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    Beauvoir’s Politics

    September 26, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Simone de Beauvoir: The Second Sex. H. M. Parshley translation. New York: Bantam Books, 1964 [1949].

    Sonia Kruks: Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

     

    Although it may seem so, The Second Sex was not all Simone de Beauvoir wrote. An experienced scholar who knows her business, Sonia Kruks invites readers to see Beauvoir’s political writings as a whole. She also wants to bring Beauvoir into contemporary debates on liberal rationalism and poststructuralism, showing that Beauvoir staked out a position critical of the former without succumbing to the arbitrary nominalism of the latter As an existentialist, Beauvoir held that political judgments involve the whole being of the individual who makes them—not only the pure mind of the rationalists but that stubborn fact, the body, with its instincts, vulnerabilities, and powers. Human beings find themselves situated not only in one mind and one body (one life) but also in concrete social milieus that tend to disclose and to foreclose moral and political choices, empower and weaken the scope for political action Beauvoir thus insisted upon the ambiguity of all political judgment and action, their complex incompleteness. Oddly, and unlike her contemporary Simone Weil, Beauvoir never seems seriously to have engaged the writings of philosophers much before Immanuel Kant—precisely those who turned to political philosophy in the first place. Aristotle makes a brief appearance in The Second Sex, but only to get slapped on the wrist for having failed to understand human embryology.

    Writing in the tradition of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger—all of whom rejected nature as a source of right and defined freedom as the absence of natural constraint—the existentialists called for “active engagement in the world.” Beauvoir distinguished herself from Jean-Paul Sartre, however, by thinking more carefully about the body, “at once the site of both freedom and constraint,” and by giving greater emphasis to social relations. These concerns caused her to emphasize the ambiguity of human life, its “irresolvable antinomies,” most especially the ways in which our embodied sociality opens us both to “reciprocity” and “violent harms.” She resists all Hegelian and Marxist attempts at some grand synthesis or ‘end of History’ which would resolve these antimonies. Most interestingly, and unknowingly, she came upon something very like the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning, now approached via the existentialist notion of liberty. There is an “ontological freedom [la liberté] and the practical, or effective freedom that is required in order to act in the world [la puissance],” the latter “requir[ing] the presence and support of others.” Ignoring classical political philosophy, she soon began “to incorporate a non-reductionist Marxism within her analysis.” I am reminded of Nietzsche’s remark on Ralph Waldo Emerson: With Emerson, we lost a philosopher.”

    This moral and social thinker found herself confronted with politics by 1939. But, and again understandably in view of her intellectual formation, she described this experience in historicist terms: “History seized me and never let me go again.” Very much to her credit, she continued to resist the determinist side of historicism. After the war, which she spent in occupied Paris, the French Communist Party beckoned, especially since “there appeared to be no middle ground between unqualified support for the Soviet Union and a pro-American position, which aligned one with the exploitative forces of capitalist domination and imperialism” (as distinguished, of course, from the exploitative forces of communist domination and imperialism). To her credit, she could not quite bring herself to join the party, which “demanded an unquestioning discipline from its members which Beauvoir could not accept” (that ‘freedom’ issue, again), “espous[ing] the highly deterministic, orthodox version of Marxism (or, more precisely, Marxism-Leninism) that Stalin had formulated.” With Sartre, although never merely imitating him, she would develop an existentialist form of neo-Marxism, some of which entered the thought of the American New Left a generation later. Meanwhile, and in line with a French tradition dating back at least to Chateaubriand, she toured America in 1947. In her book, America Day by Day, she displays her by now well-honed capacity for the ambiguous and indeed ambivalent response: America was “the belly of the imperialist monster,” a land of “shrill anti-Communism” and “chauvinism,” itself conflicted with its “high-flown rhetoric of freedom” and its conditions of racism and poverty; “but she is also in love with the vibrancy of America, its sheer scale, its physical and social diversity, and its lack of stuffy European formality.”

    Her most influential book, The Second Sex, elaborates on the question of the relation of freedom and the body. The argument is now familiar: “Women’s material dependence on men and their lack of control over their own fertility constitute fundamental elements of their oppression,” an oppression that Marxian economics alone cannot come close to relieving. Under current social conditions, a woman lives “continuously divided against herself”: both “an active subject,” a free person, and one “who is obliged to make herself both ‘object and prey'” in the mating game. Beyond the socioeconomic ‘class’ dialectics of Marx, she insists upon an underlying sexual dialectic centered on the body. Kruks doesn’t leave it there, however, showing how Beauvoir went on to criticize French imperialism in her 1954 novel The Mandarins, subsequently bringing sexual politics, imperialism, and her ‘existentialist’ preoccupation with the ultimate limit on freedom, death, all together in her substantial memoirs, weaving the personal with the political. “Simone de Beauvoir lived her philosophical orientation to the world.”

    What blocked Beauvoir from having recourse to classical philosophy was her historicist rejection of the notion of human nature, and especially the idea that the distinctive human characteristic is the capacity to reason—which, however, she identifies with Kant’s “autonomous, rational will.” “Whatever there may be that is universal to human existence does not preexist particular lives and their specific projects and is brought into being only through them.” “Projects”: There is the modernist assumption that “freedom” consists of freedom from the physical; modern materialism puts this freedom in a precarious place, in a condition (as Beauvoir would say) of ambiguity and indeed of existential threat. She accordingly rejects contemporary ‘humanism,’ including the affirmation of ‘human rights,’ denying all remnants of human nature conceived as rational in the manner of Enlightenment thinkers and the historicists who followed. Beauvoir sees, however, that to throw the ‘human rights’ baby out with the ‘humanist’ bathwater can only lead to nominalism or even nihilism, as Hitler had so forcefully demonstrated. “A critical politics does still need to be anchored in some portrayal of what it is to be human.” (To put it in the language of a later notion of ‘deconstructionism,’ if we assert ‘the death of the subject’ how can the personal be the political?) Again, Beauvoir runs up against a problem well known to the classical philosophers she ignored, the distinction between ‘human being’ as an idea and ‘human being’ as a way of life. Unlike them, she assumes that rationality cannot be the source of freedom, as indeed it cannot if rationality’s most important discovery are ‘iron laws of history.’ She settles on understanding the human being as an “embodied subject”; “the lived body [is] ‘the radiation of subjectivity.” “No exterior reality determines our choices”—as in Hegel and Marx—”yet situations that we cannot but assume may so powerfully predispose us to act in particular ways that freedom may, in practice, be significantly curtailed.” Freedom comes not from the culmination of a rationally-determined historical dialectic but in strengthened social relations “chosen, built, and sustained in the here and now”—existentially, as it were.

