denies that it belonged to Helena, but his mother sternly corrects him: “I have seen her wear it; and she reckon’d it / At her life’s rate” (V.iii.89-91).

    Afraid to admit his (as he believes) tryst with Diana—one of those ladies in Italy Helena had rightly worried might attract him—Bertram claims that he obtained the ring from a lady in Florence who threw it from her window to him, wrapped in a paper with her name written on it. But I explained my marital condition to her, and although she dropped her infatuation she nobly insisted that he keep her ring. This utterly implausible tale, worthy of Parolles, scarcely convinces the King, who no longer extends his credence to the words of the young Count. He too had heard Helena say “she would never put it from her finger / Unless she gave it to yourself in bed” (V.iii.109-10). You must have murdered her. He orders the guards to take Bertram away; “we’ll sift this matter further” (V.iii.123). In his own defense, Bertram rejoins, “If you shall prove / This ring was ever hers, you shall as easy / Prove that I husbanded her bed in Florence, / Where she never was” (V.iii.124-25). Right on the first part, wrong on the second.

    The comedy sharpens still again, as the King receives a letter from the Widow Capilet, denouncing Bertram as a seducer. The lady and her daughter then enter the King’s presence, Diana claiming that she is Bertram’s wife. Still trying to lie his way out, entangling himself further, Bertram calls her “a common gamester of the camp” (V.iii.186). Why would a prostitute have the ring? With fine irony, Diana calls none other than Parolles as her witness. But the man is “a most perfidious slave,” Bertram sputters, a man “whose nature sickens but to speak a truth” (V.iii.203,205). A man of nothing but empty, deceiving words, Parolles’ nature is so unnatural that it falls ill if forced to speak truly, the lying Bertram truly protests. In the event, Parolles testifies honestly that Bertram was indeed “mad for” Diana, although the King gets little more out of him and quickly dismisses him as worthless (V.iii.255).

    But “she hath that ring of yours,” the King suggests, the heirloom ring you would no more part with than Helena would part with the ring I gave to her (V.iii.207). Thinking quickly, Bertam concocts another word-invention. “Certain it is I lik’d her,” he allows, “and boarded her i’ th’ wanton way of youth” (V.iii.208-09)—the excuse his mother had offered to the King. But it was all her fault. Diana “did angle for me, / Madding my eagerness with her restraint”—truly a creature of “infinite cunning” (V.iii.210-11,214). She received the heirloom in exchange for a commonplace ring such as one might purchase at market. When Diana identifies the ring His Majesty has in his possession, the one he gave to Helena and no ordinary ring at all, the pretense evaporates and Bertram confesses.

    This only leads to a new perplexity: How did Diana come into possession of Helena’s ring? Knowing that Helena is waiting in the wings, Diana answers with riddles—exhibiting for one last time the ambiguity of words, even when deployed honestly. When in frustration the King orders her to prison, she calmly turns to her mother and asks her to post bail, and offers one last riddle— which recalls the play’s opening paradox of the “delivery” that is also a burial, but in reverse: “He knows himself my bed he hath defil’d; / And at that time he got his wife with child. Dead though she be, she feels her young one kick; / So there’s my riddle: the one that’s dead is quick— / And now behold the meaning”—the cue for living Helena to enter, pregnant (V.iii.293-98). 

    The King can only ask, “Is’t real that I see?” (V.iii.299). So much to hear, so many lying, deceptive, metaphorical, words, some empty of content, others pregnant with meaning: Is seeing really believing? As always in this play, yes and no. “No, my good lord,” Helena answers, focusing attention on the meaning the phrase “is’t” (V.iii.300). “‘Tis but the shadow of a wife you see, / The name and not the thing” (V.iii.301-02). I am married legally, in words, but rejected by my husband. Bertram protests, “Both, both,” we are married both in name and in reality, in convention and in nature. “O, pardon!” (V.iii.302). As a matter of fact, Helena, says, you are right: I have your heirloom ring and I also have your words in your letter, promising that when I get the ring from your finger and you have gotten me with child, you can then call me husband, put the word to the thing. Beaten, bewildered Bertram turns to the King. “If she, my liege, can make me know this clearly, / I’ll love her dearly, ever, ever dearly” (V.iii.309-10). She can and doubtless will explain how she pulled them off—both the ring and the plot.

    Critics who complain that the Count may still lack sincerity overlook the fact that this is a comedy; true romance isn’t the point, and it never was. Sure enough, good old Lafeu announces, “My eyes smell onions; I shall weep anon,” and asks Parolles, that man of mere cloth, to lend him a handkerchief (V.iii.314). Does he weep for the reconciliation, for his now-ignored daughter, Maudlin, or both?

    The King too wants a coherent, step-by-step telling of the plot, “to make the even truth in pleasure flow” (V.iii.319). He makes amends to Diana, offering her the same opportunity he’d granted to Helena, to choose her husband; she will soon come over to the side of nature, leaving virginity behind but in legal, verbal propriety while securing her widowed mother’s prosperity too.

    All’s well that ends well? The King remains prudent to the end: “All yet seems well; and if it end so meet, / The bitter past, more welcome is the sweet” (V.iii.326-27). Discord will serve concord, maybe.

    This is the point of the Epilogue. “The King’s a beggar, now the play is done” (E.1). That is, in the penultimate reversal of roles, yet another upending of convention, the King, who lives a life of command, can only hope for the best, having reached the limits of both rule by decree and rule by advice. “All is well if this suit be won, / That you express content; which we will pay / With strife [effort] to please you, day exceeding day” (E.2-4). Shakespeare, ruler of all words, himself depends upon something beyond his control, audience approval. “Ours be your patience, then, and yours our parts; / Your gentle hands lend us, and take our hearts” (E.5-6). We are now the audience to your wordless, unambiguous action, your ‘play,’ which is your applause. With this final reversal of roles, of rulers being ruled, Shakespeare and his players are done. 

    Only if Shakespeare has persuaded his audience with words and plot they deem fitting, only if he has succeeded in ruling their sentiments with his reasoned, playful argument and action will they consent to judge his work as he wishes it to be judged. Judgment first came to sight in the contrast between the authority of elders, with their advice, their piety, and their plans, and the passions and plans (often schemes) of the young, who seek to evade authority. Authority based on the experience won over many years and on piety (the ‘faith of our fathers’) finds its criterion in nature. There is the authority of medical knowledge or ‘physic,’ rightful authority over bodily nature. There is also the authority of moral knowledge, knowledge of the virtues that make men and women human or inhuman. Moral knowledge distinguishes ‘blood’—thumoerotic passion, the fight for love and glory—from virtue. It distinguishes courage (Bertram, Helena) from cowardice (Parolles), prudence (the King, the Countess, Helena) from folly (Bertram, Parolles), justice (the women generally, the King, the French lords) from injustice (the young men, especially Bertram with his failure to form a just estimate of Helena’s worth), and finally moderation (Lafeu, the Countess) from immoderation (the young generally, gripped by their passions). 

