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    What Shakespeare Means to Say, When He Says, “As You Like It”

    April 18, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: As You Like It.

     

    Note: This play was performed as part of the Michigan Shakespeare Festival at the Potter Center, Jackson, Michigan, in July 2016. The play was “adapted and directed” by Robert Kauzlaric, but the text discussed here is the standard version. 

     

    In the orchard at Oliver’s house, his younger brother, Orlando, converses with his elderly servant, Adam. If Adam’s name suggests the original ‘Vetus Homo,’ and an orchard suggests fruit, we might take this to be a new Eden. It isn’t—or if it is, the Serpent rules it.

    Orlando’s late father, Sir Rowland de Boys, provided for him in his will. The lad is to receive either a gentleman’s education or one thousand crowns. So far, he has received neither. Although Oliver has sent the middle brother, Jaques, away to a school that befits a gentleman, he keeps his youngest brother “rustically at home” (I.i.6-7)—rustically, because without an education he might as well be a bumpkin. Or worse: Orlando likens himself to an ox in a stall; his brother’s “horses are bred better” (I.i.9-10). Instead of the good breeding of a gentleman, Orlando receives poorer breeding than an animal. Oliver undermines “my gentility with my education” (I.i.18-19)—which is no education at all—and thus “bars me the place of a brother” (I.i.17-18). That is, Orlando is by nature his brother, sharing the same father, but unnatural in his refusal to treat him in a brotherly way; in so refusing, he disables Orlando from achieving his mature nature through education. He also disqualifies him from his rightful place in the gentry class by means of the same bar. Oliver violates his brother’s nature not only as a brother but as a human being, treating the youth as if he were an animal, ineducable—training him for a life of servility, the life of a beast of burden, unfit to join his brothers and other gentlemen as a ruler.

    But that isn’t his nature at all. “The spirit of my father, which I think is within me, begins to mutiny against my servitude” (I.i.20-21). The thumotic character of the natural, and not merely conventional, aristocrat, stirs in his soul. A human ox would be a beast ruled by his appetites, what Aristotle calls a natural slave. Orlando begins to be ruled by his spiritedness. What he lacks, so far, is the development of the naturally ruling element of his soul, his reason, stunted by his lack of education and perhaps his lack of experience, both of which could hone his innate capacity for phronesis. Hence, he laments, he can find “no wise remedy” for correcting his servitude (I.i.22). As yet, he can only chafe against it. But he has enough self-knowledge to appreciate his own nature, both its strengths and its (current) limitations.

    Sir Rowland de Boys surely intended to exercise his own prudential wisdom in preparing his will, providing for his sons. He rightly judged that his eldest son would treat Jaques well. He wrongly judged that he would treat Orlando well. Does this suggest the limits of prudential wisdom, or merely the limits of Sir Rowland’s prudential wisdom? Why does Oliver tyrannize over his father’s youngest son?

    Oliver enters the garden. Orlando complains of his treatment. He argues as follows: Oliver violates both convention and nature. “Courtesy”—the customs of the aristocracy, worldwide—require the younger brother to defer to the eldest, the first-born (I.i.42); by the same courtesy, the same courtly, ruling, convention, the older brother owes the younger brotherly treatment. Orlando demands that he be given a gentleman’s education or the thousand crowns their father willed him. He then goes further, arguing not only from convention but from nature: “I have as much of my father’s blood in me as you” (I.i.44-45). By order of birth (one sort of nature, but a sort determined by fortune), I am your inferior, but by a more fundamental order of nature I am your equal. 

    This latter claim infuriates his brother, and he strikes Orlando. They fight; Adam intervenes, asking them to remember their father, just as Orlando had remembered their father’s will. If Orlando shows himself a natural aristocrat in the spiritedness he shares with his father, Oliver shows that spiritedness perverted into tyranny. Oliver proves this by calling old Adam a dog; the tyrant in his anger seeks not to establish proper subordination in accordance to courtesy, the rules of which he should have learned in the course of his own gentleman’s education, but to abase his brother and his father’s longtime servant, now his own servant, whose name means ‘Man,’ to the level of animals. Hegel would say that slave-Orlando has engaged in a struggle for recognition with his master-brother. No optimist who supposes the laws of something called History will dictate the slave’s vindication in the eyes of the master, Shakespeare has the struggle issue only in a redoubling of the master’s attempt to secure his tyranny. Unable to subdue his brother by abuse of convention, unable to subdue him in animal-level natural combat, Oliver will now seek to use his ‘practical reason’ not wisely but cunningly—and murderously. And it may well be that Oliver’s apparently unreasoning rage against his younger brother erupts from an underlying fear, the cause of which isn’t hard to see.

    For it transpires that a parallel but also different circumstance exists in the larger dukedom where Oliver’s house stands. Duke Frederick has usurped the office of his brother, Duke Senior; in this case, the younger brother has rebelled successfully against the legitimate elder. Oliver may be terrified that the same thing will happen to him. Fortune has sent Oliver a man named Charles, a wrestler employed by the usurper duke. Oliver asks Charles for news of the new court, the new regime. He learns that several loyal lords of the dukedom have joined Duke Senior in exile; Frederick let them go, as this gave him what he takes to have been the good fortune of adding their lands to the holdings he had previously seized. Duke Senior’s daughter, Rosalind, has stayed behind in Frederick’s household because Frederick’s daughter, Celia, raised alongside her from infancy, doesn’t want to part from her. Oliver asks Charles about Rosalind; since young men seldom inquire after young ladies for no purpose, one may be confident that he has taken an interest in her.

    Duke Senior has retreated to the Forest of Arden, which means Forest of Love—another intimation of Eden. But this Eden is no apolitical society consisting of a man and a woman. Although Charles does liken Arden to “the golden world” (I.i.111), it has a decidedly political and even potentially military cast. “Many young gentlemen flee to him every day” (I.i.109-10); supposedly attracted to the ‘careless’ forest itself, the gathering reminds Charles of Robin Hood and his merry men—not merely esprits libres but outlaws who might someday threaten the unjust regime from which they have exiled themselves, under the command of the exiled duke. Frederick has cause to worry.

    Charles has come to tell Oliver that Orlando intends to come into Frederick’s presence tomorrow, to wrestle the Duke’s champion. That is, Orlando, without prospects in his brother’s household regime, seeks to make his fortune at the higher level of the dukedom. Charles doesn’t want to hurt the lad, whom he has every reason to suppose is taking a foolish risk. He asks Oliver to stop him; “for your love, I would be loath to foil him” (I.i.120-21). Not at all, Oliver replies. Probably lying, he says he knew about his brother’s intention, and “labored to dissuade him from it” (I.i.130). But the lad “is the stubbornest young fellow of France” (I.i.131-32) and “a villainous contriver against me his natural brother” (I.i.134). Therefore, “I had as lief thou disdst break his neck as his finger.” (I.i.135-36). Appealing to the wrestler’s fear, he suggests that it’s kill or be killed: If Orlando can’t win the match, he’ll find some way to poison Charles; the conniving youth will never leave “till he hath ta’en thy life by some indirect means or other,” for “there is not one so young and so villainous this day living” (I.i.140-42). “I speak but brotherly of him” (I.i.143)—that is, I know him for what he really is, I know his true nature. Far from speaking brotherly of Orlando in the fraternal sense of the word, Oliver conceives of his brother’s nature as if his brother were already dead: “Should I anatomize him to thee as he is, I must blush and weep, and thou must look pale and wonder” (I.i.143-45). Blush, because his gentleman’s honor is shamed in having such a creature for a brother; weep, because I myself am a man of compassion, even for irredeemably evil souls. You, Charles, must be pale, fearful, and wondrous, uncomprehending at such a monster. It would not occur to Oliver that a man might be courageous and animated by the love of wisdom, the wonder that can lead to philosophy. Instead of rewarding his brother with the courtly recognition he deserves, Oliver sends an assassin to murder a man he couldn’t beat.

    Charles leaves, and Oliver soliloquizes: “My soul, I know not why, hates nothing more than he,” Orlando (I.i.151-53). Oliver lacks self-knowledge, but at least seems to know that he does not know. This would be a promising state of soul, this knowing what’s unknown. But he does know. Orlando is esteemed among “my own people” (I.i.156). That being so, he poses a threat; aristocracy, rule of the many by the few, must always concern itself with the many; unorganized, they posed no threat, but organized under the rule of another aristocrat and they will ruin you. Orlando might prove another Frederick, another usurper, although in this case his ‘usurpation’ would be just by nature, if not by convention, given Oliver’s tyranny, which will not stop at murder to preserve itself. Rulers set examples for citizens and subjects; the example Duke Frederick has set makes even a legitimate older brother suspicious of his younger one.  

    Friends and cousins Rosalind and Celia meet not in an orchard but a lawn in front of Duke Frederick’s house. A lawn isn’t fruitful; it is a place for play, for the friendship family members should enjoy. Rosalind is too melancholy to be playful, despite Celia’s coaxing. Like Orlando, she is remembering her father. Celia criticizes her for loving her less than she loves Rosalind. If I were in your place, she says, I would have learned to love Duke Frederick as a new father. The argument fails, first because Frederick has done unjust injury to Rosalind’s father, and because Rosalind’s father is worthy of his daughter’s love. Were Celia in Rosalind’s place, she might be able to love her ‘new’ father if he were Rosalind’s father, the good Duke Senior, but could she love her ‘new’ father if he were her real father, the bad Duke Frederick? Indeed, will she love her real father if he puts her love to the test, now?

    The Duke’s fool, Touchstone, arrives with a message from Frederick, summoning Celia to him. The resulting badinage reflects the political circumstance of the dukedom under her father’s rule. When Celia tells him that he may be whipped some day for the annoyance he causes, the fool replies, “The more pity that fools may not speak wisely what wise men do foolishly” (I.ii.80-81). In his usurpation, worldly-wise Frederick has been not only unjust but imprudent. Celia replies, “By my troth, thou sayest true; for since the little wit that fools have was silenced, the little foolery that wise men have makes a great show” (I.ii.82-84). The dukedom’s right order has been upended because practical or prudential wisdom has deserted the souls of its ruler.

    A courtier of Frederick’s arrives, bearing more news. Charles has defeated three men, breaking their bones in the matches. And now another match will occur, here on the lawn: Charles versus Orlando. When the entourage appears, the ladies attempt to persuade the handsome young man not to wrestle, Celia saying he does not know himself—”your spirits are too bold for your years” (I.ii.156-57), causing your reason to fail to judge rightly. Rosalind joins in saying that his honor, his “reputation,” will not be injured if he withdraws from the contest to “embrace your own safety” (I.ii.162). This is no foolish assessment, as Orlando himself knows the limitations of his wisdom. But what has he to lose? “Punish me not with your hard thoughts” (I.ii.167-68) but “let your fair eyes and gentle wishes go with me to my trial” (I.ii.169-70). “If kill’d, but one dead that is willing to be so. I shall do my friends no wrong, for I have none to lament me; the world no injury, for in it I have nothing; only in the world I fill up a place, which may be better supplied when I have made it empty” (I.ii.170-73) Rosalind’s melancholy, heartfelt, faithful lament, the melancholy of words, meets Orlando’s melancholy of action. “Pray heaven I be deceiv’d in you!” (I.ii.180). As he locks up with Charles, she thinks him an “excellent young man” (I.ii.195). She loves him for his mood, which matches hers, and for his excellence, his courage—which, in her own way, she will match. 

    To the astonishment of all, Orlando proves more than a match for Charles. He knocks the bragging speech out of the Milo gloriosus, who is ignominiously carted off, unconscious. But when Frederick asks his name, curiosity and new respect turn sour. Sir Rowland de Boys was esteemed honorable by “the world,” but “I did find him still mine enemy” (I.ii.206-07). You are a gallant youth, but your lineage is wrong; to Frederick, a man’s innate nature is as nothing compared to a man’s nature-by-fortune. This, despite his own willingness to overturn the rank of nature-by-fortune by betraying his elder brother, usurping his dukedom. He leaves.

    Orlando avers that he is “more proud to be Sir Rowland’s son” than “to be adopted heir to Frederick”(I.ii.213-15)—perhaps thereby revealing his intention in challenging Charles at the duke’s court. To Rosalind, however, his lineage confirms his excellence: “My father lov’d Sir Rowland as his soul, / And all the world was of my father’s mind” (I.ii.216-17) As for Celia, her eyes are opened, too. “My father’s rough and envious disposition / Sticks me at heart” (I.ii.222-23 “Your mistress shall be happy,” sir, “if you keep your promises in love / But justly as you have exceeded all promise” today (I.ii.224-26).

    When Rosalind gives him a chain from her neck (“Wear this for me,” as I too “am out of suits with fortune” [(I.ii.227]), Orlando is felled almost as soundly as he felled the wrestler. As the ladies walk away, he can speak only to himself, telling himself he cannot speak to them, as “my better parts / Are all thrown down” (I.ii.230-31) even as she for her part walks back to say, “You have overthrown more than your enemies” (I.ii.235-36). His better parts are his courage and his human ability to speak to others. “O poor Orlando,” he tells himself, watching them depart for a second time, “thou art overthrown” by your “passion,” which “hangs these weights upon my tongue,” preventing the reason which no longer rules him from forming so much as a word to say (I.ii.238-40).

    Frederick’s attendant, Le Beau (“The Beautiful”), returns to the scene to make a handsome gesture in reasoned speech. “I do in friendship counsel you / To leave this place,” as the Duke “misconstrues all that you have done” (I.ii.242-46) and also now “hath ta’en displeasure ‘gainst his gentle niece,” Rosalind (I.ii.259). Le Beau adds that “Hereafter, in a better world than this, / I shall desire more love and knowledge of you” (I.ii.265-66). He is likely thinking of Heaven, but one tyrant doesn’t necessarily make a world—even this world.

    Alone, Orlando reflects on needing to return “from tyrant Duke unto a tyrant brother” (I.ii.269). Like Le Beau, he thinks of Heaven, or more precisely a glimpse of it on earth, “heavenly Rosalind!” (I.ii.270). Rosalind, indeed: hated, as he and his father’s memory are, by the tyrant Duke, and now loved by himself and, in all likelihood, his tyrant brother.

    In the Duke’s palace, to which they have withdrawn, the ladies deliberate. “O, how full of briers is this working-day world!” (I.iii.10-11). Rosalind begins. With “his eyes full of anger” (I.iii.36), as Celia describes them, the Duke enters, calling Rosalind a traitor and exiling her under penalty of death if she refuses to remove herself from his court. Why? “I trust thee not” (I.iii.51). Recalling her long residence at the palace and her long friendship with his daughter, Rosalind replies, “Your mistrust cannot make me a traitor” (I.iii.52). Frederick then shifts from ‘subjectivity’ to ‘objectivity’: “Thou art thy father’s daughter” (I.iii.54). When Celia defends her, the Duke exposes his real thought. The people of the dukedom sympathize with Rosalind. You, Celia, “art a fool” for trusting her (I.iii.76). You will “show more bright and seem more virtuous when she is gone” (I.iii.76-78). Without the daughter of the exiled former Duke in the dukedom, a perpetual reminder of the deposed man’s virtues, the lesser but real virtues of his daughter will serve to reflect well on himself. The people will no longer incline in the favor of the deposed aristocrat, and will then incline in the favor of the new one, securing his authority. ‘As you like it,’ indeed. Like Oliver, Frederick misuses his reason, making it into calculation, which he mistakes for prudential wisdom.

    Two who do not like it are the faithful friends. Rosalind will go into exile, but where? The Forest of Arden is far away, and between the dukedom and the forest many dangers menace a traveling lady. Celia chooses true friendship over a false, unfatherly, father. She will go into exile with her friend. Rosalind has her own counterplot, a prudential plan to answer the Frederick’s calculated policy. As she is tall, she will disguise herself as a man in order to intimidate would-be thieves. They agree to bring Touchstone with them, as they find him to be the touchstone (or perhaps whet-stone) to their wits and “a comfort to our travel” (I.iii.127)—providing entertainment and perhaps at least a modicum of manly protection, however unimpressive. [1] Celia says they go “to liberty, and not to banishment” (I.iii.134) and (sensible lady that she is), they’ll bring their “jewels and our wealth” with them (I.iii.130).

    With the conclusion of the First Act, Shakespeare’s audience can conclude two things about the “you” in the play’s title. They know that they are the “you” who are promised a play they will like. ‘The few’—in this case the playwrights—know that they must please the many playgoers, if they are to continue writing plays for a livelihood. The people also may suspect that “you” means the people in a political community, who hold the balance of power by consenting to the rule of those whom they deem legitimate, authoritative. Some rulers will attempt to wipe out their consent by making them fearful, but such rulers themselves are fearful—of them, and of rivals of ruling status and character, whose very virtues make them the more dangerous to tyrants and more appealing to the people. In both instances, the many hold the real power, and the few know it. The few must therefore reason, prudentially; some will reason calculatingly, instead.

    In the Forest, Duke Senior tells his allied lords, his “brothers in exile,” that “old custom” has “made this life more sweet / Than that of painted pomp” (II.i.3-4). The forest is less dangerous, free from peril, as they no longer feel “the penalty of Adam” (II.i.5).  Here the winter wind, harsh but free of malice, “bites and blows upon my body” (II.i.8) but with none of the breezy flattery of the court. Nature’s winds “feelingly persuade me what I am” (II.i.11) not, like flattery, what I am not. “This our life, exempt from public haunt, / Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, / Sermons in stones, and good in everything” (II.i.15-17). Lord Amiens (which means friend) finds him happy in so “translat[ing] the stubbornness of fortune / Into so quiet and sweet a style” (II.i.19-20) 

    The Duke feels compassion for the deer they kill for food—”poor dappled fools” dressed in nature’s motley (II.i.22). Another of the allied dukes, Amiens, tells him that Jaques suffers a melancholy fit over the deer, calling the Duke a worse usurper than his brother, for killing them. Like the Duke, Jaques is alienated from, made-foreign to, court life, but unlike him he cannot find solace in nature, in Arden, as nature requires humans to usurp and tyrannize, killing stags. Jaques rebels against life itself. The Duke would seek him out, as “I love to cope him in these sudden fits,” when “he is full of matter” (II.i.68-69).

    Back at the usurper Duke’s palace, Frederick rages about the runaway ladies. One of his underlings suggests that since they are enamored of Orlando they may be in his company. Frederick sends for Oliver; he will command him to find Orlando. But Orlando isn’t with the ladies; he is in front of Oliver’s house. Adam intercepts his “young,” “gentle,” and “sweet master,” this “memory of old Sir Rowland” (II.iii.2-4). Your very virtues, he tells him, are “sanctified and holy traitors to you” (II.iii.13), bringing not only exile but the possibility of death. Having heard of Orlando’s victory over the court wrestler, knowing that it has stirred admiration for him among the people, Oliver would burn Orlando’s house with him in it. “O, what a world is this, when what is comely / Envenoms him that bear it!” (II.iii.14-15). This old Adam knows a venomous snake when he sees one. He offers Orlando his life savings in exchange for the privilege of continuing to serve him in exile. He will prove no burden, as “my age is a lusty winter”—a human nature parallel to the good non-human nature Duke Senior has found in the forest—”Frosty but kindly”—”kind” being a synonym for natural (II.iii.52-53). He knows the reason for his health: He has practiced moderation throughout his life. If Orlando’s leading virtue is courage, Adam’s leading virtue is moderation. This Adam has learned the lesson of Eden, which is not to reach too eagerly for forbidden fruit, however good it may look. 

    Orlando sees in this “good old man” an example of the virtue of ‘the ancients’—of “the constant service of the antique world, / When service sweat for duty, not for meed!” (II.ii.56-58). In the modern world, men will only sweat for promotion, for reward. “We’ll go along together” (II.iii.66), fellow men of antiquity, when man lived closer to nature and accepted its limits as lessons in humanity. Adam replies, “Fortune cannot recompense me better / Than to die well and not my master’s debtor” (II.iii.75-76). He counts loyal service to a worthy master not merely as duty but as a kind of privilege, which he has paid for in advance by tendering the savings he earned in service to the worthy father back to the worthy, true, natural son. They will head for the forest.

    Rosalind, Celia, and Touchstone are already there. Rosalind too is a figure from the ancient world, telling Jupiter of her weariness of spirit. For her part, Celia’s weariness is bodily. They rest. They meet two shepherds, old Corin and young, love-sick Silvius (whose name means “woods”). Rosalind sees in Silvius the mirror of herself. Touchstone observes that “We that are true lovers run into strange capers; but as all is mortal in nature, so is all nature in love mortal in folly” (II.iv.50-52). Rosalind agrees, seeing that nature sets limits, even to seemingly unending love-sickness.

    When they learn that the shepherds have no food to share because the local landowner is “of churlish disposition” (II.iv.75), refusing to offer hospitality to travelers, and in fact intending to sell his farm, Rosalind tells Corin that if he will buy it she will pay him back. The ladies like the forest, and would settle there, within the malice-free limits nature imposes. Elsewhere in Arden, Orlando and Adam have found the same thing; Orlando goes in search of food for his servant—serving his servant

    Meanwhile, a self-pitying courtier in Duke Senior’s party, Lord Jaques, takes a certain pleasure in exile. This Jaques finds his contentment in melancholy—although, like Duke Senior, he understands that in the forest he has no enemy but “winter and rough weather” (II.v.8). The Duke can’t find him, wondering if he has “transform’d himself into a beast” (II.vii.1)—as in a way he has, a maudlin pitier of deer rather than a human hunter of the food necessary for life. As fortune would have it, Jaques finds the Duke, or rather wanders in on him, having met a fool (presumably Touchstone) in the forest. The fool, he reports, moralized on the reality of time, whereby “from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe, / And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot” (II.vii.26-27). Jaques took delight “that fools should be so deep contemplative” (II.vii.31). He would be one: “Motley’s the only wear” (II.vii.34); “I am ambitious for a motley coat” (II.vii.43) like that of fool-men and fool-deer. Duke Senior is confident that “Thou shalt have one”(II.vii.44).

    Jaques explains that he would be a fool because as a fool he’ll have liberty “to blow on whom I please” (II.vii.49). Since by his nature a fool won’t be taken seriously by anyone, and especially by the powerful, like nature’s wind he can whip all alike, with salubrious effect. “Invest me in my motley; give me leave / To speak my mind, and I will through and through / Cleanse the foul body of th’ infected world, / If they will patiently receive my medicine” (II.vii.58-61). Having lost his trust in dubious promise-makers upon having been deposed, Duke Senior will give him no such leave, knowing him to have been “a libertine” in his civil life, “as sensual as the brutish sting itself” (II.vii.65-66). To such a man, liberty would be nothing more than “license” to “disgorge” his sins on a world that’s bad enough now (II.vii.68-69).

    Jaques’ ‘hurt’ rebuttal of these suspicions is mercifully interrupted by Orlando, sword drawn, who challenges the men to a fight if they refuse to give him food. The Duke calms him: “Your gentleness shall force / More than your force move us to gentleness” (II.vii.102-03). Upon seeing that he’s stumbled upon gentlemen (albeit ones described as having dressed as “outlaws”—presumably to deter just such attackers), Orlando apologizes, confessing to incivility but explaining that physical necessity, and not only his own, motivated his threat—a right statement of the natural law.

    After Orlando departs to fetch Adam, Duke Senior takes the opportunity to offer Jaques some needed instruction—moral necessity being as real as physical. “Thou seest we are not all alone unhappy; / This wide and universal theatre / Presents more woeful pageants than the scene / Wherein we play in” (II.vii.130-133). This enables Shakespeare to give Jaques one of the playwright’s most celebrated speeches, the one beginning “All the world’s a stage, / And all the men and women merely players” describing the “seven ages” of man (II.vii.139-43). Two things need remarking on the these ages or “acts” on the world stage, ranging from the inarticulate (“mewling and puking”) infant to the “whining school-boy” to the “sighing” lover to the honor-loving soldier “seeking the bubble reputation” to the well-fed, latitudinarian judge to the broken-down dotard, a senile wreck in his “second childishness” on the brink of “oblivion,” “sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything” (II.vii.144-166). First, this gamut puts in motion and places in time the three parts of the soul as described by Socrates in Plato’s Republic: appetite, spiritedness, and reason. But it does so in an entirely un-Socratic way. Jaques denigrates both the life of the spirited soldier—the reputation, the honor he seeks is next to nothing, a bubble—and the practical wisdom of the judge, “full of wise saws and modern instances” (II.vii.156), a platitudinous fool. Second, man begins in feebleness and resentment (mewling, puking—rejecting even food—and whining), ends in like feebleness followed by death, nullity. That is, Jaques’ melancholy either derives from or produces a sort of nihilism based on a denial of the reality of anything much more than the body, itself only temporary.

    Duke Senior does not refute this Epicurean claim. Orlando does. He does it in action, not words—his liberal education having been denied by his unbrotherly brother. Orlando returns with the Vetus Homo, old Adam. While just as mortal as Jaques or any man, Orlando proves himself nonetheless loyal, compassionate for a man instead of deer, and just. Always courageous, his experiences in the forest have strengthened more virtues, virtues as needful as courage in a man, a woman, a ruler. Duke Senior, whose hospitality contrasts with the tight-fisted landlord, welcomes them, invites them to dine, calls for music. The song remarks the winter wind’s superior kindness, naturalness, to ungrateful men, most of whose friendships and most of whose loves bespeak “mere folly” (II.vii.181). Insofar as this is so, Jaques is right. But it isn’t entirely so. The Duke tells Orlando, “I am the Duke / That lov’d your father” (II.vii.195-96). He invites him and the “good old man” (II.vii.197) to tell him their stories, so that he may “all your fortunes understand” (II.vii.200). All men want to know, Aristotle writes; all political men want to know the fortunes of potential allies. Duke Senior is both political man and man, simply.

    From tyranny in the family and tyranny in the dukedom, from just disobedience to the family by Orlando and to the dukedom by Rosalind, in the First Act, to harsh, malice-free and just nature’s regime in the Second Act, a regime where friendship and genuine civility can rekindle, Shakespeare now takes us to the heart of his play, the Third Act, whose theme is love. Love animates families and dukedoms, whether they are just or unjust, natural or unnatural, because there are several kinds of love, ranging from the self-love that would ruin all others in its scramble for domination to the self-sacrificing agapic love of Christ on the Cross. For Shakespeare, erotic love infuses the finest friendships and marriages, but it is erotic love inflected by agapic love, a love neither selfish nor selfless but mutual, and good for both lover and beloved. If politics is ruling and being ruled, loving and being loved gives politics life, whether in a family or a dukedom, because true lovers want the good for themselves but also for the ones they love.

