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    Philip Gilbert Hamerton: Man of Letters, Man of Art

    March 15, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Philip Gilbert Hamerton: An Autobiography 1834-1858. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1896.

    Eugénie Gindriez Hamerton: A Memoir by His Wife 1858-1894. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1896.

    John Gross: The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters: A Study of the Idiosyncratic and the Humane in Modern Literature. London: The Macmillan Company, 1969.

     

    Artist and art critic, moralist, political essayist, a Lancashire man who spent much of his life in Scotland and France (where he met his devoted wife), Philip Gilbert Hamerton wrote one indispensable book, The Intellectual Life, and several other good ones. His life spanned the years 1834-1894, nearly coinciding with the reign of Queen Victoria. He thus flourished in the heyday of the English man of letters, the topic of Mr. Gross’s book, which gives a good sense of the ethos of this dimension of the English regime of that time.

    Gross describes how the literary review emerged as “a really powerful institution” in that century, spurred by the regime’s ever-increasing democratization, a trend marked by the great English Reform Acts which arrived at about one per generation. Democratization of course saw “the growing importance of public opinion,” which review editors and the authors they published sought to shape, rather in the manner Tocqueville hoped French aristocrats would do in his own country. Opinion about how public opinion should be shaped predictably varied, from Francis Jeffrey, editor of the Edinburgh Review, where “the chief use he made of his prestige was to uphold the conventional, the anemic, the decorously second-rate” in “his role of spokesman for the approved view of things, the polite consensus,” to Thomas Carlyle, whose long career saw him swing from calling literature “a branch of religion” to a celebration of the hero as man of action and condemnation of Jews as money-changing anti-heroes (he seems to have coined the term “anti-semitic,” and did not use it as a pejorative). In between these extremes, readers of the English reviews saw what one might as well call, with Gross, English liberalism, exemplified by several types: a philosopher, John Stuart Mill, who urgently tried “to reconcile the artist and the philosopher, to heal the breach between thought and feeling” in an attempt to settle what Socrates called the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy; by the “breadth, sanity and thoroughness,” and the “kindliness” of the poet and critic Matthew Arnold, who celebrated high culture while cheerfully admitting that “Doors that open, windows that shut, locks that turn, razors that shave, coats that wear, watches that go. and a thousand more such good things, are the invention of the Philistines,” not the Oxonians; and even that rare thing, a literate political scientist, Walter Bagehot, a Burkean (“famous for talking about stupidity as though it were virtually synonymous with instinctive wisdom”), whose The English Constitution remains a model of its genre. On Bagehot, Gross remarks, “At the most fundamental level, subsequent events have vindicated him: one of the more attractive features of English life remains, as Orwell put it, our habit of not killing one another.” Liberalism, indeed, fostered by a guiding aristocracy of sorts.

    “By subsequent standards the Victorian intellectual aristocracy seems remarkably small and tightly-knit: everyone knew everyone else, and was somebody else’s brother-in-law.” Fissures in the edifice, leading to its decline, can be seen in the writings of John Morley, editor of the Fortnightly Review, a democratic Hegelian who “contrived to give his readers the sense that they were riding a great central wave of Progress, intellectual, scientific and political all in one” (his American contemporaries began to call themselves Progressives). In a word, Morley although Morley “spelt God with a small ‘g'” while the sometime Prime Minister William Gladstone spelled it “with a big ‘G,'” there was little difference between them. Morley promoted writers “chiefly in so far as they can be said to urge forward ‘the central current of thought’ in their society,” what Hegel called the Zeitgeist. “For all things tend toward a final liberation of the spirit,” a liberation to be advanced gradually with “social energy” to change the world tempered by “social patience,” the willingness “to seize the chance of a small improvement, while working incessantly in the direction of great ones”—a lesson American Progressives have more or less taken to heart in the century and a half since Morley taught it. Gladstone road the same tide in politics, albeit with a more decided show of piety.

    Eventually, such democratized Hegelianism would collide with the First World War, scattering the prevailing liberalism of the English literary men, mercury-like, into a hundred globules. Even before that, a George Saintsbury seems to have wanted to pull back a bit from such soaring optimism, preferring connoisseurship to grand historical narrative, and the ebullient Catholic, G. K. Chesterton, would have none of such stuff at all. Nonetheless, the capacious, humane, morally and politically moderate atmosphere of Victorian literary life proved a comfortable point of departure for Hamerton, who nonetheless, proving more restless than his contemporaries, ranged into art (as did the more famous John Ruskin and Walter Pater), continental European culture, and even philosophy—if not so much as a system-builder in the manner of Mill than as a defender of philosophy as a way of life—the best of his generation on that topic. Hamerton also maintained a distinct independence from his generation of literati, staying clear of London and the universities. He lived a life off to one side, giving himself the chance to breathe different air.

    “My principal reasons for writing an autobiography are because I am the only person in the world who knows enough about my history to give a truthful account of it, and because I dread the possibility of falling into the hands of some writer who might attempt a biography with inadequate materials,” a writer tempted to fill the lacunae “with conjectural expressions which he only intends as an amplification, yet which may contain germs of error to be in their turn amplified by some other writer, and made more extensively erroneous.” A few articles by well-intentioned biographers had convinced him of this. As for the autobiographer’s hazard—presenting “an untrue representation of its subject as no man can judge himself correctly,” any autobiographer “must be unconsciously revealing himself all along, merely by his way of telling things.” He promises to maintain “a certain reserve” with respect to others: “My rule shall be to say nothing that can hurt the living, and the memory of the dead shall be dealt with as tenderly as may be compatible with a truthful account of the influences that have impelled me in one direction or another.” After all, “I have all the more kindly feelings towards the dead, that when these pages appear I shall be one of themselves, and therefore unable to defend my own memory as they are unable to defend theirs.” The prospect doesn’t unsettle him. “The notion of being a dead man is not entirely displeasing to me,” inasmuch as no one will be able to inflict “any sensible injury” upon him, and, regarding his reputation, by issuing his memoir d’outre tombe, “with six feet of earth above me to deaden the noises of the upper world, I feel quite a new kind of security.” He guards himself with a comprehensive agnosticism, writing that “it is reasonable to suppose that whatever fate may be in store for us, a greater or less degree of posthumous reputation in two or three nations on this planet can have little effect on our future satisfaction; for if we go to heaven ,the beatitude of the life there will be so incomparable superior to the pleasures of earthly fame that we shall never think of such vanity again; and if we go to the place of eternal tortures they will leave us no time to console ourselves with pleasant memories of any kind; and if death is simply the ending of all sensation, all thought, memory, and consciousness, it will matter nothing to a handful of dust what estimate of the name it once bore may happen to be current amongst the living.”

    Hamerton’s father was an attorney who courted the better-born Miss Anne Cocker, somewhat to the consternation of the young lady’s mother, who had duly noted the aspirant’s “rather dissolute habits.” John Hamerton was “a good horseman, an excellent shot, looked very well in a ball-room,” but “these, I believe, were all his advantages, save an unhappy faculty for shining in such masculine company as he could find in a Lancashire village in the days of George IV.” He was, one might say, a man of the gentry class with the habits of the English aristocracy. As things turned out, Mother had a point, but she bent to the determination of her daughter (“a young lady with a will of her own,” albeit one with “a very sweet and amiable disposition”) and to prudence of the young attorney, who assured her that “at my request your daughter will have all her property settled upon herself, so that I can have no control over it—thus leaving it impossible that I should waste it.” He added a promise to reform himself, which he evidently did, so long as his wife lived. In accordance with his own promise to speak as well as possible of the dead, Hamerton remarks, “It is difficult for us to understand quite accurately the social code of the Georgian era, when a man might indulge in pleasures which seem to us coarse and degrading, and yet retain all the pride and all the bearing of a gentleman.” The rise of ‘the democracy’ coincided with the revival of Christian morality, in his lifetime.

    But his mother died at the age of 24, two weeks after bearing her son, having been weak and perhaps consumptive during her pregnancy. “No portrait of my mother was ever taken, so that I have never been able to picture her to myself otherwise than vaguely,” although as a child he was told he resembled her. “There are no letters of hers except one or two formal compositions written at school under the eye of the mistress, which of course express nothing of her own mind or feelings,” so he is left with the memories of those who described her as “a very lively and amiable, person, physically active, and a good horsewoman.” “The knowledge that my mother had died early cast a certain melancholy over my childhood,” feeling “vaguely that there had been a great loss, though unable to estimate the extent of it.” 

    “The effect of the loss upon my father was utterly disastrous,” ruining his hopes and causing him to lose interest in lawyering and finally to drink himself to an early death. A reader of law books and newspapers (“this absence of interest in literature was accompanied by that complete and absolute indifference to the fine arts which was so common in the middle classes and the country aristocracy of those days”), his loss of any desire to make money (“almost the only recognized object in the place where he lived”), and with his “youth too far behind him for any joyous physical activity,” he “was condemned to seek such amusements as the customs of the place afforded, and these all led to drinking.” “Had they drunk light wines like French peasants, or beer like the Germans, they might have lasted longer, but their favorite drink was brandy in hot strong grogs, accompanied by unlimited tobacco.” Sufficiently well off not to need steady work, “he fell into a kind of life that placed intellectual and moral recovery alike beyond his reach.” He did offer his son a bit of hardheaded advice, to wit, “I should never be a lawyer, on the ground that a man had enough to plague him in his own concerns without troubling his mind about those of other people.”

    It was well that he shipped his son off to live in the town of Burnley with his two unmarried sisters, who lived with their mother at any estate called Towneley Park. Burley was one of Lancashire’s “very aristocratic neighborhoods” at a time when “nobody thought of disputing the supremacy of the old houses.” “There was something almost sublime in the misty antiquity of the Towneley family, one of the oldest in all England, and still one of the wealthiest, keeping house in its venerable castellated mansion in a great park with magnificent avenues.” His doting aunts “remained all their lives aristocratic in their feelings, and rather liked to enjoy the hospitality of the great houses in the neighborhood,” even as his uncles, along with his father, “abandoned all aristocratic memories and aspirations, and entered frankly into the middle class.” Hamerton prefers his aunts’ choice, thinking that they “showed better taste in liking refined society than my father did in lowering himself to associate with men of an inferior stamp in rank, in manners, and in habits.” “I distinctly remember how one of my aunts told me that somebody had made a remark on her liking for great people, and the only comment she made was, that she preferred gentlefolks because their manners were more agreeable. She was not a worshipper of rank, but she liked the quiet, pleasant manners of the aristocracy, which indeed were simply her own manners.”

    At the local Grammar School, Hamerton took to reading English but ran against a wall when “set to Latin,” which was taught, incomprehensibly, by giving the child a Latin grammar written in Latin. Under the circumstances, “my progress in Latin was very slow, and the only result of my early training was to give me a horror of everything printed in Latin, that I did not overcome for many years.” His native language remained his preference for the rest of his life. He could read in it, he explains, whereas he could only conjugate in Latin and Greek.

    As to his father, he seldom could conjugate with him, either. An exception was a trip to Wales, in the company of his favorite Aunt, Mary, in the summer of 1842. Aunt Mary, who had become a mother to him, required him to keep a journal; reading it in the 1850s, he’s struck by the way he expressed himself. “Being accustomed to live with grown-up people, and having no companions of my own age in the same house, I had acquired a way of talking about things as older people talk, so that the journal in question contains many observations that do not seem natural for a child,” likely repetitions of comments made by the adults who accompanied him. But he was also “very observant on my own account,” leaving the first recorded impressions of his love of “old castles and cathedrals” and of landscapes. “I had a topographic habit of mind even in childhood, which made every fresh locality interesting to me and engraved it on my memory.” He also took the future artist and arts connoisseur’s interest in the “beautiful materials” things were made of—the wool on the furniture in the great houses, the ebony chairs in the Penrhyn Castle dining room and “the old oak in the dining-room at Trelacre.” “The interest in materials is a special instinct, a kind of sympathy with Nature showing itself by appreciation of the different qualities of her products,” an “instinct [that] has always been very strong in me,” which “I have often noticed in others, especially in artists” and craftsmen. As for his father, “whilst we were in Wales together he conducted himself as a man ought to do who is travelling with a lady and a child.” This year, 1842, was “absolutely the last year of my life in which I could live in happy ignorance of evil and retain all the buoyancy of early boyhood.” The next year, “quite the most important of my early boyhood, have had a most powerful and in some respect a disastrous influence over my whole life.” 