    Speech aimed at persuasion, rhetoric, may be true or false. Speech to oneself, soliloquy, may also be true or false, insightful or self-deceptive. Speech ‘meets’ or ‘courts’ action especially in love, in courtship. Helena deceives in her actions but usually speaks the truth, and for virtuous ends. Parolles speaks lies at the service of passions, finding a ready audience in Bertram. Helena and Parolles are love-rivals, seeking to win the heart of their Count. Helena asks him the crucial, comic question: How to lose one’s virginity to one’s own liking? (And therefore to one worthy of your liking, else your liking will soon turn to disliking.) This is a question concerning bodies and passions but also a moral question concerning good and bad. To answer it, you will need to confront the problem of appearance and reality, deception and unmasking, revealing. As a wise ruler, the King knows that already, but the young lovers need to learn it.

    Nature also raises the question of free will, and especially reasoned choice, against fatality (fortune, chance) and perhaps divine providence. The clown Lavache sees this in his cynical or ‘reductionist’ way, by calculating the odds of a good marriage as one in ten. Helena sets her prudent plotting not so much against fate as within its framework. She is right to see that her beloved is ‘above her’ in conventional social standing, but the overarching question is to know one’s place within the order of nature, to have self-knowledge. More, as the French lord asks, as he considers vile Parolles, is it possible to know that one is a coward, a liar and a fool, and still to be all those things? Evidently so, as Parolles illustrates. But he too knows his place in nature. If nature is a concordia discors, an order encompassing disorder, conflict, then even a knavish fool has his place. Virtue, a kind of strength, needs vice to test it, to ‘prove’ itself in both senses of the term. 

    All’s well that ends well insofar as reason out-plots passion, bringing the convention of marriage into line with natural passion, in a condition of mutual correction. But reason’s victories are temporary because the discors remains—as it must, if the virtue aiming at the good end will not weaken. The comedy of All’s Well That Ends Well sustains itself throughout, because the audience knows that the wise plotters have the foolish scoundrels firmly under their rule. Any utopian tendency to suppose that this will always be so is wisely deprecated by the King, who has ruled too long, learned the limitations of wise rule too well, to think otherwise.

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    China in the 1990s

    July 22, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Xudong Zhang: Postsocialism and Cultural Politics: China in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.

     

    Between the massacres at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the people of China endured what Zhang calls a “tense process of relaxation,” “a silent revolution in every domain of Chinese life as the People’s Republic transformed from a centrally planned economy to the world’s new workshop and its most coveted market for international capital.” A “boisterous, disorienting social sphere underscored by a carnivalesque consumer mass culture equipped with new information technology from the cell phone to the Internet” appeared to herald “economic prosperity, cultural diversity, institutional rationalization, and even political stability”— likely to hasten Chinese integration “into the global system,” albeit with a concurrent “deepening of social divisions and tensions in the space of the nation-state.” 

    Some two decades later, we know that the Chinese Communist Party had other plans, which included a comprehensive system of surveillance, a state-controlled alternative ‘internet,’ and imperialist geopolitical extension throughout the world targeted ultimately at the United States. Zhang wants to prevent the realization some of this. He knows he may not succeed, writing, “my central observation on the 1990s is that the perceived dissolution and degeneration of the totality of a purported socialist reality opens a narrow gate on the reconfiguration of economic, social political, and cultural powers in a moment of danger.”  A ‘postmodernist’ scholar tutored by the lit-crit scholar Fredric Jameson, he would advance some sort of socialism under the usual rubric of ‘cultural’ neo-Marxism. Hobbled by the cumbersome clogs of ‘postmodernist’ jargon, his book stands as a forlorn of embodiment of a dream opposed by a disciplined oligarchic regime that knows what it wants to do and steadily goes about doing it. If ever there was a narrow gate for such a thing to limp through, China’s rulers have closed it firmly. This notwithstanding, Zhang does know a lot about China, and one can learn from him. 

    China in the 1980s, he writes, featured “the unfreedom of the total state” in China. But this “total” (dare one say ‘tyrannical’?) regime preserved two kinds of freedom. It “maintained a tightly woven collective life” of “mutual dependency, whose internal socioeconomic equality and political-ideological homogeneity ensured initiative and possibilities available only in a ‘mass democracy’ or an ‘enlightened despotism.'” I think that means a centralized state controlled by an oligarchy kept ‘the ruled’ down, but not atomized; the ruled helped one another. “Second, the state and its socialist infrastructure acted both as a mediator with and a buffer against the capitalist world market, thus effectively protecting a fledgling national market of economic and cultural production/consumption.” 

    By the 1990s, “the sweeping marketization in anticipation of China’s full entry into the capitalist global economy seems to have strengthened the Chinese economy and in particular benefited the new ruling elite of a bureaucratic capitalism.” But China’s new middle class, non-ideological and pragmatic, did not act in the manner of Western liberals, esteeming individual freedom. It sought the “deterriorialized” world of “postmodernity,” by which Zhang means (among other things) “globalization.” How then does ‘postmodernism’ correlate with ‘postsocialism’? How do global capitalism and “the revolutionary and socialist legacies of Mao’s China” interact? Zhang takes the side of ‘postsocialism’ in this confrontation, asking his readers to think about, “how it can address the complexity of Chinese reality, above all the fascination with/resistance to the capitalist commodity economy and the attachment to/forgetfulness of the revolutionary and socialist experience.” He wants to avoid any recurrence to the “Hegelian/Marxist” rationalism, which purported to describe a linear (if dialectical) historical progress toward what Zhang calls “a forever postponed and forever abstract Messianic world revolution.” A bit like a left-wing version of President Donald Trump, he insists on the need for national sovereignty. Unlike Trump, however, he hopes that this nationalism will remain socialist in a regime “whose semiautonomy (or semidependency on a larger totality) is a crucial, indispensable condition of the possibility for systematic opposition and resistance” to the “capitalist global economy.” He wishes this sovereignty could be “endowed” by “the community of the people.” He imagines that this is possible if one takes on the ‘postmodernist’ project, eschewing “abstract and essentialized cultural truth-claims” (e.g., ‘all men are created equal’) and embracing “individual and communal perceptions and experience of the epochal material-technological determinations by capitalism as a natural-historical setting and not an ontological self-understanding of human beings”—”an emergent culture or form of life.” “Life” is indeed the criterion here, as it is with ‘postmodernists’ generally, who have taken Nietzsche’s aristocratic vitalism and made it egalitarian. Post-socialism rightly understood “transcends the dogmas of capitalism and socialism to get in touch with the productive forces of the world of life with all its social and cultural specificities and complexities.” 

    Zhang divides his book into three parts. The first part describes and comments on (‘critiques,’ as ‘postmodernists’ like to say) “the convoluted intellectual discussion during the 1990s, with Beijing as the epicenter.” Here Zhang “confront[s] central contradictions or conflicts around which the major battles of intellectual and cultural-political engagements of the Chinese 1990s played out.” These contradictions included that between “neoliberal forces of market fundamentalism” and “the socialist state”; “the global postmodern turn” and “Chinese political and cultural subjectivity”; and “democracy” in the sense of a “mass society” based on a market economy and “Chinese intellectual discourses and institutions.” Overall, these contradictions embodied both the conflict between, and the intertwining of, nationalist and socialist ideas. 

