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    Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: America Under the Nixon Administration

    February 18, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    A. Wess Mitchell: Great Power Diplomacy: The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Henry Kissinger. Chapter 8-Epilogue. 

     

    In the first years of the 1970s, President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger essayed a two-part geopolitical strategy: detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Mitchell understands the United States as a greater Great Britain in the sense that its home territory extended across a continent. As a commercial republic, it always maintained strong ties with foreign countries: “A policy of true isolationism was never a viable option for a country dependent on outside trade.” And, as he also remarks, this was an imperial republic from the founding until 1890; its “energies were directed primarily inward, to the conquest of [its] own hinterland,” partly thanks to its early enemy, Great Britain, whose powerful navy “kept other powers from dominating Europe and turning their full attention to North America.” As a result of this commercial prosperity and mostly uninterrupted empire-building, “by the presidency of Teddy Roosevelt, America was capable of holding her own against the great powers”—very much including the British, about whom Roosevelt said he had no fear of any encroachments because he could counter any such attempt by seizing Canada. 

    From 1890 to the First World War, America’s economic, political, and military heft increased materially, as its population became half again as big, its steel production increased nearly two-and-a-half times, its warship tonnage more than threefold. “In 1914, U.S. GDP was already four times that of Imperial Germany; by the eve of World War II, it was larger than all the other major powers combined.” That hardly meant that it faced no dangers by the time the young Nixon began his political career in the years after that war. Having allied with the Soviets against the Nazis, the United States confronted a rival empire that extended its reach into Eastern and Central Europe, hoping for much more. And by 1949, Communists allied with Stalin had seized control of mainland China. Recognizing that “Soviet Russia was a mortal enemy with whom there could be ‘no permanent modus vivendi,'” State Department Russia expert George F. Kennan proposed a policy of “containment” whereby diplomatic initiatives to countries not yet under Communist rule would establish alliances against that threat. President Harry Truman’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson set about forming such alliances in Western Europe and East Asia. “Standing U.S. military commitments would replace Britain’s guardianship of the balance of power, backed by U.S. financial aid to thwart Communist subversion and a new international monetary system, brokered at Bretton Woods, that established a gold-backed U.S. dollar as the paramount global currency and created mechanism to prevent currency wars between the United States and her allies.” In Europe, the military alliance was formalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while the Marshall Plan provided financial aid “to rebuild foreign economies shattered by the war” and, not incidentally, to lessen socialist and Communist temptations among the allied nations. Paul Nitze, heading the State Department Policy Planning Staff, put more teeth into containment than Kennan had wanted by writing NSC-68, which recommended a military buildup backing a diplomatic strategy that amounted more or less to a public opinion campaign to reassure American citizens and the citizens in allied countries that war was not imminent and to maintain communications with the Kremlin to prevent war from erupting accidentally, as it had done in 1914 Europe.

    During these years, the capital military fact became the acquisition of nuclear weapons arsenals by the Soviet Union, which could now threaten the United States with destruction as readily as the United States could do the same to it. Nuclear weapons “made diplomacy more necessary than ever” but also “more difficult.” Whereas “for millennia, the task of diplomats had been to convert the potential for violence into political outcomes without bloodshed,” the threat of which gave negotiations urgency and often led to compromises that avoided war, against a nuclear-armed state “this logic broke down.” “If negotiation failed, nuclear weapons made war less likely than before, which in turn weakened the necessity to compromise.” Given the sharp regime differences between the Allied and Soviet blocs, including their fundamental disputes over moral principles, the prospects for diplomatic relations worsened. 

    As a Harvard political science professor in the 1950s, Henry Kissinger published Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons “made it harder to harness war to political ends in the way Carl von Clausewitz had envisioned.” He recommended American attempts to identify “limited objectives against the Soviets,” objectives that did not raise the all-or-nothing threat of nuclear war—a way of devising,” as he put it, “a framework in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue.” As an émigré from Germany, Kissinger had studied not only Clausewitz but Kant, whose hope for a League of Nations he also deprecated. And he published a careful study of Metternich’s balance-of-power diplomacy, which he judged more realistic than either Clausewitz’s maxims (now in need of revision) and Kant’s (always in need of revision). Independently, as a practicing politician—a United States senator, then Eisenhower’s vice president—Nixon had arrived “at the same conclusion.” Under conditions of the late 1960s, when they arrived at the White House, the containment policy seemed to them unsustainable. Nixon regarded it as politically and financially unsustainable, especially given the ongoing war in Vietnam and America’s “deteriorating balance of payments position”; Kissinger regarded it as too rigid, leaving too little room for bargaining. 

    Mitchell remarks the resemblance between America’s circumstance as understood by Nixon and Kissinger and the British circumstance as understood by Lord Salisbury in 1900. “Like the Edwardians, Nixon wanted to bring his nation’s commitments in line with the new realities not in order to abnegate its global position but to preserve it.” The Pentagon’s attempt to sustain the capacity to fight two major enemies and “a minor contingency in a third theater” was neither practicable nor necessary, given the success of the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the alliance with erstwhile enemy, Japan; those countries could now pay for a more substantial portion of their own defense. The United States devoted eight percent of its GDP to military spending, with 1.1 million troops, most of them in Asia, most of those in and around Vietnam. Victory there would require still more troops, still more expenditures, for which political support was doubtful. Nixon moved quickly, shifting to military policy of financing a war against one major enemy, not two, and cutting the military budget. By the time of his resignation from office in 1974, military spending and force levels had been reduced “to levels not seen since before the Korean War.” The two principles of the “Nixon Doctrine” were continued military commitment to allies with the proviso that “they would be expected to handle internal threats to their security”—a reprise of Westphalia, at least regarding allies. Nixon needed to be careful when insisting that allies increase their military spending; in previous years, France’s president de Gaulle and others had warned that Americans wanted nothing more than to abandon them, and such an insistence might look like a first step toward doing so. 

    “Also like the Edwardians, Nixon wanted to reduce tensions with U.S. rivals.” Détente had actually started under the woebegone Johnson administration, which intended to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Overtures to China, however, were all his own. Mao Zedong hadn’t mellowed with age. His brutal ‘Cultural Revolution,’ initiated in 1966, continuing until the tyrant’s death ten years later, was in the process of claiming something along the lines of one to two million lives of a variety of the regime’s ‘class enemies.’ At this point, the old Stalinist was more dangerous to his own people than the Kremlin oligarchs were to theirs. Further, Nixon “had long advocated a policy of maximum pressure against the Red Chinese state.” In his estimation, the time had nonetheless come to reverse course; “engaging with Beijing in some fashion was necessary for U.S. interests,” an important potential component of a rebalance of power in the world. Never at a loss for words of praise for his proposals, Kissinger called this strategy “a subtle triangle” designed to “improve our relations” with both enemy powers. While initially he considered Nixon’s overture to China premature if conceptually sound, he quickly warmed to it.

    “For all of Nixon and Kissinger’s creativity, their policy might have miscarried had it not been for the unwisdom of Soviet Russia”—a phenomenon surely not unknown in its history, but not sufficiently prevalent to be depended upon. The Soviets had already worsened their relations with China unilaterally, without any American initiatives. Not only had the Soviets diluted their Stalinism, much to Mao’s contempt; an eager imitator of his beau ideal of a butcher, Mao was “probably” the “biggest mass murderer in history,” his estimated 65 million kills surpassing the numbers racked up by the master himself. More, the Chinese “feared Soviet aggression and wanted to expand their own influence in the Communist world.” (It will be recalled that the American ‘New Left,’ for example, had lionized ‘Chairman Mao’ and his ‘Little Red Book’ of pithy aphorisms.) Just as Nixon had his foreign policy ‘doctrine,’ Soviet Communist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev had his. The Brezhnev Doctrine upheld the Soviet Union’s prerogative of intervening in any Communist country whose regime was threatened, and its words were not idle; Soviet tanks had rolled into Czechoslovakia a year before Nixon’s inauguration, quelling republican partisans. Sino-Soviet tensions heightened in March 1969 in a series of border clashes, “which the Chinese almost certainly initiated,” and there were even signs that the Soviets might retaliate by striking Beijing with nuclear weapons. That is, statesmen in all three of the major powers needed to worry about a two-front war. 