    But first, the haters. Act III begins in Frederick’s palace, to which the usurping Duke has summoned the lesser tyrant, Oliver. God loves by His grace; the Duke presents his listeners with a false imitatio Dei, proclaiming that he embodies “the better part made mercy” (III.i.2). He orders Oliver to find his brother and to bring him back, “dead or living” (III.i.6). As a precaution, he will hold Oliver’s lands as guarantee of his fidelity. When Oliver tries to assure him that “I never lov’d my brother in my life” (III.i.14), Frederick replies, “More villain thou” (III.i.15)—true, both as regards Oliver and himself. When Oliver leaves, he commands those among his officers who are “of such a nature” (III.i.16)—villainy—undertake an assessment of the lesser tyrant’s house and lands, preparatory to seizing them. After all, any man who matches the tyrant’s villainy might endanger the tyrant’s rule as surely as an association of good men in exile does. The greater tyrant’s self-love ruins subjects and soul alike, stealing from subjects and blocking knowledge of himself by corrupting his natural ‘self,’ or soul, the self that would have loved his brother, the true Duke. One might say that Shakespeare here gives a portrait of a man who has made the Machiavellian exchange of soul for self.

    True lover Orlando hangs a paper with a poem on it, on a tree in the Forest of Arden. His poem praises his beloved, testifying to “thy virtue.” (III.ii.8). His love must be pure, entirely non-manipulative, because he has no reason to think she will ever see it; it is rather his witness to any who might pass by. After he departs, the first to see it will be good old Corin and the roguish court-fool, Touchstone. Corin asks Touchstone, “How like you this shepherd’s life?” (III.ii.13). This elicits a sophistical and self-contradictory non-answer, culminating in a patronizing, intendedly satirical counter-question: “Hast any philosophy in thee, shepherd?” (III.ii.21) Corin has enough to know the causes and effects that anyone can see, that fire burns and rain wets, and to have common sense: “he that hath learned no wit by nature nor art may complain of good breeding, or comes of a very dull kindred” (III.ii.26-28). Evidently, the shepherd has enough philosophy in him to know how to frame an ironic rejoinder to a snobbish fool. Quite possibly sensible of the wound he has received, Touchstone declares Corin “a natural philosopher” (III.ii.29), asking him if he’s ever been in court.

    The natural philosopher’s response recalls Socrates’ critique of Greece’s natural philosophers. They attempted to understand nature directly, failing to see that their impressions of nature might be twisted by their own opinions, by what we would call their ‘assumptions.’ The way to philosophize is not, Socrates says, by naive observation of dumb rocks and trees but by examining the opinions of fellow-citizens and foreign visitors to one’s native city. Political philosophy is the gateway to knowledge of nature, and especially of human nature. Touchstone would touch the philosopher’s stone by bidding the natural philosopher to consider politics. 

    But what kind of politics does Touchstone know, if not the corrupt politics of Frederick’s dukedom? Rosalind and Celia have used him philosophically, as a whetstone for their wit, as Socrates (called “the Athenian buffoon” by one humorless German) did with many a clod in Athens, but has any of the ladies’ wit rubbed off on clownish Touchstone? 

    Not so. Still hoping to dominate the conversation, Touchstone claims that if Corin has never been at court he never can have seen good manners; without having seen them, his manners must be wicked; and since wickedness is sin and sin is damnation, “Thou art in a parlous state, shepherd” (III.ii.40). But it is Corin who understands the Socratic distinction between nature and convention: “those that are good manners at the court are as ridiculous in the country as the behavior of the country is most mockable at the court” (III.ii.41-43). His example is the courtly custom of kissing hands, which “would be uncleanly if courtiers were shepherds” (III.ii.44-45). Ignoring this pointed example, Touchstone demands additional ones, which Corin supplies, rewarded only with more entertaining sophistries in reply. As a court jester, Touchstone is a good entertainer; as a philosopher, he is the buffoon sober-sided citizens say Socrates is. “You have too much courtly wit for me” (III.ii.62), Corin allows, probably remembering his distinction between court and country and applying it to shows of wit, a natural virtue that requires apprehension of circumstances to be well-aimed. [2] As for himself, “I am a true laborer: I earn what I eat, get that I wear; owe no man hate, envy no man’s happiness; glad of other men’s good, content with my harm; and the greatest of my pride is to see my ewes graze and my lambs suck” (III.ii.65-68). Relentless Touchstone jibes that this makes him a worse sinner still, a bawd to cattle and sheep. Beatus illi: Happy or blessed is the man who lives in the country, working his own land with no landlord. In Horace’s classic statement of this theme, irony pervades the presentation, as the man who speaks is a usurer. In Shakespeare’s version, the countryman praises his way of life without irony, the courtier-jester provides the sarcastic denials. It may be significant that Touchstone touches twice on the religious theme of sin, attempting to make corin, wose name derives from ‘heart,’ cringe before him in guilt. His heart sound in the midst of nature, Corin refuses the bait.

    Rosalind unwittingly puts a stop to the dialogue. Dressed as Master Ganymede, supposed brother of Aliena, she enters, holding one of Orlando’s poems, which she found on a tree-branch. “Let no face be kept in mind / But the fair of Rosalinde,” she reads (III.ii.84-85). This pledge, a faithful act of mind, Touchstone answers with a parody which reduces love to physical terms and animal-imagery, after which he derides “the very false gallop of verses” (III.ii.103). ‘Ganymede’ calls him a “dull fool” (III.ii.105) to which he replies, “Let the forest judge” (III.ii.111). Indeed: in time nature will judge who is the fool, who the wise.

    Celia enters, another of Orlando’s poems in hand, one praising Rosalind as Nature’s distillation of all the best features of classical heroines, and again citing virtues of the mind—reading, teaching—in verses acknowledging the human pilgrimage in time, recalling Jaques’ speech but ending with a vow of loyalty instead of a counsel of despair. Dismissing Touchstone and Corin, Celia confides that she has found not only the poem but its author. The man himself comes along, accompanied by Jaques; the ladies hide, listening. Jaques wishes Orlando would “mar no more trees” by carving poems on them (III.ii.244)—his exaggeration, since while Orlando may have carved his beloved’s name in trees, he has damaged no trees by hanging papers inscribed with poems. As always, Jaques’ compassion, his feelings toward nature, veer toward the maudlin and misanthropic.

    No friendship arises between them, nor could it; the lover and the melancholic are ill-suited to one another. Genuine friendship calls for virtue, but “the worst fault you have is to be in love,” Jaques charges (III.ii.265)—a ‘vice’ Orlando will not correct in himself. Jaques judges him a fool; Orlando judges him a Narcissus, a self-regarding lover of his own reflection. Both men are lovers, then. Who is the greater fool? Nature will judge.

    After Jaques leaves, Rosalind/Ganymede discovers herself. Her witty remarks show her a superior substitute for caviling Jaques. Remarking his good grooming, she challenges his claim to be a lover. Lovers are disheveled, she says. He seems to love himself more than any other, an unconfessed Narcissus. She subjects him to a courtly love-test, here in nature. Steering the conversation to his poems, she induces him to confess that he wrote them and then, calling love “merely a madness” (III.ii.368), promises to cure him of it if he will pretend that ‘he’ is Rosalind. She will then drive the madness out of him by driving him mad with her contradictory moods. But, the patient insists, “I would not be cured, youth” (III.ii.389). Oh, but “I would cure you, if you would but call me Rosalind, and come every day to my cote and woo me” (III.ii.390-91). Does Orlando now guess the ruse? For he agrees to go.

    The central scene of this central Act is a comedy within the comedy, the natural equivalent to Shakespeare’s device of presenting a play within a play. Touchstone has found himself a country girl and woos her, as sarcastic Jaques trails behind, eavesdropping and commenting as they go. Touchstone asks Audrey if his features content her, prompting her to ask “What features?” (III.iii.4). What, indeed? Touchstone compares himself to the “capricious poet” (III.iii.6), Ovid, poet of changelings, of a nature without nature, a nature of metamorphoses effected by gods more capricious than any poet. Audrey doesn’t know what ‘poetical’ is. “Is it honest in deed and word? Is it a true thing?” (III.iii.14-15). Truly, not, Touchstone tells her, as “the truest poetry is the most feigning, and lovers are given to poetry; and what they swear in poetry may be said as lovers they do feign” (III.iii.16-18)—Rosalind’s worry about Orlando, the reason she puts him to the test. Punning on “honest,” Touchstone says he wishes Audrey were poetical because he would not have her be honest—honorable, chaste—unless she were ugly (III.iii.21-22). Honesty “coupled to beauty is to have honey a sauce to sugar” (III.iii.25-27); he would have his beauties incautious of their honor. Melancholy Jaques calls him “a material fool” (III.iii.28); he means that Touchstone gets right to what’s on his mind, sexual conquest. Playgoers may hear another sense of “material”—physicality, neither rational, spiritual, nor honorable. In this Touchstone does serve as the touchstone for Jaques’ nature, he the equal materialist (and, one recalls, the equal or even greater libertine) and the sadder man for it.

    Touchstone proposes marriage, saying that the nearest vicar, Sir Oliver Martext, can do the dubious honor. And Fortune causes that gentleman to walk by; when asked to perform the ceremony, however, he requires that there be someone to give the bride away. Jaques steps forward to volunteer, but advises Touchstone to marry not in nature but in a church with “a good priest who can tell you what marriage is” (III.iii.74-75); “this fellow” will mis-join the two of you, mar the text of the ceremony (III.iii.75). Touchstone tells the audience in an aside that he prefers not to be married well, as that “will be a good excuse for me hereafter to leave my wife” (III.iii.81). In this he is Ovidian-capricious, a would-be metamorphoser of himself. Nonetheless, he goes off with Jaques, in search of a more courtly, a less natural, priest, leaving Vicar Martext happy not to have been “flout[ed] out of my calling” by either “fantastical knave” (III.iii.93-94). 

    This comedy in the middle of the comedy embodies in farce the themes of the more (as it were) serious comedy that frames it. The lover’s folly, the question of trust—which cannot exist if nature is metamorphic, and language metaphoric, ‘dishonest’—the nature of love itself (mindful or only physical?), and the legitimacy, the lawfulness, of the marriage, the reliability of the vows, the words, central to the marriage ceremony, that should result from love: here they are. 

    All these matters, material and immaterial (in both meanings of both words), stir the two ladies. They are now frustrated because Orlando has failed to fulfill his promise to visit them. But faithful Corin appears instead, telling them to come with him “If you will see a pageant truly play’d / Between the pale complexion of true love / And the red glow of scorn and proud disdain” (III.iv.47-49). Rosalind/Ganymede can hardly resist, as “the sight of lovers feedeth those in love”; “I’ll prove a busy actor in their play” (III.iv.53-55). The “pageant” consists of Corin’s young friend Silvius courting his beloved shepherdess, Phebe. She is playing hard to get. When the youth complains of the wounds inflicted on him by her scornful eyes, she (another materialist) demands to know how eyes can have wounded him, how eyes can wound anyone, as they have no weight and cannot injure like a hurled stone. One recalls that Rosalind has seen in Silvius a mirror of herself, and she does indeed busy herself as an actor in the play, reproving the girl for her “proud and pitiless” rejection of a good suitor (III.v.40). Phebe promptly falls in love with ‘him’—with ‘Ganymede’. Promptly, because (she burbles) “Who has loved that lov’d not at first sight?” (III.v.81). Even if eyes could not wound souls they can serve as portals to souls, portals open to love’s arrows. The hard armor of the girl-materialist proves less solid than she has imagined. In this, love humbles the proud, who suppose themselves invulnerable to it. ‘As you like’ is one condition, ‘as you love’ quite another.

    The center of As You Like It and its follow-on scenes suggest that love metamorphoses all. But it metamorphoses them back to nature, which is steady, the right foundation of fidelity, although twisted by bad forms of rule in family and polity. How will love realign families and polities here?

    Rosalind (still as Ganymede) and Jaques dialogue while Celia listens. Rosalind offers an Aristotelian critique of his melancholy: like its opposite, giddiness, it is an extremity; melancholics are “worse than drunkards” (IV.i.6). Jaques admits, “I do love it better than laughing” (IV.i.4), claiming it is “good to be sad and say nothing” (IV.i.7). “Then, ’tis good to be a post,” the lady ripostes (IV.i.8)—somewhat inaccurately, since though posts do say nothing, they are never sad. This gives Jaques a chance to contradict himself by saying something—explaining that his melancholy isn’t that of a scholar, a musician, a courtier, a soldier, a lawyer, a lady, or lover (which combines the qualities of all the other kinds), but “a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from many objects, and, indeed, the sundry contemplation of my travels; in which my often rumination wraps me in a most humorous sadness” (IV.i.15-18). One might be tempted to call Jaques a comparative political scientist, but Shakespeare likely means that he is worldly, and world-weary. Rosalind/Ganymede will have none of that. Exiled, she quickly purchased a new home. “I fear that you have sold your own lands, to see other men’s; then to have seen much and to have nothing is to have rich eyes and poor hands” (IV.i.19-22). 

    Is that so bad? Jaques replies, “Yes, I have gain’d my experience” (IV.i.23). Before they can converse further, in a dialogue that might lead to philosophizing, Orlando enters. The lady posing as a young gentleman gains a dialogic partner of greater interest to herself, one who seeks not to philosophize but to establish a household, to love her country (you “disable all the benefits of your own country”), and to feel gratitude to her God (you “almost chide God for making you that countenance you are”) (IV.i.31-34). A lover of her own, and of he whom she wants for her own, she dismisses Jaques’ experience as saddening, preferring “a fool to make me merry than experience to make me sad—and to travel for it too”(IV.i.25-26). She turns from the melancholy fool-from-experience to the ardent fool she prefers.

    Apparently still fooled by her disguise, Orlando addresses Ganymede as Rosalind, as per their agreement to stage a sort of play-within-the play. Since Jaques’ speech on the six ages of man, time has run its course as an undercurrent throughout the play. Rosalind tells him that if he arrives late for a promised appointment again, “never come in my sight more” (IV.i.37). She relents soon enough (in comedy as in love, timing is everything), and they soon co-produce a play-marriage. But marriage, she tells him, doesn’t solve the problem of time: “Men are April when they woo, December when they wed: maids are May when they are maids, but the sky changes when they are wives” (IV.i.134-136) They exchange witticisms on infidelity; when it comes to sharpening her wit, fool Orlando proves a superior touchstone than Touchstone. But when Orlando tells her he must end their repartee and  leave to dine with the Duke, ‘Rosalind’/’Ganymede’/Rosalind makes his prompt return from that dinner a test of his fidelity in the course of time. Indeed, she says, “Time is the old justice that examines all such offenders, and let Time try” ((IV.i.183-184). If men and women, especially husbands and wives, often change over time, time will judge, separating the faithful from the unfaithful, identifying those whose characters are firm enough to satisfy the vows they make to others concerning what they will do and not do, in future times. The soundness of families and dukedoms alike depends on that.

    As Rosalind and Celia await Orlando’s return, Silvius delivers a love-letter from Phebe. Rosalind sends him back to her with the command: “If she love me, I charge her to love thee” (IV.iii.71-72). At this point, her ruling powers seem secure, having repelled an unwanted suitor and welcomed the better one. But now her capacity to rule men and events, and even herself, gets thrown into hazard, again, in the person of Oliver.

    The audience must assume that he has arrived in his hunt for his brother. He carries a “bloody napkin” IV.iii.94), which he presents to Rosalind as Orlando’s. He tells how it was bloodied. “A wretched ragged man, o’ergrown with hair”—the opposite of Orlando, well-groomed or civilized, even in the forest—lay “sleeping on his back,” with a green and gold snake wrapped around his neck, preparing to slither into his open mouth (IV.iii.107-11). This man was himself, who has indeed spoken serpentine words, outside the Forest of Arden. The satanic reptile would enter its own home. “Seeing Orlando, it unlinked itself, / And with indented glides did slip away / Into a bush” (IV.iii.112-14). In the shade under the bush was a lioness, waiting for the man to move; “for ’tis / The royal disposition of that beast / To prey on nothing that doth seem as dead” (IV.iii.117-19). The queen of beasts in this forest is the predator preying upon the predator-brother. In the forest, the bush doesn’t burn; not God but beasts that are enemies of man make use of it. Lioness and snake are the only deadly females in the play, and the only deadly animals. The forest needs the virtue of human beings to rule the animal-evil that does dwell in it. Human beings cannot rule when asleep, and neither can they mis-rule. 

    This gave wide-awake Orlando a choice to make. He could let his lying and lying-down brother lie, and die. Celia first wants to know if the sleeping man was Oliver, Orlando’s “most unnatural” brother (IV.iii.123). “I know he was unnatural,” Oliver confesses (IV.iii.125). He reports that his brother nearly walked away. “But kindness, nobler ever than revenge, / And nature, stronger than his just occasion, / Made him give battle to the lioness,” which he killed. (IV.iii.129-131). “I awak’d” (IV.iii.133). In saying all this Oliver must have trusted his brother to have given him a true account—a trust reinforced, as it must have been, by the sight of the dead lioness. If kindness is nobler than revenge, then Orlando had proven himself more the gentleman than his brother, to his brother. If nature is stronger than an opportunity to act justly, then the overall framework of human judgment has prevailed over the occasion—the larger understanding over the smaller. 

    Celia now wants to know if the man before them is the unnatural brother himself. “‘Twas I; but ’tis not I” (IV.iii.136). Past and present, the difference time can make, when a just action is timely within the ‘space’ of nature, the forest: Asleep in sin, Oliver woke up to his true nature. “I do not shame / To tell you what I was, since my conversion, / So sweetly tastes being the thing I am.” (IV.iii.137-39). This is a metamorphosis not out of Ovid but out of Plato and the Bible—the turning-around of the human soul toward the ideas, when a prisoner of the cave of political conventions begins the journey to philosophy, and the conversion of the sinner to citizenship in God’s regime. It is classical eros inflected by Christian agape.

    The brothers didn’t stay out in the woods. They returned to the house of “the gentle Duke,” who “gave me fresh array and entertainment, / Committing me to my brother’s love” (IV.iii.143-45) Civility requires clothing (in this case new clothes for a renewedly human man) and leisure; it also requires faithful, declared bonds betokening shared brotherliness in a family and shared citizenship in a regime ruled by a man whose gentlemanliness contrasts with the savagery of his own unnatural brother, the usurper-tyrant whose uncivil society he fled. 

    All of this points to the cause of the blood on the cloth. In combat with the lioness, Orlando lost blood. He sent me here, Oliver says, to tell you why he couldn’t keep his promise to return, “that you might excuse / His broken promise” in light of this physical evidence of his continued fidelity to me and to “the shepherd youth / That he in sport doth call his Rosalind.” (IV.iii.154-57).

    At this, ‘Ganymede’ faints, then recovers sufficiently to request that she be taken home. That is, unlike homeless ever-traveling Jaques, she continues to fix her attention on, seek comfort in, the household. Oliver cannot understand why a man lacks “a man’s heart” (IV.iii.165). Honestly enough, she confesses that it is so; she does lack one of the manly virtues. Nonetheless, Rosalind has recovered her wit with her consciousness, asking Oliver to tell Orlando that she only counterfeited her swoon. Oliver recognizes the noble lie as a lie, but will do as she asks.  

    Love begins the transition from nature to civil society with plotting. If wrongly-directed, the plots of lovers amount only to scheming, as Frederick and Oliver demonstrated. If rightly directed, toward mutual good, the plots of lovers prove reasonable pathways to consummation in marriage. Rosalind’s well-intended and reasonable, if comically elaborate plot almost fails when she loses her reason for a moment, fainting dead away. But she recovers and sticks to her story, which now moves toward its end.

    The final Act sees the lovers binding themselves firmly to one another. This begins with the unlikely pair of Touchstone and Audrey. A rival appears, the shepherd William. Touchstone interrogates him. He asks him several questions of ascending difficulty: How old are you? What is your name? Where were you born? Are you rich? And finally, are you wise? William says he is wise, upon hearing which claim Touchstone recalls “a saying, ‘The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool'” (V.i.30-31). Like Socrates, the wise man knows he does not know; he loves wisdom, without supposing he has it in any comprehensive, godlike way. William fails the Socratic test. Touchstone then cites “the heathen philosopher” who, “when he had a desire to eat a grape, would open his lips when he put it into his mouth; meaning thereby that grapes were made to eat and lips to open” (V.i.31-34). Perhaps more Aristotelian than Socratic, this simple example of teleological design illustrates what nature is. It is an instance of humanly achievable knowledge, the acquisition of which makes of one somewhat less a fool than before. Two more questions for William: Do you love this maid? Yes: that is, he desires to eat the grape. Are you “learned”? (V.i.35). No. Self-describedly wise but ignorant, then. That being so, William, learn this: pour a full cup of water into a glass and the cup will be empty, no longer holding the water. I now possess Audrey and you do not. And, not to put too fine a point on the matter, now go, or I will kill you. Audrey joins in urging him to go, joining the long line of women who cause nice guys to finish last. On a decidedly less noble level, Touchstone loves his own, as Rosalind loves her own. They understand that love is exclusive, not cosmopolitan. Now he’s as ready to marry as a man like himself will ever be. 

    Owing his life to the brother he set out to kill, Oliver has transformed their relationship from suspicion to intimacy. To Orlando’s astonishment at the sudden love between Oliver and ‘Aliena,’ Oliver simply asks for his approval of their marriage—effectively treating Orlando as an older, or at least equal brother. He will give their father’s land and revenue to Orlando, set up his household in the forest, and “die a shepherd” with his presumed shepherdess-bride (V.ii.12). ‘Ganymede’ arrives to assure Orlando that the couple really did experience love ‘at first sight,’ that experience of time compressed. On hearing this, and having learned to trust ‘Ganymede’s’ prudent wit, Orlando agrees to the marriage, wasting no time himself: “They shall be married tomorrow; and I will bid the Duke to the nuptial.” (V.ii.40-41). He only feels “heart-heaviness” because he won’t be marrying Rosalind (V.ii.44). When ‘Ganymede’ volunteers to substitute for her, he refuses; “I can no longer live by thinking” (V.ii.48). If the fool thinks he is wise, as the saying goes, then the playacting lover may well prefer to give up thinking, give up his pretend-beloved, his beloved-in-thought-alone. Only the real person will do. If he has seen through Rosalind’s disguise, he wants her to stop playing and reveal herself, in action. 

    In another sense, to give up thinking is to give up philosophizing, or the attempt to philosophize. Neither Orlando nor Rosalind is a philosopher. They are, however, candidates for the activities of marriage, for the household rule animated not by the love of wisdom but the love of their own, love of home, family, country. Where would nature be, without them? Or cities?

    Rosalind, who never loses sight of reality and is nobody’s fool, now knows the truth of what she tells him: “You are a gentleman of good conceit” (V.ii.51)—that is, of good thought—and I “can do strange things” (V.ii.56-57). Concocting yet another noble lie, she tells him that since the age of three she’s “convers’d with a magician, most profound in his art and yet not damnable” (V.ii.57-59)—a practitioner of ‘white magic’—and so tomorrow ‘he’ will use the power ‘he’ has learned to bring him Rosalind herself, “without any danger” (V.i.63-64). You can then marry her, “if you will” (V.i.68), even as your brother marries ‘Aliena.’

    The next couple to arrive are Silvius and his still-recalcitrant Phebe. No philosopher, either, Silvius offers a sound definition of love derived from his experience, and therefore according not to thought abstracting from particulars but according to an analysis of love’s sixteen components. They are: sighs and tears, faith and service, fantasy, passion and wishes, adoration, duty and observance, humbleness, patience, and impatience, purity, trial, and obedience. Adoration and duty are the central components of love, and because love’s components are sound, loving is not blamable (no matter what his beloved says).

    While not blaming misdirected love, Rosalind does intend to put the several loves here on the right tracks. To Silvius, she promises to “help you if I can”; to Phebe, she says “I would love you if I could” and “I will marry you if ever I marry woman, and I’ll be married tomorrow”; to Orlando, she promises that “I will satisfy you if ever I satisfied man, and you shall be married tomorrow” (V.ii.104-08). Reason enables her to be true and false, without self-contradiction, thanks to her mastery of the capacity of words for ambiguity and even paradox or seeming contradiction. That mastery is her true art, a magic both illusory in its capacity for telling plausible noble lies and its power to redirect human thoughts, passions, and actions toward constituting a good regime.

    Missing from this meeting, Touchstone and Audrey are still in the forest, where she tells him that she has preferred him to rustic William because she wants to become “a woman of the world,” a poor shepherdess no longer (V.iii.4). They too intend to marry tomorrow, so it won’t be long before she will learn if better social standing will be the consequence of the marriage she plans. Two pages from Duke Senior’s household come by and sing the happy couple a love song celebrating spring as the time for love. Predictably, Touchstone complains about their artistry, or lack of it, but one page insists, “We kept time, we lost not our time” (V.iii.35-36). As in comedy and love, in music timing is everything, as it is in nature itself. Music plays over time, unfolding in time, and it depends on timing both in the harmonies it consists of and in the performers who play it. Music, like comedy and love, requires right rule.

    The next day, right-ruling Duke Senior, his friend and ally Lord Amiens, Jaques, Orlando, Oliver, and ‘Aliena’ await ‘Ganymede.’ ‘He’ arrives, Silvius and Phebe in tow, commending patience, preeminently the virtue tested by time. The Duke agrees to give his daughter Rosalind in marriage to Orlando, if Rosalind does appear. ‘Ganymede’ extracts from Phebe a promise to marry Silvius if Phebe refuses to marry ‘him,’ ‘Ganymede,’ a promise she makes easily because she makes it unsuspectingly. And Silvius as easily consents to marry Phebe, “if she will” (V.iv.17). ‘Ganymede’ and ‘Aliena’ depart, replaced by Touchstone and Audrey; the jester amuses the Duke, delivering a comic account of the ways of courtly quarrelling and a satire on courtly chivalry based on a typology of lies. Having been deceived by lying courtly courtesies, the Duke takes the point. Touchstone, he observes to Jaques, “uses his folly like a stalking-horse, and under the presentation of that he shoots his wit” (V.iv.100-01). Exotericism has its virtues, a truth Rosalind will demonstrate, upon her return. 