    In the second part of the book Zhang addresses these matters in terms of “literary representations of the new global space anchored or embedded in the particular narrative discourse of modern Chinese ‘subjectivity’—as identity, selfhood, interiority, and self-image (or rather self-imaging).” In these representations Zhang finds the “melancholy of the urban middle class detached from its personal and collective identity defined historically in the project of Chinese revolution and socialism.” The book’s third part “analyzes different ways of formulating the national situation and national self-identity in the truly international space: art film.” 

    In the 1990s, “the only thing the Chinese government does not readily take from the U.S. model is it political structure.” The regime wanted economic development, “turn[ing] to authoritarian capitalist societies in East Asia—Singapore, South Korea, and, until very recently, Taiwan—for political inspiration.” The regime’s “cynical pragmatism and opportunism” served as “the sole source of its legitimacy,” a “legalistic, administrative, and technocratic blanket” with which it attempted to muffle “the public articulation of the political vision of an actually existing but internally differentiating socialism.” It hadn’t fully succeeded. “The oppressiveness of the Chinese state in some areas is paralleled by unprecedented freedom and anarchism in other parts of the social domain.” But not for long, the rulers hoped. “Under the cover of Marxist philosophy, the Chinese state, rooted in a Leninist party organization, becomes a ruthless promoter of capitalist-style development, and of the market revolution as it has prevailed in the Western world since the Reagan-Thatcher era,” a “giant interest group” in its own right: “a CCP Inc.” The self-interest, the “unchecked power and corruption” of this oligarchy “puts it in direct confrontation with the society at large,” “pos[ing] a direct threat to the economic growth and social stability that the state depends on so desperately for its own political survival.” The “rising proto-middle class demand[s] more clarity and rationality in terms of rights and positive law,” but the “state bureaucracy” wants to such things. 

    Economic growth armed with political power “creates astounding disparities in distribution of wealth, ranking China today among the most unequal nations in the world”—”worse than the United States,” Zhang shudders, rivaling such oligarchies as Russia and Indonesia. “All this has been done not through the demise of a strong central government, but under the close watch and constant guidance of a socialist regime” via “rent-seeking, insider trading, or stealing of public property,” activities made easier by “the lack of press freedom” to expose them. “The rapid erosion of the basic rights of the working people established under Chinese socialism makes them powerless vis-à-vis capital and the new managerial class.” In view of the fact that the (supposedly secured) basic rights of the working people did not prevent the deliberate extinction by famine of millions of Chinese peasants under Mao, it’s hard to read that last locution with a straight or even a somewhat composed face, but Zhang prefers not to think that state socialism aiming at social equality may ‘need’ to kill a lot of people to get there, only to lead the killers to corruption and enrichissesez-vous-ing after the bloodbath is over. Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising to learn that in China “private enterprise… lacks the legal protection it enjoys in the West.” Money-making is for the oligarchs, not the ruled. “Eighty percent of national private savings is in the hands of a tiny nouveau riche class,” while “China’s rural inhabitants—still more than seventy percent of the population—are left to fend for themselves.” That is a bit better than being slaughtered by Maoist ideologues, but Zhang has more immediate issues to consider.

    In the 1980s it still had been possible to think that Chinese intellectuals and the bureaucratic state were “natural, inseparable partners in herding the people through social change while maintaining order,” that “intellectuals are the moral conscience of the people and have the ability and right to speak for the people’s desires and longings,” and that the Chinese people want “modernity, understood as a set of unquestionable universal institutions and values.” Tiananmen Square exposed both the “parasitic and symbiotic relations” between intellectuals and the state. The modernizing adaptation of the ancient Confucian model of the wise emperor and his learned administrators, benevolently setting the moral tone for the Chinese people—an adaptation which oscillated between aspirations for “Western-style democracy” and “enlightened despotism” in China—proved illusory. The oligarchy didn’t even recognize those aspirations, “crush[ing] the popular protest as a threat to ‘stability,’ not as a crusade against neoliberalism” with all “the ruthlessness of a rising technocratic regime.” 

    Regrouping after this debacle ‘Nineties neoliberals redefined themselves. They shared the “neoauthoritarian legacy” of the ‘Eighties neoliberalism—by which Zhang means that both versions “profoundly distrust[ed] social democracy (particularly mass democracy) while searching for an efficient and radical way to establish a new socio-ideological order based on the market and private ownership.” However, the earlier neoliberals were reformers “within the movement of Chinese socialism” in the sense that they concerned themselves “with political democratization and maintaining a socially just distribution of wealth”; ‘Nineties neoliberals “not only openly challenge[d] the very existence of Chines socialism but also [took] issue with the notion of the Western welfare state from an orthodox neoliberal standpoint.” As part of “a massive deintellectualization of Chinese cultural life in the 1990s,” Chinese neoliberals turned away from Marxism and ‘postmodernism’ toward exegesis, positivism, and empiricism, evidently hoping to pass through the ideological filters of the oligarchic regime. (“State censorship plays a role in shaping the coded language of intellectual debate, of course.”) Indeed, “the post-Mao Chinese ‘public sphere’ is a sham whose only existence and festivities are in and of the ideology and fantasy,” something one might say of the Maoist Chinese ‘public sphere’ as well, although Zhang is too discreet to suggest it. Chinese neoliberals were thinking about “how to secure the freedom of a few”—themselves—against “the demands for equality by the many.” “The Chinese government’s behavior in 1989 was more effective in cracking down on the democratic initiative for economic equity, social justice, and political participation by the working people than in weeding out ‘bourgeois liberalism,’ which surged back into the domestic mainstream in the form of neoliberal economics, and into the global context with the rhetoric of freedom and rights.”

    Zhang maintains that the voices against neoliberalism belonged broadly to what was called China’s “New Left.” One part of the New Left stance was nationalism, triggered by the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, precipitated by Chinese missile tests near the coast of Taiwan. When the United States responded by deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups outside the Strait, many intellectuals recalled the history of Western imperialism in China from the 1840 Opium War to the 1945 Japanese surrender. “Human rights rhetoric… came to be viewed cynically in China as cover for political or geopolitical concerns,” part of the “clash of civilizations” discussed by Samuel Huntington in his widely-read contemporaneous book. This view was confirmed in 1999 during the Kosovo War, when U.S. cruise missiles hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; the Chinese rejected the American explanation that the attack was an error based on the use of old maps, taking the incident as an “exercise of raw power out of sheer self-interest by an integrated West led by the United States,” although Zhang leaves the definition of the supposed self-interest in destroying a Chinese embassy undefined.

