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    Tocqueville on the Moral Effects of Public Charity

    January 5, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Alexis de Tocqueville: Memoir on Pauperism and Other Writings: Poverty, Public Welfare, and Inequality. Christine Dunn Henderson translation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021.

     

    Note: A version of this review appeared in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 47, Number 3, Summer 2021.

     

    Tocqueville published his two “mémoires” or memos on pauperism in 1833 and 1837, respectively—that is, almost as bookends to the first volume of Democracy in America. In them, he considers his great theme, the advance of “democracy” or “equality of conditions” and its counterpoint, the rise of a new aristocracy founded on that very social egalitarianism, an “aristocracy” or oligarchy of industrial magnates who aim at lording it over factory workers in the cities Whereas the feudal lords of the European countryside had ruled ‘their’ peasants with a firm but often kindly hand, living with them on the same land, knowing them personally, the modern aristocrat live apart from their employees, do not know them, and think of them only as replaceable parts in factories organized rather like the machines on the shop floor.

    “This leads to “a most extraordinary and apparently inexplicable sight”: “the countries that appear the poorest are those which, in reality, contain the fewest indigents, while among the peoples whose opulence you admire, one part of the population is obliged to rely upon the gift of the other in order to live” (Memoir on Pauperism, 1). England’s prosperous countryside contrasts with its villages, where one-sixth of the people live on “public charity”; in Spain and Portugal, the countryside is impoverished but few are indigent; in France, conditions vary from province to province. Even within the same empire, “you will see proportionate growth of, on the one hand, the number of those living in comfort, and on the other hand, the number of those who fall back upon public donations in order to live” (MP, 2).

    Tocqueville is nothing if not an ardent inquirer into social causation. One of the surprises an early reader of the Democracy must have experienced was his reversal of the characteristic Enlightenment narrative. Voltaire and his allies ascribed feudalism and it abuses to Christianity; French Revolutionaries notoriously had replaced the Madonna and her Child with the Goddess of Reason. Unearthing the origin of equality, Tocqueville finds its root in the Christianity the revolutionaries loathed. To understand pauperism in the mist of plenty, Tocqueville goes even farther back, to the origin of human society itself.

    “Behold men gathering for the first time. They come out of the forests, they are still wild, they join forces not to enjoy life, but to find the means of surviving. Shelter against the intemperance of the seasons, sufficient food—such is the object of their efforts. Their minds do not go beyond these goods, and if they obtain them without trouble, they judge themselves satisfied with their fate and doze in idle comfort,” just as “the barbarous tribes in North America” Tocqueville had visited still did. Men in the earliest societies were social animals, “with very few desires” and “hardly any needs other than” those felt by the animals among which they lived. The supported themselves by hunting; property ownership occurred only after they became “acquainted with agriculture” (MP, 3).

    Now “assured of survival, they begin to glimpse that human existence offers other sources of pleasures beyond the satisfaction of life’s first and most urgent needs” (MP, 3). Inequality arose—millennia before Christianity. “One sees the spirit of conquest, which has been the mother of all aristocratic societies, spread,” based as it is on the few who possess the bodily strength and psychic ferocity to kill and to risk being killed for the sake of rule over others and the consequent seizure of their property (MP, 5).

    Such men rivaled each other, attempted to conquer each other. “The barbarians who invaded the Roman Empire at the end of the fourth century were savages who had glimpsed landed property’s utility and had wanted to get its advantages for themselves.” Having softened their moeurs after their own vast conquests, now accustomed to “the peaceful activities of field labor” but without that level of “civilization” that would have made them “capable of fighting against the primitive fierceness of their enemies,” Roman farmers became tenants of the new, rough aristocrats; “feudal society was organized and the Middle Ages were born.” “Inequality passed into laws, and from having been a fact, it became a right.” (MP, 5).

    Tocqueville “generalizes” from these facts. “If we pay attention to what has happened since the birth of societies, we will easily discover that equality is only found at the two ends of society. Savages are equal because they are all equally weak and ignorant. Very civilized men are able to all become equal because they all have similar means of attaining comfort and happiness at their disposal Between these two extremes, the inequality of conditions is found: the wealth, enlightenment, and power of some and the poverty, ignorance, and weakness of all the others” (MP, 5). Under feudal social conditions, no “Third Estate” or middle class existed, only “those who cultivated the soil without possessing it” and “those who possessed the soil without cultivating it” (MP, 6).

    Feudal peasants were ruled by the aristocrats but not usually killed by them, as “the master’s interest coincided with theirs” when it came to their survival. Peasants “enjoyed that type of vegetative happiness whose charm is as difficult for the highly civilized man to understand as its existence is difficult for him to deny.” For their part, aristocrats lived in luxury but not in comfort. “Comfort presupposes a large class whose members are simultaneously employed in trying to make life sweeter and more comfortable”—a middle class which neither provides necessities nor keens itself for military and political glory. Aristocratic life “was brilliant and lavish, but not commodious”; “they ate with their fingers from plates of silver or engraved steel.” Residents of provincial towns in the 1830s, he observes, enjoy more comfort “than did the proudest baron of the Middle Ages” (MP, 6). On one hand, “comfort was found nowhere,” not in the peasant’s hovel or the lord’s castle; on the other hand, there was “survival everywhere,” as peasants provided food and shelter for themselves and their rulers, while rulers cared for and protected peasants, often from the depredations of other rulers (MP, 7).

    This means that Enlightenment philosophes and their revolutionary admirers took a phenomenon for a cause. True, the feudal aristocrats endowed their lands to their firstborn sons and found positions in the Catholic Church for their second-born sons, and Christianity became associated with the ruling class. But they did so only as a politic appropriation, not as a logical consequence of the religion itself, which stipulated not an aristocratic right to rule but the equality of all men under God.

    Gradually, as feudalism established itself, both peasant cultivators and warrior aristocrats developed “new tastes,” tastes satisfied only by the establishment of a new class, a class of workers who left the land to “devote themselves to industry,” to the production of the goods that satisfied the new tastes. In a word, both classes became more civilized. “A vast displacement of population” occurred, as young peasants moved into the cities, seeking jobs that catered to the newfound taste for commodious living that both they and the aristocrats had discovered in themselves (MP, 7). In this, “they obeyed the immutable laws governing the growth of organized societies” (MP, 8). Tocqueville here does not pronounce on whether these laws are natural or ‘historical,’ although they do seem grounded in human nature; the growth of organized societies evidently instantiates the human equality that Christianity revealed to all men, a natural fact that the few amongst ‘the ancients’ had previously kept assiduously to themselves. Be this as it may, he diverges from Hegel and Marx by positing no known limit to the movement of this growth. The laws of social growth may have a telos, but Tocqueville does not claim to know what it is. This absence of finality leaves room for human liberty, which he famously opposes to the dangers that egalitarianism brings in its wake.

    The more the new class produces, the more commodities there are to ease the lives of ‘the many’ and not only the few. But “these happy outcomes have not been achieved without a necessary cost.” Some decades back, I talked with one of my fellow college freshmen about his parents, who had lived in Georgia in the 1930s. He surprised me by saying he anticipated another Great Depression and indeed looked forward to it. “The Morgans did rather well in the last Depression,” he claimed, contentedly. “We stayed on our farm, raised enough crops to feed ourselves and, after the Depression was over, we were the only ones in the county who had any money. We cleaned up!” That is indeed the advantage of subsistence agriculture. As Tocqueville puts it, “The farmer produces basic foodstuffs,” but even if market prices bring him no profit for a year or two, “these products at least furnish the means of life to those who have harvested them and allow them to wait for better times” (MP, 8).

    The industrial worker is not so lucky. He “speculates on artificial and secondary needs that can be limited by a thousand causes and can be completely eliminated by great events” (MP, 8). Having “received from God the special and dangerous mission of providing, by [their] own risks and dangers, the material happiness of all” the other classes, he serves them only at their convenience. “This is a major subject of reflection for today’s statesmen!” (MP, 9).

    Nor is this pauperism’s only cause. While men and women may cut back on their expenses during a time of widespread economic hardship, in ordinary times, as wealth and prosperity grow, their desires “become, through habit and example, real needs.” The more needs one has, “the more greatly [one] exposes himself to the blows of Fortune” (MP, 10). If ‘modernity’ consists not only in the advance of social equality but the advance of men’s mastery of fortune—the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate by the means of experimental science applied in manufacturing industries—that mastery itself finds at least temporary limits in disruption of supply and even of demand. Not only may an infestation of insects ruin the cotton crop, sending the textile industry into crisis, but the tastes of the many or the few may shift, making last year’s fashions this year’s embarrassments. Popular opinion under conditions of social democracy matters more than it has since the Athenians’ political democracy, and it is no less fickle. These exigencies, too, throw workers out of work.

    Here is where a Christian (and also a Rousseauian) sentiment comes in. When people are thrown out of work owing to no fault of their own, their fellow citizens feel compassion for them. Civil society wants to help them, attempting to “cure evils that it did not previously ever perceive.” “The more nations are wealthy, the more the number of those who appeal to public charity must multiply, because two very powerful causes tend toward this result: among these nations, the class most naturally exposed to need is increasing incessantly, and on the other side, needs themselves infinitely multiply and diversify; he opportunity of finding oneself exposed to some of them becomes more frequent every day” (MP, 11).

    As always, Tocqueville urges moderation, deliberation, and calm. As we consider “the future of modern societies,” “let us not become drunk by the spectacle of [their] greatness”—as Hegel tended to do; “let us not become discourage by the sight of its miseries”—as Marx tended to do, before veering toward immoderate optimism on the wings of ‘dialectic.’ True, for most modern men “existence will be more comfortable, sweeter, more embellished, longer,” while others of us “will need to turn to the support of their fellow men in order to receive a tiny part of those goods.” “This double movement can be slowed…but no one can stop it” (MP, 11). It can, however, be ameliorated if statesmen are smart and tough as well as compassionate.” 

    In addition to social democratization and the conquest of nature, modernity also features a particular kind of Christianity which generates a particular kind of beneficence. Tocqueville distinguishes two kinds of beneficence. “One leads each individual to relieve, according to his means, all the ills that are found within his reach,” an impulse “as old as the world”; Christianity made it a divine virtue and called it charity.” “The other, less instinctive, more rational, less enthusiastic, and often more powerful, leads society itself to concern itself with the misfortunes of its members and to attend systematically to the relief of their distress”; this kind of beneficence “was born out of Protestantism and is developed only in modern societies” (MP, 12). In England, this second kind of beneficence combined with a fourth feature of modernity: the modern state.

    Tocqueville recalls how Protestant monarchs Henry VIII and Elizabeth I took over not only the institutions of Christian worship, against Roman Catholicism, but also one of the traditional functions of the church they replaced—charity—in the form of state-sponsored care for the poor. Although the “poor laws” preceded industrialization and urbanization, they were made even more necessary by them and were elaborated because of them. “England’s industrial class provides for the needs and the pleasures of not only the English people but also of a large part of humanity” in what we would now call the ‘global market’; if America is “the country of the future” respecting democracy, England is that with respect to political economy. England is “the country in the world in which the farmer is most strongly attracted to industrial work—but also finds himself the most exposed to the vicissitudes of fortune” (MP, 13). Having already “accepted the principle of legal charity, England was not able to depart from it,” given its subsequent socioeconomic modernization (MP, 14).

    This has led to a challenge to English Protestantism, social equality, and the modern state. The nexus of industrialism and public charity has caused “the rebirth and spread across a Protestant country of those abuses for which the Reformation had rightly reproached some of the Catholic countries,” abuses connected to that “natural passion for idleness” seen in primitive man and civilized southern European monasteries alike. A person will work for two reasons: survival and “the desire to improve his living conditions.” Of these, the first is common, the second more rare. Most of us are not what were once called go-getters. Give me a steady diet, decent clothes, and a roof over my head and I probably will not dream of starting a business. That being so, “a charitable organization, open indiscriminately to all of those who are in need, or a law that givers to all poor—whatever the origin of their poverty—a right to public assistance, weakens or destroys the first stimulant and leaves only the second intact”—that is, the rarer one. Hence “the most generous, active and industrious part of the nation…devotes its assistance to furnishing the means of life to those who do nothing or who make bad use of their work” (MP, 15). “Every measure that establishes legal charity on a permanent basis and gives it an administrative form thus creates an idle and lazy class, living at the expense of the industrial and working class…. It reproduces all the vices of the monastic system, but without the lofty ideas of morality and of religion that often went with it. Such a law is a poisoned seed planted in the bosom of legislation. As in America, circumstances can prevent the seed from developing rapidly, but they cannot destroy it, and if the present generation escapes its influence, it will devour the well-being of the generations to come.” (MP, 17-18).