    Undisguised, Rosalind and Celia return with Hymen, the god of marriage. Hymen hymns, “Then there is mirth in heaven, / When earthly things made even / Atone together” (V.iv.102-04). Atone: Might this be Rosalind’s discreet apology, put in the mouth of a god, for her benign ruses? In comedy, justice and repentance harmonize on earth, as they do in Heaven. Rosalind recovers her father, gains a husband, and loses an unwanted lover who, now knowing the reality, bids “my love adieu” (V.iv.115). Hymen hymns again: “Whiles a wedlock-hymn we sing, / Feed yourselves with questioning, / That reason wonder may diminish, / How thus we met, and these things finish.” (V.iv.131-34). This isn’t the theoretical reason of philosophy but the practical reason of right ruling. Hymen sings on: “‘Tis Hymen peoples every town, / High wedlock then be honored. / Honor, high honor, and renown, / To Hymen, god of every town!” (V.iv.137-40). Marriage is the foundation of the family, family the foundation of the town. Hymen is a god of the civil religion everywhere, a civil religion which is nonetheless as universal as nature itself in its generative power. Having learned from nature, these now fully civilized men and women will bring what they’ve learned into a civil society that they will now establish. Duke Senior had founded a band of brothers, but by nature brothers cannot generate a lasting political community. That takes a settlement which includes women, on the right terms, the terms of human nature, which exhibits reasoned speech in conditions of shared justice and mercy.

    This happy ending ignores one massive threat. The rulers of the new polis have made no provision for foreign policy. Internally sound, it is externally at hazard from the regime of the usurper-tyrant whose evil rule all present have escaped. But there is still one more person to make his appearance. We recall that there are two Jaques—one the melancholy traveler, the other the second son of Sir Rowland de Boys. Jaques de Boys now enters, with news from the court of Duke Frederick. “Hearing how every day / Men of great worth resorted to this forest,” Frederick had mounted a military expedition of “mighty power” to attack the exiles (V.iv.148-50). Poised to enter the forest, he met “with an old religious man”—the only such a one we’ve met is the Vicar Martext—who “converted” him “both from his enterprise and from the world” (V.iv.153-55). Frederick has ceded the crown back to Duke Senior, restored all lands to those he dispossessed, and entered a monastery—spiritual exile from the Kingdom of Man.

    These are welcome, well-timed wedding gifts, indeed. Oliver and Celia will return to live on his restored estate. The Duke will return to his rightful throne. His son-in-law Orlando will return as heir to the “potent dukedom” (V.iv.163), with wise Rosalind at his side to tender counsel. All of Duke Senior’s friends and allies will “share the good of our returned fortune, / According to the measure of their states,” that is, according to justice (V.iv.168-69). Before returning to our newly-restored “dignity,” the duke happily commands, forget its restoration for the moment and “fall into our rustic revelry” with music and dance,, human harmonies consonant with those of the nature around them, and now in them (V.iv.170-71). Music is the imitation of the natural harmonies, speaking to the soul, dance the action of the body in accord with music. [3]

    The melancholy Jaques will imitate Frederick’s self-exile; like him, he has no wife, no place within the harmonies of civil society. Love harmonizes, but it also excludes those who neither love nor are loved. Duke Senior invites him to remain, but Jaques prefers to retire to the Duke’s soon-to-be-abandoned cave. He has gone from libertine to world traveler to melancholic and now to isolato. For him, however, none of his metamorphoses has changed him into a person who can participate in a civil society animated by natural sentiments, the principal of which is an entwining of agapic and erotic love, especially love of one’s own. Jaques is an egoist who doesn’t even love himself. His cave isn’t even the Platonic-Socratic cave of human convention. It is a cave not beneath but outside the cave, warmed neither by the love of God, as a monastery might be, or love of neighbor, as a civil society might be. It is the cave of misanthropy, the end of apolitical epicureanism. Shakespeare has delivered each soul to its rightful place.

    The plot of the play so concluded, Rosalind steps forward to speak to the audience in a kind of play outside the play. “It is not the fashion to see the lady in the epilogue” (Epilogue 1). Having consistently shown how to navigate between such convention and nature, she will not falter now. “If it be true that good wine needs no bush, ’tis true that a good play needs no epilogue”; since a “bush” was the vine tavern owners would hang to advertise the wine they had on offer, she means that a good play, like a good wine, needs no advertising; it will win customers by ‘word of mouth,’ as they liked it. The only other “bush” mentioned in As You Like It is the one the serpent retreated to and the lion hid underneath. Bushes may conceal the bad as easily as they may publicize the good. Predatory animals seek cover to do evil; human beings with rightly-ordered, harmonized souls seek the good without being drawn to it with ballyhoo. They do need to be told about it.

    Rosalind will not beg the audience to like the play. Rather, “My way is to conjure you” (Epilogue 10), the way of the magician of words, of speech and reason, under whose beneficial spell you may be. She conjures them with her words one last time, asking both men and women to like the play. Perhaps her spell, her lessons about love, marriage, fidelity in family and country, will remain with this real-world audience after they they leave the theater of thought Shakespeare has made, even as his characters will return to civil society re-grounded in nature.

    As you like it: Indeed, how do you like it, and what is it? How will you know yourself well enough to become a loyal brother, a good friend, a faithful citizen, a true lover, husband, wife? To know yourself you will need an education, and absent the sound, liberal, gentlemanly and gentlewomanly education of rulers, you may need to learn what is humanly natural from nature itself and from what is kindly artificial—noble lies taught by a benevolent plotter or playwright, blending well-timed speeches and actions with artful costume designs, well-ordered music, song, and dance, all of them protecting good souls and redirecting bad ones toward nature, toward human nature in its capacity for reason, love, and right reverence.  

     

    Notes

    1. Harold C. Goddard observes that a touchstone is a type of black sandstone that tests the purity of gold and silver, when a merchant rubs the precious metal on it. The small streak of metal on the stone can then be analyzed. “Not precious itself, it reveals preciousness”—or, it might be added, the lack of it—in “what touches it.” (Goddard: The Meaning of Shakespeare. 2 volumes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967 [1951]). I.290. Goddard, who finds great fault in Touchstone, doesn’t sufficiently reflect on the fact that a bit of precious metal rubs off on the Touchstone; this may be what Duke Senior sees in, or at least on, him.
    2. Scholars have suggested that “Corin” is short for “Corinthians,” and here are reminded of Paul’s observation that God has chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise.
    3. C. L. Barber writes, “As You Like It seems to me the most perfect expression Shakespeare or anyone else achieved of a poise which was possible because a traditional way of living connected different kinds of experience with each other,” a “humorous recognition… of the limits of nature’s moment.” (C. L. Barber: Shakespeare’s Festive Comedies. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1963 [1959]), 238. Except that nature isn’t only a moment, even if living ‘out in nature,’ in the forest, is. Rather, members of the renewed political society will take nature’s lessons back to the potent dukedom.

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Bodin’s Secrets

    April 9, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Jean Bodin: Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime. Marion Leathers Daniels Kuntz translation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

     

    Note: The Latin title, Colloqium Heptaplomeres de Rerum Sublimium Arcanis Abditis, literally means Colloquium of the Seven on the Hidden Secrets of the Sublime. By selecting the locution, “hidden secrets,” Bodin may imply that they will be revealed in the course of the book. I am grateful to Professor Joseph Garnjobst of the Hillsdale College Classics Department for calling my attention to this nuance in the Latin.

     

    Born around 1530, probably in Angers, Bodin became a novice in the Carmelite Order but left it, eventually spending much of his life practicing law in Paris. He was associated with the Politiques there—monarchists who sought national unity and what they hoped would be a consequent decrease in the religious asperities which spark civil wars. He admired the Huguenot logician Petrus Ramus, himself a victim of religious hatred, who criticized the Scholastic form of Aristotelianism upheld by the Catholic Church and recurred to the less grand philosophic practices of Socrates. The Colloquium may be said to propose a way, if not to make the world or even France safe for Socrates, and Socratic Huguenots, at least to make private discussions among philosophic friends safe for such.

    The “Seven” are a Catholic (Paulus Coronaeus), a Lutheran mathematician (Fridericus Podmicus), a skeptic (Hieronymus Senamus), a natural philosopher (Diegus Toralba), a Calvinist (Antonius Curtius), a Jew (Salomon Barcassius), and a Muslim (Octavius Fagnola).  Paulus Coronaeus superintends the discussion, perhaps because Bodin writes in Catholic France, and perhaps also because he wants to introduce more catholicity into the Catholic Church and, consequently, into French politics. This Paul, too, is an evangelist, although one of a different temper and possibly a different intention than those of the Apostle, whom Leo Strauss described as a highly spirited man. Bodin judges that spiritedness already has had its day in the religious sun, that a more irenic spirit is now more needed.

    “Seven” of course has Biblical significance as the Creation week in the Book of Genesis. Professor Kuntz remarks that it also suggests musical harmony (as in the seven-stringed lyre). And it may allude to the seven-branched candelabra of Moses, an image Bodin’s contemporary Guillaume Postel “used in his book, Candelabri typici in Mosis tabernaculo …interpretatio, to indicate the universal significance of Israel and France in establishing the kingdom of heaven on earth.” Postel, she relates, aimed at a syncretistic religion combining Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; Bodin extends the ambition to include two kinds of philosophers and three kinds of Christians. Kuntz also cites Ficino’s claim that ancient philosophers came from a common intellectual ancestor, Hermes Trismegistus, whose line then descended to Orpheus, followed by Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, Philolaus, and finally to Plato. This suggests a philosophic syncretism matching religious syncretism—an ideational settlement complementing the spiritual settlement.

    There are only six philosophers on Ficino’s list, although in Bodin’s dialogue a seventh, Socrates, becomes important. Any syncretic religious or philosophic doctrine might fall into the same kind of rigidity that Ramus deplored in the Church’s Christian Aristotelianism. The presence of ‘Socrates’ within such a syncretism might prevent that. At the same time, the rational character of Socrates’ enterprise can pull thinkers back from what we now see in ‘postmodernist’ vapor about ‘diversity’ and ‘inclusiveness.’

    Bodin divides the Colloquium into six books. The original Creation took six days, so the Colloquium evidently represents an act of creativity, of sorts. It would indeed take some carefully designed invention to realize the kingdom of heaven in France, but, as Kuntz notes, Bodin named his first son Elias, and even used the name “Elias Bodin” on the title page of one of his published writings—Elijah having been “assigned the task of bringing world peace and religious harmony to men.”

    Bodin frames the dialogue as a letter to his friend “N.T.” This letter differs from a Pauline letter at first glance because it is much longer than all the Pauline epistles combined. Kuntz hazards no guess regarding N.T.’s identity, so I shall make one up: N.T. is a person standing in for a book, the Novum Testamentarum. Whereas Paul in the New Testament witnesses to the Holy God—the God separate from His creation, who proceeds to divide the waters from the sky, the earth from the waters, the night from the day—Bodin witnesses to the concordia discors, the harmoniousness of the whole composed of these differentiated elements.

    On “my quest for educated and excellent men,” Bodin has arrived in Venice, “a port common to almost all nations or rather the whole world, not only because the Venetians delight in receiving strangers hospitably, but also because one can live there with the greatest freedom.” The great commercial republic of the day, the hub of Mediterranean civilization, trading in material and intellectual goods alike, Venice was a place where even the Athenian Stranger might have felt at home. “Whereas other cities and districts are threatened by civil wars or fear of tyrants or harsh exactions of taxes or the most annoying inquiries into one’s activities, this seemed to me to be nearly the only city that offers immunity and freedom from all these kinds of servitude.” Such civic peace, political, social, perhaps religious and intellectual freedom constitute “the reason why people come here from everywhere, wishing to spend their lives in the greatest freedom and tranquility of spirit, whether they are interested in commerce or crafts or leisure pursuits as befit free men.”

    Fortune, if not Providence, led Bodin to meet Coronaeus, a man investigating “all the monuments of antiquity” who “had joined with the most scholarly men in an intimate society” in his home, “considered a shrine of the Muses and virtues.” Coronaeus “had an incredible desire to understand the language, inclinations, activities, customs, and virtues of different peoples”—a political-philosophic eros, so to speak. The Seven “were exceptionally well trained in the liberal arts,” yet “each seemed to surpass the others in his unique knowledge,” knowledge supplemented their “easy access to anything new or worthy of note in the world by means of letters from friends”—like this one, to N. T.—”whom they had made a point of acquiring in Rome, Constantinople, Augsburg, Seville, Antwerp, and Paris.” All of them “were not motivated by wrangling or jealousy but by a desire to learn.” Coronaeus’ vast library and archive, and his collection of musical and mathematical instruments featured the “pantotheca,” a box six feet square containing six square compartments per foot. “Thirty-six multiplied by itself produced 1296 small boxes,” each containing replicas of natural things duly divided according to their kinds. He selected the number six as the mathematical basis for the structure because it is the “perfect” number, “because most living things terminate in this number.” He may mean that the creation of most living things (but not God Himself, or the angels and demons) was completed to God’s satisfaction by the sixth and final day of creation. “Also in nature there are only six perfect bodies, only six simple colors, six simple tastes, six harmonious harmonies, only six simple metals, six regions, also six senses including common sense.” The Seven, then, seem eminently well equipped to consider nature, to consider this world if not Heaven. It may be that a city like Venice attracts a certain kind of Catholic, Lutheran, skeptic, natural philosopher, Calvinist, Jew, and Muslim—a kind animated by the philosophic quest, one manifestation of the desire to learn.

    For this genial enterprise, Coronaeus proves a Socratic type indeed: “To preserve his strength he did not waste his time in writing or reading; rather he had developed the sharpest critical faculty by listening, discussing, and contemplating.” He does not walk like a Peripatetic, stand like a Stoic, recline like an Academic; he sits. He proposes six topics for discussion: nature and mathematics, the preeminence of laws and the best form of government, medicine and the reliability of history. The central pair, laws and the best regime, recall the topics of Plato’s longest dialogues. Bodin is Plato to Coronaeus’ Socrates. And ‘Coronaus’ suggests ‘crown’; the Socrates of Venice gently rules the dialogue as a philosopher-king. [1] If so, then Bodin acts as Plato to Coronaeus/Socrates, recording in writing a spoken dialogue. Each pair of topics corresponds to a pair of books in that written account, the Colloquium.

    On the first day, the Seven resume an ongoing discussion of the immortality of the soul. Bodin who has been serving as the reader of texts for the group to discuss, has been reading from Plato’s Phaedo—specifically, the passage on “the power of immortal souls” and the subsequent discussion of Egyptian mummification. There Socrates claims that since a mummified body lasts a long time, the human soul, having no tincture of materiality, must last even longer, or even forever.

    Salomon protests that they have discussed the matter sufficiently, and that “we”—we Jews—”have been persuaded for a long time of that immortality and that eternal rewards are fixed for the good and punishments decreed for the wicked.” Natural philosopher Toralba and skeptic Senamus demur, although Toralba admits that Epicurean atheism would have a bad effect: “For when the hope of rewards and the fear of divine punishment are removed, no society can endure.” The conversation evidently has reached an impasse.

    But it continues because the account of mummification reminds Muslim Octavius of a ship voyage he took, smuggling a mummified Egyptian corpse stolen at the behest of a Genevan “empiricist” who coveted one because, he said, mummies ward off “almost all diseases.” Egyptian law prohibits the transportation of mummies because it stirs up storms. In this storm, Octavius recalls, “we had poured out our prayers in vain,” despite the many sailors from many nations, some of whom at least must have been praying to the true God. The storm subsided only after Octavius threw the mummy overboard. The point of the story isn’t to confirm the wisdom of the Egyptian law, based on a decidedly questionable theory of causation, but to recall the symbolism of mummies. In mummifying a corpse, the Egyptians remove the hear and replace it with a stone image of Isis, Egypt’s queen-lawgiver, who was taught by Hermes, the god-founder of philosophy. The Egyptian regime would keep philosophy to itself, prevent even its image from being brought to other countries. This clearly hasn’t succeeded, as Hermes also instructed Orpheus, a poet not a ruler, who transmitted philosophy to a line of Greeks.

    When the storm subsided, “a venerable old man with white hair, extending his hands to Heaven and giving thanks to immortal God, forced the others by his example to praise God.” But are they not praying, unaware, to the god of the philosophers?

    This prompts Coronaeus to raise three questions: Why should storms arise due to the transportation of Egyptian corpses? Are the seas stirred by demons, or “only from exhalations, as the physicists say”? “With such a variety of religions represented, whose prayers did God heed in bringing the ship safely to port?” The others want time to think about these matters, so Coronaeus adjourns the conversation until the following day.

    At Coronaeus’ direction, Bodin switches from the Phaedo to letters from a merchant in Corcyra describing celebrations of the circumcision of the firstborn son of the Turkish king. These messages lead the Seven to take up the topic of messengers, and particularly the second question Coronaeus proposed. The Lutheran, Fridericus Podamicus, worries about “the wicked arts of magic,” which Plato makes punishable in the legal code proposed in the Laws. He credits stories about demon causation. Predictably, sceptical Senamus does not, demanding proof. Calvinist Curtius mediates: “The account of actions depends upon the senses the ‘that it is,’ but the proof of causes, namely, the ‘why it is,’ must be sought more deeply from the hidden secrets of philosophy.” Coronaeus asks natural philosopher Toralba to explicate “the mysteries of nature.” Toralba cautiously replies that although he can talk about natural causation, “the examination of the actions of demons and angels does not seem to me to pertain to natural science, but to those who study metaphysics, since it is evident that they take place by the will and power of demons.” He throws the topic back to Fridericus, who has studied both mathematics and the arts of magic.

    This annoys the Lutheran, who rejects the implied connection between mathematics and magic. Picking up on the theme of Plato’s Laws and citing the Justinian Code, he criticizes lawgivers, lawyers, and judges for lumping practitioners of both as impious. In this he needles his rival Protestant, the Calvinist, a practitioner of the art of jurisprudence; that gentleman replies, in effect that the same degree of precision one expects in mathematics cannot possibly be matched by lawgivers. While agreeing that mathematicians shouldn’t be confused with magicians, he asks for a certain toleration of lawgivers’ errors: “Just as nurses are wont to baby-talk to babies, so it is inevitable that legislators often err along with the people.” That is, the art of legislation itself, intended for the government of the people, habituates lawgivers to ‘popular’—and thus inaccurate—ways of thinking.

    This matter of what later philosophers might call epistemological hazard deepens when the Skeptic demands experiential proof that magicians and demons exist. The Calvinist says that the very act of observing them endangers the observer. The epistemological problem of ‘subjectivity’ matches another problem, that of ‘objectivity’: as the Seven discuss reported magical metamorphoses of men into asses, wolves, and other animals, it is obvious that if magic is real and nature so easily altered, nature itself, which philosophers attempt to understand, has no real nature at all. Accordingly, the Skeptic is the only one who outright denies the power of magic, calling it a craft aimed at producing illusions. The Natural Philosopher, who would seem to have at least as big a stake in the matter, contents himself by repeating that the question is for metaphysics, not physics, and adds, Socratically, “I realize that I do not know,” being “moved by reason alone, not by authority.” The Calvinist, who may be expected to question the authority of the Catholic Church, concurs, criticizing the ignorant, who live in “the cave of Socrates,” believing that they know what they do not know; “empty authority draws along many whom reason ought to have led.”

    It is the Natural Philosopher who draws the theological point, criticizing natural scientists—that is, those who profess to know more than they do. “Of all the innumerable errors that our natural scientists can make, there is none more serious than to think that all things which are outside man’s power come from the necessary causes of nature or fortune. Those who think this try to snatch away free will from God.” Such self-described knowers “think it base to admit that they are ignorant of the causes of the things which fall under the senses.” Against the Scholastic Aristotelians, he argues that the First Mover “is bound by no necessity to act, but tempers all things with this freedom so that it can, if it wishes, restrain the attacks of men and beasts, control lifeless natures, keep fires from burning, shake the world at will or raise it up again.” That is, there isn’t necessarily any overarching Fate that rules the god. The Biblical God, for example, is ruled by nothing.  Consequently in the Bible, contra Aristotle, the world is not eternal; the work which depends on another’s judgment and will for its safety is not eternal.” Among philosophers, the Natural Philosopher prefers Plato to Aristotelians, Epicureans, and Stoics, as in both the Phaedo and the Statesman the possibility of divine providence is treated with respect.

    Coronaeus adds that Aristotle’s opinions “leave no place for divine laws or authority.” It would seem that the Natural Philosopher’s critique of authority has led him to provide an opening for a defense of authority, albeit divine not human. Coronaeus takes this as evidence of the power of angels and demons “outside of or contrary to nature.” The Natural Philosopher remarks that Plato’s Socrates also affirms the existence of his own guardian daemon; the Jewish scholar cites rabbinical testimony that “each person has a good and a bad angel.”

    The point having been settled to the satisfaction of all but the Skeptic, Coronaeus asks if the difference between angels and demons is restricted to the difference between good and evil, and what actions and affairs they involve themselves in. That is, having limited nature by the wills of God, angels, and demons, what are the limits of angelic and demonic action? What, exactly, are demons? The Lutheran student of demonology offers Apuleius’ definition: demons are “animal in kind, rational in nature, passive in soul, aerial in body, eternal in time,” then cites numerous other ancient writers who denied their immortality. For himself, the Lutheran agrees with the Natural Philosopher in thinking that “eternity is suitable for God alone,” not for demons or for “God’s lieutenants,” the angels. The Calvinist agrees, citing the testimony of Plutarch, via Eusebius, who tells the story from the time of the Emperor Tiberius, in which a voice from a god commanding a ship-master to announce that “Pan is dead.” Not only are angels and demons mortal, but there is evidence that they are physically constrained to certain regions. The Jewish Scholar is quick to intercede when the Skeptic ventures to allege that Jews assisted demons in possessing some Jewish girls who had converted to Christianity; demons “have always been hostile to Jews.”

    The anecdotes multiply, and the Natural Philosopher prudently suggests that “it is easier to wonder at these stories than to ascertain the reasons for them.” For example, Hippocrates couldn’t tell the difference between demonic possession and epilepsy, but close observation had enabled modern physician to distinguish the symptoms of each. This is as far as natural philosophy can go. The Muslim goes a bit further, saying that “the authority of important men has the greatest influence in making faith more enduring than any opinion. However, as a few adopt this or that opinion because it pleases them to, most people wish to be convinced by necessary proofs to agree, as after a questioning, in order that by attaining knowledge they may throw off all opinion. Knowledge and opinion can no more exist at the same time than faith and knowledge.” This more than suggests that Octavius Fagnola, the Muslim speaker, has a bit of al-Farabi if not indeed of Averroës in him. Be that as it may, his astringent statement has the effect of turning the discussion from anecdote and appeal to distinguished authors, and toward a discussion of the more general philosophic questions the existence of angels and demons raises: such matters as the difference between corporeal and incorporeal substances, the limits that might or might not be placed on the latter.

    Having insisted on the distinction between metaphysics and physics, the Natural Philosopher firmly rejects immanence, the notion that “the human mind is a particle of the divine mind.” On the contrary, “the human mind is not even like God, much less the same substance as God.” Crucially for the history of philosophy as the Seven conceive it, Hermes Trismegistus also denies that the human mind has been “cut away from the substance of God.” And the Book of Genesis confirms this, as the life-giving breath or spirit of God (Ruah) isn’t the substance of God, any more than the image of God, in which Man is made, is the substance of God. The Jewish Scholar readily concurs: “Wise indeed are those who have separated body altogether from the nature of God, for this is the principal point of our creed.” The Skeptic and the Calvinist alike concur on the point that this is why God can be properly contemplated only in silence, as no human words can truly describe Him. The Natural Philosopher concludes that only God, the first cause, has no parts because He alone is incorporeal and indissoluble. The Skeptic asks, how then is God said to have ears, eyes, nose, fingers, arms, and face? Because, the Jewish Scholar replies, “nurses and parents must stammer with babies and human attributes must be transferred to God, since divine things cannot be translated to men”—another example of exotericism, already noted in lawgivers. He adds that the senses of taste and touch are never attributed to God, as they require a body. [2]

    Coronaeus is eager to hear a clear refutation of Epicureans, who avoid the problem of distinguishing the divine from all else by denying the existence of God altogether. The Natural Philosopher, who obviously doesn’t mind discussing metaphysics as long as it’s clearly separated from physics, replies with a refutation of Aristotle and Averroës instead. “It is as foolish for infinite essence to be joined to a finite little body in a finite manner as to assign infinite power to a finite nature, since there is the same discipline for opposites.” He and Coronaeus agree that the two philosophers are inconsistent on this point, although neither now considers the implications of this claim for Christianity. What the various distinctions the Seven have drawn do accomplish is to permit the Natural Philosopher to separate nature from the divine on the one hand and from chance on the other. “Action cannot be natural which happens either from God, with no help from lower causes, or from an angel or a demon or from the judgment of divine will or finally from chance. I call chance the union of many causes with unexpected effects; with these exceptions we shall say the rest are done by nature.” [3]

    The Calvinist then takes the discussion in a political direction, urging that “this world ought to be ruled just as a republic after the image of a republic of this world, or rather our state ought to be a pattern of that exemplar and archetype of a mundane state”—God’s universe, in which “the provident parent of nature has ordained certain laws to be perpetual and inviolable,” with angels as messengers between God and men. When Fridericus remarks that Plato said something similar to this, Salomon insists that “Plato had received that secret as he did all the best things from the Hebrews.” This, the Calvinist observes, we also see “in a well-ordered state—namely, that laws are sometimes changed and extraordinary officers are appointed, instead of ordinary magistrates, for the safety of the state.”

    As befits his role, the Skeptic is unconvinced of any of this. “Nothing seems good to me which happens outside of nature, as Aristotle writes.” The Jewish Scholar replies that “we should forgive Aristotle, who was ignorant of divine matters, even contemptuous of them.” “Then what keeps us from saying that all things which happen from nature are accomplished by demons and angels?” the Sceptic asks. To rescue the integrity of nature, and not incidentally the authority of God in creating it, the Jewish Scholar observes that natural things proceed gradually and regularly, as seen in the generation of plants, whereas events caused by angels and demons are abrupt. He complains that the Skeptic always “tries to direct everything clearly to natural causes.” Coronaeus agrees with the Jewish scholar, ascribing storms, falling stars, and earthquakes to demonic activity. The Skeptic observes that “many things are entangled with popular mistakes which we have finally seen explained.” If such violent occurrences “happen without demons because of a secret harmony of nature, it is consistent that those other things also depend on nature.” There are things in the heavens and on the earth that “possibly not really known by anyone.” This does not make them examples of the supernatural.

