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    Geopolitics of Love

    June 7, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: Love’s Labor’s Lost.

     

    In the royal park of the King of Navarre, Ferdinand outlines a singular policy to his three principal attendants, the lords Berowne, Longaville, and Dumaine. Ferdinand is modeled after Shakespeare’s contemporary, Henry III of Navarre. By the time Shakespeare wrote this play, Henry had seized the throne of France and had been crowned Henry IV, the first of the Bourbon line. Navarre was a Huguenot sanctuary, but after assuming the kingship of France Henry abjured Protestantism for Catholicism as a means of consolidating his authority in a predominantly Catholic country. As a reader and friend of Montaigne, however, in 1598 he issued the Edict of Nantes, establishing toleration of Protestantism in an attempt to assuage religio-political animosities in the country. Shakespeare’s Ferdinand is also poised to ascend to the French throne, but by romantic rather than military means—means appropriate to comedy.

    Berowne is Charles de Gontaut, duc de Biron, a noted Protestant soldier called the ‘Thunderbolt of France; Henry made him Marshal in 1594, but despite this distinction his loyalty remained suspect; he was beheaded on charges of treason a few years after Shakespeare’s play was first staged. Longaville is Henry I d’Orléans, duc de Longueville, a Protestant soldier who had defeated Catholic forces in a 1589 battle; Dumaine is Charles, duc de Mayenne, an ardent member of the Catholic League and former rival of Henry for the throne (they reconciled in 1595). Henry’s court thus consisted of aristocrats representing the two religious sects which had very recently put their arms down after years of civil war. Ferdinand’s court at Navarre is already a miniature version of the French court at the time of the play. 

    King Ferdinand needs to unite Navarre, especially its ruling class. For this, he seriously proposes a Renaissance version of a plan devised (with characteristic irony) by Plato’s Socrates, who said that unless philosophers become kings, or kings truly and adequately philosophize, a just political regime will prove impossible. As neither the king nor his attendants are philosophers engaged in reasoned inquiry into the conventions of their country, perhaps they can truly and adequately philosophize or, less ambitiously, become more thoroughly the liberally educated men Renaissance scholars and politicians alike esteemed. 

    If they are not philosophers, lovers of wisdom, why would they do such a thing? The king appeals not directly to their logos but to their thumos. “Fame, that all hunt after in their lives, / Live regist’red upon our brazen tombs, / And then grace us in the disgrace of death; / When, spite of cormorant devouring Time, / Th’ endeavor of this present breath may buy / That honor which shall bate his scythe’s keen edge, / And make us heirs of all eternity.” (I.i.1-7). He proposes a vast war, a war of the soul, but most emphatically not the kind of soul-war which has wracked Christian Europe. He will redirect his aristocrats’ souls towards becoming “brave conquerors” in the “war against your own affections,” the “huge army of the world’s desires” (I.i.8-10). “Navarre shall be the wonder of the world” (I.i.12), both a place of wondering and a place wondered at, esteemed, a Jerusalem of learning. “Our court shall be a little Academe”—a modern version of Plato’s school—”still and contemplative in living art” instead of roiling in war and vaunting in the art of war (I.i.13-14). 

    To this end, the king has ordained that a comprehensive three-year fast, whereby he and his attendants—all young and unmarried—will abstain from strong drink, much food, and all women for the next three years. They will arm themselves for this psychomachia by pledging their honor with “deep oaths” now to be signed (I.i.23). The young king has a bit of ‘secularized’ Calvinism about him.

    Longaville and Dumaine readily consent. For these three years, “the mind shall banquet, though the body pine,” Longaville avers, inasmuch as “dainty bits / Make rich the ribs, but bankrupt quite the wits” (I.i.25-27). Dumaine, too, pronounces himself “mortified” against “the world’s delights,” intent rather on “living in philosophy” (I.i.32). Berowne has reservations. “Not to see a woman” in three years (I.i.37)? Harsh sumptuary laws? Even sleep deprivation in order to spend more time studying? “O, these are barren tasks, too hard to keep” (I.i.47). His earlier, verbal, oath he had “sworn in jest,” but an oath in writing is a serious thing (I.i.54). “What is the end of study, let me know” (I.i.55).

    Ferdinand answers that the end of study is “to know which else we should not know” (I.i.56). You mean, Berowne asks, “things hid and barr’d… from common sense” (I.i.57)? Yes, “that is study’s god-like recompense” (I.i.58). Oh, but of course, Berowne rejoins, I have no problem in swearing to do those sorts of things—to study where I might dine well, especially on days when I am forbidden to do so; or to “study where to meet some mistress fine, / When mistresses from common sense are hid”; “Or, having sworn too hard-a-keeping oath / Study to break it, and not break my troth” by some exoteric show of compliance (I.i.63-66). This is (following Socrates’ own formula) to know what one doesn’t know. “Swear me to this, and I will ne’er say no” (I.i.69). But mere book-learning will never do. “Study is like the heaven’s glorious sun, / That will not be deep-searched with saucy looks. / Small have continual plodders ever won, / Save base authority from others’ books.” (I.i.84-87). You, King, may aspire to Platonism but you will end in Scholasticism. [1] There is no real glory or honor in that. In this, Berowne plays the role of the girl who laughed at the philosopher who stumbled while gazing up at the heavens. Such “earthly godfathers of heaven’s light”—the astronomers—”have no more profit of their shining lights / Than those that walk and wot not where they are. / Too much to know is to know nought but fame; / And every godfather can give a name” to a star he can never reach (I,i.88-93). The Christian-Aristotelian peripatetics—those Roman Catholics who couldn’t beat the duc de Biron in battle—cannot make practical use of the phenomena they know merely by observation, in order to name. The end of the king’s new regime is as little likely as Socrates’ politeia. 

    Ferdinand dismisses Berowne’s common-sense critique of Scholasticism as a self-contradictory effort “to reason against reading!” (I.i.94), and his loyalists concur. Berowne replies with an argument founded on nature as it is, obedient to the cycles of time. The king conceives of time as a death-dealing scythe against which only fame can triumph, a fame which only a three-year ‘regime’ of study governed by a uniform rule of conduct can win. But real nature is seasonal. “Why should proud summer boast / Before the birds have any cause to sing? / Why should I joy in any abortive birth? / At Christmas I no more desire a rose / Than wish a snow in May’s new-fangled shows; / But like of each thing that in season grows; / So you, to study now it is too late, / Climb o’er the house to unlock the little gate.” (I.i.102-09). The king would require book-study of four men, including himself, who should instead be thinking of marrying, then of producing heirs to their estates. (The real King Henry would indeed die heirless.) “Study evermore is over-shot,” Berowne comments, after reviewing the king’s laws; “While it doth study to have what it would, / It doth forget to do the thing it should; / And when it hath the thing it hunteth most, / ‘Tis won as towns with fire—so won, so lost” (I.i.141-44). The king’s war for fame overlooks the conditions of life itself.

    Nonsense, the king replies. He shall “of force dispense with this decree”; it will then rest “on mere necessity” (I.i.145-46). But, Berowne replies, such necessity will simply cause men in their weakness to fail in their compliance, “For every man with his affects is born, / Not by might mast’red but by special grace” (I.i.149-50). Spoken like a Protestant, but a prudent one. I shall sign your oath, my liege (Paul the Apostle also requires obedience to rulers), but I predict that I, who am the last to sign, “will last keep his oath” (I.i.158).

    Meanwhile, Ferdinand offers a form of recreation to relieve his austerity regime. There is now in Navarre “a refined traveller of Spain,” a “child of fancy,” a man “in whom all the world’s new fashion is planted,” and so a fit object for courtly entertainment at his expense (I.i.161-62,168). This Quixote, named Don Adriano de Armado, will serve as court jester; Berowne and Longaville relish the prospect of mocking such a comical land-armada of a man.

    But first the court must deal with the first arrested violator of the king’s decree, the rustic Costard, who arrives in the custody of Constable Dull with a letter from Armado. Costard has been caught speaking with a country wench, Jaquenetta; “such is the simplicity of man to hearken after / The flesh” (I.i.211-12), he confesses. The king reads aloud Armado’s verbose letter, in which he witnesses to Costard’s crime while professing to be “besieged with sable-colored melancholy” (I.i.225). Amused into mercy, Ferdinand sentences the malefactor to a week of bran and water and to the rule of Armado. Considering the evidence before him after the king and the other two attendants have left, Berowne tells Costard, “I’ll lay my head to any good man’s hat / These oaths and law will prove an idle scorn,” to which the rustic can only reply with similar humor, “I suffer for the truth, sir; for true it is I was taken with Jaquenetta, and Jaquenetta is a true girl” (I.i.287-291).

    Costard won’t become Armado’s Don Pancho, as he already has one—his page, Moth. Armado wonders at his own melancholy; much badinage later (all of it to Moth’s advantage), he answers his own question, confessing his love for “a base wench,” none other than Jacquenetta (I.ii.57). His complaint against Costard was simply an attempt to eliminate his rival, a rival soon to be returned to him as a servant, despite his intention to get him out of the picture. Meanwhile, he begs Moth for examples of “great men” who “have been in love” (I.i.63). The examples the boy offers—Hercules and Samson—should be far from comforting. When Moth tells him that Samson’s beloved Delilah had a green complexion (for jealousy) and “a green wit” (an immature one), Armado insists that “My love is most immaculate white and red”—colors symbolizing purity and modesty (I.ii.86-87). This should be no source of confidence, master, as such colors mask “maculate thoughts” (I.ii.88). To illustrate, he breaks into a lyric, saying that blushing cheeks betoken faults, whiteness fear of their discovery. “A dangerous rhyme, master, against the reason of white and red” (I.ii.103). Rhyme or poetry sets prudent limits on a too-schematic rationalism that readily ossifies into convention. 

    When Constable Dull delivers Costard (Berowne evidently having delegated that duty), Armado decides to impose a fast on his rival and to take Jaquenetta to the royal park, where she’ll be the “day-woman” or dairy-maid (I.ii.125). He confesses his helplessness against Cupid, the boy-god whose “glory is to subdue men” (I.ii.167)—even men of physical strength such as Samson and Hercules, even a man of wisdom, Solomon. He can only appeal for strength to “some extemporal god of rhyme,” lest he “turn sonnet” (I.ii.169-70). Ex-temporal: beyond time. Turn sonnet: become transformed, as in an Ovidian poem, not into another form of nature but into a poem. Only prudence can save him now—a virtue absent from his moral repertoire.

    Elsewhere in the royal park, a delegation has arrived from France, a delegation headed by the king’s daughter. The Princess (a fictional character, as King Henry III had no children) is accompanyied by attendant ladies Rosaline, Maria, and Katharine, Lord Boyet and two other lords. She has come to negotiate a dispute over the neighboring French province of Aquitaine, described tellingly by Lord Boyet as “a dowry fit for a queen” (II.i.8). Given the King of Navarre’s edict, she cannot approach him without permission, so she sends Boyet to request an audience. The Princess views Boyet with some suspicion, deprecating his flattery and telling him, when he says he is “proud of employment” in the mission, “All pride is willing pride, and yours is so” (II.i.35).

    She prudently asks her attendants for character assessments of the principal members of the king’s court. Each has encountered one of them previously. Maria judges Longaville as “a man of sovereign parts, peerless esteem’d / Well fitted in arts, glorious in arms” (II.i.44-45), if a bit too sharp-witted, a man “whose edge hath power to cut” and does so too readily (II.i.50). Katharine considers Dumaine “a well-accomplish’d youth,” but one who has “most power to do most harm” because “least knowing ill” (II.i.56-58)—a certain hazardous naivete. As for Berowne, Rosalind admires his merry disposition and ready wit, his “sweet and voluble” discourse (II.i.76). The Princess suspects aloud that her ladies are “all in love” and, given Lord Boyet’s remark about Aquitaine being a fit dowry for a queen, the possibility of marriage indeed seems to waft in the spring air.