    With this renewed nationalism came a critique of neoliberalism provoked by the failure of capitalist ‘shock therapy’ in Russia. “The Russian path became a living reminder of the road China must not go down.” The New Left thus presents a renewal of national socialism, long discredited for its linkage to Nazism.

    Zhang doesn’t put it that way. “The central debate” in 1990s China was “about how to engage in the process of social modernization in a relatively efficient and just way, or, to be blunt, how to avoid a major human disaster while embarking on this journey.” Zhang condemns the neoliberal side of the debate as “not so much a pursuit of freedom but a wishful and egoistic attempt to carve out a self-enclosed, indeed barricaded bourgeois haven out of an unstable reality of irreducibly uneven development.” Meanwhile, nationalism “takes shape on an after-image of the vanishing medium that is the traditional nation-state,” now seriously compromised by globalization. Zhang doesn’t mind nationalism at all, however, so long as it “makes itself available to a populist and even socialist vision of a sound national economy combined with a sound national politics”; “it is the socialist potential of this nationalist discourse that [kept] it as a meaningful position in the Chinese intellectual field in the 1990s.” As a ‘postmodern,’ Zhang would attempt to “de-colonize and de-essentialize the mind from Western metaphysics in general and from the predominant Western discourses of modernity in particular,” while retaining the “Marxist critique of the capitalist colonial system and its internal hierarchy,” not to mention socialism itself and “the Chinese state-form.” One might describe this set of aspirations as incoherent, but ‘postmodernism’ never claimed to esteem reason.

    It soon transpires that the New Left is just as ‘internationalist’ or ‘globalist’ as neoliberals, and even more ideological, but in a different way. The Chinese New Left is “a cluster of loosely connected intellectual discourses and tendencies” owing “its existence to a truly international and historically embedded conceptual framework, theoretical arsenal, and symbolic power.” “Many of the best Chinese students became raging ‘New Leftists’ by the time they complete their much envied education at, say, Berkeley or Duke.” But no worry, it is “no longer possible or meaningful to distinguish the ‘Chinese’ from the ‘un-Chinese’ elements in the New Left, which are intimately connected to Chinese reality.” The “critical intellectuals in China today embark on a systematic and open-ended questioning of both the socialist and capitalist assumptions of modernity,” breaking “the straitjacket of socialism and capitalism as two reified and fetishized social, political, and theoretical institutions.” This seems to mean that the Chinese New Left rejects a civil society in which market relations dominate all other social relations (the straitjacket of capitalism) while affirming a civil society of communitarian mutual aid. It isn’t clear, however, in what way New Leftist differ from other socialists (except for their nationalism). They do not think the time is ripe to get rid of the state, as American and European New Leftists did in the 1960s. On the contrary, they endorse the view of Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein in their book The Cost of Rights, which argues that “all rights, including the so-called ‘negative rights,’ depend on the state and its taxation; that all rights are public goods whose protection requires the government to make socially responsible and morally satisfying choices; and that, in view of the sorry reality in ‘free’ Russia, ‘statelessness spells rightlessness.” This is of course quite consistent with the American Declaration of Independence, which affirms that governments are instituted to secure unalienable natural rights, although it is clear that neither Holmes nor Sunstein nor Chinese New Leftists regard rights as natural but rather as historical, changeable, ever-evolving. 

    The Chinese New Left would oppose the “global imperial order” of the United States and its “bourgeois ideology” with a “Chinese way” of “constantly historicizing and contextualizing the particularities, arbitrariness, and intellectual closures of all these circulating universal claims while keeping the future-oriented utopian horizons of history open.” This isn’t really a Chinese way at all, but the Western ‘postmodernist’ way instantiated in China. It is indeed as utopian as ‘postmodernism’ generally, which is why ‘postmodernism’ gets play primarily within universities and other schools, sometimes with an assist from mass media companies and political parties, when they find it useful to do so. Zhang admits the universalist ambition of the New-Left Chinese way when he stipulates that “Chinese strivings must be defined in a way that speaks to other peoples in other parts of the world” by “articulat[ing] the national dilemma [of China] as a universal problematic, and vice-versa,” “transcend[ing] simultaneously the mythology of a self-contained Chinese culture and the closure of historical horizons in bourgeois civilization,” the rival universalism. In this, it should be noticed, Chinese New Leftism dovetails rather well with the geopolitics of those soulless bureaucrats in Beijing that they deplore.

    The 1990s saw “a thriving, omnipresent market and a retreating, decentralized state power.” If the latter claim is true, it was very much a matter of taking one step back in order to position oneself for two steps forward, but for the time the new middle class managed to form “semiautonomous social and cultural spaces of its own,” wherein they cultivated nationalism, private property ownership, and a cosmopolitanism understood as a desire to bring China out into the world as China. Nationalist and consumerist sentiments largely replaced the “universalistic high culture of humanism and modernism” of the 1980s. The “new terrain” in Chinese society established itself “outside the institutions of the state and intellectuals.” So, for example, the 1996 collection of “crude journalistic writing” titled China Can Say No, abominated America but did so without state sponsorship (although not without state “blessing”). 

    Beyond anti-Americanism, what did Chinese nationalism consist of? In the “new round of economic liberalization” undertaken in 1992, “the state itself was by far the biggest shareholder, stakeholder, and employer in an already diversified, mixed economy”; “combined with a modernizing socialist bureaucracy,” this “allowed the state to be an integral, indeed omnipresent part of the new image of the nation.” However, nationalism as understood in Chinese society differed from “the state rhetoric of patriotism.” It was more visceral. Such powerful sentiments might circle around to challenge the regime, and so were kept “tightly controlled by the government.” An oligarchic regime may foment nationalism, but it must remain alert to the risk of a nationalism that morphs into calls for popular sovereignty. The Chinese Communist Party has remained vigilant about such a prospect throughout its decades in power, and the ‘Nineties were no different. 

    Zhang rightly distinguishes “this new image of the nation” from the traditional, Confucian motif of tianxia. “Literally meaning ‘under the heaven,’ tianxia stands as a pre- or protonationalist notion of an empire, civilization, and universe, and thus runs against the grain of modern nationalism as a rational ideology of individual rights and change.” Very oddly, Zhang entirely omits the longstanding rivals of Confucianism in traditional Chinese politics and culture—not only Taoism and Buddhism but (more pertinently) the set of views often called ‘Legalism’—a sort of Realpolitik discourse that emerged in the ‘Hobbesian’ Warring States period of 453-221 BC. Modern Chinese intellectuals struggled for a century “to make China great again” after its loss of power, and of ‘face,’ to modern empires. This “painstaking shift of loyalty and identity from the cultural codes of Confucianism to the modern nation-state” ranged from republicanism to the ‘authoritarianism’ of Chiang Kai-Shek to the Marxism-Leninism of Mao Zedong; the Chinese oligarchy of the ‘Nineties had no taste for such variety of opinion in the civil society it oversaw. What would China’s “quiet yet aggressive new nationalism” become, be allowed to become?