    Mao’s chief diplomat was Zhou En-lai, whose “quiet manner and philosophic bent belied a hardened core of the kind that one finds in people accustomed to having to survive under a brutal and arbitrary regime”—in his case, as “the committed lieutenant of one of history’s most ruthless killers,” having himself “ordered the deaths of many innocent people.” “True to the revolutionary ethos of the Maoist state, Zhou saw diplomacy as an arm of warfare against China’s enemies,” a dialectical “war of words” complementing the “war of swords,” as he put it. “Diplomacy falls within the province of the war of words,” he explained, and “as sure as day turns into night, there will be a constant war of words, every day of the year.”

    Nixon and Kissinger wanted Communist Chinese help in getting out of Vietnam on the terms of a ‘peace with honor,’ as the slogan went. Unbeknownst to the Americans but well known to both the Chinese and the Vietnamese, China had little leverage with its fellow Communists in Hanoi, Vietnam being a centuries-long enemy of the Empire of Heaven. For its part, China wanted the U.S. out of Taiwan. In exchange for empty promises of influencing the Vietnamese, Zhou did extract some concessions from the U.S. regarding Taiwan: a drawdown of American troops in the country and, just as crucially, the adoption of Beijing’s ‘One China’ claim, which enables Beijing to claim that any American military defense of the Republic of Taiwan would amount to ‘outside interference in Chinese affairs.’ The two countries agreed to oppose—exactly how was unstated—hegemony in Asia by “any other country,” meaning the Soviet Union. They also agreed to the usual increase in trade, intergovernmental communication, and “people-to-people contacts”—the benefit of the latter to the United States chiefly being the infliction of Shirley MacLaine upon Mao’s personally blameless subjects. The main benefit to the Americans was that all of this made the Kremlin nervous. 

    “Without doubt, the world was brought into greater balance, in the sense that Chinese and American power redirected toward the shared Soviet threat.” The three countries nonetheless persisted in “bleed[ing] and harass[ing] one another wherever possible” in what Mitchell calls “a period of strategic rest” intended “to regain strength before resuming the contest on more favorable terms,” which all three expected to find. Mitchell rightly criticizes Kissinger for claiming that Mao was animated by “a motive of order-building.” On the contrary, contemporary documents show that the old tyrant’s intention aimed at “aggravat[ing] the contradictions” between the Americans and the Soviets in order to “divid[e] up enemies and enhance[e] ourselves.” This is Marxist dialectic at work, equally consistent with the traditional Chinese policy of “ally[ing] with the Wu to oppose the Wei.” “All under heaven is in great chaos,” Mao exulted, anticipating the delights of ever-increasing worldwide power, which his regime has continued to accrue, decades after his death. 

    These long-term deficiencies aren’t the whole story, however, inasmuch as to get to the next century in good condition one must first survive the current century. “The goal of Nixon’s grand strategy was to alleviate the military and fiscal burdens on the United States without forfeiting the overall U.S. position.” Reduced American expenditures of blood and treasure in Asia enabled Nixon to return America’s foreign-policy focus to “the place that was most important to U.S. national security, which was Europe.” Kissinger’s diplomacy “made the shift from a 2.5 to a 1.5 war standard possible,” in part by putting pressure on America’s Asian allies to put more effort into defending themselves. “Nixon’ pivot was not an end in itself; it was meant to give America an edge against her main opponent, the Soviet Union” by “forc[ing] the Soviets to bear the full brunt of their own two-front dilemma.” America went from a 70-30 ratio of forces in Asia and Europe to a 30-70 ratio, while the Chinese could transfer some of its forces away from its border with Korea to its border with the Soviet Union. His policy of détente with the Soviets, meanwhile, enabled Nixon to reduce military spending overall, as did his policy of ‘Vietnamizing’ the war in Indochina. “His policies allowed America to get her second wind spiritually,” to recover from the intense factionalism attendant to that war, “as well as strategically, at a moment when it might have turned inward,” as de Gaulle had expected. In the longer term, the United States could now put more resources into military research and development, which “resulted in a range of breakthrough technologies that the Soviets could not match.” While the Ford and Carter administrations didn’t take these advantages, they didn’t block the research, and President Reagan “was able to capitalize” both on “Nixon’s early reconcentration of effort to Europe” and on the technological advances Nixon had initiated and Reagan substantially augmented. Reagan also continued to use the Chinese Communists as a counterbalance to the Soviets. “The consequences of his administration’s deepening of ties with China, for good and for ill, remain with us to this day.” [1]

    Mitchell draws some lessons for American statesmen. The character of the American regime makes diplomatic maneuvering more cumbersome than it was (for example) in the monarchic Austria of Metternich or the Prussia of Bismarck. It takes more effort to effect a change of course “because the complexity of the U.S. federal system,” to say nothing of its democratic republicanism, “rewards consensuses that, once locked in, are difficult to alter.” Such a regime will exhibit “long periods of inertia that can only be broken by a big jolt.” (It might be ventured that the Trump administration has specialized in such big jolts, initiated by the president himself.) “As Nixon and Kissinger showed, ‘bursts’ of innovation in policy require highly focuses leadership that is willing to devote primary attention to foreign policy and able to rewire aspects of the U.S. system to chart a new course.” 

    America’s regime has forged “more alliances than any previous great power,” involving “much deeper commitments” which include “binding treaties that are approved by the Senate and considered to have the force of law.” These alliances “enhance U.S. diplomatic leverage by positioning the country to act as a kind of spokesperson for a large grouping of states,” sometimes even including ever-balky France. This does have the deficiency of setting up “a perverse incentive to free-ride”—another Trumpian concern. “A perpetual dynamic in U.S. diplomacy of trying to both reassure and motivate allies…would have been familiar to Bismarck from his dealings with Austria, but on a much bigger scale.” But “then as now,” America’s allies “lack viable alternatives to the U.S. market and security umbrella,” as President Trump evidently has concluded. 

    “Nixon’s successes demonstrate that realist precepts are compatible with republican government.” Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalin against Hitler, Nixon’s simultaneous détente with Brezhnev and his rapprochement with Mao against Brezhnev, Reagan’s sometime support of anti-Communist tyrants against the Soviets, were all “short-lived affairs,” given the regime differences between republicanism and Communist oligarchy and Communist tyranny alike—modi vivendi “that allowed American to tread water and regain her strength.” Despite the fact that “the 20th century is strewn with many U.S. diplomatic tombstones,” notably Wilsonian and Rooseveltian internationalism, “it also saw the triumph of a uniquely American variety of hard-nosed diplomacy that blended aspects of British maritime strategy, continental realism, and homegrown meritocratic pragmatism,” with the use of diplomacy “as a tool of strategy to outlast powerful enemies that would have been recognizable not only to the not only to the classical European statesmen whom Kissinger so admired but also to the descendants of the Chinese emperors who would now succeed the Soviet Union to become the American Republic’s greatest adversary.”

                                                                                                                                                         *

    Mitchell concludes his discussion of great power diplomacy with observations drawn from all of his examples, across centuries, regimes, and civilizations. He has invited readers to consider circumstances in which great powers faced the prospect of a war “beyond the state’s immediate ability to win by force alone,” although its military officers might imagine otherwise. Appeals to the law of nations were futile. But “the diplomat offered a service that neither the soldier nor the jurist could provide: the possibility of rearranging power in space and time to the state’s advantage, s that it did not face tests of strength beyond its ability to bear,” usually “either by augmenting the resources at the state’s disposal externally”—gathering allies—or “by reducing the number of enemies requiring immediate attention, or both.”