    King Ferdinand, however, dampens the mood when he arrives in the park, failing to extend his hospitality by inviting his visitors to the castle, given his decree to keep women at arm’s length. He is all business. Having fought on France’s side in the religious wars during his father’s time, Ferdinand expects France to honor the agreement to pay the expenses, half of which France still owes. In the meantime, Navarre holds part of Aquitaine as surety. The problem is that a letter from the French king intimates that the money has already been paid, and so Navarre should yield back the territory; yet Ferdinand has no record of the payment. “Dear Princess, were not his requests so far / From reason’s yielding, your fair self should make / A yielding ‘gainst some reason in my breast, / And go well satisfied to France again.” (II.i.149-53). He requests proof of payment, but Boyet has none, promising that the diplomatic pouch containing them will arrive tomorrow. Please then, Princess, “deem yourself lodg’d in my heart, / Though so denied fair harbor in my house” (II.i.173-74). He leaves, but Berowne stays behind to flirt with Rosaline, who rejects him; Dumaine and Longaville soon return to confess their interest in Katharine and Maria, respectively. Boyet answers them with courtesy laced with irony, then suggests to the princess that the king is in love with her.

    It is easy for romantically-inclined modern readers to overlook the stakes, although the courtly audience of Shakespeare’s play would not. There is the potential for a serious diplomatic incident, here. The French king does not likely send his daughter to head a mission to the bachelor king of Navarre without political intent. Does he hope to marry her off and cement the alliance? Or does he hope to evade a debt by sending such a charming delegation of ladies? What is love’s labor? How might it be lost? What will be the consequences if it is lost? With no war against common enemies to unite them, will France and Navarre (now with a foothold on French soil) turn on each other? This comedy might or might not end happily.

    In still another part of the forest, Armado grants Costard his liberty and money in exchange for carrying a letter to Jaquenetta, evidently trusting that these boons will overcome any feelings Costard may still entertain for the girl. On the way, Costard meets Berowne, who gives him a letter for delivery to Rosaline. One cannot expect these arrangements to end well, given Costard’s mixed motives, to say nothing of his doltishness. 

    In her part of the park, the Princess expects to leave soon, after proof of payment arrives. Meanwhile, she prepares, Diana-like, to hunt a deer, conferring with the forester who directs her to “a stand where you may make the fairest shoot” (IV.i.11). Pretending that he praises her beauty with the word “fairest,” she builds the exchange into a criticism of King Ferdinand’s policy. To accept praise for beauty would be vain; better to deserve praise for merit. Praise is a form of glory or fame, the ambition with which Ferdinand sought to fire the lords in support of his regime of austere pursuit of learning. But “Glory grows guilty of detested crimes, / When, for fame’s sake, for praise, an outward part, / We bend to that the working of the heart; / As I for praise alone now seek to spill / The poor deer’s blood that my heart means no ill.” (IV.i.31-35). The quest for honor interferes with more natural loves, great and small. As for the greater hunt she and her attendants evidently have undertaken, however, “praise we may afford / To any lady that subdues a lord” (IV.i.41-42). In that case, honor honors nature.

    Speaking of which, Costard arrives, misdelivering Armado’s letter to Jaquenetta while announcing it’s a letter from Berowne to Rosaline. Badinage about arrows and pricking ensues. The Princess, her attendants, and Boyet now know more about ongoing love aspirations than anyone in Navarre. They have achieved a substantial diplomatic advantage, thanks to superior intelligence-gathering. How will they exploit it?

    The final pair of characters now enter the play. The schoolmaster Holofernes and his curate friend, Sir Nathaniel, are passing the time with Constable Dull, a man neither of great learning or of conspicuous piety. Costard and Jaquenetta enter with the love-sonnet letter they suppose to be from Armado. They need someone to read it to them. Holofernes does so; in recognizing the real author, he tells them to deliver it “into the royal hand of the King,” who will find in it evidence of Berowne’s disobedience (IV.ii.134). Sir Nathaniel approves of this charge as a thing done “in the fear of God, very religiously,” an act of deference to a ruler, as commanded by Paul the Apostle (IV.i..138). But Holofernes cares more about the author’s literary style, which he deems “very unlearned, neither savoring of poetry, wit, nor invention” (IV.ii.149-50). He promises a thorough critique at dinner.

    Scholars have identified in ‘Holofernes’ a demi-anagram for the name ‘John Florio,’ the famous scholar who first translated Montaigne into English. They point to the contemporary debate over the question, ‘Love or Learning?’—the theme of the play. The eminent Cambridge University scholar Gabriel Harvey was the leading polemicist among the defenders of learning, called the ‘Artists.’ Cambridge University graduate and satirist spoke for the ‘Villainists,’ who argued in favor of love and of experience generally—Nashe contending, for example, that the debtors’ prison from which he had also graduated offered more useful instruction than the university did. Florio was a learned man who translated the learned Montaigne, a man who nonetheless commended experience, subtly praising Machiavelli rather than the Renaissance humanists, whose vast learning both Montaigne and Machiavelli could be said to have matched. Shakespeare, well-acquainted with Florio’s translation, would have noted the paradox. And he would have known Florio’s stricture, “It were labor lost to speak of love,” since there are so many books about it. Obviously, Shakespeare disagreed, and his Florio-figure is a figure of fun. But will Shakespeare side with Machiavelli’s understanding of the lessons of experience, given the framework of geopolitical plotting of the story he tells?

    It’s now the Navarrians’ turn to learn the truth about one another, about how they fought love with the law and love won. Berowne soliloquizes about his losing attempt to conquer his desires. “By heaven, I do love,” he confesses to himself, “and it hath taught me to rhyme, and to be melancholy”—the melancholy of the lover who knows not whether he’s loved in return, who must admit he cannot maintain his self-sufficiency, even in banding together with his peers in the study of books (IV.iii.11-12). Seeing the king approach, he hides, quickly seeing that Ferdinand too has turned sonneteer. In his poem for the Princess, the king takes up the traditional imagery of his lady’s eyes, which are something like the sun, making her lover’s tears shine in “thy glory through my grief” (IV.iii.33). “O queen of queens! how far dost thou excel / No thought can think nor tongue of mortal tell.” (IV.ii.36-37). The rhyme of love sets limits on the prose of reason.

    The king himself now hides, as Longaville arrives, his own sonnet in hand, unwittingly to join the king’s “sweet fellowship in shame” (IV.iii.45). Against courtly and scholarly rhetoric, “the heavenly rhetoric” of Maria’s eye, “‘gainst whom the world cannot hold argument,” has “persuad[ed] my heart to this false perjury,” this evasion of the king’s law (IV.iii.56-58). If rhymes set limits on reason, they also set limits on love as “guards on wanton Cupid’s hose,” in attentive Berowne’s words (IV.iii.53). To make rhyme requires the speaker to set his passion to music, to give it measure, to form unreason to a rule of reason. Set to rhyme, love’s reason is not the king’s ‘rationalist’ or book-learned reason; it is rather the kind of reason right for loving and for lovers. For Longaville, poetry enables him to justify his love as lawful: “A woman I forswore; but I will prove, / Thou being a goddess, I forswore not thee. My vow was earthly, thou a heavenly love; / Thy grace being gain’d cures all disgrace in me, / Vows are but breath and breath a vapor is; / Then thou, fair sun, which on my earth dost shine, / Exhal’st this vapor-vow, in thee it is. / If broken, then it is no fault of mine; / If by me broke, what fool is not so wise / To lose an oath to win a paradise?” (IV.iii.61-69). Berowne immediately spots the fallacy, which consists of the argument’s false premise, “which makes flesh a deity / A green goose a goddess—pure, pure idolatry” (IV.iii.70-71). The argument will need a natural, not a theological premise, if it is to hold.

    No time for that, as Longaville too hides and Dumaine (as he supposes) soliloquizes on Katharine. “Once more I’ll mark how love can vary wit,” Berowne remarks (IV.iii.96). Dumaine is a man of fewer words than the others. His imagery isn’t sunlight or tear-water or the earth, nor does he attempt initially to reason either legalistically or theologically. For him, the ruling image is another element, air. “Love, whose month is ever May, / Spied a blossom passing fair / Playing in the wanton air.” (IV.iii.98-100). Love “wish’d himself the heaven’s breath,” so that he could blow on the cheeks of his beloved: “Air, would I might triumph so!” (IV.iii.106). The theology comes at the conclusion of Dumaine’s sonnet, not at the beginning, as he pleads, “Do not call it sin in me / That I am forsworn for thee,” since Jove himself loved Juno, “turning mortal” for her love (IV.iii.112-16). Like Dumaine, Jove loved one who resisted his advances. He won her heart by transforming himself into a helpless little bird, which the kindly goddess did love; he then transformed himself back into a god, and his lady’s love kept on. Dumaine’s sonnet is the intended bird, singing to his lady. He will send “something more plain,” too, more prosaic, “express[ing] my true love’s lasting pain” (IV.iii.117-18)—as pitiable, he hopes, as Jove in a form of helplessness.

    In turn, each hidden man steps forward, Longaville to accuse Dumaine, Ferdinand to accuse Longaville, Berowne to accuse the king and the others. He justly rebukes their “inconstancy,” asking rhetorically, “When shall you see me write a thing in rhyme?” (IV.iii.177). Right away, as it happens, as Costard and Jaquenetta pop up, his love-sonnet to Rosaline in hand.

    This calls for a conference to settle on a change of policy and to formulate a justification for the correction. Fortunately, Berowne already had argued against the king’s regime, and so has an argument ready, this time addressing an audience eager to give its consent.

    “Sweet lords, sweet lovers, O, let us embrace: / As true we are as flesh and blood can be,” he begins (IV.iii.210). Since “young bloods doth not obey an old decree” (IV.iii.213); since beauty makes old age feel “new-born,” giving “the crutch the cradle’s infancy,” being “the sun that maketh all things shine” (IV.iii.240-42); since all these things are true, Berowne is more than happy to fulfill the king’s request to “prove our loving lawful, and our faith not torn” (IV.iii.280-81). It is really quite simple, Berowne explains. For young men to swear “to fast, to study, and to see no women” in obedience to a king who rules by convention is nothing less than to commit “flat treason ‘gainst the kingly state of youth” (IV.iii.288-89)—that is, against nature, which ordains the seasons of life. His companions have spoken of nature’s light, earth, water, and air, but they have forgotten nature’s other element, fire. “From women’s eyes this doctrine I derive: / They are the ground, the books, the academes, / From whence doth spring the true Promethean fire” (IV.iii.298-300). “Where has any author in the world / Teaches such beauty as a woman’s eye” (IV.iii.308-09). Where did you, who came so recently to sonneteering, find “such fiery numbers as the prompting eyes / Of beauty’s tutors have enrich’d you with?” (IV.iii.318-19). Surely not in “leaden contemplation” (IV.iii.317). Love “first learned in a lady’s eyes / Lives not alone immured in the brain, / But with the motion of all elements / Courses as swift as thought in every power, / And gives to every power a double power, / Above their functions and their offices.” (IV.iii.323-27). Love is what sets the other elements of nature in motion, harmonizing and vivifying all the senses, and also every virtue, whether it be courage, wisdom, or moderation. Love civilizes the savage and, with respect to justice, “plant[s] in tyrants mild humility” (IV.iii.345) by teaching them the happiness of unforced reciprocity. Therefore, let us “lose our oaths to find ourselves” (IV.iii.357). As the Gospels teach, “charity itself fulfills the law, / And who can sever love from charity?” (IV.iii.360-61).

