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    Politics and Romance: Hawthorne’s Blithedale

    April 29, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    ‘Utopia’ means ‘no place’ as well as ‘good place,’ so founding one outside book would require giving no place, negating the airy nothingness of imagination. If you can dream it, you can do it, utopians say. Realists reply, Why so? and utopians answer, Why not? The problem with the question, ‘Why not?’ is its openness; an evil man can pose it as easily as good one. One should deal circumspectly with utopians.

    Nathaniel Hawthorne prefaces The Blithedale Romance circumspectly, with a ‘cover’ story. [1] Although Blithedale (‘Happy Valley’) resembles the Brook Farm commune founded in Roxbury, Massachusetts in 1840, Hawthorne professedly does not intend “to illustrate a theory, or elicit a conclusion, favorable or otherwise, in respect to socialism” (633). Hawthorne invites his readers to think undogmatically about a political dogma. He claims a purely literary reason for selecting this no-place for his setting. An “American romancer” needs “an atmosphere of strange enchantment” not easily found in his matter-of-fact commercial republic. Brook Farm/Blithedale was just such a place, “essentially a day-dream, and not yet a fact”—”an available foothold between fiction and reality” (674). By so characterizing the Roxbury utopia, Hawthorne quietly puts its founders (himself included) in their place, while saying nothing to provoke ideological antagonism. To thoughtful readers he uncovers himself as a politic man.

    His apologia leads such readers to wonder, Why be a “romancer” at all? Why not be novelist who stays closer to hard facts? Or a journalist, or an essayist? the author selects the genre, not the other way around. Hawthorne wrote in a variety of genres. Why choose this one?

    To write astringently about Brook Farm in 1852, a decade or so after living there, would have exposed Hawthorne to hazards akin to the political speaker who engages in ‘personalities.’ Moreover, although Brook Farm had faded away by 1852, reform politics had strengthened, at least in New England; abolitionism, women’s rights, pacifism, and prohibition (of alcohol and even tobacco, a crop harvested by slaves) all had their fervent champions, many of whom endorsed all of those reforms more or less at once. The collision of romanticism with American politics would precipitate such controversy as might end in violence. A head-on critique, a polemic or word-war, would only exacerbate tensions. A prudent man might prefer indirection. A sort of romance novel—with its vivid characters, men who aspire to heroism, ladies with mysterious pasts, love repressed and expressed—might neutralize romantic toxins with romantic and mock-romantic anti-toxins. A romance after all will hold the attention of romantic souls first of all; a certain sort of romance might cure them of romantic excesses. Can there be a prudent romance?

    Finally, does political life itself not have a touch of romance in it, even in the sobersided commercial republic? He would rule by ballots rather than bullets needs to tell a story about himself in order to get elected; he needs to become Old Tippecanoe, Dr. New Deal, or the Man from Hope. Even the regime of enlightened self-interest runs also on stirring fictions and semi-fictions that make an election seem more than the usual rat race. Hawthorne in his preface shows himself both politic with respect to his circumstances nd understanding with respect to American politics, indeed politics generally.

    He divides his romance into twenty-nine chapters, narrated by a man whose name, Miles Coverdale, incorporates covering or masking. Scholars have noticed that a dale or valley symbolizes the human heart in Hawthorne’s fiction; Mr. Covered-heart will tell us about the no-place of Happy Heart, in a romance by a writer with a cover story. As for “Miles,” it suggests distance; Coverdale characteristically distances himself, does not fully participate in life real or utopian, in order to see clearly, and to consider what he sees. His watchfulness adds nothing to his popularity, to his political effectiveness in a democratic society, but it does make him a more plausible than any whole-souledly political actor would be.

    Inasmuch as the word ‘utopia’ invites one to think about place, one may group the chapters here according to the place in which the narrator resides. Coverdale walks miles back and forth between Boston and Blithedale. The first and final chapters complement one another; each is set in the city. The second and fourth chapter groups (chapters 2-15 and chapters 24-28) describe the narrator’s stays in the countryside commune. The central group of chapters see Coverdale in the city. The city, Boston, means politics and commerce; the country commune founds itself on principles opposed to American commercial republicanism, albeit not entirely opposed to all American impulses, particularly in New England: Many critics have noticed in the Blithedalers the American Puritan and even American Enlightenment urge to secede from a corrupt old world and start anew. [3] Americans need to distinguish among secessions. Some are reasonable, some merely passion-driven, factitious.

    The first chapter, “Old Moodie,” contrasts with the last chapter, “Miles Coverdale’s Confession.” Each title points to a man. Old Moodie, an eccentric partly masked by an eye-patch, accosts the bachelor-poet Coverdale, whom Moodie knows to be ready to take up residence at Blithedale. Old Moodie almost but not quite asks Coverdale to do him “a very great favor,” unspecified, then reconsiders and demurs. His secret, a story of love gone very wrong, counterbalances the self-uncovering of Coverdale’s own futile love in chapter 29. Like politics, so often fueled by libido dominandi, romantic love lends itself to covering, to stratagem, to subterfuge. Aristotle sees that the love of man and woman can yield a family, then link with other families to form clans, tribes, villages, and finally the political community. Modern romantic love complicates the very foundation of political life by democratizing it, so to speak. By making marriage a love-match, it introduces the complexities of the lovers’ assent, and consequently their passions, into the very foundations of the city, where before the young had done their fathers’ bidding in sustaining the family founded by distant ancestors. Coverdale himself seems to have no family. Not only has he no wife or children, he seems not to have parents or relations of any sort. He is a man without connections, if not qualities. If Coverdale is young man so to speak without parents, Old Moodie will turn out to be a father so to speak without children, a man who sired but did not really father two daughters who find themselves living together for the first time at Blithedale. Blithedale is indeed utopia, a no-place populated in part not by fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, but by ‘consenting adults’ whose real families are nowhere to be seen. [4] They are social atoms who suppose themselves to oppose commercial republicanism with communitarianism, the “blithe tones of brotherhood” (641), but in fact exaggerate or caricature its individualism. Blithedale is, as one chapter title calls it, “a modern Arcadia,” and thus no Arcadia at all.

    Blithedale as No-Place
    The first group of chapters, set in Blithedale, find Coverdale’s attention quickly focused on two women and one man. [5] Zenobia’s name and nature belie the ostensible egalitarianism of communitarianism conceived democratically. “Zenobia” is a pen name, “a sort of mask” (637), for a feminist literary lioness with “something imperial” about her: “However humble looked her new philosophy, [she] had as much native pride as any queen would have known what to do with” (642-643). She’s taken her name from the third-century queen of Palmyra, whom we meet in Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. [6] Such spiritedness by nature precludes social and political equality from the start. Such a one must rule, ruin, or be ruined. At the founding of paradisiacal Blithedale, she is both Eve (646-647) and Pandora (652), unwittingly bringing evils. [7] That commercial-republican America can produce a Zenobia, the type of an Oriental despot, poses a problem that Blithedale utopianism cannot cure, one that the great commercial republic itself can only ‘kill.’ That commercial-republican America can produce a Zenobia also suggests the limits even carefully-designed political institutions and the way of life they reinforce can have over some human souls—bad news for good-place aspirations.

    The other woman, young and wan, is carried in out of the snowstorm half-frozen. Eventually discovered as Zenobia’s half-sister, offspring of Old Moodie’s second marriage, Priscilla arrives masked or veiled as it were, wrapped in a cloak against the cold. Anything but imperial, she attaches herself to Zenobia, seeking and needing protection and just rule. A natural rank-order establishes itself on the first day of Coverdale’s stay at Blithedale.

    The man, Hollingsworth (his worth will indeed finally sound hollow, not holy, when tested), tends Coverdale patiently when the poetaster takes ill, less out of compassion than to attach an ally by the cords of obligation. The only Blithedalian to ask a blessing in prayer, he prays not for the successful founding of Blithedale. Hollingworth subverts the commune even more radically than Zenobia does, coming to it not as a citizen but as a revolutionary under cover. Hollingsworth wants to turn Blithedale into the site of a reformatory for criminals, and in his monomaniacal reformism he cares for Coverdale “only for the ulterior purpose of making me a proselyte to his views” (681). He seeks co-conspirators for a bloodless coup d’état, a revolution to replace the revolutionary experiment the others have consented to undertake. Declaiming vehemently against the French socialist Fourier, who would build socialism upon selfishness (677), he mistakes his own “terrible egoism” for “an angel of God” (679). Hollingworth had worked as a blacksmith; Hephaestus numbered among the gods Zeus charged with the creation of Pandora. Hephaestus is a sort of father to Pandora. Blithedale’s Pandora, Zenobia, and her half-sister both fall in love with Hollingsworth. Their love for a superficially strong megalomaniac derives from their real father’s failure to father.