    Generally speaking, “the idea of rights” “elevates and sustains the human spirit”; Tocqueville “find[s] something grand and virile” in a principle that brings the ruled up to the level of the ruler, entitling the ruled to make honorable demands upon the ruler. “But the right that the poor person has to obtain society’s assistance is unique, in that rather than elevating the heart of the man who exercises it, it debases him.” In making my claim to public charity I formalize my “poverty, weakness, and misconduct,” admit my “inferiority” to my neighbors (MP, 18). To exercise most rights, I vindicate my honor as man and citizen; to exercise this right, however, I must sacrifice my honor, perhaps even my self-respect. It is noteworthy that Tocqueville connects the idea of rights to the human spirit, to its potential for greatness. In Democracy in America he connected grandeur or greatness to human nature. [1] Further, this understanding of rights connects them not only to one of the best characteristics of human nature but to politics strictly speaking, the practice of ruling and being ruled Aristotle locates in the family bond between husband and wife, distinguishing this reciprocity from the one-way forms of rule also seen in the family, the rule of parents over children and of masters over slaves. Tocqueville also understands the distinctively human characteristic as a matter of the human spirit and mind, the self-respect of what Aristotle calls a rational animal. [2]

    More, the original and perennial kind of kind of beneficence “establish[es] precious ties between the rich man and the poor one,” as “the act of generosity itself makes the giver interested in the one whose poverty he has undertaken to relieve” and inspires gratitude in the one helped. This was the beneficence displayed by feudal aristocrats and indeed by the aristocrat of antiquity. But under modern conditions of social equality, beneficence becomes impersonal. The “legal charity” seen in the modern state “is not like” the natural charity of beneficence of previous times. “Alms remain, but their morality is removed,” as the rich man “see in the poor man only a greedy stranger, summoned by the legislator to share his goods,” and the poor man “feels no gratitude for a benefit that could not be denied him.” Modern states develop civil societies divided into “two rival nations”; rich and poor “have existed since the beginning of the world,” but “public charity breaks the only line that could have been established between them” (MP, 19). A greedy stranger: a foreigner who should be a fellow-citizen, even if a weaker and dependent one, a stranger whose dependency precludes him from citizenship as surely as birth into a peasant family had done, but without the personal attention of feudalism and the small degree of a political relationship feudalism retained as a consequence of that attention.

    Even worse, “if idleness in the midst of wealth, the hereditary idleness earned by works of service, the idleness surrounded with public regard, accompanied by inner contentment, interested by the pleasures of the mind, moralized by the exercise of thought—if this idleness,” that is, aristocratic idleness, “has been the mother of so many vices, what will come from a degraded idleness acquire from cowardice, earned by misconduct, that is enjoyed amid ignominy and that can only be endured to the extent that the soul of the one who suffers it becomes completely corrupted and degraded?” (MP, 19-20). Such a soul “knows the future, as an animal does, because he ignores destiny’s circumstances, and who is thus focused like the animal in the present and in the ignoble and fleeting pleasures hat the present offers to a brutalized nature.” Thus “the number of illegitimate children has risen continuously; that of criminals has grown incessantly” (MP, 20)—in both instances because public support obviates the need for husbands, as an unmarried mother “finds a kind of dowry in her infamy” (MP, 25). While enlightenment expands throughout the rest of the nation, moeurs become gentler, taste becomes more delicate, habits more polite,” the poor “fall back toward barbarism while in the midst of civilization’s wonders, their ideas and inclinations bring them closer to savages” (MP, 20). The equality of conditions prevailing in modern societies finds a countervailing pressure in this new source of social hierarchy.

    Not only does this new social hierarchy lack the old aristocratic generosity, it also retains no vestige of aristocratic liberty—the spirit which, as readers of the Democracy and The Old Regime and the Revolution will recall, serves as an indispensable barrier against despotisms “hard” and “soft” in modern states. Unlike America, where the slogan “Go West, young man, go West” would make good sense as both an aspiration and as a safety valve to relieve the miseries of city dwellers, England “has immobilized one-sixth of their population”; not only do the poor find themselves unwelcome in a new town, but unlike feudal villeinage, which “forced the individual, against his will, to remain where he was born,” legal charity ” stops him from wanting to move away” (MP, 21).

    What to do? Distinguishing the deserving from the undeserving poor is difficult. The English state can send overseers of the poor to every village; they can identify poor persons easily enough. But how can it prove its causes, case by case? “The laws will have declared that blameless poverty alone will be given assistance, but in practice, assistance will be given to all poverty” (MP, 16). Yet the sheer number of paupers makes this impossible to support. The English have therefore attempted the poorhouse system, whereby those identifiably impoverished must work. But this leads to an oversupply of workers and the consequent establishment of ‘make-work’ projects that empty public coffers as much as they direct ‘relief,’ albeit in a novel way. All of this only contributes to the tendency of modern democratic societies to generate a “regularized, permanent, administrative system” hose intended benefits will ruin the civic spirit of liberty and thereby denature the human beings who live under it. These societies may end, Tocqueville warns, in “a violent revolution in the state when the number of those who receive alms becomes as large as the number of those giving them and when the indigent not able to draw from the impoverished rich what is necessary for their needs, find it easier to strip them suddenly of their goods than to demand assistance from them” (MP, 27).

    “I believe that beneficence must be a manly and reasoned virtue, not a feeble and thoughtless inclination”; otherwise, beneficence “is still a sublime instinct, but in my view, it does not deserve the name of virtue” (MP, 26). In this, American practices will not help, as Americans “have borrowed most of their institutions related to the poor from the English,” making charity “a political institution” through a system of poorhouses (Pauperism in America, 51). The result is the same: “Almost all of the genuine poor have contracted habits of laziness that are difficult to change,” as they associate work with the punishment of confinement (PA, 52). The (mostly Irish) poor “spend the summer in abundance and the winter in poor houses,” finding free employment as hired ‘hands’ on farms during the warm months before retreating indoors to what amounts to prison work in order to get out of the cold. As a result, “public charity has lost its character of shame for them, because thousands of men turn to it daily” (MP, 54). Dependency not liberty has become a way of life for them, making them de facto foreigners within the commercial republic.

    this notwithstanding, the American model of civil association may offer some hope, if applied to the practice of charity. Civic associations are the institutions that reprise the personal and civic character of aristocratic society under conditions of democracy, of equality. “By regulating aid, associations of charitable people could give greater activity and power to individual beneficence” (MP, 26). It is to this possible remedy to the problem of modern poverty that Tocqueville turns in his Second Memoir on Pauperism, published four years after the first.

    Tocqueville recalls Benjamin Franklin, “who was in the habit of saying that with order, activity, and economy, the road to fortune was as easy as the road to the market. He was right.” Even the poorest farmer exhibits these virtues because, unlike the industrial worker, he owns land. “With landed property comes thought of the future” (Second Memoir on Pauperism, 31). Since “among the means of giving men the feeling of order, activity, and economy, I have never known a more powerful one than facilitating their access to landed property”; and since “unlike landed property, we have still not discovered a way of dividing industrial property so that it is not made unproductive”; since, undivided, such property “has preserved the aristocratic form in modern nations” despite the overall trend toward civil-social democracy; and finally, since “we are still far” from the day when a balanced international market in industrial products will make “commercial crises” “rarer and less severe,” contemporary statesmen need “to find a means of giving the worker the small farmer’s spirit and habits of property ownership” (SMP, 33, 34).

    Tocqueville knows two ways of doing this. What “initially seems the most efficacious” is to give the worker “an interest in the factory,” whether through profit sharing, pensions, stock options, or some other device (SMP, 35). Such proposals, however, “have always encountered two obstacles to their success”; capitalist entrepreneurs have proved reluctant to institute them (“a grave mistake,” but there it is); and up to this point, worker-owned businesses have usually failed. Nonetheless, Tocqueville maintains some hope for the latter enterprises. “As our workers gain broader knowledge and as the art of associating together for honest and peaceful goals makes progress among us, when politics does not meddle in industrial associations and when government, reassured about their goals, does not refuse them its benevolence and its support, we will see them multiply and prosper.” Yet although “the idea of workers’ industrial associations is bound to be a fertile one…I do not think it is ripe” (SMP, 36).

    Other reformers urge that the best thing to do is to provide the incentives and means for proletarians to build their savings. In their view, “the only means to give the industrial class the spirit and habit of property that a large portion of the agricultural class possesses” is the state-owned savings bank (SMP, 37). Tocqueville doubts it. Even if state owned, such banks would still be subject to mass withdrawals in the event of financial panic; they would accelerate excessive state centralization, already the bane of democratic societies; they would also lead to increased financial centralization, further enriching the cities and starving the provinces for investment capital. “I cannot believe that it would be wise to place the entire fortune of a large kingdom’s poor classes in the same hands, and so to speak, in a single place,” where a major crisis would ruin the depositors (SMP, 40). This poses an especially noticeable threat in France, where both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ regimes declared bankruptcy and where there have been numerous changes of regime, military invasions, and other serious disruptions of civil life. Savings banks, yes: but only as one measure, not to be misconceived as “a universal panacea” for the problem of poverty (SMP, 43). 

    Tocqueville prefers banks that would combine savings with loans. At the “savings-and-loan” bank, “poor people who have money to lend would deposit it in the hands of the administrators, and they, in return for collateral, would return that money to those poor who might need to borrow it”; that is, “the thrifty poor or those momentarily favored by fortune would lend their savings at interest to the wasteful or unfortunate poor.” That does not sound like an especially promising financial model, except that “there is nothing more certain in the world than a collateralized loan,” as any pawnshop owner will tell you (SMP, 44). And, of course, the loan with collateral as its insurance will make at least some of the wasteful or unfortunate poor begin to think in terms of the future—in Franklinian terms, as it were.

    Very well, but what about the provinces? What can be done for the rural poor, to dissuade them from seeking their fortunes in the city factories? Tocqueville suggests a kind of township association. These associations “would have no political character” and would be separate from government without being hostile to it (Letter on Pauperism in Normandy, 47). they would embrace no more than three townships—preferably only one. Members would pool their available monies; a board of directors would distribute those monies but the members themselves would be first in line to receive assistance. Because “no one would be able to count on the members’ aid in advance” and the members themselves would determine who got the loans, the associations would not draw additional poor people into its territory. Members could quit at any time, so there would be no “risk for making poverty an insupportable burden,” as it is with state-sponsored charity (LPN, 48). “Once the association was well established, even the poor themselves would be able to place summer savings into the association’s hands in order to be entitled to its benefits in winter”—obviating the need for poorhouses. The available revenues would exceed those available to any local aristocrat, however generous and well-heeled. And “because the collective funds would be used systematically and in accordance with a fixed plan, a very small contribution would be enough to relieve a great deal of poverty” (LPN, 49). And the money would “stay local.” The association would assist members “only under the condition that the recipient would not beg,” thereby causing “the disappearance of those demeaning habits that take away poverty’s respectable face, that deprave childhood and most often follow a generation of indigents with a generation of thieves.” Finally, the existence of such an association would give each township the moral authority “to expel nonresident indigents from its midst” on the grounds that all townships should care for their own paupers (LPN, 50). the proposal comports with Tocqueville’s aim of defending liberty in democratizing modern societies by encouraging habits of heart and mind, along with strong local institutions, intended to strengthen local resistance to administrative centralization and to vindicate and defend, intellectual, moral, economic, and political liberty.

    In bringing these fascinating pieces into the English language and writing a fine introduction that gets her readers right down to business, editor and translator Christine Dunn Henderson has contributed not only to our understanding of Tocqueville to clear thinking about poverty and the attempts we make to ameliorate it. Much of what Tocqueville told his contemporaries speaks to us, suggesting that we could still use a measure of his vigorous and astringent common sense.