    Having declared war on love, which he’d conceived as low, unworthy of the human mind, newly-converted King Ferdinand now declares war for Saint Cupid: “Soldiers, to the field!” (IV.iii.362). Newly respectful of nature’s time, and timing, the king urges haste in preparing for the campaign, “some entertainment for them in their tents” (IV.iii.369), “for revels, dances, masks, and merry hours / Forerun fair Love, strewing her way with flowers” (IV.iii.375-76). He drafts none other than Quixote-Armado for the task, who in turn engages Latin-mangling pedant Holofernes and the English-bungling curate Sir Nathaniel for the task—men who “have been at a great feast of language and stol’n the scraps,” as impish young Moth remarks, men who “have liv’d long on the alms-basket of words,” as plain-speaker Costard puts it (V.i.35-38). Under Holofernes’ direction, they will present a pageant of the Nine Worthies, famous conquerors from Joshua to Pompey the Great. As there are nine worthies but only four players to represent them, Holofernes will play several. Never will so many owe so little to so few.

    With the gentlemen absent, the ladies are beginning to bicker amongst themselves, with Rosaline and Katharine exchanging barbs. Pronouncing the exchange “a set of wit well play’d,” the Princess redirects their hostilities toward the suitors, asking them to compare the love-sonnets they’ve received (V.ii.29). Rosalind deprecates Berowne’s flattery: his “numbers” or metres are “true,” but his “numbers” or reckoning exaggerated; according to him, “I were the fairest goddess on the ground” (V.ii.36-37). With characteristically greater asperity, Katharine dismisses Dumain’s effort as “a huge translation of hypocrisy, / Vilely compil’d, profound simplicity” (V.ii.52-53). As for Longaville, Maria confines herself to opining that she wishes his poem shorter, the accompanying chain of pearls longer. The Princess finds the King Ferdinand’s poetry equally verbose, although she has kinder words for the diamond necklace he enclosed with it. (“We shall be rich ere we depart” [V.ii.1]). In all, “We are wise girls to mock our lovers so” (V.ii.59), and as for the young men, “none are so surely caught, when they are catch’d / As wit turn’d fool; folly, in wisdom hatch’d / Hath wisdom’s warrant and the help of school, / And wit’s own grace to grace a learned fool.” (V.ii.69-72). As one scholar has observed, in Love’s Labor Lost “the word wit is used more often than in any of the other plays” [2]; among other things, the play is a witty meditation on wit. When learning outpaces prudence it acts as an accelerant to “fool’ry’s” fire, providing false proofs of stupid thoughts (V.ii.76).

    The lovers have arrived, Boyet announces, and they have disguised themselves as Russians. He overheard their planning session—quite by accident, or so he says. He advises the ladies to prepare their defenses, and the Princess is battle-ready: “Saint Dennis to Saint Cupid!” (V.ii.87). The Cupidians of Navarre will meet the forces of Saint Denis, the third-century martyr who brought Christianity to Gaul, was eventually named Bishop of Paris, then martyred by the Romans. One might have expected the Princess to invoke St. Louis, patron saint of the French monarchy, but instead she chooses the patron saint of the French people. A republican at heart? Perhaps rather a just sharer in monarchy. The real French king who preceded Henry of Navarre, Henry III, provoked a popular uprising after murdering his brothers; his criminal attempt to secure his authority undermined it. Under those circumstances it is better to invoke the saint of the people instead of the so-recently betrayed saint of a monarchy turned unsaintly.

    Be this as it may, she tells her attendants to confuse the invaders by posing as—one another, masking themselves and claiming each other’s identities (Rosaline will play the Princess). Each man will woo the wrong woman. Crucially, based on Boyet’s somewhat slanted account, the women assume that the men come only to mock them. Just as there’s no fool like a learned man, so “there’s no such sport as sport by sport o’erthrown” (V.ii.153). 

    The Navarrians walk into the trap and exit soon after, verbally cut and bruised. “The tongues of mocking wenches are as keen / As the razor’s edge invisible,” Boyet gloats (V.ii.256-57). The Romans beheaded Saint Denis; his devotees have beheaded the followers of Saint Cupid. The Princess pronounces it to have been an unequal battle: “Better wits have worn plain statute-caps,” the headgear of commoners (V.ii.281). After his beheading, Saint Denis was said to have carried his head in his arm, continuing to preach sermons; Boyet predicts that the Cupidians will be equally resilient. When they do return, Rosaline advises the Princess, we should mock them for their silly disguises, and so they will.

    Berowne has now understood Boyet, that “ape of form, Monsieur the Nice” (V.ii.325); he sees what the Princess had seen, that Boyet wears a mask of flattering words. When the king worries that the ladies see through the men’s disguises and now will “mock us downright,” Dumaine recommends, “Let us confess, and turn it to a jest” (V.ii.389-90). Very well, but this will only reinforce the ladies’ conviction that they are being toyed with. They in turn reveal their ploy of disguise to the still-unsuspecting men, to which intelligence Berowne can only scold Boyet: “Might not you / Forestall our sport, to make us thus untrue?” (V.ii.472-73). Boyet smirks, “Full merrily / Hath this brave manage, this career, been run” (V.ii.483-84). 

    As the men prepare to retreat a second time, Costard arrives, announcing the approach of the Nine Worthies. When the king worries that the impending farce will only “shame us” further, Berowne cogently replies that that can scarcely happen, given the ignominy of their defeat. What is more, “’tis some policy / To have one show worse than the King’s and his company” (V.ii.509-11). As for the Princess, her appetite for watching men make fools of themselves has yet to be sated: “That sport best pleases that dost least know how” (V.ii.514); and most acutely, when “zeal strives to content, and the contents / Dies in the zeal of that which it presents,” such “confounded” form “makes most form in mirth,” as “great things laboring perish in their birth” (V.ii.515-18). “A right description of our sport, my lord,” Berowne tells Ferdinand (V.ii.519), and indeed it is a fine assessment of the nature of incompetence in love and poetry, to say nothing of philosophy, piety, and play-writing. The Princess has explained how love’s labor is lost, how any kind of labor can be lost.

    As hapless Holofernes and his troupe essay their entertainment, the forces of saints Dennis and Cupid unite for the first time in heckling them. Eventually, the Princess takes pity on the poor players; she is less thoroughly merciless than she has seemed. Even Armado begins to see how silly he is. Player and audience alike have moved toward self-knowledge—the purpose of all true comedy, which holds up the mirror to human nature.

    Human nature is political, and a messenger arrives to remind everyone of that. “Thou interruptest our merriment,” the Princess complains, but the news is grave: her father, the king of France, is dead. Graciously excusing herself from Navarre, with both an apology for any offense given and a reminder that the men had earned it, she thanks the King Ferdinand for granting her “great suit” for recovering Aquitaine (V.ii.727)—the first mention of it since the beginning of her embassy. She has successfully completed the diplomatic mission her father sent her to accomplish. The French ladies will leave in triumph.

    Ferdinand now presses his own mission, the love-suits undertaken by himself and his attendants. Offering an apology in both senses of the word—a defense and an expression of regret—he argues that “your beauties, ladies, / Hath much deformed us, fashioning our humors / Even to the opposed end of our intents,” making we lovers seem both ridiculous and cynical (V.ii.744-46). This being so, “ladies, our love being yours, the error that love makes / Is likewise yours. We to ourselves prove false, / By being once false for ever to be true / To those that make us both” (V.ii.760-62). Our falsehood, our Russian gambit, admittedly was “in itself a sin,” but the true intent behind it purifies, “turns to grace” the foolish and sinful attempt at deception (V.ii.763-64). “Now, at the last minute of the hour, / Grant us your loves” (V.ii.775-76). Do not let the cormorant of time devour us.

    The Princess repeats her own defense, that her party had interpreted the king and his court as mockers, pretenders in love. A most politic woman, she will not be pressured into a hasty decision, become an idolater of time. The last minute is “a time, methinks, too short / To make a world-without-end bargain in” (V.ii.777-78). She intends to observe the right form, to mourn her father’s death for the next twelve months. If you, King, will yourself retreat “to some forlorn and naked hermitage,” then I shall marry you at the end of that time (V.ii.782). Rosaline, Katharine, and Maria make the same guarantee—Katharine characteristically with more reserve (“then, if I have much love, I’ll give you some,” Lord Dumaine [V.ii.818]), and Rosaline characteristically with more rigor. Berowne is not merely to seclude himself but to reform himself, learn to bridle his sarcasm by visiting the sick and dying, to learn that “a jest’s prosperity lies in the ear / Of him that hears it, never in the tongue / Of him that makes it” (V.ii.849-51). If Berowne finds his jesting ill-met by ill men, “throw away that spirit, / And I shall find you empty of that fault, / Right joyful of your reformation” (V.ii.855-57). Navarre is Protestant, a man of the Reformation; French Catholic Rosaline would reform the Reformer, who has too often deployed his wit to reform others, seldom turning it on himself. His love must become Christian, charitable.

    Berowne reflects. “Our wooing doth not end like an old play: / Jack hath not Jill. These ladies’ courtesy / Might well have made our sport a comedy,” but it hasn’t (V.ii.862-64). The men’s foolish and conventional love-labors have been lost, new and more austere love-labors imposed. As one scholar puts it, the ladies’ final commands, their final love-test, will discover whether the Navarrian aristocrats can love after they’ve endured a year outside courtly conventions. [3] The king is ready for the challenge; after all, a year is only one-third of the time his men had agreed to. Berowne remains as skeptical as ever in assessing such vows. “That’s too long for a play,” he concludes (V.ii.867). It is indeed too long for a theatrical play, a fiction, and also too long to sustain a self-deceiving vow. This love-test will uncover the reality of the men’s vows (and the women’s), one way or the other.

    The play isn’t too long for a closing song. Newly-sobered Armado returns, this time with a shorter, simpler, and much more pointed performance by his players. During the time of the love-test, and for the rest of their lives if they pass it, the men will know the anxiety love’s exclusivity necessarily brings. The first song, sung by “Spring,” reminds them that in that season “The cuckoo then on every tree / Mocks married men, for thus sings he: ‘Cuckoo,'” cuckhold (V.ii.885-86), “a word of fear, / Unpleasing to the married ear” (V.ii.897-98). The second song, sung by “Winter,” “when icicles hang on the wall,” reminds them that in that season every night “the staring owl” sings “Tu-who, Tu-whit, Tu-who”—a “merry note” heard indoors, out of the cold (V.ii.900-07). While the anxiety of unknowing, unsure love comes with summer, winter brings men indoors, where they know, can say, can name (to-wit) those to whom they can truly address their love. To say ‘tu’ is to say ‘you’ with intimacy. It bespeaks knowing love of one’s own, one’s own household—the persons there, the warming fire, the food cooking on the stove. 

    The song reprises Berowne’s prosaic initial critique of King Ferdinand’s planned regime, sets it to music. Nature imposes the cycle of seasons, over time. Both the not-knowing and the knowledge of love will occur and recur, throughout every human life. Contra Florio, there is always more to write about love, because love is the fire that moves the elements of nature, and nature cannot forever be denied by philosophers, theologians, or rulers. For commoners like Armado, Holofernes, Sir Nathaniel, Jaquenetta, Costard, Moth, Dull, and the Forester, the outdoor nature of the summer meadow and singing birds and the indoor household amidst the winter snow (where “birds sit brooding” [V.ii.910]) will limit the pretensions of those who would rise above their station with self-inflating talk. For aristocrats like the Navarrian gentlemen and the French ladies, each season will limit the pretensions of those who would rise above their station as rulers, to suppose themselves Platonic philosophers minus Socratic irony, pretensions both impolitic and unnatural, ruinous both to rule and to philosophizing. For rulers, the harsh realities of war, territorial disputes, and succession crises jar them out of the pretensions peculiar to the prominent, the thought that their sayings must make things so.