    Sickness (and by implication death) takes some of the blitheness out of the dale. Imagery of cold and marble prefigure death at Blithedale (664). Coverdale’s suggestion to build a cemetery gets brushed aside; the residents of Happy Valley want no part of the Valley of the Shadow of Death. Sickness and death put natural limits on utopia. So does work. After recovering from his illness, Coverdale quickly finds that the community needs a sort of foreign policy, a way of competing economically with the city (649). A true no-place—the just city of Plato’s Republic, for example—need not worry about foreigners, but this no-place is placed, and so must. To compete, it needs workers, not poets or feminist tractarian-orators, and Coverdale does work, hard, experiencing for the first time, he later sees, “the curse of Adam’s posterity” (688-689). In any real place, a life balancing work and leisure proves nearly impossible. The curse of Adam’s posterity is here in the new Paradise; merely communalizing labor does nothing to lift that curse. Blithedale’s egalitarianism precludes even the very limited leisure seen in Socrates’ utopia, restricted to the philosopher-kings and compromised even for them because they must take the time to rule their inferiors. there will never be a ‘synthesis’ of democracy nd utopia. The cure for the ills of utopianism is not more democracy.

    Modern science gives intellectual and even some moral authority to the modern commercial republic, assisting citizen in their quest for the conquest of nature in order to procure self-preservation and comfort. But the Promethean technology that enables citizens to dispense with slaves has yet to enable commercial republicans to work less hard, although they do work less with their bodies. For all its rhetoric of Enlightenment, modern science covers a heart that beats for power, not liberty. In Boston, Coverdale had seen an exhibition of clairvoyance—forward-seeing, literally pro-methean—starring The Veiled Lady, a covered, mysterious figure whom Coverdale calls “one of the earliest that had indicated the birth of a new science, or the revival of an old humbug” (635). In replacing the authority of God (in Enlightenment terms, priestcraft) with the authority of science, we must still ask: Is the latest modern marvel a produce of science or of quackery, real knowledge or clever sham? [8]  The Veiled Lady’s partner is a Professor Westervelt (‘Western-world’), a Satanic mesmerist who later slithers into mock-Edenic Blithedale, confiding truths and lies. The main truths: that Hollingsworth cares less for Zenobia than for the money she can donate to his projected reformatory (this, to Coverdale); that Priscilla is the Veiled Lady and Zenobia’s half-sister (this, to his ex-lover, Zenobia). The main lie: his very being, which uses truth cynically, to rule or, failing that, to ruin. Westervelt lives in the shadow-world of the Enlightenment project, seeing that if science can conquer nature the appearance of science, a mask of scientism, can gull citizens to consent to tyranny. Both sisters, without the natural protection of a fatherly father, have at different times succumbed to Westervelt’s half-real, half-fraudulent charms—modest Priscilla to the charm of his mesmerism, the erotic and spirited Zenobia to the charms of his body. Mesmerism combines a sort of science with a sort of rhetoric; Westervelt’s personal beauty is artificially enhanced with false teeth and fancy clothes.

    As for the fourth character, the narrator himself, in the first set of Blithedale chapters he reveals more than he knows. Coverdale reveals himself as a modern and democratized man, a being of denatured manliness, “a devoted epicure of [his] own emotions” (760). Of his Blithedale foray he rightly says, near the outset, “the greatest obstacle to being heroic”—to being a man in full—”is the doubt whether one may not be going to prove oneself a fool; the truest wisdom is to resist the doubt; the profoundest wisdom is to know when it ought to be resisted, and when obeyed” (640). Just so, especially in a political enterprise, especially an enterprise of political reform, and most especially in the most radical enterprise of political reform, the founding of a new political community. In this highest politics, heroism, the finest spiritedness, combines with prudence or practical wisdom to form the statesman-founder or the preserver of some good founding. Coverdale finds such wisdom, but only retrospectively. Although attracted, he could not, “under any circumstances, have fallen in love with Zenobia” (672), as a real man might have done; he reads the George Sand romances she gives him without discernible effect. He dislikes his own sex (men are such brutes, he muses [695]); he contends that the best aspect of a man’s soul is seen when womanly caring shines through (667); he says that he wishes he could be ruled by women instead of men. But the two sisters he cares for at Blithedale love the blow-hard but at least superficially manly Hollingsworth, armed with the “necromancy” of rhetoric (741)—when they are not in the thrall of that other magician, Westervelt. Coverdale lacks even the modest degree of manliness that would attract a woman sufficiently to want to rule him. He can neither rule nor be ruled, and so lacks both characteristics of the Aristotelian citizen.

    Covering himself, he quite literally observes others from all angles; from below, when listening to Hollingsworth’s harangues delivered atop a large rock; from above, when in an apartment in town, looking into the windows across the street, or in a leafy bower in the woods at Blithedale. He acts effectively only in slavish work, never in political rule. Coverdale has one strength, born of passivity; he can resist the machinations of stronger men. He instantly spots Westervelt as an evil mountebank, and sees through Hollingsworth, too, not so quickly. In the book’s central chapter, “A Crisis,” he resists Hollingsworth’s offer of subordinate partnership in the criminal-reformatory scheme. He is just strong enough to say no, if never strong enough to say yes. Zenobia, so very wrong so often and even wicked in one thing, foretells Coverdale’s fate in her story of a young man, Theodore (literally and ironically, ‘Gift-from-God’), offered the choice of loving the Veiled Lady without seeing her unveiled or unveiling her first but forbidden from having her and longing forever for her face. Coverdale can resist evil, but lacks the manliness to love erotically or Christianly/agapically, which is always, in this world, to love sight-unseen (776-777). Zenobia (‘Gift-from-Zeus’) does see into the covered heart of Mr. Gift-from-God, and judges him not to be God’s gift to women.

    Coverdale’s refusal does precipitate a crisis. If Hollingsworth can have no male followers (however minimally manly), only women, he has only one half of what he needs as a founder. His enterprise because no other men will join it, not even weak ones. If the romance ended here, the romancer would have a novella satirizing modern reformers. But Hawthorne will dig deeper.

     

    Return to the City

    In the central set of chapters Coverdale recounts his time back in the city, after his break with Hollingsworth leaves his bonds with the sisters weakened. Before leaving Blithedale, he visits the communal pigsty, “to take leave of the swine!” (757). In Plato’s Republic, one of Socrates’ young interlocutors pushes his partners to new philosophic heights by dismissing Socrates’ first formulation of the just city as a mere city of pigs, a place where only the most ordinary needs of the body are to be satisfied, while the boldest, most spirited eroticism will starve. Blithedale’s real city of pigs is populated by “greasy citizens” who are “almost stifled and buried alive, in their corporeal substance.” “Peeping at me, an instant, out of their small, red, hardly perceptible eyes”—no visionary madness, here—”they dropt asleep again; yet not so far asleep but that their unctuous bliss was still present to them, betwixt dream and reality” (757-758). In the preface Hawthorne had called Brook Farm itself both daydream and fact, fiction and reality. For Hawthorne as for Plato, the best practical utopians are pigs, who suffer none of the heart-burnings of people.

    Going to the countryside means returning to nature, and Hawthorne uses the four natural elements (fire, water, earth, and air) as images throughout. Coverdale returns to the city but discovers for the first time that nature is there, too: sky, rain, fruit trees, grapevines, wind, birds, and a solitary predatory cat. And a human family, the only unbroken one in the novel. The city is natural for human beings; romanticism is mistaken in its naturalism. “‘I bless God for these good folks,’ thought I to myself—’I have not seen a prettier piece of nature, in all my summer in the country…. I will pay them a little more attention, by-and-by'” (764). If he ever does, he doesn’t tell us; that doesn’t prevent us from remembering them. He next sees a dove in a rainstorm, yet does not think of the Covenant, and its promise of a world that will never be destroyed again, by God or man.

    Against the persistent strength of nature, human beings in this group of chapters set their art. The first of these artists is the wealthy Zenobia, whom Coverdale spies in her apartment with Priscilla and Westervelt. In town, Zenobia dresses according to her status, transforming herself “into a work of art” (775). Offended by her cold treatment, Coverdale induces her to blush and then to pale by mentioning Hollingsworth, who, he remarks, likely prefers the more pliant of the sisters. Zenobia sees this, too, and attempts to rid herself of her rival by shunting her back to Westervelt, who puts her on exhibit again as the Veiled Lady. Here socialism, scientism, and charlatanry converge explicitly. Westervelt speaks to his audience of marks about “a new era that was dawning upon the world; a near that would link soul to soul, and the present life to what we call futurity, with a closeness that should finally convert both worlds into one great, mutually conscious brotherhood” (806). In this New Age of what Coverdale calls with deliberate paradox “mystical sensuality,” men believe that not only nature but human nature, the human soul, are infinitely malleable (804), stuff for the scientistic and synthetic forging of a new Heaven and a new Earth. This is the utopianism of the evil ‘Why not?’ Coverdale witnesses the mesmeric exploitation of Priscilla for a second time, but does nothing; it is Hollingsworth, who has actively pursued her back to town, who has the strength to call out to her and break the spell. More precisely, the hypnosis fails less by virtue of Hollingsworth’s own strength of character (he is really only reclaiming a lost disciple) as by virtue of the strength of Priscilla’s agapic love for him. The real enchantment of selfless love defeats false enchantment in this true, that is, anti-Romantic, romance.