    Aristotle finds in the reciprocal rule of husband and wife in the household the nucleus of political rule in the polis. In her own way, so does Beauvoir: As subjects, the ‘otherness’ of others “is rapidly tempered by the reciprocal realization that each one of us is an object for the other, who is thus, like us, a subject.” Unlike Aristotle, she requires that such reciprocity meet the standard of egalitarianism; in this, she registers the democratic sociopolitical regime described by Tocqueville, although unlike Tocqueville she allows it to determine her moral and political doctrine. In this sense, she is no philosopher, having never ascended from the ‘cave’ of her time and place.

    In considering oppression, Beauvoir doubts that Hegel’s ‘master’ in the ‘master-slave’ struggle for recognition truly esteems his masterly status because it exacts recognition from ‘his’ slave. Upon reflecting on Beauvoir’s work, Kruks identifies three kinds of oppression: asymmetrical recognition, indifference, and aversion. Dehumanization is the most extreme form of oppression. As seen in the Nazi extermination camps—where human beings “were just so much material to be processed efficiently”—to the old-age or (as they are called) retirement homes, where “the aged are frequently viewed as nothing more than pure objects,” dehumanization means treating the subject as object, as in Hegel. But of course there is a difference between dehumanization motivated by extreme aversion, as in the ‘camps,’ and the milder aversion seen in our attitudes toward the aged, as in the ‘homes.’ Sexual politics, in distinction to both of these, derives from asymmetrical recognition; it isn’t that men don’t recognize the subjectivity of women but rather that they subordinate it by the deployment of self-satisfying myths about ‘The Woman.’  In Beauvoir’s witty formulation, The Woman is “the mirror in which the male Narcissus contemplates himself,” or, as Kruks more prosaically puts it, “the object of male fantasies.” Such ‘objectifying asymmetrical nonrecognition also describes the ways in which Europeans (mis)understand Africans, Asians, even Americans. In America itself, dehumanization manifests itself most usually in an indifference fortified by complacency in contemplating the abstract principles of the Declaration of Independence and of constitutional law.

    There is a difference between the dehumanization of the aged and the other kinds. The others are remediable. Although the attitudes toward the aged taken by their relatives and caretakers may be changed, aging itself cannot. Kruks remarks that, unlike The Second Sex, Beauvoir’s late book, The Coming of Age, does not conclude with a section on liberation. To borrow a Sartrian phrase, there is no exit in this life from the coming of age. “With the approach of old age one makes the startling discovery that one’s body, in its brute physical facticity, is itself ‘Other.'” Aging kills not only our bodies but our “projects,” our freedom, along with them. The old man does nothing: “He is defined by an exis, not a praxis.” She blames capitalism for this, inasmuch as “for many, a prior life of alienated labor also means that they have no existential resources to enjoy the enforced ‘leisure’ of retirement.” Old age “exposes the failure of our entire civilization,” Beauvoir writes, hyperbolically. She does not explain why socialism, as distinguished from, say, religious convictions, could help, and Kruks has nothing much to suggest, either.

    Unlike many socialists from middle- or upper-class backgrounds, Beauvoir confronted her own privilege. Drawing upon Beauvoir’s thought but also supplementing it, Kruks insists on the limitations of “a politics of self-transformation” often seen among contemporary leftists, including feminists. She blames this on “a tacit neo-Kantianism” which centers on recognition of ‘the Other’ as “an autonomous rational will.” But as Beauvoir argues, and as Kruks agrees, rationalism, however well-intentioned, won’t bring us to a condition of fully egalitarian practice. “It may be preferable to acknowledge that one is privileged but then to act from one’s privileged location: to deploy one’s privilege as effectively as possible.” Beauvoir herself began to see her own privileged position as the Algerian war of independence from France intensified in the late 1950s. In the face of French brutality in Algeria, she could not deny that she was not French. But neither did she attempt to reject “her own privileged culture, or her privileges as an intellectual” within it. “Aware of her privileged status, she instead learned to deploy it as a basis for effective, public, political intervention.” Against French nationalism vis-à-vis the Algerians, she in turn deployed an appeal to patriotism, to France as the vindicator of The Rights of Man. “In actuality, Beauvoir supported a project of decolonization that did bring very significant changes in the world (not all of them perhaps for the best).” Indeed: As Kruks observes, the Third-World ‘liberation’ movements included the 1979 Iranian revolution, itself a denial of the rights of women Beauvoir had championed for so long; she broke with such French leftists as Michel Foucault, who foolishly and unjustly supported the mullahs when they “demanded that women wear the veil.” In her own way still a child of the Enlightenment, Beauvoir didn’t like veils on anything or anyone.

    Such conflicts bring Kruks back to Beauvoir’s theme of the ambiguity of politics, and of human life generally. Beauvoir rejected reason as the standard of political judgment. As “acts of situated freedom,” political judgments are and should be made “with our entire being,” including our bodies, emotions, and “personal history.” Hence she treats political judgment most thoroughly in a novel, The Mandarins, not an essay. There, the main character arrives at the same political judgment Beauvoir espoused in the late Forties: alignment with a ‘third way’ democratic-socialist party in France but geopolitical support for the Soviet Union, which, “for all its deformations,” remains “the greatest force for progress and, as such, must be given support” against capitalist, imperialist America. Such judgments must always be open to revision, however, given exactly the self-knowledge they require, and also the limitations of our knowledge, both of our situation and our selves. “A political judgment is, even at its best, but an informed and reasonable guess, one made by a particular, ‘idiosyncratic’ self in a particular situation—and like all human action it is subject to failure.” (As indeed Beauvoir’s assessment of the Soviet Union so obviously was.)

    “That these personal elements play a role does not mean, however, that reason is absent,” but rather that “political judgment must be understood as an existential choice.” Although Kruks doesn’t emphasize this point, she should, inasmuch as in the absence of reason, which is really nothing more than the principle of non-contradiction, judgments and choices would descend to incoherence or, when coherent, they would be so by chance, at random.