    After listening to a series of further appeals to tradition and to what his interlocutors take to be the incoherence of Aristotelian natural philosophy, the Skeptic tries again. “You have explained these matters elegantly and charmingly,” but then (recurring to the Muslim’s original story, which sparked the discussion) why do demons pursue the bodies of Egyptians, in those sea-storms, rather than the bodies of Greeks? Because, the Lutheran explains, Greek bodies being transported have not previously been buried. The Skeptic confines himself to remarking that if demons cause so many things, there must be an enormous number of demons.

    Coronaeus admits that “Senamus has proposed a very difficult but proper question,” and asks the Natural Philosopher to answer him. That gentleman demurs, referring it rather to the Jewish Scholar, inasmuch as the matter goes beyond physis. “We ought to seek an explanation of these things from the Hebrews, who drank divine secrets from those very fountains and sacred sources.” Moreover, he claims that both Aristotle and Porphyry wrote that “all things and hidden scientific knowledge had proceeded from the Chaldeans,” who were the original Hebrews; these “secrets of divine matters, treasures as it were,” have been “hidden” in “a certain occult discipline called Cabala which is inaccessible except to very few.” Salomon affirms that “the ancestors of our race were Chaldeans” who emigrated to Phoenicia. From there Cadmus “brought the alphabet to Greece.” “After our ancestors returned to Chaldea as prisoners”—the Babylonian Captivity—”they became acquainted with many things by divine communication.” “However,” he maintains (somewhat astonishingly) “we received nothing which has not been common knowledge throughout the whole world and available to everyone.” This speech meets with a respectful silence, the interlocutors not wishing “to disturb the elderly man” in his “honor and dignity.” Coronaeus finally speaks up, respectfully requesting that he reveal “only that which your customs, your discipline, your laws allow.” This account must wait for the third day.

    In the first two days of creation, God separates light from darkness and the heavens from the waters. In the first two days of the dialogue, the interlocutors address the difficulties of separating knowledge from ignorance and the divine from nature. Of the three questions Coronaeus proposes at the outset, two are addressed explicitly, the last (which of the many religions addresses God effectively?) indirectly, through the tensions that arise among the Seven. The paramount question for both religion and philosophy is causation, and this points inquirers to the “hidden secrets” of philosophy and the “secret matters” of religion, in particular the Cabala. Salomon replaces the story of Hermes teaching Orpheus, who then brought philosophy to Greece, with the story of the Hebrews teaching the alphabet to Cadmus, who brings it to Greece, and rabbis teaching true doctrines to Plato, who refines philosophy in Greece, in part by following Socrates’ turn from the materialist natural philosophers to political philosophy. Even the Natural Philosopher here partakes of Socratism by knowing that he does not know, and by citing Socrates’ guardian daemon. For his part, Coronaeus resembles Socrates in conversing but not writing. The Calvinist is Socratic in invoking the image of the cave of conventional opinion Socrates invents in the Republic; the Calvinist also Socratizes by turning the discussion to politics, indeed to a regime he describes as a republic, one modeled on the structure of God’s creation, nature.

    The distinction between God and man may be seen in the difficulty with which men struggle to separate light or knowledge from darkness or ignorance and even danger to the inquirer after knowledge and wisdom. It may also be seen in men’s struggle to clearly delineate the natural as distinguished from the supernatural. All agree that nature exists, but if the supernatural, especially in the form of angels and demons (as seen in the story of the Egyptian mummy), are taken to have power over nature, does nature really have a nature at all?

    The central pair of books concern political philosophy with respect to the preeminence of law (the topic of Plato’s Laws) and the best form of government (the topic of Plato’s Republic.) Can the impasse seen in the first pair of books, the impasse Socrates noted in the thought of the natural philosophers who proceeded him, be approached Socratically, through the ‘epistemological’ approach of considering nature not directly but indirectly, by dialectical engagement with the opinions of men? Coronaeus, for one, evidently has some interest in doing this, given his fascination with the diverse customs of nations.

    And so he begins the third day by returning to the Phaedo —specifically, to the passage at 107d when Socrates gives Simmias an account of the soul after death. Rather like Senamus, Simmias has expressed scepticism about the immortality of the soul. What men think of life after death has a moral implication, Socrates warns. If the soul is not immortal, bad men would welcome it as a release not only from their bodies but from their own souls’ defects. If the soul is immortal, then one should want to take care of it. Socrates goes on to say that after death the guardian daemon of each soul will guide that soul to the house of Hades. Impure souls will be shunned, and will wander for a time before being forced into the “proper dwelling place.” Pure souls will find gods for fellow-travelers and leaders, who will bring those souls to their proper dwelling place.

    Coronaeus remarks, “The difficulty of this passage makes me wonder why the ancient Greeks and Hebrews veiled their writings with such obscurity that even a wise man cannot really understand these precepts which are remarkably useful, first of all, and then enjoyable.” Aesop, Pythagoras, the poets, and “finally the most ancient philosophers hid the principles of their wisdom under a veil obscurity,” and “even sacred writings are full of allegories.” Declaring that “nothing is more useful than clarity,” the Lutheran declares that “there is no fault in a writer worse than undue obscurity.” The Calvinist thinks, on the contrary, that the ancients chose not to cast pearls before swine, or “to cheapen most precious wisdom by its accessibility.” The Skeptic dismisses exotericism as an attempt to “affect obscurity in words to produce admiration” for the writer. The Jewish Scholar, who will dominate the discussion on this day, says that the Skeptic’s complaint applies to sophists, not to the wise, “and surely not against those who veiled the teachings of sacred wisdom in very obscure writings”—men such as Moses Maimonides.

    Very well then, the Skeptic replies, “What does this saying—’The evil of man is superior to the goodness of women’—accomplish?” It is absurd on the face of it. But the face of it is not the meaning of it, the Jewish Scholar explains. “The blandishments of women,” even and especially those who are good in the sense of beautiful, “are worse than the harsh words of men.” “Likewise souls excel bodies.” In allegory, ‘woman’ means body. Further, “the intellectual faculty, however base it might be, excels lust, which is called the brute and mortal soul.” This teaching “cannot be understood literally,” inasmuch as the Bible features such good women as Deborah; it can only be understood allegorically. “The word man indicates natural form, and woman indicates matter, which also is often called in Proverbs meretrix (harlot), since, as a harlot takes pleasure in a number of men, so matter delights in a number of forms.”

    The use of allegory entails not only moral but religio-political distinctions. “Just as the people worshiped in the courtyard of the temple separately from the Levites, the priests but not the other Levites had access within the curtain, and only the high priest approached that most sacred place where the Ark of the Covenant was housed.” Similarly, in the Torah such things as the Decalogue and other commands, along with customs are “clearly explained,” understandable “by all”; “the occult rites and sacrifices which have less to do with salvation are understood only by the learned”; “the knowledge of the natural mysteries, the Cabala, is understood only by the most learned”; “finally, the most difficult of all pertains to the chariot which is described by Ezekial in a wondrous portrayal of the heavenly bodies and most holy matters.”

    The Skeptic asks, in his down-to-earth way, How is this useful? It will only stir resentment among the spiteful and confusion among the ignorant. The Jewish Scholar says it is useful in exercising the mind, inciting men to “abstain from faults and embrace true glory… seek health for the body, prudence and wisdom for the mind, and the closest union with immortal God.” Much of that, it should be noted, parallels what Socrates tells Simmias, with the exception of the last point. But as a man of the Bible the Jewish Scholar insists that “without divine aid” no one can understand “all things.” This is an indirect rebuke to the Skeptic: “In the discussion of divine affairs, first we must see that nothing escapes anyone heedlessly since nothing can be more serious or damnable. This usually happens to those who, inflated with pride in human affairs and subtleties of dialectics, think they can understand all things above, below, first and last with the sharp keenness of their own ability.” But “wisdom separates piety from impiety; intelligence separates the good from the evil; knowledge separates the true from the false, and art the useful from the useless.” Salomon’s namesake, the original Solomon, thus asked God for “intelligence, so that he could separate the base from the noble and thereby urge men to the fear and worship of God.” The keeping of secrets stimulates the ignorant and even the evil, the deformed souls, to seek the wisdom withheld. “Therefore [God] taught Moses and Isaiah by what arts they were to call back miserable men from their criminal and depraved lives to true honor and to restore them to salvation.”

    Salvation is necessary because man is mortal and inclined to evil. The Skeptic accordingly remarks that “nothing has challenged me for a longer time than the allegory of the tree and the serpent.” The Jewish Scholar says that Greek and Latin interpreters “did not know this allegory,” but Philo did, and his interpretation can be found in the Legum Allegoria. There one learns that Adam or Man means the mind; Eve or Woman means “outward sense”; the Serpent means pleasure, and serves as the link between mind and outward sense. “Of all the passions the most mischievous is pleasure”; “the life of the wicked is governed by pleasure.” That is why the Serpent is described as the most subtle of all the beasts that are upon the earth—lying, deceiving, telling the outward sense that partaking of the fruit of the Tree of Life will be good, ‘planting’ doubts of the goodness of God’s command, and thus of the goodness of God. When the outward sense rules the mind and seeks pleasure, it will injure both itself and the mind; hence the enmity between Woman and the Serpent, after the Fall.

    The Jewish Scholar explains guardian angels as guides to good men on earth. “If a good man has turned to a wrong thought, suddenly he recognizes in the recesses of his soul a teacher and guide who leads him away from the base thought.” This is what Socrates’ daemon did. Evil demons, by contrast, “are a torrent of flowing matter,” which, “with a blindness of soul and passion torture and blot out reason from those who insult God, the parent of all things, and do violence to the pious mother, the laws of nature.” Whenever Solomon says “Father” he means God; whenever he says “mother” he means nature. The torrent of flowing matter, then, by itself is bad, but God rules it within the entirety of His creation. Therefore, “we must not accuse angels and demons who bring no calamities unless ordered and follow only the decrees ordered by God. Furthermore, each man must accuse himself and admit his own faults,” whereby he has released the torrent of passions upon himself, to his own injury. “Those who fear demons commit a serious offense” because they ignore God’s rule over the whole of creation.

    The Skeptic remains troubled by the problem of evil. If God created Leviathan, “the prince of corruption and death,” then is He not “the author of evil,” “the cause of the cause”? The Jewish Scholar first remarks that Plato is mistaken in identifying matter with evil. God saw His creation, including matter, and pronounced it good. The Natural Scientist concurs: “There is no sin in matter in the first place because the force of action is not in matter but in form, and in the second place matter has no substance at all of itself in nature.” The Jewish Scholar says that the source of this error is in thinking that evil is “something when it is nothing at all.” In separating light from darkness, God made darkness the privation of light; allegorically, this means that “evil is nothing other than the privation of good”; it “follows the removal of good.” Thus ‘evil’ demons, in tempting human beings to crime, serve God’s purposes, as He “never allows any crime to be permitted unless something better will come from it.” For example, He “steals away famous and brave men in the prime of life lest they suffer worse conditions in this life.” God is not, Coronaeus summarizes, “the author of evils,” but rather the permitter of them, for the good.

    Coronaeus accordingly turns away from the problem of evil and asks the Jewish Scholar to address the Skeptic’s other point, namely, that there seems to be such a huge number of demons (and, Coronaeus adds, angels). This brings the discussion from morality to politics, to ruling and being ruled. The Jewish Scholar grants “that there is nothing more excellent in nature than the proper order,” and if so “there is no doubt that dominion and sovereignty exist in each order of angels and demons.” Leviathan rules the army of demons; Michael rules the angels, as seen in the Book of Daniel. Even the stars possess reason, understanding, contemplation and action, as suggested in a verse from the Psalms and another from the Book of Judges. The Muslim and the Calvinist affirm this claim. The Natural Philosopher finds in the orderly, slow movement of the stars evidence that they are natural beings, and the Jewish Scholar concurs. And the number of the stars is vast, the Lutheran adds, which would account for the huge number of celestial intelligences, conjoined with heavenly bodies even as intelligence is combined with bodies on earth. Intellect governs; nature is orderly, governed by intelligences.

    Given the emphasis on allegorical interpretation of Scripture, the reader will wonder whether this account of the heavens should be taken allegorically. The Book of Genesis itself calls the stars, sun, and moon the heavenly “signs.” The analogy of the natural concordia discors with the republican regime has already been posited by the Calvinist.

    It is also noteworthy that the third day of the Colloquium corresponds to both the third and the fourth days of creation. The Seven have considered the Biblical teaching that there is a vast sphere of water above the visible heavens, which accounts for the Flood, which occurred when God caused some of that water to pierce through the heavens and fall on the earth on the third day. They have said even more about the events of the fourth day, in which God created the heavenly bodies. The Jewish Scholar relates the sun and the moon to the active intellect, the angels, and the passive intellect (the human beings). The moon is “illuminated and derives its light in conjunction with the sun,” obscured “when it is separated from the sun’s orbit,” just as the human intellect is “enlightened by the attendance of an angel,” then “languishes and grows dull without the angel’s presence”—evil being the absence of good, as he remarked earlier. This is why Joshua “ordered the sun and moon to stand still so that he might utterly destroy the Moabites,” Israel’s evil enemies. He cautions that many of the ancient peoples erred in taking the lights of the heavens to be gods themselves, but the active intellect of the angels is not God; it derives from Him. Moreover, “the actions of angels as well as demons are attributed to God so that all may know that man must confess to eternal God alone, that He alone must be worshiped and feared,” not any part of His creation.

    The Skeptic “acknowledge[s] that power has been handed down to each best man who is skilled in governing.” He then reverses his previous argument almost literally, turning the matter upside down. If there is such a plenitude of angels and demons, what accounts for the scarcity of good men, good rulers, on earth? At most this shows that there are many more demons than angels. Coronaeus again asks the Jewish Scholar for assistance.

    Initially reluctant to continue to reveal wisdom revealed only to a few, the Jewish Scholar offers that the souls of evil men perish with their bodies. It is therefore unlikely that the heavens house so many demons as the Skeptic has ironically suggested. Those who do survive suffer “eternal dishonors,” the prophet Daniel testifies, paying justly for their crimes before perishing. In addition, the lives of the good on earth are lengthened by God, the lives of the bad abbreviated. “Certain boundaries for the life of each man have been established and decreed by God, and these can be extended according to the excellence of unusual virtues of each man. But the wicked diminish and contract the boundaries of time and life.” In these matters Catholic Coronaeus agrees, except of course regarding the doctrine of the mortality of souls.

    The Skeptic then questions the doctrine of resurrection. The Jewish Scholar says that mind, though invisible, is corporeal, like air. It isn’t the fleshly body that is resurrected but the mind, a “heavenly and delicate essence rather than… a heavy and impure body”—”the soul leaping from the tomb.” When the Bible-literalist Lutheran demurs, insisting that the concrete body is resurrected, the Jewish Scholar cautions him not to take Jacob’s ladder literally. In this he finds support from the Muslim, who cites Christ’s reply to “certain Epicurean Sadducees” who “asked Christ whose wife was the woman who had married seven husbands in turn,” eliciting Jesus’ deprecation of “the corporeal pleasures of marriage” and His affirmation that “the blessed would be like to angels.” The Jewish Scholar concedes that recently-deceased, undecomposed, corpses might be resurrected by the power of God, as when Elijah “brought forth the son of the widow of Sarepta,” a phenomenon that even the Skeptic is ready to admit.

    Coronaeus closes the discussion by begging his friends “by immortal God and for the right of our piety and friendship that we not allow ourselves to be pulled away by any enticing arguments from the established and accepted opinion of faith,” wandering into the profanation of mingling sacred and profane. He proposes a fresh but related topic for discussion on the fourth day: “whether it is proper for a good man to discuss religion.”

    The Seven spend the following morning listening to Bodin read a tragedy written by the Muslim on the parricide committed by three sons of Prince Solimannus. This raises questions, however. Suleiman the Magnificent, a contemporary of Bodin (and therefore of the Seven) was not the victim of parricide. Quite the opposite: He caused the deaths of two of his three sons. Why the distortion? In terms of the Colloquium, the ‘father’ of all religions is Judaism. If one is a Muslim, one can surely say that Judaism has three ‘sons’ who have attempted parricide, namely, Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism. In addition, like Suleiman’s three sons, they harbored fratricidal tendencies, as well (as did many rivals for the Turkish throne, through the centuries). And there is an even more radical possibility. If, as the Jewish Scholar has said, ‘Father’ means ‘God’ throughout the Book of Genesis, the Muslim may imply that the three Christian sects are deicidal.

    The piece receives universal congratulations for the craft with which it was composed ;the interlocutors are silent on its content. This seems to lead the Seven to take up the matter of musical harmonies, then harmonies generally. The Natural Philosopher speaks of the delight taken in “the blended union of opposites.” “Opposites when united by the interpolation of certain middle links present a remarkable harmony of the whole which otherwise perish if this whole world were fire or moisture”—the claim of the earliest Greek natural philosophers. The Skeptic continues to raise the problem of evil; in this concordia discors, such evils as disease, pain, and anxiety form part of the mixture. The Calvinist replies that “the poisonous toad in the garden or the spider in the house are as necessary for gathering poisons as the hangman in the state.” This begs the question of why the poisons need be there in the first place: Would not a state without evil men not be a happier state?

    The Skeptic’s interlocutors continue to talk around the question, albeit in interesting ways. They discuss the balance of hostile factions within the state, as seen in Rome’s mixed regime of patricians and plebeians. The Calvinist says that although “nothing is more dangerous in a state than for citizens to be split into two factions, whether the conflict is about laws, honors, or religion,” if there are “many factions, there is no danger of civil war, since the groups, each acting as a check on the other, protect the stability and harmony of the state.” In this he looks back to Aristotle, who regards the mixed regime as the best practicable regime, and ahead to James Madison and his argument for the “extended republic” in the tenth Federalist. That is, conflict among the evil can generate good. The Jewish Scholar adds that even angels fight among themselves, even if these are conflicts “of virtues and noble souls.” There is no avoiding strife. The Muslim cites the example of the kings of the Turks and the Persians, who “admit every kind of religion in the state,” producing “a remarkable harmony” in “reconcil[ing] all citizens and foreigners who differ in religions among themselves and with the state.” The Jewish Scholar also endorses kingship, although he is thinking of the Lord of Heaven.

    Should a state establish a religion, even if it tolerates other religions? If so, on what terms? (The Muslim neglected to mention that the religious toleration seen in Muslim country nonetheless subordinates non-Muslims, permitting them only the status of dhimmitude.) The Lutheran, Catholic Coronaeus, and the Jewish Scholar advocate a religious establishment; the Skeptic, the Muslim, and the Natural Philosopher are the religious pluralists. (The Skeptic argues that either all existing religions are false or one is true; if so, then none should be excluded since the right one might be among those.) The Calvinist takes a more moderate ground, advocating political pluralism but not religious pluralism, inasmuch as the practices of some religions, up to and including ritual homicide, are evil.

    The Lutheran worries that “whoever admits a variety of religious differences seems to bestir an upheaval of the true religion.” Who, after all, “can worship God and a demon at the same time”? The Jewish Scholar would not have the state punish the impious, but simply refuse to reward them. “The piety of the nations is impiety toward God,” and while such Gentile piety should not be persecuted, neither should it be honored.

    Among the pluralists, the Muslim is concerned not so much with heterodoxy (of which he himself might be suspected, by fellow Muslims); atheism is the danger, not heterodoxy. “I think that the man who scorns the true religion and false divinities, which are believed to be true, is guilty of the greatest impiety.” Coronaeus, no pluralist, nonetheless concurs with that sentiment, saying that he believes all of the Seven “are convinced it is much better to have a false religion than no religion,” because even a false religion holds wicked men to their moral and civic duties. Anarchy is worse than a regime founded on falsehood. He is thinking of his bète noir, Epicurus, who “committed an unpardonable sin because in trying to uproot the fear of divinity he seems to have opened freely all the approaches to sin.”

    The Lutheran criticizes pluralism because if error in religion is excused, a “cowardly servant” could avoid a just flogging by pleading that he “neglected the commands of his master” out of error. That is, religious pluralism tends to dissolve all authority. The Skeptic ripostes that “Indeed this is so, if we agree with the words of Luke.” He doesn’t. “Who will be so unfair a judge, so cruel a tyrant who wishes to kill those who violate the prince’s edicts which have been secretly hidden?” He seems to suggest that the Christian commands Luke issues and the Lutheran endorses are unknown to many, that (for example) an eternity in Hell is unjust punishment for those who have never heard the Gospel. The Calvinist claims that the divine law has indeed been promulgated—often, and for a long time. “But if there are laws contrary to laws and lawgivers hostile to lawgivers, religion opposed to religion, priests warring with priests,” the Skeptic replies, “what will the poor subjects do when they are pulled here and there into the sects?” And when the Lutheran asks, rhetorically, “Who can doubt that the Christian religion is the true religion or rather the only one?” the Muslim has an easy rejoinder: “Almost all the world”—Asia, most of Africa, much of Europe. Yes, but “the best kind of religion is not determined by numbers of people, but by the weight of truth which God himself has commanded.”

    Coronaeus rescues his friends, and their conversation, by recalling the question he had presented the night before: “Is it proper for a good man to discuss religions?” Should we be having this latter debate at all?

    The Natural Philosopher says it is not proper, saying that “Plato was wise in saying that it is difficult to find the parent of the universe and wrong to spread it abroad when you find him.” It is not Plato who says this but Timaeus, a character in a Platonic dialogue; at least one character in Bodin’s dialogue does not understand the dialogue form. Be this as it may, what the Natural Philosopher and Timaeus (and quite possibly Plato) think is that philosophy isn’t for everybody. This point the Natural Philosopher does understand. As he puts it, with some acerbity, “The common herd whose eyes are covered with mist cannot comprehend the splendor of sublime kings,” and even those can comprehend it lack “the eloquence to describe the secrets of divine majesty,” about which even the wise may be in error. The Jewish Scholar regards “conversation about religion” as “dangerous,” as the discussants may offend God and, in addition, “it is wrong to uproot anyone’s opinion of piety, of whatever sort it may be, or to cast doubt by arguments on anyone’s religion unless you believe you will persuade him of something better.” Indeed, when the Hebrew high priest “tried in friendship to draw Florus to the worship of one eternal God and turn him from the worship of empty idols, he was unsuccessful, and he caused deadly hostilities with a powerful enemy.” [4] The Lutheran agrees with the Natural Philosopher that “it is both dangerous and destructive for the masses to engage in discussion about the accepted and approved religion unless one can control the resisting common people by divine power, as Moses did, or by arms, as Mohammed did”; this notwithstanding, “a private discussion about divine matters among educated men” is indeed “fruitful.” For his part, the Skeptic also argues against the introduction of any new religion, even if it were true.

    Coronaeus attempts to coax the Jewish Scholar into further discussion. He refuses, on four grounds: he is prohibited by Jewish laws and customs because Jews do not want to disturb needed certainties; he is too old to change his opinions; at least one of his interlocutors, the Lutheran, refuses to be converted in accordance with his own principles; God would disapprove if Salomon were to convert to another religion. The Skeptic, the Muslim, and the Natural Philosopher lend the Jewish Scholar their support in this.

    The Lutheran persists: “But what if the reason [for discussion] is for teaching or learning?” This draws a thorough reply from the Natural Philosopher. Religion is grounded either in knowledge, opinion, or faith. If grounded in opinion, that opinion will often waver “between truth and falsehood” during a heated discussion, undermining piety. If grounded in knowledge, religion must rest on first principles “which admit no discussion of this kind.” “Moreover, there is no one, in my opinion, who has devoted himself to the proofs of each religion,” only those who have sought to prove their own religion—rather like the Seven themselves. Finally, if grounded on faith, religion will be injured by discussion because “faith is destroyed if it must rely on proof and science.” Science means knowledge; “knowledge alone can check the mind drawn here and there in different directions,” as it is when ruled by opinion. But “the theologians believe that faith is pure assent without proof.” Science and faith are therefore incompatible. For example, “whoever agrees with a teacher of geometrical theories and does not understand geometry has faith, not knowledge. But if he understands geometry, he obtains knowledge, but at the same moment loses faith.” Theologians call faith a virtue “which has God as its only proof and object,” a proof “granted by divine gift and concession,” not by ratiocination or even noetic apprehension by the divinely unassisted mind. Further, rational proofs proceed by logical necessity; one cannot not accept the Pythagorean theorem once having understood the proof of it. If, however, “faith is based on free assent, it is the greatest impiety to try to tear away from anyone by human arguments the instruction which God has bestowed from his bountiful goodness.” And that is why “we must abstain altogether from discussions about religion.”

    Catholic Coronaeus will have none of that. Discussion of religion can proceed, argumentation can occur without great risk, if the arguments are grounded on reason, authority, tradition, knowledge, and clear proofs.” Such discussion ought to be undertaken “in the interest of the union of humanity and love that man has with man.” This is the first invocation of Christian love in the dialogue. It fails to convince the others. The Calvinist speaks up for the first time, observing that “Mohammedans and Jews refrain from discussions about religion because they cannot see the clear light of Christian truth with bleary eyes”—an accusation that by itself tends to block inquiry.

    The provocateur Skeptic wants to know who would arbitrate such a discussion. The replies illustrate the difficulty: the Lutheran cries, “Christ the Lord!”; the Catholic says, the Church; and the Jewish Scholar says, the Israelites. As the Skeptic politely puts it, “Necessarily, the religion which has God as its author is the true religion, but the difficulty is in discerning whether He is the author of this religion or that religion. This is the task and the difficulty.” It is so great a difficulty that the Lutheran himself, a man of no small certitude, wishes “that a certain Elias in sight of kings and people would prove by a heavenly sign which religion from so many is best.” [5] The Jewish Scholar, who well knows the difficulties Elijah encountered, says that even that wouldn’t work: “No miracles and signs move the wicked.” “Elias” Bodin has turned to other methods.

    A discussion of demonic deceptions and the unreliability of dreams ensues, followed by the assertion by the Natural Philosopher and the Jewish Scholar that the oldest religion is the best. Since religious novelty has been conceded to be disruptive, and since the oldest religion is the closest one to God, there is no need for either new arguments or new revelations, especially since arguments are perennially questionable and unsettling, revelations suspect as possibly demonic or delusional.