    Zenobia’s betrayal of her sister and Westervelt’s pseudo-mystical, scientistic spell would never have occurred had it not been for the failure of Old Moodie as husband and father. His prideful confession is central to this central, city-centered chapter group. Coverdale finds him in a saloon, after noticing that the same wine that brings joy elsewhere in the world brings a sort of death-in-life drunkenness to the commercial-republican descendants of Puritan New England. Still, as in Plato’s Laws, nature finally exerts its power over regime differences, dissolving some conventional restraints. Wine gets old men talking here, as it did in ancient Greece. Moodie tells his story, the story of a rich man named Fauntleroy (‘Boy-King’) who, basking in the “unnatural light” of his gold and wanting to stay rich, committed a crime, was discovered, and fled; unable to take his punishment like a man, he left his noble wife to die and his beautiful daughter “worse than orphaned” (791-792). With “no adequate control” from any parent, “her character was left to shape itself,” its passions leading the way to the rule of Westervelt. Moodie saw her years later, feeling not shame but pride at “the brilliant child of my prosperity” (800). “In Zenobia, I live again!” (799), his vanity renewed. Soon forgotten—”being a mere image, an optical delusion, crated by the sunshine of prosperity” (792), he had by then remarried, choosing this time a poor seamstress, who bore him another daughter before dying. Like the Emperor Gallienus, the moody old ex-king invites rebellion. Old Moodie is a sort of King Midas, his “fatality” determined by his love of gold, “being to behold whatever he touched dissolve” (793). [9]  And through Moodie Westervelt also came to rule Priscilla. Moodie had caused Priscilla to be brought to Blithedale in order to bring her under Zenobia’s protection (had he, like his elder daughter, finally come to be disenchanted by the charlatan?), hoping that Zenobia would treat her as a sister. But he had long ago destroyed the natural foundations of any sisterly feelings, which would depend upon a shared childhood. What the family could not supply, the watery communitarianism of Blithedale could not begin to replace. Just the opposite: The two sisters became rivals in love, the more powerful betraying the weaker by returning her to a man she knew might destroy Priscilla’s soul.

     

    Justice Without Communitarianism

    The third group of chapters returns Coverdale to Blithedale, where Hollingsworth, Priscilla, and Zenobia have also come, after the defeat of Westervelt. Coverdale quickly learns that defeating Satan once does not defeat him once and for all, or even for long. The Blithedalers enjoy a masquerade: Dressed in costumes that mix antiquity (the goddess Diana, Arcadian shepherd) with early America (Puritans, shakers, Indians, a witch), and modern America (“a negro of the Jim Crow order,” a Kentucky woodsman), they dance to a fiddler dressed as the Devil (814-815). New-Age Blithedale contains human types that span the history of the West, and so is not entirely new. [10]  All in play—but all linking the Blithedale project imagistically with the more sinister devil and play-actor, Westervelt. Earlier, Westervelt had only lurked on the edges of Blithedale; now, his symbolic equivalent plays the tune to which the communitarians dance. They laugh at each other’s costumes, and Coverdale—concealed and watching, as usual—betrays his presence by laughing, too. The Blithedalers merrily chase him. Escaping, he stumbles over mossed-over logs left by some previous owner, decades before. After tripping over these hard facts produced by nature and a hard-working man, Coverdale wanders off to find his three erstwhile friends, engaged in a real showdown.

    Utopians seek justice. In real communities, justice is the aim of the courts. With characteristic drama, Zenobia announces, “I have been on trial for my life,” and Hollingsworth does look the part of the Puritan judge trying a witch, with Priscilla “the pale victim” of witchcraft. Costumed as the Oriental princess for whom she named herself, Zenobia appears “dethroned” (818-819). Appealing her case to a higher authority, God, she counter-accuses Hollingsworth of selfish manipulation. They are right about each other, and God will indeed judge them both. Hollingsworth leaves with Priscilla, who is rejected by her sister in the end because Zenobia cannot humble herself to ask forgiveness for injury. In any event, Priscilla loves Hollingsworth more, needing him and owing him more, and better able to give him what he will need after he gets what he deserves. She is the real human judge, the only one animated by Christian love, and she renders the right decision.

    For her part, Zenobia draws a moral—the wrong one. Men always triumph over women on “the battlefield of life” because a woman’s breast has no breastplate, and “the whole universe” makes “common cause against the woman who swerves one hair’s-breath, out of the beaten path”; in so swerving, the woman herself “goes all astray and never sees the world in its true aspect afterwards” (827). In her Epicurean ambition to swerve like one of the philosopher’s atoms, Zenobia succeeds only in confusing herself. Her feminist/reformist self-pity illustrates the truth Zenobia mixes with it. She then denies that Priscilla will be a better wife for Hollingsworth than she could have been; judging by appearances (as she had done in her liaison with the handsome Westervelt, and as an attractive person is especially likely to do), she mistakenly claims that Priscilla is too weak to sustain the marriage. She leaves Coverdale with a final lie. “Sick to death with playing at philanthropy and progress” in “a foolish dream,” she will convert to Catholicism and go “behind the black veil” (830)—in imitative opposition to Priscilla and the silvery veil she wore in the mesmerism shows. In reality, Zenobia has chosen the black veil of suicide; she walks into the water, quenching the fire of her spirit, to the end playing the tragic heroine of a romance novel, a romance Hawthorne undercuts by describing the grisly scene of the recovery of her corpse. [11]  In death she defeats Westervelt—at the funeral he laments, “she is beyond my reach”—and Hollinsworth, who will spend the remainder of his life overcome by guilt for his crime—he, who had intended to reform criminals. But in so triumphing she destroys herself. Only Priscilla really triumphs, now the “guardian” of her broken beloved, whose presence nonetheless protects her in the society of her day better than Zenobia could have done. When Coverdale next sees the couple, Priscilla shows “a veiled happiness in her fair and quiet countenance” (843-844)—veiled, because she cares for an emotional invalid, but true, because agapic love is true. Nature also wins: “While Zenobia lived, Nature was proud of her, and directed all eyes upon that radiant presence, as her fairest handiwork. Zenobia perished. Will not Nature shed a tear? Ah, no! She adopts the calamity at once into her system,” growing grass on the beauty’s grave (845). Nature’s water quenched nature’s fire. The airy, still small voice of the one unselfish human soul in the story and the powerful, silent workings of nature quietly and justly prevail over earthly play-acting and self-importance.

     

    Coverdale Uncovered

    “I—I myself—was in love—with—PRISCILLA!” (585). Coverdale’s confession, his unmasking of his own nature, constitutes the book’s last words and confirms Zenobia’s parable about the need to love unselfishly and sight-unseen. Coverdale can perform neither of the principle duties of a citizen: He cannot form a family; he cannot summon the energy to fight in a good cause. [12]  He has the strength to tell a story truly, and no more. Some scholars have called him an unreliable narrator, but he is actually quite reliable at that. It is as a man and a citizen that he cannot be relied upon.

    Hawthorne writes no ‘postface’ to balance his preface. He leaves that to his readers. In a way, he also leaves some notes toward one, consisting of his other contemporaneous writings and citizen activities. Some decades ago, American literary scholars debated whether books like The Blithedale Romance ought to be read in their ‘historical context’ or as works with an integrity of their own, apart from the circumstances in which they were written. Both sides were right. To understand the pith of The Blithedale Romance, one needs know little more of Brook Farm and of America than Hawthorne says in the preface, which isn’t much. Utopianism is perennial, and so is a just critique of utopianism. This notwithstanding, it amplifies the understanding of any work of art to look beyond it, to consider the possible political purposes of its author in practice as well as ‘in theory.’ Would it not be good to see if a book that commends prudence as a moral and political good actually tended to serve the ends intended?

    Hawthorne’s lifetime coincided with the ever-sharpening factionalism which lead to civil war. [13]  The compromises that had helped to hold the Union together for decades began to unravel as the Kansas-Nebraska Act reopened the issue of slavery in the American West. The Democratic Party tried to close regional divisions within itself and within the country at large by nominating Hawthorne’s college friend, Franklin Pierce, for the presidency. A New Hampshireman, Pierce exemplified the political ‘Doughface’—the Northern man with Southern principles who opposed abolitionism as destructive of the American constitutional union. A loyal Democrat, Hawthorne wrote a campaign biography of Pierce. Whigs jibed, Hawthorne has given us another romance, and in a way he had. But he intended his Life of Franklin Pierce to complement Blithedale as a cognate act of prudence. [14]

    A “man of the people, but whose natural qualities inevitably made him a leader among them,” Pierce had learned patriotism from his father and religion from his mother (83). His father had opposed the “questionable, if not treasonable” disunionism of the High Federalists during the Madison Administration. As a boy, Pierce had listened to his father talking politics with “homely, native eloquence” (84). At Bowdoin College Pierce joined “the progressive or democratic” rather than the “respectable conservative” student party (87). In political life ever since he has remained a firm Jacksonian, detesting governmental centralization as much as disunion. Thus he had never “shun[ned] the obloquy that sometimes threatened to pursue the Northern man who dared to love that great and sacred reality—his whole, united, native country—better than the mistiness of a philanthropic theory,” namely, abolitionism (105). Pierce saw that anti-slavery agitation would tear “to pieces the Constitution”; “the evil would be certain, while the good was, at best, a contingency” (163). More likely, abolition of slavery would result in “the ruin of two races which now dwelt in greater peace and affection, it is not too much to say, than ever elsewhere existed between the taskmaster and the serf” (164). “The theorist may take that view [abolitionism] in his closet; the philanthropist by profession may strive to act upon it uncompromisingly, amid the tumult and warfare of his life. But the statesman of practical sagacity—who loves his country as it is, and evolves good from things as they exist, and who demands to feel his firm grasp upon a better reality before he quits the one already gained—will be likely here, with all the greatest statesmen of America, to stand in the attitude of a conservative.” (163) Slavery is an evil, but it is “one of those evils which divine Providence does not leave to be remedied by human contrivance, but which, in its own good time, by some means impossible to be anticipated, but of the simplest and easiest operation, when all its uses shall have been fulfilled, it causes to vanish like a dream” (166).

