Speech to the Jersey Shore Branch of the American Association of University Women. Forum on “Peace and Security.” The Presbyterian Church on the Hill, Ocean Township, New Jersey, November 14, 1983.

 

Having heard of the devastation nuclear explosions inflict, having considered the history of the arms race, our thoughts incline toward arms control. In thinking of arms control, we of course think of safety. To want safety is to experience fear. Fear can concentrate our minds wonderfully, to paraphrase Dr. Johnson. But it can also blur the mind.

Consider, for example, the words of Mr. Jonathan Schell, author of a bestselling polemic titled The Fate of the Earth. “The defense of our nation, or the defense of liberty or the defense of socialism, or the defense of whatever we happen to believe in,” he claims, is morally negligible in contrast to the need to prevent human extinction. Although camouflaged in moralistic language, this is nothing other than the doctrine of survival at all costs, and it’s easy to arrive at: Schell consults his cowardice and calls it ‘conscience.’ For to say that we must sacrifice “whatever we believe in” in order to survive is to destroy any reason to survive. It allows—more, it encourages—the aggression of tyrants, the very war it tries to prevent. Commenting on the false idealism that deluded two generations in Europe after the First World War, Adolf Hitler wrote, “Other people’s illusions about power were my great opportunity.”

Whenever we hear proposals for arms control, we must therefore take care that our fear truly concentrates our minds instead of blurring them. It is not enough merely to recount nuclear horror stories and call for a treaty. We must examine the several kinds of treaties and ask, Which one makes the most sense, not only now but in the long run?

Making sense in the long run means that at least three criteria must be met: stability, verifiability, and enforceability. Stability means that adversaries will have no incentive to start a nuclear war; because they are adversaries, this means deterrence, not trust. Verifiability too cannot rest on trust; it requires reliable, independent, national means of inspection. Enforceability is perhaps the most neglected criterion: The ability to verify a treaty violation means nothing if the United States government lacks the means and/or the political determination meaningfully to penalize the country that commits the violation. Deterrence must hold not only in matters of war but also in matters of peace.

There are three basic types of nuclear arms control treaties: limitation treaties, reduction treaties, and moratorium or ‘freeze’ treaties. Limitation treaties, exemplified by SALT I and II, allow some growth in nuclear arsenals but put a ‘cap’ on that growth. Such treaties were popular in the last decade. But the reduction and ‘freeze’ treaties get more attention today, and they are the ones I’ll discuss tonight. Obviously, it’s possible to devise treaties that combine features of all three types, but for our purposes it’s best to keep things clear.

I oppose the several ‘freeze’ treaties that have gained currency in the last three years. I support several of the ideas for reductions and limitations. Here are my reasons.

Advocates of the ‘nuclear freeze’ argue that a ‘freeze’ on the development, production, and deployment of all nuclear weapons would be easily verified because any nuclear weapons activity at all would violate the treaty. We would not need to worry about technical distinctions between kinds of nuclear weapons. But ‘freeze’ partisans also argue against the deployment of cruise missiles—which, they say, are too small to keep track of. If this is true, then a ‘freeze’ in Europe is unverifiable because most of the nuclear warheads there are on short-range, ‘tactical’ launchers even smaller than cruise missiles. Without verification, treaty enforcement is obviously impossible.

What about a ‘freeze’ on only the larger, ‘strategic’ and intermediate-range missiles? This would run into a major long-term problem, as there are important differences in the ages of the U. S. and Soviet arsenals as well as in the kinds of weapons they contain.

Eight-five percent of the Soviets’ strategic nuclear warheads are on bombers and missiles built after 1970. Less than half of ours are. Moreover, the Soviets’ major offensive threat to us consists of the three kinds of big, land-based missiles that they first deployed in 1974 and 1975—the SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s. There are now over 800 of them, equipped with thousands of powerful warheads; they can destroy most if not all o our land-based missiles and about one-ha of our bombers and submarines. Our bombers and submarines, upon which we depend to deter such attack, are, with few exceptions, five, ten, and some cases fifteen to twenty years older than the Soviets’ new land-based missiles.

The lifetime of a bomber is 25-30 years; that of a submarine is 20 to 25 years. Under a total ‘freeze,’ the Soviets would have no reason to reduce their arms. They could simply wait for our older systems to deteriorate. They’re already deteriorating. Four years ago, we had 41 submarines armed with strategic nuclear missiles; since then, we’ve deactivated ten of them (with a total of 160 missiles and hundreds of warheads) because they were too old. We’ve replaced them with five new Trident submarines, with a total of 120 missiles. By the mid-1990s, under a total ‘freeze,’ we would have only these five submarines as a deterrent. At any given time, only two or three of them would be at sea–inviting g targets for Soviet anti-submarine warfare.