    But what is the oldest religion? The Natural Philosopher considers “natural religion” the oldest, the one consisting in the law of nature. The Jewish Scholar of course holds up divine law, which consists of moral law (worship of God and the duties of men), ritual law, and political law. Citing Philo, he avers that “there is no sacrifice, no sacred verses, no rites which do not contain the most beautiful secrets of things hidden in the treasure chest of nature.” That is, Jewish law encompasses the natural law, which can be discovered by Philo’s allegorical way of interpreting Scripture. Thus “the first tablet of the Decalogue pertains to the higher faculty of the soul which is the mind itself [symbolized, one recalls, by ‘Adam’ or ‘Man], to which the laws of the first tablet about divine worship are related; the second tablet is related to the lower part of the soul by which we are taught to control anger, to restrain passion, to master desire, to keep our minds, eyes, and hands from another’s possessions”—the soul’s right relation to the body, ‘Eve,’ ‘Woman.’

    The Natural Philosopher proves receptive to this claim. He remembers having been told by “a Jewish astrologer” that each of the Ten Commandments refers to one of the ten “celestial orbs.” The first commandment, to worship God alone, honors “the supreme author of universal nature’; the second commandment refers to “the second orb which is called by the Hebrews desert-place because no star is contained in this heaven,” paralleling the prohibition of graven images; the third commandment, forbidding His people to take His name in vain, corresponds to the planets and the stars, which we must swear oaths by; the fourth, establishing the holiness of the Sabbath “is related to the orb of Saturn to whom also the seventh day of Saturn is vowed”; the fifth, commanding children to honor parents, refers to Jupiter, the “helping father” among the Olympians; the sixth, prohibiting murder, refers to Mars, the man-slayer and destroyer of cities; the seventh, prohibiting “adulteries and lusts, is fitting to Venus’ orb”; the eighth, prohibiting theft, “is in the sphere of Mercury whom the ancients made the god of traders and the originator of gain”; the ninth, forbidding lies, “is attributed to the sun about which Vergil said, ‘Who can say that the sun lies?” and stands for esteem for the  truth and mercy of God; finally, the tenth orb, that of the moon, that inconstant body which symbolizes our desires, which “we are ordered to restrain.” To all of this the Jewish Scholar simply adds that the Decalogue was God’s renewal of the natural law, which had been violated by human sins and crimes. “All the secrets of the highest matters and the hidden treasures of nature are concealed in the divine laws” (emphasis added).

    The Natural Philosopher agrees, except on one point. The “divine law is altogether consistent with nature except for the Fourth Commandment, on the Sabbath. While the Jewish Scholar concedes that this commandment was “a token between God and His chosen people,” it nonetheless serves a natural purpose, enabling us to fill our bodies with strength and to increase our wisdom in study. To those who object that the Sabbath rendered Israelites helpless against their enemies, he replies that “vengeance against the powers of the air” protected them. On the mundane level, the Sabbath may be broken if necessary, for example in self-defense against enemy attack, because “the laws were not made for the safety of the laws but for the safety of men.”

    The Jewish Scholar then goes on the attack himself, criticizing Catholics for worshiping saints, which he regards as a sort of polytheism. Coronaeus wants to reply but holds back, “lest I seem to have hampered anyone’s liberty of speaking.” In this he is no Socrates, but he is a wise ruler of the colloquium. Does this suggest that the paradoxical character of the philosopher-kings sketched by Socrates in the Republic—that the intrepid inquiry of the philosopher doesn’t fit well with prudential decisions needed to rule well? And if there were no philosopher-kings, but kings did philosophize—perhaps by reading the Colloquium—how would they manage such inquiries in civil society?

    A discussion of prayer and other religious customs brings the Muslim to a lengthy defense of Islam. It transpires that he is a convert from Christianity, a fact that the Lutheran wonders at. In his apologia, the Muslim discovers himself as a highly selective adherent to the faith. He cites with approval Averroës’ dismissal of the Muslim Heaven as “a paradise for pigs”—itself an adaptation of Glaucon’s complaint in the Republic, that Socrates and Adeimantus have proposed a city for pigs, not for real men. The Muslim does praise the Koran, but only if the “empty fables” in it are excised. His reason for conversion to Islam evidently was his desire for liberation from slavery, inasmuch as Christianity does give some support to the maintenance of slavery: “Many are accustomed to embrace Mohammed and allow themselves to be circumcised in order to obtain freedom.” This more than suggests a certain deviation from full belief in the content of Islam. It comes as no shock when he later endorses the Platonic and Xenophontic recommendation of the noble lie, regarding both Heaven and Hell as examples thereof.

    And this has been true of many if not all among the Seven, with their allegorizing interpretations of Judaism and Christianity. The Natural Philosopher asserts, “If true religion is contained in the pure worship of eternal God, I believe the law of nature is sufficient for man’s salvation. We see that the oldest leaders and parents of the human race had no other religion” than this “oldest and best of all” religions, namely, the natural religion. Both the Jewish Scholar and the Muslim concur, although the Calvinist understandably remains more severe, especially with regard to Catholicism and Islam.

    But the agreement between the Natural Philosopher, the Jewish Scholar, and the Muslim on the basis of the natural religion must be considered a breakthrough. If representatives of those three stances can come to an agreement on a shared foundation for a political regime, a city like Venice has the potential to endure and continue to thrive as a regime where commerce in material and intellectual goods has found a home.

    These two central books of the Colloquium illustrate the Socratic approach to some advantage, even when attempted in a regime, indeed a civilization, which now sees prophetic religions rather than the ancient civic religions Socrates saw. Part of the solution to the religio-political problem in modern times is Socratic-Platonic: exotericism, respect for the secrets of the sublime, seen in Plato’s noble lie as recommended by the Muslim. Part of the solution to the political problem is not so much Platonic as Aristotelian, although none of the interlocutors, all of them inclined to criticize Aristotle, says so. This is the mixed-regime republicanism the Calvinist recommends, which dilutes factional conflict, even among evil men.

    In view of the Muslim’s defense of the noble lie, Coronaeus sets the following question for the discussion after dinner: “Whether it is right for a good man to feel otherwise about religion than he confesses publicly.”

    Book V begins with the after-dinner discussion on the fourth day of the colloquy. Bodin has continued reading the Muslim’s play about Suleiman the Great. But the focus of attention now is a basket full of natural and artificial fruit Coronaeus has placed on the table. The artificial fruits are so lifelike that it’s hard to distinguish them from the real ones; comically, it is the somewhat dogmatically-inclined Lutheran who bites into one of the fakes. If the senses are so easily deceived in such an insignificant matter, Coronaeus asks, how can we have “certain knowledge of difficult and sublime matters?” Wounded, the Lutheran deplores dissimulation, presumably including noble lies.

    Later on, the Jewish Scholar will reveal that the center of the Book of Genesis contains the key teaching of that book. It so happens that the discussion of the distinction between art and nature occurs at the center of the Colloquium. There he says, “Art is the ray of man, but nature is the ray of God; moreover, art is so far from conquering or equaling nature that it cannot even imitate it.” This amounts to a denial of the modern philosophic project as outlined by Machiavelli and, and few decades after Bodin, by Bacon. The wisest of the Israelites, the Jewish Scholar’s namesake, outsmarted the wily Queen of Sheba, who tried to deceive him with artificial flowers. Solomon commanded that bees be brought in, and they foiled the deception. Animal instincts can be more reliable than human opinion, if that opinion does not marshal animal instincts wisely.

    Still smarting from his Catholic host’s playful deception, and by no means lacking Martin Luther’s thumotic temper, the Lutheran wishes that men “who know very keenly how to simulate the false and conceal the true with such happiness be exposed.” But Coronaeus disagrees. The power of omniscience is “proper to God alone.” “For if every wish and thought of all men were exposed to all, good men would not be able to protect their innocence against the power of wicked men”—who would know their intended victims all too well—”nor could just punishments be meted out for the wicked, because according to human laws, wicked thoughts do not merit punishment.” In human beings were omniscient, bad men “would always try to trap good men, but good men would never try to tap the wicked.”

    The Lutheran nonetheless deplores the ways of religious hypocrites, who do one thing while thinking and feeling another, secretly. The Skeptic responds with a typology of religious and irreligious men. He identifies seven classes of religious men: those who practice public and private worship of the eternal God, without fear; those who practice private worship and decline public worship of idols; captives who publicly worship idols but privately worship the eternal God; public worshipers of idols who do so in order to avoid losing their wealth or being exiled; private worshipers of “domestic gods” who shun the temples of the civic gods; those who worship “private gods and a false religion” both privately and in public; private doubters who worship in public. There are four classes of atheists: deceivers who want the reputation of piety; magicians and sorcerers who worship publicly but mentally curse God while thinking Him real; those who openly “follow like animals their lustful desires”; mockers of religion—”the most loathsome of all” atheists.

    The Skeptic’s colleagues discuss these options. The Lutheran and the Calvinist support public confession of faith. The Muslim defends the noble lie, if necessary: “When two wrongs are proposed the greater must be avoided”; public worship and private disbelief is bad, but private belief coupled with public worship of idols is less bad. The Jewish Scholar disagrees, saying that idolatry is worse than atheism because idolatry unites God with created things, a violation of the Second Commandment.

    What of those who simply know no better than to worship idols? The Natural Philosopher says that this is excusable in the uneducated and the mis-educated, “but there is no just cause of error for those educated and especially for those who have been imbued with a knowledge of natural things, from which they could have drawn the clearest ideas about the nature, power, and goodness of one God, as Paul himself openly declares” in his well-known ‘argument from design.’ The Jewish Scholar agrees that “there is a remarkable power of nature inserted in the minds of men which awakens them to piety, justice, and all virtues,” but “it is no more possible for man to attain divine knowledge without God’s inspiration than for a picture in a dark place to seem distinct without a clear light,” no matter how well-painted it may be. Otherwise, prophecy would be superfluous.

    The Skeptic advances the most latitudinarian view, that all the religions represented by the Seven “are not unpleasing to eternal God and are excused as just errors” because religiosity itself leads to virtue. The Natural Philosopher disagrees. He, the Muslim, and the Jewish Scholar all agree that “the true religion is the natural religion.” “What is the need for Jupiter, Christ, Mohammed, mortal and fictile gods?” He cites Job as his exemplar. “Who likewise entwined more secrets of natural and divine things in allegory than he? Who of mortal men has worshiped eternal God more purely?” An Arab who predated Moses, and “who lived by no other law than the law of nature, the law of Abel,” Job nonetheless merited God’s praise as the most just, pious, and pure mortal. Further, “Job neither hoped nor ever thought that Christ, who was born two thousand years afterwards would come—much less Mohammed.” Job never worshiped such natural phenomena as the sun and the stars, worshiping God alone. For this reason, the Natural Philosopher prefers “clear arguments” to authoritative books.

    How do you differ from “the philosophers?” the Lutheran quite understandably wants to know. The Jewish Scholar amplifies his earlier assertion about the need for divine revelation. Because human reason is insufficient to understand God—one might observe that Job speaks with Him—and because in today’s world divine prophecies are “very rare,” we need the Book. He cites the some many Christian and Islamic sects as evidence that human beings should recur to the Torah and abandon religious speculation undisciplined by it.

    The two Protestants protest. The Lutheran insists that Christian sectarians agree on basic doctrine. The Protestant concedes that God chose the Israelites as His people, but they eventually denied God (i.e., Jesus) and brought down God’s wrath upon themselves. The Jewish Scholar rejoins that the Chaldeans killed more of their descendants, the Israelites than Christians have done, five hundred years before Christ. Further, Christians have suffered martyrdom, too. Why, then, were attacks on Jews by Christians a sign of God’s displeasure, and why is Christian martyrdom not such a sign? He explains calamities inflicted on Jews as punishment for failing to hold themselves separate from other nations, not for amalgamating with them. “Good men must not fear harsh fates.” Moreover, God’s punishment of Jews “is the very greatest proof of divine love for us,” as “prudence is obtained by punishments and griefs.” By scattering Jews around their empire, the Romans inadvertently spread the critique of the idolatry of their own civil religion; “those to whom heaven has fallen do not need land,” and indeed the Jews’ very landlessness now only enhances their holiness or separation from the concerns of nations that have land to defend.

    The Hebrew language itself “has been granted to the race of men by a divine gift. The other languages… are illegitimate and fashioned by the will of men. This language alone is the language of nature and is said to give names to things according to the nature of each,” as Adam did, at God’s command, in Eden. This alone shows that Jews constitute “the true church of God.”

    This is all too much for the Calvinist, who charges that Jews killed their own prophets, Christian apostles, and even Christ Himself, through whom members of the true Church can only be only be chosen, as seen in Jesus’ statements, “No one comes to Me unless the Father shall have drawn him” and “No one comes to the Father but through Me.” Jews, Romans, and Ismaelites (Muslims), pagans, and Epicureans “separated themselves of their own accord from the roll of the church.” The Jewish Scholar denies that there can be such an invisible church, inasmuch as ‘church’ means “a coming together” that can be seen, not an “invisible church of the elect.”

    The Lutheran attempts to falsify Judaism by citing predictions of the coming of the Messiah and the several false Messiahs who were Jewish. The Jewish Scholar explains that the ancient Greeks and Latins “did not sufficiently comprehend” what the word ‘Messiah’ (translated into Greek as Christon) means: simply an anointed king or prince. Both Samuel and David “call themselves Messiahs.” “Therefore, those who think there is or will be only one Messiah are mistaken,” and even “more dangerous” is “the error of those who think that this messiah, who we hope will come, will be God” and indeed “the savior of the human race.” Jews rather expect a Messiah in the sense of “a strong leader” who will bring “the Israelites, scattered here and there, into Palestine and their ancestral homes and free them from the high-handed domination of others.” Jesus did not liberate God’s people from Roman servitude. He deprecates Jesus as “a dead leader.”

    The Calvinist says, “I receive this answer very coldly.” He denies that rabbis have come to a consistent teach about the term, ‘Messiah.’ Both Protestants charge that Jews have distorted the meaning of their prophets’ own words. “You see what deplorable ignorance of the sacred language has driven the Christian theologians,” the Jewish Scholar replies, to which the Lutheran responds, “The Jews stir up amazing subtleties not as much out of ignorance as out of obstinacy so that they may color the clear passages of sacred scripture with inky darkness.” After more philological dispute, the Jewish Scholar continues to maintain that “it is necessary to return to the springs of the Hebrews if there is any ambiguity in the Greeks.” In doing so, not only the meaning of Hebrew words but their placement in the books of the Bible must be heeded if the secrets of the sublime are to be understood. The middle passage of Genesis—”You shall live on your sword”—is crucial, as are the middle passages of other books, including the Psalms. [6] The Hebrew Bible was composed with scrupulous care. But “no one can say what kind or whose writing the New Testament is.” “The written tablets of the Old Testament are most certain; their testimonies are most authentic according to the consensus of not only Hebrews but also Christians and Ismaelites. But what faith can there be in the Gospels which the Hebrews and Ismaelites rightly reject?”

    The Calvinist answers that “if you reject the evangelical testimonies, it is as if you denied the principles of the sciences, without which not even the geometricians will have any proof.” The Muslim objects: “The principles or postulates of the sciences lie open to all the understanding of all men and are clear to the minds of the unlearned. But on what principles do these things which are contrary to nature rely?”—that is, the virgin birth, the new star that stood in the sky over Bethlehem when Mary gave birth.

    The Muslim also contends that the Gospels are full of contradictions, sparking a debate over these alleged contradictions. The Lutheran, who earlier called the whole discussion of language “very subtle, or should I say futile,” now intervenes to say, “Trifling critics and those who split hairs find everywhere an infinite variety of readings and times.” This spells crisis for Socratic philosophy in circumstances when prophetic religions dispute. To claim a divine revelation delivered in words poses a problem that Socrates did not need to face, namely, which language was used to convey that revelation, and how (or even can) that language be accurately translated? This puts a premium on those who ‘rule’ the chosen language. This controversy would enter philosophy some four centuries after Bodin, with Heidegger, who claimed that one can philosophize adequately only in Greek or German.

    To counter the Jewish Scholar, the Calvinist relies on an argument from exotericism in the Gospels. “Christ spoke one way to the Apostles another way to the Scribes and Pharisees who customarily maligned his words.” It might be added that Jesus commended both the innocence of doves and the prudence of serpents, before sending His disciples out into the world.

    Abandoning philology for logic, the Jewish Philosopher says, “I do not understand what divinity there can be in Christ,” since “what is more alien to divine power than for God to be tormented by a demon?” Additionally, God is omniscient, yet “unless the Gospel is strongly distorted one cannot deny that Christ did not know many things.” How then could Jesus ask His Father why He was forsaken? The Calvinist recurs to traditional Christian doctrine: “Christ was not only true God but also true man, nor had each nature been mingled in him.” Further, Christ has been given authority to judge the world, and only God can have that.” He reaffirms the spiritual necessity of “never allow[ing] ourselves to be separated from the acknowledged faith,” regardless of any troubling arguments against that faith. That is, faith is faith.

    Looking ahead to the next day’s discussion, Coroneaus tells the Calvinist, “Indeed you have spoken most correctly, Curtius. However, it is not enough to have explained that Christ is true God and man, as we are persuaded, unless we know what is the unity of each nature and of what sort it is.”

    The discussion recorded in the sixth book is Friday, the fifth day of the colloquium; to go further in the week would be to violate the Sabbath of the Jewish Scholar. The fifth day and sixth book parallel the fifth and sixth days of the Creation week, wherein God created first the “moving creatures that hath life”—those that move in the air and those that move in the water—all “after their kind,” then the land animals, each “after his kind,” and finally man, after His “image” and “likeness,” with rule over all the other moving creatures. “Male and female he created them,” and all of these creatures are blessed with the capacity to “be fruitful and multiply.”

    Human dominion over the other moving creatures is on display almost immediately in Book Six, as the Skeptic twits Coronaeus for observing Catholicism’s Friday fast by eating fish, a food once regarded as a delicacy fit for kings. The Seven briefly discuss animal sacrifices.

    They are much more interested in discussing the nature of man and his relation to God. The Skeptic and the Lutheran as if the reports of men’s great longevity, as reported in the early books of the Bible, are plausible. The Natural Philosopher suggests that God granted long life to give men time to establish the arts and sciences, the exercise of reason; the Calvinist suggests that God intended to grant time to propagate the human race, a thought closer to the teaching of revelation. Given that Bodin began the meeting by reading from a tragedy he wrote on a high priest and interpreter of the divine law who “atoned for the death of three leaders by begging remission from God,” readers are led to suppose that the interpretations of divine revelation that follow, whether naturalistic or spiritual, have life-and-death significance, and may expose the interpreters to the need for divine pardon when they are done interpreting.

    A discussion of fasting leads to a consideration of the varieties of religious custom generally, including dancing, the use of musical instruments, and songs. But it isn’t long before the Natural Philosopher and the Muslim renew their criticisms of the Christian doctrine which holds that Christ is both man and God. The Natural Philosopher insists that God can only be spoken of not as what He is (as we do of natural beings) but as “what He is not”—not created, not mortal, and so on. The Jewish Scholar agrees that it is wrong “to join the incorporeal God to any creature,” as this fails to conform “to the nature and essence of God” and is “also contrary to the honor of His majesty.” The Muslim sneers that it wasn’t hard to convince Greeks and Latins that God took on human flesh because they were accustomed to stories of gods mating with mortals.

    The Lutheran replies that “the remarkable acts of Christ and His wondrous deeds furnish that which the weakness of the human mind cannot grasp,” but the Muslim dismisses these acts by likening them to magicians’ tricks. Coronaeus says that no magician has attracted a following that has spread so widely and endured so long. “A monkey is a monkey, though clothed in purple, so a magician, however he presents himself, will always be like himself,” and eventually found out. The Skeptic refutes this argument by observing that paganism lasted for centuries longer than Christianity has lasted so far, and was “considered most religious” for all that time; mere longevity is no valid evidence of truth. The Jewish Scholar adds that in any event Judaism has endured longer than Christianity, and longer than many paganisms.

    Coronaeus returns the discussion to the question of how the “divine and [the] human” could have been united in the person of Christ. The Natural Philosopher goes on the attack. A creature “is able to be and not to be,” but the divine person is immortal.” Therefore, in Christ “the will of God was to produce only a creature, not only a person divine and uncreated.” The Lutheran points to Christ’s dual nature; “in Him it is necessary that contradictions be true at the same time,” since the purpose of each nature was different. The Calvinist warns that “we have entered an inextricable labyrinth,” which defers the debate, temporarily.

    The Skeptic raises a more manageable problem. In commanding His disciples to pray for their enemies, Jesus contradicted the teachings of David and the prophets. The Jewish Scholar heartily concurs. While it is true that “there is no greater or better antidote against the lust of raging vengeance and the desire for revenge than to pour it all into the bosom of God Himself who would receive no vengeance except the most just,” the “new lawgiver,” Jesus, “detract[s] from the divine law” by commanding His disciples to turn the other cheek if struck. “All divine and human laws have always allow and will always allow one to repel an unjust blow from his head in an honorable manner”; to say otherwise is “absurd,” as “the wicked would be allowed to do everything against the good, and the good would be allowed to do nothing against the wicked.” The Lutheran remarks that Jesus’ precept isn’t comprehensive but rather a commendation of patience with and goodwill toward one’s enemies.

    The Calvinist goes further in defending Jesus, saying that He surpassed the prophets of the Old Testament, as testified by those prophets themselves, who anticipated the advent of a Messiah. The Jewish Scholar rejects this claim as well, affirming that God reserved “the salvation of all” to Himself; “He did not say through His Son Jesus.” The Calvinist responds by turning the discussion back to the combination of divine and human in Christ’s person. Jesus was “called Savior not as a man, but as a Creator”; “the divine essence was not mingled with the human mind.”

    What, then, is the character of this union? The Natural Philosopher again invokes the principle of non-contradiction. Finite and infinite cannot be united, unless “a certain third nature [was] established from both”—as Hegel would argue, much later. Not only does this disprove the possibility of a God-Man but it also disproves the possibility of God as Trinity, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

    Coronaeus “see[s] no contradiction in these pronouncements: God is one, God is not one, because they are not in the same order. The first is in the order of essence; the second is in the order of persons.” No, the Natural Philosopher says: “It is not possible that things which are united to one third thing are not united among themselves, and things which are to one thing the same among themselves are the same, according to the very principles and decrees of philosophy,” all founded on the principle of non-contradiction. “Therefore, if the divine mind is united with the human mind and the human mind to body, it is necessary that there will be the same union of divine mind and body. This is ridiculous; therefore, the former is.” The limited human mind cannot “combine with eternal God into a unity” because God’s infinitude precludes such a unity. The Jewish Scholar cites Maimonides on this point: “Moses Rambam thinks that he who believes there is anything corporeal in God is guilty of a more serious blasphemy than he who worships idols.”

    The Lutheran dismisses this last point with an ad hominem argument. “Talmudic theologians” are “subverters of the Christian religion, who try by every means to snatch deity away from Christ, and reason, memory, and will which He shares in a certain way with man from God.” There is a real argument embedded in this: To say that Jesus was both God and man does mean that He was God and man at the same time, for 33 years, but it doesn’t mean that He was God and man with respect to the same ‘part’ of Christ. An infinite being could manifest itself in bodily form while remaining infinite in its essential being; an omniscient mind could restrict itself within that manifestation while remaining omniscient ‘in Heaven,’ that is, in its ruling capacity over that locally self-limited mind.

    The Calvinist brushes past the arguments, saying simply that “faith is needed.” He cites Plato’s Laws (V. 738c), where the Athenian Stranger, in the Calvinist’s words, “orders the things which have been handed down by the elders to be believed without proof.” In the Laws itself, the Athenian Stranger discusses what should be done in founding a new city or in re-founding an old one that has become corrupted—either of which might apply to Jesus’ founding of his Ecclesia, as He conceives it. The Athenian Stranger says that an intelligent founder will not try to change what has been laid down by the three main Greek oracles—the ones at Delphi, Dodena, and Ammon; nor will he alter what has been ordained by the “ancient sayings” of those oracles. This is consistent with Jesus’ insistence that He changes not one jot or tittle of Jewish law, for Jews.

    “That may be so for Christians,” the Natural Philosopher replies. If, as the Lutheran says, “There is one Father, unborn, and one Son, born from time eternal,” then, the Natural Philosopher says, that means “the substance of the Father and Son is different.” Even if one says, as the Lutheran does, that “hypostasis is is different from essence”—that is, the three Persons of God differ from the essence of God—”nothing begets itself nor can be the cause of itself.” If it could beget itself, this would mean that it was incomplete, not a whole. And in that case the Son “is different from the Father, not in the respect of persons but in the whole order of substance, as seen in what he says John has Jesus say in John 14:24: “The Father who sent Me is of another kind.” (As it happens, that isn’t what John has Jesus say; He says, “the word which you hear is not mine, but that Father’s which sent me.”)

    The Natural Philosopher recurs to his core argument. “Nothing is so alien to God as to grant a part to Him or to take away a part, since His own nature cannot have parts; otherwise [His nature] would be bodily and indeed divisible.” The Lutheran counters, “in divinity God is not the efficient cause of the Son, but the essential cause, which is very different from the efficient cause.” To say the Father “begot” the Son is not to say that He begot Him in the way a natural father begets a son, as the planter of his ‘seed,’ but as an emanation of Himself. As Coronaeus explains it, “the Father is eternal without a progenitor and the Son also eternal but with a progenitor,” just as fire and the warmth it generates are simultaneous, or as the sun and the light it generates are simultaneous.

    In that case, the Natural Philosopher says, they are not the same. Further, you can’t say that Christ was born but is also eternal. The Lutheran goes back to the Calvinist’s earlier insistence that these matters must be accepted on faith, inasmuch as “God cannot be comprehended in the hovel of the human mind.”

    There are at least two questions here, a fact that explains the philosopher and the Christians are ‘talking past one another.’ Coronaeus isn’t saying that Father and Son are simply the same—else why distinguish them in the first place? He is saying that the Father’s generation of His Son, like heat from fire and light from the sun, is simultaneous with His being, which is eternal. It is not self-contradictory to say that heat and fire, light and sun, are ‘essentially’ the same in the sense that it’s ‘of the essence’ of fire to generate heat, sun to generate light.

    On the other hand, the invocation of faith by the Christians doesn’t suffice. If I say, ‘I hold in my hand a round object,’ you can believe me, have faith in what I say, or disbelieve me, either by denying my claim outright or by asking for proof of it—’atheism’ or ‘agnosticism,’ respectively. If I say, ‘I hold in my hand a square object,’ the same responses are possible. But if I say, ‘I hold in my hand an object that is a round square,’ you cannot possibly believe what I say because you don’t know what I’m talking about. You might believe that I am holding something I am calling a round square, but that’s as far as you can go. You can’t believe something that is inconceivable, and that is what a truly self-contradictory statement is.