    “[G]reat moral reform” occurs not by dint of human will and intellect,” and even when human “progress” effects such reform, it leaves some other “evil or wrong on the path behind it” (166). All of this mixes prudence and romance in much the same proportions as Blithedale does; unfortunately, unlike even a prudent romance, political analysis must do more than illustrate moral truths, although it ought not ignore them. The complacent portrait of amicable master-slave relations and the prophesied ease with which the evil of slavery would dissolve are probably intended as artful romantic tranquilizers for overwrought reformers, but they are utopian-all-too-utopian.

    In falsifying these romantic claims, the Civil War shook Hawthorne. Ten years after the publication of Blithedale and the Life, he published one of his last essays, “Chiefly About War Matters,” published in 1862 [15]. He masked himself with the pen name, “A Peaceable Man” and decried the likelihood that domestic politics would be populated by military heroes for the next half-century (one bullet-headed president will succeed another in the Presidential chair”) (367). True to his unionism, he condemned secession as treason.

    He rightly predicted that “whoever may be benefitted by the results of this war, it will not be the present generation of negroes… who must henceforth fight a hard battle with the world, on very unequal terms” (387). He condemns John Brown (“Nobody was ever more justly hanged”) because such utter lack of prudence alone deserves the most severe requital (397-398), while admitting that “my Yankee heart stirred triumphantly” when he saw the conversion of the fortress Brown had stormed into a prison for rebels (398). The prisoners themselves are men of a type unknown to Northerners; having lived in isolation and illiteracy under the rule of plantation grandees, these peasants had not “the remotest comprehension of what they had been fighting for” (400).

    The weakest section of the essay unfortunately forms its centerpiece: Hawthorne’s portrait of Abraham Lincoln. The “essential representative of all the Yankees” is ungainly, kind, naturally if not conventionally dignified, and yes, honest (374-379). Of the stated purpose of Lincoln—to defend the Union in war in order to preserve the Constitution in defense of the natural rights of enunciated in the Declaration of Independence—Hawthorne betrays not the slightest comprehension. He awards more unmixed praise to General George McClellan, the Democratic Party general who would run against Lincoln two years later. By then Hawthorne would be dead, and with him much of the generation that had attempted to invent ways of preserving the Union in peace, mixing realism and self-deception.

    If, finally, Hawthorne lacked both the firmness in defense of principle and the practical wisdom of Lincoln, if his prudential critique of utopianism lacks an adequate philosophic dimension to go with its attractive and understated Christianity, that reservation suggests that he was no Shakespeare. ‘Being no Shakespeare’ is a widely-held deficiency among writers, hard to hold against one. ‘Being no Lincoln’ as a political man is also no rarity. The Blithedale Romance remains a fine American antidote to the utopianism some Americans fall into when their patience with their country finally runs out.

     

    Notes

    1. Nathaniel Hawthorne: The Blithedale Romance. In Millicent Bell, ed.: Nathaniel Hawthorne: Novels (New York: The Library of America, 1983). All subsequent citations in text. For the best textual exegesis of the novel, one that is especially alert to Hawthorne’s use of symbolism, see Hyatt H. Waggoner: Hawthorne: A Critical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).
    2. “[T]he humorous sketch of his companions in the custom house”—which Hawthorne published some time before writing the Blithedale Romance—”had called down upon Hawthorne’s head a storm of vilification. Consequently… he wanted to take every precaution to make clear that he was not copying actual people.” See F. O. Matthiessen: American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (London: Oxford University Press, 1972 [1941], 266).
    3. See for example A. N. Kaul: “The Blithedale Romance,” in A. N. Kaul, ed.: Hawthorne: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, 155. Founded by a Unitarian minister, Brook Farm aspired to a sort of secularized or at least non-sectarian community, imitating the structure of the highly sectarian and entirely unsecular communitarian aspirations of the American Puritans. See also George Parsons Lathrop: A Study of Hawthorne (New York: AMS Press, 1969 [1876], 181-190) and Hubert H. Hoeltje: Inward City: The Mind and Heart of Nathaniel Hawthorne (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962).
    4. “We had very young people among us, it is true,—downy lads, rosy girls in their first teens, and children of all heights above one’s knee [i.e., no infants at all], but these had chiefly been sent hither for education, which it was one of the objects and methods of our institution to supply” (685-686). Few families ventured upon the utopian project.
    5. Some critics have complained that Hawthorne’s portrait of the commune fails because it centers on four characters only. But that is Hawthorne’s point: Human beings naturally settle into cliques of families and friends. Founders of stable political communities recognize that and build upon it. Mis-founded communities, including utopias, do not, and fail.
    6. Zenobia was one of several provincial rulers who rebelled during the irregular reign of the Emperor Gellienus in the third century A. D. Mild and indolent, with outbursts of cruelty, Gellienus failed adequately to defend the Empire—something of a parallel, as it happens, to the father of Hawthorne’s Zenobia, as will transpire. Zenobia, “queen of Palmyra and the East,” claimed Cleopatra as an ancestor, equaling her in beauty and surpassing her in chastity and valor (Gibbon: Decline and Fall, I.xi). A woman of “superior genius [who] broke through the servile indolence impoed on her sex by the climate and manners of Asia (I.xi) (its political life proverbial in the West for its luxury, ‘effeminacy,’ and consequent susceptibility to despotism), the heroic Zenobia’s “manly understanding,” her “incomparable prudence and fortitude,” refined by her considerable learning, entitled her to rule. It did not entitle her to rebel, in the estimation of the Romans, and the Emperor Aurelian crushed her army, captured her, fettered her with gold, and exhibited her in a triumph at Rome. In the end, her courage faltered and she “ignominiously purchased life by the sacrifice of her fame and her friends,” blaming her rebellion on her political allies (I.xi). Ancient Palmyra was a place of commerce and arts; its queen’s luxury, spiritedness, treachery, and enslavement in gilded chains prefigures the character and history of her fictional American counterpart.
    7. ‘Zenobia’ means ‘gift of Zeus,’ and Pandora was indeed Zeus’ ‘gift’ to human beings. The story of that unpleasant gift forms part of a story of the gods themselves, which for the Greeks was a story of failed fatherhood. The first gods are the offspring of Father Heaven and Mother Earth. Father Heaven hates his own offspring, confining them; in revenge his son Chronos castrates him. Zeus is a new god, an Olympian, who defeats his father Chronos and ends the times when fellowship existed between the gods and men. Zeus founds an oligarchy if not a tyranny in the cosmos. In order to subordinate men, Zeus hid labor-saving fire from them, because leisure provides men with the opportunity to think and thus to rule or challenge the rule of the gods. In the familiar myth, Prometheus—a brother of Chronos and therefore an enemy of the Olympians—steals fire and gives it to men; Zeus retaliates not by injuring Prometheus, whom he did not fear, but men, bidding the blacksmith-god Hephaestus and other Olympians to create the beautiful Pandora, like Hawthorne’s Zenobia a master of rhetoric with a taste for finery in clothing. ‘Pandora’ means ‘all-gifted,’ the one who has been given everything; she in turn will give not good but evils (Hesiod: Works and Days, ll. 42-105). Pandora is the first woman, the Eve of Greek myth, a bringer of evil to men, that is, to males, tormenting them if they marry and leaving them without support of family if they refuse to marry (Hesiod: Theogeny, ll. 585-612). The parallels to Hawthorne’s Zenobia and her two ‘countries,’ Blithedale and America, are clear: the father who gives wealth to the daughter but inculcates no good habits in her, the founding and refounding of political communities that repeat the tensions between fathers and children down through the generations. There is one twist to the Greek myth: Hawthorne has the father, Old Moodie, deliver not Pandora but his other daughter, Priscilla, to Blithedale. In a sense Priscilla  opens a box of evils, leading to the effective destruction of the community, but it is the evil in Zenobia she ‘opens.’ Hawthorne would never simply blame any being or force external to men for evil, knowing that men supply their own evils out of their not-so-blithe hearts.
    8. Hawthorne set down a solid foundation stone for his own marriage in writing to his fiancée on the new ‘spiritualism’: “The view which I take of the matter is caused by no want of faith in mysteries, but from a deep reverence of the soul…. Keep the imagination sane.” (Cited in Matthiessen, op. cit., 205). Keeping the imagination sane is the purpose of Hawthornian romance. In a more directly political way, Hawthorne also wrote, in 1844, that the American Revolution “did not, like that of France, go so deep as to disturb the common sense of the country.” (“A Book of Autographs,” in Nathaniel Hawthorne: Miscellanies: Biographical and Other Sketches and Letters [Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1900, 344]).
    9. Kaul says that Old Moodie’s story “might be called The Parable of the American,” a riches-to-rags saga of a man who lives in the two American nations of rich and poor (Kaul, op. cit., 59). If anything, this is a reverse parable, a reverse Horatio Alger plot designed before the invention of Horatio Alger, just as Hawthorne’s Blithedale is a refutation of Marxist utopianism before Marx. Neither capitalism nor socialism wins Hawthorne’s wholehearted allegiance.
    10. In Matthiessen’s words, “Unlike virtually all the other spokesmen of the day, [Hawthorne] could never feel that America was a new world…. Even at Brook Farm, he  had not been able to share in the declaration that the new age was the dawn of untried possibilities” (op. cit., 322).
    11. A real Catholic, Orestes Brownson, wrote in a contemporary review that Hawthorne erred in having Zenobia commit suicide: “Women of her large experience and   free principles never kill themselves for disappointed affection” (Review, Brownson’s Literary Quarterly, October 1852; quoted in J. Donald Crowley, ed.: Hawthorne: The Critical Heritage (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970, 266). Here Brownson is too much the realist, ignoring the genre Hawthorne has chosen.   Zenobia must die, because in romances justice must triumph.
    12. “Were there any cause, in this whole chaos of human struggle, worth a sane man’s dying for, and which my death would benefit, then—provided, however, the effort did not involve an unreasonable amount of trouble—methinks I might be bold to offer up my life” (847).
    13. The best account of Hawthorne’s politics is Lawrence Sargent Hall: Hawthorne: Critic of Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). Hall skillfully links Hawthorne’s writings with his political activities, including his tenure in the American consulate in London during the Pierce Administration.
    14. Nathaniel Hawthorne: Life of Franklin Pierce, in Miscellanies: Biographical and Other Sketches and Letters (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1900). All citations in text. On the Whiggish jibe, see Matthiessen op. cit., 316-317.
    15. Nathaniel Hawthorne: “Chiefly About War Matters,” in Miscellanies, op. cit.  All citations in text.