    Such work entails three strategies: conciliation, enmeshment, and isolation/containment. Conciliating an enemy might involve bribing him, appeasing him (i.e., giving him what he wants), or détente (persuading him that he needs to back off as much as you do). Enmeshment means pulling the enemy closer through trade or identifying shared political priorities. “Most of the examples of enmeshment in this book involved a relatively weak power looking for ways to lighten the load of defense expenditure and maintain empire on the cheap,” as in the cases of Vienna, Nineteenth-century Austria, and Britain after the Treaty of Versailles. Isolation means building coalitions that are militarily, politically, and economically strong enough to deter the enemy because attacking the coalition would be too costly. Mitchell hastens to note that “none of these strategies offers any assurance of success” and that they “are not a first choice but rather a necessity…foisted upon a great power by geopolitical and financial exigencies.” 

    To increase his chances of success, a diplomat will need to study history. Admittedly, “diplomatic history does not provide pat lessons for the present any more than military history does.” Such study is rather an extended exercise in prudential reasoning in which errors are instructive instead of ruinous. Nonetheless, Mitchell does offer fourteen “basic principles” drawn from his own study—fourteen in number, perhaps as a counterweight to President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which turned out to be less than prudent.

    1. Diplomacy concentrates power.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

    Diplomacy concentrates power and dilutes the enemy’s power by reducing your “exertions in one place” and “increas[ing] them in another.” You may be weaker or stronger than your enemy, but you must select the more immediate threat for your primary attention, as the Byzantine emperor did when he and his chief diplomat “conciliated Persians to focus on Huns” and when “Americans and Chinese both sought détente with one another to concentrate against Soviets.”

    2. Effective diplomacy constrains the enemy.

    This requires understanding of the enemy’s geography, his fear of nations other than your own, economic weaknesses, military weaknesses (especially weakness of military technology). Very often, your enemy will know his weaknesses better than you do, so these are points of leverage in negotiation. “Effective negotiation works with the grain of these constraints to narrow the options for profitable aggression and stack the deck in favor of stability.” Do not expect to discover good intentions; do not assume that diplomacy can “transform opponents internally,” making their regime compatible with yours. Regime change is an overly ambitious task for diplomats to undertake. It typically results from harsher methods, overt and covert.

    3. Conciliate to constrain, not to appease.

    You are unlikely to change your enemy’s motives. Whereas Theodosius the Younger correctly attended to the weaknesses of the Huns, negotiating with them on that basis, Neville Chamberlain “tried to remove the sources of conflict by giving Hitler what he wanted,” namely, the territory which strengthened the tyrant’s military position, enabling him to demand, and seize, still more. 

    4. Use enmeshment to restrain your opponent, not you.

    “There is a fashionable modern notion,” propounded by the prominent academic, John G. Ikenberry, “that enlightened states use diplomacy to wrap themselves in layers of commitments that restrict their own freedom of maneuver and thereby win the trust of other states” by rendering themselves harmless. Bad idea. You want “to foster economic dependencies”—your enemy’s dependence on you. “Communist China has used the economic enmeshment occasioned by Nixon’s opening and confirmed by post-Cold War U.S. presidents to created dependencies that translate into constraints on the United States in wartime, while the U.S. side has been much less adept, until recently, at using these arrangements to its advantage.”

    5. Isolate your enemy to prevent war.

    The Communist Chinese rail against ‘encirclement’ and ‘containment’ strategies deployed against them, even as they take every opportunity to push into Latin America. But in fact, containment strategies usually “make war less likely, for the simple reason that it forces a would-be aggressor to diffuse its military attention in multiple directions, therefore reducing its chances of success through conquest.” This puts the enemy on the diplomatic path rather than the military one. “The sine qua non of strategic diplomacy is to foist the multifront burden back onto an opponent in order, as Richelieu put it, to ‘keep your enemies so busy everywhere that they could not win anywhere.'” One suspects that the Chinese Communist Party understands this quite well, happily watching the United States embroiling itself in ‘long wars’ against Muslim terrorists and others. The Party is likely to be less than pleased with America’s successful brief, sharp strikes against its enemies.

    6. Generally speaking, interests outweigh moral, religious, and political doctrines.

    That is, “the law of self-preservation” usually prevails, inasmuch as a regime cannot advance whatever moral and political principles if reduced to a puff of smoke. This has been true throughout diplomatic history, as seen when states propounded religious principles, risking “the wrath of God” and “their own souls.” “The force that repeatedly led bitter enemies to find common cause was fear of a shared enemy,” a sentiment “that has consistently trumped the dictates of conscience, faith, or creed,” or perhaps consistently informing such dictates with the prudence of serpents. This notwithstanding:

    7. Effective diplomacy is imbued with a higher mission than “the science of fear.”

    Ideology is one thing, identity another. A nation’s identity depends in large measure on its regime: its purposes, its way of life, the kind of people who rule it, the institutions within which they rule. Byzantium had gold to offer, but it also had Roman law, the Christian Church, and the beauty of its capital city; during the Cold War, American diplomats “had at their back a great democratic republic grounded in the humanizing ideals of the U.S. Constitution.” If foreign countries see that a regime consistently upholds an ethos, a character, that benefits others along with themselves, trust increases. “Many of history’s most disastrous breakdowns of order occurred when a leading state discarded time-proven missions in favor of the power principle,” as when Wilhelm II sacked Bismarck and replaced the alliance system Bismarck had built with Weltpolitik.” Foreign policy realism isn’t necessarily as realistic as its proponents suppose. In contrast, Austria’s Kaunitz and America’s Kissinger “were both able to engineer radical reorientations in their nations’ foreign policies without sacrificing long-standing alliances with smaller states because the great powers they represented were understood to be committed to a mission that was preferable to those of other great powers.”

    8. Smaller powers matter.

    Sweden was no France, but it forced the Habsburgs to “divert attention and resources away” from France, as did Albania for Venice, menaced by the Ottomans. These kinds of alliances occur when the great power’s interest in fending off another great power coincides with a smaller power’s interest in not getting squashed by that other great power. If, however, the great power aims at detente with its great-power enemy, the smaller ally needs reassurance that it won’t be abandoned, as President Nixon appreciated in attempting “to allay Taiwanese and Japanese fears about rapprochement with China.” 

    9. In negotiation, culture counts.

    Know your enemy’s ethos. “The Byzantines used conventional treaty diplomacy with the Persians, a literate cosmopolitan civilization like themselves, but used methods of barter and intrigue hen dealing with a nomadic, ego-driven culture like the Huns.” Mitchell’s contrasts here are Wilhelmine Germany, which attempted to terrify the British, who hadn’t built their empire on cowardice, and both Chamberlain and FDR, who imagined “that their autocratic interlocutors” (Hitler and Stalin, respectively) “would negotiate on the basis of consensual give-and-take of the kind that characterized their democratic systems at home.”

    10. Superior diplomacy fosters superior technology.

    The delays diplomacy arranges gain time for technological innovation, including the development of better weapons systems. Commercial relations generate wealth, and wealth can be used for research, development, and manufacture; alliances can enable their members to “specialize in and therefore get better at, a certain range of technologies that are the most vital for its unique geographic situation.” Resources expended in Vietnam were turned toward the development of computers, missile guidance systems, and an array of other technologies that proved useful in outpacing the Soviet Union, the power the war in Vietnam had been intended to contain.

    11. Money is more effective at attraction than deterrence or compulsion.

    By this, Mitchell means that financial sanctions work less well than incentives. States have successfully used money “to get someone to do something helpful for them,” but have enjoyed less success in using money “to prevent someone from doing something harmful to them.” The Byzantines and Venetians deployed bribes “to succor the enemies of their enemies.” Britain used its powerful banking system to prop up small states on continental Europe whose interests happened to align with theirs.