    “Notwithstanding my father’s kindness to me during our Welsh tour, my feelings towards him were not, and could not be, those of trust and confidence.” His father was a mean drunk; “when inflamed with brandy he became positively dangerous, and I had a well-founded dread of his presence.” The boy needed the protection of his aunts when he went to visit the man at his home, Ivy Cottage, in Shaw, but in June 1843 that protection was abruptly withdrawn. “Declaring, in terms which admitted of no discussion, that although a child might live with ladies it was not good for a boy,” and so “he had determined to have me for the future under his own roof.” [1] This “separation from [Aunt Mary] in childhood was the most bitter grief that could be experienced by me.” This notwithstanding, given over to his father’s “Spartan severity,” a discipline sharply contrasting to the man’s own perfect indiscipline, Hamerton sees that this “was not ill-calculated for the formation of a manly character,” which might not have developed under the kind tutelage of his beloved aunts. And his father imparted one habit of his old legal training, understanding “the importance of applying the mind completely to the thing which occupied it for the moment.” “If he saw me taking several books together that had no connection with each other, he would say, ‘Take one of those books and read it steadily, don’t potter and play with half-a-dozen.'” “A Philistine in neglecting his own culture, he had not the real philistine’s contempt for culture in others and desired to have me well taught.” He also “accustom[ed] me to money matters” by “plac[ing] gold and silver in my keeping” and demanding an account of his use of it. “In this way money was not to be an imaginary thing for me, but a real thing, and I was not to lose the control of myself because I had my pocket full or sovereigns.” Although Hamerton takes this to have been “a very original scheme in its application to so young a child,” it is actually quite like the method commended by Locke in his book on the education of “the young Gentleman,” published a century and a half earlier. 

    But nothing could really compensate for the alcoholism. “My existence at Ivy Cottage was one of extreme dullness varied by dread.” He recalls a night when the full moon illuminated the garden’s trellis work. “My father’s cruelty had then reached its highest point,” in the aftermath of yet another beating. “The situation had become absolutely intolerable, the servants were my only protectors and though devoted they never dared to interfere when their master was actually beating me.” He had those sovereigns in his pocket; he could have mounted a horse and made his escape. But he had nowhere to go and would have been disinherited at the age of ten. He seems not to have thought of returning to his aunts, perhaps because they would have little choice but to return him to his father, who retained the legal knowledge that would have been necessary to make that happen. 

    What law and custom could not do, nature did. After his father succumbed to a fit of paranoid delusion, his Aunt Mary arrived. “I did not even know she had been sent for; but the sweet reality entered into my heart like sunshine, and throwing my arms about her neck I burst into a passion of tears…. It had only been six months in all, but it had seemed longer than any half-dozen years gone through before or after.” His father died of “apoplexy” a short time later, at the age of 39.

    Aunt Mary was named his guardian. She had her own plans for him—far kinder but not a fit for his character. She wanted him to become a clergyman, sending him to Doncaster School as the first step towards entering Oxford. This was not to be, but his initial feeling was that “it seemed rather hard” to be separated from her at a boarding school. “But she thought the separation necessary, as there was nothing in the world she dreaded more than that her great affection might spoil me”—a worry that probably had afflicted his father, too—evincing her “remarkable firmness of character,” enabling her to “act, on due occasion, in direct opposition both to her own feelings and to mine, if she believed that duty required it.” 

    An usher at the school delivered himself of the opinion that “the establishment of religious toleration in England had been a deplorable mistake, and that Dissent ought not to be permitted by the Sovereign.” Although “my principal feeling about the matter was the prejudice inherited by young English gentlemen of old Tory families, that Dissent was something indescribably low, and quite beneath the attention of a gentleman,” the policy of “compel[ling] Dissenters by force to attend the services of the Church of England did seem to me rather hard.” Some years later, this sensibility would take him in a firmer direction, away from the Church of England and indeed from Christianity altogether. But for the time, he was “extremely religious, having a firm belief in providential interferences on my behalf, even in trifling matters.” His required summaries of Sunday sermons were supplemented by some of his own thoughts, to the point that he once “produced a complete original sermon, which cost me a reprimand, but evidently excited the interest of the master.”

    He found the beautiful church at Doncaster “a powerful stimulus to an inborn passion for architecture.” He considered the school’s ruling amusement, the game of cricket, a bore (“I hated the game from the very beginning, and it was pure slavery to me”), and the poems of Sir Walter Scott compensatorily exciting. “Nothing in the retrospect of life strikes me as more astonishing than the rapid mental growth that must have taken place between the date of my father’s death and its second or third anniversary. When my father died I was simply a child, though rather a precocious one, as the journal in Wales testifies; but between two and three years after that event the child had become a boy, with a keen taste for literature, which, if it had been taken advantage of by his teachers, ought to have made his education a more complete success than it every became.” The problem was that the Greek and Latin classics were taught philologically, “dissected by teachers who were simply lecturers on the science of language, and who had not large views even about that.” Literature was lost in its wrong-headed study. For relief from his consequent headaches, he came into the habit of taking long walks. 

    Doncaster was a prep school for Cambridge. After the death of the headmaster, Hamerton transferred to Burley, a prep school for Oxford, likely to the satisfaction of Aunt Mary, but he interrupted his studies to care for her during the last months of incurable heart disease.  This hiatus put the last nail in the coffin of his attempts to learn the classical languages, a deficiency which “at the same time left my mind more at liberty to grow in its own way.” He was happily encouraged to write poetry by one of his teachers, “a practice that I followed almost without intermission between the ages of twelve and twenty-one.” “The best that can be expected from the poetry of a boy is that he should give evidence of a liking for the great masters, and in my case the liking was sincere.” 

    Thanks to his reading of Scott, “in those days I lived, mentally, a great deal in the Middle Ages,” a habit “also due in some measure to a romantic interest in the history of my own family, and of the other families in the north of England with which mine had been connected in the Past.” He learned about heraldry, drawing and coloring “all the coats of arms that had borne by the Hamertons in their numerous alliances” and dreamed of taking up falconry (he bought all the accoutrements, but his family never got round to giving him a falcon). “For the Greeks and Romans I cared very little; they seemed too remote from my own country and race, and the English present, in which my lot was cast, seemed too dull and unpicturesque, too prosaic and commonplace.” He indulged his tastes in the school library, “which is rich in old tomes that few people ever read,” and in the library of his uncle’s brother-in-law. Edward Alexander had taken a near-paternal interest in the boy and guided him to a highly useful lifelong habit. “He rigorously exacted order in his library; I might use any of his books, but must put them all back in their places. Perhaps my present strong love of order may be due in a great measure to Mr. Alexander’s teaching and example. Among the friends of my youth there are very few whom I look back to with such grateful affection.”

    “The reader will see that up to this point my tastes had been conservative and aristocratic. Then there came a revolution which was the most important intellectual crisis in my life.” At Burley, he listened to the sermons of James Bardsley, “a man of very strong convictions of an extreme Evangelical kind,” a “really eloquent” man who “possessed in a singular degree the wonderful power of enchaining the attention of his audience.” “His longest sermons were not felt to be an infliction; one might feel tired after they were over, but not during their delivery”—praise, indeed. The Reverend Bardsley’s “power was best displayed in attack, and he was very aggressive, especially against the doctrines of the Church of Rome, which he declared to be ‘one big Lie.'” For her part, Aunt Mary, “with her usual good sense, did not approve of this controversial spirit” when her ward brought it home on break; “she was content to be a good Christian in her own way and let the poor Roman Catholics alone.” In order better to combat Catholic doctrine and to prevent the prospect “that the power of the Pope might one day be re-established in our country,” Hamerton began to inquire into the controversy. He learned, in time, a disappointing lesson: “The spirit of inquiry is not considered an evil spirit so long as it only leads to agreement with established doctrines,” a limitation that tends to blunt the spirit of inquiry. Exposed to the teachings of “German neology”—the claim that Scripture is not inspired by God—he began to think that “Protestantism is an uncritical belief in the decisions of the Church down to a date which I do not pretend to fix exactly, and an equally uncritical skepticism, a skepticism of the most unreceptive kind, with regard to all opinions professed and all events said to have taken place in the more recent centuries of ecclesiastical history,” and that “the Church of Rome, on the other hand, seemed nearer in temper to the temper of the past, and was more decidedly a continuation, though evidently at the same time an amplification, of the early Christian habits of thinking and believing.” (To say nothing of the Roman Church’s superior cathedral architecture.) “If devotional feelings had been stronger” in him “than the desire for mental independence, I should have joined the Church of Rome.” “My decision, therefore, for some time was to remain in a provisional condition of prolonged inquiry”—a prayerful condition, he carefully adds. At the time, the English Protestant “believe[d] his religion as firmly as he believe[d] in the existence of the British Islands,” a “matter-of-fact temper” that “in more recent times” has been largely replaced by “a more hazy religion.” The young Hamerton was in this instance ahead of his time. “The reader is to imagine me as a youth who no longer believed in the special inspiration of the Scriptures, or in their infallibility, but who was still a Christian as thousands of ‘liberal’ Church people in the present day are Christians.”

    Adding to his determination to remain independent in his judgments was his acquaintance with an atheist, a man whose good character “enabled me to estimate the vulgar attacks on infidels at their true worth.” Although “my own theistic beliefs were very strong, I knew from this example that an atheist was not necessarily a monster.” Mr. Utley based his atheism on what he considered the probabilistic argument that “the self-existence of the universe” was easier to believe than the notion that “a single Being,” equally “without a beginning,” “could create millions of solar systems.” As for himself, Hamerton found it “much easier to refer everything to an intelligent Creator than to believe in the self-existence of all the intricate organizations that we see.” At the same time, it also “seemed to me quite natural that thoughtful men should hold different opinions on a subject of such infinite difficulty.” To this lesson in religious toleration, he eventually added the thought that both Protestant and Catholic clergy have “take[n] up and consecrate[d] popular beliefs that may be of use, and that they drop and discard, either tacitly or openly, those beliefs which are no longer popular.” As remarked above, Hamerton’s life coincided with England’s social and political democratization, so the thought may have been suggested by the ongoing regime change itself.

    The year 1851 saw the opening of the Great Exhibition in London, that celebration of modern science and its technology that the City exemplified, along with the spirit of commerce. “My first impression of London was exactly what it has ever since remained”: “the most disagreeable place I had ever seen.” “I wondered how anybody could live there who was not absolutely compelled to do so.” Indeed, despite his patriotic feelings, “the real exile for me would be to live in a large town.” Admittedly, there is one, and only one, “reason for living in London, which is the satisfaction of meeting with intelligent people who know something about what interests you and do not consider you eccentric because you take an interest something that is not precisely and exclusively money-making,” but the noise, hurry, and dirt of a big city tend to overwhelm that attraction. During this tour, he did see some pictures by the Pre-Raphaelite artist John Everett Millais, then on exhibit at the Royal Academy. “I distinctly remember the exact sensation with which my young eyes saw these works; so distinctly that I now positively feel those early sensations over again in thinking about them. All was so fresh, so new!” Against his resolution never to return to London weighed that excitement, and of course he would return once his interest in painting intensified.

    By now, entrance to Oxford University and the fulfillment of Aunt Mary’s ambition for him as a clergyman loomed. “That was her plan; and a very good scheme of life it was, but it had one defect, that of being entirely inapplicable to the human being for whom it was intended.” He was, as it were, saved by Oxford’s requirement that entering freshmen sign the Church of England’s Thirty-nine Articles of faith,” an act Hamerton “could not do conscientiously, and would not do against the grain of my conviction.” Against Oxford there was also “a difficulty in my own nature, which is a rooted dislike to everything which is done for social advancement.” Nor did he relish the thought of further study of the classics, and his tutorship under a clergyman from Yorkshire reinforced his aversion, the man having “the usual characteristic of the classical scholars of his generation, a compete ignorance and misunderstanding of the fine arts.” “The extreme narrowness of his literary tastes led me to place a higher value on my own increasing knowledge of modern literature, and conclusively proved to me, once for all, that a classical education does not necessarily give a just or accurate judgment,” lacking “the virtue of opening the mind which is ascribed to it.” Nor did his tutor’s “injustice towards Dissenters and unbelievers” do more than arouse “in me a profound sympathy for these aligned and despised people.” “In a word, my tutor made me dislike the very things that it was his business to make me like.” By the end of the year, Hamerton’s guardian also saw “that it was useless to prepare me any further for Oxford.” In that time in England, among persons “of our class in society,” “education and the clergy were looked upon as inseparable, even by myself.” Soon, he returned to education “with fresh energy on my own account, and I am still working at it, in various directions, at the mature age of fifty-two.”

    The religious way of life foreclosed, what way of life would he choose? Not the law: by precept and by example, his father had warned him off that. Despite the mill on the family property, “the cotton trade required a larger disposable capital than I possessed, to start with any chance of success.” Worldly success in general seemed unlikely, inasmuch as “it seemed to me that the liberty of thought which I valued above everything was incompatible, in England, with any desire to rise in the world, as unbelievers lay under a ban, and had no chance of social advancement without renouncing their opinions.” (In social gatherings, “I had one merit, that of being an excellent listener, and that has been a great advantage to me through life.”) He might, as so many men of his class in fact did, “have made use of the Church as an instrument, have given himself the advantages of Oxford, married for money, offered his services to the Conservative party, and gone into Parliament.” But how dishonest, and how tedious. Fortunately, he “had independent means,” along with membership in “one of the oldest and best-descended families in the English untitled aristocracy.” This being so, a life devoted to the two things he really liked, literature and painting, required no more armature than that. “I decided to try to be a painter and to try to be an author and see what came of both attempts.” Looking back on his choice, he concedes that “I have been sometimes represented as an unsuccessful painter who took to writing because he had failed as an artist,” but so what? “The exact truth is that a very moderate success in either literature or art would have been equally acceptable to me, so that there has been no other failure in my life than the usual one of not being able to catch to hares at the same time.”