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Political Authority: Resistance and Obedience, Socrates and Hobbes

    April 27, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    The Apology and the Crito present the reader with a contradiction and a paradox. The contradiction is that Socrates advocates resistance to political authority in one dialogue, obedience in the other. The paradox is that Socrates advocates resistance in public, before the Athenian jury, whereas he advocates obedience in the privacy of his jail cell in a one-on-one conversation with an old friend.

    The contradiction is easy to resolve. Socrates advocates resistance to public authority for ones like himself, for philosophers. If the soldiers at Gettysburg died so that the nation might live, Socrates at Athens died so that philosophy may live. He provokes the Athenians to kill him so that the philosopher as a human type will be admired and defended as a man of courage and not merely as an ‘intellectual’ by spirited and influential men who may have their own reasons for resisting the sway of public opinion. such men may come to identify with philosophers, offer them protection.

    Crito is just such a man—wealthy, politically connected, a born ‘fixer.’ What he is not is a philosopher. (When the Hollywood movie producer Darryl F. Zanuck heard that Ronald Reagan wanted to run for governor of California, he protested, “No, no! Not Ronald Reagan as governor! Ronald Reagan as the governor’s best friend!” Crito is, or at least wants to be, the philosopher’s best friend. A man lacking philosophic wisdom may still admire the philosopher’s wit, justice, and courage.) Socrates does not want wealthy citizens like Crito to get into the habit of evading the law. On the contrary, Socrates’ argument in the Apology depends upon his own refusal to evade the law or the punishment attached to it. If Socrates were to consent to Crito’s plan, his words before the Athenians would ring hollow: For once, the ironic smile would play on the lips of the Athenians and not on the lips of Socrates. the Athenians would be victorious over philosophy if they were cheated out of killing the philosopher.

    In solving the apparent contradiction between the dialogues one also removes the paradox. Socrates defies public authority by refusing to stop philosophizing; he provokes the death sentence that will make him, as the type of the philosopher, immortal by insolently asking for a reward for his philosophizing. (He then offers to ‘negotiate down’ to the payment of a trivial fine.) “The unexamined life is not worth living” is the final insult to the Athenians: Your lives are not worth living without me, the one who examines you, the one who prevents you from drifting off into the dreamy sleep of the quotidian. “I would rather die having spoken in my manner, than speak in your manner and live.” Dying life—philosophizing is practice of how to die—is preferable to living death—thoughtless, impassioned, mistaken.

    The philosophic quest, animated by the eros for the good, renders Socrates unshakable. But what might render a decent non-philosopher like Crito unshakable, even as he fulfills his role as a friend and ally of philosophers? No public opinion, which will tolerate, then condemn, then regrets its condemnation of Socrates. Crito should rather be attached to the laws, as well as to a philosopher who abides by the laws. True, the laws themselves depend upon public opinion and its mood swings, but if enough citizens can be persuaded to revere them, public opinion itself will become less fickle. If the rich and well-connected become ‘conservative’ not only inasmuch as they seek to conserve their wealth but seek to conserve the laws, their conservatism will provide ballast for a ship too much buffeted by demagogic winds, by the tyranny of the majority as incited by malicious rhetoricians. If he rich instead decide, as Crito initially has decided, to regard the man wronged by the city as free to retaliate, then the rich will undermine the city, seek to rule it on their own terms. Their contempt for the law will infect the people, and violent factional strife—leaving peaceful philosophers maximally exposed to suspicion on both sides—will roil the city forever. This is the criticism Publius makes of ancient democracies. And so Socrates pretends that the laws are his parents—surely, as Peter Ahrensdorf notes, the most extreme form of ‘conventionalism,’ so extreme as to be deliberately parodistic of conventionalism. [1]  Philosophically-minded reads will see the joke. Crito will not, and that is all to the good, both for him and for the Athenians. In this, Socrates earns his title as not only a wise man but a just one.

    Thomas Hobbes presents a different, sterner, and seemingly more doctrinaire view. The difference may be accounted for in terms of philosophy—his different account of nature—and in terms of politics—specifically, the advent of Christianity and its collision with secular rulership.

    Far from being orderly, nature as a whole exhibits dissociation (Leviathan I. 13). Nature is atomistic. By nature, human beings war with one another, like colliding atoms. But the atoms themselves do have a certain discernible order, a structure of passions with the fear of violent death as its capstone, but also the desire for the things hat make life commodious and the hope to attain those things. Therefore, each atom obeys nineteen natural laws: among these Hobbes lists the inclination to seek peace and follow it; to defends its own existence by all available means; to seek peace by establishing “justice,” i.e., contractual agreements to recognize the “rights” of (more accurately, desires for) life, liberty, and the property that makes life and liberty sustainable.

    The establishment of an effective contract for peace, with security for each one, requires that some power be instituted with sufficient capacity to enforce that security—else “every man will, and lawfully rely on his own strength and art” (Leviathan II. 17). Therefore, no right to revolution exists. For the sake of civic peace, the sovereign must be the soul judge of the actions and desires of the subjects. To challenge the power of the sovereign is to return to the dissociational nature of all objects above the ‘atomic’ level, and so to threaten the existence of the ‘atoms,’ the members of the civil society themselves. “Sovereign power is not so hurtful as the want of it” (II. 18). Civil obedience is absolute: “Nothing that the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on any pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury” (II. 21); only if the sovereign fails to protect his subject, plunging the subject back into the natural war of all against all, will the subject’s obligation to his sovereign dissolve.

    Hobbes lists fifteen “infirmities” of commonwealths leading to what we now call a ‘failed state.’ Central to the list is the imitation of foreign nations (II. 29), perhaps because a false prophet is one who teaches “any other religion than that which is already established” (III. 32); Jesus apparently did not do so, as Hobbes observes that He expounded the Mosaic Law (III. 42). However, Pauline Christianity, based upon Jesus’ command to take the Gospel to all nations, clearly does violate Hobbes’s rule. Evangelizing Christianity, which at bottom recognizes no nations, denying the distinction between Greek and Jew, has introduced dangerous novelties wherever it has gone. This can be seen more concretely in Behemoth, Hobbes’s dialogue on the English civil wars, “the many shiftings of the supreme authority” which occurred between 1640 and 1659. [2]

    In Hobbes’s telling, seditious factions caused these bloody wars. Presbyterian ministers, Catholics, and the various ‘dissenting’ sects (central to the list being the Fifth-Monarchy men, who envisioned the imminent return of the Christ to earth); liberally-educated parliamentarians infatuated with classical republicanism; businessmen enamored of a foreign nation, commerce-minded Netherlands; the poor, avid of money; and the people, “ignorant of their duty” to obey the sovereign: all these groups, some averse to one another, fired the ambition to rebel against the monarchy and the established Church of England (Behemoth, 4). Because “the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people,” heterodoxy is civic poison (16). “The Universities have been to this nation as the wooden horse was to the Trojans” (40), serving as “the core of the rebellion” (58). Is it not an outrage that a man “will trouble himself and fall out with his neighbors for the saving of my soul, or the soul of any other than himself?” (63)  This spiritual effort he could very well keep to himself, without disturbing the public peace. The privatization of religion divides and conquers all religion, except for the civil religion of the State, the doctrines of which are identical to the will of the sovereign. (In this matter as in others, Hobbes wastes little sympathy. To kill 1,000 Presbyterian ministers would be a “great massacre,” but the “killing of 100,000” in a civil war ignited by ministers “is the greater” [95].) “[C]onverse with these divinity-disputers as long as you will, you will hardly find one in a hundred discreet enough to be employed in any great affair, either of war or peace” (144). Better to keep them as private men.