    “The words of Mercury are harsh after the songs of Apollo,” Armado says, to both sides (V.ii.917). Mercury’s words come from the gods; Apollo, god of music, makes reality seem sweeter than it is. And finally, Armado delivers himself justly of a thing he had longed to deliver unjustly and foolishly: a command. “You that way: we this way” (V.ii.918). You aristocrats, we commoners. You French devotees of Saint Denis, we Navarrian devotees of Saint Cupid. You Catholics, we Reformers. If unity comes, it will need to be an articulated unity, the hard-won unity of lovers who remain distinct from one another—not a rushed and thoughtless amalgamation but a unity founded on practical wit, not on the unsteady show-wit of learning for fame’s sake.   

     

    Note

    1. There may also be a critical glance at the Protestant emphasis on book-learning in the form of Book-learning, Bible study.
    2. C. L. Barber: Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form and Its Relation to Social Custom (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 99.
    3. Barber, p. 112.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Shakespearean Comedy: Two Points on the Compass

    May 31, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: The Merry Wives of Windsor.

    William Shakespeare: Much Ado About Nothing.

     

    Shakespeare’s only English comedy, The Merry Wives of Windsor is also the purest of his comedies—the merriest, the most thoroughly funny of them, a bedroom farce in which almost no one gets into a bedroom. Set in continental Europe, Much Ado About Nothing threatens to veer into tragedy at any moment.

    At Windsor, the English knight, Sir John Falstaff, scion of erstwhile warrior-aristocrats, has turned not merely to commerce but to the lowest commerce, the kind that has no respect for property upon which commerce depends, trafficking in swindles, more generally to speculating on what is not legitimately his own, with his schemes of adultery. He illustrates the self-contradiction of the commercial spirit, which, taken in its purest form, undermines itself.The only other ‘sir’ in the play is another figure of fun, a Welsh parson, in a regime where foreigners are funny. In commercial England, the most serious characters are bourgeois gentlemen and gentlewomen—the former a bit too serious, the latter witty but never dangerous avengers.

    Not so on the continent. There, peaceful commerce has yet to replace war. There, the aristocrats are lords and ladies, rulers of states. They make war as well as love, alliances as well as money. Foreigners could be marriageable friends or deadly enemies. Much Ado About Nothing isn’t. It’s a comedy because it ends happily, but nearly does not. 

    Likely performed first at the Garter Feast on St. George’s Day, in Greenwich, following the election of the new knights, preceding their installation at Windsor, The Merry Wives of Windsor has gentlewomen outsmarting one knight while teaching their husbands a lesson. As in so many Shakespearean comedies, the women are wittier than the men and act as the real rulers of society, but here their wit instructs the knights-elect in the audience, who are brought to witness the hazards of being laughable. The story goes that Queen Elizabeth, who had delighted in Sir John Falstaff as the most memorable comic figure in the English History Plays, wanted to see him in love. Since Falstaff is by nature incapable of being ‘in love,’ loving only food and drink, sex and money, Shakespeare entangles him in not one but two love triangles, which are really sex triangles as far as the rotund and covetous knight is concerned.

    An English comedy might well turn on comic twists of the English language. This one does, throughout, with word-benders foreign and domestic hacking their way into the weeds of self-deception. At the outset, Justice of the Peace Robert Shallow complains of abuses of English law he’s suffered at the hands of Sir John. His cousin, Slender, reverses the meanings of “successors” and “ancestors”—deranging time, that course upon which legitimacy in both law courts (with their respect for precedent) and marriages (with their need for heirs) both run. Meanwhile, the Welsh parson, Hugh Evans, mixes up “luces,” a species of fish, with “louses,” a species of insect; the parson verbally deranges not time but nature. As a churchman he stands ready to reconcile legalist Justice Shallow and lawless Sir John, but the judge would rather keep things out of the divine realm and take the case to the Star Chamber. Parson Evans then falls back on the attempt to deflect the men’s attention toward a plot to marry Slender to Anne Page, a young lady of substantial dowry. If the churchman can’t overcome Shallow’s natural anger with divinely blessed peacemaking, he might do it with natural love.

    They knock on the door of the father of Miss Page, but Falstaff is there, reviving Justice Shallow’s animosity. “He hath wrong’d me, Master Page” (I.i.91). He has beaten my men, killed my deer, and broken open my lodge. Indeed I have, Falstaff replies in his own defense, but the Council will laugh at your charges. In the mind of Sir John, property claims in men, beasts, and buildings made by commoners will amount to very little among his fellow aristocrats. Slender has his own charges against Falstaff’s companion, Pistol, whom he alleges to have picked his pocket. Slender draws a sober lesson from the experience: “I’ll ne’er be drunk whilst I live again, but in honest, civil, godly company, for this trick. If I be drunk, I’ll be drunk with those that have the fear of God, and not with drunken knaves.” (I.i.162-66). In Slender, Pastor Evans has found a pious soul indeed, hoping to be Spirit-filled when next spirits-filled.

    “The question is concerning your marriage,” Pastor Evans declares (I.i.197-98), getting things back on track. Imitating the court-language he would have picked up from his cousin on ‘the reasonable man,’ Slender allows that “I will marry her upon any reasonable demands” (I.i.102-03)—specifically, the command of the justice of the peace, whom Slender purposes to obey as if he were his father. But the pastor wants dimwitted Slender to love, not to reason: “Let us command to know that of your mouth or of your lips; for divers philosophers hold that the lips is parcel of the mouth” (I.i.204-07). For the first “mouth” he means “mind”; as for the second “mouth,” he is right literally—the lips can be considered part of the mouth—while contradicting his first assertion, which distinguishes merely verbal assurances from the true intent of the mind. In his Welshman’s mangling of English, he continues to garble nature. He defines love agapically—”can you carry your goot will to the maid? (I.i.207-08)—while Justice Shallow defines it more naturally, more mundanely—”can you love her?” (I.i.209). Slender remains the man of reason who cannot think for himself: “I hope, sir, I will do as it shall become one that would reason,” a human being, a rational animal (I.i.210-11). At further prompting, Slender avers to his cousin with malaproprian determination, “I will marry her, sir, at your request; but if there be no great love in the beginning, yet heaven may decrease it upon better acquaintance” (I.i.220-22); of that “I am freely dissolved, and dissolutely” (I.i.225-26). “I think my cousin meant well,” Justice Shallow construes (I.i.229).

    The audience first sees Falstaff at The Garter Inn, his natural habitat, where he drinks in the presence of the inn’s Host, along with Sir John’s four sometime partners in crime. He plots the seduction of Mrs. Ford, the wife of a substantial Windsor citizen; “she gives the leer of invitation” to me (I.iii.41)—a supposition his confederate Pistol takes to be wishful. “He hath studied her well, and translated her will out of honesty into English” (I.iii.45-46). In his own way truly English, Sir John’s motive isn’t so much erotic as economic; the lady “has all the rule of her husband’s purse” (I.iii.49-50). As if to illustrate how dishonest English can be, Falstaff reads a love letter he has composed both to Mrs. Ford and the equally rich Mrs. Page, its language a parody of the English one reads in a medieval romance or a poem by Dante. In Falstaff, chivalry is dead, money’s what counts and what one counts, aristocracy has reached its comedic nadir.

    Unfortunately for Sir John, there really is no honor among thieves. Pistol will tattle on Falstaff, doubtless angling for a material reward for himself.

    The audience next meets the other rival suitors for the hand of Miss Page. They are Dr. Caius, a French physician, and Fenton, a young gentleman. Dr. Caius mistakes Pastor Evans as his rival; the pastor has sent a message to the doctor’s acquaintance, Mistress Quickly, asking her to intervene with Miss Page on behalf of Slender’s suit, and the doctor assumes he must be angling for himself. For her part, mischievous Mistress Quickly separately assures both Caius and Fenton that Miss Page loves him and him alone, although she dismisses Fenton’s chances: “I know Anne’s mind as well as another does” (I.iv.147-48).

    Falstaff’s identical letters meet with the indignation of both respectable married ladies. They plot revenge upon him. But in one respect they differ. Mrs. Ford’s husband is a jealous man; Mrs. Page’s husband is not, and his disposition is not improved when Falstaff’s false pals inform him of Falstaff’s intentions toward his wife and her alleged attraction to him. Therefore, the wives’ counterplot against Falstaff’s scheming must not only punish Falstaff but correct Ford. Eventually, they will need to run three counterplots, one after the other, as Sir John persists in his lechery and avarice, and Ford remains adamant in his jealousy.

    Letters are composed of words, which are composed of letters, all capable of being rearranged for comic effect, usually by provoking anger, whether the indignation is righteous, foolish, or both at the same time. When Falstaff describes Mr. Ford as a peasant, cuckold, and knave to Ford disguised as another man, Ford sputters with fury at the imagined infidelity of his wife and the verbal affronts to his honor. When the French doctor challenges the Welsh parson to a duel over Anne Page, Justice Shallow asks, mockingly, “What, the sword and the word! Do you study them both, Master Parson?” (III.i.40-41). The Host arrives at the dueling site and plays the real peacemaker: “Disarm them, and let them question; let them keep their limbs whole and hack our English” (III.i.70-71). Let there be peace between “soul-curer and body-curer” (III.i.89). “Am I politic? am I subtle? am I a Machiavel? Shall I lose my doctor? No; he gives me the potions and the motions. Shall I lose my parson, my priest, my Sir Hugh? No; he gives me the pro-verbs and no-verbs,” the ‘dos’ and the ‘don’ts’ (III.i.91-95). Since verbs are words of action and actions speak louder than words, Gentlemen, do nothing injurious to one another. The Host gets at the essence of comedy, if not the Word of God.

    In the first of the ladies’ counterplots against Falstaff, they lure him to Ford’s house. He woos Mrs. Ford but she proves the more adroit manipulator of words: “Well, heaven knows how I love you,” she accurately replies to his suit; “and you shall one day find it,” she rightly predicts (III.iii.69-70). “Keep in that mind; I’ll deserve it,” Falstaff returns, condemning himself unknowingly. When on cue Mrs. Page approaches, announcing the imminent arrival of Mr. Ford, they hide Falstaff in a laundry basket and have him carted away, with instructions to the servants to dump him in the Thames. This reprises the scene in Aristophanes’ The Clouds in which Socrates is hoisted up toward the heavens in a basket; the Falstaff of The Merry Wives is Socrates as Aristophanes portrays him, a ridiculously false claimant to wisdom. His baptism in good English waters won’t cleanse his soul.

    For his second go at Mrs. Ford (urged upon him by the duplicitous Mistress Quickly), Falstaff again shows up at the Ford house. He falls for the same routine, as Mrs. Page arrives to warn of Mr. Ford’s approach. This time they disguise him as a woman for, as Mrs. Page tells her friend, “We cannot misuse him enough. / We’ll leave a proof, by that which we will do, / Wives may be merry and yet honest too” (IV.ii.88-91). That is, the proof of wit and honor won’t be in ever-elusive, ever-manipulable words, the things to which Mr. Ford gives too much credence, but in irrefutable actions. When the self-beleaguered Ford does arrive, he’s told that the disguised Falstaff is his wife maid’s aunt, a witch, a fortune-teller, a spell-caster—that is, an abuser of words who exploits the witless. Out-witted and gulled once again by words, Ford beats ‘her’ out of his house, thus expediting the escape of the man he expected to capture in flagrante. 