     

    Notes

    1. See Tocqueville, Democracy in America II.i.3.
    2. In the Democracy, Tocqueville makes his explicit statement on natural rights quite appositely in a passage condemning slavery; see Democracy in America I.ii.10. Also, in his July 1839 Report Made to the Chamber of Deputies on the Abolition of Slavery in the French Colonies, he advocated abolition on the basis of “the principles of justice, humanity, and reason” while denying that “Negro Slavery” has “its foundation and justification in nature herself”—a claim he describes as “odious.”

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    The Statesmanship of Word and Deed: Abraham Lincoln

    December 29, 2021 by Will Morrisey

    Diana Schaub: His Greatest Speeches: How Lincoln Moved the Nation. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2021.

     

    The distinction between speech and deed concerns the statesman somewhat in the way the distinction between theory and practice concerns the philosopher. The Greek word logos means both speech and the reason that can make speech coherent, make speech truly itself. If Plato takes preeminence among philosophers who consider the relation between logos and praxis, Abraham Lincoln may have earned that honor among statesmen. Or so one might well think, after reading Diana Schaub’s magisterially attentive meditation on his three “greatest speeches,” the Address to the Young Men’s Lyceum at Springfield, Illinois, the Gettysburg Address, and the Second Inaugural Address. In those speeches, Lincoln intended to recover the American Union, “re-conjoining word and deed, promise and performance,” without muddling them together in sophistical or demagogic appeals to passion. Reasoned speech requires thoughts and words free from contradiction; sophistry, the deliberate attempt to confuse minds, and demagoguery, the deliberate attempt to inflame them, both stand as perennial enemies of statesmanship and philosophy, including political philosophy. More profoundly and therefore more dangerously, certain schools of philosophy, gaining momentum in the universities during Lincoln’s lifetime, attempted to ‘synthesize’ theory and practice. These philosophic doctrines of ‘immanence’—melding thought and speech and deed in accordance with a new kind of logic which posits and then claims to overcome all contradictions in theory and in practice—brought on a politics not of statesmanship but of ‘leadership,’ a politics practiced by politicians who sought to persuade the rest of us that that they marched on the ‘cutting edge of History.’ Tyrannies hard and soft have resulted. By keeping straight the distinction between the natural rights of human beings discoverable by reason and the civil or conventional rights which may not fully protect those natural rights in practice, Lincoln, resisted the characteristic tyranny of the American regime of his time, the tyranny of slave-holding, based on the claim that human beings may rightly be owned by other human beings who enjoy neither a right to property themselves nor, allegedly, a property in their natural rights. If, as the Declaration states, governments are instituted to secure those unalienable but violable rights, and if tyrannical souls always live among us, ever ready to deploy the arts of sophistry and demagogy in their quest for unanswered rule, beckoning us to depart from “the timeless principles of self-government” as a prelude to replacing it with government by themselves without our consent, then “Lincoln’s greatest speeches matter as intensely today as when first delivered,” 

    There is, Schaub writes, a “necessary sequence of logos and praxis, the way in which our saying leads to our doing.” This introduces the element of timing into statesmanship. In politics as in warfare and love, timing matters. Lincoln’s three speeches address three crucial dates when the course of events in America turned: 1787 (the framing of the U.S. Constitution), 1776 (the issuing of the Declaration of Independence), and 1619 (the introduction of African slaves with the earliest English colonial settlements, an act that inflected both subsequent acts). In each of those years, persons who were founding new political communities chose between liberty and tyranny. Lincoln notices the distinction between chronos and kairos—natural time and the ‘revealed’ or ‘providential’ time marked when we date our years from the birth of Christ. And, just as the philosophers of ‘immanence’ would synthesize theory and practice, so they would synthesize natural and providential time, claiming that the course of events, now re-named ‘History,’ unfolds logically or ‘dialectically’ over time, leading to the End Time, the End of History, not as the culmination of a plan conceived by a Creator-God, a holy God, separate from His creation and from the events He guides within it, but as the culmination, the purpose, of the dialectical unfolding of the ‘Absolute Spirit,’ embodied in a nature that evolves toward that purpose. Lincoln is no historicist, neither a ‘progressive’ nor a ‘declinist.’

    The Lyceum Address concerns 1787 but it also invokes the memory of the president of the Constitutional Convention and his later Farewell Address, “verbal echoes” from which Schaub rightly detects in Lincoln’s speech. In that speech, George Washington calls America’s Constitutional union, these United States, “a main Pillar in the Edifice of your real independence,” as distinct from but motivated by the independence-in-speech seen in the Declaration. Washington calls the Union “a main prop of your liberty,” your self-government. Lincoln remarks the decay of some of these pillars and props. They have decayed because the sectionalism Washington warned against, regional factionalism, has corroded them. As Washington upholds the Union by urging his fellow citizens to obey the law, and especially the supreme law of the land, the Constitution, calling this “sacredly obligatory upon all,” Lincoln urges the citizens of his time to make reverence for the Constitution and the laws enacted under it their “political religion.” And as Washington warns “against the dangerous effects of ‘the strongest passions’ and the “cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men” who would “usurp for themselves the reins of Government,” so Lincoln “disparages passion—calls it “our enemy”—and puts us on guard against the unbounded ambition of the republic-destroyers. Both statesmen regard virtue as indispensable to perpetuating America’s political institutions; institutions do not maintain themselves, however prudently designed they may be. “It is on this score especially that Lincoln’s address is the more profound one,” Schaub writes, “cut[ting] deeper in its analysis of the passions of both the few and the many, deeper in its grappling with the human temptation to tyranny, deeper in its portrait of the mob and its motived, deeper in its understanding of public opinion, and, consequently, deeper in its rhetorical presentation.”

    It is also important to notice Lincoln’s seemingly passing remark on the value of the American land, the territory ruled by the self-governing people. It is the most important feature of nature for Americans, aside from their human nature. “We find ourselves in the peaceful possession of the fairest portion of the earth, as regards extent of territory, fertility of soil, and salubrity of climate.” The youths he addresses know what he’s talking about. They know that the American Midwest consists of an immense expanse of rich soil crisscrossed by a river system that reaches south to the Gulf of Mexico. No other continent has that, and by the 1830s Americans now govern it and farm it, having ousted the many societies and replaced them with one unified federal state—a giant free trade zone. The political institutions he would have his fellow citizens perpetuate guard them from tyranny and their land from war. But those institutions now face the peril of lawlessness which, unchecked, will undermine not only those institutions but the prosperous way of life the institutions support. Although (with some exaggeration) he denies that the land can be seized by any foreigner or alliance of foreigners, homegrown disunion is another matter. For his part, Washington had devoted the second half of his Farewell Address to elaborate a foreign policy of nonintervention in foreign wars, the eschewal of inveterate hatreds and habitual affections for foreign nations; Lincoln’s America faced no such threat in the 1830s, its foreign policy limited to dealing with the weak and disunited Amerindian nations and tribes, and to the question of tariffs on foreign goods. But that favorable condition could change if disunion provided an opportunity for foreign powers to play divide-and-conquer in North America, as they had done with the Indians in the previous century.

    Lincoln would have Americans understand their circumstance as a sort of account book, a ledger in which they owe moral debts to the men who wrote the law that constituted their federal government, the means of their self-government in a republican regime wherein the lawmakers represent the people. Thanks to the Founders, Americans have legally inherited a portion of nature, the American land, and a government of liberty, a “political edifice,” a work of art, a convention that secures for them that land and secures—for most of them—another portion of nature, the rights inherent in their own nature as human beings. In guaranteeing the natural right of the people peaceably to assemble, the Constitution or supreme law of the land distinguishes “the people” from “a mob.” Mob violence is Lincoln’s immediate concern in the Address. For Lincoln (pace, Dr. King), “democratic citizenship does not admit of ‘civil’ disobedience,” since (as the Apostle Paul insists, speaking of monarchs) even unjust laws must be obeyed until repealed, lest acts even of righteous disobedience descend the slippery slope to unrighteous ones, animated by a spirit of disrespect for laws in general, preventing the perpetuation of our political institutions.

    Schaub carefully distinguishes between perpetuation and conservation or preservation. To conserve or preserve, say, a bowl of cherries “involve[s] altering the original…as a hedge against future need.” But to perpetuate is to keep something as it originally was, “to cause it to endure indefinitely.” “Lincoln’s subject of perpetuation requires an inquiry into the nature of time and causation. It hints at metaphysical as well as political questions.” Lincoln chooses the word with prudent irony respecting practice, too. The most impassioned advocates of slavery were called the “Perpetualists,” Schaub recalls. “Lincoln countered that the perpetuity of the Union could be secured only by placing slavery back where the founders had originally placed it, namely, ‘in the course of ultimate extinction.'” This, for the protection not only of American’s liberty but also for the protection of their ‘geography,’ their territory, the material foundation of their prosperity. 

    Americans secure their liberty through the political institutions Lincoln seeks to perpetuate. Mob rule threatens those institutions. The Framers famously separated three branches of government, assigning to each a distinct power. The lawless, wild, and furious judgments of worse than savage mobs, combine executive, legislative, and judicial functions in one set of hands—Thomas Jefferson’s definition of tyranny. What the mobs, and the spirit of mobs, would amalgamate in destructive passion Lincoln would separate in accordance with the spirit of reason, of making distinctions, of thinking on the lines of the principle of non-contradiction. Just as he distinguishes theory from practice, speech from deed, so in his address he insists on life-saving and liberty-saving dualities, dualities that exist not only perpetually, ‘abstractly,’ but over time, in the course of events, never to be synthesized in a grand culmination of that course, but always present, as the course is always present. And so “Lincoln gives two very different accounts of the founding generation; he gives two very different accounts of the lynchings that occurred in Mississippi and St. Louis; analytically, he divides the effects of mob rule into two categories (direct and indirect); he discerns two types of danger (current and prospective) and, accordingly, offers two different solutions (reverence and reason); finally, he examines the problem of the passions in its different manifestations in the few and the many (those timeless political categories)” which instance themselves throughout time.

    Schaub takes up “the most dramatic of these doublings,” his “stories of mob rule in action,” first. Lincoln concedes that the victims of the mobs deserved to die. This concession “disposes his audience to listen to him by validating their instinctive hostility to wrongdoers”; at the same time, “he renders their concern with justice less heatedly angry and more coolly calculative,” in part by adding a touch of humorous understatement to his narratives and by leaving race out of them. In a very Washingtonian move, “rather than appealing altruistically to their concern for others, he appeals instead to their self-interest, but in a way that demonstrates the linkage between [the vigilantes’ and their defenders’] self-interest and the cause of law-abidingness,” showing that people blinded by rage might turn on some of their own, and then on “the truly innocent.” Worst of all, “since popular opinion was in sympathy with their conception of justice the perpetrators went unpunished,” onlookers who have no sense of justice at all take heart. The “lawless in spirit” will then become “lawless in practice,” and the vigilantes, who “meant to crack down on crime,” embolden criminals. Seeing this, good citizens lose confidence in the regime of republicanism, since “the really dangerous opportunists are not the petty criminals but the tyrannically inclined,” the ultimate enemies of the rule of law and of republican self-government, to whom the desperate people will look “for deliverance” from lawlessness. Under these conditions, “‘We the People’ become willing to trade anarchic liberty for despotic security, or at least the demagogic promise of it.” In their passionate fear of lawlessness, they will fall prey to those who speak to them in the fake-rational accents of unreason. And he brings it all home to his listeners by citing a local instance of such violence, the murder of the Abolitionist publisher Elijah Lovejoy by a mob in Alton, Illinois, the previous year.

    What to do? “The solution is absolute law-abidingness” in practice and in sentiment. Inasmuch as the laws are their own, “democratic citizens should obey not out of fear but out of reverence.” Lincoln proposes the adoption of this reverence for the law as “the political religion of the nation”—the italics marking Lincoln’s acknowledgment of the strangeness of such a formulation in American ears, accustomed as they are to a religion that binds its adherents to the Kingdom of God in Heaven, no earthly kingdom or republic. Lincoln’s reasonable slippery-slope argument on the malign effects of lawlessness may be sound but it will not suffice; “he highlights the role of habituation and piety in shaping a deferential attitude toward the law.” He is asking students to think about education as part of his own effort to educate them to citizenship, to adulthood, to responsibility.