    Where does this leave the philosopher? Philosophy and divinity both yield “the advancement of the professors,” which Hobbes associates with the priestly caste throughout history. True philosophy “can never appear propitious to ambition, or to an exemption from the obedience due to the sovereign power” (96). In this, Hobbes adopts the teaching of the Crito with Socrates’ self-defense or apologia subtracted. But what of the defense of philosophy, given the fact that Hobbes is so evidently a philosopher?

    For this one must turn to A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England. Given the character of law as command and of philosophy as reasoning, law and philosophy might seem to be at odds, the philosopher’s supposedly unquestioning obedience to the laws of the sovereign open to question. But Hobbesian reason differs in nature from that of the common lawyers, even as it differs in character from the reason of Aristotelian philosophers, with their emphasis on prudence, an inclination the lawyers attempt to emulate. Hobbesian reason rests on ratio—that is, on proportion, on geometric certitude. Ancient philosophers suffered from “a want of method”: “there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications, of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used in geometry: whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable” (Leviathan I. 5). To treat all reason as if it were mathematics brings Cartesianism to Hobbes’s famous discovery of Euclid.

    Hobbesian reason can partake of the authority of law, can in fact revise existing laws, because it alone cannot be questioned—unlike the flickering light of prudence, now seen to be unphilosophic, a thing of mere experience and not of true reasoning at all. It might be added that the certainty afforded by ‘mathematized’ reasoning applied to all of human life, the assurance of those confident of having received divine revelation finds a rival. Hobbes carefully suggests, through the person of the philosopher in the Dialogue, that the sovereign king is actually subservient to the public safety, and thus open to criticism by the true reason based on the true axiom of nature, self-preservation.

    The Hobbesian political philosopher differs from the Socratic not so much in his apparent teaching of conformity to the law, but in instantiating a new kind of  philosopher-king, a man who makes rigorous deductions from right axioms. The philosopher-king is no ironic construct as seen in Plato’s Republic, who ends by lording it over a population of children, but a man who holds the scientifically-irrefutable keys to the real political kingdom, whose reasonings are commands because they are accurate deductions from right axioms.

    The strength of the Socratic approach is its flexibility, the way in which it can adopt philosophy to concrete circumstances, and so to enable philosophy to survive in a world that is never philosophic. The Socratic approach as dramatized by Plato exhibits the prudence so often not found among the ranks of the highly intelligent.

    The weakness of the Socratic approach, at least if kept within the fairly restricted horizon of Apology-Crito, is its apparent inability to say what might be done to remedy the defects of a very bad regime. In that case, mere law-abidingness is not enough. For such considerations, one must turn to the Statesman, or perhaps to the regime analysis in Book IX of the Republic.

    The strength of the Hobbesian approach is that it cuts the chatter. The seditious chatter of the Christian universities and parliaments of his time and place resembled in its virulence the seditious chatter of mosques and madrassas in our own century; the rule of such absolute monarchs as the Atatürk of Turkey, Shah of Iran, the Nasserites of Egypt, Hussein of Iraq, all their regimes replaced, all might well be preferred to the fanatics who have founded new regimes in those countries. And regarding philosophy, Hobbes distinguishes dialogue from chatter, rather as Socrates distinguishes philosophy from sophistry and rhetoric. Hobbes invites ‘intellectuals’ to a repast of humility, without requiring them to humble themselves to God.

    The weakness of Hobbes’s approach is in its confidence in geometric reasoning, particularly as it might be applied to politics. Push prudential reasoning aside as irrational is imprudent, and might well undermine the very discretion Hobbes himself commends. Although Hobbes assures us that no monarch is “so inhuman” as to command a son to murder his own father (51), both prudential reasoning and experience strongly suggest otherwise. There is no real-world evidence that geometrizing despotism would remain benevolent, as distinguished from a more liberal, though far from conflict-free republican regime. There Locke was right to break with Hobbes. Whether le sage Locke would have broken with him under the circumstances Hobbes faced in England, circumstances prevailing in many parts of the world today, is a matter to be gauged by prudence, not geometry.

     

    Notes

    1. Peter J. Ahrensdorf: The Death of Socrates and the Life of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato’s Phaedo. Albany: State University of New York Pres, 1995, 171.
    2. Thomas Hobbes: Behemoth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    The French and American Revolutions Compared

    April 25, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Lecture delivered at Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, Michigan
    February 3, 2000

     

    Why bother to compare the American and French revolutions? What do events that occurred so long ago have to do with us, now or in the future? Even granting that the American Revolution still matter, as we live under most of the provisions of the 1787 Constitution, framed in its aftermath, why should we still care about the French? Why compare their old debacle with the longstanding success of American republicanism?

    Because the French and not the American Revolution is often regarded as the modern revolution, the precursor of the Leninist and Maoist revolutions, themselves long believed to be harbingers of the future world order. Whereas the American Revolution was merely a political revolution (the claim goes), the French Revolution was also a social revolution—so much more profound.

    The collapse of Soviet communism dampened this enthusiasm. But even after the Soviet empire collapsed, the new Russian regime has rejected the commercial republicanism or liberal democracy of America and western Europe. Not only Russia, but a number of the regimes founded in the following decades can be classified as what one scholar has called illiberal democracy—regimes in which real democratic elections are held but the economic and civil liberties that we associate with republicanism scarcely exist. Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin has said, “all possible support for new Russia’s democratic institutions is the only guarantee” for “set[ting] up an insurmountable barrier. to the dark past.” But he added, “Russia will not soon become, if ever, a second copy of, say, the United States or England, where liberal values have deep historical traditions…. Among us, the state, its institutions and structures, have always played an exclusively guiding role in the life of the country and the people. A strong state for Russians is not an anomaly, not something that must be fought for or against, but on the contrary is the source and guarantor of order, the initiator an driving force of all change.” ‘Illiberal democracy’ resembles the French revolutionary regimes far more closely than the American regime.

    Finally, we compare the French and American revolutions because we want to know not only that new republics differ so sharply from ourselves, but why they do so. Considering the American and French revolutions together—events thoroughly studied by generations of scholars—can serve as an exercise in how to ‘do’ comparative politics. Comparing and contrasting the social, political, and economic institutions of one country with those of another, comparing and contrasting the kinds of statesmen who rule those countries and the kinds of citizens (and subjects” who inhabit them, can help us to isolate ‘probable causes’ of political life—why things turn out for the better or the worse–and so guide us as citizens and as scholars in trying to understand the world.

    To think about these two revolutions, the first thing we need to know is: What, exactly, is a revolution? ‘Revolution’ is a metaphorical word. To understand it, one must know what it is that has revolved. Aristotle explains that it is the regime of a country that changes in a revolution. A regime or politeia is the organization of the most authoritative offices of the country, the ones that shape its distinctive way of life, serving the purposes set by those who rule it. The system of authoritative institutions is founded and embodied by the politeuma or ruling body—those individuals who wield authority in the country. Aristotle classifies regimes into six types based on quantitative criteria (rule of the one, the few, or the many) and qualitative criteria (the good and the bad). Within each of these types there can be many sub-types, based on what we moderns would call socioeconomic factors: for example, a democracy consisting mostly of farmers and warriors will differ significantly from one consisting mostly of artisans and traders. A revolution, then, is a change of political form, a change of kind and not merely of degree: from oligarchy to democracy, democracy to tyranny, and so on.

    To Aristotle a revolution did not involve seizing something called ‘the state.’ There was little in the way of any permanent institutional structure to seize. Typically, one faction would overthrow another, establishing its own institutions and replacing the previous rulers. The ancient Greeks did not have a term like our ‘state.’

    Various modern writers define ‘state’ variously. I define the modern state as a set of bureaucratic institutions, separated from the society it rules, a society occupying a clearly defined territory. A modern bureaucracy is a rule-bound, impersonal organization, as distinguished from the older governing organizations in which the allegiances were personal, based on patronage. A state also contrasts with a private corporation. General Motors has a centralized locus of authority and is assuredly bureaucratic, but it rules no territory, and it can only tell you what to do as long as you’re on the clock.

    As objects separated from society, states are instruments desired by the ambitious. States are useful to states-men because states enable them to mobilize and concentrate the human and material resources of a given territory, for whatever purposes statesmen may conceive.

    Beginning roughly in the year 1500, state-building in modernity has had several consequences that we now see all around us: extensive, uniform administration of large territories by central bureaucracies that have been expanded and regularized; a split between military and police functions; sophisticated systems of taxation and of finance; the disappearance of mercenaries, accompanied by civilian control of the military; the development of something called ‘nationalism,’ sometime by states in order better to rule social groups, sometimes in reaction against states by those social groups. The French Revolution serves as an excellent example of state-building. In 1789, the French monarchy controlled a fairly large state, by the standards of the day: 50,000 men staffed Louis XVI’s bureaucracy. By 1796, French bureaucrats numbered nearly 250,000—most of them appointed during the period of the Terror, in 1792-93. This apparatus has endured throughout the many changes of regime subsequent to 1796.