    Zhang shares its anti-Americanism. “In today’s international community, the United States is probably the only nation to believe that, or act as if, it has the right and moral obligation to impose its standards on other nations while at the same time fiercely promoting its own national interest, often under the same banner of American exceptionalism and supremacy,” he sniffs. He is sufficiently honest to admit that “the tension between universal principles and national boundaries is by no means unique to liberalism,” the Marxism-Leninism promoted in Mao’s widely distributed ‘Little Red Book’ being a conspicuous instance thereof. The departure from Maoism begun in 1979 and continued throughout the ‘Eighties, a departure based on pragmatism and the desire for economic development, appeals to Zhang for its non-universalist character, but worries him because the bureaucracy which implemented it opposes “any attempt to redeem or appropriate the Maoist notion of mass democracy and participation.” Zhang’s ‘postmodernist,’ pick-and-choose Maoism—a neo-Maoism pretending that Marxism tolerates popular sovereignty as a sound feature of state socialism—wants “the emergent discourse on Chinese nationalism and mass culture” to “achieve its ultimate historical and political meaning,” a somewhat vague prospect which he quite sensibly fears the oligarchs may block. 

    Here is where intellectuals like, well, Zhang himself come in. “Without the full participation of its attendant ‘high culture,’ the newly emerging social experience is hampered by a lack of cultural vision, ideological articulation, and political legitimacy; instead, it is forced into a probational state of namelessness and wordlessness, even though it is clearly the field in which the dazzling vocabulary of historical change reaches or, better still creates a mode of language and representation.” This is nothing less, or more, than a new vanguardism, albeit one animated by ‘postmodernism’ instead of ‘scientific socialism.’ With the cleverly-designed tools of ‘deconstructionism’ in hand, ‘postmodern’ intellectuals like Zhang intend to guide the masses not by dictatorship according to the ‘iron laws of History’ but by rhetoric according to the great unquestioned universalist assumption of our contemporary ‘postmodernists’: egalitarianism or ‘democracy’ camouflaged by the rigorously anti-universalist valorization of “locality, difference, relativism, and a ‘deconstructive’ mode of thinking.” Such intellectuals can pummel pro-capitalist, ‘neoliberal’ intellectuals as universalizing, aristocratic pawns of the bureaucratic state, paying “only sporadic lip service” to civil rights in their striving for “a new authoritarianism.” Given the tendency of ‘authoritarian’ capitalist regimes in some other countries to ‘liberalize’ the political sphere as well, bringing in the regimes of commercial republicanism ‘postmodernists’ detest, such a pummeling is de rigeur.  

    By the 1990s, the Chinese state had begun “neutraliz[ing] the moral appeal of liberal thinking by buying off the population, above all, the technocratic-managerial class,” aiming “to win back popular support” in the wake of Tiananmen “with rapid economic growth.” On the coercive side of the equation, “tighter state control of ideology forced liberal intellectuals into a state of perpetual, although silent, dissent.” The Communist Party’s state “took the lead in an all-out embrace of the market and global capital,” suspending “the commitment to the people as a whole, and to the historical experiment to create a new kind of democracy, freedom, and equality that supersedes the bourgeois model.” “As long as the tensions or disagreements” between state and society “remain manageable,” the two spheres could “pursue and formulate their interests and ideologies separately.” But “what risked being lost” was “a collective passion for political and cultural democracy.” In the years since Zhang has published his book, the regime has ‘managed’ dissent with fair success and with little interest in indulging any collective passion for democracy, if such exists. “Throughout the 1990s… the People’s Republic was swiftly mutating into but another nation-state defined by not the twentieth but the nineteenth century, and this tendency was consolidated both by the internal rationalization of the state and with the blessing of a homogenizing global ideology that presides over the withering of meaningful political life everywhere.” Post-socialist or not, modernity’s most recent turn has led not to the withering away of the state but the withering away of politics, suffocated by the knee of administrative (that is to say, oligarchic) states which tolerate capitalism insofar as it provides them with revenue and, in the West, tolerates ‘postmodernism’ insofar as it is congenitally incapable of exercising anything resembling rule in the real world.

    Zhang exemplifies the latter mentality, hoping that somehow Chinese nationalism might turn democratic. He distinguishes “postmodernism in China”—the “global discourse of postmodernism and postmodernity, which entered China via the intellectuals who seek theoretical inspiration from, and discursive synchronization with, the West, and which is largely limited to small circles of literary and art criticism”—from “Chinese postmodernism”—which “pertains to Chinese everyday life as a producer of a culture of the postmodern,” in opposition to “economic, bureaucratic, and social rationalization.” As mentioned, Zhang numbers among those intellectuals who are eager to describe and define that democratic “everyday life,” maybe not so much on its own terms but on the terms of the “global discourse of postmodernism and postmodernity.” He divides his discussion into “four steps”: the “stylistic features of Chinese postmodernism”; the shift from modernism to postmodernism; the “political stakes” involved in the debates resulting from that shift; and the achievement of “a historical understanding of Chinese postmodernism as the cultural logic of a postsocialist society.” Notice that ‘postmodern’ historicism adds to the Marxist dialectical logic of socioeconomic class conflict a “cultural logic” that emphasizes art criticism of a certain kind as a supplement to, even a partial displacement of, the social ‘sciences.’ How logical will “cultural logic” turn out to be?

    Regarding the “style” of Chinese postmodernism, Zhang nods to his teacher, Fredric Jameson, who links postmodernism to “consumer society.” Jameson is well known in American lit-crit circles for his attempt to understand literature as a means of encoding political and social commands and demands; in this, he led the charge in American New Left discourse as it held up ‘the young Marx’—the more Hegelian/’idealistic’ Marx—against the mature Marx who propounded ‘scientific socialism’ and spawned what was, by the 1960s, the ‘old’ Left lumbering toward its international extinction in the next generation. “Postmodernism is seen by its Chinese students as primarily a sociohistorical change articulated culturally.” That is, the cultural “logic” the course of social events, although that course may not be described fully by Marxian dialectic, which would give the enterprise a bit more rationalism than ‘postmoderns’ like. Be this as it may, in China ‘postmodernity’ features the undermining of high modernism by mass culture and the nation’s “rapid economic growth, its decidedly mixed modes of production, and its incomplete but intensifying integration into the global capitalist market.” The situation is complex, not only because socialism and capitalism have renewed their rivalry in post-Mao China but because “truly ‘premodern’ elements in Chinese society” haven’t gone away: “poverty, ignorance, superstition, chaos, repression, and the backlash of the ultraconservative” (by which Zhang means Confucianism). “To see how China receives postmodernism one has to show how China produces it”; Chinese postmodernity is “an admittedly unfinished project but one whose legitimacy, validity, and universal claims have already, for better or for worse, come under fire.” 