    And he sees the problem with this religion. “Law at its best seeks justice, but it is never identical to justice; moreover, sometimes law is used to establish and maintain injustice.” “Let me not be understood as saying there are no bad laws,” he concedes. “Not only was slavery legal in half the states of the union, but the entire nation was under a constitutional obligation to return fugitive slaves to bondage.” Nonetheless, “all disobedience,” including disobedience to bad laws, “is uncivil and destructive of civil government.” Washington and his colleagues had upheld their right to revolution, but revolution is uncivil, an appeal not to human law but to natural right. “Short of that exigency there is only acknowledgment of the majority’s legitimate power through its ballots to determine the motion of the body politic”; the majority rightly rules not because it is always right in its rule but because it has the “rightful authority” to rule, an authority “grounded in the truth of natural equality and its logical corollary, government by consent.” Even nonviolent civil disobedience violates civility; if Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther King can nullify a law, why not John C. Calhoun’s South Carolina? The same thing goes for abolitionists who peacefully break the fugitive slave law as well the mobs who murder them. However, Elijah Lovejoy acted as a publisher. He wasn’t breaking the law. “It might be possible to persuade even those who despised the abolitionists as fanatics that the promulgation of abolitionism is constitutionally protected speech.” This might then lead to asking “whether abolitionist doctrine is right or wrong.” And that in turn “would require the public to reflect on both the moral and the constitutional status of slaver, including the possibility of a disjunction between those two.” Lincoln here shows the way to reverse the slippery slope into lawlessness and tyranny, the way to climb back up that hill towards a civil way of life, a regime of liberty. He shows young men, that portion of the population most susceptible to impolitic passions, why they should want the reciprocal ruling and being-ruled of political life by showing them the attractions of being ‘politic’ or prudent, not boyish. At the same time, in other speeches, he showed politically immature abolitionists the error of their own ways, the folly of their often-inflammatory rhetoric, rhetoric which invites responses in kind from slaveholders—a dynamic that can only lead to disunion.

    Lincoln was far from unmindful of the immediate political circumstances in which he delivered his address. He was a Whig. Newly elected president Martin Van Buren, a Democrat, had delivered an inaugural address earlier in 1837 in which he viewed America’s future “without foreboding.” Van Buren put the entire blame for “local violence” on the backs of abolitionists. “For him the spirit of civility and compromise was to flow in one direction only. Deference, in word and deed, must be accorded the sensitivities of the slaveholders.” “Lincoln’s ultimate aim in the Lyceum Address is to dispel this democratic complacency,” which will exacerbate disunion, not prevent it. While democracy or majority rule flows from natural equality, when it oppresses the minority, it is an imperfect expression of it; democrats (and Democrats) need to see that. Two decades later, Lincoln would argue against Senator Stephen Douglas’s doctrine of ‘popular sovereignty’ in the newly settled American territories on these same grounds.

    Having raised the matter of majority rule and its relation to tyranny, “Lincoln now delves into that ancient staple of political thought: the distinction between the few and the many, including how that distinction affected the nation’s founding and how it will affect the future.” Looking back at the Founders, he “reveals that [the young Americans’] political ancestors were composed of two distinct human types, possessing divergent motives,” “two sets of animating passions.” In 1776 (and now Lincoln shifts his gaze to the revolution that issued in the Constitution, not ‘1787’ itself), the few, the Founders, were passionate for celebrity, fame, and distinction, whereas the many were united in the passions of hate for the British and revenge for injuries the British had inflicted upon them. These “self-serving passions,” ruling on the one hand the noblest, on the other hand the least noble minds, “were happily, but coincidentally, mustered for the cause of civil and religious liberty.” Both wanted popular self-government in America—an unproven “proposition,” not a self-evident truth, even if it rested upon self-evident truths. Securing self-evident natural rights may be the purpose of government, but can popular self-government do that? The Founders sought the glory that would attend to such a success, and until recently, during the lives of the founding generation, that glory itself proved a powerful motive for sustaining the proposition. The 1787 Constitution was designed to give future such lovers of fame pathways to celebrity and distinction that would keep the many safe from them, indeed, to engage the few in the task of continuing to secure the natural rights of the many. Separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism—these don’t suppress ambition but harness it “to the duties of office and the public good.” 

    Lincoln applauds the Framers’ work. The Constitution’s arrangement of ruling offices will indeed satisfy would-be Congressmen, governors, even presidents. But among these few there will number still rarer souls, those “(maybe just one) for whom even the highest office would be small potatoes,” one for whom the broad horizons of a large republic will seem painfully restrictive. An Alexander, a Caesar, a Napoleon (dead only a generation back) belong to “the family of the lion, or the tribe of the eagle.” “A natural predator behaves as if entitled to take what it likes,” as if a law unto itself. So much more will this “man-beast” who acts as if he’s a god, this “towering genius,” dismiss the protests of the many weaklings that he intends to put beneath him. (Indeed, as ‘King of Beasts,’ the lion must debase his human subjects.) It is noteworthy that family and tribe are sub-political groups; self-governing political communities consist of them, but are not reducible to them, unless disunion ruins those communities, giving the chieftains of those families or tribes, the warlords, a chance to elevate themselves to rule. [1] The tyrannical man-beast comes out of the less-than-political milieus of family and tribe, bringing his unpolitical habits with him as he quests for the supreme unpolitical, non-consensual office by means of deceptive speech and bold actions. 

    He can be stopped, but only if the many remain united with each other, attached to the government and the laws, and generally intelligent—smart enough to recognize an aspiring tyrant when they hear him. This generation lacks the passion of the people of the revolutionary generation, having no foreign enemy to hate (partly as a result of their representatives’ inclination to pursue Washington’s advice on permanent alliances). As for intelligence, they have no memory of the revolution or the revolutionaries, as nature in the form of death has silenced them in the march of time. The God of Biblical religion solves this dilemma by sending His Holy Spirit in the stead of His crucified and resurrected Son. For the American civil religion, Lincoln has proposed, is there a “political equivalent” of the Holy Spirit, who remains alive after the Apostles have died? Mere histories will not rekindle those passions; even the stories recorded in the Bible serve only as ways of sensitizing the reader’s mind to the presence of the Holy Spirit, who alone can turn a soul around. Lincoln points rather to the spirit of the laws, enunciated in “the fundamental charters that govern communal life,” where readers will follow the live thoughts of men now dead, think along their lines of thought, reason along with them. “A nation founded upon a text has an ever-renewable resource for perpetuity not available to other nations,” nations that rely on mere stories, traditions, which may come to seem irrelevant to life in changed circumstances.

    While “passion has helped us” up to now, Lincoln says, it “can do so no more,” and will soon “be our enemy,” incubator of lawlessness among the many, tyrants among the few. For the new generation of Americans, and for every generation after it, “a passionate and impassioning politics is likely to be divisive.” Unlike speakers who tell the young to ‘find your passion,’ Lincoln invites them to find it and then rule it with reason. We otherwise fall into “hyper-partisanship, hate-filled invective, insufferable self-righteousness, and general nastiness.” Add divisions based on territory, on land, and you head for civil war. Lincoln does not foolishly imitate the Enlightenment philosophes who imagined the rule of reason (and of self-conceived ‘philosophers’) simpliste. He persuades as Washington did, by invoking moral sentiments, mixing rational judgment with feeling, but avoiding passions, which would overbear reason. (Even compassion, seemingly so commendable, “quite naturally provokes anger at those who cause the suffering” which the compassionate soul feels along with the sufferer.) While “the old props” for American constitutional republicanism “were the passions of the few and the many during the revolutionary period” and beyond it, now we need “pillars rather than props”—pillars made of the “sober reason” recoverable by reading the writings of the Founders. “Self-government in the collective depends on self-government within the self,” on the rule of reason in individual souls. The call for reverence for the laws, for “political religion,” “nest[s] within this more comprehensive call for reason.” That is “political reverence is itself an instantiation of reason.” When Lincoln advises the young fathers-to-be to “let reverence for the laws be breathed by every American mother to the lisping babe”—struggling to learn to speak, and eventually to reason—who “prattles in her lap,” he puts the natural reverence of the child who “literally looks up, in love and fear, to its mother” in the service of “political reverence,” which “must be deliberately inculcated,” taught in homes and in young men’s lyceums. This won’t be a family of the lion or the lioness but a family of men and women who know that they need security beyond what the family can provide.

    Lincoln ends his Lyceum Address with a paean not to a mother but a father, a father with no natural offspring of his own but with political offspring—to George Washington, the Father of his Country. Let us revere “his name to the last,” so that ‘during his long sleep,” we have permitted “no hostile foot to pass over or desecrate his resting place.” This parallels Lincoln’s assurance at the beginning of his address that the foot of no foreign conqueror will ever do that. If American sons of Washington remain true to him, no native foot will desecrate his resting place, either; no factious, uncivil warrior will overturn the regime that aims at securing unalienable rights for its citizens. Schaub remarks that such an awakening of Washington from his grave will require “the Second Coming of Christ” and the fulfillment of “the Christian promise of the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting,” whereby the perpetuation of American political institutions will no longer be necessary. But until that day, it will be. “Lincoln suggests that the political order must contend against the same forces of sin and death that have characterized the human situation since the fall of mankind. The new pillars of intelligence, morality, and constitutional reverence, ‘hewn from the solid quarry of sober reason,’ are the political analogue to the rock of Peter.”

    What of Lincoln himself? Edmund Wilson, along with a host of others, accused him of being the Alexander, the Caesar, the Napoleon, the man-beast tyrant of America. And indeed, what would inspire a man of Lincoln’s towering genius (to say nothing of his towering height as a physical giant among the men of his generation) to work for the perpetuation of our political institutions instead of his ascendancy over their wreckage? In his own Farewell Address, delivered at Springfield, Illinois before his departure for the White House in the city named after Washington, he told his friends that he faced a task “greater than that which rested upon Washington,” who had the passions of the few and the many on his side, the side of republicanism and natural right. This “greater task of saving the Union” can indeed satisfy the soul of him who is by nature of the family of the lion and the tribe of the eagle, but who finds family and tribe insufficient for the securing of those natural rights only governments of, by, and for the people can secure.

    The Gettysburg Address begins squarely with ‘1776.’ The Declaration of Independence moves from abstract truths in its major premises to particular facts in its minor premises to a logical conclusion stating actions to be taken. Lincoln’s much shorter address integrates “highly abstract” language (“there isn’t a proper noun to be found, with the single exception of God) with recollections of specific events, also ending with a logical conclusion. It begins with an unusual formulation, “four score and seven years ago.” Schaub explains this King James Bible language as Lincoln’s reminder to his listeners, many of them ardent readers of Scripture, that the United States has gone past the Biblically noted human lifespan of threescore and ten years, “forc[ing] us to wonder whether there are similar limits on the lifespan of mankind’s political collectives.” “Brought forth” is another Biblical locution, an image of childbirth, associated however not with bloodlines nor with autochthony (“ours is not a blood-and-soil patriotism”) but with ideas. The American ‘child’ was conceived in liberty, not in a bedroom, and dedicated (baptized, as it were) to a proposition, that all men are created equal. The separation from physical nature is completed by the thought that it was a group of fathers, not a mother, who gave birth to the American nation. In this, the Founders resemble Moses, the nursing father of Israel, giver of laws given him by the nursing, providential Father God. [2]

    Schaub remarks the double meaning of “conceived”: physical-sexual and mental-ideational, action and thought—distinct but related. “Before the nation could be brought forth into practical realization, it had to be thought of or imagined.” “The new nation was conceived not in sin or sorrow”—adultery or rape—but “in liberty.” Since liberty means self-government, not license, the conception of the United States was as immaculate as a human act can be.