    His misjudgment came not so much in his underlying choice but in overestimating his ability to paint. “Constantly attempting what was far too difficult for me in art,” unable “to find any one ready and willing to put me on the right path,” he turned to John Ruskin’s Modern Painters for guidance and corresponded with him for a time. Ruskin proved an excellent literary influence, “as anything Mr. Ruskin has to say is sure to be well expressed,” and Ruskin did direct his readers’ “attention to certain qualities and beauty in nature.” “But in art this influence was not merely evil, it was disastrous,” as Ruskin “encourag[ed] the idea that art could be learned from nature,” an “immense mistake” since “nature does not teach art, or anything resembling it; she only provides materials.” His future wife concurred in this judgment, writing that “the main reason for his failing to express himself in art, is that he was too much attracted by the sublime in Nature, and that the power to convey the impression of sublimity has only been granted to the greatest among artists.” 

    Attraction to the sublime in nature led him to the Scottish Highlands and Loch Lomond. Approaching the mountains by steamer “was a revelation of Highland scenery.” “A rugged hill with its bosses and crags was one minute in brilliant light, to be in shade the next, as the massive clouds flew over it, and the colors varied from pale blue to dark purpose and brown and green, with that wonderful freshness of tint and vigor of opposition that belong to the wilder landscapes of the north. From that day my affections were conquered; as the steamer approached nearer and nearer to the colossal gates of the mountains, and the deep water of the lake narrowed tin the contracting glen, I felt in my heart a sort of exultation like the delight of a young horse in the first sense of freedom in the boundless pasture.” He made sketches and kept a journal, which he now pores over with wonder at “how a youth with so little manifest talent as may be found in these sketches and journal could indulge in any artistic or literary ambition.” And “besides this, I was living, intellectually, in great solitude.” A well-meaning uncle prevailed upon his guardian to buy him a set of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Aunt Mary prevailed upon him to join the local militia, likely in the hope of curtailing his dreamy self-indulgence. As of age nineteen, “I had not found my path, and was always dissatisfied with my studies”—not surprising, as “young men both overestimate and underestimate their own gifts”; “they do not know themselves, as indeed how should they?” 

    At the end of 1853 he ventured to London to study landscape painting. But of course, he selected for a tutor a man who shared his devotion to nature studies, one who moreover “had no education, either literary or artistic, and very little imaginative power.” Knowing “little of those necessities and conditions that make art a different thing from nature,” he led Hamerton “to nature instead of leading me to art and this was a great misfortune for me, as my instincts were only too much in the same direction already.” “Mr. Pettit taught me to draw in a hard, clear, scientific manner…. The ideas of artistic synthesis, of seeing a subject as a whole, of subordination of parts, of concentration of vision, of obtaining results by opposition in form light and shade, and color, all those ideas were foreign to my master’s simple philosophy of art.” Several years later, his young French wife, accustomed to viewing the masterpieces in the Louvre, looked at the Pre-Raphaelites her husband admired; “I did not understand it as art,” and “it was for my eyes what unripe fruit is for the teeth.” “The most famous specimens” of the Pre-Raphaelite style “only awoke an apprehension as to what I might think of his own pictures when they were shown to me.” Indeed, a wife well chosen.

    The benefit of attending to nature inhered in his writing, not his painting. After meeting R. W. Mackey, author of The Progress of the Intellect, a fairly typical product of nineteenth-century English liberal faith in the advancement of science at the expense of religion, Hamerton concluded that there was no sense in “going painfully over the whole theological ground and explaining every belief and phase of belief historically and rationally,” rather in the manner of Hegel, but that “the true liberation must come from the enlargement of the mind by wider and more accurate views of the natural universe,” whereby “medieval beliefs must drop away of themselves.” That is, Mr. Mackey was a victim of his own “excessive culture,” having “withdrawn [himself] to much from commonplace reality” and instead seeming “to be moving in a dream.” “All the culture in the world, all the learning, all the literary skill and taste put together, are not so well worth having as the keen and clear sense of present reality that common folks have by nature.” In his own books, most notably The Intellectual Life, a topic that lends itself to Mackeyism, he resists by staying close to practical matters. This inclines him to a certain tough-mindedness. Upon being told by the painter C. R. Leslie that geniality “is of great value to a poet,” that Byron might have been another Shakespeare had he “possessed the geniality of Goldsmith,” Hamerton judges that “Leslie probably underestimated the literary value of ill-nature,” as “much of Byron’s intensity and force is due to the energy of malevolence.” He agrees with the classical scholar Watkins Lloyd, who replied to his thought that “undeserved diseases seemed to me clear evidence of imperfection in the universe,” that “we receive many benefits from the existing order of things that we have not merited in any way, so we may accept those evils that we have not merited either.” “This struck me as a better reason for resignation than the common assertion that we are wicked enough to deserve the most frightful inflictions. We do not really believe that our wickedness deserves cancer or leprosy.”

    Polite society punished him for such heterodox thoughts by imposing a degree of social ostracism, among neighbors and even family. Invitations to dine decreased in number, and he worried that this might “indirectly be injurious to my guardian,” Aunt Mary, “and her sister, and I began to feel that I had become a sort of social disgrace and impediment for them.” When it transpired that Aunt Mary shared the general view, her complaints “were infinitely painful to me, as coming from the person I most loved and esteemed in all the world.” The good woman went so far as to regret that he had a close friend in town, “not for any harm that my friend was likely to do me but because with my ‘lamentable opinions’ I might corrupt his mind.” This “cut me to the quick, and then I knew by cruel experience what a dreadful evil religious bigotry is.” Years later, another family member ventured to tell his wife that “she hoped my books had not an extensive sale, so that their evil influence might be as narrowly restricted as possible.”

    In the case of his first book, published on his twenty-first birthday, the lady need not to have worried. Out of a run of two thousand copies, “exactly eleven were sold in the real literary market.” Looking back, he recommends that “poetic aspirants” have one hundred copies printed and sent to publishers, who either accept or (more likely) reject the collection. “If they all declined, my loss would be the smallest possible, and I should possess a few copies of a rare book.” He headed off to Paris, later that year, to give painting another go.

    There, a military officer gave him a ticket to a ball in honor of Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel of Italy. “We who saw the sovereigns of France and Sardinia walking down that ball-room together, little imagined that would be the ultimate consequences of their alliance—the establishment of the Italian kingdom, then of the German Empire, with the siege of Paris, the Commune, and the total destruction of the building that dazzled us by its splendor, and of the palace where the sovereigns slept that night.” More lasting but no less predictable was the result of a chance meeting back at the hotel with a man who had been a member of the French General Assembly and opposed the coup d’etat that brought the lesser Napoleon to the throne. M. Gindriez had fled to Belgium but was allowed to return to Paris “on condition that he did not actively set himself in opposition to the Empire.” Gindriez “had in the utmost strength and purity the genuine heroic nature,” and invited him to dine with his family. His eldest daughter, then sixteen, eventually became his wife, although “it did not occur to me that we were likely ever to be anything more than friends,” an “international marriage” seeming quite implausible to him at the time. “She, with a woman’s perspicacity, knew better.” His main evident benefit from his brief stay in France came not in his painting (he was still laboring under the illusion that he might make a good landscape artist) but in improving his French. “The best French criticism on the fine arts is the most discriminating and the most accurate in the world, at least when it is not turned aside from truth by the national jealousy of England and the consequent antipathy to English art.” And then “there are qualities of delicacy and precision in French prose which it was good for me to appreciate, even imperfectly.”

    Upon returning, “I remained working in the north of England, discouraged, as to literature, by the failure of the book of verse, and without much encouragement for painting either.” He began to find his way when he took it into his head to spend the autumn on moors in Yorkshire. “The physical work attendant upon encamping, and the constant attention that must be given to such pressing necessities as shelter and food, give exactly that contact with reality that educates us in readiness of resource, and they have the incalculable advantage of making one learn the difference between the necessary and the superfluous.” Solitude and silence amidst “leagues of fragrant heather” cheered him (“towns are depressing to me—even Paris”), and it reinforced his sense of the distinction between “the natural and the artificial in landscape.” Yorkshire was also the place his ancestors had lived, with the home of Richard de Hamerton, the first known member of the family, still partially intact after seven centuries. “The Hamertons do not seem to have distinguished themselves in anything except marrying heiresses, and in that they were remarkable successful.” They lost many a fortune so gained thanks either to confiscation or imprudence, and in the end “they have not kept their lands.” 

    The next summer, now aged twenty-three, he spent “encamping,” this time along Loch Awe in the Scottish Highlands with “only one servant.” He seems to have done nothing artistically memorable—he makes his excuse, that the weather was too changeable to capture on canvas, that he should have fitted himself out for sketching, not painting—but he wrote up the experience and the result was his first literary success: A Painter’s Camp. In the 1850s, no one ‘camped out’ for recreation’s, or creation’s, sake. “The novelty of camp life by choice seems to have interested many readers, though they must have been already perfectly familiar with camp life by necessity in the practice of armies and the experience of African travelers.” Like sailing, hunting, and fishing, camping is deeply connected “to the memory of the race”—the human race—as such, exerting an “intense attraction” to the human spirit. And for himself, although his ‘Romantic’ fondness for Sturm und Drang weather further delayed his artistic development, “what is called dreary, wild, and melancholy scenery afforded me, at that time, a kind of satisfaction more profound than that which is given by any of the human arts.” In his mature years he would come to prefer the brighter landscape of southern France.

    Aunt Mary could not bring herself to approve. “My guardian, like all women, had an objection to what was not customary, and as my camp was considered a piece of eccentricity, she wanted me to take a house on Lockaweside,” which he did. She also wanted him to marry. “Though she had prudently avoided marriage on her own account, she thought it very desirable for me,” contending that since she wouldn’t live forever, her beloved ward ought “to have the stay and anchorage of a second affection that might make the world less dreary for me after she had left it.” She also “may be suspected” of having “looked to marriage as the best chance of converting me to her own religious opinions, or at least of obtaining outward conformity.” As for himself, he remained unenthusiastic, primarily because Aunt Mary was right: “So far as I could observe married men in England, they enjoyed very little mental independence, being obliged, on the most important questions, to succumb to the opinions of their wives, because what is called ‘the opinion of Society’ is essentially feminine opinion.” True, “no mother was ever loved by her son more devotedly than my guardian was by me, and yet her intolerance would have been hard to bear in a wife”; “I determined that if I married at all it should not be to live under perpetual theological disapprobation.” Plus, he would have needed a bigger income, the acquisition of which would have precluded a life lived in front of a canvas or at a writing desk. 

    A solution occurred to him. Marriage to an Englishwoman being so unattractive, why not a foreigner? He remembered Mlle. Eugénie Gindriez, who “had read more and thought more than other girls her age,” which by now had reached the marriageable point. Not only did she ‘have conversation,’ but she had been running the household for several years in lieu of her mother, who suffered from bad health. He booked passage for France, returning with the bride who had in the meantime “waited patiently” for him to come to her own conclusion. She being Catholic, he being agnostic, the wedding in France proved a disappointment to the guests, who “expected a grand ceremony in the church” instead of “a brief benediction in the vestry.” Upon the couple’s return to England, Aunt Mary was pleasant but Aunt Susan much less so, disgruntled at any family tie with a Papist. For her part, Mrs. Hamerton was fortunate to cross the Channel in fine weather, “all a wonderful play of pale greens and blues, like turquoise and pale emerald,” but “she had lived in a great artistic center” and to her eye English painting was too bright, London too dingy. Back at Loch Awe, “I set myself to do what had never been done—to unite the color and effect of nature to the material accuracy of the photograph.” 

    There Hamerton’s autobiography breaks off. Whether intentionally unfinished or not, it stands as a guide and encouragement to any young person who prefers to live a bit to the side. His wife took up the narrative after he died, and carried it from the year of their marriage, 1858, to his sudden death in 1894.

    He had been quite honest with her. The Scottish Highlands are not the boulevards of Paris; this will be a drastic change, he told her. And “already his devotion to study was such that he requested me to promise not to interfere with his work of any kind that he deemed necessary—were it camping out, or sailing in stormy weather to observe nature under all her changing aspects, either of day or night.” These sober cautions notwithstanding, “he was so sensitive to the different moods of nature that his descriptions gave to a town-bred girl like me an intense desire to witness them with my own eyes, and when I did see them there was no désillusion, and the effect was so overpowering that it seemed like the revelation of a new sense in me.” Once settled, she set to work organizing the household. She even managed, eventually, to win over Aunt Susan, who seems to have found a real Catholic girl far less appalling than such a creature contemplated in the abstract. Eventually, she “became my most faithful friend.”