    The Jewish Scholar intervenes, telling the Lutheran that his animadversion concerning the limitations of the human mind assumes what needs proof, namely, that Jesus is God. The Muslim cites II Corinthians 33:14, in which the Apostle John associates Jesus with grace, God the Father with love, and the Holy Spirit with communion. The Natural Philosopher concludes that there cannot be three essences or substances of God. “Who can seriously think that [God] that He is God who owes the principle of His origin, His essence, and power to another?” To these charges, Coronaeus can only repeat that “we must consider not three eternal, not three infinite, nor three gods, but one God, eternal and infinite, yet distinguished by a certain property appropriate to each Person.”

    He goes on to observe that in the Old Testament has several names, but the Jewish Scholar disputes this, giving as an example the three “persons” mentioned in Zachariah 4:1-5, two of whom are actually cherubim. Losing his patience, he says that “when the Hebrew theologians write in earnest about Jesus, they do not even dignify him by calling him by name but scornfully refer to him as the one who was hanged.” When the Apostle John writes, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,” he simply lapsed into incongruity. Neither the display of impatience nor the critique of John’s sentence fazes the Lutheran, who replies that whatever is in God is His essence; to say that the Word of God ‘is’ God means only that.

    The Natural Philosopher takes up this latest charge of contradiction by asking, “Who would be so foolish as to say that he thinks the ordinances, the laws, the actions, and words which proceed from out of the man are the essence of the man?” The Calvinist would: “When John says that the word of God is the son, he understands not an utterance but His intimate essence, wisdom, and mind,” “for if wisdom had been created, there would have been a time in which wisdom not yet was,” but the wise  King Solomon himself said, “These things have been ordained from eternity, from the beginning, from the ancient days of the world.” The Lutheran concurs: “Nothing in the Trinity is before or after in time, but only in the order of relation; nor is the Creator less Son than Father, or less the Holy Spirit than either.” The first word of Genesis, bereshit bara’ (in the beginning, He created), that is, in the beginning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit created; for the word of three letters, bara’, signifies three Persons, namely, av, ben, ruah, Father, Son, Holy Spirit.” Surely the Jewish Scholar “will not deny that this is drawn forth from the holy secrets of the Hebrews and the holier Cabala.” But of course he does deny it. “Who does not see that very diverse sentences can be fashioned from those same letters? Indeed our elders never strongly approved of that kind of Cabala. It would be much more likely to contrive a quaternity from the same Tetragammaton than a trinity.”

    Such an argument reveals the ambiguity, the inconclusiveness, of reasoning about texts when the reader demands certitude, feeling an urgent need for it. The Skeptic therefore asks another question: Granted the Christian doctrine of Trinitarianism, why did the Son “assume human flesh”? And why was that necessary for human salvation? The Muslim adds, “Why was there need of so great a change, so cruel a punishment for a most innocent man?”

    The Calvinist says it was because “it pleased Him”—God the Father—”to do so.” That is, God’s will is self-justifying, and human beings have no authority to bring Him to the bar of their own sense of justice. Coronaeus gives two reasons: Jesus’ death on the Cross “recalled us from the defilement of faults to virtues”; and it was done “to increase our love for him.” When the Natural Philosopher again raises the problem of whether it is even possible to conceive coherently the combination of divine and bodily nature, the Lutheran picks up the Calvinist’s point, charging the Natural Philosopher with “think[ing] that divine matters must be verified by the scales of philosophers.” What is more, “even if he knew the clear truth of the matter, he would still oppose it by subtle arguments.”

    The Jewish Scholar asks why Jesus was not sent earlier. When the Calvinist says he was, in the sense that there were several ‘types’ of Christ, prefigurations of Jesus, among the Israelites, the Jewish Scholar denies it. The previous messiahs—Moses, Joshua, Samuel, David, and the others—did not die for their people’s sins; “no one of these was killed as an expiation for the people.” “It is entirely unheard of that good men are sacrificed for wicked men.” The Natural Philosopher agrees: “It was fairer for each man to pay the penalty for his own sin,” and to worship dead men as gods is “insane madness.” The Calvinist has his answer ready: “All men are guilty of sin” except for Jesus; “therefore, why is it strange that God wished this victim who was most pleasing to him to be sacrificed?” That is, God requires of all sacrificial offerings to be unblemished.

    The Muslim judges it “absurd” to think that “God, angered with mankind, exacts vengeance from Himself.” Coronaeus meets that assertion by denying that God acted out of vengeance. “The death of Christ not only was beneficial in atoning for the sins of the wicked”—what greater sacrificial act of atonement could there be?—”but also keeps us the more willingly from sin when we realize that immortal God was so displeased by the sins of the wicked that He wanted His dearest Son to undergo the most loathsome death because of the sins of others.” Customarily, an act of sacrificial atonement is undertaken by the sinner. In this case, the act was undertaken by the sinless Son of God Himself; human beings can then align themselves with that sacrifice, make it their own, by confessing their sinfulness and aligning their own wills anew, in accordance with God’s love and laws.

    The Muslim worries that this doctrine is “very dangerous,” as “each most wicked man can fortuitously accept” the divine pardon: “What is this except to provide impunity for all and a wide path to all impieties for each most daring man?” I could live a life of crime, confident that my deathbed confession would spare me an eternity in Hell. The question would then be the moral and spiritual status of such a confession, inasmuch as it was calculated in advance. But the Lutheran doesn’t answer that way, saying rather that “the death of Christ was especially necessary for mankind to purge the foulest Fall.”

    This raises the topic of original sin, which the Natural Philosopher regards as impossible because “there is no sin unless it is voluntary.” You can’t inherit sin. And if you can’t, all the problems surrounding the Trinity and the Incarnation and the Resurrection are meaningless. The Jewish Scholar regards Adam as a sinner, “but not because he plucked the forbidden fruit, or tasted it when his wife offered it to him, as people imagine in their childish error.” The right interpretation of the story is that “he sinned because he allowed his mind, led away from the contemplation of intelligible things”—naming the plants in the Garden according to their kinds—”to be enticed and overcome by the allurements of sensual desires.” The woman symbolizes the body, the serpent pleasures. “But in whatever way Adam sinned, why did that sin spill over to his innocent posterity?” No, “parents do not hand on to their descendants any virtues” or vices.

    Coronaeus identifies this as the Pelagian heresy, “repudiated by the complete agreement of the theologians and driven out by the decrees of the councils” of the Roman Catholic Church. He quotes David as acknowledging having been conceived in sin and Paul as understanding that God’s curse was death and indeed damnation for all men. On the contrary, the Jewish Scholar insists, “the divine laws very clearly forbid that a son be bound by a fault of his parents” (Ezekial 18:1-23). “Each man suffers punishment for his own sin, not for another’s.” He then explains the fact that God punishes down to the third generation as a deterrent to sin in parents, who would not want their children and grandchildren so injured.

    The Natural Philosopher vindicates nature and God alike. “Surely those who blame the nature of any sin relate the sin not to themselves but to the parent of nature, and nothing is more deadly than this.” But there is no sin “without the total will of the sinner.” Since an infant can neither avoid such an inheritance, if it exists, nor knowingly will sin, “no sin can be charged to an infant,” and no punishment “ought to be sought”. The Lutheran again takes this as an opportunity to deplore philosophy. “If we give assent to the subtleties of philosophers, we must reject faith and piety.” Adam knowingly sinned, incurring punishment, and as for us, his descendants, “with whatever color the root is imbued, it imbues the trunk, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits with the same flavor, odor, color, and poison.” By the grace of God we can transform our own destiny, if not our own nature entirely, by heeding the Gospel: “Believe and you will be saved.” (I John 1:8) Coronaeus modifies this according to the Catholic teaching, imputing redemption to baptism. This sets the framework for the subsequent disputation on the topic, with the Natural Philosopher rejecting Scriptural authority and the three Christians disputing its exact meaning.

    After listening to them talk, the Jewish Scholar argues ad hominem, attributing “all this discussion about the Fall” to “the leaders of the Christian religion,” who invented the notion “in order to draw the souls of unlearned men to themselves.” The story of Adam in the Garden is “an elegant and divine allegory,” not to be taken literally. After God’s rebuke, Adam “returned from the delight of the senses to the contemplation of intelligible things, which is to say, he enjoyed the tree of life, which Solomon interprets as true wisdom,” fathering Seth, “clearly a divine man,” and eventually dying—but surely not suffering “eternal death.” Far from it. God “even indicated to Adam a salutary remedy when He said: ‘Perhaps he will pluck the tree of life and live forever.'” This contradicts the context of God’s statement, which is presented as His reason for driving Adam and Eve out of the Garden, precisely to prevent that “remedy.” (Oddly, the Christians interlocutors fail to mention this.) The Jewish Scholar goes on to argue that Noah, Enoch, Job, Moses, Samuel, and Elijah were “greatly praised by God himself” and showed little or no evidence of pollution by original sin. Abraham, “father of our race,” was favored with “many and so great benefits” when God “opened the founts of divine goodness to all people because of him.” How sinful could Abraham have been?

    The Natural Philosopher raises the question of free will, saying that the doctrine of original sin abrogates it, thereby ruining the basis for morality. Coronaeus agrees with him, remarking that the Catholic teaching does not go so far as the Protestant teaching does, regarding the alleged helplessness of man in the face of sin and the doctrine of predestination. The Calvinist responds by denying free will to man not only after the Fall but before it. Divine foreknowledge precludes free will for human beings. If free will really existed, “eternal God’s foreknowledge would depend on the changeable and fallacious opinion of men, which is absurd.” But God has no need to opine, to guess what his creatures will do, or to adjust his intended actions to their latest freaks. To this, the Natural Philosopher doesn’t deny divine foreknowledge (“Providence cannot seem to hang from” changeable human will), “but it foresees your future changes and therefore free will has not been removed from each man.” That is, God’s foreseeing in no way deprives you of your choice. The Jewish Scholar traces free will not to logic but to Scripture—specifically, to Moses’ admonition to his people, to choose to obey God’s commandments: “Choose life that you may live.” The divine law is the true Tree of Life.

    The Calvinist asks if “anyone can obtain salvation from the law,” even if the doctrine of free will is granted. “I still deny that anyone except Christ could satisfy divine law,” and only he could “absolve us from the antiquated laws of Moses.” Since Moses said that he does not “exactly perform the letter of the law” shall be cursed, and because the Israelites consented to this, Paul “concludes that those who have placed their salvation in the actions of law are subject to this curse.” Christ redeemed our sins; only God could have done so.

    The Jewish Scholar replies that “often Paul is caught cutting out words of the law and prophets or adding words or plainly changing the interpretation.” In this case, words Moses uses mean, “Be cursed who does not have the fixed words of this law that he might follow them.” But even a man who sinned as gravely as David was pardoned by God, precisely because he did know the fixed words of the divine law, repented of his sins (which included adultery and homicide), and then “gave compensation in part” for his deeds, in accordance with that law. The Calvinist replies with several New Testament citations, emphasizing redemption through faith in Christ, effective thanks to his grace. The obvious problem is that the Jewish Scholar denies the authority of the Christian Bible because he denies the accuracy of the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible by the Christian apostles.

    The Natural Philosopher rebukes both men. “If you continue to lead out with authorities, I shall summon all the families of philosophers who easily conquer those insignificant theologians by the excellence of the erudition and training.” Better “to argue with the senses and clear reasons.” Yes, the Jewish Scholar admits, “except in obscure and ambiguous matters in which the human mind can find no way out”—that is, except when considering the secrets of the sublime. At the same time, one must be cautious, inasmuch as to rely on authorities does resemble the practice of tragic poets, who call down the deus ex machina to extricate their characters (and thus the poets themselves) from the plot tangles they, the poets, have plotted. Religious sectarians do exactly that, “hear(ing) divine oracles from the mouths of the prophets and from the sacred books which the theologians, not only Hebrew, but also Christian and Ismaelite, have now for a long time approved, each in his own religion.” Not only does this show why Bodin had two of his own characters, the Muslim and ‘Bodin’ the lector, read tragedies—why he introduced the theme of tragic poetry into his Colloquy—but it also shows why the Jewish Scholar has sided with those among the Seven who advocate religious toleration.

    The Natural Philosopher deems it “utterly alien to all reason to confess with simple assent that Christ died for the salvation of the human race in order to secure not only pardon for immense disgraces”—why should these be pardoned?—”but also supreme praise for justice and integrity”—how can the Man of grace be considered just, strictly speaking?—”but to avow that just men” such as Socrates, Plato, and the Catos “are tormented as if by the wicked and sinful eternal flames of hell and the most cruel punishments.” The Skeptic states the same thought ‘positively’: “I believe that each man is blessed by his excellent acts,” that the more such acts he commits “the more he will be pleasing to immortal God, although he worships foreign gods in good faith and just error.” Whereas the Natural Philosopher finds the sure ground of conduct in reason, the Skeptic finds it in morality.

    To this, and to the Christians’ recurrence to the several doctrines of their several sects, the Jewish Philosopher answers that “it often happens that a man most wicked in God’s sight is considered most just in men’s opinion. But in order for God to take away from men this arrogance and haughtiness, Gods clearly says: ‘No one of the living will be justified before Me.'” (Psalm 143:2) The Natural Philosopher, a Platonist or neo-Platonist, concurs: only the ideas are pure; nothing material is.

    The Muslim intervenes to assert the superiority of Muslims to Christians in acts of virtue. Dependence on faith alone can only lead “far and wide to a destruction of states.” This confuses the path of salvation with the path or ‘way of life’ of a state, and Coronaeus immediately denies that he, as a Catholic, depends on faith alone for this-worldly conduct: “Surely all divine and human laws would perish if there were no rewards for deeds performed well and no punishments for sins.” The Lutheran stoutly resists, on grounds momentous not only for German religion but for German (and eventually Western) philosophy and politics. “No reward is owed for a duty.” The just man simply does his duty; “indeed, a reward is contrary to duty.” However, “he who does wicked things acts contrary to duty” and does deserve punishment. He derives these principles from the status of Christians as servants or slaves to God (Acts 16:17; Romans 6:16, 22; I Peter 2:16). In this the reader will see the lineaments of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, with its strict rejection of ‘eudaimonianism’ in ethics, and its consequent need to derive moral right not from nature or even from God but from the categorical imperative.

    The Jewish Scholar “grant[s] that no one is made just by actions, however worthy they may be, much less by an empty belief in a dead Jesus,” but by the blessing God gives for those just and honorable actions. And indeed, “if no one except the just is blessed, no one would ever be blessed,” as “no one is free from stain and impurity”—as both the Bible and neo-Platonic philosophy insist. Rather, one is blessed or cursed insofar as one commits acts of justice and honor. Further, “the divine law commands nothing which you cannot easily do if you wish.” Paul himself “boasts that he was blameless in the justice of the law.” (Philippians 3:6) “What lawgiver was ever so cruel that he commanded his people to do something impossible?” (He may be pardoned for having failed to anticipate the ‘ideological’ tyrants of the twentieth century.) But Paul also writes that the sinner stands condemned to Hell-fire for eternity (Hebrews 10:26), leaving no “room for confession or repentance” apart from Christ. “Yet there are those who think the divine law is harsher than the Christian law!” The Lutheran explains, or perhaps explains away, Paul’s threat as “hyperbole to frighten the wicked.” The Jewish Scholar, having carried his point with these interlocutors, then in effect endorses Jesus’ summation of the divine law. “What is the total justice of the law? It is for man to love God more than himself, but his neighbor as himself; a thing which each can do.”

    The Christians fall into a debate over the Catholic practice of venerating saints and icons, treating them as intercessors with God. The Natural Philosopher, the Skeptic, and the Muslim scorn the practice as fodder for “the untutored masses,” as the Muslim puts it. The Jewish Scholar explains that when God ordered Moses to make a bronze serpent, the sight of which was to cure the Israelites from the poison of the fiery serpents God had sent among them as punishment for their sins (Numbers 21:8-9), God only wanted them “to see the serpent, but not to worship it, because of a remarkable secret in the serpent.” The sublime secret of the serpent was “to indicate that we should extinguish in us the mad desire for delicacies (which is indicated by the word for serpent) and would thus attain eternal life.” Since “the chief power of the serpent is in its teeth,” God used the symbol of the serpent not as a talisman but as a reminder that the Israelites must “eat the purest manna which had fallen from heaven and forget their old delicacies.” Once such a symbol has served its immediate heuristic purpose, it may be safely destroyed, lest it be worshiped (as Kant would say) as ‘a thing in itself.’

    Despite his own noteworthy powers when it comes to allegorizing Scriptural stories in search of the secrets of the sublime, the Jewish Scholar adds a caveat: “I am accustomed to be amazed at the secrets of divine things which I understand less, and we ought not to be too inquisitive concerning them.” He therefore “consume[s] the secrets of difficult matters which I cannot understand with the fire of divine love”—also a theme of Coronaeus’ understanding of God. However, unlike a Catholic, the Jewish Scholar “wonder[s] whether or not God’s presence depends on the will and power of the priest, as they say.” He finds himself repelled especially by the sacrament, and indeed by the worship of Jesus Himself, both of which practices he likens to the Israelites’ forbidden worship of the golden calf; like the Israelites, who worshiped God in “the appearance of a calf,” Christians worship in the appearance of a man or worse, in the appearance of bread and wine.

    The Muslim likewise deplores that the One worshiped as God “is torn by hands and teeth” in the partaking of the sacrament. “Averroës used to say that it seemed very strange to him that Christians were greedily swallowing so many thousands of gods whom they boasted they created in a moment under the appearance of piety.” What is more, “there is no greater poof of severity and hatred than to eat the flesh of an enemy.” Christians are cannibals of God. Coronaeus brushes off Averroës: “May the name of the atheist Averroës be abolished by eternal oblivion.” But this only returns the discussion to the issue of eternal punishment.

    What justifies the concept of mortal sin?  “Christ clearly announced that eternal punishment had been decreed for the depravity of willful men,” (Matthew 18:32-35), and the Skeptic confirms that “these punishments are useful also or the terror of the wicked,” as does the Calvinist. The Natural Philosopher objects that those who commit the kinds of sins deemed mortal “believe that those terrors have been proposed for the ignorant and the womanish”; others “believe in the punishments of hell” but “despair of attaining pardon,” growing “old in perpetual wickedness.” In either case, the deterrent power of the doctrine is doubtful. More fundamentally, the doctrine of mortal sin is unjust. “With this reasoning, not only are all sins infinite, because one always sins against God”—which the Lutheran characterized as an “infinite” or mortal sin—”but also all sins are equal, since all infinite things are equal among themselves.” What is more, the whole notion of infinite sin makes no sense, as God is infinitely good, and the power of evil is never held to equal the power of God by Christians.

    The Jewish Scholar disputes the Christian doctrine by saying that “divine punishment is always lighter than the sin” because God’s harshness is never “more severe than the transgression,” or “more lasting.” Coronaeus goes so far as to say that with God the punishment fits the crime, but not all crimes merit eternal punishment. The Calvinist and the Muslim alike insist that there is no middle ground. Salvation or damnation, those are the alternatives, and God will decide which to apply to which souls. The Calvinist adds that the Catholic doctrine of a gradation of sins serves the priestly interest in selling indulgences. For his part, the Natural Philosopher sides with Plato, who regards absolution by prayers and entreaties “dangerous” and “deadly,” instead proposing an afterlife not of punishment but of purgation of sins, with light at the end of the tunnel of Hades.

    The dialogue has consisted of a long series of such impasses. The Natural Philosopher says, “I see that Jews differ from both Christians and Saracens in the key point of religion,” that “Saracens” or Muslims “have serious controversies among themselves about faith,” as do Christians and Jews. “In short, almost everyone is at odds with everyone; all are angry at all with curses and ill words for all.” Is it “not better to embrace the most simple and most ancient and at the same time most true religion of nature, instilled by immortal God in the minds of each man from which there was no division”? By that religion the “heroes dearest to God,” from Abel to Jacob, lived. The Jewish Scholar, who has worked toward religious tolerance throughout the dialogue, only demurs because “if we were like those heroes, we would need no rites nor ceremonies,” but “the common people and the untutored masses” need stronger restraints than “a simple assent of true religion” can provide. This suggests, however, that men such as the Seven might well form a society so founded.

    Coronaeus also sees that the discussion has played out. Stating his belief in the Apostolic Succession, he concludes that “although I cannot persuade you of this which I do not despair will come to pass, I shall not cease praying to Christ, true God and man, and His hallowed parent, the honor of virgins , all the hosts of angels, martyrs, and confessors, and the orders of all saints that they render eternal God propitious to you and bear entreaties for your salvation.” The Jewish Scholar returns the benediction: “We owe unusually great thanks to Coronaeus for so many kindnesses and especially for his exceptional piety and love toward us, which we in turn must imitate and pray, each one for the other, to eternal God that He lead us in the right path of salvation, purged from all the brambles and thorns of errors.”

    The Skeptic “approve[s] all the religions of all rather than to exclude the one which is perhaps the true religion,” drawing the Jewish Scholar to question whether it is “possible to defend the religions of all at the same time, that is, to confess or believe that Christ is God and to deny that He is God.” The Natural Philosopher, like the the Skeptic, “wish[es] neither to agree lightly nor deny rashly the things which the theologians turn upside down in doubtful discussion,” and observes that in contemporary Jerusalem eight Christian sects, Jews, and Muslims worship in separate temples but nonetheless “cherish the public tranquility with supreme harmony.” The Jewish Philosopher remains doubtful that such a harmony can endure among “such a great variety of religions.” The Calvinist warns that “to protect publicly the authority of different religions in the same city has always seemed to me the most difficult matter of all,” especially since “the common people” whipsaw their princes with religio-political animosities; at the same time, it is even more dangerous to ‘privatize’ religion, as that drives the sects underground, where they plot “secret conspiracies of citizens, which finally at some time erupt into destruction of the state.”

    Coronaeus points not to Jerusalem but to Venice, where Jews and Orthodox Greek perform public ceremonies but other foreign religions are not allowed that privilege. “However, it is possible for each man to enjoy liberty provided he does not disturb the tranquility of the state, and no one is forced to attend religious services or prevented from attending.” The Muslim calls this “a wise judgment” by the city’s aristocratic regime because “in this kind of state no more dangerous pest can arise than civil discord.” The rule of the few may be wise and just, but remains vulnerable to the passions of the many and the conniving of would-be tyrants who exploit those passions.

    After some discussion, the Seven agree that compulsion in religious matter is, as the Jewish Scholar puts it, “an insult against God,” “since no one can approach Him in love with a soul sufficiently eager.” Love can’t be coerced, but love is what the God justly expects from His creatures, as all Christians, Jews, and Muslims maintain, and as the Natural Philosopher feels toward his ‘god,’ Nature. “Henceforth,they nourished their piety in remarkable harmony and their integrity of life in common pursuits and intimacy. However, afterwards they held no other conversation about religions, although each one defended his own religion with the supreme sanctity of his life,” enjoying a seventh, Sabbath day of conversations that stretched out, evidently, for many years.

    The Colloquy a Platonic dialogue in the sense that all the characters are ‘types’ as well as individuals, and their natural virtues and vices have been in certain ways shaped by the ‘type’ that their religious ‘regimes’ have inclined them to be. Coronaeus, for example is both Catholic in religion and catholic in temperament. [7] He defends Church doctrine, but in a spirit that earns the gratitude of the elderly Jewish Scholar, who has lived long enough to see instances in which Jews were not so well-treated by Catholics. Intellectual catholicity for French Catholicism will require less philosophic-theological system-building, more philosophizing as Socrates philosophized. Thomism, yes, but an opened-up Thomism, one never allowed to calcify into doctrinairism, much less persecution. What will bind such a reformed (if not ‘Reform’ or Protestant) church together?

    The Seven move toward an appreciation of Coronaeus’ understanding of Christian love as the bond of their society. Agapic love looks to the good of the person in front of view, the one with whom you are conversing. It does not speak with asperity, having learned the patience which did not come naturally to thumotic Apostle Paul.

    Coronaeus’ hospitality provides a framework in which reason and revelation may meet and even, to some extent ally. In this regard the alliance between the Jewish Scholar and the Natural Philosopher becomes crucial. They are the spokesmen for the two oldest ‘religions’: the worship of the Creator-God of the Bible and respect for, if not worship of, nature. The Jewish Scholar regards the divine law as the law governing God’s creation, nature; to that extent, divine law is natural law. The Decalogue renewed man’s cognizance of the natural law he had violated. At the same time, as the Jewish Scholar insists, although revelation is rational the God who reveals His intentions keeps certain sublime secrets, speculation concerning which must be undertaken only with the greatest caution and equanimity toward those whose attempts to ‘solve’ divine mysteries have resulted in conclusions at odds with those of Judaism, and at odds with each other.

    Two cities show how such a spirit might prevail in the modern world. The ancient city of Jerusalem currently exhibits religious toleration, although not without tensions which might be aggravated in a destructive way. The modern city of Venice, called a commercial republic but really an aristocracy, the city where the Seven meet at Coronaeus’ house, might be described as a ‘New Jerusalem’—a commercial regime in the comprehensive sense, trading in goods of all kinds, and located in Mediterranean, the center of Western Civilization from antiquity until Bodin’s day. Perhaps if the French Catholicism and monarchy heed Bodin, Paris will rise still further in the firmament of world civilization. And not to leave the Protestants aside, the Calvinist advocated republicanism while remaining a critic of ‘the people’—of democracy, which gets carried away with its own passions, religious and other. The Calvinist is the one who wants to see a mixed and extended republic, the one who anticipates the American of the American Founders.

    The final ‘Sabbath’ achieved by the Seven for their own intimate, private society within the Venetian political regime enables them to strive for the purpose of the Sabbath as understood by Judaism: “to increase our wisdom with study.” With insoluble sublime secrets discreetly set aside, all of the Seven can continue their shared inquiries.