    And the nation so conceived was dedicated to a proposition of human equality. Lincoln here departs from the Declaration, which calls equality a self-evident truth, evidently because human nature, with unalienable rights, was created by God, whereas the United States was made by men, who can at best dedicate themselves, and their nation, to that equality. In this sense, equality isn’t an axiom but “a theorem that must be demonstrated in practice.” In choosing “proposition” instead of “axiom,” Lincoln “wants to highlight the needfulness of translating an abstract truth into concrete political form.” Self-government is “the corollary of equality,” but as the mob rule of the 1830s and the attempted secession of the 1860s demonstrated, not all Americans share the Founders’ view, that “We hold these truths to be self-evident.” The slaveholders and their apologists denied that all men are created equal; the generational transmission of what should be self-evident truths had fallen prey to sophists and demagogues who confused minds and whipped up passions that left those truths implausible to many. The Founders held human equality to be self-evident; the British regime and their American partisans did not. In proclaiming independence, the Founders made the British regime and its partisans ‘foreign.’ By Lincoln’s time, however, the sons of the new republican regime of popular self-government themselves had factionalized, one side attempting to found a still newer regime on American soil, a regime dedicated to the proposition that all men are not created equal, that some rule by natural right over others. 

    “In his opening paragraph, in thirty words, Lincoln has performed an act of remembrance. His description of ‘our fathers’ is meant to make his audience reverential. But, at the same time, the generative imagery conveys the message that each successive cohort of Americans is essential to the maturation or completion of the founding. The needed proof is ongoing.” The proof has implications beyond America. “At stake is the very possibility of political life based on such premises…. The failure of the American experiment would constitute the failure of popular government altogether,” in view of the almost uniquely favorable conditions that prevail on the North American continent. If a president duly elected under the Constitution may be rejected by a substantial body of citizens, does that not amount to a rejection of the Constitution itself? Does secession, like mob rule, not imply anarchy, or perhaps the proof of force, of bullets, over proofs of reason, of ballots? “The dynamic of despotism was such that the rejection of first principles led inexorably to an assault not only on majority rule but on other constitutional rights as well”—an assault seen even before secession, in the censorship of abolitionist literature in the southern mails and the ‘gag rule’ in Congress. The defense of slavery finally required the planned death of civil liberty in America, the abortion of the nation conceived in liberty.

    What is being dedicated at Gettysburg is a cemetery, a house of the dead. But, as Schaub writes, Lincoln “goes to some lengths not to utter the word ‘cemetery,” calling it instead “a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation”—the one “so conceived and so dedicated”—might live. The resting place has been placed on a battlefield, a field of action, and that action must continue if that nation is to live. The battle itself had instanced a rare invasion of the Confederate troops on territory held by the Union, on the remaining land of liberty. If America has remained secure from foreign invasion, as Lincoln expected in the 1830s, it has not remained secure from internal invasion by troops commanded by a seditious faction. Altogether, Lincoln judges it “fitting and proper” to dedicate a part of the battlefield to those who have rested from the task of defeating the attempt to sunder the American republic and to deny the principles of that republic in theory and in practice, ruining the regime that makes the extensiveness, fertility, and salubrity of the American land serve the good of the people on it. Parts of that land, including Gettysburg, have become battlefields in the struggle over what regime will rule that land and that people.

    “But in a larger sense,” Lincoln writes, “we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground.” Schaub calls Lincoln’s “But” “the most significant use of the word in the literature of the English-speaking peoples.” It was the action of the soldiers, not the words uttered by the speakers and heard by the audience, which has already dedicated, consecrated, and hallowed it. “Lincoln pivots from words to deeds.” As a speaker who is also a doer, Lincoln would emphasize we in each segment of that segment, three ‘we’s’ that parallel the three he’d enunciated in the previous paragraph, where he said, “we are engaged in a great civil war,” “we are met on a great battlefield of that war,” and “we have come to dedicate a portion of that field.” In that paragraph, he called attention to our actions, things “we” have successfully done; in this third paragraph he calls attention to the inadequacy of speech alone to accomplish the ends it proposes. Unlike the consecration of the host in the Roman Catholic Church, words have yet to be made flesh in American; God has created all men equal in their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but dedication to securing that equality in a political regime has not sufficed to such a securing. Lincoln therefore “speaks for practical effect,” urging his listeners to put the words of the Declaration into practice. “Lincoln, like Pericles before him in his Funeral Oration, must redirect the energies of his audience to something more productive than mourning.” He wants Americans not so much to dedicate a cemetery to those who can no longer act but to dedicate themselves to right action in “the cause of self-government,” a cause “proper to us as Americans, and proper to us as free and equal human beings.” In so doing, he “remind[s] the listener of the essential similarity of the living and the dead,” whose cause is the same as our cause. “We must act as they did. It is not enough for the nation to have been dedicated or for the cemetery to be dedicated; we must be dedicated.” Lincoln thereby turns the truths of the Declaration (it was, after all, only a declaration) “into a task.” 

    To do this, he begins with the dedication of the nation and of the cemetery, moves to the devotion to the cause seen in the actions of the dead soldiers, and finally to resolution: “that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” Schaub observes, “whether used as a verb or a noun,” ‘resolve’ “is a practical word that has both mathematical and political applications.” Legislative assemblies pass resolutions; mathematicians solve problems, prove or disprove propositions. Here and now, “the answer to the question of whether the nation will endure is to be found through resolve. To be effective, dedication and devotion must take the form of resolve,” replacing unsteady and often self-contradictory passions. In real life, in which the rational laws of Nature and of Nature’s God prevail, there’s no such thing as a lion-eagle. Tyranny is incoherent.

    To be untyrannical, civil laws must comport with natural laws. As Lincoln maintained in the Lyceum Address, there can be bad laws. If all laws were bad, if law itself were bad, no one would reverence them and no one would resolve to obey them. Behind any set of laws stands the regime that enacted them. “Lincoln’s fidelity to republicanism is visible…in the trusting manner by which he addresses fellow citizens”; “letting them know what needs to be done and how it can be done, he leaves it to them.” At Gettysburg he talks about these dead and us, the living, but not about himself. Today, “humility has disappeared as an element of rhetoric” (Muhammad Ali put a stake in it) but it is “in no way at odds with loftiness of aim.” “After all, mere personal fame and fortune are not particularly lofty, whereas the achievement of self-government is.” The Union, the nation under God, and the republican regime are all greater than even Lincoln, and Lincoln knows it. 

    Lincoln even submits himself to the laws of grammar. He is “a master of prepositions,” those words that indicate “the relations between things.” Such relations are not synthetic; the things retain their integrity, even and in some cases especially in relation to one another. His best-remembered set of prepositions is “government of the people, government by the people, government for the people.” Schaub “giv[es] these relations a Lockean gloss,” suggesting that government of the people refers to the social contract, the consent of the governed, that government by the people refers to the form consent takes “in a constitutional democracy,” and government for the people means government for the people’s benefit, for the common good. Such government is never ‘over’ the people. Another possibility is that government of the people means exactly that: the people are governed, but they govern themselves. The people both rule and are ruled—Aristotle’s definition of politics strictly speaking. They govern themselves for their own good, to secure their unalienable natural rights with conventional laws. 

    The problem has been that “the people” have excluded slaves from the regime. The “new birth of freedom” the nation—now more fully understanding what God requires of the nation that lives under Him—will now recognize “the civic claims of black Americans” and do so, it should be noticed, not only by abolishing slavery and the laws that buttressed it but by changing the regimes of slaveholding—oligarchies with aristocratic pretensions—which had prevented the United States from being a fully republican regime. “The principle for which the war was fought was the principle of free elections,” the principle that prefers ballots to bullets, the legal set of actions that bespeaks freedom. The old birth of freedom acknowledged the universality of natural rights but did not fully embody it; its conception was right, but the child was bound too tightly by the swaddling clothes. As Schaub nicely puts it, “the liberty of the opening” of the Address “was associated with conception, not birth, whereas freedom itself is now the thing born.” Now, “the original conception in liberty could progress toward the actual birth of freedom as a consequence of the renewed dedication to equality.” In this regard, one good effect Lincoln had a fellow American was to bring Walt Whitman to his senses or, more precisely, to his right mind. In his poetry, Whitman famously intoned, “Do I contradict myself? Very well, I contradict myself. I am large, I contain multitudes.” Yet when thinking of the emancipation of American slaves, when thinking as it were prosaically, he called it “that parturition and delivery of our at last really free Republic, born again, henceforth to commence its career of genuine homogeneous Union, compact, consistent with itself”—no longer self-contradictory. Lincoln might be said to write prose poetry, poetry governed by reason not impassioned effusion.

    “It’s important to remember that the freedom Lincoln heralds is an infant freedom, in need of further maturation.” It will need Constitutional amendments to solemnize it. For its maturation it will also need to acquire “moral and intellectual virtue through the disciplines of habit and study,” since “as a nation, we have done better in extending freedom than in educating for it.” Lincoln began this task at the Young Men’s Lyceum and continued it as president. 

    The supreme teacher is God. “According to Lincoln, the superintendence of God plays a role in the new birth of freedom.” His “hint here of a politically active, justice-seeking, providential order, setting certain limits upon human action, will come to fruition in his Second Inaugural,” to which Schaub now turns.

    “If Gettysburg is Lincoln’s war speech, then the Second Inaugural is his peace speech”—peace being the purpose of war, as Aristotle teaches. “Just as he fought the war with resolution rather than fervor, he wages the peace with charity rather than pride.” Lincoln knows that Biblical charity differs from mere material generosity or liberality; it means loving the good for other persons. Charity thus requires knowing that person as he really is, knowing what the good is, and knowing what the good is for that person. In 1865, reconciliation of the American factions “requires truth-telling and an inquiry into the cause of the war.” It requires education. In a later speech, Lincoln will make equal education of whites and newly freed blacks a central task of Reconstruction, as he planned it, along with conferral of the right to vote on the freedmen.

    In our own days, the New York Times (which I understand to be a newspaper published in New York City’s Borough of Manhattan) has formulated an educational curriculum called the 1619 Project. Schaub judges that “the Second Inaugural is the original and better 1619 Project.” While both ‘projects’ “share the conviction that Americans must fully feel and acknowledge the nation’s foundational wrong,” slavery, Lincoln’s version is superior in “historical accuracy,” “psychological realism,” and “political prudence.” He takes account of obstacles to reconciliation, which included “the temptations of northern moralistic arrogance, southern regressive resentment, white race hatred, and Black rage”—none of which have disappeared in the near century and a half since Lincoln wrote. By interpreting the war in a way “designed to blunt the force of each of these passions,” Lincoln follow “the spirit of reparative atonement.”

    Once again, the word “I” enjoys no prominence. And unlike the Gettysburg Address, the Second Inaugural doesn’t use “we” very often, either. This time, the noteworthy word is “all.” The war was ‘us-versus-them,’ as any war must be. The peace speech “is a speech about the whole, about how to put ‘the whole population’ of a fractured country together.” Here as before, he shapes “public sentiment,” that “conjoining of judgment and feeling,” now to “support the practical and immensely difficult work ahead.” To do so, he directs American minds to consideration of the past, initially to the time of the First Inaugural in 1861. He recalls that at that time “no one wanted war,” that the conflict “was over the Union,” that the unwanted war came anyway as a result of actions taken and choices made, and finally that the war was therefore no accident but the “logical result” of those actions and choices. In considering the actions and choices of that time, he clearly favors the Unionists while still assigning some moral responsibility for the war to them.

    What, then, caused the war? It wasn’t immediately a war of religion, since both sides, as Lincoln puts it, “read the same Bible, and pray to the same God,” invoking “His aid against the other.” The war came instead from a difference of opinion over slavery. Although “slavery and color are entwined with one another” in America, Lincoln “does not use the word ‘race,’ characteristically inviting his readers to think of a difference between peoples that is “only skin deep.” He describes slavery as “a peculiar interest,” a condition whereby, in Schaub’s elaboration, “human beings become a commodity in which other human beings”—the “oligarchic few”—hold “an economic interest.” In a speech delivered before he became president, he had “described how the meaning of the Declaration was obscured by the lust for profit: ‘the plainest print cannot be read through a gold eagle,'” the coin of the American realm at that time. If the few are of the tribe of nature’s eagle in a grandly dangerous sense, the many are of the tribe of conventional eagle in a petty but in some way no less dangerous sense, at least when it comes to countenancing slavery, and therefore tyranny, in their midst. Lincoln now declares, “All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war,” and in honesty every American should understand this to be true, despite the niaiseries of the Confederacy’s defenders, then and now, who pretend it was all a conflict over ‘states’ rights.’ (States’ rights to be sure, but the states’ rights to do what, if not to enact and preserve laws enforcing slavery? No one familiar with the Congressional debates of the 1850s can honestly believe that slavery wasn’t the issue that divided the American house.)