    12. Effective diplomacy depends on disciplined institutions.

    Foreign policy bureaucracies arise in response to the need to keep good records and to gather and assess information on foreign countries, whether they are friendly or hostile. But any bureaucracy can become too big for its own, and its government’s good: “states developed bureaucracy to gain an edge in competition, yet the larger the bureaucracy became, the more it took a life of its own and stifled diplomatic creativity.” A too-large bureaucracy also tends to separate itself from the executive branch of government that it is intended to serve, becoming a government-within-the-government. “Almost every leader in this book wrangled the bureaucracy into alignment with his or her will at moments of international danger, either by creating parallel structures or by radically overhauling the bureaucracy, or both.” More recent American examples include presidents Reagan and Trump.

    13. Democracy doesn’t guarantee success.

    Better at trade and coalition-building than other regimes, more stable internally and more attractive internationally (partly because they are more inclined to keep faith with treaty partners), democratic and commercial republics enjoy “credibility, which is the foundation of effective diplomacy.” That doesn’t mean that they guarantee progress from one triumph to another, that ‘History’ is ‘on their side.’ “Some of the greatest disasters in this book came about when elected leaders tried to conduct diplomacy on the basis of progressive notions about the way the world should work”: Wilson at Versailles, Chamberlain at Munich, Roosevelt at Yalta. A democratic regime “does not allow great power to transcend power realities or exempt it from the tradeoff that lie at the heart of effective diplomacy.” Susceptible to “mood swings,” democracies need statesmen who are “deliberate about sustaining a focus on the national interest and nurturing the classical repertoire of skills that comprise diplomacy’s professional core, lest these be subsumed by fashionable causes.”

    14. Expect no gratitude.

    “There are plenty of statues of the West’s most famous generals and admirals, but very few of its great diplomats,” first of all because a Dwight Eisenhower cuts a more esthetically pleasing figure than a Henry Kissinger. The sword will always prove a more dashing accessory than an attaché case. On a more sober level, diplomatic triumphs are less spectacular than military ones. They often inspire “the messy anguish of compromise” rather than the thrill of victory or the agony of defeat. 

                                                                                                                                                                  *

    Kissinger titled one of his books The Necessity of Choice. In all, Mitchell impresses upon his readers the necessity of diplomacy. Liberalism in its progressivist form “did not expunge geopolitics from human history.” Statesmen still need ways to close “gaps between national-security means and ends” and of “keeping war’s costs and aims subordinate to politics.” The end of national security has become more complex, not simpler to reach “in an age of military balances, mutual nuclear vulnerability, and proliferating conventional military technologies.” Even AI technology cannot replace diplomacy, “cannot formulate preferences or provide the finesse and interpersonal skill that have always constituted the X factor of success in negotiations.” Twenty-first century Chinese Communists have become “adept at using diplomacy to win friends and influence people,” exhibiting “the mixture of political acumen, ideological flexibility, and patience that typically characterize successful great powers.” To counter such an impressive enemy, the United States and its allies will need to jettison the illusions of historical progress that have characterized the modern West for at least two centuries. 

     

     

    Note

    1. For an extensive discussion of Reagan’s foreign policy, see “Reagan Geopolitics: The First Term” and “Reagan Geopolitics: The Second Term” on this website under the category, “American Politics.” See also “The China Strategy” on this website under the category, “Nations.”

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: Germany and Britain

    February 11, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    A. Wess Mitchell: Great Power Diplomacy: The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Henry Kissinger. Chapters Six and Seven. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022.

     

    It was the consolidation of the German states into one nation-state that rearranged European and, finally, world geopolitics in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Modern Germany had a larger population than any European state except Russia, a larger GDP than any European state except Britain, and occupied more territory than the Germany of today. The architect of that consolidation was Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Although Bismarck has been associated with the policy of ‘iron and blood,’ a phrase from his 1862 speech preparing Germans for wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, Mitchell shows that he was far from a simple militarist, but in fact a state builder and diplomat. As a state builder, he embraced no dogma except nationalism, no regime but monarchy; as a diplomat, he embraced no dogma but nationalist Realpolitik. When asked if he was pro-Russian or pro-Western, “I have always answered: I am a Prussian.”

    As such, he understood that his Prussianized Germany could be no Austria, with a defensive strategy. Located squarely on the Great European Plain, Germany had no natural boundaries, no mountains to protect it from attackers. This lent Germans to militarism, as embodied by Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke. Following the teachings of the Prussian military scholar Carl von Clausewitz, Moltke always sought the “decisive battle,” the one that would destroy the enemy army. He went so far as to reject Clausewitz’s preference for civilian control of the military during wartime, when “the job of politicians was to get out of the way.” His overall strategy was to defeat France first (which he did, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71) and Russia, which he did not get the chance to do.

    Bismarck opposed him on the Eastern Question. Beginning in 1887, when Russian troops reportedly began to move toward the Austria-Hungarian border, Moltke and the other generals wanted to continue the iron and blood strategy that had prevailed in the previous three wars. Bismarck saw that Russia was no small or medium-sized country. Twice the size of Germany, assured of an alliance with the French, with their ambitions for revanche against the humiliation of 1871, Russia could exploit the vulnerabilities of newly constituted Germany, “his new creation.” In the years since the victory over France, Bismarck forged and cultivated “an intricate system of alliances designed to avoid that scenario and give Germany the space she needed to develop as a great power,” a system centered on a triangular alliance with Austria-Hungary in the south, Russia in the east. All powers other than France should be put in a position to need Germany. Those needy powers should be “held apart from coalitions against us by their relations to each other,” relations governed by mutual distrust. To prevent Russian conquest of territory in Austria-Hungary, that shaky coalition needed to be preserved; France should be encouraged in their colonization of Africa, which kept them embroiled in distant lands; the Russian alliance needed constant maintenance, lest the czar align with France against Germany. “The heart of Bismarck’s disagreement with the generals” under these circumstances was his sense that “rather than making Germany more secure…military buildups and preventive war would bring about the very catastrophe they were meant to prevent,” terrifying the Austrians and the Russians instead of building their confidence in German bona fides. But no: “The secret to politics,” Bismarck insisted, is and will remain “a good treaty with Russia.” Such a treaty reinforced dynastic ties (Wilhelm I was Czar Alexander II’s uncle), financial ties (Russian railways were financed by German banks), and military ties (Germany was Russia’ main arms supplier). 

    There was a flaw in this strategy. In expelling Austria from the German Confederation in 1866, ridding Prussia of its only possible rival for dominance therein, Austria had turned its geopolitical sights on the Balkans, putting it “into increased competition with Russia.” To prevent this competition from erupting into war, Bismarck first arranged a secret mutual defense pact with Russia, then a treaty with both Russia and Austria-Hungary whereby each pledged to the others to enter into tripartite consultations if any dispute arose. The League of the Three Emperors eventually became “a three-way pact for preserving peace in the Balkans.” Mitchell observes that this was similar to Metternich’s Holy Alliance of the first decades of the century, except that this time Berlin dominated Vienna. As the putative peacemaker in the Balkans, Germany could negotiate not only with its alliance partners but with the Ottomans and the British, who also had interests there.

    The arrangement began to unravel in Moscow. The czar was unhappy with Bulgaria, which had aligned with the western powers. Not only did Alexander refuse to renew the League in 1887, but he also began to explore the alliance with France that Bismarck had hoped to head off. In his last three years as Chancellor, he increased military spending and moved toward closer relations with Britain and Italy in an effort to contain France. More, he undertook “the final grand diplomatic maneuver” of his tenure in office, the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. This treaty mutually pledged “benevolent neutrality” between the two countries and joint efforts to “localize the conflict,” should either party “find itself at war with a third Great Power” unless the war occurred as a result of a German attack on France or a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary. Bismarck also conceded to Russia “preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria”—a small price to pay for Germany, if not for the Bulgarians. As Bismarck assured British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, Germany could not afford to see Austria-Hungary conquered or chopped up by the Russians, as that would leave Germany exposed to a Franco-Russian assault. Salisbury was convinced and made an exception to Britain’s general preference for ‘splendid isolation’ from Continental affairs when it came to military security commitments. The crisis of 1887 had been averted. “That Europe didn’t go to war in 1887 or 1888 was primarily due to Bismarck’s diplomacy.” 