    Prudential reasoning informs political life, but its end is justice, the topic of Kruks’s final chapter. Given Beauvoir’s socialism, one expects a discussion of distributive justice, but Kruks makes the more interesting choice, turning to the question of punitive justice. In her 1946 essay, “An Eye for an Eye,” Beauvoir considers the case of French Nazi collaborator Robert Brasillach, who had publicly identified Jews and Resistance members during the Occupation, effectively guaranteeing their “deportation, torture, or execution.” An opponent of capital punishment before the war, Beauvoir admitted that her heart wanted Brasillach dead. She distinguished punishment, defined as “the purely retaliatory treatment that revenge demands,” from sanctions, “those penalties that have intended purposes other than revenge,” such as deterrence or reform. “Revenge as a response to atrocity is almost always a failure on its own terms” because it cannot erase the effects of the crime. Nonetheless, true to her contention that judgment is not and should not be wholly rational, she finds hatred of “those who commit absolute evil” and “appropriate response”—a passion but not “a capricious passion.” This especially pertains to bystanders, those not directly injured by the wrongdoer; their response expresses “the inherent sociality of individuated existence,” the “intense personal bonds” we feel for those unjustly and cruelly injured and killed. Human sociality constitutes part of “who I am.” “For our world is suffused, our existence shaped, by our participation (often unchosen) in various anonymous social collectivities.” Although Kruks herself doesn’t approve of it, Beauvoir refused to sign a petition asking for clemency for Brasillach. Brasillach deserved to suffer the death penalty, in Beauvoir’s judgment, “as an expression of society’s extreme revulsion at [his] violation” of “the values that his crimes [had] violated.” Kruks prefers our contemporary ‘truth and reconciliation’ committees, whereby societies turn to a sort of therapeutic response to atrocity. She concedes that many members of those societies find reconciliation as unsatisfying as she (and to some degree Beauvoir) find punishment and sanction. As Beauvoir concluded at the end of her essay, “failure haunts all human action, love as much as vengeance.” The persistent ambiguity of human thought, sentiment, and action did not impede her “struggle for greater freedom in the world.”

    Kruks’s helpful, comprehensive view of Beauvoir’s political thought shows a thinker who, beginning and remaining entirely within the horizon of ‘late-modern’ or post-Kantian political thought, with its valorization of freedom in opposition to ‘nature’ conceived as brute matter, nonetheless can be seen as struggling with the same considerations of prudence and of justice seen in Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Never having studied them carefully, she ties her own thought into unnecessary knots. Given the seminal character of her best-known book, The Second Sex, her argument there should be considered in light of the handicap imposed by her own intellectual formation.

    As an advocate of freedom, Beauvoir begins with critiques of the three most prominent determinisms of the time: biology, Freudian psychology, and Marxism. “The fact is that the individual, though its genotypic sex is fixed at fertilization, can be profoundly affected by the environment in which it develops.” She concurs with Hegel’s judgment that biology enables men to act as ‘subjects,’ as individuals well adapted for activity, “while the female remains wrapped up in the species.” By this she means that after copulation the male mammal is free to leave whereas the female is stuck with pregnancy. Men create; they “strike out from temporal unity in general.” Women maintain; “in the female it is the continuity of life that seeks accomplishment” in her. “The individuality of the female is opposed by the interest of the species; it is as if she were possessed by foreign forces—alienated.” This begins well before pregnancy in menstruation and continues after it in nursing the child. The woman’s individuality remains “the prey of outside forces” until another ‘outside’ force, menopause, relieves her of these natural cycles; throughout her life, “there are many times when she is “not in command” of herself. “In comparison with her the male seems infinitely favored: his sexual life is not in opposition to his existence as a person, and biologically it runs an even course, without crises and generally without mishap.” Beauvoir resolutely overlooks the satisfaction that women take in their womanhood, and especially in child-rearing.

    What she does insist upon is that although these “biological facts… are one of the keys to the understanding of woman,” they do not “establish for her a fixed an inevitable destiny” and remain “insufficient for setting up a hierarchy of the sexes.” “Woman is weaker than man” (not for her the absurd claim of some later feminists, that opening up sports for girls will result in women competing on an equal basis with men on the athletic field), but her weakness “is revealed as such only in the light of the ends man proposes, the instruments he has available, and the laws he establishes”—seen particularly in violent competition. “Thus we must view the facts in of biology in the light of an ontological, economic, social, and psychological context”; “the nature of woman has been affected throughout the course of history.”

    Turning then to one of those elements, psychology, she observes that “all psychoanalysts systematically reject the idea of choice and the correlated concept of value, and therein lies the intrinsic weakness of the system.” (Decades later, feminists who argued in favor of the right to abortion ‘on demand’ framed the issue in exactly Beauvoir’s existentialist terms, as a matter of free choice.) Freud, for example, “endeavored to replace the idea of value with that of authority; but he admits in Moses and Monotheism that he has no way of accounting for this authority.” In contrast, “I shall place woman in a world of values and give her behavior a dimension of liberty,” with “the power to choose between the assertion of her transcendence [of biological and other determinisms] and her alienation as object.”

    The same goes for historical materialism. Contra Marx, Beauvoir contends that the aforementioned “course of history” is not destiny. Although “the theory of historical materialism has brought to light some important truths”—notably, that “humanity is not an animal species” and “human society” arises against nature, “tak[ing] over the control of nature in its own behalf” by its “practical action.” But the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate also relieves woman’s estate, beginning to “annul the muscular inequality of man and woman.” It also liberates women from much household drudgery (without the need to enslave other human beings) and even liberates them from multiples pregnancies and from some of the burdens of child care. Marx and Engels misunderstood gestation and childbirth as ‘labor’ in the sense of artificial production; gestation and labor, and especially the sexual impulse that leads to them, register more than “productive force” in the manner of carpentry or welding. Woman “is for man a sexual partner, a reproducer, an erotic object—an Other through whom he seeks himself.” Even under the democratic socialism Beauvoir advocates, after the abolition of social classes, “sexual differentiation would keep all its importance” (emphasis added).  “Underlying all individual drama, as it underlies the economic history of mankind, there is an existentialist foundation that alone enables us to understand in its unity that particular form of being which we call human life.” For Beauvoir, for existentialism, the modern conquest of nature and the freedom it gives to the conquerors, relativizes all determinisms that modern scientists and philosophers have held up in its wake.