    “Lincoln now declares that the abolition of slavery is more fundamental than a Confederate victory would have been, even though such a victory would have dealt a death blow to the nation and a devastating blow to the cause of self-government.” Popular governments had failed before, and have failed since, but “a war fought between white citizens over the fate of Black slaves that leads to the emancipation of four million men, women and children is something both ‘fundamental and astounding.'” One is tempted to call it ‘exceptional.’ 

    But what has God to do with it? During the war, in their prayers, Unionists and Secessionists alike have “weaponized” “the bond of Christian belief,” praying to the one God to rally to “their side.” Midway through the speech, Lincoln makes religion “the main topic,” as he attempts “to reverse this partisan appropriation of divine power.” But if reverence for the laws could be offered as America’s civil religion in the 1830s, that will no longer suffice during a civil war, when a faction has broken the supreme law of the land by sundering the Union. Religion must now address the condition of war. True enough, “God may be the God of Battles, but not in the sense traditionally understood and invoked.” First, the God of the Bible makes the curse of Adam, that he shall work by the sweat of his brow, universal. If you do not work by the sweat of your brow but coerce others to work for you, you are a tyrant and no faithful lover of God or of neighbor. Work is the means of liberty in this post-lapsarian world. Free labor brings what human beings may in this life enjoy when it comes to hope, energy, progress, and improvement; free labor cultivates thought, empowering reason to rule in practice. This implies a firm if toned-down judgment against slavery. But also, “Judge not that ye be not judged,” a Biblical monition Lincoln aims at the victorious Unionists. He wants no triumphalism among the winners, who have also lost many of their own sons. In both the Lyceum Address and the Second Inaugural, Lincoln urges his fellow citizens to understand self-government as the rule of reason, the rule of the distinctively human capacity, despite the radical change in circumstance that nearly three decades of political turmoil, civil and uncivil have wrought. 

    “How to explain these unanswered prayers?” It could be that there is no God to hear them, but Lincoln “either rejects or suppresses this atheistic possibility.” God doesn’t always answer our prayers because His purposes are not our purposes and, absent revelation, we don’t know what those purposes are. In the Civil War, “God’s intention has disclosed itself slowly and through our mutual suffering.” That suffering has indeed been mutual, an experience that unites rather dividing us, because all human beings have sinned, and rightly suffer. “While using religion for political purposes, Lincoln does so to encourage humility rather than pride or certainty,” the way we sinners prefer to use it. Slavery, Lincoln tells his fellow citizens, has not been “Southern slavery or African slavery but ‘American Slavery'”; sin “belongs to the nation, the punishment is meted out to both North and South.” Northerners didn’t own slaves who harvested cotton and tobacco, but they wore the first and smoked the second; in fact, even free blacks (one in ten of all black Americans) enjoyed those privileges, too. “Lincoln’s strategy is to nationalize the wrong,” not “to racialize it.” He invites all Americans to pray not for victory, which by now was nearly assured, but for peace. 

    One might still ask, was the suffering God inflicted upon Americans just? How can such an immense punishment, more than Americans would suffer in the two world wars of the next century, be the act of a just God? Lincoln replies that God has been not only just but merciful. Have Americans shed as much blood in shooting and cutting each other as have been drawn by the slaveholder’s lash? Hardly. And “the shedding of blood is fundamentally not an assault on a body but on a being made in the image of God,” whose injuries the God who made him might well in justice avenge. Have they spent as much treasure in this war as they accumulated “by the bond-man’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil,” since he first was brought here to Jamestown, Virginia in 1619? No. With her usual perspicacity, Schaub notes that Lincoln writes “bond-man” here, not “slave.” “Bond-man” is “an old English term” emphasizing the “personhood” of the servant. The King James Bible uses it “to remind the Hebrews of their deliverance,” as when the prophet tells them to “remember when thou wast a bondman in Egypt,” eventually “redeemed” by the LORD. Lincoln draws the analogies of the Israelites to African-American slaves and of the American people to Pharaoh. He might also be reminding Americans that they were bondmen in America, under ‘Pharaoh’ George III. If that civil war pitted English against English, this civil war, also a “war between brothers” in a House Divided, “is divine chastisement for the other brothers’—the Black brothers—enslavement.” Had they not suffered even more severely than the American English had suffered at the hands of the men the Declaration calls “our British brethren”?

    Schaub suspects that Lincoln learned of the malign inheritance of 1619 from William Grimshaw’s History of the United States. Grimshaw writes about the Dutch slavers who sold slaves purchased on the eastern coast of Africa to Virginia planters at that time, an event he describes as “a climax of human cupidity and turpitude.” He went on to describe the then-ongoing emancipation of slaves in the North to advocate an end to “domestic bondage in the remaining states, citing the words of the Declaration and the instruction of George Washington” in his Last Will and Testament to emancipate the slaves at Mount Vernon. Lincoln himself “consistently argued that political necessity left the founders no choice but to accommodate the pre-existing colonial injustice, even as they pronounced it a grievous wrong,” but in the Second Inaugural he now “adds the somber thought that submission to necessity does not negate the weight of the past and its moral obligation.” Unlike the current 1619 Project, however, which “argues that the nation is irredeemably racist, racist from the beginning and racist throughout,” Lincoln regards 1776 not as “a continuation of the spirit of 1619 but its antithesis, and that “1787, too, although pragmatic in its compromises, was anti-slavery in principle,” unlike the Confederate constitution of 1861, which “enshrined the spirit of 1619” by stipulating that no law “denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves shall be passed,” and that “the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected” not only in the existing Confederate states but by any subsequent territories annexed by that confederation. 

    Schaub pauses to remark that “we should never forget that the enslavement of Africans was a global phenomenon,” with the Arab-Muslim trade beginning more or less as soon as Muslims advanced into Africa, a millennium before 1619; of the 10.7 million Africans who survived their cruel shipment to the Americas, 3.6 percent went to North America, the remainder to Central and South America and the Caribbean.  Of those who came to the United States, the vast majority arrived between 1810 and 1860; this “means that roughly 80 percent of those ever enslaved in North America were freed in consequence of the Civil War. The price was high: “One soldier died for every seven persons enslaved from 1619 to 1865; and one soldier died for every six persons freed by the 13th Amendment.” Even then, Lincoln implied, not every drop of blood “drawn from the lash” had been repaid by the blood of Americans; were it so, the judgment of the Lord would remain “true and righteous altogether.” 

    Southern theologians and laity alike didn’t like the sound of that. They explained away their losses in the war as a test of God’s chosen people, not as punishment for their sins. “Lincoln does what he can to help southerners admit their error,” but (as it happened) to little more effect than his plea in the First Inaugural for southerners not to secede had had. 

    Undeterred, Lincoln ends his speech by calling on Americans to “strive on to finish the work we are in” in the spirit of malice toward none, charity for all. “The aim of the speech has been to arrive at this call to action,” in that spirit—in Schaub’s words, “to imbue the demands of duty with an overarching spirit of kindness and patience.” Having “started with all Unionists in the first paragraph,” he expands “all” to both Unionists and Disunionists in the second, widens it to include “the slaves and their stolen labor” in the third. “Finally, Lincoln calls on his listeners to feel ‘charity for all,’ to strive ‘to do all’ that accords with peace properly understood, closing with a global extension to all nations”: in Lincoln’s words, “to do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.” Charity and peace: the Second Inaugural, with its new birth or baptism at the price of blood sacrifice, is America’s ‘new testament.’ [3]

     

    Notes

    1. Lion and eagle together make a griffin, the mythological being depicted in Christian iconography as the beast of the Apocalypse. On a more down-to-earth level, the lion is a predator on land, the eagle a predator from the air who attacks and devours the groundlings. These are predators the rich American land might support. For a consideration of the predator-tyrant at sea, Melville’s Moby-Dick may be consulted. The tyrant of the sea turns out not to be the whale but the man, Ahab, aided by his demonic familiars.
    2. For further discussion of Lincoln’s Biblical allusions on this point, especially Numbers 11, see Will Morrisey: Self-Government, The American Theme: Presidents of the Founding and Civil War (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003, 178-179. 
    3. See Ibid. 180-181.

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    John of Paris on Royal and Papal Power

    December 22, 2021 by Will Morrisey

    John of Paris: On Royal and Papal Power. J. A. Watt translation. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2002.

     

    Christianity posed a problem to the world—quite intendedly so, as its Founder insisted. He testified to the sovereignty of the Kingdom of God, a new regime (though arguably the oldest) challenging all existing regimes, beginning with the Roman Empire. At the same time, the citizens (or perhaps subjects) of this new regime were commanded to obey the regimes of this world, which did not wield the sword in vain. Given the new regime’s stern means of enforcing its own way of life—eternal damnation—it too wielded a mighty sword, however. And its purposes might easily conflict with the purposes of all other regimes, which worshipped gods the new regime despised as demons. That the two swords might clash was seen, horribly, in the Founder’s crucifixion. That they would continue to clash was guaranteed when the new regime’s ecclesia or assembly acquired substantial property controlled by the assembly’s monarch, reigning in Rome.

    Jean Quidort “of Paris” considered this religio-political dilemma in the early 1300s. In his excellent introduction, J. A. Watt recounts the controversy which had arisen between King Philip IV of France (“Philip the Fair”) and Pope Boniface VIII. For nearly a century, the Roman Catholic Church had denied the right of secular power to tax church property without the pope’s permission. The penalty for so doing was excommunication; if prolonged until death, excommunication meant damnation, according to Catholic doctrine. Philip was the latest French king to chafe under this proscription, needing revenues for his war against Edward I of England, who had also taxed church property and outlawed clergy who protested. Philip enraged Boniface when he arrested the “loudmouthed” and seditious bishop of Pamiers in October of 1301 on charges of treason against France, to which the royal chancellor soon added charges of simony, heresy, and blasphemy. “The issue at stake was sovereignty,” a word deriving from the Latin superanus, meaning “any elevated place” whether physically, morally, or politically on high. “Who was then ‘souverain es choses temporeix‘ in France?” 

    In the event, Boniface was seized by the king’s agent, Guillaume de Nogaret; the pope was tried by the French parlement and died six weeks later. That didn’t stop the judicial proceeding, which continued until March 1310, with the predictable outcome: the pope was judged guilty, the king’s right to tax church lands affirmed. Yet while force majeure combined with a legal judgment settled the question in practice in that time and place, it scarcely addressed its theoretical dimension. A Dominican who had written a defense of Thomas Aquinas, John of Paris defended the king’s stance with arguments from both natural law and Scripture. 

    As a Christian Aristotelian might well do, John begins by exercising the virtue of moderation, situating himself between two extreme doctrines. The Waldensians, he writes, deny that popes have any power in temporal affairs or any legal right to temporal wealth, charging that “when the church accepted Constantine’s donation” of Rome and its environs for its capital on earth “it became Roman and no longer the true church of God.” The Herodians make the opposite claim, that Christ’s kingship “was of the human kind” and, as a consequence, “the pope, in so far as he stands in Christ’s place on earth has a power over the properties of princes and barons as well as cognizance and jurisdiction of them” owing to the pope’s receipt of “primary authority, derived directly from God.” By contrast, “the prince” “has his power mediately from the pope.” According to Herodias, “other prelates and princes,” in contrast to the pope, “are not lords but guardians, agents, stewards.” 

    John demurs. “Truth lies midway” between these claims. While “it is not wrong for prelates to have lordship and jurisdiction in temporalities,” this power “is not theirs because of what they are or because they are vicars of Christ and successors of the Apostles”; rather, they have power over worldly things “in virtue of of the concession and permission of rulers if they are so endowed through the piety of rulers,” like Constantine, “or receive them from some other source.”