    The state complicates but does not erase class classical regime theory. A polity may still be tyrannical or monarchic, oligarchic or aristocratic, ‘mixed’ or democratic. But the state may persist through such regime changes, making for a remarkable sight: The political regime may undergo revolution but the state itself may as a consequence change or stay the same in size and strength.

    When speaking of state organization, one needs terms in addition to those descriptive of ‘regimes.’ With states the key terms are not ‘the one, the few, and the many’ but: 1) degree of centralization; 2) degree of bureaucratization; 3) size of territory ruled. The major political feature of modernity, ‘stateness,’ complicates revolution considerably. Revolutionaries now seize control of ‘the state.’ They do so ostensibly to serve certain social constituencies according to the purposes and the standard of moral judgment revolutionaries actually seek to enforce. Once in control of the state, revolutionaries become part of a different ‘class,’ so to speak, namely, the state’s men and the state’s women. They seize the state but the state in a way seizes them. Their interests may now differ from the interests of the very social classes from which they arose. When Lord Acton warns that power tends to corrupt, he may be considering a symptom of just this phenomenon.

    While the French Revolution continued the monarchic state-building project under several regimes, ending with that of Napoleon, the American Revolution ended such a project. To be sure, our revolution resulted in a national government, a government strengthened between 1787 and 1791 by the framing and ratification of the U. S. Constitution, and for several years thereafter by the able and prestigious administration of George Washington. But this government was hardly a state apparatus by European standards. Such an apparatus was not fully consolidated in this country until the New Deal, and to this day it is not as extensive as its European counterparts.

    What is more, whereas both American and French revolutions were violent, and resulted in the confiscation of the property of the political enemies by the revolutionaries, the French Revolution was really several revolutions in a row—from the liberal regime of 1789-91, to the terror-driven regime of Robespierre, to the liberal but somewhat authoritarian regime of the Directorate a couple of years later, and finally to the orderly tyranny of Napoleon in the early years of the nineteenth century. Each of the first three of these regimes disposed of its predecessor violently, causing the Spaniard Goya to paint his sickening image of the revolutionary monster which devours its children.

    Why do we see this nexus of violent regime instability and state-building in France, contrasting with the freer, more stable outcome in America? (In this, of course one must acknowledge the catastrophe of the U. S. Civil War; nonetheless, over the two centuries following their revolutions, Americans had a less troubled political life, with no thoroughgoing regime changes.)

    American conservatives have long had an intelligent answer to this question, written in 1800 by the Prussian Friedrich Gentz, who by then was serving as an advisor to Prince Metternich of Austria. John Quincy Adams translated Gentz’s book, The French and American Revolutions Compared, as a sort of very high-level political campaign pamphlet. His father’s opponent in the 1800 presidential election, Thomas Jefferson, had enthused over the French Revolution several years longer than had been wise, and Gentz’s book must have looked like a pretty good snowball to aim at the liberty cap of the Sage of Monticello.

    Gentz argues as follows: First, the American revolutionaries were colonists; that matters because the rights of sovereignty of an imperial power are so often dubious. States found colonies for the benefit of the state, not for the benefit of the colonists. By contrast, the French revolutionaries overthrew a king on his native soil; major reforms could have been legally undertaken, but not without the king’s consent, in accordance with the constitution. Instead, one group—albeit by far the largest one, the Third Estate, the commoners—declared itself to be representative of the whole nation. A part that claims to be the whole is really a faction, a usurper. Therefore, Gentz concludes, the difference between the American and French revolutions was the difference between right and wrong, legitimate and illegitimate.

    Second, the American Revolution was defensive, a matter of stern necessity. The revolutionaries demanded no new rights, exercising a “glorious moderation,” sticking to “a fixed and definite purpose,” namely, independence under the rule of law. Because it was factitious, the French revolution was offensive, animated by demands for new rights hitherto imagined only by philosophes and publicists. It was not a moderate but an “insatiate revolution,” always pushing ahead to demand more, always destroying everything in its path in a march toward “the unbounded space of a fantastic arbitrary will.”

    Third, the American revolutionaries maintained governmental continuity. The colonial legislatures remained, while the monarch and his colonial governors were replaced by governors elected by the people or their representatives. The American revolutionaries thus avoided “the deadly passion for making political experiments with abstract theories and untried systems.” In France, each faction had its own conception of what the revolution should be. The revolutionaries there appealed to abstract natural rights rather than to the strict limits of constitutional law. Such grand appeals to big ideas, fueling and fueled by factionalism, resulted in civil war. Further fueled by the fear of reprisal for their crimes, the revolutionaries’ passions turned by cruel, resulting in the Terror of Robespierre and a series of offensive wars against much of Europe—wars that, in the years after the publication of Gentz’s book, would see Napoleon conquer, then lose, the continent.

    Looking back from the perspective gained by two hundred years, Gentz’s analysis holds up very well in many respects. Especially telling is his observation on the moderation of the American Founders, their respect for law even as they revolutionized.

    Nonetheless, Gentz evades or minimizes one key point. In replacing a king with elected governors, the Americans asserted popular sovereignty. In this the American revolutionaries were one with the French. Both upheld popular sovereignty limited by natural and civil rights, “the rights of man and the citizen,” as the French styled them. The problem in France was rather a matter of emphasis. The French declaration says that “ignorance, forgetfulness or contempt of the rights of man are the sole causes of public misfortunes and of the corruption of governments.” This is as silly and doctrinaire a statement as might be imagined, leaving no role in politics for prudence or ‘common sense,’ the ability to establish and maintain institutions that secure natural and civil rights. In this, the Americans and the French parted company. Popular sovereignty framed by natural and civil rights is no political impossibility, as the Americans proved. But you couldn’t prove that by the French of the 1790s, or for many decades to come.

    This corrected version of Gentz’s analysis is as good as far as it goes. But why did the two sets of revolutionaries diverge at this point? What inclined the Americans toward a politics of prudence, the French away from it? Here we need to look not so much at ideas—although I’ll do that, too—but at structures—social, political, and economic institutions.

    To look at those structures, you need to know something about the development of the French state. As Tocqueville observed in The Old Regime and the Revolution, French state-building began centuries before the revolution, under the monarchy. State-building occurred under conditions of tension between the landed, titled aristocrats and the French kings. The aristocrats needed the kings’ troops to help control the peasants, who periodically rebelled against aristocratic exactions. But the kings also competed with the aristocrats for the revenues to be extracted from the peasants.

    In contrast, there were no native-born American aristocratic or monarchic lines among the English settlers. Class distinctions, yes, but no estates, no social groups ‘born to rule.’ Also, America had no peasants, although of course there were slaves. As for warfare, which so often built up the state in Europe, much of it was conducted by colonists imbued with the English tradition of the militia—citizen-soldiers, not professionals or conscripts.

    Let me separate these two points: warfare and socioeconomic antagonism. With respect first to war, the German historian Otto von Hintze wrote, “Absolutism and militarism go together on the [European] continent just as self-government and militia do in England.” State-sponsored standing armies were used by monarchs in order to extract revenues from subjects and to acquire new territories, new subjects, new revenues, from foreign rivals. Monarchs initially had no way to govern conquered territories directly, but the aristocratic allies they employed for this purpose had aristocratic self-interest too prominently in mind for monarchic tastes. Gradually, monarchs began to solve this problem by putting their own hired officials into the provinces—by establishing a centrally-controlled proto-bureaucracy—and by separating police from armies, thus freeing the latter for more wars and regularizing the collection of taxes and the enforcement of tax collection. This formula eventually succeeded, reaching its apogee in France under Louis XIV, more than a century before the revolution. Civil and foreign war helped monarchs to build the absolutist, monarchic state. No wonder the American revolutionaries were suspicious of the civilian agents sent by George III “to eat out our substance,” as the Declaration of Independence puts it, and of standing armies as well.

    What is more (and often overlooked), the peasants who were both the foundation of the economy and the ones who were being squeezed, enjoyed some political self-government, via the village assemblies. Peasants could, as we now say, ‘network’ among themselves. Given their subordination to the various armed classes above them, such networking usually led only to violent but ineffective rebellions. But given a crisis among their rulers, they had the basis for an organized revolt.

    Under the process of state-building, French monarchs extracted revenues for warfare and political control by offering royal privileges in exchange for those revenues—guild privileges, sale of offices, municipal privileges, and the like. Once granted, a privilege cannot be granted again; revenue from the sale of an office is what policy wonks of today call a ‘one-shot revenue enhancer.’ Therefore, it’s not just a play on words to say that there is a certain static quality to statist economics. Entrepreneurial dynamism need not apply. The only entrepreneurialism is seen in the state-builder himself, who ‘grows’ the state in order to ‘grow’ his income. In addition, in times of economic distress, discontent falls not on ‘the economy’ but on the state itself. Statism thus tends to turn on itself, undercutting its own authority and its own revenues even as it attempts to gather authority and revenue to itself.