    Indeed, history amounts to the story of this progressive conquest redounding to the favor of women. In the earliest societies nature bound women down with pregnancy and children; the true curse laid upon Eve was her exclusion from the “warlike forays” of men, “for it is not in giving life but in risking life that man is raised above the animal,” thereby “transcending” mere life by inventing tools (including weapons) and generally “shaping the future.” If this sounds very much like Hegel, Beauvoir acknowledges that indeed it does: “Certain passages in the argument employed by Hegel in defining the relation of master to slave apply much better to the relation of man to woman.” “Doomed to immanence”—the opposite of manly transcendence—for centuries, women slowly began to benefit from the victory of “Spirit” over “Life,” of “technique over magic, and reason over superstition.” Because woman instantiates the larger immanence of nature itself (more tellingly, ‘nature herself’), “the devaluation of woman represents a necessary stage in the history of humanity.” But this is only a dialectical stage, not a permanent condition, and it too shall be transcended. There are even foreshadowings of future equality in some historical moments, such as ancient Egypt, where the goddesses lived on equal footing with the gods and “woman had the same rights as man, the same powers in court,” and the same property rights. Although Beauvoir doesn’t say so, this means that the exodus of Jews from Egypt was a dialectical reversal of that early, just social condition, for which humanity as a whole was not yet prepared; in fact she will go on to excoriate Judaism and Christianity for their masculinism.

    “Christian ideology has contributed no little to the oppression of women,” subordinating them under its legal code and banning abortion as a result of “endowing the embryo with a soul”; abortion thus “became a crime against the fetus itself,” which it never had been under the preceding Roman law. In “demand[ing] a new status,” today’s women “wish that in themselves, as in humanity in general, transcendence may prevail over immanence.” She avers that “it is in Soviet Russia that the feminist movement has made the most sweeping advances,” citing as evidence the constitution of the Soviet Union—not necessarily the most reliable reflection of the realities of the Soviet way of life.

    As in history, so also in myths, which persist into modern times. “The cult of the leader, whether he be Napoleon, Mussolini, or Hitler, excludes all other cults.” Bizarrely (given the status afforded to Lenin, Stalin, and soon to Mao Zedong), she claims that “socialist ideologies, which assert the equality of all human beings, refuse now and for the future to permit any human category to be object or idol: in the authentically democratic society proclaimed by Marx there is no place for the Other.”

    Leaving aside her pro-Communist niaseries and looking at the core of her argument, one notices that Beauvoir has a problem to solve. The earliest religions, matriarchies, valorized Woman but also identified her with nature, with immanence. Ultimately, Man must rebel against her. “It was Christianity, paradoxically, that was to proclaim, on a certain plane, the equality of man and woman” in its renunciation and indeed hatred of ‘the flesh’ along with the world and the devil. Women are equally invited to renounce the flesh, which they (in Beauvoir’s terms) live in and through. “If she agrees to deny her animality, woman—from the very fact that she is the incarnation of sin—will be also the most radiant incarnation of the triumph of the elect who have conquered sin.” However, she can only do this by worshipping and serving Jesus as the Christ—a male god. “This is the supreme masculine victory.” It can only be overturned dialectically by valorizing eroticism as the new spirituality, by a sort of Hegelian synthesis of body and spirit, immanence and transcendence, all expressed in social egalitarianism. This is possible because human life itself consists not only of the bodily but of a tension between body and spirit, necessity and freedom. “The bond that in every individual connects the physiological life and the psychic life—or better the relation existing between the contingence of an individual and the free spirit that assumes it—is the deepest enigma implied in the condition of being human, and this enigma is presented in its most disturbing form in woman.” “What is she?” For her answer Beauvoir again calls upon Egypt: Woman is “a sphinx,” the riddle, “a fundamental ambiguity” who—and that—must be addressed.

    In the second half of The Second Sex Beauvoir accordingly abandons consideration of history and mythology, turning to “woman’s life today.” The modern world is the world of human transcendence, of nature-conquest. To be sure, men have led the way so far, but their victories have readied the world for the ascent of woman, that is, for full human liberation. In terms of this non-deterministic version of historicism, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,” a being produced by “civilization as a whole,” a civilization that aims at such liberation by the means of conquering nature. Even in the course of nature itself, the pre-pubescent girl is physically and mentally equal to her male cohort; such feelings of inequality she may entertain result from social indoctrination, especially from bans on risk-taking—climbing trees, fighting. But with puberty, nature imposes restrictions. The girl finds herself now “consumed in waiting, more or less disguised.” “She is awaiting Man,” daydreaming of “the liberator,” the “rich and powerful” Prince Charming. To attract him, she must cultivate “grace and charm,” appearing “weak, futile, docile.” Whereas “the young man’s journey into existence is made relatively easy by the fact that there is no contradiction between his vocation as human being and as male,” the young woman becomes “divided against herself,” “doomed to insincerity and all its subterfuges.” On the other hand, this conflict, this ambivalence, causes her inner life to “develop more deeply than that of her brothers”; barred from action, she must think. Her eroticism is, because it must be, much less unsubtle than the man’s. Also, despite her natural inclination to maintain rather than to create and transcend, the woman’s life cycle manifests itself in “crises—puberty, sexual initiation, the menopause—which are much more decisive than in the male.” Natural reality stares the woman in the face more intently. Oddly, Beauvoir additionally contends that these facts makes the woman less socially conformist than men; she could only be thinking of herself, and not the generality of women, who are surely no less conformist than men.

    Already, in 1949, the conquest of women has transformed marriage into a contract between “two independent persons.” Marriage for the woman is “a more advantageous career than many others,” inasmuch as most jobs are still closed to her, but it is nonetheless a career choice, not a necessity. “Today the house has lost its patriarchal splendor,” having become merely “a place to live in,” no longer the locus of ancestor-worship, as it was in ‘the ancient city’ described by Fustel de Coulanges. Middle-class women who “lack outside interests” will busy themselves with make-work projects, “just to have something to do.” (Indeed, one of the ‘moms’ in my old neighborhood would clean the house every day, topping this off by a weakly waxing of the patio tiles, and then prohibit her husband and their three sons, as well as the rest of us, from entering her spic-and-span domain without removing their shoes.) And when she does find something to do outside the home, typically her activities amount to good-works civic associational activities, undertaken again for the sake of warding off boredom—Tocquevillian civil society gone pretentious and silly. (To some extent, Beauvoir needs to denigrate women’s ‘clubs,’ given her commitment to a statist socialism that would absorb such things into its all-encompassing egalitarian embrace.)