    “What distinguished Bismarck from the generals is that he was enough of a realist to see that the German Empire would not be able to attain a lasting security by primarily military means.” While he had unhesitatingly backed military action in previous decades, “when it suited the state’s needs,” those needs had changed. A unified Germany had different fish to fry, and a different recipe with which to prepare them for its now more delicate appetite. Mitchell remarks that “military power was a crucial enabler to Bismarck’s diplomatic success,” but military power need not be expended in order to be effective. As an island country, Britain enjoyed the geographical foundation for a pick-and-choose foreign policy. What Britain had geographically, Bismarck aimed at through diplomacy: “What Germany got most through her treaties was the ability to exercise influence over other powers’ actions while maintaining flexibility in her own”—the “closest that a great power” on the European continent could get to a noncommittal foreign policy.” The flaw was the very intelligence of Bismarck, the intricacy of his secret arrangement. He was a suspect man. His Realpolitik turned unrealistic when suspicions of German intentions, and of Germany military power, intensified.

    We cannot know if Bismarck could have kept the game going, or for how long. After his patron Wilhelm I died, “the strutting and insecure Wilhelm II” fired him. Wilhelm, along with the next generation of German generals—even more aggressive than the ones Bismarck had outmaneuvered [1]—frightened the rest of Europe sufficiently to put Europe on the path to the First World War, a war in which “Germany found herself embroiled, for the first time since Frederick the Great, in a war on two fronts.” By 1914, “Bismarck’s system failed not so much because his successors didn’t understand it but because they rejected it, opting instead for a simpler and seemingly more dignified military-intensive security.”

    With this, Mitchell turns to British diplomacy in the years before each of the two world wars the Germans widened in the first instance and triggered in the second. With Germany’s consolidation and defeat of Austria and France, followed by its industrial and technological advances in the final three decades of the nineteenth century, British statesmen understood that they needed allies. But who? At the turn of the century, the Americans were still not friends and France might prefer alliance with Russia to alliance with Albion perfide. “Even if they never congealed into a hostile bloc, the presence of so many powerful states at so many points on the compass created the prospect of a multifront dilemma well beyond the country’s ability to manage.” It wasn’t as if Great Britain wasn’t great. The Empire ruled one-fourth of the world population—more than “those of the next four great powers combined.” It shared nearly a quarter of world trade and out-produced mainland Europe in steel. Its fleet ruled the seas, worldwide, in accordance with its “Two Power Standard”: “maintaining a navy at least as big as those of the next two most powerful states combined.” Its imperial holdings enabled it to support both its navy and its international shipping with a worldwide network of ports and coaling stations. All of this notwithstanding, the Boer War, which required 500,000 British and colonial troops to prosecute, showed that the far-flung British Empire had also stretched itself dangerously thin. To build a still bigger navy was untenable. Britain needed to reduce the number of potential enemies, then “focus its strength on the places that mattered most, which were the British home islands and the Mediterranean. That would require diplomacy.

    Charles Henry Keith Petty-Fitzmorris, fifth Marquess of Lansdowne, succeed Lord Salisbury as foreign secretary. Salisbury had already gathered a capable Foreign Office staff of some fifty persons, each placed in one of six departments that oversaw the several major regions of the world. Those persons were smart and well-informed. “The Foreign Office represented Britain’s accumulated institutional memory a great power: the ‘digestive organ’ by which events could be conceptualized against the basis of Britain’s past experiences, and translated into practical policy.” Lansdowne himself came to office with substantial experience overseas, first as governor-general of Canada, then as viceroy of India. He understood “just how vulnerable the empire had become at its outermost frontiers.” He did not want to relinquish Britain’s independence of action in foreign matters, sometimes called its ‘splendid isolation’ from Europe’s continental broils. To avoid joining an alliance there, he preferred to “ameliorat[e] difficulties with as many rivals as possible.” “In these times,” he observed, “no nation which intends to take its part in the affair of the civilized world can venture to stand entirely alone.”

    British diplomats first negotiated a naval treaty with the United States, so that the British navy could transfer its ships to more dangerous waters than those in the Western Hemisphere. They then approached Japan, forming a mutual defense treaty, enabling the British to concentrate their Asia-based fleet nearer to their biggest colony, India, and to assist its army, “bogged down in a long and grinding war in South Africa” against the Dutch settlers, the Boers. Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain had maintained that Britain should work towards alliances or at least settlements with the United States, Germany, and Japan to contain any Franco-Russian combination. Lansdowne concurred. The resulting overtures resulted in the Hay-Paunceforte Treaty with the U.S. in 1901, recognizing exclusive American control of the Isthmus of Panama, and a naval treaty with Japan, but Germany balked, regarding Britain as an unsure ally in any future continental fight. Lansdowne then turned to France, and in April 1904 the two countries agreed to recognize their English rights in Egypt, French rights in Morocco. They also resolved colonial border disputes in Africa and Southeast Asia. In this, Landsdowne won the applause of the younger Foreign Office administrators, who viewed Germany as a more serious threat to Britain than France. As for Russia, its defeat by Japan in 1905 lowered its geostrategic standing in Asia, while increasing the threat of a Russo-German alliance, which Kaiser Wilhelm II was in fact seeking. Britain continued attempts to reconcile British and Russian interests in Central Asia, and these did work out, at the cost of relinquishing any claim to Tibet, geostrategically important in relation to India.

    Overall, “Lansdowne’s diplomacy facilitated the concentration of naval power” without incurring “ruinous financial outlays.” Britain closed three of its nine overseas naval stations—the ones in America’s sphere of influence—and reduced the size of its Asian fleet, intensifying its assets in Europe in the years before the First World War. In addition to the Tibet concession, Britain also gave up on halting the Panama Canal project, “which its naval planners rightly foresaw would forever alter the balance of power in the Atlantic” by enabling the United States to move ships from coast to coast, even as the Mississippi River had long enabled it to move commercial shipping between north to south to and from the Gulf of Mexico. And in conceding naval dominance in East Asia to Japan, Britain relinquished “the status of top naval power to an Asiatic state without a long-term plan for regaining her position there”—with deadly results in the decades following the Great War. France came to dominate most of northern and equatorial Africa, while Russia benefited from trade routes it now indisputably controlled in Central Asia, leverage that resulted in political and economic advantages for the Soviet Union, whose existence no one beyond the small knot of Bolsheviks foresaw at the time. In the impending war, however, Britain enjoyed alliances with France, the United States, Russia, and Japan—just enough to defeat powerful Germany and the now-hapless Austro-Hungarians and Ottoman Turks. Under the terms of the 1919 peace treaties, “the German and Ottoman empires were disassembled, and big chunks, including choice portions of Africa and the Middle East, were transferred to Britain,” adding to the acquisition of German naval and merchant vessels, a year earlier. This gave Britain “the widest margin of naval superiority in her history.”

    As has long been understood, the Woodrow Wilson-David Lloyd George notion of a new diplomacy, one of open covenants, openly arrived at, with disputes settled in a neo-Kantian League of Nations—all assuming not a balance but what Wilson called a “community of power”—simply didn’t work. “Where the old diplomacy had operated on the rule that ‘conferences only succeed when their results are arranged beforehand,’ the new diplomacy left everything to be settled at the conference, in a compressed timespan,” putting statesman under self-imposed pressure to “have something glitzy to show for their labors,” namely “elaborate communiques that masked disagreements and left the underlying problem,” whatever it might be, “to be resolved at a later date.” Mitchell comments, “Diplomacy, it turned out, was a good deal harder than the politicians had imagined.” 