    The American Civil War and the consequent interruption of the trade in cotton caused economic depression in England; the Hamerton family mill had nothing to work on. They decided to move to France, with Hamerton to partner with her father in the family wine business. They would need more income, as the first two of three children had already been born in England. When her father died shortly after their arrival, Hamerton partnered with a family friend but that business, too, collapsed a few years later. 

    The “almost unexpected” financial success of A Painter’s Camp saved them from ruin. As it happened, its setting in the Highlands caught the eyes of Mr. Macmillan, the eminent publisher; “being a Scotsman, he was in immediate sympathy with so fervent an admirer of the Highlands as my husband, and had at once agreed to publish the book.” The American firm, Roberts Brothers, perhaps in consideration of the substantial Scottish population in that country, won an audience for it there, and publishing contracts for subsequent manuscripts followed. 

    His family prospects improved, Hamerton refused to give up on art. He took up etching—of all the visual arts aside from sculpture the best adapted to the precision he aspired to achieve. “His main thought, as I thought”—and one is inclined to trust her judgment—was “attempting too much finish and effect, and I used to tell him so.” To this he gave verbal assent, but he simply could not resist retouching and retouching until the picture was ruined. “The amount of labor bestowed upon etching by my husband was stupendous, as he had to seek his way without help or advice” from any etcher. Once again, his literary skills averted the family from bankruptcy, as he was appointed art critic for the Saturday Review and won a contract for his second (real) book, Etching and Etchers. Now in his mid-thirties, he moved with, and introduced his wife to, several of the literary lions and lionesses of the time, including George Eliot (très aimable“) and Tennyson (“I was greatly impressed by the dignity of his simple manners and by the inscrutable expression of the eyes, so keen and yet so calm, so profound yet so serene”), Louisa May Alcott, who reported that Emerson was among her husband’s American readers, and Robert Louis Stevenson (“What a bright, winning youth he was!” even if he smoked too many cigarettes). Hamerton became so busy that he began to suffer occasional bouts of nervous exhaustion, so he cut back on work and railway travel. It must be said that he was a highly productive writer, nonetheless, producing two novels and a dozen or so books on art, literature, and politics, while editing (beginning in 1870) The Portfolio, which he founded and made into the preeminent English-language arts journal of the time. “It was indeed difficult to give rest to a mind incessantly thirsting for knowledge.” 

    The most jarring political and military event in France in their lifetimes was the Franco-Prussian War. “Just at the beginning of the hostilities, my husband had deprecated the rashness of the French people, which was blinding them to the unprepared state of their army and to its numerical inferiority when compared with the German force. But when he saw that, although the King of Prussia had said that the war was not directed against the French people, he was still carrying it on unmercifully after the fall of Napoleon III, his sympathies with the invaded nation grew warmer every day, and he did all that was in his power to spare from invasion that part of the country where we lived, and which we knew so well.” He wrote to one of the French generals to explain how the German camp at Autun could best be approached and attacked. In the event, the family watched the battle from the garret window of their house, watching as the German forces gradually fell back. 

    In anticipation of continued threats from now-united Germany, and with respect to his happy marriage and the future of his two sons, especially the two sons, he became increasingly concerned by the “jealous hostility between France and England,” which had never disappeared since the Napoleonic Wars. He hoped to found “an Anglo-French Society or League, the members of which should simply engage themselves to do their best on all occasions to soften the harsh feeling between the two nations.” Matthew Arnold’s complaints about the French as a nation “sunk in immorality” had particularly offended him: “The French expose themselves very much by their incapacity for hypocrisy—all French faults are seen.” Although he had no stomach for “the heavy correspondence” such an enterprise would impose upon him, he wrote, “peace and war hang on such trifles sometimes, [and] a society such as I am imagining might possibly on some occasion have influence enough to prevent a war.” Staying more within his métier, he was moved to write a book, French and English, in which he gave “an impartial comparison of the habits, institutions, and characteristics of the two nations, on account of his sympathies with both, and his intimate knowledge of the French language and long residence in France.” He wanted no two-front war, and by 1887 he wrote to a friend, saying “we are rather troubled by the possibility of a war between France and Germany,” as “my sons would probably both volunteer into the French army in defense of their mother’s country, as it would be a duel of life and death between German and France this time,” not only a territorial dispute over the governance of Alsace and Lorraine. Without foreseeing the mass wars and mass murders of the next century, he anticipated the beginnings of them clearly enough.

    The 1870s and 1880s saw a continuous production of books. One of them, Human Intercourse, a commercial success “in spite of its cold reception by the Press,” drew the criticism that he “had no genius.” He groused, with equanimity, “I don’t pretend to have genius; I never said I had; then why make it a reproach?” Not for him the preening of his younger contemporary, Mr. Wilde. “He certainly cared infinitely and incomparably more for his reputation—such as he wished it to be, pure, dignified, and honored—than for wealth, his only desire about money, often expressed, was ‘not to have to think about it.'” By now, he seldom needed to. The family suffered the loss of their younger son, Richard, who committed suicide in 1888. He designed Richard’s grave marker, inscribing it with the word, “Peace,” which was the wish the young man had expressed to him in their last serious conversation.

    He wrote to a friend, “For my part, I don’t know what to think of the future. Long ago I used to hope for a true religion, but now I see that if it is to be freed from mythology, it ceases to be a religion altogether, and becomes only science, which has nothing of the heating and energizing force that a real religion certainly possesses. Neither has science its power of uniting men in bonds of brotherhood, and in giving them an effective hostile action against others as religious intolerance does.” He died of a heart attack in 1894, “still in the full possession and maturity of his talents, and in the active use of them” and “conscious of a useful and blameless life.”

     

     

     

    Note

    1. The contemporary distinction between a “child” and a “boy,” equivalent to today’s distinction between a boy and a youth, or adolescent, or ‘teenager,’ evidently registers the assumption that children before puberty are innocent because supposedly sexless, whereas nature then differentiates them more clearly between boys and girls.

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Manent on “The Religion of Humanity”

    March 8, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Pierre Manent: The Religion of Humanity: The Illusion of Our Times.  Paul Seaton, editor and translator. South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2022.

     

    In his introduction to this judiciously ordered thematic selection of Manent’s writings, Paul Seaton distills the philosopher’s central thought: “The Imago Dei is also the zōon politikón.” One might initially respond, How can this be? Upon reflection, aided by the arguments Manent frames, one might equally ask, How could it be otherwise? If human beings are made in the Image of God, and if God is a person who rules not only His creation but Himself—in no fewer than three Persons, as the Gospels teach—then human beings must be political by nature. By contrast, the “Religion of Humanity” which animates so much of European and American politics rejects God and denigrates self-government. Insofar as we adhere to this novel faith, the identity of the Image of God and the political animal will be lost on us. At the same time, precisely because it is true, we will fail to understand ourselves, with all the attendant moral and political derangements that lack of self-knowledge must engender.

    Seaton has Manent open his argument with an account of the political history of Christianity, the story of “a succession of theological-political arrangements, of solutions to the theologico-political problem,” wherein “each solution ends by revealing itself to be as unsatisfactory as the one that it succeeded”—precisely because the “problem” can only be truly solved by the rule of God on earth, an event which has yet to occur. The first solution, which posited God’s Assembly or Church as “the true republic, the perfect society,” in contrast to which all merely human associations held “an ontologically inferior rank,” led to the doctrine of the plenitude of power or authority in the Catholic Church. But because this Church lacked the physical power to rule human beings directly and in all respects—Jesus Himself recognized this in telling His disciples to leave the things of Caesar to Caesar (who didn’t need Christians to tell him how to raise and spend taxes, and did not wield his sword in vain)— this led to an uncomfortable dual citizenship, an allegiance to God’s regime and to whatever worldly regime a Christian lived in—”a permanent division and uncertainty, since two loyalties necessarily share the heart of each Christian.”

    In an attempt to overcome this dualism, European rulers founded a new state form, the form of absolute national (and some might say ‘statist’) monarchy. In these countries, “religion remains a command, but this command is essentially administered by the temporal sovereign,” as exemplified by the Tudor dynasty in England and, most strikingly, the Bourbons in France. “The national monarchy was intended to overcome the medieval duality of the priesthood and the emperor, ‘to reunite the two heads of the eagle,’ to bring it about that Christian subjects ceased ‘to see double,'” as certain modern political philosophers put it. The Christian or apparently Christian modern state (“apparently” because, after all, the philosophers quoted followed Machiavelli and his hints about the benefits of a purely ‘civil’ religion) might have one of several regimes: the English monarchy heading the ‘English’ or Anglican Church, attempting to adapt such an institution to English common law, thereby satisfying neither Catholics nor the more ardent Protestants; the democratic-republican regime of American Puritans, who fled the English regime only to establish a sort of absolutism of ‘the many’ instead of ‘the one’; and European nationalism, first instantiated as monarchic and then, in France, very much in opposition to the Church and to the God of the Bible, as republican. 

    It is the European form that concerns Manent, first and foremost. Whether under a monarchic, republican, or oligarchic regime, nationalism without God, the elevation of each nation to quasi-divine status, has ended badly. The ‘secularized’ nationalisms that advanced throughout Europe after the French revolution culminated in the debacle of nationalism in the world wars. Those wars “have worn away the charm of the sacredness of the nation.” The victory of republican regimes over the others has ameliorated the problem but at the cost of the exhaustion of the nationalist sentiments that animated them. Ambitious and fearful men alike began to call for, then to implement, a “supranational” Europe; among other things, supranationalists imagine that political borders are at best meaningless, at worst harmful to trade and dangerous to defend. The resulting “massive immigration of non-Christian populations,” populations whose supranationalism often consists not in the dream of the European Union but in the dream of the ummah, not the Religion of Humanity but the religion of Allah, contradicts the very principle it was intended to demonstrate. 

    Having first separated Church and Caesar on Christian terms, then fusing them on terms that might have been sincerely Christian or covertly Machiavellian, European liberalism separated them. Manent observes that separation is one thing, separate but equal another. “When one considers the question of government, or of command…one sees how much separation—far from being a stable situation that leaves the two protagonists intact—is an endless process that implies the ever growing and indefinite domestication of the Church” because the Church relinquishes coercive power to the State. “This gives a decisive advantage of the public institution over the private one.” The Church can and does attempt to rule within “civil society,” beneath the ruling apparatus of the State, ruling by consent rather than coercion. “However, to govern is to govern. To govern in civil society is not so different from governing in the State.” Under any genuine liberal regime, I can exercise my right to liberty by leaving the nation ruled by the State or by leaving the church that I have joined, but it’s much more difficult to leave my country than it is to leave my church. I can exercise religious liberty simply by attending the church across the street, or by staying home. And even the ‘liberal’ attempt to make exercising political liberty by leaving my country almost that easy, by making borders porous throughout Europe depends upon a shared sense of belonging that transcends one’s sense of national language and way of life—no simple effort, one animated by the rather casual expectation of a sense of ‘Europeanness’ as strong as Englishness, Frenchness, Germanness, and so on. 

    This being so, the Church might pretend that religion entails no form of government at all. It then becomes “the collective ‘beautiful soul'” of the German Romantics, a “bearer of ideals and values”—entities which, “in contrast to law, cannot be commanded.” European churches today “propose ‘Christian values.'” Unlike laws, such entities “cannot be commanded”; “unlike the old Decalogue and also unlike democratic law,” they “are impossible either to obey or to disobey.” This leads Christianity away from itself and towards the Religion of Humanity because “under the rubric of ‘values’ it is hopeless to make ‘the Gospel message’ listened to, or at least heard, except by engaging in humanitarian and egalitarian overbidding.” ‘More compassionate and democratic than thou’ replaces ‘holier than thou.’ But ‘holier than thou’ always remained in principle governed by the admission that only God really was. Humanitarian and egalitarian sentiment come with self-righteousness built in, with no real authority above it.

    The same goes for the standard of natural, as distinguished from ‘human,’ rights. The natural rights of the original liberal republicanism were said to inhere in every human being as such, thus serving as a criterion for human conduct. But ‘human’ rights as conceived by the Religion of Humanity cannot have recourse to nature because “modern humanity…desires to be the sovereign over nature, creator of its own nature,” right down to ‘gender assignment’ by oneself rather than by birth or (as in Eden) by God. The Church has long posed the question, What is man? or (what amounts to the same thing) What is Adam? But modern democracy “neither can nor wants to respond to this question in any manner or form”. Modern democracy rules, but it cannot say in the name of what, other than in accordance with certain sentiments, coming from it knows not where. The Church no longer rules, but it does attempt to “overbid” the democratic State in terms of the State’s own self-legitimizing sentiments. This gives the Church a sort of “dialectical advantage” over the State—or would, if the Church could shake off its own confusion. The Enlightenment had hoped to wrest not only political sovereignty but dialectical advantage from the Church by philosophizing its way out of Christian doctrines; today, the democratic state, in its moral and intellectual egalitarianism or relativism, can no longer command itself, although it does not hesitate to command others. “No one knows what will happen when democracy and the Church become aware of this reversal.”