Some ‘freeze’ advocates reply by offering to replace old weapons with new ones of the same kind—ne Polaris submarines for old Polaris submarines, for example. They admit the existence of the difference in age between the U. S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals but say they only want a ‘freeze’ on new types of weapons—no replacing Polaris submarines with Trident submarines.

This argument overlooks two problems. First, although some ‘freeze’ proponents say that they only want a ‘freeze’ on new kinds of weapons, in fact they never push for the replacement of the old ones. Their inaction speaks louder than their words.

Second, ‘freeze’ advocates fail to see that even with replacement, the Soviet task of attacking will remain simpler than the U. S. task of defending. Bombers (defensive weapons too slow to use in a surprise attack, given the current state of anti-aircraft technology) can be shot down. Techniques are now being developed that will enable both countries to track and destroy submarines more efficiently. In addition, the Soviets are reportedly testing a new anti-missile missile, the SA-12, which may be capable of destroying our Poseidon submarine-launched missiles. Under a ‘freeze,’ anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons would not be outlawed because most of them wouldn’t be nuclear weapons. The Soviets could put the money they would save on building nuclear weapons into weapons to use against our submarines an bombers. Meanwhile, we would still need to worry about their land-based missiles, against which a feasible defense will be highly problematic. Land-based missiles constitute seventy percent of their stockpile.

Could we tie a ‘freeze’ to a treaty prohibiting anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons? Probably not: Current types of anti-aircraft systems could be monitored, but satellite-based technologies would almost surely be unverifiable. And no one knows how to enforce such a treaty, even if it were verifiable.

Fortunately, reduction treaties, if properly designed, avoid the disadvantages of the ‘freeze.’ The most important of these treaties is called the nuclear ‘build-down.’ Proposed by Democratic Congressman Al Gore, it now has bipartisan support in Washington.

The ‘build-down’ solves the problem of the differences between the U. S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. It does so by proposing that both sides move gradually toward greater emphasis on smaller, defensive weapons and less emphasis on the large, fast, accurate first-strike weapons. The ‘build-down’ would cut the number of strategic warheads by eliminating multiple-warhead ICBMs by 1994. It would limit the number of air-launched cruise missiles while limiting the range and speed of submarine-launched missiles. It would reduce the power of land-based warheads.

Advocates of the nuclear ‘freeze’ have attacked the ‘build-down,’ in part because they misunderstand it and in part because they understand it all too well. Some have claimed that it allows us to deploy first-strike weapons; this, clearly, is nonsense. They are confusing the proposal itself with the political deal Democrats in Congress struck with President Reagan in in order to make the ‘build-down’ official U. S. policy. Reagan accepted the ‘build-down’ in exchange for Democratic endorsement of such offensive missiles as the MX and the Trident D-5. This endorsement, however, is contingent on the failure of the Soviets to come to an equitable agreement. If the ‘build-down’ is accepted, the MX could not be kept beyond 1994. There would be very little reason to build it at all. If, on the other hand, the ‘build-down’ or some other equitable treaty is not accepted, the U. S. and the Soviet Union will continue the arms race. This, of course, is true of any arms control proposal, including the ‘freeze’; it can’t work if it’s not accepted.

The real reason that some leaders of the ‘freeze’ campaign object to the ‘build-down’ is the one I hinted at earlier. They are using the vehicle of a bilateral ‘freeze’ as a prod to force a unilateral ‘freeze’ on the United States. Adoption of the ‘build-down’ would frustrate this intention.

At the beginning of my talk I criticized the irrationality of those who would sacrifice all their convictions for the hope of survival. I shall end by criticizing not the theoretical arguments of some disarmers, but an equally flawed practical argument they advance.

One reason for their campaign to unilaterally ‘freeze’ U. S. development, production, and deployment of the MX, the Trident D-5, and the Pershing II missile system in Europe is the fact that these are offensive weapons that could, sometime in the 1990s, threaten to destroy Soviet land-based missiles and command centers, just as the Soviets can now destroy our own land-based missiles and command centers. If we deploy such weapons, disarmers say, the Soviets will put their missiles on a computer-based system of alert, so that their missiles can be fired before our missiles strike. Under such circumstances, a computer error would inevitably lead to catastrophe.

The argument ignores two points. First, the Soviets have more than enough time to increase the number and quality of their defensive weapons, their submarines and bombers, thus deterring future U. S. attack. that is exactly what they are doing now, among other things. They also have more than enough time to sign a reasonable treaty. Second, the whole argument assumes that the Soviets would deliberately put their lives at the mercy of unreliable computers. In effect, this would amount to committing sure suicide in order to avoid the risk of being killed. Surely we cannot make our defense policy a hostage to such an incredible threat.