    As in Europe and America, where the “high modernism of James Joyce, Le Corbusier, Vassily Kandinsky, etc.” was challenged by the cultural-political revolution typified by ‘May ’68’ in France, ‘Nineties China saw a similar ‘democratization’ or vulgarization, sometimes by “a journalistic genre designed for quick media exposure and consumer gratification,” sometimes by an attempt to establish a Western-style academia, complete with scholarly production and regularized promotion. Zhang argues that since ‘history’ (conceived as the course of events) accelerates with democratization, shifting with popular sentiments, an analytical approach emphasizing quick construction of cultural products and their equally quick critical deconstruction will track the permutations of Chinese society better than more traditional scholarly practices, such as ‘comparative literature,’ which requires stable bodies of work to compare and contrast with one another. At least as pertinently for his purposes, ‘postmodernism’ “may carry a revolutionary message in an era when October-style revolutions”—efforts of the ‘old’ Left—now “seem all but impossible and undesirable,” given the massive power of the oligarchic surveillance state. ‘Postmodernism’ and it alone “points to a horizon beyond socialism as we know it.” Before the Maoist regime was founded in 1949, “revolution, socialism, and mass democracy” served as the Marxist “negation of the bourgeois project of industrialization and nation building”; Deng’s “New Era” pragmatism was “a negation of the Maoist paradigm by means of Weberian rationalization,” leading “logically to a market economy under the supervision of the bureaucratic state.” Chinese postmodernism now aspires to be the negation of the negation, as Marxists like to say, thanks to the wedding of the ‘young Marx’ to a democratized Nietzscheism. It “historicizes the ideological and simplistic opposition between socialist modernity and its bourgeois or counterrevolutionary alternative” by ‘deconstructing’—”reveal[ing] and destabiliz[ing]”—the “ideological assumptions embedded in the premodern-modern order around which the foundational discourse of modern China evolves.” This, Zhang hopes, will “break the Eurocentric grip on the notion of the modern, which makes it possible for non-Europeans to imagine a native or modern in which one feels both contemporary and at home,” protected from the “ruthless force of global standardization” and defending a worldwide (but not universalistic) pluralism. It is of course a question whether relativism holds up against ‘local’ cultures such as those seen in Muslim countries or indeed in China, neither of which seems any less expansionist in ambition than the United States of today or the Europe of yesterday. ‘Clash of civilizations,’ indeed. Zhang wants ‘postmodernism’ to subvert globalism, the clash of civilizations it engenders, and the contemporary Chinese statism which purports to face off against globalism and foreign civilizations. Waxing eloquent, he avers, “One could argue that it is only amid the postmodern, postsocialist ruins or prosperity (depending on one’s perspective) that Mao’s China obtains its afterlife as an epic monument, an empire with all its sublime grandeur.”

    This suggests that what Zhang calls the “political stakes” entailed in the struggle of Chinese postmodernism might be substantial. Chinese post-modernism “can only be experienced and measured against the established, dominant institutions” of the Chinese regime. Like modernism, postmodernism consists of “an endless and sometimes self-defeating struggle to become and remain the ever new”; like modernism, “postmodernism encompasses radically different social ideals and political ideologies”; “unlike modernism, however, postmodernism does not see everything as cosmologically, heroically new; rather, its concept of newness or creation hinges on a sophisticated, almost cynical sense that all good and evil, in their most extreme forms, have been somewhere, somehow, and sometimes before, tried, and what is left for contemporary men and women is nothing more than shrewd and occasionally breathtaking eclecticism, synthesis, reproduction, and representation.” Postmodernism takes ‘history’ to be “fundamentally cyclical,” not progressive. Zhang suspects that even if ‘postmodern’ egalitarians prevail in China against “the Old Left and the New Right” (the latter being the neoliberals), “new power elites in new national and international class reconfigurations” may result. This is a welcome touch of sobriety, although one might regret that it took the detour of ‘postmodernism’ to arrive at it. 

    One might regret this because it’s obvious that ‘postmodernism’ will prove a feeble weapon against something like the Chinese regime. The “core assumption” of ‘postmodernism’ is “that politics, ideology, human experience, and history itself no longer matter, indeed, no longer exist, an assumption which underscores the rise of a variety of postmodern cultural identity (of ethnic or sexual varieties), or academic politics, often in the void of classically political categories such as class and nation.” Not surprisingly, Chinese nationalism “attacks postmodernism as a discourse of phantasmagoria,” while ‘postmodernists’ attempt to undermine the regime with the denial that realist epistemology has validity. An epistemological realist will refute these latter-day Berkeleys in much the same way as Dr. Johnson did, although in this case the stone they kick may be aimed at the shins of ‘postmodernists.’ Deconstruct that.

    Zhang contends that Chinese postsocialism and Chinese postmodernism go together. A ‘money’ economy enhances ‘postmodernity’ because “money is a great equalizer which unifies an uneven socio-economic terrain.” When the new economy collides and entwines with China’s “residual socialism” it “keep[s] Chinese society in a permanent state of economic mobilization and ideological agitation,” with the “frustrations, fears, resentments” of “the rising consumer masses,” their “newly achieved freedoms and sense of power, their obsessions with the here and now, as well as their need for a new collective identity and social ideal” all percolating amidst “a dazzling variety of modes of production, social structures, political lexicons, ideological courses, and value systems.” This should provide “conditions of possibility for Chinese postmodernism,” he hopes, by suggesting that socialism can be “understood as an ongoing historical experiment” rather than a fixed concept in support of a fixed institutional system. Zhang cites the Chinese scholar Cui Zhiyuan’s “call for ‘intellectual liberation’ and critique of ‘institutional fetishism'” as way forward toward the construction of “a collective, cooperative model of economic development” with special emphasis on the much-neglected and indeed much-abused rural population. Zhiyuan envisions an economics and a politics of fluidity instead of institutionalism, a sort of historicist Heracliteanism. This, Zhang bravely insists, comports with “the Chinese economy and everyday life” of today, which “have already outgrown the bureaucratic control and ideological tutelage of the Reform regime, whose popular support if not political legitimacy was damaged by the tragedy of Tiananmen in 1989.” What is needed is “a new theory for a new social system, a new democracy, and a new cultural-intellectual program.” Zhang deplores any “rigid understanding of Maoism as a utopian totalitarianism,” insisting that it too can be deployed ‘postmodernly,’ as in its simultaneous legitimation and distortion “during the commercial Mao craze of the early 1990s,” wherein Mao’s image became a popular imprint on merchandise. The real Mao was a mass-murdering tyrant, but the magic wand of postmodernism can deconstruct and reconstruct him as the fairy godfather of a future Chinese democracy.

    Good luck with that.