    In her drive to liberate women from what has been considered necessity, Beauvoir does not hesitate to attack the continued valorization of motherhood. Returning to abortion, she claims that laws against abortion rest on “the old Catholic argument” that “the unborn child has a soul, which is denied access to paradise if its life is interrupted without baptism.” But, she objects, the Church does not oppose capital punishment or war; indeed the Holy Wars were launched against the unbaptized. In this she ignores the obvious point that murderers and marauding anti-Christian soldiers deliberately oppose Christian principles and practices, unlike unborn children. And of course by rejecting natural right she can simply avoid the question of a natural right to life. As for the mother who gives birth, she “is almost always a discontented woman” who attempts “to compensate for all [her] frustrations through her child,” spanking her child as a means of “taking her vengeance on a man, on the world, or on herself.” It is again difficult to resist the thought that Beauvoir takes a jaundiced view toward mothers and their supposed discontentedness. She also overlooks the maternal love of one’s own, which explains the ambitions mothers entertain for their children at least as well as displaced frustration. Admitting the strength of the love of one’s own would throw both her eroticism and her socialism into serious question.

    Summarizing her analysis, Beauvoir writes that “Woman does not entertain the positive belief that the truth is something other than men claim; she recognizes, rather, that there is not any fixed truth,” a recognition based on the decided changes in her own body that occur at certain junctures in her lifetime. In denying the fluidity of truth, man is the one who is finally the greater hypocrite, “pompously thunder[ing] for his code of virtue and honor” while secretly inviting woman “to disobey it” and confidently expecting her to do so. “Man gladly accepts as his authority Hegel’s idea according to which the citizen acquires his ethical dignity in transcending himself toward the universal, but as a private individual he has a right to desire and pleasure,” marrying one woman and frolicking in a whorehouse with another, or others. Under these circumstances, woman consoles herself with religion, “the mirage of some form of transcendence.”

    Beauvoir assures her readers that a forthrightly atheistic if not materialist democratic socialism will change all this. Equal work, equal pay, “erotic liberty,” consensual marriage which can be broken “at will,” free contraception and abortion, State-paid pregnancy leaves, State-sponsored child care (children will not “be taken away from their parents” but “would not be abandoned to them” by society): “Only in a socialist world” can these dreams be realized. The Hegelian dialectic will be consummated in mutual recognition of man and woman, but without any permanent ‘synthesis’ or ‘end of History,’ inasmuch as “sexuality will always be materialized [in] the tension, the anguish, the joy, the frustration, and the triumph of existence.” Nature, conquered, will also be redeemed as fully human, as Marx promises. By sexualizing Hegel and Marx, Beauvoir corrects them, relieving their theories of excesses of masculine ‘transcendence’ while making socialism more humanly satisfying, less Heaven-like.

    Having remained entirely within the horizon of modern philosophy, Beauvoir underestimates nature both as a physical entity and as a source of right. (It almost goes without saying that she rejects God as the ultimate source of right.) Accordingly, she assumes that she can maximize freedom and equality at the same time, a circle not so easily squared if one respects the integrity of circles and the principle of non-contradiction. In presenting laws of change as an account of Being as a whole, Hegelian logic aims at overcoming that principle, of incorporating it into a larger movement. Beauvoir’s version of Hegelian and Marxian dialectic partakes of the dubiousness of its forebears, but it has succeeded in bringing modern feminism along with it.

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Resistance, Reconsidered

    September 26, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Robert Gildea: Fighters in the Shadows: A New History of the French Resistance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015.

    Originally published in Law and Liberty, February 29, 2016.

     

    To this day, every major political grouping in France offers its own account of the opposition the country mounted against the Germans in World War II, leaving it to historians to sort things out. Robert Gildea has produced a well-researched and balanced book on the subject, guiding readers through the factional snags.

    Moral and political fragmentation in fact is the major theme here. As conflict with Nazi Germany loomed, the French were horrified at the prospect of another Great War, and unnerved to the point of military paralysis. So factionalized was the society that it found no unity even against the aggressor. Insofar as most French citizens agreed on anything, it was that their hero of the earlier conflagration, Marshall Philippe Pétain, was right to counsel surrender. In 1940, they gave peace with the Nazis a chance—under their direct rule in the north, under the collaborationist government at Vichy in the south.

    Nuclei of resistance to the occupier formed at once, but, as Gildea shows, with little strength or cohesiveness. Except for Charles de Gaulle, recently made a general, no member of the last Cabinet of the Third Republic continued the fight. The handful of parliamentarians who wanted to start a government-in-exile were arrested by the Vichyites in Casablanca, released, and placed under surveillance. Some French communists went underground but they were in the minority–the party line was to take no stand against Hitler, who was in a non-aggression pact with Josef Stalin until Hitler broke it by invading Russia in June 1941.

    Most of France’s North African colonies sided with Vichy—recall Captain Renault in the movie Casablanca—and although sub-Saharan France saw strong pockets of resistance (for black Africans, a new order founded upon Aryan triumphalism looked even worse than French colonialism), how would those colonies be organized as effective fighting units against the German military machine? General de Gaulle made his famous appeal for unity from his exile in London. Few in France heard it; fewer still heeded it, even among the isolated resisters.

    Although throughout the conflict, the resisters’ numbers grew, the schisms among them continued even as Allied forces gathered, took the war to the enemy in multiple fronts, and weakened the Nazi grip on France. De Gaulle and his “Free France” (later “Fighting France”) organization eventually dominated the field, but the political splinter groups frustrated him then and after the war, and the story of the Resistance itself became a matter of contention in the political fights to come.

    Into this historiographic free-for-all wades Gildea, who teaches modern history at Oxford. He holds decidedly Laborite political convictions—at one point he pauses to regret that the French missed their chance, in the aftermath of the war, to form a new Popular Front coalition of social democrats and communists, which might have made for “a French-style Labour Party.” But he is too much the historian to give himself over to partisanship. This even-handed book leavens its social and political analyses with stories gleaned from the archival and oral-history sources he so evidently loves.

    When honest academic historians sift through competing partisan narratives, trying to figure out what really happened, they sometimes miss what those narrative are aimed at: not historical accuracy but myth-making, and often of an honorable kind. De Gaulle, for example, wrote his War Memoirs (1955) not as history in the academic sense but as a political testament, a means of unifying the French along the lines of a stable republican regime animated by renewed patriotism.