    Seaton next causes Manent to get down to the particulars. NATO’s 1999 war on Serbia, which had attempted to quash an independence movement in what had been the Serbian province of Kosovo. NATO characterized its military action as a “humanitarian intervention”—a novel concept at the time. While “the notion of humanity conceived as universal” dates to the Roman Empire, an empire presupposes an emperor; “it therefore was a universal that remained political.” It also was not universal in fact, making it necessarily political in its foreign relations. As for the Catholic or universal Church, it remained universal in principle but, being spiritual, not as a political fact. Indeed, it soon “produced divisions and separations in the world,” between believers and unbelievers and between the several denominations of those who thought of themselves as Christians. What makes Christian charity realistic, however, is that centers on the love of God and of God’s image in one’s neighbor, who is as intrinsically unlovable as oneself. When, in anticipation of the Religion of Humanity, Rousseau’s notion of compassion replaced the Christian principle of caritas, the ground was tilled for the field of humanitarianism. Unlike charity, which is so difficult for human beings that it requires God’s grace to aid us in feeling it, humanitarianism comes naturally to most, easily to many. This also distinguishes it from humanism, which requires arduous self-development whereby the soul aims at becoming fully human. [1] Unlike Christianity, which retains the Biblical sense of politics, of friends and enemies, those in the Church or Assembly of God and those outside it, humanitarianism pretends that nothing human is foreign to me. 

    Being at once sentimental and active, humanitarianism “habituate[s] people to disdain political reflection, politics themselves and their concrete conditions of existence, as if the affirmation of humanity sufficed itself.” While NATO was right to intervene (“it was dangerous and dishonorable for Europe to allow a regime that institutionalized the oppression of a minority to continue to act”), in “refus[ing] to call ‘war’ the massive bombardment of a country, week after week,” the NATO countries lied to themselves and to the world, including the Serbs, who were not dignified with the title, ‘enemy.’ Consistent with this inhumane humanitarianism, NATO also adopted a policy of ‘zero fatalities’ for itself, obviating the idea of self-sacrifice, whereby “war “in a certain way ‘redeems’ itself own immorality” by risking the lives of the warriors. Finally, NATO evaded the political question of what Winston Churchill called the aftermath of war: What to do with Kosovo, after victory.

    To think of the aftermath of war, to think politically, requires more than mere sentiment, however pure. It requires prudential reasoning. And even Rousseau, the founder of the demi-politics of compassion, sees that “human beings are not capable of a disinterested sentiment,” a morally pure sentiment, but “only natural sentiments, that is to say, they necessarily seek their interest and their pleasure,” experiencing compassion because “the visible suffering of another person tells me that I too could experience it, that I am as venerable as the other.” “There is nothing in pity that is heroic or impossible, since its wellspring is the selfishness of each person,” yielding “the society of the Goodwill soup kitchen.” The soup kitchen attends to the needs of the body, its organizers feeling compassion for nothing specifically human. This “tends to weaken the consciousness and sentiment of what is specifically human,” of reason, albeit in the name of humanitarianism. This is why animals too are now said to have a ‘right’ not to suffer physical pain, as per the morality of Peter Singer, who defends abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia so long as they cause no pain.

    The apolitical character of the humanitarian military intervention obviates the sovereignty of states. Humanitarian action is indeed a Christian and humanistic duty, but it isn’t the same as humanitarian military intervention. The aim of military action is victory; victory entails responsibility for ruling the defeated. That is, “to modify the political circumstances of a humanitarian crisis”—to bomb Serbia—results in “political consequences,” and “the one who takes the initiative thus immediately assumes new political responsibilities.”  If prompted to intervene solely by sentiment, the humanitarian statesman will likely “engage in a political and military action in conditions that he does not know well, with inappropriate instruments, and for vague political objectives.” To so “falsify the conditions of political judgment” has “a profoundly demoralizing effect, “plac[ing] political life under an exigency that is impossible to honor and which contributes to the delegitimation of the normal political life of democratic nations.” To be genuinely political, the Religion of Humanity would need to animate some political institution that rules humanity as a whole. But “humanity as such does not have a political existence.” How, then, can national governments pretend to be agents of humanity, especially since the sentiment of humanitarianism isn’t shared by non-Western nations? In so pretending, and by doing so without reference to a standard outside themselves, beyond their own sentiments, they confuse themselves with God. This does not mean, Manent pertinently insists, that to make moral judgments and act on them amounts to ‘playing God.’ On the contrary, it is to be human. But to be human, guidance must come from that inside us that is distinctively human, which is thoughtful, and operation of logos, the distinctive feature of human nature that, in Christian terms, bespeaks the Image of God.

    Manent elaborates on this new religion, the Religion of Humanity, beginning by citing Tocqueville on ‘democracy’ or social equality and its intellectual and moral effects. Tocqueville observes that aristocratic societies have a weak sense of “humanity in general.” The idea of the human species is strongly present in the minds of the very few, the philosophers. Democratic societies, however, consist of individuals who readily see other individuals as their semblables, their ‘similars,’ their fellows. This seeing is at least as much a feeling as it is an insight, and so finds its highest expression in poetry. Victor Hugo was the poet of the nineteenth century—the ‘democratizing’ century—the writer “who expressed most amply and insistently, almost systematically, the idea and sentiment of Humanity.” Although “Hugo’s poetic style no longer suits our taste,” we still “share the poet’s religious or quasi-religious sentiment.” The sentiment is so powerful that it governs even rationalists, even an Auguste Comte, whose positivism complements his humanitarianism—so much so, that he invents a sort of social (if not truly civic) religion of humanitarianism, complete with rituals and symbols imitating those of the French Catholic Church. 

    Why does Manent object to this kinder, gentler historicism, surely a thing preferable to the harsh practices of Marxism and Social Darwinists? Because even if, per impossibile, “the principal evils of society will have been healed by altruism,” will human beings find some new object for their striving or will they rather cease to strive at all? Manent predicts that humanity living under ‘Comteian’ conditions “will be a humanity closed in on itself, one that is prey to an immense, or sublime, selfishness,” home to the contemptible being Nietzsche derides as the Last Man. “The religion of Humanity is Christianity and specifically Catholicism, with all the vices Nietzsche sees in it, but without the grandeur that a belief in God entails, that is, in a Being greater than humanity.” Christianity becomes Christianism, an ideology. Depending on how one translates Nietzsche’s German, the Last Man either blinks, toadlike and uncomprehendingly, at “the Roman roads, the medieval cathedrals, the Renaissance palaces,” “strangers to the motives that produced these works,” or he winks at them, feeling himself superior to the supposedly benighted folk who made them, superstitious ignoramuses who lacked the “historical perspective” of modern man. But this perspective, Nietzsche complains, “produces the flattest disposition of the soul, that of the tourist”; “the effectual truth of the modern religion of Human is tourism,” seen today in the public television programs ‘hosted’ by that cheerful bland twit, Rick Steves. “Just when present-day humanity aims to include and congratulate itself on excluding nothing that is currently human, it excludes its entire past, all past generations, from itself”—as remarked by the aristocratic Mr. Burke. “It is at the moment when it embraces itself wholly that it ceases to understand itself,” ceases to exercise its distinctively human capacity to know itself. 

    Unlike human self-understanding in terms of the Image of God and of human nature, both of which respect the political character of human persons and thus the limits of human sentiments and actions, the complacent universalism fostered by the Religion of Humanity rejects “all mediation and concretization” of the human ways of life—such political institutions as nation-states and their attendant borders, with provinces and cities within those borders, and with the political responsibilities which human self-government possible. Contemporary Europeans have been able to imagine themselves “natural citizens of humanity” because the United States has taken responsibility for their military defense. Writing in 2010, a decade before Russian soldiers rolled into Ukraine, Manent warns that “this does not constitute a vigorous political order, or one likely to last.” “Sooner or later, Europeans will have to remember the political conditions of humanity.” This realization won’t come readily, as the Religion of Humanity invites us to enjoy “the certainty of doing good as well as the feeling of being good, all the more so because in the world of fellow-feeling, most of the doing lies in the feeling,” consisting primarily if not exclusively of “acknowledging and appreciating the similitude of the ‘other.'” “This way of thinking entails the inglorious death of civic virtue, as well as of serious attention to the Christian proposition.”

    The central section of the book as Seaton has carefully designed it consists of a sequence of considerations on the Christian proposition. Like Jesus, the Son who mediates between the Father and Man, the Church mediates, or should mediate, between “real humanity and a dreamed-of ‘Humanity,'” between human beings as they are and human beings as they should be, at least as envisioned by the secular prophets and priests of the Religion of Humanity. Since the founding of the Church, pseudo-religions have arisen, religions that distort “this-or-that aspect of Christianity” and attempt to impose it upon men—Communism yesterday, Nazism the day before yesterday. The Religion of Humanity shares in their attempt to fuse theory and practice in “a powerful enterprise of great extent to regulate the human world by means of international rules and institutions, so that nations, losing their character as sovereign political bodies, would henceforth be nothing but ‘regions’ of a world en route to globalization, i.e., unification.” Although the Church has always been distrustful, even critical, of sovereign states, often regarding them as loci of the libido dominandi, such states also “prevented imperial stagnation” and, in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia, often protected small nations from the big ones. States are not simply fields of ‘power’; they also serve as fields of politics rightly understood, there being “no more powerful source of the moral development of each person than concern for the common good or the ‘common thing,’ the res publica.” “The formation and then the deployment of the human virtues require the participation in a collective ‘unit of action’ before the members of which we feel ourselves responsible, and whose praise and blame we experience.” ‘Humanity’ constitutes no such field of action. “There is, to be sure, a human race, but it is only actualized in the plurality of human communities” in which the political nature of human beings can flourish, a nature which is the Image of God. The Catholic Church would be better advised to treat with friendship the other real communities, the nations, which, whether Christian or not, at least form a cadre of education and action in which human beings can truly engage in a search for the common good.”

    There are those who argue that multinational corporations can replace nation-states as intermediaries, ultimately providing the institutional structures for world government. But commerce alone hasn’t prevented wars; commercial republican regimes have prevented wars amongst themselves, but corporations are oligarchies, not republics. And as commercial and industrial enterprises, corporations lack a full understanding of human nature. Corporations undertake exchange, an activity that “only needs very limited agreements that bear upon the characteristics of the object in question and its price”; corporate agents need not even know one another personally, as “commerce demands but little of ‘the common’ and therefore only produces a little of ‘the common.'” Commerce is a res without a publica. As such, corporations can distribute goods and services without thinking much about the distribution of honors, which requires knowledge of persons, not things. Corporations have done very poorly in managing their relations with China and with the more seriously religious elements among Muslims, even as they often blundered their way through relations with the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. “China, Islam, the Jewish people, the Christian world, these are not the different colors of a rainbow humanity, these are ‘grandeurs,’ they are ‘political and spiritual quantities,’ which come to sight as proposals and affirmations of humanity and which need to be made compatible.” Manent regards the Catholic Church as likely more capable of serving as a mediator among these grandeurs than corporations will ever be, as “the only completely established real universal community, the sole ‘perfect spiritual republic.'” Its spirituality makes it a physical threat to no one; its republican character registers its political dimension, beyond mere economics.

    In doing so, it can uphold the distinction between charity and compassion. [2] Com-passion is “indeed a passion,” prompting us to aid those who suffer or are in danger. “If we didn’t have this sentiment, human life would be much crueler than it is, and it would lose a good deal of its sweetness.” As a passion, however, compassion shares the weaknesses of all passions: “it is weak,” often fleeting, and “it is largely blind,” lacking the guidance of reason. “One cannot found or govern any community by means of compassion alone” since communities require virtues to sustain them—courage, justice, moderation, prudence—not passions, or at least not passion alone.

    So, for example, the migration of suffering populations inspires compassion but “does not include the duty to make fellow citizens of those whom we aid.” It provides a spur to action but does not tell us what to do. By contrast, “charity is clearly a virtue, and even the culminating virtue, of the human being and the Christian,” directing us to love with the prudence of serpents and the innocence of doves. Agapic love “characterizes not certain acts, but the tenor of a life.”

    This is why Seaton places Manent’s article, “Who Is ‘The Good Samaritan’?” in the center of the book, tenth among nineteen chapters. [3] Manent wrote the article in answer to Pope Francis’s encyclical, Fratelli tutti, in which the pope deploys the Gospel parable to illustrate “fraternity and social friendship.” Fraternity and social friendship are admirable, yet human-all-too-human. To interpret the parable in such terms is to ignore its centering in the things of God, not of Man. Even the Jewish priest and the Levite, who see the injured man and pass him by are thinking of God—more specifically, of His law, which bars men who are ritually clean from touching what appears to them to be a corpse. The Samaritan is under no such legal restriction. More, and supremely, “the amplitude to his deeds,” the “liberty of his conduct,” the “competence in his care for all wounds,” the “competence in his care for all wounds,” the “authority to his word,” and the “ability to make promises worthy of belief,” all point to his more than human character. “The Church Fathers were right: the Samaritan is none other than Jesus himself.” We humans lack God’s charity, strength, “reparative virtue,” patience, hope or faith “to be like the Samaritan.” “There is no Christianity outside of Jesus Christ,” and we humans need to recognize that. 