    Given his ‘postmodernist’ predilections, it makes sense that Zhang turns away from politics (recall that it no longer exists) to contemporary Chinese literature and film. He begins with the fiction of Wang Anyi, who sets her plots in Shanghai. Prior to World War II, Shanghai was China’s most cosmopolitan city, ‘the Paris of Asia,’ “the epitome of Chinese urban modernity.” Since then, the Maoist revolution has come and gone, and in Wang’s account the city now “threaten[s] to outsmart and outlive its peasant conquerors and the brutal system they imposed on it.” She nonetheless retains the Marxist framework of “class analysis,” as “Shanghai residents remain deeply embedded in consumerism and nostalgia for a consumer’s life-world despite Shanghai’s metamorphosis from a city of urban middle-class consumers to one of producers and from a cultural to a political center.” Shanghai’s “anticollective, apolitical” sensibility can find no resources in a pre-modern past, having “no significant past or memory prior to its founding as a treaty port, an event marking the global expansion of capitalism and colonialism in the nineteenth century.” Shanghai residents have long associated “the rest of the country with darkness, backwardness, and chaos,” even as residents of the rest of the country think of Shanghai as the place where the mercantile “foreign devils” were allowed well-contained access to China. Pre-Mao, the city regime “was made and reinforced by a self-governing, self-regulating city council that consisted of wealthy, predominantly foreign taxpayers who took full advantage of the power vacuum of the semicolon and wasted no time in creating a petit État dans l’État.” The regime and those it governed thought of Shanghai “as a dynamic vanguard of history, an island of civilization, and the ultimate embodiment of the true present of modernity,” set “to forcibly yank China… out of the vicious cycle of tradition.” The Maoist defined the vanguard of history rather differently; they won, but not simply and not permanently. 

    Zhang takes Wang’s fiction itself as a sort of vanguard. In her “allegories of Shanghai one will not find any utopian gesture of redemption”—as one finds in partisans of capitalism and communism alike—and “not even a guarded optimism for a rising everyday sphere in a China that may be well on its way to creating a new urban and political culture precisely by incorporating a reinvented past into the undefined present.” Firmly anti-utopian, she holds herself open to the way in which the present may define itself in the future, so long as China resists the too-rigid over-defining ideologies of the past, and their sometimes brutal practices. ‘Postmodern,’ indeed. In his discussion of Shanghai’s ‘minor literature’ of the ‘Nineties, Zhang leans heavily on such ‘postmodernists’ as Raymond Williams, Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno, claiming that “Shanghai may be a privileged site to witness the central dilemma of modernity,” defined by those writers as “a historical process which enlightens by mythologizing,” sweeping aside previous mythologies while producing its own “intricate network of signs, images, and narratives.” Modernity contradicts itself, not merely in the dialectics of class struggle, as Marxists say, but in language, symbols, sentiments. Modernity’s constant change, seen in Shanghai, frustrates hierarchies: “None is exhausted or ready to settle, which hints at the beginning of a long existence whose meaning must be read against and redeemed from all the chaos and meaninglessness of the now.” 

    What might that meaning be? Zhang turns to ‘Nineties filmmakers for suggestions. He selects several that “share the postrevolutionary assumption and seek to deconstruct the ‘grand narrative’ of social revolution and idealism by constructing a counternarrative of national trauma and traumatized individual life.” As not only post-revolutionary but post-Tiananmen films, films made after the regime halted its apparent liberalization of the ‘Eighties stopped, they also register “the end of the so-called New Era and all its popular and intellectual euphoria about modernity, progress, and subjectivity.” The regime’s crackdown on dissent “was viewed by liberals inside and outside China as moving against the global wind of change which completed the destruction of the Soviet Empire”; therefore, “the Chinese situation was and must be viewed as a shocking and painful anomaly,” as Chinese liberals went down to “disastrous defeat” and attempted to recover through “renewed association with international ideological and symbolic orders.” 

    For their part, filmmakers sought “an authentic experience of time and history, an ontological meaning of existence amid change (or no change).” But “as long as the Chinese government is constantly on guard against ‘peaceful evolution’—a code word for subverting the socialist system in China through internal mutation—’liberal intellectuals’ in China remain prime suspects of a ‘fifth column’ in the eyes of an ideologically besieged state.” The regime “now grounds its legitimacy solely and defensively on economic growth, social rationalization, and its own monopolistic role in order maintenance”—in sum, “growth without democracy” or “market socialism,” a strategy which Zhang supposes has been “forced” upon the regime because it is “compet[ing] with international capitalism on the latter’s terrain.” In the ‘Nineties, “the socialist state [took] the lead in a massive integration with global capitalism,” he writes, although a generation later it has become obvious that “integration” was the beginning of a play for dominance. But Zhang could see that “the twin forces of commodification and state intervention [were] closing up a real or imagined public sphere which once existed for the liberal intellectuals of the New Era,” who turned to “neo-Sinology and neo-Confucianism” in “an eternal Quixotic battle against totalitarian repression.” 

    Zhang prefers the filmmakers’ strategy, which comports with his ‘postmodernist’ sensibilities. In Tian Zhuangzhuang’s The Blue Kite, three episodes in the film correspond to moments of recent Chinese history: Mao’s 1957 purge of intellectuals; the “Natural Disaster, code word for the massive famine resulting from the Great Leap Forward,” the Second Five Year Plan imposed by the Maoist regime between 1958 and 1962; and the Cultural Revolution of the late ‘Sixties. Tian presents each of these events “in a way irreconcilable with orthodox historiography,” deconstruction “the myth of national history” by “accounting for the traumatic experience of innocent individuals.” Titling his three episodes “Father,” “Uncle,” and “Stepfather,” Tian hopes to overcome “the oppressive nature of fatherhood”—under Chairman Mao it was Saturnine—with “the youthful power authorized by a higher authority, namely the Father or the Name of the Father, which solely determines the meaning of history.” But despite the presence of this Father of fathers, what makes The Blue Kite a compelling film is the fact that it offers no ready catharsis, no instant relief, no psychological drama or cultural exoticism which channels shock to its articulation in the world of commodities.” In this, Tian captures the way in which Chinese postmodernism reversed the teaching of Maoist Marxism by using a Maoist-Marxist technique. He shows the contrast between the old and the new, as the Maoists did, but “for opposite ideological and political effects.” “In reading the cinematic rewriting of the national history of modern China, we can argue that the trauma of modern China is not so much the ennui of history, nor even the melancholy of revolution and modernity, but, rather, the anxiety that history has not yet truly begun,” that the true intentions of the true Father have yet to be revealed. Although Zhang doesn’t mention it, one should notice that many Chinese of the next generation would establish underground Christian churches consisting of persons who hold that the true Father has indeed revealed Himself. Whether Tian may share this conviction is impossible to say; he does show why it might find ready listeners in contemporary China.

    Zhang devotes his main interpretive energies to The Story of Qiu Ju by the well-known filmmaker Zhang Yimou. This film, and Zhang Yimou’s films generally, demand to be ‘read’ on their own terms, resisting ‘deconstruction.’ Xudong Zhang nonetheless determines to soldier on, intending to interpret the film in accordance with the (‘postmodernist’) “logic of historical analysis.” He will make The Story of Qiu Ju a reflection of “the emergent mainstream ideology of the everyday world framed by Chinese society’s massive transition into the market system guided by an authoritarian party-state.” “It is precisely the fantastic absolutism, demonstrated in both the planners of socialist modernity and the visionaries of global capitalist homogeneity, that is cast in doubt by Zhang Yimou’s films about the commoners in the postsocialist Chinese everyday world.”