    Absolutism contradicted itself. It encouraged men to think of France as one thing. At the same time, it needed to use the carrot of privilege and the stick of military coercion in a policy of divide and rule, of disunity. When the tensions so caused were strained by the economic crises of the late 1780s, the regime left itself vulnerable to challenges from within and ‘from below.’ The Revolution began as an aristocratic attempt to capture the state—a modern version of the factional struggles that tore ancient Rome. But the Third Estate, especially its middle-class segment, soon co-opted the revolution, allying itself with the urban poor and the simmering peasantry.

    So that’s why the French Revolution started. But why did this large set of social groups embark on a career of extremism, unlike the Americans?  The answer has several levels: political thought, political experience, foreign policy, economic class, and religion are the most significant.

    On the level of political thought, the French never solved the problem of faction. In the tenth Federalist, James Madison shows how faction might be used to stabilize, not ruin, a republican regime by the means of such institutions as representation, division of power, and federalism. The French weren’t listening. Almost to a man, they insisted on cultivating one national will expressed in a unicameral legislature. In a way, they needed to reinforce unity more than the Americans did, because French social divisions were estates, not classes—sharper divisions, legally enforced, tied up with political authority. But the French attempt to replace royal patriarchy with republican fraternity simply could not work in such a large territory, among such a large and diverse population. The French national assembly was a novelty, with no ties to, and therefore no support from or authority over, local governments. In this it resembled the first American constitution, the Articles of Confederation. A federal structure like that seen in the American Constitution wasn’t considered, and would have been difficult to design and to establish; that structure is what makes Madison’s extended republic possible. ‘Fraternity’ was the inadequate ideological substitute for the resolutely non-ideological pursuit of happiness.

    By contrast, the Americans got rid of the vestiges of anti-republican politics by breaking free of the king—who kept his head and his throne—and exiling his Tory allies to Canada. Class conflict, rather than estates-conflict, more easily lends itself to Madisionianism. Class conflict can lead to balanced sharing of power; estates-conflict more likely produces factions with claims to rule that are more rigidly exclusionary.

    On the level of political experience, both the French and the American revolutionaries featured young lawyers and government officials rather prominently. But the French revolutionaries had experience only in the politics of a statist monarchy. The Americans had extensive experience in the republican politics of routine colonial life. As a result, when the French became self-governing, many of them simply did not know what to do. They had loved ‘Enlightenment’ from afar, worshipped ‘Reason’ as a goddess, but had no practice at the self-government they preached. As the Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero argues, such inexperience led to fearfulness; fearfulness led to the commission of political crimes; crimes led to guilt and fear of retaliation; these led to the Terror. In a psychological pattern that became familiar in this past century, fear among the rulers resulted in state terrorism against the population. French politics remained prey to regime-threatening factionalism, for the next 180 years. In the United States, the quasi-aristocratic Southern planter class very nearly sundered the state, for precisely the same reason; they posed a regime threat to commercial republicanism in North America.

    On the level of foreign policy, a further, equally futile attempt to forge national unity was warfare, a standard ploy of monarchs commended to ‘the prince’ by Machiavelli. The French republicans waged offensive war against a continent full of monarchs, even as French kings had done. Here again, fear ruled: The revolutionaries invented something very much like what we call ‘total war’—complete with mass conscription, maximum feasible mobilization of all national resources, and propaganda—all out of the fear that France might become another Poland, divided and conquered by enemies of the republic foreign and domestic.
    These wars required substantial revenues; revenue extraction provoked popular resistance, which provoked more state-building. The revolution in the name of the people was advanced against the people by the suppression of political clubs and local militia. In the end, this only elevated Napoleon Bonaparte, a new monarch at the head of a still larger state apparatus.

    America designedly fought no major wars after the revolution, until 1812.  No less a military hero than Washington established this wise policy. Both the American and French revolutionaries invoked the imagery of Roman republicanism. But the ‘Roman’ imagery associated with Washington linked him to Cincinnatus, the man called from his farm to serve the republic who, having served, returned to his plow.

    On the economic level, Karl Marx got it somewhat wrong. The French Revolution was not a ‘bourgeois revolution’ in the same sense as the revolutions in England and America. To be sure, the revolution did establish a political economy based on private property rights. However, the revolution also confirmed France as a statist country with a bourgeoisie largely uninvolved in industry or finance. Although the populations of both countries were mostly agrarian, French farmers we peasants revolting against landlord-aristocrats, and then against the extractive French state. Independent and commercially-oriented, American farmers rebelled first against a foreign state, then against American debt-holders, but lacked any moral purchase with which to resists George Washington or Congress, whom they had helped to elect.

    Finally, on the level of religion, it is customary to observe that the close association between the Catholic Church and the French monarchy made anticlericalism and even atheism an all-too-attractive alternative to what might be termed the spiritual side of absolutism. Absolute monarchy made Christianity itself suspect. The reality is more complex. Most of the more ardent atheists were renegade aristocrats, the Marquis de Sade being the most conspicuous example. Among the middle classes, however, most revolutionaries were Christians, whether Catholics or Protestants. A minority were atheists or agnostics. They weren’t much interests in libertinism à la Sade. Many were secular moralists who wanted somehow to retain much of Christian morality without its theological underpinnings. The kind of military discipline required by this not-very-bourgeois middle-class republic required moral discipline.

    The problem arose in 1790, when the National Assembly voted not only to abolish tithes, cutting off Church income, but also to reorganize the Church dioceses and to make clerics salaried state officials. That is, the republic sought to entwine the Church in the state structure more tightly than the monarchy had done. As a result, with respect to education, eventually the regime attempted to replace the parish priest with the local schoolmaster. The philosophe Condorcet calls the teachers instituteurs, which means agents of the founding morality of the republic. The republican schoolteacher would then be an agent of the state operating locally, inculcating the proper secular republican virtues in the young.

    Needless to say, all of this attracted the unfavorable attention of the clergy and their many faithful adherents throughout the country. It fueled passions on all sides, encouraging everyone to think of politics as an irreconcilable spiritual conflict.

    In the United States, where the clergy very often supported the revolution on the basis of a Biblically-oriented version of natural and civil rights, where the established, Anglican Church had much less strength than the Catholic Church of France—hardly any at all in many colonies, which had been founded by religious dissenters—thee was usually no sharp conflict between Enlightenment types, who could afford to remain discreet, and a generally, though not entirely, pious citizenry. The American Founding saw a collaboration between such genuine Christians as John Dickinson, John Jay, and the clergy, and such Deists and secularists as Franklin, Jefferson, and Adams. As for the schools, they remained largely in the hands of religious men for a long time, because religiosity in America simply did not contradict republicanism.

    To answer my question—why republican France saw simultaneous instability and state-building, while republican America saw a civil war delayed long enough so that a resolute president and his fellow Unionists could restore the republic and preserve the national state—I have admired arguments advanced by Friedrich Gentz, who points to the moderation and legitimacy of the American Revolution. I have supplemented Gentz’s analysis in two main ways:

    First: the class differences in American versus the conflict of estates in France. Because estates are imbricated in a statist or proto-statist structure, every major social conflict threatens the regime itself. Class animosities, by contrast, are often directed not at ‘the state’ at all, and often have little or no revolutionary potential. Note well: many of the worst revolutions of the twentieth century, and many of the worst revolutionary outcomes, occurred in countries with traditions of imposing state structures—Russia, Germany, China.

    Second, the socioeconomic bases of the American Revolution were agrarian and commercial; the socioeconomic bases of the French revolution were agrarian and military—military because the state-building monarchic regime preceded the revolution. The Roman-republican militarist imagery of the French revolutionaries reflected and glorified this condition, a legacy of the statism or proto-statism induced by the saliency of Machiavellianism in Europe, crowded with countries formidable to one another. The Americans faced less dangerous enemies on their continent, needing less ‘state’ than Europeans. The state-building aspect of Machiavellianism made less sense here.

    In the eighteenth century, a story well known to students of the ancient world was the clash between the two great republics of Rome and Carthage. Rome was a military republic, a regime of the citizen-soldier. Carthage was a commercial republic. The French attempt to modernize the military republicanism of Rome led to disaster, eventually to Napoleon’s career, which might be described as Caesarism on amphetamines. The attempt to modernize the commercial republicanism of Carthage, seen in America and more gradually in England, led to a surprising result: the commercial republics, unlike the ancient republic, have enjoyed victories in the major wars they’ve fought against regime enemies. The English themselves in the 1780s, then the American Confederates, then the monarchic Germans of the First World War and the German tyranny of the Second, and finally the communist and eastern Europe all lost military/political confrontations with regimes they believed too sot, too money-mad, too unsoldierly to fight.

    The governance of faction is the practical problem of political life. On this, the statist polities appear more formidable than they are. State power, the ability to impose and to intrude, generates opposition precisely targeted against the political order itself. It sharpens factionalism even as it attempts to smother it. By contrast, regimes of liberty diffuse opposition and moderate or at least redirect political passions. Given the massive increase of technological power that modern life encourages, and the accordingly massive increase in the power of the state, the political discoveries of the American revolutionaries will continue to prove indispensable in the twenty-first century, the century in which you will raise families, govern, and engage others in the American regime of self-government.

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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