    One of my favorites among the many remarkable persons Gildea describes is the French woman résistante who, upon being asked by one of her astonished Nazi captors, why she had taken up arms against the Reich, answered “Quite simply colonel, because the men had dropped theirs.” The men needed to recover from their humiliation after the war if they were once again to become citizens. De Gaulle understood that, too. While carefully separating the poetic from the prosaic, he is a historian who never forgets the indispensable political and therefore human need for poetry. When he quotes de Gaulle’s ringing celebration, in a liberated Paris in 1945, of “One France, the true France, eternal France,” Gildea observes the exaggeration while showing his readers the need for it.

    Small in number, resisters nonetheless came from every one of the factions—Left and Right, soldiers and civilians, Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant (the word “Resistance” itself alluded to Protestant resistance to Catholics during the sectarian civil wars of the seventeenth century), and atheistic. Gildea takes care to show how women proved crucial to the Resistance, not so much as combatants but in the dangerous tasks of carrying messages and sheltering fugitives—crimes punishable by prison or death. He also gives full credit to foreign combatants, including veteran from the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War, and the many courageous and resourceful Jewish refugees from Central and Eastern Europe who found shelter in Vichyite southern France until late 1942, when the Nazis elbowed aside the French collaborationists and assumed direct rule as in the north.

    The fundamental split that emerged, once the defeat of the Nazis and the collaborators was assured (and de Gaulle knew it was, early, telling Churchill so on the day after Pearl Harbor), was between the French republicans, led by the exiled de Gaulle—initially from London, then from Algiers—and the communists. For a short time, these two Resistance wings allied, thanks to the work of one of the really great men the war brought forward, Jean Moulin.

    A prefect before the war, displaced by the Vichyites, Moulin (1899-1943) found his way to London and met de Gaulle in October 1941. De Gaulle needed someone to bring the several Resistance organizations together under Free French coordination, and in Moulin he found someone with the courage, organizational savvy, and persuasive powers to do that. Moulin returned to France, where he made contact with key leaders of all factions, many of whom spun their own mythologies, most of them featuring inflated estimates of the number of men they commanded. Through Moulin, de Gaulle hoped to persuade the communist and also the romantic-revolutionary republican factions to delay their quixotic guerrilla actions and await the Allied landing, still two years away. By the beginning of 1943, Moulin had managed to get them all to agree to this, more or less.

    This astonishing achievement was almost immediately imperiled by Moulin’s capture, torture, and death at the hands of the Gestapo. (Two decades later, André Malraux said, “He revealed not a single secret—he who knew them all.”) But before he died, Moulin established the innocuously titled Committee for General Studies, eventually headed by Michel Debré, who went on to write the constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958. What the Committee ‘studied’ was the identities of non-communist French men and women who were qualified to assume the functions of government as soon as the Allies drove out the Nazis. Immediate rule of France by well-vetted Frenchmen would prove indispensable to reestablishing French republicanism because the only well-organized force in what remained of French civil society was the French Communist Party, whose chairman, Maurice Thorez, was spending the war in Moscow, where he received his instructions for the postwar struggle.

    For their part, the communists never fully recovered from the infamy of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but it must be noted that many exhibited great courage once they focused on the real enemy. Their own myth, Gildea observes, amounted to an atheist’s version of Christian martyrdom. This never quite convinced most Frenchmen, many of whom suffered the reprisals that followed communist heroics. But there can be no doubt that communists exhibited valor equal to any other group that fought the occupiers.

    Meanwhile, in Washington, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull detested de Gaulle, supposing him to be a would-be Bonaparte intent on founding a dictatorship. Fortunately, the wiser heads of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower prevailed.  The Americans let de Gaulle deal with the communists, the more idealistic but none-too-well-organized republican résistants, and the Vichyites, as U. S., British, Polish, and some French troops (most of them not civilian résistants but men battle-hardened in North Africa) rolled up the Germans on the Western Front, while the Red Army, along with Poles under the command of Soviet officers, closed in from the east.

    Gildea handles a substantial mass of facts and competing stories with the deft and practiced touch of a master of the historical craft. The story he tells is far more complex than the one I’ve told here, and he unfolds it with seasoned aplomb. Of course no review should be without its cavils, and mine is that he doesn’t do full justice to de Gaulle’s intention. It is not true that “the only ambition of de Gaulle was to strengthen the state and to secure his leadership role within it.” That was half of the goal, and only the first half. It makes him sound too much like the Bonapartist bogey imagined by FDR, even though Gildea himself disputes FDR’s more sinister interpretation. De Gaulle was equally concerned to restore French republicanism, if in new form.

    Since at least the early 1930s, when he had lobbied the French Assembly for support of his plans for mobile army forces to supplement the passive defenses afforded by the Maginot Line fortifications, de Gaulle had witnessed the chaos, even imbecility, of parliamentary politics in France. Without shading into Bonapartism, he understood the need to establish an independently elected executive. This was especially important in the countries of Europe, where troops could pour across a national border faster than any parliament in an invaded country could act. De Gaulle had longed for such a regime change in the interwar years, and he dedicated his remaining life to founding and perpetuating a French republicanism that could defend itself.

    Among the stories told about the Resistance, Gildea seem to favor the more recently told ones: those that lend themselves to a feminist emphasis on “highlighting a devotion to others rather than to their own glory’; those that show Jews as both victims and résistants; and those celebrating the rescuers who sheltered all types of résistants, a perilous thing to do. What he terms the “humanitarian narrative,” I observe, fits better into today’s demi-regime of the European Union, and better into his own democratic socialism, than into what he calls “the Gaullist myth of national liberation.” It better fits the EU than “the communist myth of popular insurrection,” too. Socialism in our day is more likely to come in on a blitzkrieg of bureaucratic paperwork in the name of just this sort of soft humanitarianism.

    One may prefer the tougher and more forthrightly political myth of Gaullism, as I do. Robert Gildea is nonetheless right to think that all of these stories bring facts to the table, and to give to every résistant some portion of the honors distributed here.

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Three English Settlements in North America, Compared

    September 25, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Malcolm Gaskill: Between Two Worlds: How the English Became Americans. New York: Basic Books, 2014.

    Originally published in Law and Liberty, November 25, 2015. Republished with permission.

     

    English settlers in America might have intended to transmit the traditions of the mother country to subsequent generations. This didn’t exactly happen—partly because the settlers disagreed amongst themselves about which of those traditions deserved preservation, and partly because the experience of life in North America challenged many of the traditions they did want to preserve. The disagreement and the adaptation together led, eventually, to a political revolution.