    As in The Blue Kite, in The Story of Qiu Ju the filmmaker insists that there is something more than the existing Chinese regime and its ‘laws’ (such as they are). There is “something prior to” these laws, to any laws, and even to the regime, to any regime. Qiu Ju is a young woman seeking justice in the broader sense, and the film narrates “the comic ways by which a simple-minded peasant woman” persistently misunderstands the Chinese legal system, “missing its point in the same way as she keeps getting lost in the modern big city.” 

    “The keywords in the film are ‘justice’ and ‘apology,’ two things Qiu Ju is so determined to obtain and around which the film narrative unfolds.” The two English words translate the same Chinese word, shuofa. “Shuofa means the way things are discussed, talked about, and eventually, understood and accepted without coercion”—more, “the way things are must be accepted by those to whom it is explained; the politicolegal order must rest on a tacit agreement,” on what Americans would call the consent of the governed, reasonable assent. But Qiu Ju doesn’t seek justice in the American or Western sense, either; she seeks not “an abstract general law” that applies “to all equally and indifferently,” but for a way to make sense of things, a way of “ensur[ing] the coherence and integrity of the world of meaning and value, of understanding and, indeed of being. She is there not so much to litigate as to heal, above all her own peace of mind.” Her husband had gotten into a fight with the village chief over the hazy property rights that prevail in rural China, “a gray area between the government and the written law, on one hand, and peasant culture, everyday practice, and the plebian sense of right and wrong” that persists despite the Communist regime’s assiduous efforts to erase it. The dispute had escalated into a (mis)perceived challenge to the reputation, the ‘face,’ of the chief, who kicked Qiu Ju and (it eventually transpires) broke one of his ribs. Despite being in the third trimester of pregnancy, Qiu Ju embarks on her quest.

    The film thus “runs against the grain of the notion of ‘rule of law’ introduced by the modernizing state for its political legitimacy, but whose philosophical justification lies historically in the bourgeois pursuit of indifferent abstract generality,” a “generality based on exchange-value and the universal individual as the social figure of property rights.” It equally challenges the regime that has been flirting with such a conception of rights. As Qiu Ju stubbornly works her way up the legal-administrative Chinese food chain, she exhibits something like “a peasant’s belief in the good and benevolent emperor,” to whom she feels entitled to appeal, as per the practice of classical imperial China. And indeed under Mao, the “notion of mass democracy and proletarian dictatorship” hovered “above the law.” Qiu Ju “seeks the rule of law at the highest level of government, that is, the realm of the sovereign, which is, by definition outside and above the law but defines its moral-political constitution.” 

    There are three reasons “why Qiu Ju’s repeated trips are doomed to fail.” “First, the peasant fails the state by not understanding its efforts to modernize its legal system, which alone protects the peasant’s rights.” That is, even insofar as the post-Maoist Chinese state really does attempt to protect property rights, the peasant whose rights it seeks to protects doesn’t understand what it’s trying to do. Second, “the state fails the peasantry by not understanding their inarticulate moral and political codes that constitute and underscore any real, substantial order.” It doesn’t know what it would take to win the consent of the peasants. Third, “Qiu Ju’s quest for justice is bound to fail because a general, indifferent, legalistic justice is not what she wants and does not solve her problem, and yet it is all that the modern rational social and state organization has to offer.” The drama of the film consists a sort of dialectical examination of shuofa. Starting “with a question regarding the law, in terms of a perceived injustice,” it moves to “a persistent demand for an explanation,” but culminates in “a commentary, a reflection on law and its limits.” “The difficulty the heroine encounters in this film is not so much the difficulty of the legal order understood as an abstract and general norm, but the value system of everyday life in contemporary China struggling with its own fundamental and political self-understanding.” 

    Whereas the most obvious conflict the film portrays consists of the confrontation between “the unwritten moral-ethical codes of the peasantry tinged with the political legacy of Chinese socialism”—including “but not limited to conventional rubrics such as ‘popular habit,’ ‘social custom,’ ‘natural right,’ or ‘tradition'”—and “modern rationality” instantiated in “the bureaucratic-legalistic machinery of the modernizing state” as it “tries to show itself in abstract yet specific, impersonal, yet socially ‘responsible’ terms,” the genuine healing, “the solution in real ethical and moral senses, is attainable only within the parameters of village life.” There, neither habit nor custom nor tradition but nature prevails, as Qiu Ju goes into labor on New Year’s Eve. The village chief intervenes and gets her to the hospital, saving her life and the life of her boy. “For the village chief, that is merely the right thing to do as a fellow and elderly village,” quite apart from his dispute with Qiu Ju and her husband. In the village, conventional behavior looks to nature as its guide. In the final comic twist, as a gesture of reconciliation the family invites the chief to the traditional party celebrating the one-month anniversary of the child’s birth, but he’s nowhere to be found. Belatedly, the legal system has caught up with him, arresting and imprisoning him for a short period as punishment for his assault. Tellingly, the regime’s verdict isn’t too little, too late but too late and no longer necessary.

    “The film situates its dramatic intensity squarely in the structural gap between the legal and the political,” and especially the political understood as “judgment based on a particular form of life,” justified and defended with “moral courage and assertiveness.” This “invisible and inarticulate framework is prior to the legal and the legalistic order, yet it constitutes the very foundation of the latter,” the consent of the governed based not on “justice done in legalistic terms” but “‘right-and-wrong’ in terms of ‘natural right’ rooted in the singularity (not generality) of a peasant community,” a form of right or justice that governs the peasants’ “world of everyday life and informs their moral and political behavior.”

    Here is where Zhang seizes the opportunity to extract a socialist-‘postmodern’ lesson from what is quite evidently a pre-modern understanding of right. Qiu Ju “is still not happy at the end of the film”—she had reconciled with the village chief, no longer wanted him punished—but “that is not a problem” because “as long as the subject here is not a bourgeois individual but something embedded in and constituted by a collective,” the problem disappears. The right to life of the individual person, the right to the individual’s liberty, the right of the individual to his property and to pursue happiness—none of these matter in a tight-knit village community. And how could the world of the peasant village somehow overcome the impersonal power of the modern state and become the world of some post-post-socialist society? “The subversion of the Kantian notion of law and the Hegelian notion of mediation”—the philosophic preludes to Marxism and ‘progressive’ contemporary liberalism alike—may “thus open up a theoretical vista for the imagination of a revolutionary form of collectivity which unites the universal and the singular in the contemporary context of capitalist globality and its discontent”—the “possibility of the impossible.”

    Or not. Zhang’s ‘postmodern’ politics does indeed recall the communitarianism of the American New Left of the ‘Sixties, when the first wave of American ‘postmodernism’ gathered the strength it took to flood the schools with its doctrines of anti-statist and utopian egalitarianism. More interesting is his recognition of the interplay between natural right (without the scare quotes) and convention. This recognition eventually led him to political philosophy as understood by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and to such commentators on that philosophy by Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss. 

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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