    Diplomacy of the new sort worked with the like-minded American regime and the not-so-like-minded but allied Japanese regime. The three countries met at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22, agreeing to freeze warship tonnage, halting the construction of navy ships for ten years and to scrap many of the existing ones. This gave Britain confidence that the U.S. would refrain from using its manufacturing power to build “a fleet far outstripping her own,” thereby enabling it to continue to police the British Empire. 

    Unfortunately, Japan was less cooperative in reality than it was ‘on paper,’ moving to achieve dominance in East Asia on the basis of the supposed racial superiority of Japanese to Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and others. Communism in Russia, fascism in Italy, and finally Nazism in Germany were regime enemies of Britain, much closer to home. The British economy, saddled by war debt, left its land army weakened and its people “spiritually sapped,” largely pacifistic. And quite realistically, the British Admiralty told the cabinet that the navy could not fight a two-front war with Japan and “the strongest European naval Power,” which by 1934 was Nazi Germany. By 1937, the Chiefs of Staff implored the cabinet to “reduce the number of potential enemies,” just as the diplomats had done in the years prior to the Great War. With Japanese rulers intending to seize British and American territories in Asia, with the Soviet Union under Stalin an implacable enemy, with the worry that an alliance with France would only serve to provoke Germany, the decidedly more powerful of the two nearest continental great powers, British prospects had dimmed.

    It was in line with all of this that Joseph Chamberlain’s son, Neville, famously pursued another policy of appeasement in 1938, this one based on a much thinner margin of error, a margin narrowed by economic depression and substantially weaker military strength. The political atmosphere had changed, too, with the Germans buoyant under the initial results of Nazism, the British, “most of whom had lost menfolk in the Great War,” eager for ‘peace in our time.’ For its part, the British ruling class, very much including its foreign policy establishment, wanted to give the Germans a break, mindful of “the harsh terms that they regretted imposing on Germany after the previous war.” This is not to say that the Brits imagined Hitler to be genuinely appeasable. They did suppose that they could buy a bit of time. 

    Chamberlain himself saw that Germany, even in its condition of economic recovery from the Great Depression, had recovered on the basis of massive state investments in manufacturing, investments that by definition could not be sustained. Germany would need a short war. If Germany ventured to do so, “Chamberlain reckoned” that “he could trigger an Anglo-French-U.S. coalition whose industrial powers far outstripped those of the Reich.” Surely Hitler understood that. Therefore, the right strategy was to placate Hitler “at a reasonable price to Britain,” then turn to negotiations with Japan, “sequenc[ing] the strategic dangers facing the country while avoiding a military buildup on a scale that would overwhelm Britain’s fragile economy.” 

    Chamberlain met with Hitler twice before the notorious meeting at Munich. In the aftermath of the useless agreement reached there, Hitler continued to seize territory, culminating in his attack on Poland, “where Chamberlain finally drew the line.” The British failure to stop Hitler with words led Stalin, in a way paradoxically, to negotiate his own pact with the Führer, with the same eventual result. While it is true that Chamberlain had made the correct prediction—Hitler could not sustain a long war—that war “came at the cost of eighty million lives and the ultimate demise of the British Empire.” Intending to “quiet Europe in order to concentrate attention on Asia,” he “achieved the opposite, emboldening Germany and thereby reducing the bandwidth that Britain could devote to Japan.” In terms of his negotiation strategy, his failure was to allow Hitler “to set the pace and parameters of negotiations,” and even to accept “Hitler’s aims as the basis for negotiation and abandoning his own positions at the slightest indication of displeasure.” He attempted “to change the mindset of a mercurial ruler,” as if “the problems in international relations are the result of misunderstandings that can be cleared up like disagreements between individuals.” Mitchell acutely observes that such a misguided diplomatic strategy and the equally misguided diplomatic techniques that followed from it typify a mindset easily fostered by “liberal democracy,” namely, that “conflicts arise not because the other side’s interests collide with one’s own but because he is misunderstood, and the corollary, that conflict can be avoided through the patient application of reason and goodwill.” But of course, Hitlerian tyranny, and many others, utterly despised reason and goodwill as defined by liberal democrats/commercial republicans, regarding them as signs of contemptible weakness of will and of character. In the case of Chamberlain, and indeed of the British people generally, the regime ethos had been exacerbated by “three decades of decline not only materially but spiritually.” 

    In its overall geostrategic performance over two centuries, “Britain forms the connective tissue between the classical European states-system and the global power blocs of the 20th century” as “the last mistress of the balance of power and the first operator of worldwide collective security.” As it has happened, the United States has inherited “Britain’s role and the burdens it entailed.” And perhaps Russia, followed now by China, have set themselves in the place of Germany?

     

    Note

    1. See Charles de Gaulle: The Enemy’s House Divided. Robert Eden translation. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: France and Austria at Their Apogees

    February 4, 2026 by Will Morrisey

    A. Wess Mitchell: Great Power Diplomacy: The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Henry Kissinger. Chapters Four and Five. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022.

     

    In 1515, Francis I, the recently crowned king of France, then under the Valois dynasty, was captured by the Austrians at the Battle of Pavia and imprisoned by the Hapsburg emperor, Charles I. The Queen Regent, Louise of Savoy, formally requested the intervention of the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman I, an entreaty that “scandalized Christendom.” Muslims were the enemy. But Mitchell sees in this policy “a blueprint for a continent-wide grand strategy rooted in the use of alliances and state interest that would culminate, a century later, in France’s rise to European preeminence and the creation of the modern states system under one of diplomacy’s greatest practitioners, Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu.”

    Like Byzantium and Venice before it, France was surrounded by enemies. That pioneer of modern statebuilding, Henry VIII, plotted recovery of the territories England had ruled in northwestern France before the Hundred Years’ War. Elsewhere, the sprawling Hapsburg empire ruled substantial territories in Central Europe, Italy, and the Iberian peninsula. Charles V, king of Spain and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, continued to exhibit “an iron determination to expand his inheritance by all means necessary,” and France was on the list. 

    France had one advantage: compactness. French territory was not disjointed, as were the lands of Charles and Henry (who had more than one island in his kingdom). “French geography encouraged centralization,” that is, statism, thanks to its coherent river systems, north and south. No mountain ranges impeded movement of troops within it. But statism was still mostly potential, with monarchic rule “constrained by the particular privileges of towns and provinces, by the persistence of large ducal fiefs and foreign enclaves, and by the absence of a shared language and code of law”; most of the French didn’t speak French, and the Napoleonic Code was some three centuries distant. Still, the French understood the dangers all around them, and warfare is a great centralizer of governments. “The need to build and maintain larger armies spurred kings to assert greater central control over the resources of their realms, which meant reigning in the feudal lords with whom they had long shared power.” Centralization already had a foundation by Francis’s time, as the Estates-General did not wield the power of the purse; the king could collect taxes directly. The Parlement of Paris, which combined the judicial power with those of an upper legislative chamber, “derived its power from the king.” Francis could not rule as an ‘absolute’ monarch, as the Bourbon Louis XIV would do, but political writers had begun to ‘theorize’ monarchs as persons “bound neither by duty to the populace nor by obligations to the nobility, but only to the dictates of divine and natural law.” Those laws obligated them to defend the realm, not to promote “Christian virtue.” In this, “they were following in the footsteps of the Italians.” 

    Charles V proposed exchanging Francis for French territories, transfer of territories in the north to England, and allowing the Duc de Bourbon, “Francis’s French rival,” to establish “a kind of state-in-miniature inside France.” That is, he proposed to subordinate France to himself. Louise refused to pay such an intolerable price for her son’s return, but in 1526 Francis agreed to the swap, which he seemed to guarantee by giving the Hapsburgs his sons as hostages. Once safely back on French soil, however, he reneged. That might well have provoked a disastrous war. But his mother had used the intervening decade-and-a-half to some advantage. France wasn’t the only European country worried by the Holy Roman Empire. 