    Finally told of his own folly, Ford reforms, acknowledging his wife’s honor and chastising himself with such vigor that Mr. Page intervenes to tell him to “be not as extreme in submission as in offense” (IV.iv.11). But bruised, humiliated Falstaff still won’t give up. As water and blows haven’t worked, the ladies turn to spiritual terror and a suggestion of hellfire. Mrs. Page recalls a legend of Windsor Forest, an old wives’ tale about Herne the Hunter, the late gamekeeper, whose spirit returns every winter, decked with “great ragg’d horns,” changing the milk in cows to blood and frightening all those who see him (IV.iv.30). She proposes that they tell Falstaff to rendezvous with them in the forest, disguised as Herne. They will arrange for local children disguised as urchins, elves, and fairies to encircle him, dance, pinch him and burn him with candles. After “the unclean knight” has been so tormented, “we’ll all present ourselves; dis-horn the spirit, / And mock him home to Windsor” (IV.iv.56, 63-64). Pastor Evans pronounces this a set of “fery honest knaveries” (IV.iv.79-80).

    Meanwhile, Sir John is concealing his most recent humiliation, defending his remaining illusions of aristocratic honor with lying verbiage. The Host of the Garter Inn hears that a fat old woman has gone up to Falstaff’s room. Falstaff claims that yes, there was a woman, but she is gone now, after having “taught me more wit than ever I learned before in my life, and I paid nothing for it neither, but was paid for my learning” (IV.v.54-56). This is another parody of the life of Socrates, who tells the tale of Diotima, his teacher in the philosophy of love. Socratic eros begins with love of beautiful bodies, ascends to love of beautiful souls, and culminates in the love of “beauty as a whole,” of philo-sophia, the love of wisdom. Falstaff indeed would do well to begin his ascent on this ladder of love, but he will need a hard-earned lesson in modest practical wisdom before he can aspire to the heights.

    He isn’t the only erotic schemer in Windsor. All of Anne Page’s suitors know she will participate in the Falstaff-tormenting fairy dance. Each plans to spirit her away. Mr. Page tells Slender that his daughter will appear in white; Mrs. Page tells Dr. Caius that she’ll be dressed in green. Anne has feigned to consent to both parents, but she’s written to her favorite, Fenton, saying that others will be dressed in those costumes and that she will elope with him. 

    All goes according to the lovers’ plan, as inscribed within Anne’s parents’ plan. Slender makes off with the figure in white, Caius with the figure in green, Anne and Fenton with one another to a waiting vicar. Falstaff receives his just reward, after Anne, as the Fairy Queen, intones, “Evil be to him that evil thinks” (V.v.67). Here at last the right words fit the right deeds, as the children, singing “Lust is but a bloody fire,” singe the old bounder with candles. Duly mocked, Falstaff admits to having been an ass, while Ford vows never to distrust his wife again. When Pastor Evans mocks Falstaff in his heavy Welsh accent, Falstaff exclaims, “Have I liv’d to stand at the taunt of one that makes fritters of English?” (V.v.136-37). He has, indeed, and as Anne Page as the Fairy Queen has suggested, it’s the thought that makes language and action good or bad. Mr. Page promises him forgiveness at the price of further ridicule at dinner.

    But what of the deceived suitors? Slender reports first, complaining that the fairy he ran off with was “a great lubberly boy” and, compounding the indignity, the son of a postmaster (V.v.176). Slender resolutely attempts to salvage a shred of dignity by averring, “If I had been married to him, for all he was in woman’s apparel, I would not have had him” (V.v.182-83). Deceived by words and apparel, he can at least uphold the natural standard. Dr. Caius wasn’t so lucky. The French physician didn’t identify the nature of his ‘bride’ until the ceremony had finished. “I’ll raise all Windsor,” he declaims, a move that may not improve his reputation in the town (V.v.197).

    As Mr. Ford understates it, “This is strange” (V.v.200). “Who hath got the right Anne?” (V.v.200). The young lady herself stops by, husband by her side, asking her parents’ pardon for her disobedience. Fenton offers the apologia for love according to the principles of nature fake-Socratic Falstaff could never learn from his fake Diotima—that is, from himself. “You would have married her most shamefully, / Where there was no proportion held in love” (V.v.208-09). In love reciprocity is the natural way, as indeed the merrily indignant wives and the jealous husband had understood, when thinking of themselves and the rogue knight. Not only nature but God is on the true lovers’ side: “Th’ offense is holy that she hath committed; / And this deceit loses the name of craft, / Of disobedience, or unduteous title, / Since therein she doth evitate and shun / A thousand irreligious cursed hours, / Which forced marriage would have brought upon her” (V.v.212-17). Even Falstaff sees this, saying to the Pages, “I am glad, though you have ta’en a special stand to strike at me, that your arrow hath glanc’d” (V.v.221-22). Both Fenton and Falstaff have spoken in better English than any Slender or Caius could have offered, and the Pages, defeated at their own game of wit against each other and against their daughter’s good, concede defeat with grace and good humor. Mr. Ford is satisfied that he will sleep tonight with Mrs. Ford.

    Shakespeare’s English comedy defends the right use of the English language, the right use of convention in the service of just love, love in proportion, the reciprocal love that animates the reciprocal rule of a husband and a wife over their household. The Falstaff of the comedy differs from the Falstaff of the history plays; he is ‘lower,’ less clever, because in the histories he operates in the presence of warring kings, whom he cannot underestimate, while here he finds himself in the presence of mere gentrymen and women, whom he can and does underestimate. Commercial, no longer aristocratic, English civil society lends itself to comedy in its denizens’ readiness to make sharp deals by hawking falsely advertised merchandise. In this kind of society, where there are no lions but plenty of foxes, nature as seen in love must live by the wits of true lovers. They can triumph, achieve comedy’s happy ending, but only if their prudence in plotting counter-deceptions equals their ardor.

    The Continental regimes enjoy no peace. They are always warring or preparing for war. The aristocrats are noble or, in one instance, evil, not figures of fun. The witticisms have sharper points. Love and marriage unite ruling families, not merely prosperous ones, and a failed courtship might ruin an alliance, incite a war. Much Ado About Nothing is a comedy without merriment. It ends happily, but only just. The fathers here are rulers, not merchants, and there are no mothers; the women are witty and good (more precisely, one is more witty than good, the other more good than witty), but they are daughters and nieces, and do not rule the action.

    Leonato is the governor of Messina in the Kingdom of Sicily. Don Pedro is a prince of Aragon, under which kingdom Sicily thrived as a subordinate but largely self-governing regime. Aragon itself had merged with Castile in 1479, forming the nucleus of modern Spain, Tudor England’s great rival. The Spanish Armada had sailed only ten years before Shakespeare wrote the play. 

    Don Pedro arrives in Messina in triumph, having won a battle as it were comically, happily, his troops having suffered few casualties. “A victory is twice itself when the achiever brings home full numbers” (I.i.7-8), Leonato tells his daughter, Hero, and his niece, Beatrice—eligible young ladies who themselves might well be ‘doubled’ or married to eligible suitors. They hear that a young Florentine named Claudio has acquitted himself well in the fight, “doing, in the figure of a lamb, the feats of a lion” (I.i.12). He will prove a fitting hero for Hero. As for Beatrice, she inquires about a “Signor Mountanto,” by whom she means Signor Benedick of Padua, a man she denigrates as a trencherman and lover-boy (both his name and his nickname suggests as much), leaving the audience wondering why a lady of her stature would inquire after such a nullity. But he is no nullity, the messenger from Don Pedro insists; he is a man of virtue, a brave soldier. Ah, but “You must not, sir, mistake my niece; there is a kind of merry war betwixt Signor Benedick and her; they never meet but there’s a skirmish of wit between them” (I.i.53-54). Beatrice immediately claims near-total victory in their last war of words, after which “four of his five wits went halting off, and now is the whole man govern’d with one,” leaving him at best human-all-too-human, “a reasonable creature” but little more (I.i.58-59, 62-63). Serves him right, too, as he “wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat; it ever changes with the next block” (I.i.66-67). 

    Claudio loves Hero, openly. Benedick exchanges verbal arrows with Beatrice, concluding, “I will live a bachelor” (I.i.213). Don Pedro wisely doubts it. But Claudio has no inclination to camouflage his feelings: Having looked upon Hero “with a soldier’s eye” before the war, having “had a rougher task in hand / Than to drive liking to the name of love,” upon returning, with “war-thoughts… left in their places vacant, in their rooms / Come thronging soft and delicate desires, / All prompting me how fair young Hero is, / Saying I lik’d her ere I went to wars” (I.i.261-67). Don Pedro promises to intervene with Leonato and Hero on his friend’s behalf.

    But Don Pedro’s bastard brother, Don John, resents his brother’s patronage. “I had rather be a canker in a hedge than a rose in his grace” (I.ii.22)—a sentiment anticipating Milton’s Satan, who would rather rule in Hell than serve in Heaven. And like Satan, Don John knows himself: “It must not be denied that I am a plain-dealing villain” (I.ii.25-26), who, “if I had my liberty, I would do my liking” (I.ii.28-29). Don John is an aristocrat who defines liberty like a democrat, as doing whatever he wants. Upon hearing that his brother has negotiated the beginning of a courtship between Claudio and Hero, he vows, “If I can cross him any way, I bless myself every way” (I.ii.58). He has no interest in the lovers whose happiness he would ruin, wanting only to injure his gracious brother. To him, the lovers are mere collateral damage. Unlike Falstaff, his vice is unnatural; he is not so much a bad man as an evil one who would ruin both brotherly love and chaste erotic love.

    For her part, Beatrice echoes Benedick’s anti-marital vow. “Not till God make men of some other metal than earth” shall she take one as her husband (II.i.51-52). More wittily, “Adam’s sons are my brethren; and, truly, I hold it a sin to match in my kindred” (II.i.55-56)—and there is indeed a touch of brotherly-sisterly raillery in the repartee of the obviously well-matched pair.

    Don John’s first plot against his brother has him lie to Claudio, telling him that Don Pedro really woos Hero for himself. When he confides his anger to Benedick, the scheme quickly dissolves, as Benedick tells Don Pedro, who announces the real result of his suit, confirmed by Leonato: “Count, take of me my daughter, and with her my fortunes; his Grace hath made the match, and all grace say Amen to it!” (II.i.271-72). So the romance seems to conclude, with joy. Don Pedro then purposes to exercise his matchmaking skills on a harder challenge posed by Benedick and Beatrice, enlisting Claudio and Hero as his allies.

    But Don John won’t surrender. I will “cross this marriage” (II.ii.7), thanks to a plan thought up by his follower, Borachio. Borachio’s lover is Margaret, one of Hero’s gentlelady attendants. If Don John can arrange to have Don Pedro and Claudio near her chamber window at night, Borachio will address her as Hero, letting them ‘discover’ Hero’s infidelity. This scheme has the advantage over Don John’s abortive one, as it arranges for its victims to see and hear for themselves. 

    At the same time, Don Pedro plots his own much more benevolent deception of Benedick, letting it drop that Beatrice is secretly in love with her verbal fencing partner. Don Pedro deplores the lady’s unwisdom in this, but Leonato, who’s in on the scheme, excuses his niece, saying, “O my lord, wisdom and blood combating in so tender a body, we have ten proofs to one that blood hath the victory” (II.iii.150-51). Claudio chimes in with the claim that Hero has told him that poor Beatrice will surely die if Benedick continues to spurn her. Don Pedro adds, “I love Benedick well; and I could wish he would modestly examine himself, to see how much he is unworthy of so good a lady” (II.iii.189-90). This combined appeal to Benedick’s real if unrealized love for Beatrice, his Christian humility combined with his aristocratic pride (sure to make him want to prove that he is indeed worthy of so good a lady), has exactly the intended effect on the young nobleman, who has been ‘secretly’ (so he imagines) listening in to the well-planned conversation. “If I do not take pity of her,” he tells himself, “I am a villain; if I do not love her, I am a Jew” (II.iii.239-40). “I will go get her picture,” that is, go see her and fall more fully in love (II.iii.240-41).