     

    Notes

    1. In Greek and Roman mythology, King Coronaeus is indirectly associated with the goddess of wisdom, Athena. In Ovid’s telling, the king’s daughter, Coronis, was assaulted by Poseidon as she walked along the seashore. Athena rescued her by metamorphosing her into a crow, enabling her to fly away. Ovid elaborates, saying that Athena chose Corona as her life-companion, only to toss her aside for Nyctimena, another maiden Athena changed into a bird, the ‘Owl of Minerva.’
    2. This is not necessarily correct, inasmuch as God is said to savor the smell of the smoke produced by sacrifices as they burn.
    3. Very roughly, what the Natural Philosopher calls chance corresponds at least in part with what later philosophers will call history. For him, however, there are no laws of history.
    4. As related by Josephus, Gessius Florus ruled Palestine under the Emperor Nero, “fill[ing] Judea with abundance of miseries.” By imprisoning Jewish petitioners and several other oppressive acts, he provoked the First Jewish Revolt in 66 AD.
    5. Professor Kuntz notes that “Elias” means the prophet Elias (Elijah) to the Lutheran, but may also mean ‘Elias’ Bodin or even ‘Elias Pandocheus’ (which means ‘Who-Reveals-All), a.k.a., Guillaume Postel.
    6. The Jewish Scholar refers to Genesis 27:40. The passage forms part of the story of Isaac and his sons, Jacob and Esau. In collusion with his mother, Rebekah, Jacob has deceived Isaac, who gave him a blessing, that he will prosper and rule over his brethren; even the nations will bow down to him. When Esau and Isaac learn of the deception, Esau asks him for another blessing. “And Isaac his father answered and said unto him, Behold, thy dwelling shall be the fatness of the earth, and of the dew of the heaven from above; And by thy sword shall thou live, and shalt serve thy brother; and it shall come to pass when thou shalt have the dominion, that thou shalt break his yoke from off thy neck.” If this passage is understood not only as literally but thematically central to the Book of Genesis, then it appears to make armed liberation superior to clever calculation in God’s order of creation. But this seems to be belied by the fact that it is Jacob who ascends the ladder to God in his dream, and it is Esau who becomes the father of the Edomites, enemies of the Israelites.
    7. For a spirited recently-published argument holding that Coronaeus and Catholicism form the center of Bodin’s dialogue, see Thomas F. X. Varacelli: “Coronaeus and the Relationship between Philosophy and Doctrine in Jean Bodin’s Colloquy.” (Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture June 2017). As argued above, I maintain that Bodin himself functions as Plato to a Coronaeus who resembles Socrates in some ways, but cannot finally be considered the spokesman for the thoughts of Bodin himself.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Edmund Spenser on What to Do with the Irish

    March 26, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Edmund Spenser: A View of the Present State of Ireland: Discoursed by Way of a Dialogue between Eudoxus and Irenaeus. In William P. Trent, ed.: The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Company, 1903.

    Edmund Curtis: A History of Ireland. London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1950 [1936].

     

    “Lord! How quickly doth that country alter men’s natures!”

    Eudoxus

     

    In his elegant and judicious introduction to Spenser’s works, William P. Trent declares that “no idealist, no sensitive lover of ethereal beauty, no reader endowed with an ear trained to delight in the subtlest melodies and most exquisite harmonies, no dreamer enamored of the stately and romantic past, no willing prober of allegories and symbols, and, above all, no soul in love with essential purity can possibly remain indifferent to the appeal made by the poet and, to a considerable degree, by the man.” For any such reader, “to know Spenser at all thoroughly is to love him deeply” as the author of poems “gentle, pure, and lovely, rather than sublime.”

    “But,” Trent continues, “idealists, symbolists, ethereal natures, and readers trained to enjoy the subtlest poetic harmonies are, and always have been, rare. This is a work-a-day world actuated by a rather overpowering sense of the real.” In the modern world, he writes “the great national dramas killed allegory.” Trent wrote those words with the First World War little more than a decade distant. And with still worse to come, the taste for epic poetry along the lines of The Faerie Queene would lie even more deeply buried under the rubble left by tyrannic cruelty and egalitarian vulgarity.

    Had Spenser no sense of the real, though? He saw war. In his prose if not his poetry he unhesitatingly urged harsh measures against the enemies of his people, his queen, and his family. So much so, that Spenser’s literary admirers seem not quite to know what to make of his dialogue, A View of the Present State of Ireland, in which one character recommends the use of famine to break Irish resistance to English imperial rule, citing Machiavelli’s Discourses as an authoritative guide to mastering rebels. Spenser had to gather his wife and four children to flee an advancing Irish army, which burned his County Cork home down to the first floor. If an ‘idealist,’ he felt all the fury of a disillusioned one. Or would a closer reading of his poetry reveal toughness beneath the ethereality?

    The Spensers had been living on the forfeited estate of the Earl of Desmond, in the manor and castle of Kilcolm. How London-raised Edmund Spenser, son of a clothier, scholarship boy at Pembroke College, Cambridge University, found himself living in southern Ireland itself requires a mind-clearing draft of real Irish history, as served by Professor Curtis.

    Once a people centered in modern-day Austria but driven off by the Romans, the Celts arrived in Ireland around 350 BC. Spenser would have known the later Celtish claim, dating from medieval times, that they descended from the fierce Scythians, who established a nomadic empire in Central Asia in ancient times. Such claims notwithstanding, the Celts, with their “warlike, aristocratic, and masterful temper,” conquered the existing rulers, whose ancestors themselves had conquered peoples who’d arrived before them. The Gaels, as this branch of the Celts called themselves, practiced Druidism; the Roman authors Spenser would have read claimed that the Druids or priestly class practiced human sacrifice. The Druids shared authority with an aristocratic warrior class (in Caesar, the equites). In addition, the Fili—poet/seers who cast spells—served as “hereditary keepers of the ancestral lore and learning of Ireland as expressed in the Irish language.” Finally, the Gaels developed a set of laws, not written down until the eighth century AD, eventually called the Brehon laws, after the Brehons or judge-arbitrators who presided over cases under it.

    Gaelic rule did not go uncontested, as chiefs of non-Gaelic peoples brought Gauls in as military allies. The strategy failed, but many Gauls stayed, settled, and became absorbed into the Irish population. Charles de Gaulle traced some of his ancestors to this population, and later English dealings with Ireland may have added to his list of grievances against perfidious Albion. For although the Romans never ruled Ireland, the Anglo-Saxons, who arrived in Britain in the fifth century AD, would eventually make the attempt.

    The Anglo-Saxons may have been brought in as military guardians against the Celts, who were feared raiders in the region, poorly guarded since the end of Roman rule there, in 410. A young Christian born only about twenty years earlier, Patricius, son of Calpurnius, had been seized by Celtic raiders and served as a slave there—tending sheep, David-like, before escaping first to Britain and then to Gaul, where he studied for the priesthood at Auxerre. Dreaming that the voices of the Irish were calling on him to return and save them from Druidism, he received authorization from the Church of Gaul (then a more powerful element of the Roman Catholic Church than Rome itself) to launch an evangelizing mission. Consecrated as a bishop, in 432 the Church sent him on the mission which would indeed begin the end of Druidism and earn him recognition as a saint of the Church.

    Culturally, Gaelic Ireland thus became a blend of Fili tradition and Roman-Church learning, and remained so. The Norse conquerors who ruled for nearly two centuries left no lasting political or cultural mark. Eventually called the “Ostmen,” they became “in spirit and habit almost Irish.” Of much more political significance were the Normans, who arrived in 1166, one hundred years after they had conquered Britain and a dozen years since they had lost control of the English throne to the Plantagenets. Perhaps wanting to give this “aggressive baronial race” something to do, and following a precedent set by his Norman maternal grandfather, Henry I, Plantagenet king Henry II had already given them liberty to attack Wales. There they mixed with the native Celts and gained a knowledge of Celtic customs useful in dealing with the Irish. With superior fortifications and military equipage, they quickly established a substantial foothold in eastern and southeastern Ireland.  In October 1171 Henry II landed at Waterford, on Ireland’s southern coast, giving the first charter for Norman-English rule to Dublin, on the east coast. He appointed a viceroy and assumed control of land-titles, per English law. Staying only six months, he left the Norman-English “gentleman buccaneers” in de facto control of the territories they had seized.

    This established the fundamental political dynamics that persisted, in one permutation after another, throughout Spenser’s lifetime. The Norman-English, also called the Anglo-Irish and eventually the “Old English,” struggled for control with some of the Celts while intermarrying with others; they also struggled with the English monarchy whenever it attempted to exert greater control over its colonies. The Celts fought with one another, too.

    The viceroy or royal Deputy served as supreme judge, political ruler, and commander of the feudal levy in the Dublin government, whose territory was called ‘the Pale,’ a term referring to a fence made of stakes and meaning a boundary. Assisting the viceroy was an exchequer, a chancellor, a treasury, and a judiciary that followed English common law. The Magna Carta was extended to Ireland in 1217. Thus the Anglo-Irish enjoyed English rights. The Crown reserved the power of legislation to itself, consistent with the English understanding of the monarch as the ‘defender of the realm’ and ruler of imperial holdings. Locally, the English section established the shire form of government. But the native Irish there were reduced to the status of feudal villeins—essentially serfs with no rights under the English common law but no protection under the Brehon law, which the common law replaced.

    Independent of and sharply contrasting with the Pale, northern Ireland was ruled by Gaelic kings who observed the Brehon law. They maintained their sovereignty with the aid of Scottish mercenaries, the formidable ‘galloglasses,” capable of fighting even the warlike Normans. The Anglo-Irish called these kingdoms the “land of war.” In the central and southern areas, a compromise was worked out. There weren’t enough English settlers to rule there, but the king nonetheless claimed sovereignty. He devised an arrangement whereby Irish chieftains would rule by royal grant. Called the “march lands” or the “feudal Liberties,” these areas served as fields of conflict for centuries.

    As a result of these political arrangements, the Irish remained incapable of unifying against their conquerors but often could defend themselves locally. The Norman-English settlers also quarreled among themselves while at the same time intermarrying with the Irish and adopting many of the customs of the country—becoming increasingly Anglo-Irish. By the 1330s, Edward III had grown sufficiently alarmed that he abridged Anglo-Irish rights, provoking the formation of the first “Patriot party,” men unified not on the basis of Irish nationalism but by shared antipathy to political control centralized in Westminster. Edward assigned his second son, Lionel of Clarence, to settle the Irish question. Lionel called the Parliament of Kilkenny in 1366; to prevent Anglo-Irish “degeneracy,” he forced through a set of laws requiring the Anglo-Irish to maintain English language, laws, usages, even fashions, instead of adapting those of the “Irish enemies.” To counteract the charm of the Irish Fili, the new laws prohibited the employment of Irish minstrels, poets, and story-tellers as entertainers in English households. Violations of these laws would result in forfeit of lands—controlled, it will be recalled, by the monarch. Irish living within the Pale were excluded from all Anglican cathedrals and abbeys. This legislation succeeded in reinforcing ‘Englishness’ in the Pale, while effectively giving up on efforts to extend it in the other territories. Further, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw England distracted by more urgent matters than the governance of Ireland. Wars in France and the civil War of the Roses, which began in 1455, enabled the Irish to make political gains in some fifty to sixty provincial regions, where Irish barons, bards, and Brehons prevailed.

    During the English civil war, the Irish supported the Yorkist challenge to the Lancastrian dynasty. Retreating from England, the Yorkists found in Ireland a springboard for counterattacks. In the provinces west of the Pale, Anglo-Irish lords were ascendant, eventually dominated by Thomas, Earl of Kildare. Gerald, the eighth earl, called Garret More by the Irish, was the most impressive of the line. Edward IV attempted to rein him in by sending Leonard, Lord Grey, to replace him, but Lord Grey failed.

    So did the Plantagenets. When the Tudor king Henry VII ascended to the throne in 1485, replacing Richard III and ending the War of the Roses, England had its first genuinely ‘modern’ king—that is, a determined state-builder or ‘centralizer’ of English political authority. But in Ireland, the Earl of Kildare backed the anti-Tudor pretender, Edward VI, sending an expedition of Anglo-Irish and German mercenaries into England in 1487. They were crushed, and Henry had Kildare removed from power in 1494. He appointed Sir Edward Poynings as the new viceroy, tasked with “bridling the Irish Parliament,” as Curtis puts it, and with ending home rule by Yorkist aristocrats in Dublin. In doing so, Poynings secured the Pale. Recalling Poynings in 1496, Henry then reversed course and effectively co-opted Kildare, making him his Deputy in Ireland—a Deputy now unconstrained, but also unaided, by the parliament in Dublin and mindful that Henry could ‘unmake’ him as soon as ‘make’ him. Henry used Kildare this way for the next seventeen years. Dissatisfied with continued Anglo-Irish and Irish recalcitrance, Henry finally ruined the House of Kildare in the 1530s, reappointing Grey as his Lord Deputy. Grey called the “Reformation Parliament” in 1536, which attainted the Kildare family and revived the long-unenforced bans against Anglo-Irish marriage, employment of Irish minstrels and poets by the Anglo-Irish, and Irish styles of dress. To these regime changes to the Anglo-Irish way of life, the centralizing state added structural regime changes: reform of the Irish Church along more strictly Anglican lines; the end of aristocratic Home Rule; suppression of Brehon law; the territorial extension of the Pale. Henry had himself installed as the king of Ireland. Treaties with many of the Irish and Anglo-Irish lords allowed them to keep their lordships at the price of accepting tenure in office under the Crown. Henry’s successor, the Catholic Mary, Queen of Scots, who might have been expected to be more sympathetic to Irish and Anglo-Irish claims, in fact extended Henry’s policy by confiscating lands in the midland section of the island, replacing Irish landlords with English.

    This, along with the church reforms, led to a series of rebellions in the next half-century. It had been “hoped on the English side that the great lords and chiefs would gradually introduce and enforce in their own countries the English law, religion, and language.” But by the beginning of Elizabeth I’s reign in 1558 it had become clear “what a determined opposition the old Gaelic and Brehon order was capable of, even among the Old English.” The poets and bards had persisted in their role as “the chief inspirers of the native tradition,” maintaining “the haughty pride and warlike spirit of their patrons by their encomiums in verse.” The Brehons and chroniclers “kept up the native law and all its records.” Old-regime loyalists upheld an ethos in which the finest human type was held to be aristocrats who, Curtis writes “still lived in the heroic age, in the atmosphere of battle and foray, and who were expected by their poets, historians, and followers to be warriors rather than statesmen.” With the modernizing young queen on both the English and the Irish thrones, “the old Gaelic world, which had existed for two thousand years, was now to clash with the modern world as represented by the Tudor government.”

    The Reformation Parliament in the 1560s imposed the Book of Common Prayer on church services; established the monarch as the head of the Church of Ireland; and confiscated Catholic cathedrals and churches for use by the Church of England. Curtis summarizes the rebels’ motives in the phrase, “religion, land, and local lordship.” In religion, the Catholic Counter-Reformation was now underway, with Jesuits sharpening the issues with their astute use of dialectic and Puritans answering with their astute use of doctrine. This promised international support for the rebels. The land issue centered on the insecurity of land-titles held by Anglo-Irish aristocrats in Leinster and Munster, where they were threatened by the introduction of English-born planters. And the political issue centered on threats to the feudalism introduced by the Normans and to the even older Irish chieftanships. The modern state tolerated neither.

    Born in 1552, Spenser saw reports of the first rebellions against Elizabeth. In 1566 she appointed Sir Henry Sidney as Lord Deputy of Ireland. He enforced Westminster policy vigorously from Dublin. The First Desmond Revolt—named for the Earldom of Desmond, its locus—began in 1569. The Fitzgerald family, which held the Earldom, expected military assistance from Philip II of Spain. Preoccupied with his own rebels in Spanish-ruled Netherlands and with the expenses of ruling his extensive New-World colonies, Philip could offer very little to the Geraldines. Even with his own poorly-disciplined troops carrying the fight, the Earl managed to sustain the rebellion for five years before giving it up.

    In 1579, twenty-seven-year-old Edmund Spenser was introduced to the Earl of Leicester by his young friend and fellow-poet, Philip Sidney, son of the now-former Lord Deputy. Spenser became his secretary, but soon found a new patron: Arthur, Lord Grey of Wilton, who was appointed as Lord Deputy the following year, bringing Spenser with him as his aide.

    By then the Second Desmond War had erupted. Initiated by James FitzMaurice Fitzgerald, commanding forces that included papal troops, this was (as the rebels put it) “a war for the Catholic religion and against a tyrant who refuses to hear Christ speaking by his Vicar”—namely, Pope Pius V, who had excommunicated Elizabeth a decade earlier. Henry Sidney, now on the Privy Council, supported stern repression. Arthur warred against the rebels unmercifully but ineffectively, and was recalled to face criticism in 1582. Among the decisions criticized was his conduct of the siege of Smerwick, a town west of Dingle on the southwestern shore of the island; Spanish and Italian soldiers had surrendered but were nonetheless massacred by Arthur’s troops. Yet Spenser never ceased to admire him, calling him in a set of verses of dedication to The Faerie Queene “Most Noble Lord, the pillar of my life, / And Patron of my Muses pupillage.” Writing his book from the “savage soyle” of Ireland, Spenser defended the Tudor policy of Anglicization in Ireland, and spared no pity on those who resisted it.

    The rebellion ended in 1583 with the Crown forces triumphant. Beginning in 1586 English colonists were installed on the Munster Plantation in County Cork. Spenser was among them; his influential friend, Sir Walter Raleigh (who introduced him to the Queen a few years later) amassed some 40,000 acres; Spenser had to be content with a mere 3,000, residing in the confiscated manor and castle of the Earl of Desmond. He also won appointment as the Clerk of the Office of Munster.

    Catholic resistance to Anglican rule hardly ended with the Desmond Wars. Most spectacularly, the Spanish Armada was wrecked only two years later; had the expedition succeeded, the lives of the English settlers would have been forfeit. And in 1594 the Tyrone War, also called the Nine-Year War, resulted in the aforementioned destruction of Spenser’s home.

    The provinces of Tyrone and Ulster are nowhere near Munster. They are located to the northwest and northeast, respectively, of the Pale. In Ulster the old Gaelic regime had continued, and there “Red” Hugh O’Neill initiated the conflict, soon joined by his brother-in-law, Hugh O’Neill. They won several victories over the English, but with no artillery or siege weapons they failed to take Dublin. Hoping for Spanish aid, they nonetheless intended to prolong the war until the now-elderly Elizabeth died, in the hope of extracting a better settlement from her successor, James VI of Scotland. Enraged by the early defeats, Elizabeth appointed Sir Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy as Royal Deputy. In Curtis’s words, Mountjoy “decided that the war could only be ended by a general famine” brought on by burning crops—a policy Spenser’s patron, Arthur, had already tried. A war of containment and attrition followed. Mountjoy used this induced scarcity as a prelude to buying off many commanders and their vassals. Modest Spanish military assistance did come, but it was ineffective, and Hugh O’Neill surrendered in March 1603, four years after Spenser’s death. When James ascended to the English throne in the same year as James I he inherited a largely pacified Ireland.

    Published in 1596, Spenser’s dialogue on Ireland may or may not have had some influence on the militarily successful English policy. It wasn’t published until 1633, but it circulated in manuscript shortly after Spenser completed it. Spenser also prepared a brief report to the Queen, giving her the gist of his argument. What is certain is that it provides arguments in favor of harsh means for achieving the end of regime change in Ireland, whereby it might be more firmly fixed in the Empire.

    The interlocutors are Eudoxus, which means ‘Good Opinion,’ and Irenaeus, which means ‘Peace.’ Irenaeus has just returned from Ireland, reporting on its “good and commodious soil.” Eudoxus begins with a statement of wonder: “I wonder that no course is taken for the turning thereof to good uses, and reducing of that savage nation to better government and civility.” Irenaeus says that “good plots” have been devised for doing those things, but “they say”—he never identifies them—that all such plots or plans fail for four reasons, two ‘pagan’ and two Christian. They say the “genius” of the soil interferes with good plots; a “genius” is a presiding spirit, good or evil, determining the character of a person, place, or thing. It is present from the beginning—hence the root it shares with ‘generation—and is ineradicable. “They” also say the influence of the stars interferes; in Renaissance astrology, “genius” itself may be determined by the alignment of the stars at the time of origin. More pious persons say that God has not yet appointed the time of Ireland’s reformation, or that God may be reserving Ireland “in this unquiet state” to use it as a scourge of England.

    Mr. Good Opinion knows bad opinions when he hears them. He dismisses them as “vain conceits of simple men” who “judge things by their effects, and not by their causes.” The real causes of failure must be unsound counsels and plans or else “faintness in following and effecting” them. “Through wisdom, [Ireland] may be mastered and subdued,” “since the poet sayeth, ‘The wise man shall rule even over the stars,’ much more over the earth.” [1] Eudoxus’ inclination to wonder, and his desire to get to the real causes of things marks him as more than merely a man of good opinion but as a political philosopher, or a would-be political philosopher, or perhaps a political man who seeks practical wisdom. He asks Irenaeus to enumerate the evils he’s observed there, as a “wise physician” diagnoses the disease before he treats the patient. This reinforces the impression that Eudoxus guides himself by the light of nature, not revelation ‘ancient’ or ‘modern.’

    Irenaeus deplores “the infinite number” of evils in Ireland, which he likens to Pandora’s box. But the worst, “most ancient and long-grown” of these are the laws, the customs, and the religion.

    How can laws, intended for the good of the commonwealth, be a source of evil? Eudoxus asks. Irenaeus replies that it is with laws as it is with a physician’s remedies: a given regimen may be good in itself but bad in the circumstances; or it may have been good in the original circumstance, bad when that circumstance changed. What is more, if medical or legal prescriptions are not consistently followed, evils will result.

    By laws, Eudoxus asks, do you mean English common law or statutes enacted by Parliament? Both: the common law, brought over by William the Conqueror, “fitted well with the state of England then being” because the English at that time were a peaceable people tyrannized by their king, eager for change. William and the Norman laws were looked upon as improvements by this law-abiding population. “But with Ireland it is far otherwise, for it is a nation ever acquainted with wars, though but amongst themselves, and in their own kind of military discipline, trained up over their youths.” Indeed, “they scarcely know the name of law,” having “kept their own law,” the Brehon Law, which Irenaeus judges to be scarcely worthy of the name of law at all. Like the English common law, it is unwritten and traditional, but unlike the common law it is “in many things repugning quite both to God and man’s law.” For example, in criminal cases the Brehon does not so much judge as arbitrate between the parties to determine compensation. Even murder cases are settled with payment. More, the Brehon is appointed and controlled by the local lord, and can be depended upon to “adjudgeth for the most part the better share unto his lord.”

    These practices continue despite the Irish acknowledgment of Henry VIII’s sovereignty and of English law. “What boots it to break a colt,” Irenaeus asks, “and to let him straight run loose at random?” The current generation disavows any agreement made by their fathers, since they Irish are not bound by oaths sworn by any previous generation. And indeed they are not so bound, under their own laws of succession, which are based not on inheritance but on tanistry: In Ireland, after a lord or captain dies his people elect a new ruler, usually a brother or cousin of the deceased, not one of his children. What they do respect and adhere to are “all the former ancient customs of the country.” This includes the rule that property not be ceded to strangers, “especially the English.” Tanistry ensures that they will have adult rulers, better defenders of the land than boy-kings or girl-queens dominated by their regents.

    Eudoxus asks, how can this be remedied? Mr. Peace invokes Cicero: “all is the conqueror’s as Tully to Brutus saith.” Henry VIII did not sufficiently force the recognition of the right of conquest on the Irish, although the Irish parliament gave lip service to obedience. But perhaps, Eudoxus suggests, “it seemed better under that noble King to bring them by their own accord unto his obedience, and to plant a peaceable government among them, than by such violent means to keep them under.” And surely his daughter Elizabeth can rectify matters.

    Irenaeus doesn’t think regime change comes so readily. “It is no so easy now that things have grown into a habit and have their certain course, to change the channel, and turn the stream another way, for they now have a colorable pretense to withstand such Innovations, having accepted other laws and rules already.” Ireland is no blank slate. Further, the William the Conqueror stayed “in person to overlook the Magistrates, and to overawe the subjects with the terror of his sword and the countenance of his Majesty,” whereas in Ireland neither the Plantagenet Henries nor the Tudor Henries did any such thing for a sustained period. Further, and crucially, “laws ought to be fashioned unto the manners and customs of the people, to whom they are meant, and not to be imposed unto them according to the simple rule of right; for else… instead of good they may work ill, and pervert Justice into extreme Injustice. For he who would transfer the laws of the Lacedaemonians to the people of Athens should find a great absurdity and inconvenience.” The Lacedaemonians were a military people, like the Irish, although better disciplined.

    When the Irish grow weary of war “they sue for grace, til they have gotten new breath and recovered their strength again.” For this reason, “it is vain to speak of planting laws, and plotting of policies, til they are altogether subdued.” But were they not subdued by Henry II? Yes, but the Irish then retreated “into the deserts and mountains,” beyond the reach of the laws, as the English could not do in 1066. The Anglo-Norman settlers stayed under the law and enjoyed its benefits among themselves, but when the Irish returned, desperate for food and shelter, they were placed under vassalage by the foreign aristocrats, “who scarcely vouchsafed to impart unto them, the benefit of those laws, under which themselves lived, but every one made his will and commandment a law unto his own vassal.” The law of England “was never properly applied unto the Irish nation, as by a purposed plot of government”; the aristocrats evaded it. Then, when the War of the Roses began, the Anglo-Irish left to fight. The Irish, seeing the countryside “so dispeopled and weakened,” repossessed many of their former lands. And so Ireland has gone ever since—sporadic English attempts to rule interspersed with Irish rebellions in times of English weakness or distraction.

    Satisfied with this account of the efficient causes of disorder in Ireland, Eudoxus requests an analysis of the problems of adapting English common law to the circumstances there. Irenaeus sets down as a first principle that laws must “take their first beginning” from “the manners of the people and the abuses of the country” for which they are “invented.” The aim of the laws should be justice, by which he means the prevention of “evils” and the safety of the commonwealth. So, for example, under ordinary circumstances it is wrong to punish thoughts—only words or acts—except when “devis[ing] or purpos[ing] the death of the king.” Regicide threatens the safety of the commonwealth itself, and must be punished capitally even if detected at the planning stage. “So that jus politicum, though it be not of itself just, yet by application, or rather necessity, it is made just; and this only respect maketh all laws just.” English common law, though invented in Normandy, fit the character of the English people; it does not fit the Irish people.

    For example, English common law provides for jury trials, with juries “chosen out of the honestest and most substantial freeholders.” But a jury of Irish freeholders will always decide in favor of the Irishman against the Englishman, even against the Queen herself. In the latter cases, the Crown loses revenues. In their dealings with the English generally, the Irish “are most willfully bent,” never hesitating to perjure themselves or to cheat, a “cautelous and wily-headed” people, especially when armed with a smattering of legal knowledge. And if (as Eudoxus) suggests, English magistrates appoint English juries, then the Irishman will “complain he hath no justice.” And if, per impossibile, this could be done without stoking further resentment, witnesses called from “the base Irish people will be as deceitful as the verdicts” of Irish juries—”so little feeling have they of God, or of their own souls’ good.”