    “The hinge of Louise’s strategy was England.” She aimed at disengaging it from its alliance with the Hapsburgs, to eliminate the threat of a two-front war. Her argument to Henry was simple: instead of my territory, take my cash. This led to the Treaty of the More—a pun worthy of Shakespeare, their contemporary—which came with a promise from Henry to push for Francis’s release. Nor did Louise neglect the continent; “she sent agents to the German princes siding with Martin Luther in his escalating dispute with the emperor” and she appealed to Venice and Rome to form a coalition to remove the Habsburgs from Italy. And she reached out to the Ottomans. 

    By the time of her son’s return, France had positioned itself to force Charles V to think twice about a punitive war. A scholar and patron of arts and letters, Francis readily justified his refusal to comply with the treaty “on the grounds that under natural law, a ruler could not give away any part of his demesne without obtaining the permission of his people.” He reinforced his mother’s diplomatic overtures by forging a formal alliance with England in the spring of 1527 and continued to court German Protestants, along with the ever-restive Poles. But it was “the breadth and audacity of the Franco-Ottoman alliance” that “shocked Europe,” this “blasphemous union of the lily and the crescent,” as its critics sniped. The renowned Italian writer Pietro Aretino exclaimed, “You have thrust the sword of the Ottoman into the heart of Christendom!” In the war itself, France fared poorly, saved “only by the military incompetence” of its enemies. But, Mitchell observes, the example of French diplomatic success stands as an example of a country confronted with military threats on several fronts “foist[ing] the problem back” onto his main rival, notwithstanding the religious differences between his country and a principal ally. In Francis’s reign “we see the stirrings of a French school of diplomacy geared to the conscious cultivation of a European states system.”

    After Francis had passed from the scene, three Valois kings succeeded him, after which the male line of the dynasty died out. The first Bourbon, Henry IV, married a Valois, uniting the two rival families; he also attempted to unite French Catholics and the Huguenots. His reward was assassination. Henry’s son, Louis XIII, ascended the throne in 1610 as a child. His mother, a Medici, ruling in his stead, rather badly, and was exiled by him in 1617; her closest advisers were killed. The Thirty Years’ War, initially a civil war of religion within the Holy Roman Empire, broke out a year later. In 1624, Louis made the most important decision of his thirty-three-year reign, appointing Richelieu as his principal minister. The Empire was not only divided religiously but it had also been divided into Spanish and Austrian lines, with the Austrian Habsburgs looking east toward Central Europe and the Spanish Hapsburgs concentrating their attention on the New World. Spain was “the greater threat” to France, having invaded France a few years earlier in an attempt to overthrow Louis’s father. Although predominantly Catholic France might have supported the Hapsburgs in their civil war against Protestants, they could not do so, given the geopolitical threat the empire posed. 

    Instead, Richelieu undertook la guerre couverte. Remaining formally at peace with Spain “for the time being,” Richelieu forged a system of alliances against the empire. He prudently “avoided Francis I’s mistake of being sucked into Italian affairs,” focusing instead on Germany and its Protestant states, intending to prevent Habsburg consolidation of power there. “If the Habsburgs could be stopped in Germany, they would remain, from France’s perspective, a largely peripheral empire confined to Spain and Austria.” ‘Germany’ was not united; unification of the some thirty-seven German states would only occur two centuries later. Richelieu encouraged German Protestants to remain “in the fight against the Hapsburgs” while working to pry German Catholic states away from “the Imperial cause.” In the event, he did sign a secret treaty with Bavaria, agreeing to a defensive alliance. At the same time, he made overtures to the Low Countries, Denmark, and Sweden, with whose monarch, Gustavus Adolphus, France entered into alliance in 1631. As the Byzantines and the Venetians knew, money lubricated good relations and were a lot less expensive than the cost of maintaining larger armies.

    As with Byzantium and Austria, such a complex diplomatic strategy required the establishment of a foreign policy bureaucracy to assist in its management. “The very creation of such an entity gave institutional expression to diplomacy as a standing preoccupation of the state, distinct from war, with its own budget, staff, and voice in high policy.” Accordingly, Richelieu systematized French foreign policy, with its ambassadors abroad now “tightly tethered to a professional secretariat back home.” 

    Richelieu’s aim was “a Europe of sovereign states Catholic and Protestant, whose rights would be enshrined in law and held together by an equilibrium underwritten by its largest powers,” among whom France would hold the balance. The smaller states would be protected. The balance of power would “ensure le repos de la chrétienté.” Mitchell knows that “what ultimately gave French diplomacy its compelling energy was the country’s capacity for large-scale military action.” When its envoys spoke, foreigners listened. But the threat of military intervention came with rational justification: Do you really want to descend into religious warfare, again? Do small states not deserve to have their rights, especially their “liberties” or self-government, respected as much as big states do? Does not the law of nations say that all states have such rights? “By appealing to custom and law as the basis for this policy, rather than the power principle, French kings elevated self-interest to a national mission.” Such arguments required that French statesmen practice what they preached. “The minute [France] switched to a policy of active conquest it would be seen not as a protector but as an opportunistic predator.” When Louis XIV took the throne a year after Richelieu’s death in 1642, he initially followed the advice of the Richelieu’s successor, Mazarin; the 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War and kept Europe at peace for a generation. But in the 1660s, Louis abandoned the Richelieu-Mazarin strategy, adopting a policy of “security through conquest,” which ended the peace of Europe. And the great power France had neutralized led the charge against France.

    In 1755, after ninety years of intermittent war, Austria saw that Prussia, ruled by the brilliant and ruthless Frederick the Great, had arisen as a new danger to Europe generally and to Austria in particular, having seized and held Austria’s most valuable territory, Silesia, in two wars, with a third (also won by Prussia) to follow the next year. The Austrian empress, Maria Theresa, did not rule a thoroughly modernized state, as Austria consisted of “a wild assortment of territories, inhabited by more than a dozen ethnicities,” which “complicated its leaders’ ability to create a powerful central government capable of mobilizing resources for war.” And it was surrounded by enemies.

    Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rittburg was Maria Theresa’s most sagacious cabinet minister. In 1749, he wrote a memorandum proposing “nothing less than a comprehensive overhaul of Hapsburg foreign policy” in light of the Prussian menace. Austria needed allies. That required detente with France, hitherto Austria’s “archenemy”—a radical proposal, indeed, since “rivalry with the Bourbons was part of the fixed furniture of Habsburg statecraft,” and one that might easily Austria’s alliances with England and Holland. But those sea powers had proved inadequate for Austrian security. Austria needed the assistance of “nearby land powers—big players, with real military heft, like France and Russia.” 

    Austria also needed a much more coherent foreign policy apparatus. Its Privy Conference had charge of national security, overseeing the Austrian Court Chancellery, headed by the Chancellor, effectively the foreign minister. In the second quarter of the eighteenth century, another institution was established, the Chancellery of State, headed by the State Secretary. This led to confusion, which Kaunitz set out to eliminate by “install[ing] modern administration on the French model”: a foreign minister (himself), a deputy minister, three department heads, all of whom practiced regular reporting from the ambassadors and routinized office functions. Foreign diplomats were no longer allowed to approach the empress’s advisors directly. The Chancellery, not the Privy Conference, became “the real locus of policy.” This enabled the empress and her foreign minister to implement a coherent new policy, which otherwise would have been stymied: to break with the maritime countries and ally with France and other Catholic countries against the Protestants of Prussia.