    And Hero goes to work on Beatrice, with the identical strategy: a conversation with her other attendant, Ursula, fashioned for the ears of her ‘eavesdropping’ friend, whom she describes as too prideful and self-absorbed to respond to Benedick’s love, which she has duly reported. “Nature never fram’d a woman’s heart / Of prouder stuff than that of Beatrice. / Disdain and scorn ride sparkling in her eyes, / Misprising what they look on; and her wit / Values itself so highly that to her / All matter else seems weak.” (III.i.50-54). After they leave, Beatrice steps forward, ashamed of herself and ready to requite Benedick’s love. Later, Hero will see that she’s come down to natural equality with others of their sex, “look[ing] with your eyes as other women do” when they are in love (III.iv.81-82).

    At this point, Benedick and Beatrice are well on the way to a comedic finale, but Claudio and Hero have been charted as firmly toward a tragic end as Romeo and Juliet are, by as malignant a villain. Enter, however, a band of English-like clowns who will blunder themselves into saving the day. Constable Dogberry selects a night-watch, charging them to guard Leonato’s door, “for the wedding being there tomorrow,” there must be no disturbance tonight (III.iii.84). From this post, the watchmen hear Borachio tell another of Don John’s followers how well his scheme worked, how Don Pedro and Claudio heard him courting Margaret-as-Hero, with Claudio swearing that he would go to the wedding ceremony and expose her betrayal to all the guests. The watchmen determine to report this, “the most dangerous piece of lechery that ever was known in the commonwealth,” to the good Constable (III.iii.152-53). Initially, however, when Dogberry attempts to tell Leonato of the plot, he is too buffoonish to get to the point, and the governor can only tell him to go back and complete his investigation of the men he’s arrested.

    At the church, Claudio accuses Hero (“She’s but the sign and semblance of her honor”); Don Pedro testifies against her (“upon my honor”); Don John condemns her vices as being beyond the “chastity” of language to be uttered in polite company; her father wishes she were dead or better, never born (IV.i.32,87,96). Under the weight of these sudden, false accusations, Hero collapses. Among the nobles, only Benedick doubts the charge; only Beatrice defends her.

    But unlike the notoriously foolish, corrupt, ineffectual clergymen elsewhere in Shakespeare’s plays, the Friar who was to have performed the marriage ceremony shows perception (“I have marked / A thousand blushing apparitions / To start into her face”), prefers not to exclaim or declaim, and speaks with the authority of both religion and experience without expecting any to defer to him on account of them (IV.i.158-60), while insisting that “there is some strange misprision in the princes” (IV.i.185). This gives Benedick an opening to express suspicion of “John the Bastard, / Whose spirits toil in frame of villainies” (IV.i.189), which in turn makes Leonato doubt his daughter’s accusers: ” If they wrong her honor, / The proudest of them shall well hear of it” (IV.i.191-92). That is, he will chastise even a prince of the kingdom that rules, albeit lightly, over the kingdom in which he governs one region. The same honor that inspires aristocrats to defend their countries and their allies stands in defense of their families, and if family honor is impugned civic honor will be shaken.

    Harmless as a dove, but prudent as a serpent, only Friar Francis sees the way to satisfy the requirements of honor and to defend civic peace, a way that exists because human nature is what it is, a way that the Friar sees because he understands human nature and also knows how it may be brought to follow justice. “Pause awhile, / And let my counsel sway you in this case” (IV.i.200-01). Hero has fainted and her accusers have walked out; let them believe her to be dead. This alone will change “slander to remorse” (IV.i.211). Hero will be “lamented, pitied, and excus’d, / Of every hearer; for it so falls out / That we have we prize not to the worth / Whiles we enjoy it, but being lack’d and lost, / Why, then we rack the value, then we find / The virtue that possession would not show us / Whiles it was ours. So it will fare with Claudio.” (IV.i.216-22). Benedick puts his own honor on the line, telling Leonato that he will find a way to vindicate his daughter.

    But first he must deal with his enraged fiancée, who demands that he kill Claudio. This is her love test, set for the man she’d accused of waywardness at the beginning of the play. In her ferocity, she wishes she were a man so that she could “eat his heart in the marketplace”—a use of the marketplace that would not occur to the English at Windsor. Although he tries to calm her, she extracts a vow to challenge the calumniator. Again, tragedy threatens.

    Fortunately, the forces of the English common law, remarkably at play in Messina, are still on the case. Constable Dogberry calls his officers to order, inquiring, “Is our whole dissembly appear’d?” (IV.ii.2). Dissembling schemers Borachio and his accomplice, Conrade, are indeed present, and the interrogation of the accused and their accusers wends its way eccentrically toward establishing the facts of the case. They report back to the governor’s house in time to interrupt Benedick, who has duly challenged Claudio, then departed. Borachio confesses. But Leonato continues his own plot, telling Claudio that although innocent Hero is dead, he has a niece who looks just like her, who stands to inherit not only his own estate but the estate of his brother, Antonio. Claudio happily accepts the substitute wife (it is a comedy, after all), and the wedding is set for the morrow.

    As for Benedick, he must return to a conversation with a lady who expects him to return with his shield or on it. He returns with it, his shield being his wit.  After telling her that he has indeed challenged Claudio, who will either answer it or be deemed a coward, he distracts her from her anger by reinitiating their badinage, asking her to say “for which of my bad parts didst thou first fall in love with me?” (V.ii.52-53). Why, “for all of them together; which maintain’d so politic a state of evil that they will not admit any good part to intermingle with them” (V.ii.54-56)—an anticipation of the kind of arguments Publius will unfold in Federalist 51. This will be a marriage of separate and balanced powers.

    “Thou and I are too wise to woo peaceably,” Benedick remarks (V.ii.63). Hardly so on your side, the maid replies, since the wise man rarely praises himself by calling himself wise. “An old, an old instance, Beatrice, that liv’d in the time of good neighbors; if a man do not erect in this time his own tomb ere he dies, he shall live no longer in monument than the bell rings and the widow weeps” (V.ii.66-69). Benedick is an aristocrat who understands the modern world, where humility no longer wins honor because neighbors no longer know or love you. For once Beatrice can bring no ready counter-witticism to mind. When Ursula interrupts with the news that Hero was falsely accused, Don Pedro and Claudio abused, and that Don John has fled the country, they hurry to the governor’s house.

    There, Hero unmasks herself, as Leonato explains, “she died…but whiles her slander lived” (V.iii.66); her slander now dead, her honor vindicated thanks to the Friar’s wise ruse, she has risen. She will marry Claudio. And after a bit more verbal sparring, which they begin by telling one another that they love one another “no more than reason” (V.iii.75,78), Benedick and Beatrice are kindly exposed by the newlyweds, who produce letters from each confessing love for the other. “A miracle!” Benedick pronounces it. “Here’s our own hands against our hearts” (V.iii.91). He silences any more less-than-beatific chatter by kissing his bride-to-be; the man Beatrice had derided as Signor Mountanto delivers a sermon from the mount in loving action, winning their war of words as surely as he had won the war which preceded the play’s beginning. That makes two miracles, uniting two couples; Much Ado About Nothing is as close to a divine comedy as Shakespeare would ever write. 

    When Leonato tries to delay a celebratory dance, Benedick makes bold to countermand his order, telling him to get a wife, as “there is no staff more reverend than one tipp’d with horn,” a merry joke about cuckoldry in the wake of one wedding and in prospect of his own (V.iii.117-19). A messenger then brings word that Don John has been captured and will return to Messina tomorrow, under armed guard. It isn’t Governor Leonato but Benedick who concludes, “Think not on him till tomorrow. I’ll devise thee brave punishments for him. Strike up, pipers.” (V.iii.121-23).

    And why not? He and Beatrice were the first among the aristocrats to suspect Don John’s perfidy, Hero’s innocence, and the others’ error. Although decent Claudio and Hero are the heirs to the fortune of the Governor and his brother, Benedick and Beatrice will be the real rulers of the city, as the wittiest and wisest aristocrats in town. A victory is twice itself when the victor brings home full number, Leonato had intoned. He has just been shown how his aphorism might be enacted.

    In his English comedy, Shakespeare shows how a decadent aristocracy in a peaceful, commercial society can be well supplanted by the wit of the gentry class or upper ‘bourgeoisie’—crucially, by the wit of women, wives whose virtues can now rule because commerce has supplanted war. But on the continent, wars will continue. In Shakespeare’s continental comedy, the witty woman needs to find her match in an equally witty, or even wittier man. And even they will need the assistance of a wise, politic churchman who knows how to moderate the tempers of still-indispensable warrior-aristocrats while awaiting the ascendance of the better angels of their nature. In commercial England, a tavern host serves as peacemaker, the parson as a good-natured foreign language-bender.

    In England, English words prove unreliable in dealings commercial and marital; actions speak louder. On the continent, words might prove unreliable, lying, but also whetstones of wit; actions bespeak love (a kiss to silence a too-contentious mouth) and harmony (a betrothal dance). In England, love requires the wit of deception to defend itself against the low, farcical eroticism commerce encourages. On the continent, love requires the wit of perception to defend itself against malignant scheming and excessive aristocratic spiritedness. In England, wit and prudence defend love against base assaults and surmises; on the continent, they defend love by contriving ‘miracles’.  

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Founding the Christian Regime

    May 22, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Paul the Apostle: The Epistle to the Ephesians.

    John Stott: Ephesians: Building a Community in Christ. Notthingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 1998.

     

    Throughout the Bible, God founds regimes for His people—beginning with the simple regime of the Garden of Eden, which Adam rules as His vicegerent. The Bible also looks forward to a final regime for human beings, to be founded after the coming of the Messiah. Between the regime of Eden and the final regime, there have been several regimes, including both a republican and a monarchic regime for the ancient Israelites. There have also been several forms of ‘states,’ that is, communities vastly differing in size and centralization of authority—again ranging from tiny Eden to the Israelite empire at its peak.

    The universal character of the Christian ‘state’ also required a new kind of regime. If God no longer legislated primarily for a particular people, giving them a fully articulated regime while leaving the other nations, the ‘Gentiles,’ to their own political devices, what would this new regime look like? And if God did not intend to rule the world’s nations directly until the advent of the Messiah—if there was to be no legitimate ‘world government’ until then—how could the new regime advance throughout the nations? Would rulers and peoples of existing nations not regard the new founding with considerable suspicion?

    Saul of Tarsus’ spiritedness, his zeal in persecuting Christians, found itself redirected toward the founding and perpetuation of this new regime after his now-famous conversion on the road to Damascus. The Christian ecclesia or assembly, the Christian church, would be the institutional or formal element of the Christian regime, a regime ruled by God according to the purposes revealed in the Old and New Testaments. The Jewish community would continue to find authoritative guidance in the substantial body of law delivered through Moses in the Pentateuch. Paul addressed that community in his Epistle to the Hebrews. His main efforts concerned the Gentiles, peoples living under the rule of human laws and worshipping a variety of ‘gods,’ many of them declared enemies of the God of the Bible since the earliest days of Israel and indeed before that, when the Israelites were slaves in Egypt.

    Located on the coast of Ionia, now a province in Turkey, Ephesus had been a Greek colony, its patron goddess Artemis. The Temple of Artemis at Ephesus was one of the ‘Seven Wonders’ of the ancient world. The empires of Lydia, Persia, Macedonia, and the Seleucids ruled Ephesus before the Romans seized it in 129 BC. The emperor Augustus made it the capital of the Roman colony in Asia Minor. As a cosmopolitan and commercial city, a port city, it proved fairly open to Christian evangelism; Paul had lived there between 52 and 54 AD. However, its still-vigorous cultic societies were well-known for their practice of sorcery, so while Ephesus afforded Christian founders a degree of tolerance, they would also find determined enemies there. 