    God needs no boundaries. We humans do. Among those boundaries are national borders. The migrations which have given the question of charity and compassion an inescapably political dimension in our time “oblige all citizens to take a clear and precise view of the political community that they wish to form, and they force Christians to define the meaning and significance of the virtue of charity that is the center of the Christian life.” Traditionally, the Catholic Church “put the social and political nature of man at the fore, or on the first plane,” recognizing that “the development of a person’s humanity passes by the mediation of his or her civic and social association.” To speak of the rights of migrants is to define rights in exclusively ‘individual’ terms, but whatever rights inhere in individuals as such do not translate simply into citizen rights. Manent here goes too far, denying that rights “can be attached to the isolated human individual” at all. This confuses human being as potential with human being as more fully actualized within a political community. Human being as potential, seen in individuals born and unborn, in and of itself implies no civil right, although the political nature of human beings implies a right to civility, to the membership in a regime that both protects individuals from harm and assists in their development as mature citizens. [4]

    Be this as it may, “borders are the condition of existence of a political association capable of assisting” migrants.” And political borders make human approximation of Christ’s charity possible in reality. Love God and neighbor, not neighbor alone, recognizing that while God is limitless neighborliness implies the limit of propinquity, the limit that human persons must respect when they consider their own nature as undivine beings defined by the Image of God but not by godliness itself. “No one can claim to know to what point a political body can accept a growing heterogeneity without falling apart,” thereby becoming a ‘failed state’ of the sort the migrants themselves have fled. Respect for immigration laws expresses “concern for the stability and viability of the civic body of which we are a part,” of “preserving and, if possible, of improving the conditions of a ‘good way of life’ or a ‘good life'”—a good regime. And as to the Church, its charity, centering on God, identifies the good way of life as God’s way of life, expressing agapic love by tending to the souls of those who suffer primarily, their bodily needs and even their moral rights secondarily. Humanitarian care “is precious but is spiritually empty because it does not bring the Word and does not show the Way.” Meeting the displaced person who is a Muslim, can a Christian not care first and foremost for the conversion of the Muslim’s soul to that Way, by means of that Word? [5]

    Political and Christian prudence alike call republican citizens and members of the City of God alike to understand their obligations to migrants as conditional, not all-encompassing. Migrants “impose themselves on us by the strength of their numbers and their aggression,” having been “encouraged, even directed, by foreign states who have unfriendly, even hostile aims toward us.” Acts of war are not limited to bombings and tank sorties. In us, in ‘We Europeans,’ “It is a major political and moral fault to yield to force hiding itself behind misery.” Further, in agreeing to accept a measured quantity of migrants, we “cannot agree to abandon the principles of our political regime.” In the republics, “we are the sole judges of this possibility, as is fitting for political bodies that govern themselves democratically.” The same goes for the Church, which consists of discrete churches, none of which has unlimited physical resources, even if their members could command unlimited spiritual resources—which, being human, they cannot do, either, although they can pray for as many of them as God chooses to grant. It therefore makes no sense, politically or Christianly, to renounce our sovereignty in our own communities or to “weaken what remains of Christian dispositions and Catholic habits, for the sake of a religion of Humanity that delivers us over to the strongest.” Under that religion, “‘Christianity’ now only presented the general idea of humanity under the form of a particular opinion,” an ‘ideal’ in the Hegelian sense, an instantiation of a particular moment in the history of the Absolute Spirit, an entity very far from the Holy Spirit. Even as modern political philosophers from Machiavelli on denigrated Christianity as unrealistic, a belief in an “imaginary principality,” even such sympathetic observers as Chateaubriand inclined to accept that categorization, albeit with friendly feelings, an ideal which inspires noble sentiments. 

    Why do so few persons today recognize this transformation? Manent suggests that the reconfiguration of Christianity as an ‘ideal’ forms part of a much larger moral and intellectual framework. As a result of modern philosophy, we no longer think politically. This seems paradoxical, because Machiavelli and his followers called for the construction of the modern state, a vast political task. But the size of the modern state establishes a distinction between ‘the state’ understood as a government apparatus and ‘civil society’ located inside the territory ruled by the state. (Christianity anticipated some of this, in its separation of the things of God from the things of Caesar, thereby “having broken apart the ‘beautiful whole’ of the pagan city.”) This, along with the ‘state of nature’ doctrine, has inclined many thinkers to locate the fundamental elements of politics in pre-political and sub-political places, which are said to have generated the state. To think so is to think that sociology deserves intellectual primacy over political science. Moreover, sociology partakes of the aspirations of modern science, especially its tendency to abstract ’causes’ from the phenomena in the form of mathematical formulae, in order to propound ‘theories’ of society. “While Aristotle’s point of view” in his political science “is a practical perspective, the point of view of the sociologist is a theoretical point of view.” Theory so conceives ‘objectifies’ the phenomena it studies; “it is difficult to know what the sociologist shares with the human beings he studies,” separated as he is “from his object by his scientific instruments themselves.” Europeans now think of religion ‘sociologically.’ If they think scientifically, they regard it as objectively empty, except as a social fact, more or (increasingly) less prevalent. If they think religiously, they assume there is “nothing objective and shareable to say about it to those who are outside of it.” 

    Manent resists. It is true that the ancient city no longer exists, that the historical context of classical political science has been discarded. But politics remains, even in the modern state. “I propose preserving and affirming the ‘architectonic’ character of political science among the social sciences,” which Aristotle affirmed. True, modern states have brought on an attenuated civil life, leaving the intimacy of self-government in the small poleis far behind, at least on the level of nations. But can anyone doubt that modern states actually do rule? Or that tyrannical regimes of modern states have aped the compactness of the poleis in pursuing ‘totalitarianism,’ always with a malignant form of personalism rightly derided as a ‘personality cult.’ 

    “I therefore propose to study religion first of all politically—as a human association and as a government.” After all (one might add), every religion consists of a regime, a way of ruling. Given that European democrats “define ourselves by two ideals,” the “practical ideal of sincerity and the theoretical ideal of objectivity,” we handicap ourselves when we think about religion by consigning it to the realm of subjectivity in practice and scientific, even mathematical criteria when we consider it theoretically. That is, when we ask, “How is one to talk politically about religion?” “The way the question is posed renders it even more opaque and practically insoluble.” Muslims don’t think that way. In their opinion, “the divine Law is immediately positive and manifestly rational,” and “obedience to it constitutes the umma,” the Muslim religio-political community, a community that occupies territory. On that territory, Muslims are objectively at war with non-Muslims—spiritually at all times, physically when that is advantageous. Since the best political regime existed only under Muhammad’s monarchy, “no one regime characterizes Islam” in other times; Muslims ready themselves to make war within them all. They tend to be disadvantaged by democratic republicanism, whose way of life that consists of give and take, ruling and being ruled, scarcely comports with strict obedience to Islamic law.

    Empire is “the political form,” as distinguished from the political regime, “closest to Islam.” Islam’s last empire was the Ottoman caliphate, gone now for more than a century, replaced by Mustafa Kemal’s nation-state, Turkey. This abrupt transition contrasts with the decades it took to replace the Holy Roman Empire and the Christendom it embodied with the modern state. “We therefore find ourselves in the presence of an immense empire, or at least an immense imperial imprint, without an emperor”—religiously powerful but politically weak, its subjects indignant at their own weakness. When they go so far as to call Europeans and Americans ‘crusaders,” we think the charge an absurd anachronism. The language may be antique but were we to understand our own regimes better we might see the point. In our regimes, states guarantee equal rights, “especially freedom of conscience, to everyone, believer and unbeliever alike. This can only be so in a regime founded upon no one established religion. For that to happen, a people must derive their rights either from nature or nationhood, or both. If it is from nationhood, then the nation becomes a new form of the sacred community. Nationality replaces Christianity without necessarily abandon crusading or imperialism. This is what Muslims are talking about. In contemporary Europe, elites want nationality to go the way of Christianity, but the elites have their own religion, the Religion of Humanity. That religion commands ‘openness to the other,” but if the ‘other’ is Islam, a religion that prohibits openness, how will the Religion of Humanity deal with it and remain openness? Without Christianity or the nation-state, it cannot. “Let us, therefore, return to and ‘reenter’ the real Europe that we are trying in vain to leave.”

    As a preliminary to this return, Manent commends the writings of Charles Péguy, “one of the most penetrating critics of the historical and sociological points of view which dominate modem consciousness.” In Péguy’s lifetime, the preeminent event that raised the religio-political question was the Dreyfus Affair, the twelve-year-long ordeal that wracked French politics, beginning in 1894 with the false accusation and wrongful conviction of the Jewish French Army captain Albert Dreyfus on charges of treason. The Affair brought out the worst of French anti-Semitism, implicating the Army and involving the French Catholic Church hierarchy, while reviving antagonism against the republican regime. A fervent Catholic himself, Péguy sided with Dreyfus against the ultra-nationalist monarchist Right, but also came to oppose the Dreyfusard socialists, whom he charged with “wanting to control thought and word” every bit as much as the Catholic Church and the Old Regime had done in previous centuries. 

    Crucially for and in anticipation of Manent’s own argument, Péguy “saw the Dreyfus Affair as the event par excellence, the event which is unforeseeable, which neither historians nor sociologists could understand, because they try to find general laws of history, because they make and deal in general categories.” The affair wasn’t ‘historical’ in that sense (the sense most doggedly pursued in France by the ‘historicist’ historian, Hippolyte Taine) but personal, first of all concerning a person, Alfred Dreyfus, and his identity as a Jew, his status as a French army officer, the relations of his Jewishness and his membership in the Army to the republican regime and, more broadly of both Jews as such and republicans as such to the Catholic Church. This unpredictable coincidence of ’causes,’ all centering on a person, raised “what was to become the central mediation of [Péguy’s] life: what is a people? What is a city? And indissolubly linked to these two: what is Christianity?” 

    In his meditations, Péguy came to see the “radical conflict” not merely between those who believed Dreyfus guilty and those who understood him to be innocent—there were anti-Dreyfusards and Dreyfusards among republicans, monarchists, army men, civilians, Catholics and non-Catholics—but between the ancients and the moderns. Among the Dreyfusards, the socialists were resolute ‘moderns,’ not genuine republicans at all but statist, would-be oligarchs, ready to suppress their opponents and to rule without dissent. They shared this tendency with the modern or Hobbesian-Bodinian, monarchists, seeking to level civil society while centralizing political power in their own hands. The true republicans (contra their Catholic accusers, remembering Jacobin depredations of a century back) shared with the ancient world the sense of politics as ruling and being ruled, in turn. We Dreyfusards, Péguy wrote, “demand that science, art, and philosophy be left unsocialized”—free, personal, not reduced to matter. “What struck him most was that this materialism, this atheism, lived only on what they rejected, that is, on the Christian, or perhaps the ancient, idea of the world.” the secularist Dreyfusards admired the after-shine of Christian charity and Roman civic virtue while perverting both. “History is not socialist,” Péguy wrote. “It is historical. Philosophy is not socialist. It is philosophical.” Philosophers love wisdom; the socialists claimed to have achieved it, parodying God. But for a human being to take on the role of God is to become incapable of “achieving consciousness of himself,” the self-knowledge Socrates prized. And the familiar trope invoking ‘the judgment of History’ in an attempt to end political debate amounts to “a parody of the Last judgment.” It divinizes ‘History’ or the course of events, dismissing the original meaning of history as inquiry, not humanly-conceived revelation. As a result, “freedom and the risk inseparable from genuine human action…are hunted down by modern intellectualism.”

    Risk implies a sort of wager, which in turn reminds one of Pascal. It was here that Péguy began to see the worth of the Christianity that he had previously rejected. He saw that “humanity as implied by Christianity is also that which is revealed in the precise observation of human nature.” Christians were on to something. Even the terrifying Christian teaching on eternal damnation began to make sense. As Péguy writes, if men must choose, “there must be a total risk,” and Christianity extended the Roman virtue of gravitas, of seriousness, ‘all the way down’—quite literally! It is true that Hell is inhumane. But that is the point.