    When the French and their Indian allies defeated and mortally wounded British General Edward Braddock in the July 1755 Battle of the Monongahela, Kaunitz seized the moment to persuade the Privy Conference to adopt his policy, implemented by offering Louis XV the part of the Austrian Netherlands now called ‘Belgium’ in exchange for French territories in Italy. The French were reluctant, at first, but when Frederick successfully treated with England the following year, they began to see merit in the offer, and in the reconstitution of their alliance structure. Louis pledged military aid to Austria, if the Habsburgs were attacked by a “third party”—obviously, Prussia. Mitchell judges that “it would be hard to find a more lopsidedly advantageous arrangement in diplomatic history.” Kaunitz had no use for the Austrian Netherlands, preferred the southern sphere of influence, Italy (well away from Prussia), and could hope for French military assistance to regain Silesia, if Prussia attacked. Further, France was unthreatened by Prussia and was sending troops needed in North America to a bordering country on continental Europe, instead. Kaunitz then reached out to the Holy Roman Empire, Russia, and the Ottomans in what was called his renversement des alliances. 

    Now, Prussia was the isolated country. Its rival, Austria, had doubled the military strength it could field. Its new ally, England, was a naval power, unable to offer much military help on the continent. Unfortunately for the Austrians, their military officers were less skilled than their diplomatic corps. In the Seven Years’ War, the Habsburg coalition defeated Prussia repeatedly, driving its army back into its own territory, “but each time, cautious Austrian commanders frittered away their victories and allowed Frederick to bounce back.” When Czarina Elisabeth died and “her erratic son, Peter III,” succeeded her, he abandoned Austria and allied with Prussia, “allowing Frederick to focus his full attention on Austria” and to “force Maria Theresa to the negotiating table,” where she was unable to recover Silesia. Kaunitz’s balance-of-power system might have worked, had the other elements of the Austrian regime met the challenge. They didn’t. With the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had buffered Austria from Russia, now in disarray, Austria could either do nothing other than watch Russia and Prussia carve it up or join in the carving. They chose the latter, agreeing to the first partition of Poland in 1772. Kaunitz thus added more than 30,000 square miles of territory and 2.65 million people to the empire—a mixed blessing, since now the acquisitions would need to be governed by the none-too-coherent Austrian state apparatus. He had avoided war, temporarily, at the cost of increased dependence upon Russia, which he had brought back into alliance with Austria; he needed it as a counterweight to Prussia, which had also gained territory and population. “As Europe’s sprawling middle power, Austria could never win in these games.”

    And the games continued. The French Revolution and Napoleon made France a new menace to Austria, this time not only a threat to its territories but to its imperial structure and its regime. Austria lost some of its territory in 1797, but this was only a prelude to Napoleon’s dismantling of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and to the 1807 agreement between the French emperor and Czar Alexander I, which “divided Europe between them.” A last, desperate war Austria launched two years later “ended with her comprehensive defeat” and the loss of 32,000 square miles of territory along with independence. As an act of propitiation, “the Austrian emperor, Francis I, gave his eldest daughter, Marie Louise,” the great-niece of Marie Antoinette, in marriage “to the Corsican ogre.” And while Napoleon finally met his Waterloo, Austria suffered more combat fatalities than any other country, lost one-third of its population and territory, and incurred a huge war debt. 

    Once again, diplomacy, so often the art of the weaker, proved Austria’s strongest feature. Klemens Wenzel Count von Metternich, the Austrian foreign minister, organized and hosted the Congress of Vienna, where the victorious powers met to negotiate the postwar settlement. Metternich aimed at what he described as “a long general peace” after “the pains of a two-and-twenty years’ war.” To do that, he recognized, would require the establishment of “a new state of affairs” in Europe “that conforms to all interests,” putting “the geographic and political relations of the powers on a just and therefore durable basis.” He went on to write that he wanted European statesmen to reject “the system of conquest” and to establish a “system of restitution and equivalents in the forming of kingdoms and states” in accordance with the law of nations. “The modern world,” he wrote inclines nations “to draw near to each other, and in some fashion to enter into a social league.” The ancients had only “prudence” to restrain international relations, but modern states might establish those relations “upon the basis of reciprocity, under the guarantee of respect for acquired rights, and the conscientious observance of plighted faith”—all of which requires steady diplomacy. Metternich did not imagine that the balance of power could be erased. It rather should be supplemented by “adherence to treaty rights”—those “acquired rights” he had cited—and an institutional structure that would enable the great powers to consult with one another and coordinate their actions. This went “well beyond Kaunitz’ conception of diplomacy,” as Metternich proposed “a political order in which peace would be preserved not on a reactive basis, through the cobbling-together of coalitions once a war had already broken out, but proactively, on the basis of binding obligations supervised by the great powers,” “an essentially federative arrangement rooted in collective security.” The Holy Roman Empire could provide Europeans with an example of such a structure, a precedent which collapsed not because it was too big but because it wasn’t big enough, did not encompass the whole of Europe. This, and Austria’s own vulnerability, “lent moral credibility to Austrian diplomacy”; the moral thing to do, the peacemaking thing to do, was the only thing contemporary Austria could do. Unlike the other great powers, its particular ‘is’ coincided with the universal ‘ought.’

    Structurally, Metternich planned what his aide Friedrich von Gentz called a “central dike” consisting of a strengthened Habsburg monarchy, drawing revenues from territories it had lost to Germany, surrounded by smaller states tied to Austria politically, militarily, and economically. Austria would head a German Confederation, its states following the policy of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all.’ He also hoped that eventually the states within the Confederation would agree to common commercial policies and a transportation network. He also advocated a Quadruple Alliance consisting of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Britain to contain France and the Holy Alliance consisting of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to uphold monarchic regimes against republics and republicanism, associated in Europe with secularism. A son of the Enlightenment himself, Metternich privately despised the Holy Alliance’s religious inflexion while regarding it as necessary to keep Orthodox Russia involved—which he wanted to do, because he envisioned of regular consultations among Alliance members as a means of restraining the Czar’s ambitions in Eastern and Central Europe. 

    Generally, such consultation was the animating practice of all these constructs. He did not want any of them to have a professional executive body. That, “he believed, would have fueled the growth of a permanent bureaucracy with its own separate agenda.” Regular conferences or “congresses” charged with addressing specific interstate problems or questions were much preferable. 

    In 1818, France joined the Quadruple Alliance. The new Quintuple Alliance proved fragile, as Britain “was drawn more and more to its traditional foreign policy of avoiding peacetime alliances on the European continent,” especially after George Canning replaced Metternich’s friend, foreign secretary Viscount Castlereagh in 1822, and as France also distanced itself after the appointment of Chateaubriand, who “saw France’s participation in the Vienna system as a national humiliation.” On Austria’s eastern and southern fronts, Russia coveted Ottoman territories in the Balkans “under the guise of protecting Orthodox Christians” and Ottoman power declined, especially under the pressure of the Greek independence movement. 

    Metternich kept the alliance with Russia alive, nonetheless, and it was fortunate for Austria that he did. In the revolutionary period of 1848-49, the Habsburg family was threatened, Metternich fled the country, but Russia came to Austria’s aid and Prussia assisted in quelling the rebel forces within the German Confederation. “Metternich’s diplomacy helped ensure not only that Austria’s geopolitical rivalries were pacified but that the rivals themselves were active participants in her salvation.” 

    War among the great powers did break out in the mid-1850s, when the ever-weakening Ottomans refused the Czar’s demand to make Russia the protectors of Orthodox Christian in the sultan’s empire. In retaliation, the Czar’s army occupied the Danubian Principalities—Moldavia and Wallachia—controlled by the Ottomans. In order to preserve what was now called the Concert of Europe, Britain and France sided with the Ottomans and defeated the Russian forces in 1856. Thanks to the Austrian system, however, the war did not become generalized, as it would in 1914. That was after “the impetuous young emperor Franz Joseph had discarded Metternich’s conservative methods in favor of a new grand strategy centered on offensive military power,” which left Austria “ranged against multiple rivals without a single ally.” The results “were catastrophic” both for Austria and for Europe.

    Austria’s decline facilitated its expulsion from the German Confederation, a move precipitated by Prussia under the direction of its master geopolitician, Otto von Bismarck.

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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