    By 62 AD, Paul was imprisoned in Rome. The salutation of his letter to the Ephesian Christians identifies who he is, what he is, and the source of the authority which entitles him to address them as their ruler: “Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God” (1:1) He also identifies his addressees: “the saints which are at Ephesus” and “the faithful in Jesus Christ.” Some interpreters claim that “saints” refers to Jewish converts, “the faithful” to Gentile converts; others claim that the distinction suggests that Paul addresses both the Christians at Ephesus immediately and Christians everywhere, wherever the letter may eventually circulate. Paul might also be suggesting the following nuance: “saints” emphasizes the fact that they are Christians in a place, a place with a regime foreign to the Christian regime, a place also limited in territory in a way the Christian state is not; “the faithful” emphasizes their own regime and state, ruled as they are by the universal God.

    Paul offers a triple blessing. “Grace be to you, and peace, from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual [pneumatikos] blessings in heavenly places in Christ” (1:2-3). This reciprocal blessing proceeds from God and His Son through Paul to the Ephesians, then from Paul back to God the Father and to Lord Jesus Christ—that is, from one who is ruled to his Ruler(s)—and finally to the blessing from Christ to both Paul and the Ephesians. These blessings have the effect of showing the bonds that unite Christians to Christ and to His Father, while simultaneously showing that these bonds are invisible, spiritual, in Heaven not on earth, even as both Paul and the Ephesians now live on earth, one of them literally imprisoned on it. For Christians, members of a new kind of regime and a new kind of empire, physical bonds matter less than spiritual bonds.

    What is the character of these spiritual bonds? Christ has “chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy”—separate from other regimes—”and without blame”—innocent of wrongdoing—and “before him in love [agape]” (1:4). The Ruler of the regime chose His subjects, not the other way around, from the other peoples ruling themselves in other regimes, to be law-abiding or blameless not only out of fear—the binding sentiment of most regimes, and one them in this—but out of the specific kind of love Christianity brings to prominence. Agapic love seeks not the possession of the beloved but his good, his perfection. As Paul elsewhere is never shy to remark, the radical defects of human beings make them impossible to perfect without divine power, manifested in the divine graciousness animated by that love.

    At the same time, Christians also seek to serve their Ruler’s good. God has “predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the beloved” (1.5-6). Here the image of the ruling body shifts from the regime of a political community to the regime of a family—far more intimate. Jesus is God’s Son; we Christians are Jesus’ adopted children. This puts His children under an obligation of gratitude; God deserves the praise of His glory precisely because He has adopted us, done something indispensable for the achievement of our good. 

    Through the centuries, most Christians have taken the strong language of God’s choosing of His people “from the foundation of the world,” His predestination of them, to mean that He has predetermined who will become a Christian, a ‘saved’ human being, even before human beings were created. Supplementing this is the argument that if God foreknows all events they are ‘as good as’ predestined. The question turns on the weight the interpretation gives to the word ‘predestinated.’ If Christians were predestined by God to become Christians, regardless of their own will, agency, intention, then God’s intention is mysterious. Why did He select these people and not those—especially since His grace demonstrably has no correlation with the discernible virtues of the individuals chosen, as distinguished from those not chosen? If, however, ‘predestination’ means instead that God wants all of his human creatures to join Him in His regime but leaves them free to choose whether they do join—if He leaves room for human consent—then their praise for the glory of His grace becomes a moral obligation, a matter of consent, and also more of a genuine good God’s creatures can bestow upon God.

    What is clear is the foundation of human gratitude to Christ. He redeemed them “through his blood,” through the sacrifice of His life, obtaining forgiveness for otherwise-indelible sins against the Father from the Father. In Christ “we have redemption”; that is, we are ransomed from slavery to the harsh non-Christian regimes, all of them condemned by God the Father as contradictory to His laws, His way of life. This is more than liberation alone. “The riches of his grace” preeminently amount to “wisdom and prudence,” sophia and phronēsis (1:8).The knowledge of Being, which philosophers seek, theoretical knowledge, and the knowledge all men, but especially political men, seek, the knowledge of practical affairs, of ‘what to do’ in the shifting circumstances of life in this world, both require divine assistance. But, as in the case of ‘free will’ or consent to God’s rule, interpreters have varied regarding the part human ‘agency’ plays. Does God simply lead men to their theoretical and practical discoveries? Or does he grant a certain ‘space’ for their own efforts? However this may be, obedience to God’s regime in His empire evidently heightens both theoretical and practical intelligence. As the Word of God, the Bible makes you smarter.

    In what way has God added to, or simply provided, the discoveries of these two kinds of wisdom? He has “made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed to himself” (1:9). That is, He has revealed to us certain matters that we could never discover on our own, and has done so for His own purposes, dependent as He is on no one. The good God seeks from us—indeed commands from us—is our just gratitude for the gifts of life, liberation, and wisdom. Our gratitude pleases Him without making Him in any way dependent upon us. His regime is not ‘political’ in Aristotle’s sense of politics as reciprocity of ruling and being-ruled. God rules but is not ruled in turn. His regime is what Aristotle calls kingship: the rule of one over the many, for the sake of the good of the many, as distinguished from tyranny, the rule of the one over the many for the sake of the one. The good rule of the one over the many may also serve the good of the one, and the bad rule of the one over the many may surely be bad for the one, even if he supposes it good. In that sense there is reciprocity of goods if not of rule. But in the case of divine as distinguished from human rule, the good of the One entails a humble, just duty of the many to the One; the One doesn’t need that offering, being capable of ‘happiness’ without any such homage, any such subjects, at all.

    God’s founding of His regime has yet to be completed. In “the fullness of times” he will “gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth; even in him: In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will: that we should be to the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ” (1:10-12). The regime of God in its future perfection will encompass all of His creation; the adopted children within His family will receive membership in this regime even as children of a human father receive their inheritance of property from him. The twelfth verse, central to the first ‘chapter’ of Paul’s epistle, repeats the purpose of this regime insofar as human beings contribute to it—the praise of God’s glory—and the terms in which it is permissible to offer it—as beings who have trusted in, have had faith in, Christ as their sacrificial redeemer. Underlining the dependence of human beings on God, and the independence of God on human beings, the subjects are to praise God’s glory; God’s glory exists whether or not they praise it, God having been glorious whether human beings existed or not.

    To enter God’s regime, one must first trust Christ—consent to His rule—then hear “the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation” (1:13). After believing it, you then receive the royal seal, the “Holy Spirit of promise,” which is the “earnest” or guarantee of the family inheritance “until the redemption of the purchased possession” (1:14). Having acknowledged the Ephesians’ membership in the regime, Paul thanks them and tells them that he prays that the Father will “give unto you the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him” in three ways: knowledge of “the hope of his calling”; what “the riches of the glory of his inheritance” are; and “what is the exceeding greatness of his power” toward all those under His regime (1:17-19). These powers were manifested in His raising of Christ “from the dead” and His setting of Christ “at his own right hand in the heavenly places” (1:20). That is, God’s power is so great that it can not only reverse death but it can raise His Son beyond the reach of the regime that killed Him, and indeed “far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come” (1:21). The spiritual, Christian regime is indeed enforced, not by human rulers but by God.

    The Father has set His Son at His right hand—that is, the hand of strength—so as to give him authority over “all things in the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all” (1:22-23). Although the Roman regime had broken Christ’s body on the Cross, the Church is His new ‘body,’ of which He is the “head” (1:22). Political communities or states, families, and bodies all have regimes—the latter still suggested by our term ‘regimen,’ a plan of diet and exercise.

    The first ‘chapter’ of the epistle thus describes a regime with a ruling body compared initially to a family, then to a physical body. The regime consists of a father and a son ruling their subjects, children, or members. The unique character of these rulers is their holiness, their separation from and superiority to all ordinary families, all ordinary bodies now alive on earth. The purpose of the regime is wisdom and prudence, knowledge of both ‘being’ and of practice. Since a fully-articulated regime also consists of forms of rule—the ruling structures or institutions—and a way of life, readers may expect or at least hope for an account of those things.

    Just as the rulers of the Christian regime are holy, so the subjects are also set apart. Christ has “quickened,” made living, his subjects; you “who were dead in trespasses and sins,” walking “according to the course of this world”—its way of life, its regime— according to “the prince of the powers of the air,” who rules “the children of disobedience” in all other regimes, has in effect done for you what His Father did for Him: raised you to life out of a spiritual death (2:1-2). The way of life of the prince of the powers of the air leads to death; that way is disobedience to the way of life of God. Since the subjects of God’s regime within the city of Ephesus manifestly remain physically alive, this new life must be spiritual. Paul emphasizes this by calling the non-Christian regime one guided by “the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh, and of the mind”; to live in that way is to live the way of beings who “were by nature the children of wrath” (2:3). This is why he compares the Church to a body; the natural body and the natural mind love ‘erotically,’ aiming at possessing those things that the body and the mind crave by their nature. Lives lived according to erotic love consist of ways of life that resist God’s way of life. 

    “But God, who is rich in mercy,” loves not erotically (there is nothing he needs, nothing he yearns to possess) but agapically (2:4); in justice, He could leave us in the way of life we have chosen, but by his grace He has chosen to save us from our own way of life, inviting us back into His regime. He has “raised us up together, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus” (2:5). His purpose in raising us above the natural regime of the human body and mind is to show us “the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness toward us through Christ Jesus” (2:7). Beyond the riches He has already bestowed upon His people in ‘this’ life, He will give them still more after their bodies die. Among these gifts will be companionship with his Son, rather as family members keep company with one another.

    Paul makes it clear that Christians’ newfound, elevated status was strictly “the gift of God,” having nothing to do with our own efforts (2:8)—which are ruled by the prince of the powers of the air, through natural eros. Human nature has been misdirected, but as “created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in,” that nature has now been redirected, placed into a new regime entailing a new way of life, this one marked out by God and involving works that are good, no longer misdirected.

    Gentiles are uncircumcised, unmarked by the physical practice that symbolizes membership in God’s regime, Israel. Without Christ, you were “aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world” (2:11). But thanks to a different shedding of blood—not of your own blood, by circumcision, but of Christ’s blood, by crucifixion—you have become members of His body, His family, under His regime. Christ shed physical blood, sacrificing the life which blood supports and symbolizes, in the world He created. When His Father raised Him to life at His right hand in Heaven, both Father and Son revealed a life beyond physical life in this world. But that better life can only come through obedience to God’s regime, as His Son demonstrated in the Garden of Gethsemane by determining to obey His Father’s command to submit to crucifixion for the sake of the human beings He had created.

    In this way God is “our peace,” having made Jew and Gentile “both one,” breaking down “the wall of partition between us, “abolish[ing] in his flesh,” on the Cross, “the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances; or to make in himself of twain one new man,” like Saul himself, a man at peace with himself (2:14-15). This new man, neither Jew nor Gentile, has also reconciled with God, being now “in one body by the cross” (2:16). By allowing His human body to be destroyed, Christ showed the way toward rejecting the erotic love of misdirected human nature by replacing that love with self-sacrificing and humble agapic love. Erotic love is the way of “wrath” in the sense that it aims at possession, aiming at what I want to be mine and not thine, which must lead to conflict, to war over who gets what he wants and who is left empty-handed. But if through Christ “we both have access by one Spirit unto the Father,” then we have no more cause for conflict (2:18). This is how Jesus “preached peace” (2:17), how His regime brings the union all regimes aim at but none other can deliver, misdirected as all of them are.