    Where does Christianity leave citizenship in the earthly city, and specifically in France? To be a citizen or rather subject in the Kingdom of God, loving its Ruler, in no way precludes citizenship in France, loving one’s neighbor as “a citizen of a given city.” For this reason, Péguy departed from Pascal’s inclination to denigrate ‘the World,’ although this surely did not imply indulgence of the flesh and the Devil. Rather, “the eternal is the dwelling place of the temporal.” Where Manent in his turn departs from Péguy is seen in his refusal to follow Péguy’s hope of reuniting the pagan sense of civic holiness with Christian holiness, “the city of nature with the city of grace.” No: creation and Creator remain distinct, even if intimately related in love. Manent rejects “some absurd sentence in which [Péguy] suggested that a ‘French’ saint and a ‘French’ sinner would form a community from which a ‘German’ saint would by his essence be excluded.” Saintliness is a category within Christianity, and its claims remain universal. Every country is ‘God’s country.’ Sinners abound and saints are martyred in all of them, even as Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards could be found among all social, political, and religious groupings in France. It is likely that there were saints and sinners among both Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards, too.

    With this book, Pierre Manent’s considerations on the greatness of political and Christian life have been introduced to Americans by an expert arranger and translator of these writings, Paul Seaton, and by Daniel J. Mahoney, author of an introduction that gets readers right on track. 

     

    Notes

    1. This is true of the Renaissance humanists and also of later figures—for example, André Malraux, whose “tragic humanism” clearly implies struggle and indeed sacrifice.
    2. For the reader of the Bible in English, this distinction is often obscured by the translation of the word for Christian love, agape, as ‘compassion’; for example, the King James Bible does this, perhaps to avoid the Latin-based (and therefore Roman Catholic) translation, ‘charity.’
    3. Nineteen is also the number of chapters in Machiavelli’s The Prince, the book in which Machiavelli proposes to replace a prince of war with the Prince of Peace. Aristotle, however, considers peace the object of war, and in Christ Christians fight spiritual warfare for the sake of spiritual peace; both understand politics in a way Machiavellians cannot.
    4. This is the answer to Manent’s question, “How can rights be attributed to the individual as individual if rights govern relationships between several individuals, if the very idea of right presupposes an already instituted community or society?” That is, contra Manent, individual natural rights need not assume the ‘state of nature’ propounded by modern political philosophers, as he argues in his 1988 article, “Some Remarks on the Notion of ‘Secularization,'” reprinted in this volume.
    5. In Europe, the question of non-Christians living within civil societies must always recall the ‘Jewish question.’ That question differs from the ‘Muslim question’ in several ways, one of them being the sheer size of the Muslim population; Jewish Europeans hardly threaten, and have never threatened, to overwhelm European Christians by their sheer numbers. The radical depopulation of European Jewry, first by the Holocaust and then by emigration to Israel, has caused a very different problem. “The destruction of Europe’s Jews put the Shoah at the center of Jewish consciousness, but also of European consciousness, or of Western consciousness in general,” but “this center cannot suffice to provide the spiritual coordinates we need to orient themselves,” as it is a ‘negative’ bond, sure to weaken as memories of the Shoah recede. The relations between Jews and Europeans require “a positive principle, a principle of friendship.” There is indeed such a common bond: “To express the meaning of Jerusalem in the language of Athens, since man is by nature a political animal, God can only make himself known to human beings by forming in their midst, or out of their midst, a people that can be His people.” To recall this, both political Europe and Catholic Europe should understand that while nation and Church have their important roles to play, neither role requires the assumption “that Israel is only left with blindness and hardness of heart,” as the Church wrongly taught for centuries and as some nations taught not only to the peril of Jews but ultimately to the peril of themselves. 

     

     

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    American Vercingetorix

    March 1, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    John D. McDermott: Red Cloud: Oglala Legend. Pierre: South Dakota Historical Society, 2015.

     

    Born in 1821, during the Monroe Administration, the Oglala chief Red Cloud witnessed the ruin of his way of life at the hands of the American empire of liberty. The dispute turned, in many ways, on what ‘liberty’ means. The American meaning of liberty contradicted the Oglala meaning of liberty, and this reflected the contradiction between the regimes that drove the conquests undertaken and the empires established by the Oceti Šakowin or Lakota and the United States. The Oglala tribe numbers among the seven political groups or ‘Council Fires’ of the Lakota. The Lakota arrived in what are now southern Wisconsin, northwestern Illinois, and northeastern Iowa in the seventeenth century, driven out of Upper Mississippi by the Ojibwas or Chippewas, who called them the ‘Sioux’ (a term that may mean ‘snake’ and is therefore rejected by many Lakota). In alliance with the Hurons, the Chippewas also successfully resisted encroachments by the powerful Iroquois to the east, who had driven the Hurons out of the Finger Lakes region, earlier. 

    If this suggests that northern and western North America prior to European colonization was no less roiled by warriors than Europe itself, the suggestion has merit. By the late eighteenth century, the Oglala and some of their fellow Lakota, the Brules, moved west across the Missouri River, searching for game, reaching the Black Hills of today’s South Dakota by the early nineteenth century. During this time, they fought and usually defeated the several non-Lakota tribes in the region, prompting Red Hawk, a medicine man and contemporary of Red Cloud, to pronounce his people “superior to all others of mankind.” According to the Lakota civil religion, all mankind, and indeed all of what Western philosophers call ‘Being,’ finds its unity in the Wakan Tanka or Great Spirit, which “dwelt in every object, whether of nature or of man’s making.” Such unity does not preclude hierarchy, however, and to the Lakota, “when whites tried to take them away from their lands” under the policy called ‘Indian removal,’ “they threatened not only Lakota livelihood but Lakota essence as well”—an essence the Lakota judged to be of the highest merit. The essence of the Americans was the same as the essence of the Lakota insofar as they both instantiated the same Spirit, but at very least the Lakota deserved to continue their way of life on their Spirit-granted land, having won it from the other tribes. This meant that American military victories were not mere instances of physical overpowering but called into question the (so to speak) metaphysical status of the Lakota, which they had proven to their own satisfaction in battle. 

    McDermott contrasts the Lakota and American regimes. The Lakota dwelling, the tipi, with its conical shape represented “the wholeness and unity” of the world animated by the Great Spirit. So did the camp circles. The tipi is easily assembled and reassembled, designed to serve a nomadic way of life whereby the Oglala “move[d] over the land from one place to another in chase of the buffalo and to harvest fruits and other wild foods from spring through fall.” As Red Cloud put it, “no house imprisoned us.” The American settlers, by contrast, built four-cornered houses, symbols of “security and immobility, meant to protect the few who occupied it and keep out the uninvited”—in a word, property. Red Cloud, however, had no desire “to dig the earth to make food and clothing grow from it.” Such stark regime differences quite understandably led to war.

    The Lakota regime was well-adapted to warfare. “Like other Oglala boys, Red Cloud received warrior training,” with battlefield courage revered as “the greatest of virtues to which a young warrior should aspire.” The virtues inculcated by the Oglala regime find parallels in the regimes of the Gauls as Julius Caesar describes them, including generosity in addition to courage. As a young man, Red Cloud claimed some 80 ‘kills’ of enemies, many of them Crows and Pawnees, becoming what a friend of his called “a terror in war with other tribes.”. When the United States Army took over the fur trading settlement, Fort Laramie, in 1849, Red Cloud “immediately saw the differences between the Lakota and white approaches to warfare,” differences again reflective of the two regimes. Lakota warriors themselves fought in a sort of ‘nomadic’ fashion, with no organized formations; the American more resembled the Romans, forming in lines. Knowledge of the American way of war proved “most useful” to Red Cloud, Red Cloud said.

    “Red Cloud grew up in a world of intrigue and violence,” in which the Oglala fought the Pawnees, Omahas, Crows, Utes, Shoshonis, and other non-Sioux tribes, while also fighting one another. Red Cloud killed the leader of his grandfather’s enemy, Bull Bear, in 1841; this enhanced the young man’s prestige among his people, prestige he needed to rise in the tribal hierarchy because he was a second son, not in line to inherit a chieftainship. He continued to exhibit his prowess in the next decade and a half, by which time he had achieved the status of a chief “recognized by Lakotas and whites alike.” 

    Up to the late 1840s, the few Americans Amerindians saw in the region “brought firearms and other material good that benefited Lakotas,” and such traders were welcome. The California gold rush brought an influx of travelers, not settlers, but travelers carried disease, hunted, burned wood, used the prairie grasses for grazing the livestock they brought with them. To help supply and protect Americans, the United States government established forts in Nebraska, Wyoming, and Idaho. In 1851, five tribes signed an agreement with the U.S. to guarantee safe passage to travelers and acceding to the presence of the forts in exchange for annual payments in the form of goods. But this did not settle territorial disputes between the Lakota and the Crow, who continued to fight one another; nor did it prevent a serious incident a few years later, when U.S. Army Lieutenant John L. Grattan blundered into an exchange of fire with some Brules, who killed him and the men under his command. A retaliatory expedition led by Brevet Brigadier General William S. Harney resulted in a devastating defeat for one of the Brule encampments; unintimidated, the Lakota agreed in council to “exclude whites, other than traders, from the region north of the north Platte River and West of the Missouri,” to sign no more treaties, and to make war on the Crows in order “to gain control of the buffalo country near the Powder River.” The Lakota won that war, with assistance from their Cheyenne and Arapaho allies, in 1860, as the Americans readied themselves for civil war.

    Unfortunately for the Lakota, in 1858 Americans had discovered more gold and silver in what is now Colorado. “These regions became magnets drawing fortune-seeking whites in large numbers, some of whom wished to cross the Lakotas’ new sanctuary en-route.” The United States government supported their intentions, with Army Captain William F. Raynolds marking out a wagon route between the Oregon Trail and the Yellowstone-Missouri Basin, roughly along the same line as what would soon be called the Bozeman Trail, named after wagon train leader John M. Bozeman. In the wake of the Army’s victory of the eastern Sioux, resulting in the seizure of Sioux lands in Minnesota, Red Cloud went to war to prevent that from happening to his own people. “Shall we permit ourselves to be driven to and fro—to be herded like the cattle of the white men?”

    One of the main problems the U.S. government faced was lack of firm control over the Army officers, travelers, and eventual settlers in this distant part of the continent—a circumstance similar to that faced by President Jackson in his dealings with Georgians covetous of Amerindian land in the 1830s. One egregious instance of such infirmity occurred in November 1864, when an Army troop under the command of Colonel John M. Chivington attacked a peaceful Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho village, killing 53 men and 110 women in what is now known as the Sand Creek massacre. The carnage “shocked even some of the most hardened Indian-haters,” and Chivington resigned his commission to escape military prosecution. Striking back, an allied force of some 3,000 Plains Indians defeated U.S. forces at Platte Ridge Station, Wyoming, with Red Cloud participating as one of the war-party leaders. “By the end of 1865, Red Cloud was fully committed to stopping white migration and settlement in the Powder River Country and to preserving the superb hunting grounds east of the Bighorn Mountains for his own people. By doing so effectively, he had inspired like minds among the Lakotas, and from then on he was a force to be reckoned with.” 

    McDermott pauses to offer a telling observation about the Lakota way of war. A leader like Red Cloud would set strategy and lead his men to battle, but during the battle itself the warriors would fight as they chose, vying for “battle honors.” (As indeed Red Cloud himself had done, as a young warrior.) That is, they fought the way the Gauls fought the Romans or, for that matter, the way the Greeks fight in the Iliad. For their part, the Americans fought in imitation of European models, themselves based on Roman practice.  Regimes animated by individual honor or heroism resist military discipline.

    By the mid-1860s, covered wagons weren’t the only problem faced by the Plains Amerindians. Americans were building railroads, which frightened the game and thereby deprived the Lakota of their livelihood. Red Cloud saw no alternative to continuing the war that he had thus far prosecuted with some success: “White man lies and steals. My lodges were many, but now they are few. The white man wants all. The white man must fight, and the Indian will die where his fathers died.” 

    The war lasted from 1866 to 1868. Red Cloud faced U.S. forces strengthened with the end of the Civil War. He responded exactly as Vercingetorix had responded to the legions of Julius Caesar, using tactics of “stealth, swift movement, and surprise attacks designed to hurt and harass the enemy while exposing the war party to minimum risk were hallmarks of the Plains Indian military tradition,” a tradition necessarily continued because Red Cloud’s warriors “lacked up-to-date firearms, and many still depended on bows and arrows, lances, knives, tomahawks, or war clubs.” Like the great Gaul commander, Vercingetorix, who knew better than to fight the Romans alone, he offered alliance with his erstwhile enemies, the Crows, who declined to join him. By the beginning of 1868, Red Cloud, making a realistic calculation of his reduced chances, offered negotiation with the Americans, but insisted on continued Lakota rule over the Powder River valley. Seeing that there were other routes to Montana, the Grant evacuation ordered the evacuation of U.S. forts along the Bozeman Trail, signing an agreement with another prominent Lakota chief—the Brule, Spotted Tail—but not with Red Cloud. [1]

    The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 set aside the Great Sioux Reservation in the western half of today’s South Dakota and part of today’s North Dakota. Although the treaty language stipulated that these lands were reserved “for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupancy of the Sioux,” it also stated that Americans had the right to construct railroads, wagon roads, mail stations, “or other works of utility or necessity, which may be ordered or permitted by the laws of the United States”; it identified a large area between the Black Hills and the Bighorn Mountains as a place where Reservation Indians could hunt, but only so long as the buffalo population “remained sufficiently numerous.” Once the buffalo disappeared, the land “would revert to the public domain and only Americans, not Indians, would be allowed to settle there.” That is, the treaty recognized Lakota sovereignty within the Reservation but set in motion the conditions under which that sovereignty would soon become impossible to maintain. In tacit recognition of this likelihood, the United States supplied “a variety of specialists, services, infrastructure, and equipment” to encourage the Lakota “to give up their traditional way of life and take up agriculture on the Euro-American model”—the policy of regime change the Washington Administration had successfully implemented with the five Southern Amerindian tribes, before the Georgians took it upon themselves to drive them out. Americans established an “agency” or headquarters along the Missouri River, where guaranteed food rations and clothing allotments would be distributed. The rival Crows signed a similar treaty, which established a reservation in southern Montana.