    Malcolm Gaskill puts it bluntly: “Migrants did have one thing in common: they were no longer in England, and they had to get used to it.” His new book tracks what happened to the English in their three (very different) principal areas of settlement: Virginia, New England, and the Caribbean. He also keeps an eye on what the English who stayed at home—financing these expeditions and attempting to rule them from afar—thought and did, especially in competition with the Spanish, who had settled large swaths of the New World a long time before their geopolitical rivals in London really got started. This gives Between Two Worlds a lot to do, but the author, a professor of early modern history at the University of East Anglia, manages his unruly topic by considering each of the first three settler generations in turn.

    Gaskill deals in his prologue with the inauspicious sixteenth-century beginnings of the project, remarking that the English understandably modeled their efforts on the recent conquest of Ireland, the wild tribes of which reminded them of their own pre-Roman-conquest ancestors and of the North American peoples. the first settlement, at Roanoke, “Virginia” in 1585—named for Elizabeth, the Virgin Queen, of course—vanished from the earth like Prospero’s insubstantial pageant. To this day, we don’t know what happened to its more than 100 inhabitants.

    The years 1607 to 1640 mark Gaskill’s first generation of permanent settlers. Of the four million English in 1600, thousands would journey to the New World during this period, Half of them went to the West Indies, slightly more than a third to the Virginia/Chesapeake area, only fifteen percent to New England. Motives varied, but as the ‘southerly’ movement of the new arrivals suggests, the prospect of a mild climate fit for rich plantations and an interest in “resisting Spanish Catholics—the dark lords of an American empire”—figured prominently in English ambitions. To wrest land from the infidels of Spain and from pagan indigenes—better still, while converting the latter to Protestant Christianity—reconciled, at least to the satisfaction of the English, desires for both liberty and empire. (Two centuries later, Thomas Jefferson’s formula, ‘the empire of liberty,” would address the same paradox, albeit in very different terms.)

    Upon ascending to the throne in 1603, James I followed a two-track strategy regarding Spain. He made peace while endorsing some New World plantations. King James’ restraint in New World settlement bespoke not only diplomatic caution but also the worry (prescient, as it would happen) that large English settlements in the New world might upset England’s place “in the hierarchy of nations.” The New World tail might someday wag the Old World dog. He took care not to use the Crown’s money for investment, leaving colonization to private speculators who nonetheless remained under royal control. Hence the Virginia company and the Plymouth Adventurers, both established in 1606.

    The former reached the Chesapeake Bay under the command of Captain John Smith the following year, founding Jamestown and meeting resistance above all from the Indian chiefs or Paw-Paws, who recognized a rival form of worship when they saw one. As Gaskill puts it, “Indian suspicion on one side, and a haughty sense of entitlement on the other, guaranteed an Anglo-Indian future steeped in misery and bloodshed.” And this notwithstanding the marriage of the entrepreneur John Rolfe to “Pocahontas” (her real name, Mataoka, concealed from the English), optimistically renamed “Rebecca,” after the Biblical mother of two nations. She died less than a decade later, after a publicity tour of England, taking the rather faint hope of peaceful intermarriage and Christina conversion of the Indians with her.

    The real answer to lasting English settlement in America was found in political thought—specifically, in what political scientists now call ‘comparative politics.’ “Adventurers had to learn that merely installing English settlements in America was not enough,” Gaskill writes. “They had to identify things that made England work socially, politically, and economically and reproduce them. Peopling the land was the key.” If ever a people were, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous phrase, forced to be free, it was the English in North America. More specifically, they were force to think, and to think politically. It was a habit that would eventuate in independence and republicanism, early two centuries later.

    Having been engaged in fierce geopolitical struggles amongst themselves for centuries, the Indian nations and tribes quickly saw the danger of any substantial territorial encroachments by the newcomers. At best, the white strangers might be deployed against traditional enemies. Incidentally, one of the merits of Between Two Worlds is its treatment of the Indians—a treatment free of the American triumphalism of the old accounts, and also of the condescending sympathy for ‘Native Americans’ fashionable in the past half-century. Gaskill describes but makes no attempt to justify the sudden attack on Jamestown masterminded by the apparently friendly Powhatan chief Opechancanough, whose men murdered 387 unsuspecting settlers in March 1622, then mangled the carcasses. After that, “Throughout the Atlantic world, men decided that Indians could not be trusted.” Settler eminences now began to speak not of intermarriage, peaceful trade, and conversion but of the right of war and the law of nations exercised against savages. This means that one should be cautious with the term ‘racism’ when thinking about the settlers. There was no trace of biologically-based racism in them. Their suspicion of ‘the Indians’ rather arose from what logicians would call a ‘hasty generalization,’ imputing the savagery exhibited by the Powhatan chief to all Indians or, at a minimum (and this would be more reasonable), keeping their guard up when dealing with any Indian group. The latter policy was already well in place among European nations in dealing with one another.

    As for the Plymouth Adventurers and their descendants, the New Englanders faced analogous circumstances but with a different set of Indian nations, in a harsher climate; and they arrived with more intense religious aspirations. A band of Protestant dissidents landed at “New Plymouth” in 1620, settling in territory where the local tribe had been eradicated by disease. Gaskill notes that the Mayflower Compact was no “democratic constitution but a company contract to bind the strangers to order upon landing, a quick fix before formal authority was established.” (Many of the Pilgrims were Dutch, with no habitual allegiance to English ‘bosses.’) In the same vein, he points out that this and similar settlements in New England didn’t establish beachheads for political liberty; John Winthrop’s 1630 Salem founding was a theocracy supervised by God’s vicegerent, Mr. Winthrop. The settlements were democratic only in Tocqueville’s social sense: No titled aristocrats made the trip. By ‘liberty’ the settlers meant, in the frank words of one, a world free of bishops.

    As for the West Indies, settlers worried less about Indians than about the heat, the hurricanes, and the disease-carrying mosquitoes. There, a new aristocracy began to take shape, based on slaves who were imported from Africa to work in a climate Europeans could not bear to work in. By the 1630s the Virginia settlers were beginning to do the same thing. The portentous social distinction between South and North had begun to take shape.

    Having made his peace with Spain, James I faced increasingly sharp resistance to his rule from Protestants at home, their suspicions roused especially by the king’s attempts to marry his eldest son to one Catholic princess after another (success came in 1625, when the future Charles I wedded Henrietta Maria of France). By the time the second generation of English Americans took charge, relations with Indians had become foreign relations, slavery was giving rise to a set of New World aristocrats, and civil war loomed in England itself.