If I can achieve only one thing tonight, it would be to encourage everyone to examine arms control proposals, and the arguments supporting them, with as much care as we examine proposals to build more weapons. Properly understood, defense and diplomacy are the proverbial ‘two sides of the same coin.’ I am not going to stand here in a Christian church and suggest that survival in liberty is a coin of infinite price. This church embodies convictions transcending political liberty and physical survival. Nevertheless, survival in liberty is a coin of high price, worth keeping. Let’s flatter ourselves in thinking that reasonable discussions of “peace and security” will help us keep it.

Sam Cohen: The Truth About the Neutron Bomb: The Inventor of the Bomb Speaks Out. New York: William Morrow, 1983.

In the early years of the Reagan Administration, the proposed buildup of American nuclear weapons stockpiles provoked a backlash which took several forms. Among these were the ‘nuclear freeze’ movement in the United States and the demonstrations against deployment of short-range and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. At the time, the Warsaw Pact forces commanded by the Soviet Union outmatched those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The ‘neutron bomb’ (originally conceived in the late 1950s by physicist Sam Cohen of the Livermore Laboratories) was intended to redress this imbalance by threatening ground troops with destruction while causing less (although still substantial) damage to buildings and other structures. This capacity inspired a memorable Soviet propaganda line, which described the weapons as “the capitalist bomb, which kills people while leaving property intact.” Given the fact that the Warsaw Pact forces would have destroyed both people and property (a telling commentary on the character of Communism), the witticism fell a bit flat.

By the twenty-first century, the neutron-bomb technology had been countered by improved armor for tanks. Never deployed, the weapons themselves no longer form part of NATO stockpiles. This notwithstanding, the controversy raised important moral issues concerning military technology. The review below was published in Chronicles of Culture, Volume 7, Number 10, October 1983.

 

“This book marks the first time a ‘nuclear hawk’ has defected from the American nuclear establishment,” the blurb-writer exclaims, with customary dustjacket urgency. One expects another “what have I done?” lament by a guilt-ridden nuclear physicist, stuff guaranteed to make its author a celebrity on the church-and-college lecture circuit. Some partisans of disarmament will surely buy it, hoping to confirm their prejudices.

I hope they read it. For Sam Cohen resolutely disdains to conceive of himself as Dr. Frankenstein. After working at Los Alamos during World War II, he became a specialist in radiological warfare, inventing the neutron warhead in the late 1950s. “Speaking candidly and truthfully, I will say that I’ve never had any moral qualms or feelings of guilt about my pursuits in this military field. I have always believed that the United States must have strong and effective military forces—especially nuclear forces. His patience with dovish colleagues is limit; “many respected scientists… know better intellectually but are emotionally helpless to look objectivity at issues involving the military use of nuclear radiation.” Or, still more bluntly: “[T] here has been one thing that particularly impressed—better still, depressed—me about most renowned American scientists. This is their ability to be impeccably careful and responsible when working in their fields of specialization (if they’re not, their colleagues will catch them and even punish them) but their sloppiness and irresponsibility when giving their scientific opinion on nuclear weapons when they have an ideological bias against them, because they know that their colleagues, who share their bias, don’t give a damn when they do.” Among these are scientists now prominent in the ‘nuclear freeze’ campaign: Dr. George Kistiakowsky, science adviser to the president in the Eisenhower Administration, whose “strong ideological conviction that a nuclear test ban was imperative” led him to support the first such ban (1958), abrogated by the Soviet three years later; Dr. Jerome Weisner of MIT, who campaigned vigorously for John Kennedy and evidently has maintained his partisan allegiance; and Nobelist Hans Bethe, who claimed, with J. Robert Oppenheimer, that the hydrogen bomb could not be built. At very least, Cohen can further dispel the popular illusion that scientists speak to us, well, scientifically when they engage in politics.

Cohen divides his book into two sections. The first four chapters contain his account of the neutron warhead’s invention and the controversies attending it. The Pentagon had wanted nuclear warheads that would generate a powerful blast, intense heat, and radiation—in that order. Cohen wanted to reverse that priority, for two purposes: to develop a warhead whose high radioactivity would cause the explosive in an incoming nuclear warhead to decompose (the Sprint anti-ICBM missile resulted, “many years later”); to develop a short-range missile warhead whose intense but short-lived radiation would make it “the first battlefield weapon… in history [which] would allow a guaranteed, highly effective defense against an invading army without producing wholesale physical destruction of the country being invaded.”