    Would “heavy laws and penalties” against perverse jurors reform the courts? No, Irenaeus answers: “When a people are inclined to any vice, or have no touch of conscience, nor sense of their evil doings, it is bootless to think to restrain them by any penalties or fear of punishment; but either the occasion is to be taken away, or a more understanding of the right, and shame of the fault is to be imprinted.” For if the lawgiver had prohibited theft among the Lacedemonians or drunkenness among the Flemish, “there should have been few Lacedemonians then left, and fewer Flemings.” Other Irish acts of exploitation, abuse, and evasion of the common law include clever ways of dodging responsibility for the receipt of stolen property. Even outright rebels can avoid confiscation of their lands by the Crown if they convey those lands into a trust, prior to rebelling. They can enjoy their profits from the comfort of exile in some country ruled by “her Majesty’s professed enemies.” Generally, in Ireland and indeed in England, the great lords have too much power and can too readily defy the authority of the monarchy in their struggles to shift the regime toward de facto aristocracy.

    In addition to being antiquated, many statute laws, too, are misapplied because the judges have too much leeway in their interpretation. “It is dangerous to leave the sense of the law unto the reason or will of the judges, who are men and may be miscarried by affections, and many other means. But the laws ought to be like unto stony tables, plain steadfast, and immovable.” In Ireland the rule of law is a hard principle to maintain, as when a lord is charged with treason he is required to “bring forth” his kindred in order to be “justified”; he thus assembles a small army of men who serve under the accused traitor, “who may lead them to what he will.” Eudoxus shudders, “In very deed, Irenaeus, it is very dangerous, especially seeing the disposition of all these people is not always inclinable to the best.”

    At Eudoxus’ request, Irenaeus turns to a consideration of Irish customs, the Irish way of life, which underlies Irish law. Three peoples have contributed their customs to the Gaelic people: Scythians, Gauls, and English. This comes as no surprise, as “no nation now in Christendom, nor much farther, but is mingled and compounded with others.” Ethnic purity is a myth. And this is a good thing because God in His providence brought northern European nations to the south, where they encountered Christianity.

    The interlocutors discuss the difficulty of tracing specific influences by consulting tradition. There can be no “certain hold of any antiquity which is received by tradition, since all men be liars, and may lie when they will.” For example, it is well-established that a people arrived in Ireland from Spain, but they might have been Gauls, Spaniards, Goths, or Moors. Of these peoples, however, the Gauls were the ones who had an alphabet, so he considers them the likely immigrants.

    Such mingling can be good or bad, depending on the various sets of customs and the way they mix. The English colonizers have now “degenerated and grown almost Irish.” Eudoxus wonders, again: “What hear I? And is it possible that an Englishman, brought up naturally in such sweet civility as England affords, can find such liking in that barbarous rudeness, that he should forget his own nature, and forgo his own nation?” Yes, as a matter of fact, thanks to “the first evil ordinance of that Commonwealth,” by which Irenaeus evidently means Ireland, not England. But before going any further on that theme, he analyzes the evil traits which now characterize the Irish nation.

    Scythians contributed seven. Like their Scythian ancestors, the Irish live in waste spaces, pasturing cattle, which leads to licentiousness, a life beyond the reach of the law. They wear mantles, allowing an outlaw “to cover himself from the wrath of heaven, from the offense of the earth and from the sight of men.” The mantle serves rebels and thieves alike, concealing weapons and booty. Prostitutes disguise themselves and swaddle their bastard children in the mantle, and even housewives can “lie and sleep in it, or… lowse themselves in the sunshine,” evading work. They wear their hair long, enabling themselves to mask their identities. “Uncivil and Scythian-like,” they howl in battle and indulge in “immoderate wailings” at funerals; this “Irish hubbabowe” gives vent to their savage passions. In their battle they go forth in a “confused order of march, in heaps, without any order or array.” Their barbaric religious customs include swearing by their swords and drinking bowls of blood to solemnize their warrior-bonds before battle. And the Irish, like the Scythians, claim that they turn into wolves once a year. The fact that they make such a claim bespeaks a longing for subhuman ferocity in predation.

    The Goths contributed the customs of revering and supporting bards and drinking the blood of enemies. As for the English, their decent customs have been perverted by “liberty and ill example.” Making “private wars against each other,” English lords recruit allies among the Irish themselves; this corrupts the English and emboldens the Irish. The English “are now grown to be almost as lewd as the Irish,” except for the ones who live in the Pale. And this is no wonder, as “proud hearts do oftentimes (like wanton colts) kick at their mothers,” including their mother-country. Alliance often entails intermarriage, too. “Great houses there be of the old English of Ireland, which through licentious conversing with the Irish, or marrying, or fostering them, or lack of good nurture, or other such unhappy occasions, have degenerated from their ancient dignity, and are now grown as Irish as Ohanlan’s breech,” which is very Irish indeed.

    Eudoxus can only gasp, “Where the lords and chief men wax so barbarous and bastardlike, what shall be hoped of the peasants, and base people?” Irenaeus brings him back to a more sober view. “It is but even the other day since England grew to be civil.” In Henry II’s day, English customs themselves were “very rude and barbarous.” That is to say that the English colonies in Ireland were themselves ill-founded.

    For example, the English in Ireland abused their own language by speaking “Irish.” Eudoxus finds this strange, inasmuch as “it hath been ever the use of the conquerors to despise the language of the conquered, and to force him by all means to learn his,” as the Romans did. [2] Irenaeus explains this by recalling the English habit of intermarrying with the Irish and/or giving their children to Irish nurses. “The child that sucketh the milk of the nurse, must of necessity learn his first speech of her, the which being the first that is enured to his tongue, is ever after most pleasing to him,” even if he learns English later on. And not only speech: Anglo-Irish children also learn Irish “manners and conditions,” for “small children be like apes, which will affect and imitate what they see done afore them, especially of their nurses whom they love so well, they moreover draw unto themselves, together with their suck, even the nature and disposition of their nurses; for the mind followeth much the temperature of the body; and also the words are the image of the mind, so as, they proceeding from the mind, the mind must needs be affected with the words.” An Irish heart will come from Irish speech, “for out of the abundance of the heart, the tongue speaketh.” The most intimate of infant experiences proves the path to a different regime.

    So does the most intimate of adult experiences. Intermarriage with a foreign people is “a dangerous thing in all commonwealths,” as “the simplest sense” perceives. “How can such matching” of English with the Irish “but bring forth and evil race, seeing that commonly the child taketh most of his nature of the mother.” By mothers children “are first framed and fashioned,” and what they learn at her knee will be “hardly ever after forgot.”

    Mr. Peace leaves no doubt regarding what habits of heart will be learned from the Irish. They are the habits of warriors. Although Eudoxus thinks that Irenaeus’ description of Irish garb, which reflects Irish spiritedness, takes them away from their discussion of customs, it is not so. If Irish customs underlie all Irish law, warfare underlies all Irish customs. They are Scythians and Goths first, civilized English only superficially if at all.

    Thanks to the Goths, they have bards to urge them on. Irenaeus distinguishes bards from poets. They share with poets the task of “set[ting] forth praises and dispraises of men in their poems and rhymes.” “None dare to displease them for fear of running into reproach through their offense, and to be made infamous in the mouths of all men.” They mold public opinion. Mr. Good Opinion asks how they differ from poets. They differ, not in their art but in their use of their art. Poets “do labor to better the manners of men, and through the sweet bait of their numbers, to steal into young spirit a desire of honor and virtue.” Poets “are worthy of great respect.” Not so “these Irish bards.” “Far from instructing young men in moral discipline,” it is “they themselves [who] do more deserve to be sharply disciplined.” They praise not “the doings of good men for the ornaments of their poems, but whom soever they find to be the most licentious of life, most bold and lawless in his doings, most dangerous and desperate in all parts of disobedience an rebellious disposition, him they set up and glorify in their rhymes, him they praise to the people, and to young men make an example to follow.” They excoriate the English and encourage the “lewd liberty” of the Irish. “Evil things are decked out and suborned with the gay attire of goodly words, may easily deceive and carry away the affection of a young mind,” leading it to honor its own passions. As a result, Irish youth are “brought up without awe of parent, without precepts of masters, without fear of offense, not being directed, or employed in any course of life, which may carry them to virtue.” With bardic encouragement, a boy “waxeth most insolent and half mad with the love of himself, and his own lewd deeds; for such a youth, “his music was not the harp, or the lays of love, but the cries of people, and clashing of arms.”

    Irish political customs also conduce to disorder. The Irish hold popular assemblies on hills, where disputes between townships are settled. This practice originated not among Scythians or Goths but among the Saxons, but in Ireland it is abused by “the scum of base people,” who “confer of what they list,” inflaming those desires as they do so. As a result, Englishmen who have ventured to attend such meetings have been murdered. Local democracy practiced by “a people so evil-minded” must be restrained. Eudoxus, who harbors republican sentiments, regrets the proposal but Irenaeus firmly insists that the meetings be abolished. The Irish are not ready for self-government; they need a stronger hand, and one not their own. Their very militancy makes them ungovernable: In this “country of war” with armies “scatter[red] around the country,” soldiers routinely requisition food and lodging from civilians. This provokes “great detestation of soldiers” among the common folk, which issues “into hatred of the very government, which draweth upon them such evils.” If soldiers are not seen as protectors but as plunderers, government itself will be distrusted, whoever attempts to govern. This too feeds licentiousness.

    The last custom Irenaeus describes is economic. Landlords and freeholders rent farms to tenants on a year-to-year basis, or even during pleasure. Nor will tenants take land for longer periods. As a result, tenants fear landlords’ peremptory demands for both horses and humans, not knowing when their landlord will requisition either or both. The landlord, expecting the departure of his tenant at any time, “hover[s] in expectation of new worlds”—new tenants, new relations. With this unstable combination of liberty and arbitrary rule, tenants never invest in the land, which for them is here today, gone tomorrow. Their homes are “rather swine-steads than houses.” This here today, gone tomorrow attitude toward property injures not only local economies but the commonwealth as a whole.

    On religion, his third set of Irish evils, Irenaeus will have “little to say.” The Irish profess Catholicism, but they are “so blindly and brutally informed (for the most part) as that you would rather think them Atheists or Infidels.” The problem stems from “the first institution and planting of religion” in Ireland. By then, religion had been “generally corrupted by [the] popish trumpery” of the priests. “What other could they learn from them, than such trash as was taught them and drink of that cup of fornication with which the purple harlot had then made all nations drunken?” Irenaeus asks, a touch rhetorically. Priests, pope, and people “have all erred and gone out of the way together.” So far, no reform has been possible, again because Ireland has been continually at war. “Instructions in religion needeth quiet times, and ere we seek to settle a sound discipline in the clergy, we must purchase peace unto the laity; for it is an ill time to preach amongst swords.” That is, civil or regime reform and stability must precede ecclesiastical reform.

    It isn’t that Irenaeus lauds the Church of England. Simony, greed, “fleshly incontinence,” and sloth infect that church, too. It’s simply that the Roman Church is even worse. Merely replacing English with Irish clergy won’t help, as Irish prejudice against the English will prevent any real reform.

    Given these legal, conventional, and religious evils, what is to be done? Irenaeus first highlights actions that haven’t worked. Certain military captains will not prosecute war vigorously, worrying that if they win they will be out of work. Some of the Crown’s appointed governors also do little, hoping to prolong their appointments. Other governors will conceal problems, passing them on to their successor. “The governors usually are envious one of another’s greater glory.” As a result, there is no peace. “The longer that government thus continueth, in the worse course will that realm be; for it is all in vain that they now strive and endeavor by fair means and peaceable plots to redress the same, without first removing all those inconveniences and new framing (as it were in the forge) all that is worn out of fashion.” The Irish will continue to resist, and resist successfully, any reform because they fear expropriation of their property, as happened when the Norman English first occupied their island, so long as dilatory half-measures prevail.

    “Therefore, the reformation must now be the strength of a greater power,” for “it is vain to prescribe laws, where no man cares to keep them, nor fears the danger of breaking them.” The sword must come first. “All these evils must first be cut away with a strong hand, before any good can be planted,” as a tree must be pruned in order to “bring forth any good fruit.” Mr. Peace does not shrink from the task: “Where no other remedy may be found, nor no hope of recovery had, there must needs this violent means be used.”

    He hastens to say that he does not recommend what we now call genocide. “Far be it from me that I should ever think so desperately, or wish so uncharitably.” It is “not the people which are evil.” And those among them who are evil “by good ordinances and government may be made good; but the evil that is of itself evil will never become good.”

    Irenaeus then offers a detailed and comprehensive plan for regime change. First, England must send an army adequate to put down the ongoing rebellion. This means a force of 10,000 foot soldiers and 1,000 cavalry. It will take them about eighteen months to do it. These men must be well provisioned (as they are not now), so that they won’t need to requisition supplies from civilians. Military efforts should focus on the strongest rebel force, the one led by the Earl of Tyrone. Because the Irish are guerrilla fighters, it is useless to pursue them. Instead, set up four encampments in Ulster. From these encampments, gather intelligence on the enemy’s movements and drive him from one English stronghold to another. Do it in winter, when there will be less cover, more hardship. Offer amnesty to all those who surrender in twenty days from the beginning of the campaign.

    After this, the remaining rebels will be the hardened and incorrigible ones, men upon whom no compassion need be wasted. Above all, lay waste to their food supply—cattle and grain. This worked in Munster (where Spenser had served), and Irenaeus doesn’t spare Eudoxus a picture of the result. After eighteen months, the rebels there “brought to such wretchedness, as that any stony heart would have rued the same. Out of every corner of the woods and glens they came creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs could not bear them; the spake like ghosts crying out of their graves; they did eat of the dead carrions, happy were they if they could find them, yea, and one another soon after, insofar as the very carcasses they spared not to scrape out of their graves.” “In all that war, there perished not many by the sword, but all by the extremity of famine, which they themselves had wrought”—presumably by their refusal to surrender sooner. Eudoxus can only say, “It is a wonder that you tell and more to be wondered how it should so shortly come to pass.”

    No need to wonder, Irenaeus rejoins. The battle-ready Irish have no secure property. Accustomed to live off the land, they readily take from one another, up to and including devouring one another. As for the English destruction of livestock and crops, “this is very necessary to be done for the soon finishing of the war.”

    Eudoxus sees a problem. When Arthur, Lord Grey imposed exactly this policy, the Queen’s compassion was aroused and those around her claimed that “he regarded not the life of her subjects no more than dogs.” Irenaeus agrees that “the Good Lord [was] blotted with the name of a bloody man,” when he was in fact a “gentle, affable, loving, and temperate” man acting under “necessity.” At Smerwick he made no promises to the Spaniards, who were not “lawful enemies”—having admitted to being adventurers, sent by neither the Spanish king nor the pope—and therefore not protected by the law of nations. As for his dealings with the rebellious lords, “he spared not the heads and principals of any mischievous practice or rebellion, but showed sharp judgment on them, chiefly for example’s sake, and that all the meaner sort, which also then were generally affected with that evil, might be terror thereof be reclaimed and saved, if it might be possible.” [3]

    Irenaeus insists that before this harsh course of action be initiated, “it must be foreseen and assured, that after once entering into this course of reformation, there be afterwards no remorse or drawing back for the sigh of any such rueful objects as must thereupon follow, nor for compassion of their calamities, seeing that by no other means it is possible to recure them, and that these are not of will, but of very urgent necessity.” The property of those executed for their crimes should go to their heirs, not to the Queen. In this Irenaeus takes a thought from Machiavelli, he observes that men feel the sting of losing their patrimony more sharply than that of losing their father. Perhaps to strengthen Elizabeth’s resolution, Irenaeus recalls that she had raised up the chief rebel, the Earl of Tyrone, who now takes advantage of her kindness. And if any might question the right of England to rule Ireland in the first place, Ireland belongs to England by right of conquest, a feature of the law of nations—the right the Anglo-Irish themselves invoke against the Crown, when they resist its authority. [4] Lands owned by rebels who are not executed will be confiscated and added to Crown lands.

    Very well then, Irenaeus, once the war is over, what do you propose to do with the victorious troops? Will they not be dangerous if they return to England, or hire themselves out as mercenaries for foreign powers? Irenaeus would maintain 6000 of the troops in garrisons on Irish soil; the remainder should be given farms there. Some will be assigned duty in Munster, the likely point of any Spanish attack. Few if any will return to England.

    The enemy must be disarmed and all but the leaders should be given land to farm. Other Irish commoners can be made tenant farmers on English-owned plantations, so that they can be watched, with the garrisons on call if any serious trouble arises. The plantation owners will pay for the soldiers’ upkeep, needing them for protection; this will relieve the Queen of any burden.  Indeed, such a standing army will prove less expensive than sending troops over to Ireland every seven years or so, to quell the latest rebellion. This simply reprises the Roman policies when they conquered England. The lack of such policies explain why Henry II’s conquest didn’t issue in civil peace.

    Further, each garrison would have a town associated with it, a commercial town populated by additional English settlers. With civil peace assured, increased prosperity for Ireland, and increased revenues for the Crown will surely follow.

    Irenaeus disapproves of locating the Lord Deputy’s office in Dublin, within the Pale, on the western shore. He should rule from Athy, “the main-mast of the ship,” located in the Earldom of Kildare along the River Barrow.  Kildare is the section directly west of the Pale, and therefore a strategic borderland where Irish and Anglo-Irish influences meet—an inflection point, as it were, and also the place where the rebel Fitzgeralds live. From there, the Lord Deputy should act on the general guidelines established by the Queen’s council of ministers, but he should be supervised, and subject to review by a new officer, the Lord President, a man trusted by the Queen for his justice and equity. However, within that framework of safeguards, he should be given much greater discretion to act with energy and rapidity as a genuine executive of the laws, not needing to consult with his superiors before making a move. In recurring to this point near the end of the dialogue, Irenaeus will add, that “this (I remember) is worthily observed by Machiavel in his discourses upon Livy, where he commendeth the manner of the Roman government, in giving absolute power to all their Consuls and Governors, which if they abused, they should afterwards dearly answer it: and the contrary thereof he reprehendeth in the States of Venice, and Florence, and many other principalities of Italy who used to limit their chief officers so straightly, as that thereby oftentimes they have lost such happy occasions as they would never come into again.”

    After a detailed discussion of specific actions to be taken to pacify the several most rebellious regions, Irenaeus concludes with his recommendations to remedy the three main “evils” he had outlined earlier. Regarding law, at this point “we cannot now apply laws fit for the people, as in the first institution of commonwealths it ought to be,” and as he had wished it had been done by Henry II and his colleagues. With English common law longstanding, “we will apply the people, and it them to the laws.” This can become possible only because many more English will settle in Ireland and participate in the Irish parliament, and because in the aftermath of the war the Irish will be more submissive. Irenaeus also recommends that the Irish upper house be packed with English aristocrats. Since the Irish nobles fomented the rebellion, not the people, they deserve to be shouldered aside, at least to some extent, in the Irish House of Lords.

    Irish submissiveness can be prolonged, and civility enhanced, if the Crown divides the country into small, easily policed subsections. This will rid the country of the bandits and will also facilitate a regularized system of tithing. The precedent here is what King Alfred did in England when it resembled Ireland in its lawlessness, with “every corner having its Robin Hood in it.” With officials appointed by the Crown and answerable to it, these English-style shires will ensure that revenues are “withdrawn from [the] lords, and subjected to [the] Prince.” “By this the people are broken into man small parts, like little streams, that they cannot easily come together into one head,” “adhering unto great men.” In all this one readily sees the lineaments of a modern state, wherein a subordinated and co-opted aristocracy finds itself replaced by agents of the central government.

    Irenaeus is confident that these new legal and institutional arrangements will foster reform of the Anglo-Irish aristocrats who exploit their tenants, cheat Her Majesty out of her rightful revenues, and become too Irish. The Old English “need a sharper reformation than the very Irish, for they are much more stubborn, and disobedient to law and government than the Irish be, and more malicious to the English that daily are sent over.” This elicits a shudder from sober Eudoxus: “Lord! How quickly doth that country alter men’s natures!” Irenaeus demurs, a bit: “No times have been without bad men…. Neither is it the nature of the country to alter men’s manners, but the bad minds of them, who having been brought up at home under a straight full of duty and obedience, being always restrained by sharp penalties from lewd behavior, so soon as they come thither, where they see laws more slackly tended, and the hard restraint which they were used unto now slacked, they grow more loose and careless of their duty; and as it is the nature of all men to love liberty, so they become flat libertines, and fall to all licentiousness, more boldly daring to disobey the law, through the presumption of favor and friendship, than any Irish dare.” With reformed laws, some of the dangers of English and Irish living together will be diminished, especially if they both must pay the same tithes.

    As his final legal stroke, Irenaeus would ban the use of Irish names. New family names should be chosen, a surname description of the man’s trade, or “some quality of his body or mind,” or the name of his dwelling place. No more “Oes and Macks”—O’Brian (for example) meaning the grandson of Brian, McDonald meaning the grandson of Donald. The Irish way of naming was introduced for “the strengthening of the Irish” by recalling family lineages. Prohibiting the practice will help to blend the English and Irish populations rightly, so that each Irishman “shall in short time quite forget his Irish nation.”

    As for customs, what Eudoxus calls the “manner of life,” Irenaeus intends to tame Irish warlikeness. Each non-freeholder shall have a trade. All trades are either manual, intellectual, or mixed. First and foremost, Irish commoners should become agriculturists, as agriculture is “the enemy of war,” replacing aggression with patience, contempt for property with respect for it. Husbandry is “the nurse of thrift, and the daughter of industry and labor.” In this it contrasts with herding, which conduces to habits of command, to marshaling masses of the obedient, and to long periods of idle dreaming which stoke ambitions of conquest—all consonant with a warlike people.

    For others, a liberal education is indispensable, especially for “the sons of lords.” “That wretched realm of Ireland wanteth the most principal [trade], that is, the intellectual; therefore, in seeking to reform her state, it is especially to be looked into.” Liberal education can teach the arts of “civil conversation”—precisely what glory-loving would-be warrior scions of the Irish aristocracy need, if they are to participate in a civil not military society.

    As a last-resort discouragement to the old way of life, and to give teeth to the new one, the Queen should appoint Provost Marshalls to patrol the countryside with a set of deputies. These men will round up stragglers and runaways, “terrify[ing] the idle rogues,” and wielding power of life and death over them.

    Eudoxus calls liberal education second only to “the knowledge and fear of God.” Irenaeus has a few thoughts on religion. In noticeable contrast to the civil order, religious orthodoxy “is not sought forcibly to be impressed into [the Irish] with terror and sharp penalties, as now is the manner, but rather delivered and intimated with mildness and gentleness, so as it may not be hated afore it is understood, and [its] Professors despised and rejected.” Nor should Englishmen take the forefront. “Discreet ministers of their own countrymen” should be “sent among” the Irish, so as not further to associate Protestantism with the English. Irenaeus esteems the examples of St. Patrick and St. Columba, who proved that converting the Irish to Christianity was not impossible, even if they left the job woefully incomplete. He criticizes Anglican ministers for lack of energy in their missionary work, unlike their rivals, the Jesuits. He recommends repairing churches, in order to draw the people into them voluntarily.

    Returning to matters secular, Irenaeus would build not only churches but better transportation infrastructure—roads and bridges which would support bigger markets and more national unity. He wants to see more market towns, with a ban on black markets supplemented by the branding of livestock, which will discourage both cattle-rustling and livestock smuggling.

    He ends by adjuring his countrymen to remove legal corruption respecting public offices. The Lord Deputy must not sell offices “for money,” nor sell pardons, shares of bishoprics, or commercial licenses. The same prohibition goes for cronyism.

    Spenser himself succinctly summarized his thoughts for the benefit of the Queen in “A Briefe Note of Ireland,” dated October 1598, a year before he died. First, “there can be no conformity of government where there is no conformity of religion”; second, “there can be no sound agreement between two equal countries” within the same empire; third, “there can be no assurance of peace where the worst sort are stronger.”

    Of these precepts, the matter of religious conformity would be more effectively solved by religious toleration, or better, religious rights so long as the practices claimed by the religious do not violate civil order. That is (and to use an anachronism) the liberalism Spenser himself exhibits in his intention to shift the Irish, and especially Irish and Anglo-Irish aristocrats, away from war and toward peaceful civil and commercial ways of life would be supplemented by religious freedom. In this, he is seriously handicapped by his lack of a theory of natural right which might undergird the practice of religious liberty.

    The matter of empire would be solved by the end of genuine empires and, in the case of what was soon to become Great Britain, the establishment of the British Commonwealth. As for the claim that peace cannot prevail when the evil predominate, that stands, despite the efforts of Bernard Mandeville and other ultra-Machiavellian political thinkers and practitioners. Like the later liberals, Spenser would dilute the evil influences within all human hearts by carefully-designed political institutions.

    In considering regime change, Spenser enjoys the advantage of knowing what a regime is, in all its dimensions. The purposes of a good regime may be seen in the names of his interlocutors, “Peace” and “Good Opinion.” He clearly identifies who will rule in Ireland. He sets down the ruling structures to be established by law. And he understands the importance of custom, the way of life of a people. He sees how all these regime elements relate to each other.

    Americans have undertaken regime change for themselves, and for nations they have defeated in war, on several occasions. Like Spenser, they have found that lasting regime change occurs only if the ruled consent to it (as did the Amerindian nations the Washington administration reformed) or, alternatively, if the ruled are first devastated and then supervised by the conqueror (as in Germany and Japan, after the Second World War). Half-measures induced by humanitarian critics prove ineffective and ultimately inhumane.

     

    Notes

    1. The poet cited is Jeun de Meun in The Romance of the Rose. He is following Thomas Aquinas, in contradistinction to William Gower’s Confessio Amantis, in which not the wise man but the prayerful, pious man rules the stars by the grace of God.
    2. Not quite so: one must recall the Trojan-Latin settlement, described in the Aeneid.
    3. In his 1598 report to Elizabeth, “A Briefe Note of Ireland,” Spenser took up this matter directly with Her Majesty. “Great force must be the instrument and famine must be the means, for till Ireland be famished it can not be subdued.” (See The Poetical Works, p. 849.)
    4. The right of conquest proceeds from the mercy the conqueror has shown the conquered: he has allowed him to live. Obviously, this can apply only if the conqueror fought a just war in the first place. The English likely could have claimed that their war of conquest was just because the Irish had raided English shores repeatedly, for many years.

    Filed Under: Nations

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