    With the war, second-generation colonists “were forced to examine their consciences and allegiances to decide what being English meant” and what it meant to belong physically and spiritually to America. The First English Civil War—which pitted a new and more absolutist monarch, Charles I, against Oliver Cromwell and his Puritan “Roundheads”—stirred existing factions in North America, engaging them not only in the political thought forced upon the first generation but in regime-changing political thought. Passions associated with political revolution and religious conflict mixed with passions aroused by the already worsening settler-Indian relations.

    Puritan victory in England meant that it became, briefly, more like New England. A new Reformation was imposed, this one described as a “Reformation of manners,” including capital punishment for adultery and what Gaskill calls “a united front against popery.” (The draconian law against adultery never saw rigorous enforcement—probably a good thing for the sake of continued English population growth. One emigrant to Virginia wrote that the deer in his new country were as numerous as cuckolds in England.) Puritan victory did not bring dismantlement of the king’s wartime bureaucracy, which the Puritans simply took over, continuing extralegal absolutism but in clerical garb. The new republic saw the abolition of the House of Lords, the established church, and the monarchy, but the empowered Cromwell and Parliament had no more intention to frame a liberal republic than had the Puritan fathers of New England. Although a bit lax in enforcing the adultery laws, both England and New England went after suspected witches, with England initiating the attacks and (surprisingly, given subsequent accounts) surpassing the New England courts in handing down convictions. At least New England magistrates “insisted on proof of a satanic pact,” unlike their more ardent English-Puritan counterparts.

    Fleeing in defeat, Royalists went to the West Indies, sometimes to Virginia. When Parliament threatened to pursue them across the water, they allied themselves with local champions of self-government as putative advocates of—what else, if not the tradition of the English common law (for which the Stuarts and their allies had previously shown little regard). Meanwhile, Cromwell’s designation as “Emperor of the West Indies” put English republicanism, such as it was, on the side of statist centralization. Because the monarchy had sold off most of its lands under the Tudors, the new statists had no choice but to obtain revenues through taxation. Back along the Chesapeake, Catholics and Protestants fought each other in Maryland, with Protestants from as far away as Massachusetts joining the fight, which the Protestants eventually won at the Battle of Severn (near Annapolis) in 1655.

    By the time of Cromwell’s assassination in 1658, New England and Virginia had established themselves economically. Trade began to eclipse religiosity in both places. As it did in England: Charles II, crowned in 1660, proved considerably more latitudinarian in doctrine and in morals than were the Puritans. Increased trade also brought greater demand for slaves, especially in the West Indies; not only Africans but English prisoners, Scottish rebels, and the ever-beleaguered Irish were “barbadosed.” Charles II did prove disappointing to merchants in one important respect: Needing revenues as much as his father and as much as Cromwell, he renewed the stiff regulation of trade. As Gaskill observes, the English civil/revolutionary wars proved to Americans that their difficulties with the mother country arose not simply as a result of defective regimes—monarchs and parliaments alike exacted revenues and demanded obedience—but as a result of the empowerment of the modern state, quite apart from its regime form. A century later, their descendants’ Declaration of Independence excoriated not only the monarch/tyrant but also the Parliament for, among other things, sending tax collectors to eat out their substance.

    Increased trade also spelled trouble for the Indians The more prosperous the American English became, the more numerous they were; the more numerous they were, the more land they wanted. In Virginia, especially, where plantation owners locked up the best land, new settlers pressed westward. The British Empire set down its own grander, imperial policy. In the words of diarist John Evelyn, “Whoeover Commands the Ocean Commands the Trade of the World, and whoever Commands the Trade of the World Commands the Riches of the World, and whoever is Master of that Commands the World it self.” Charles II resumed the strategy that had been set down decades earlier by the disgraced Francis Bacon, that of “merg[ing] politics, profit, and natural philosophy”—the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate, and particularly the British estate.

    By now, about 60,000 English settlers lived in New England. Metacom, or “King Philip” of the Wampanoags, began a major war against them. “This was for the second generation what sea crossings and scratch-building had been for the first: a hardening, defining experience.” Using what we now call guerrilla tactics, the coalition of Indian tribes fought through the bitter winter of 1675-76, taunting their captives with the question, “Where is your God now?” Gaskill describes the “extravagant cruelty” of Indian and Englishman alike: “Indians tortured because martial ritual required it, the English to obtain intelligence.” Two thousand settlers died before the Indian coalition surrendered in July 1677. Sporadic Indian raids continued, and the colonists duly noted that their British brethren had offered no protective aid aside from parish collections, “which were mere gestures.” Nor did the British prove any more helpful to Maryland, where settlers put down a similar uprising.

    By the third generation, writes Gaskill, “experience set the colonists apart, creating opposition internally and with England.” Struggles with Indians continued; in the north the tribes began to ally with the French, another Catholic enemy. Catholic James II ascended the throne in 1685; after Charles II died, intensifying the worries of Anglo-American Protestants. West Indian and Virginian settlers added to their slave populations and simultaneously to their worries about slave rebellions. Along the Chesapeake, in the 1680s alone the slave population rose from 4,500 to 12,000. This increase also decreased incidences of manumission; a people engaged in demographically-based dominance of the Indians had no intention of being overwhelmed by emancipated African slaves.

    No solution, even in theory, to any of these ethno-political or religio-political dilemmas was available to Americans until a writer of the time, John Locke, began publishing. A political regime founded upon the principle of equal natural rights could form the basis of racial and religious peace in a political community that actually framed laws to conform to that principle. Gaskill mentions Locke in passing but mistakes his natural rights philosophy for “pragmatism.” What made the third generation of Americans react against the excesses of the last witch-hunting spasm, in 1690s Salem, was not pragmatism but an understanding of Christianity that Americans in New England were the first to begin to integrate into their laws.

    As Gaskill describes it, “Boston’s Brattle Street Church was founded in 1698 not upon scriptural literalism, the ‘New England way,’ or a covenant, but upon nature, reason, and inclusiveness”—in other words, upon a combination of Christianity and Lockean philosophy. What remained of the older generations, he concludes was a legacy of “extraordinary courage.” The commercial republic of the future would prove battle-ready, to the dismay of its enemies for centuries to come.

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

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