The Pentagon, particularly the Navy, championed the neutron warhead from 1959 to 1961, not so much because it cared about the weapon itself but because it wanted to end the Eisenhower/Khruschev proposal for a nuclear test ban. Then as today, the Soviets denounced neutron technology, with Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev averring, “This is the morality of monsters!” Similar protestations from the community of conscience recurred until September 1, 1961, when the Politburo announced a unilateral end to the ban, followed by “the most massive series of tests the world has ever seen.” Having arranged their experiments in advance while the Americans as it were busied themselves with inactivity, the Soviets briefly gained a lead in nuclear weapons technology. (Cohen has the good manners not to insist that readers associate this tactic with current Premier Andropov’s recommended ‘freeze’). After this debacle, the Pentagon no longer needed the neutron warhead as a weapon in bureaucratic warfare; interest in it disappeared until the mid-1970s.

By then, America’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union had yielded not a relaxation of tensions but a Soviet advantage in European ground troops so striking that even President Jimmy Carter noticed it. He planned the neutron warhead’s production and deployment, then reneged after Soviet ‘President’ Leonid Brezhnev, United States Senator Mark O. Hatfield, and other peace-loving souls inveighed against the ‘capitalist bomb’ that ‘destroys people but not property.’ “The problem,” Cohen remarks, “is that any agreement, tacit or explicit, to effect a mutual forswearing of N-bomb production is nonsense. There is no conceivable way by means of national technical verification, that such an agreement can be monitored.” Seismic sensors can detect the underground testing of warheads that explode by nuclear fission; they cannot detect the much smaller explosions produced by nuclear fusion in neutron warheads. An unverifiable treaty won’t amount to much.

President Ronald Reagan ordered the production of neutron warheads, but deferred their deployment in Europe until after land-based intermediate-range missiles (Pershing II’s and ground-launched cruise missiles) go into place. Impatient with diplomacy, Cohen argues that a weapon good enough to produce is good enough to deploy. This is not necessarily the case; scientists may not be any better at strategy than they are at purging their minds of ideological biases.

The book’s last five chapters consist of polemics on the military, political, and ethical problems associated with Cohen’s invention. He quickly disposes of opponents regarded as experts by the news media. To Herbert Scoville, Jr., one of the most-quoted ‘freeze’ eminences, who claims that irradiated soldiers will fight harder, Cohen replies that the soldiers targeted will become incapacitated quickly, and that by asking us to fear the possible behavior of soldiers on the periphery of the explosion Scoville “divert[s] the targeting issue to troops that aren’t targeted.” To Dr. Kistiakowsky, who claims that the Soviets could shield their tank crews against radiation, Cohen replies that indeed one can, “provided that you’re willing to incapacitate the tank” by overloading it with heavy armor. To Stanford University physicist Sidney Drell, who claims that a neutron warhead explosion would make the irradiated area “uninhabitable for long periods of time,” Cohen replies that “This is patently false,” that calculations show radiation declining to a safe level in a few hours. To United States Senator H. John Heinz, who claims that the neutron warhead is “literally dehumanizing,” Cohen replies, “Speaking for myself, if I were going to be wounded on the field of battle, I’d far rather be dosed by radiation than burned by napalm, or crushed by blast concussion, or have my body torn up by a land mine or fragmentation bomb.”

These arguments are not only persuasive, they are simple. Cohen argues that intellectuals think badly about war because they imagine suffering so vividly that their fear overturns their intellect. I am convinced that there is an additional problem; even when intellectuals master their fear, the basic simplicity of warfare befuddles them. It is too unsubtle for them to grasp, all this business of push coming to shove. They complicate matters beyond recognition, then take professional soldiers for bloody-minded dolt. Cohen, no professional soldier, is at his best when he thinks like one.

At his worst, he essays geopolitical strategy. His advertised ‘defection’ from “the American nuclear establishment” consists of an argument for isolationism. In a war with the Soviets, Europe and the Middle East would cost us more to defend than they are worth, he writes. So pull our troops out and use the money we save to rebuild our nuclear arsenal and strengthen our civil defense programs. These eminently American sentiments cannot amount to a serious policy for a commercial republic confronting a military oligarchy animated by ideologically-inspired fanaticism. Soviet domination of Europe and the Middle East would obviously give them control of two of our principal markets.

Even in its military aspect, Cohen’s isolationism must fail. He calls defending Europe impossible because the Soviets will try to destroy NATO’s nuclear defenses, including any neutron warheads in Europe, before the Warsaw Pact forces move in. But the Soviets warn that any NATO warheads hitting Soviet territory—and some surely would, even during an intendedly preclusive strike by the Soviets—will bring retaliation against the United States itself. If they mean that, they recognize that a European war would probably cause global war. They will not imagine they can win that war unless Western pacifists have their way. Nuclear weapons in Western Europe will tie America to its allies more firmly than at any time in the last twenty years. Europeans who fear this tie, who feel more threatened by our weapons and our policy than by Soviet weapons and policy may yet to decide to see more clearly. Cohen says they won’t; I suspect they will. We’ll see which one of us is right, but in the meantime it would be a bad mistake to insure defeat by giving up too soon.