    John defines royal government in Aristotelian terms, as “the government of a perfect or self-sufficient community by one man for the sake of the common good.” [1] As a community, it differs from animal herds, which govern themselves by “natural instinct” and from human beings “who live a solitary life,” governing themselves “by reason.” Aristotle had distinguished political life from that of animals and of gods; as a Christian, John cannot use the example of ‘gods,’ and so changes it to solitary rational beings, who might be human or the one God. Self-sufficiency differentiates the political community from sub-political communities, especially families, which Aristotle regards as incapable of living a fully human life on their own. The common good differentiates the royal regime from the bad regimes—tyranny first of all, but also oligarch and democracy—and “by one man” distinguishes that regime from the good regimes consisting of a few or many rulers—aristocracy and “polycratia,” John’s term for Aristotle’s politeia or ‘mixed’ regime. Government so defined “has its roots in the natural law and the law of nations,” which consist both of human needs and of human reason. 

    As Aristotle teaches, “man is a social or political and social animal,” and men outside the political community” do “not live as men according to what is proper to their nature,” remaining stunted, somewhat bestial. Political communities evince a certain ruling order or regime, which may or not conduce to the fulfillment of human nature. Of those that do, the good regimes, John prefers royal government. “Government of a community is more effective when conducted by one man according to virtue, than when exercised by many or few virtuous men,” for four reasons. First, “virtue is more united and therefore the stronger in one ruler than when divided among many”; second, “there can be no community where unity and concord is missing,” and “the single ruler better upholds that unity of the community,” so long as he is virtuous; third, “a single ruler has a sharper eye for the common good than many rulers can have even if they are ruling according to virtue” because he can more readily consider the community as a whole, standing farther apart from particular interests than the few or the many; finally, “in the law of nature all government is reduced to overall unity just as in any body composed of a mixture of parts there is one element which is master over the others,” as the soul rules the “heterogeneous human body.” 

    Where, then, does the priesthood come from? Unlike Aristotle, Christians insist that “man is not merely ordered to such good as nature can bestow on him, which is to live virtuously, but that he is also ultimately ordered to a supernatural end, which is life eternal.” Given the superiority of the royal regime, “it follows that there must be some one person who will have the direction of all to this end.” Were it “possible to achieve this end simply through human nature,” the king would rightly take this function, but since a human being “cannot secure eternal life through purely human virtue” the ruler in question can only be God—that is, “Jesus Christ, who in making men sons of God has brought them towards eternal life.” Christ was not only a wise king (as attested in the Book of Jeremiah 23:5) but a priest. Priests offer sacrifices to divinity, reconciling men with divinity; that is their function. Unique among priests, Christ “offered himself as a sacrifice” for the purpose of removing “the universal obstacle,” sin, between men and God. “For this [Christ] is [the] true priest.” Christ as embodied in human form died on the Cross and subsequently awakened from death, returning to His Father in Heaven. He left behind His ecclesia, His church; this assembly of human beings needed “to establish certain remedies through which this general benefit” of human salvation from sin “might be applied in some way.” “These remedies are the sacraments of the Church,” which are physical embodiments of Christ’s “spiritual power,” embodiments “placed on the same plane as their principal agent, the incarnate Word, to whom they owe their spiritual power.” Absence the physical presence of Christ on earth, “it was necessary for him to institute ministers who would administer these sacraments to men,” conferrers of “sacred things” because “they are leaders in the sacred order” who “teach sacred truths” as “intermediaries between God and man” in action and word or argument. “The priesthood is the spiritual power, given by Christ to the ministers of his church, of administering the sacraments to the faithful.” As in the political communities, so in the regime of God there should be “one supreme head,” who is “the Roman pope, successor of Peter,” responsible for maintaining the unity of God’s assembly when “diversity of opinion” threatens to “divide the Church, whose unity demands unity of belief.” 

    “Therefore it is by God’s decision that there is a subordination of church ministers to one head. But it does not follow that the ordinary faithful are commanded by divine law to be subject in temporalities to any single supreme monarch.” The world is too diverse for that. Climates, languages, and conditions vary around the world; “in order to live well together” the nations need to “choose the sort of rulers appropriate for the sort of community in question.” Royal government or kingship may be the best of the best regimes, but that regime may not be best for a particular community; as Aristotle teaches, circumstances count when you get down to cases. Further, “one man alone cannot rule the world in temporal affairs as can one alone in spiritual affairs,” as the sanction of “spiritual power” is verbal, a matter of the Word of God, whereas “secular power…cannot so easily extend its sword so far, since it is wielded by hand.” In keeping with the physicality of temporal communities, worldly regimes consist of property owners; “each is master of his own property as acquired through his own industry,” unlike ecclesiastical property, which “was given to the community as a whole.” Finally, “all the faithful are united in the one universal faith, without which there is no salvation,” but that doesn’t mean that “all the faithful should be united in one political community,” as “what is virtuous”—as distinguished from what is salvific—in “one community is not virtuous in another, as is true also for individuals, of whom the Philosopher speaks in Ethics Book II, that one thing may be too little for one man and too much for another.” Not only the philosopher Aristotle but the Christian Augustine holds “that a society is better and more peacefully ruled when the authority of each realm was confined within its own frontiers,” that “the cause of the Roman empire was its ambition to dominate and the injurious provocation of others,” leading to its cataclysmic fall.

    Although the papal monarchy is superior in dignity to that of any secular monarch—salvation being even more important than the happiness virtue enables and, as Aristotle himself argues, “what is concerned with the final end is more complete and more worthy and gives direction to what is concerned with an inferior end”—it “does not follow” that “the priestly is a more dignified function than the royal” in “every respect.” “The power of neither of these derives from the other but rather both from some superior power.” That superior power isn’t hard to find in the Bible. “Both take their origin immediately from one supreme power, namely God,” and “hence the inferior is not subject to the superior in all things but only in those matters in which the supreme power has subordinated the inferior to the superior.” No one would claim that because a teacher of letter or of morals “guides a household to a nobler end, knowledge of truth, than its doctor,” the guide to bodily health, that “the physician should be subject to the teacher in the preparation of his medicines.” The rulers of Rome have consented to the authority of the priests, but this local “custom” need not, should not, be universalized to all cities, all political communities. Rather, the Roman dispensation symbolized “the greater excellence of the priesthood of the future,” when the greatest and truest Priest will return to rule a new Heaven and a new earth. A similar anticipation may be seen in France. “Because in the future it was to be in France that the religion of the Christian priesthood was to flourish best, divine providence ensured that among the Gauls the pagan priests called druids gave definition to Gallic life,” just as the Roman papacy now anticipates the rule of the supreme Priest.

    Because Constantine donated Rome to the Catholic Church, it belongs to the Church as a whole, not to any one person. The bishop of Rome has the right to ordain its use; he wouldn’t be entitled (for example) to sell it. He is the “steward” of Church properties, not their “lord.” What is more, just as a monastic community may “depose its abbot” so the Church “might do the same to its bishop, if it has been established that he has squandered the property of the monastery or church and that he has broken faith in taking for his private gain what was for the common good.” “Even less” is the pope lord of lay property; “nor is he its steward, unless perhaps in some extreme need of the church,” such as “pagan invasion or some such disaster”— one “so great and obvious” that he “could demand tithes and fixed contributions from individual members of the faithful, though these should be according to their means”—or “the common spiritual good”—such as the need to pay for additional assistant priests in a growing parish when revenues have not risen commensurate with the increase of spiritual services to the parishioners. The penalty for non-compliance is “ecclesiastical censure,” not jail time or some other bodily or material punishment. This is because lay property isn’t granted to the community as a whole, “but is acquired by individual people through their own skill, labor and diligence, and individuals, as individuals, have right and power over it and valid lordship,” entitled thereby to “order his own and dispose, administer, hold or alienate it as he wishes, so long as he causes no injury to anyone else, since he is lord.” 

    Although Christ as God had lordship over all men and their property, Christ “as man did not have it.” And even if He did, he didn’t “pass it on to Peter.” Christ is king in three senses: He is king of all creation; He is king of men because “what he did in the flesh leads us to membership of a kingdom, not indeed of this world” but of “the kingdom of heaven”; and He is head of “all the faithful,” who, “in so far as they are his members, one with Christ the head through faith and charity, are kings and priests” in their own, lesser, right. But Christ “as man” is not king. As man, He was poor, His kingdom not of this world, and he exercised “no authority or judicial power over temporalities,” giving instead simply an “example of virtue.” Therefore, no Christian priest “may claim to be Christ’s vicar” respecting temporalities. When He drove the moneychangers out of the Temple, when He sent his disciples to fetch an ass and a colt, when He exorcised demons by forcing them into pigs who hurled themselves into the sea—all violations of property rights if performed by a man—He exercised “authority as God,” not as man. Those who argue that a Christian convert subjects himself to the pope in property matters “in the same way as men are subject to their kings” unwittingly imply “that Christ had changed his kingdom into an earthly one.” It is rather that Christ rules by faith, governing “the hearts of men and not their property.”

    Even if Christ did claim or exercise jurisdiction over lay property as a man, he didn’t “hand it on to Peter.” It is true that Christ functioned as head of the Church “according to his human nature, not only according to his divinity.” But in anticipation of His death and resurrection, He gave His spiritual authority to Peter, leaving His corporal authority to Caesar, who already had “received it directly from God.” He didn’t even confer all spiritual authority to Peter, giving him the power to forgive sins but not to “dismiss” them, to wipe them off an individual’s moral balance sheet altogether. Only He made the supreme priestly sacrifice by His work on the Cross.

    The division between spiritual and temporal authority comports with the way God has ordered creation. “The more a thing has perfect being, the more its being is distinct.” John means that, for example, when God created animals, and in particular man, “male and female he created them”; hermaphroditism is “an error of nature,” an imperfection whereby the organs of generativity are confused, indistinct. Or, in the poorly ordered household as described by Aristotle, “one person is occupied by many tasks.” There is no adequate division of labor. God has so ordered His Church that it attends only to its proper task; “it is inappropriate that one person alone should be entrusted with such diverse duties as the priestly function and the royal lordship.” In the words of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux to the priesthood, “Your jurisdiction is over sin not possessions.” thus “the pope has neither the power of both swords nor any jurisdiction in temporal affairs unless it has been granted to him out of piety by a secular ruler,” such as the Emperor Constantine. “To say,” as some do, “that royal power came first directly from God and afterwards from the pope is quite ludicrous” because royal office “comes indisputably from God” and God gave Peter no “power of conferring the royal office.” 

    John devotes the remainder of his book to listing 42 arguments advanced “by those who maintain the contrary position” to the one he has taken and then, Thomas-like, responding to them. He groups the argument in seven clusters of six arguments each. The first cluster consists primarily of Scripturally-based arguments, the most telling of which derives from Matthew 16:19, which states, “Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth it shall be bound also in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven.” The second cluster consists of citations from the Canon Law, as when the pope is empowered to depose an emperor or to hear appeals from a secular judge. The arguments in the third cluster attempt to establish that the superiority of spiritual over temporal matters means that spiritual authority encompasses temporal authority: “Who can do the greater thing can do the lesser,” and “since therefore the pope can command in spiritual matters, so he can in temporal matters.” Fourth-cluster arguments purport to find in spiritual things the causes of temporal things, “deduc[ing] from this argument that it is the pope who gives to the prince the laws according to which they exercise or should exercise their jurisdiction, nor can a secular prince receive law from any other source without its being papally approved.” The arguments in the fifth cluster center on justice, that “without true justice a republic cannot be ruled and that there cannot be true justice in a republic when Christ is not its ruler”; therefore, it is reasoned, the temporal sword may be wielded justly “by the hand of the soldier, but at the priest’s signal and the emperor’s command.” The arguments in the sixth cluster relate temporal and spiritual “as means to end,” saying that since the pope wields spiritual power the king’s temporal power must serve the pope’s purposes. The seventh cluster consists of ‘real world’ arguments. Since “the pope must be self-sufficient as regards both types of religious life, active and contemplative,” and since “he cannot be self-sufficient for the active life unless he has direct and meaningful power over temporalities,” and moreover because “the clergy are more vigorous in reasoning and intellect than the laity,” clergymen generally and the pope above all must take the lead over kings. 