    Red Cloud demurred. He did not want regime change for his people. “What he did want, he said, was some powder and lead to fight the Crows,” which Fort Laramie commander Major William Dye promptly refused. Red Cloud nevertheless agreed to peace with the Americans, since the Bozeman Trail was being abandoned by them, and that had been the casus belli. At the same time, he wanted Dye to understand that the existing regime ethos and organization of the Lakota would make “the young Lakota warriors…difficult to control.” (Indeed, Lakota chiefs and American civilian and even military authorities faced similar problems of obtaining obedience from subordinates.) Warrior regimes valorize young men; chiefs rule them by persuasion and authority, but such rule can be tenuous. Indeed, although he remained “the most influential tribal chief among the Lakotas, “the young warriors began to drift away from Red Cloud, preferring the uncompromising chiefs Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull.” In one sense, the warriors were right: the Fort Laramie Treaty “was an undeniable strategic victory for the whites because it set the stage for the eventual dispossession of the Sioux.” In another sense, Red Cloud saw more clearly than they that the Americans could no longer be stopped if the Americans chose not to be stopped. He “would spend the remainder of his days as chief attempting to ameliorate European-Americans’ impacts on his people.” He was caught in between a policy of regime change which might have preserved his people under the new conditions—although that, too, would have left them with the same risks taken by the Five Civilized Tribes of the South, which had led them to the Trail of Tears—and the predictably futile military resistance led by the war party. 

    Red Cloud confirmed his prudential sense that American advance was irresistible during his visit to Washington, D.C. in June 1870. He announced his rejection of the Fort Laramie Treaty, claiming that U.S. government translators had lied to Lakota negotiators about its terms. He also made a successful speech in defense of this position to a sympathetic audience at Cooper Union in New York, including a defense of the moral character of his regime. (“We do not want riches, but we want to train our children right. Riches would do us no good”—as indeed they would not, in the eyes of a warrior.) But he saw the vast numbers of Americans and assessed their military and economic power. Sobered, when he tried to relate what he had seen to his people at home, they dismissed his stories as impossible, some “believ[ing] that the whites had been able to make Red Cloud see only what they wanted him to see,” having cast a spell over him. Nor could Red Cloud effectively resist this consensus, given “the influence of warrior societies in Lakota affairs” and the repugnance which they felt for the agrarian way of life. By 1872, seeing that war was hopeless and the conditions of peace ignoble, Red Cloud refused to ally with Lakota in northern areas who had not signed the Fort Laramie treaty: “You must carry on war yourself. I am done.” He might not be able to win consensus among his own people, but he retained his power to refuse the requests of outsiders.

    He undertook rather to deal with the Americans at what had been titled the Red Cloud Agency, located just south of where he had located his camp. John J. Saville was the first agent there, and his “job was not easy.” Warriors from the northern tribes would arrive and demand supplies they were not entitled to have; when the intimidated Saville handed over the good it diminished those supplies for those who had signed the treaty. In order to determine the quantity of supplies he needed, Saville needed to take a census of those living at the Agency, but the Lakota wouldn’t stand for it, “fearing that the count would result in reduced rations.” As for Red Cloud himself, he had to deal with increasing factionalism among his people. Some did come to accept life on the reservation and the regime change the Americans wanted them to undergo; others also stayed but resisted regime change; some wanted a reservation of their own. Yet the U.S. government dealt with Red Cloud as if he were the “principal chief of the reservation Sioux and expected him to control all the reservation Oglala. Even if he could have done that, some of the residents were Brules, not Oglala, and Red Cloud had no real authority over them. The United States had assigned Saville more responsibility than his real power warranted; it had assigned Red Cloud more responsibility than his real authority warranted.

    This situation might have continued for a long time. It didn’t, after General Philip Sheridan sent George Armstrong Custer to explore the Black Hills. Custer confirmed the discovery of gold, there. Red Cloud and Spotted Tail were willing to enter negotiations for the sale of the Black Hills; although “the power of Wakan Tanka was concentrated in all its multiplicity in the Black Hills,” that didn’t mean that the region was sacred and never to be sold, but rather that it was primarily a source of wealth and therefore saleable at a fair price. Those who opposed the sale at the time, notably Sitting Bull, also considered it as a place of great natural resources—a gift of Wakan Tanka to the Lakota but not sacred land. Negotiations went nowhere, as President Grant met with a Lakota delegation including Red Cloud and told them to relinquish the Black Hills or lose their government-supplied food and provisions. As the impasse continued into the summer of 1875, U.S. military commanders ordered “miners and other unauthorized whites to leave the Black Hills and the other unceded Indian territories described in the Treaty of Fort Laramie” and to stay out “until new arrangements were negotiated with the Indians.” The negotiations saw no progress, with both sides hardening their positions. 

    As so often happened in U.S.-Amerindian affairs, the Army couldn’t enforce its own edicts. Miners filtered back into the Black Hills. The Army did move to enforce a command that non-treaty Indians in unceded territory move to the reservations, and when many refused to comply, the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 began. Sheridan planned a three-pronged march against the recalcitrant Lakota and Cheyenne, intending “to force the Indians into a general area where they could be engaged by any of the columns.” For his part, Lieutenant Colonel Custer was assigned five companies of the Seventh Cavalry Regiment to block a possible Indian escape in the south by occupying the Little Bighorn Valley, believed to hold a large Indian village.” He and his men famously fell victim to their gross underestimation of Lakota, Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors in the valley. Nonetheless, the overall campaign resulted in the crushing defeat of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. True to his word, Red Cloud took no part in the war.

    Loss of the war meant loss of the Black Hills. The U.S. government offered to pay for the Black Hills in exchange for not only the Black Hills but relocation—some to what is now South Dakota and others, including the Oglala and the Brules, to “Indian Territory” (now Oklahoma), where the land was better for farming. Red Cloud joined several other Oglala chiefs in signing the treaty, making “no secret of their displeasure in doing so.” On the American side, General George R. Crook, who had commanded one of the three Army forces in the 1876 march against the non-treaty Indians, suspected Red Cloud of secretly aiding those Indians who had continued to resist militarily. He removed him as chief of the reservation Indians, replacing him with Spotted Tail; this meant that the Brules, not the Oglala, would have their chief recognized by the United States as “overall chief of the Sioux.” 

    In 1878, Red Cloud and his people did move, but not to Oklahoma. They settled along White Clay Creek, just south of the town of Pine Ridge on the today’s Nebraska-South Dakota border. The Office of Indian Affairs concurred with this decision, establishing the Pine Ridge Agency as the home of Red Cloud’s much-diminished people. “The government’s struggle to remake Lakota society would continue in earnest at Pine Ridge.” 

    Spearheading the move for regime change was a thirty-year-old agent named Valentine McGillycuddy. A critic of U.S. government mistreatment of the Lakota, he had been appointed to his position after meeting with Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ezra A. Hayt and Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz in January 1879. “McGillycuddy made it his mission to start his charges on the white man’s path through education, Christianization, and agriculture”—the longstanding American policy of regime change. Unfortunately, he was temperamentally ill-suited to be a founder, “lack[ing] patience and finesse.” He told Red Cloud, “The white man has come to stay; and wherever he places his foot the native takes a back-seat.” When Red Cloud protested that this was not right, the would-be Christian agrarian educator offered that “it is not a matter of right or wrong, but of might and destiny.” By now, Red Cloud knew all about might and destiny but continued to detest the prospect of regime change. “The Great Spirit did not make us,” the Lakota, “to work. He made us to hunt and fish. The white man can work if he wants to, but the Great Spirit did not make us to work.” The Black Hills weren’t sacred, but the Lakota way of life was; since the Black Hills had been taken from the Lakota by the “white man,” the white man therefore “owes us a living for the lands he has taken from us.” McGillycuddy had no interest in perpetuating U.S. government payments to the Lakota but rather in standing them up for self-sufficiency. The way of self-sufficiency could no longer be hunting and fishing but farming, that is, regime change. For this purpose, he intended “to settle Indian families on individual homesteads throughout the reservation,” undercutting the authority of the chiefs, which depended upon economic and social communalism. As McGillycuddy observed in a report to his superiors, the chiefs’ “glory as petty potentates will have departed,” once this policy was enacted. He went so far as to undermine Lakota family structure by “encouraging” parents “to send their children to the Carlisle Indian Industrial School in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.” As an alternative, Red Cloud supported the Holy Rosary Mission, established by Jesuits in 1887 near the Pine Ridge Agency. McGillycuddy didn’t much like Catholics, and had kept them out of the reservation, but the Lakota had had good relations with a Jesuit missionary, Father Pierre-Jean De Smet, who had lived in the area in the 1830s through the 1860s. McGillycuddy outright forbade Indian religious ceremonies and practices, particularly the Sun Dance, his actions reinforced by the 1883 Code of Indian Offenses issued by the Secretary of the Interior, prohibited polygamy, the practices of the traditional medicine men, and (perhaps reflecting the growing American sentiment for prohibition of alcohol) the presence of liquor on all Indian reservations.  “The code, which outlawed several key elements of Sioux culture, was a terrific blow to the Lakota people and to Red Cloud’s prestige.” The U.S. government then added the Major Crimes Act in 1885, which eliminated Indian judicial control over cases involving felony crimes, transferring that authority to federal courts. To enforce the code, McGillycuddy moved to replace the Indian police force with Americans.

    Weary of “the bickering, charges and countercharges, threats, and confrontations emanating from Pine Ridge,” and perhaps none too happy with a Republican Party appointee in the position, the Cleveland Administration removed McGillycuddy in 1886. “Red Cloud had finally won.” His temporary replacement, Captain James M. Bell of the Seventh Cavalry, proved less annoying, and Hugh D. Gallagher, the permanent agent, quickly “established a rapport with Red Cloud and the other chiefs.” However, the Allotment Act of 1887, which advanced the policy of eliminating communal property and settling families on tracts of 160 acres, followed by the 1889 Sioux Act, which divided the Great Sioux Reservation into six smaller units and provided for the sale of the surplus to settlers, revived Red Cloud’s animosity. This time, he was outvoted by his own people, who acceded to the new arrangements. But with additional restrictions on Indian settlement, they were left with the task of “cultivat[ing] essentially barren land in a semi-arid climate.” 

    The years 1889-1890 saw another round of deadly epidemics. This led to the Ghost Dance movement, a religious revival, which Red Cloud explained: “There was no hope on earth, and God seemed to have forgotten us. Some said they saw the Son of God; others did not see Him. If He had come, He would do some great things as He had done before.” The revival coincided with the arrival of still another agent, Daniel F. Royer, “whose political connections were his sole qualification for office.” Terrified by the Ghost Dance, he “dispatched a frantic plea for military protection.” The arrival of army troops in turn terrified the Ghost Dancers, who fled the reservation; simultaneously, a band of Minneconjou Lakota left their reservation and headed for Pine Ridge. Intercepted by U.S. cavalry at the end of December and refusing to disarm, they fought and died near Wounded Knee Creek, losing at least 175 men, women, and children while killing 25 U.S. cavalry and wounding 39 others. Red Cloud correctly predicted that the surviving “hostiles” would eventually surrender and settle in the reservation. As for himself, “My sun is set. My day is done. Darkness is stealing over me.” He died in 1909. 

    Red Cloud shared with Vercingetorix what would later be called a ‘guerrilla’ strategy. This shows that military strategies suggest themselves to human beings as such, when they face similar circumstances. Both the Lakota and the Gauls loved liberty, understood as living free of rule by foreigners; this, too, may well reflect human nature. And they were both brave in battle. Yet Red Cloud, as Americans understood him, excelled Vercingetorix. as Caesar understood him, in steadiness and prudence. Constrained by young warriors who wanted only to fight and win honor, himself preferring the way of life of the hunter to that of the farmer, neither he nor his regime was quite civilized in the Roman (or the American) sense, but he had a statesmanlike quality that sets him above the Gaul. 

     

    Note

    1. For a careful study of Spotted Tail’s life, see Richmond L. Clow: Spotted Tail: Warrior and Statesman.  Pierre: South Dakota Historical Society, 2019.

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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