    John begins his reply with some “general ideas.” Aristotle observes that “nature does not fall short in what is essential; when it gives a power, it gives it only with all aids sufficient to the proper exercise of that power in the manner appropriate for its operation.” God “is more perfect than nature”: in giving “spiritual power to priests, he gives them those means necessary for its proper execution.” There are five such means: sanctification and consecration of the sacraments (the means of action); correct instruction and knowledge of the sacraments through doctrine (a means of the mind); “coercion of those who despise the sacraments” through “fear of legal punishment” (a means of enforcement); “due differentiation and orderly arrangement of those who administer the sacraments” (the means of ordination); and provision of what is necessary for supporting the lives of the ministers so ordained (a means of funding). Christ Himself also granted six powers to the Apostles and “therefore” to the ministers of the Church, powers whereby these means can be enacted: the power of consecration (“Do this in remembrance of me”); the power of administering the sacraments (the power of the keys to the Kingdom, especially the forgiveness of sins); the authority of the apostolate seen in preaching; the judicial power “to coerce in the external forum by which sins are corrected through fear of punishment,” namely, anathema; the power of establishing ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the power to receive the materials means of whatever may be needed to “maintain a suitable standard of living” for the clergy. The Apostles received “these six” powers from Christ and “no others” except the power to work miracles which bishops and priests today no longer have, “for the confirmation of our faith is so manifest as no longer to need confirmation by miracles.” 

    In his thirteenth, central chapter John draws the conclusion from the previous chapter, announcing in his title, “Prelates of the Church have neither lordship nor jurisdiction in temporal affairs by virtue of the powers granted to them nor on their account are princes subject to them in temporal affairs.” The first three powers (consecration, forgiveness, and preaching) are obviously spiritual. “The nub of the difficulty lies in the fourth power,” the judicial power. John proposes two “keys” to understanding what Christ means by this power of coercion. His disciples ask Him what they should do if one brother in Christ sins against another. Jesus tells them to confirm the charge with witnesses and to admonish him. “If he refuses to listen to you, tell it to the Church. And if he refuses to listen even to the Church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector”—that is, an outsider. The consequence of this judgment will “bind,” will be authoritative, in earth and in heaven. The penalty on earth is exile from the Church; Christ makes no mention of any other punishment. Further, “sin can be committed in temporal matters in two ways”: by error respecting doctrine, obviously a matter for an “ecclesiastical judge” only; and by “aiming to secure another’s property for oneself or making threats to do so,” a matter for a civil judge under the civil laws. Property laws exist to “ensure that property is put to those proper human uses which would be neglected if everyone held everything in common”; indeed, “if things were held unreservedly in common, it would not be easy to keep the peace among men.” As Augustine teaches, by “natural law there is equal freedom and common possession for everyone in everything,” but once sin was introduced into the world only property law was left to prevent men from ruining one another. That property law was initially introduced by God (“Thou shalt not steal”) but the Roman emperors also upheld it. Ecclesiastical law, by contrast, pertains to the thing all Christians do hold in common, namely, the Holy Spirit. As Bernard of Clairvaux advised Pope Eugenius, “Your power is not in possessions but in hearts.” As John puts it, “both the pope and emperor have universal jurisdiction, though the one has spiritual jurisdiction and the other temporal.” The pope may therefore excommunicate a sinner, including an emperor but that is the limit of his authority; he may request the “barons and peers of the kingdom” to correct the offender, but no more. Similarly, if a pope himself becomes “delinquent in spiritual matters,” the cardinals should first warn him; if they can’t remove him “on their own,” they may request that the emperor do so. “This is the way two swords are bound to lend help to each other in that common charity which united the members of the Church.” 

    Chapters 14 through 20 are given over to refutations of the forty-two arguments for papal supremacy in temporal affairs stated in Chapter 11. The first cluster of six arguments, based on Scripture, tend toward what John calls “mystical exposition of the text”—symbolical readings, such as an interpretation of a passage describing the moon as reflecting the light of the sun as representations of the emperor and the pope, respectively. No such reading can “be accepted unless a proof is found from some other passage of Scripture, because mystical exegesis does not proceed by proof.” In this instance, without any more textual explanation, “moon” and “sun” might be said to represent any pair of persons or of things, a procedure limited only by the ingenuity of the reader. And even granting the symbolic reading, it doesn’t prove what it’s said to prove, inasmuch as “the moon has a virtue proper to itself, given to it by God, which it does not receive from the sun, by which it can cause” sublunary effects other than those caused by the sun. 

    The second cluster of arguments, drawn from Canon Law, supposedly entitling a pope to depose an emperor, derive from “de facto situations, being concerned with what has in fact been done, rather than with what ought to have been done.” To put it in our terms, they derive from precedent. But precedent has no validity if it contradicts the letter of ‘constitutional’ law. Compared to laws set down in the Bible, Canon Law resembles mere statutory law. Further, the supposed precedents contradict one another, as “there are many arguments concerned with past practice which can be used to demonstrate the contrary of this alleged papal power.”

    No argument in the third cluster, which consists of arguments maintaining that spiritual power encompasses temporal power, withstands the test of logic. For example, it is true that a pope may denounce an emperor for sin, but “denunciation does not give the pope jurisdiction.” “If it did, all civil jurisdiction would be utterly obliterated,” contra the clear teaching of Christ. And true, the pope’s power is greater than the emperor’s power, but that doesn’t mean that it extends to control over the emperor’s sphere of authority. “The orders or genus are different: if my father can generate a man, it does not follow that he can generate a dog nor that if a priest can absolve from sin, he can absolve from a money debt.” The power to generate a man is more impressive than the power to generate a dog, but its superiority in that regard does not entail the lesser power. In the fourth cluster’s attempts to find spiritual causes for temporal things, John finds another ‘category mistake.’ “In a well-ordered household it is not he who teaches letters and morals, a spiritual function who appoints the physician; both are appointed by the head of the household”; similarly, “the whole world is a single community under God as its supreme power who appoints both pope and prince.” “In so far as a king is concerned to be a faithful Christian,” the pope “directs him in faith but not in government.” And if the prince proves a tyrant? God works in mysterious ways for the spiritual benefit of His people: “tyranny of princes can exist for punishment of sinners,” or a means of “prov[ing] the endurance of subjects, or to force them to take refuge with God who alone can change the hearts of kings for the better.” These tests have their limits, however, as one must not “fall into the error of Herod who thought fearfully that Christ would destroy the earthly kingdom.”

    Against fifth-cluster arguments justifying the superiority of papal power over temporal power, John replies that “moral virtues can be complete without theological virtues.” This leads John to reject ‘papist’ reading of Luke 22:38 on the “two swords.” “There is nothing here except a certain allegorical reading from which no convincing argument can be drawn.” As with the symbolic interpretations put forward in the first cluster of arguments, “allegory is insufficient to prove any proposition unless some clear authority can be produced from another source to substantiate it.” In this passage, John suggests, the two swords refer not to the royal and papal powers but to the Old and New Testaments, or perhaps “to the sword of the Word and the sword of impending persecution.” And even if it be granted that the conventional reading of the “two swords” is correct, the text doesn’t say that “they are to be Peter’s or any other Apostle’s, for Peter did not touch one of them, namely the secular sword, since it was not his.” And Christ told him to put even the spiritual sword into the scabbard, “for certainly an ecclesiastical judge ought not to use his spiritual sword precipitately for fear it might be despised, but only after much consideration and in circumstances of great necessity”—a cautionary monition to any pope, and to popes inclined to emulate Boniface, in particular.

    The sixth cluster of arguments, consisting of claims that secular power serve only as means to spiritual ends, John follows Aristotle’s treatment of the relation between the moral and theoretical virtues, rather than (for example) Augustine’s more Platonic integration of human motivation under the rubric of love, whereby he denies the morality of any but those virtues founded on caritas. “The Lord appointed a king for the Jewish people at the same time as the priesthood or even before.” And even this king ruled in a mixed regime, not in a true, purely royal, regime, and the mixed regime’s aristocracy “rule[d] according to virtue” without the guidance of priests. Here, John shifts his earlier argument in favor of monarchy, recalling Aristotle’s teaching in Book III of the Politics, that monarchy “joined with aristocracy and democracy…is better than the pure form, because, in a mixed regime, all have some share in government,” and “through this sharing, the peace of the community is preserved” because “everybody loves a government of this type and watches over it.” John goes so far as to commend this regime to the Church itself. “It would certainly be the best constitution for the Church if, under one pope, many were chosen by and form each province, so that all would participate in some way in the government of the Church.” Further, a pure monarchy “easily degenerates into tyranny” because “perfect virtue is to be found in few.” God eventually shifted Israel’s regime to a pure monarchy at the request of the Israelites, but only “as if in displeasure…because they were rejecting a regime more beneficial to them.” Surely the papacy should not be organized in a manner appropriate to the Israelites in their condition of moral decline.

    To the arguments in the seventh cluster, the ones based on a sort of hard-nosed realism, John reverses the reality. It is the prince who must, realistically, be “permitted to withstand the abuse of the spiritual sword as best he may, even by the use of the material sword, especially when abuse of the spiritual sword conduces to the mischief of the community whose care rests on the king”—as when a pope claims revenues needed to pay for defensive wars against foreign powers, whether pagan or Christian. “Otherwise, [the prince] would be ‘bearing the sword in vain.'” John defines “spiritual” as something whose “relationship to the divine spirit is through causality or concomitance”; for example, “the sacraments of the Church are spiritual as is their administration, because they contain grace and cause it.” Popes are entitled to tithe Catholic Christians for such a purpose; “it is by virtue of spiritual function that right to tithe is held.” As to the claim that clergy excel the laity in “intellectual power,” “if this is so, they ought not therefore dominate in everything but only in the higher and the better, namely, in spiritual matters.”

    In his final five chapters, John turns first to a consideration of the donation of Constantine and to what it entitles popes to do. “Some people” claim that “by reason of this gift, the pope is emperor and lord of the world and that he can appoint kings”—for example, the king of France—and “get rid of them like an emperor.” To this, John replies that Constantine donated one province of his empire to the Church, and it was Italy, not France. What is more, “the donation was displeasing to God,” according to no less an authority than St. Jerome. Civil and doctrinal disorder followed in its wake. As far as France is concerned, although the Gauls submitted had to the Roman yoke, the Franks never did, in keeping with the meaning of their name, ‘fierce.’ And is the Roman Empire, even in its current iteration as the Holy Roman Empire, a sacrosanct thing? Even if the pope does rightly rule it, will it last? Hardly so, as “it seems to be quite expressly stated in Scripture that the Roman empire should fail just like any other.” And popes themselves are not entitled to perpetual rule. A pope can resign or be pushed out for good cause: If he proves “totally unsuitable or useless, or if some impeding condition such as insanity occurs later, he ought to seek release from the people or from the college of cardinals, which in this case stands in place of the whole clergy and people.” Were this not so, “what was instituted in charity would be warring against charity, should he continue to rule injuriously, causing evil and confusion in the church and imperiling his own soul.” God bestows the papacy, but “through human cooperation.” It is “in a certain degree way natural” that “some men have jurisdiction over others,” but that jurisdiction is both conferred and “may be taken away” by the consent of the governed. A pope’s priesthood is permanent, but his ‘popehood’ is not. He took an oath of office when he was elevated to the papacy; if he violates that oath he may rightly be removed. 

    Some fearful souls worry that a book like this should not exist, making as it does “judgment about these issues concerning the pope.” To this John replies in proto-Kantian fashion, ‘Dare to know’: “I believe it not blameworthy to speak the truth”; in fact, “ignorance is dangerous,” not truth.

     

     

     

    Note

    1. He later refines this definition, writing that a regime is royal “only when whoever rules it does so according to laws he has himself made,” in distinction not only from tyranny but from what would later be called a ‘constitutional monarchy,” where the monarch “rules not according to his own will but according to laws which the citizens and others have made”—what Aristotle calls a ‘mixed regime’ or what John calls “a civil or political constitution, not a monarchical one.”

     

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