    “Now therefore you are no longer strangers and foreigners; but fellow citizens with the saints; and of the household of God” (2:19). Here the metaphor shifts. Not only are we members of one body, children of one family, but also citizens of one house, the “foundation” of which is “the apostles and prophets” (again, both Jews and Gentiles) and the “chief cornerstone” of which is Jesus Christ (2:20). The cornerstone ensures that the foundation is square; a square foundation is a stable foundation for the house. The house upon which the foundation is being built, consisting of the citizens God has chosen is “a holy temple” (2:21)—a new temple to replace the one in Jerusalem. You are “builded together” as a “habitation of God through the Spirit” (2:22); you, the Church or assembly of God’s people, are the new house of God, the new ‘body politic’ not insofar as you are of flesh, whether living flesh marked by circumcision or the solid and stolid ‘flesh’ of a stone temple, but a meta-physical, beyond-physical, house designed by God according to his architectural plan. Like a body or a family, a building has a ‘regime’: a ruler or owner; a structure designed by the architect; a ‘way of life’ determined by the owner but also partly determined by the structure; and a purpose or set of purposes such as shelter and comfort for its ‘citizens’ or residents.

    Paul’s body now lives not in a physical temple but in a Roman prison. Although an outlaw in the eyes of the Roman regime, I am not, he writes, so much the Romans’ prisoner as “the prisoner of Jesus Christ for you Gentiles”; the “cause” or reason I am so imprisoned is to be a sacrifice, a sacrifice parallel to if not equal to that of Jesus, a sacrifice of the body in the service of the Spirit (3:1). In prison I can write this letter disclosing the “revelation [Jesus Christ] made known unto me” regarding the “mystery of Christ” (3:4). In previous times this mystery “was not made known unto the sons of men” (3:5). The revelation to Paul, a Jew, was that the Gentiles he had been persecuted “should be fellow heirs” to God’s inheritance (3:6). “I was made minister,” thanks to God’s grace, grace given “by the effectual working of his power” (3:7). Paul was given a ruling office in God’s regime. Just as ‘ministers’ in an ordinary political regime on earth execute the intentions of the ruler, the sovereign, so Paul has been selected to execute the intentions of God. To the question, ‘Who died and left you in charge?’ Paul answers, ‘Jesus died and left me, among others, in charge as His designated ‘representatives’ as executors of his Word. Paul’s physical weakness, his incarceration, serves to highlight his spiritual authority.

    In addition to his office as God’s minister, Paul is also a preacher of that Word, God’s spokesman. “Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ” (3:8). Why “the least”? Perhaps because he had been a persecutor of Christians: Paul does not say. What he does say is the purpose of his ministry and of his preaching: “To make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ” (3:9)—the last a fact not made known in God the Father’s revelations to Moses and his earlier prophets. The intent of Paul’s activities as minister and preacher in God’s regime is to “make known” the “manifold wisdom of God”—wisdom being the virtue most needed in a ruler (3:10). This newly revealed matter, centering on the existence, words, and actions of the Son, must be promulgated, as all legitimate commands are. Paul is a messenger ordained for that purpose, the human promulgator of God’s promulgation to him. This means that the ‘new’ regime is really the original regime; what is new is the revelation that the Son was there all along, that the Father created the world through Him, and that this authorizes him to unite Jew and Gentile in one regime, by this promulgation “unto the principalities and powers” (3:10).

    Any subject, and any citizen, will want access to his ruler or rulers. The Father has set down his “eternal purpose,” for which end He made “Christ Jesus our Lord” (3:11). Christians “have boldness and access with confidence” to Jesus through their “faith of him” (3:12). For this reason, Paul’s physical imprisonment, the effect of the power of the Roman regime over him, should not cause the Ephesians to “faint,” to ask ‘Where is God?’—to suppose that the foundations of God’s regime are unsteady, not worthy of confidence and courage (3:13). On the contrary, Paul’s “tribulations” will serve “your glory” (3:13), again in imitation of Christ’s greater sacrifice. Paul prays for them, “bow[ing] my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (3:14). The image of bowing is the image of the bow; the ‘goddess’ of Ephesus was Artemis/Diana, the huntress whose weapon was the bow. She is to be replaced by Christian ‘hunters’ and ‘fishermen,’ spiritual huntsmen and huntswomen. Paul prays that the Father “would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man” (3:16)—inner strength or power is spiritual not physical, agapic not erotic, the presence of the indwelling of God’s Holy Spirit and of His Son in the human soul. Paul further prays that Christian souls, “rooted and grounded in love” (3:17), will comprehend the vast dimensions of God’s regime, no longer restricted to the Israelites but to the nations, the Gentiles, as well; that they will know Christ’s love for them; that they will be “filled with the fullness of God” (3:19). As His new body, family, temple, city, you are His dwelling place, inwardly, in your hearts—that is, in your minds, newly repurposed for the purposes of God’s regime. 

    Paul expresses this in a paradox, praying that the Ephesians will know the love of God, “which passeth knowledge” (3:19). This means that they will know that God’s love exists by perceiving it inside themselves, without knowing why God offers it to them. To be filled with the fullness of God is a form of personal knowledge, not ‘abstract’ knowledge, just as one might say he knows a human person without being able to say what his chemical composition or other impersonal characteristics are. 

    Not only does God’s knowledge surpass man’s knowledge, His power far exceeds human power, in part because what He can do far exceeds “all that we ask or think” (3:20). Human power is limited in part because human knowledge is limited. The new knowledge available in the ‘new’ regime will enhance the power of human beings in the way Paul shows, by praying to God in the knowledge that He is the Father of our Lord, our ruler. Prayerful appeals to God as Father of our Lord, our Ruler, remain within the bounds of God’s just and gracious regime because they honor the right Person: “Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end” (3:21). In all regimes citizens and subjects are expected honor the rulers of their regime; when the rulers are no longer honored, revolution, regime change, may follow. That attitude of honor, along with the criteria for defining what is honorable, limits the uses of the powers they request from their rulers, and also limits the powers the rulers may use in attempting to meet those petitions.

    Having established the major premises of his argument in the first half of the epistle, Paul reaches his first conclusion, his first ‘therefore’ clause. “I therefore, the prisoner of the Lord, beseech you that you walk worthy of the vocation wherewith you are called” (4:1). Since I am less the prisoner of Rome than the willing “prisoner” of Jesus Christ, having prayed to Him to ask that the Ephesians know Him, he now ‘prays’ to the Ephesians, requesting that they follow the way of life God has established for them in His regime. A prisoner is confined; to walk is to be free; to walk along a given path is to consent to follow the restrictions and draw nearer to the end of that path. The first half of the epistle consists of teaching first principles and praying for their fulfillment among the members of the Church, although to describe Paul’s teaching as the enunciation of principles alone is incomplete and somewhat misleading, as the ‘principles’ include the filling-up, the animation, of human souls with the Holy Spirit, a Person not an abstraction. The second half of the epistle consists of Paul’s exhortation to actions in accordance with those principles.

    To follow the way of life of the Christian regime requires four virtues: “lowliness” or humility; “meekness” or gentleness; “longsuffering” or patience; and forbearance “in love” (4:2). Forbearance was originally a legal term meaning abstaining from collecting a debt; here, the forbearance derives not from self-restraint but agape. All of these virtues aim “to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (4:3). If the Church, God’s regime in its this-worldly manifestation, is to survive and prosper, like all bodies, families, buildings, and cities it must have some bond, some ligament, some structural tie to hold it together. Since the Church is first of all a spiritual unity, this bond cannot be sustained ‘automatically,’ like the bonds that sustain bodies and buildings do. A spiritual union requires moral and spiritual bonds—that is, those moral virtues most consistent with the rule of the Holy Spirit, the Son, and the Father. While the classical virtues of courage, moderation, wisdom, and justice are all esteemed by God and His people, these less natural virtues are the ones that put obedience to God above self-sufficiency or self-rule. They are the virtues that ‘shine’ less, giving glory to the Ruler and conducing to a willingness to abjure self-assertion and work toward the good of the regime as a whole.

    There is not one bond of unity but seven. They are: one body, one Spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, and “one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all” (4:6). This follows from the premises of the argument Paul has already cited. The Church body differs from natural bodies, animated by agapic instead of erotic love, by Spirit not ‘flesh,’ aiming at, hoping for, full citizenship in God’s regime. Central to the list is the Ruler of the regime, its “one Lord” (4:5), Jesus Christ—as indeed the matter of ‘who rules’ must be of central importance in any regime. God the Father is at once universal (“Father of all”), superior to (above all members of the regime), pervasive (“through all”), and present within each member (“in you all”). 

    But how can God the Father be universal, superior or “above,” pervasive, and present “in” each member of His regime, all at the same time? Universal and superior are manifestly consistent attributes; there is no contradiction in saying that a Being rules everywhere. It is the seeming contradiction between God’s ‘aboveness’ and His pervasiveness and ‘in-ness’ that can cause confusion. God’s pervasiveness evidently refers to the Church as a whole, whereas His ‘in-ness’ refers to each individual member of the Church. How so?

    Paul explains that “unto every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ” (4:7). The Father acts through His Son, who ‘measures out’ God’s grace, giving different gifts or abilities to different persons. The Son is the link or bond between the universal and infinitely superior Father and both human individuals and human organizations. When the Son “ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts to men” (4:8). Picking up his theme of imprisonment, Paul compares Jesus’ resurrection from the tomb to a liberation from jail, a liberation from the debtors’ prison in which all human beings are confined because they have violated God’s laws, and from which Jesus freely gives those prisoners their own freedom in God’s regime. He even liberated dead men from Hades, having also “descended first into the lower parts of the earth” (4:9). “He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens that he might fill all things” (4:10). Earth, Hell, the heavens, and Heaven: all the parts of God’s creation have now been ‘filled’ by Christ, used for His purposes. 

    What were the gifts Christ gave to human persons? They are the distinct but coordinate gifts needed to be apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers. A prophet of God receives direct revelation from God; a pastor or a teacher doesn’t receive such revelation, and does not need to receive it, having the revelations entrusted to the prophets available to him in the Bible. The purpose of actions in accordance with these various gifts is “the perfecting of the saints,” the “work of the ministry,” and “the edifying of the body of Christ” (4:12). Whereas the perfection of the natural person by natural means is ethics, as seen in the four ‘classical’ virtues, the perfection of the Christian as a citizen of God’s regime requires the four Christian virtues as revealed to those gifted by God in these enumerated ways, and then taught by those ‘gifted’ persons to the Church members both as individuals and as citizens and subjects of the regime.

    This teaching will continue “till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ” (4:13). Just as citizens of earthly regimes emulate the heroes held up by that regime, so the imitatio Christi will remain the task of each Christian. Paul exemplifies this in seeking to free the Ephesians from their earthly ‘prison’ while in Rome’s prison. In imitating the Ruler of the Christian regime, Christians intend to “henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine”—every breeze and every storm directed at them from the prince of the air—”by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive” (4:14). Philosophy, and especially Socratic philosophy, is the human cure for sophistry and rhetoric; philosophic dialectic is the means by which the philosopher can question sophists and rhetoricians, expose the contradictions in their arguments. Socratic philosophy does not, however, provide definitive answers to the questions, it raises, or at least to all of them. God’s revelation does provide answers to many of those questions, although the revelation is always partial, with God reserving some mysteries for Himself.

    “Speaking the truth in love,” Christians “may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ”—from whom “the whole body is fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in that measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love” (4:15-16). The Christian regime, like all regimes, seeks to educate its citizens. It does so, however, not only for the sake of the rulers, for the sake of their glory, but in agapic love—for the sake of the ruled. Paul here has recourse to his metaphor of the Church as a body, the most tightly organized of the several entities to which he compares the Church. Agape edifies or strengthens the body, builds it up, and at the same time does so justly, in right measure, as the head of a natural body animates and directs the inferior members. 

    This leads Paul to his second conclusion, his second “therefore” clause. “This I say therefore, and testify in the Lord, that ye henceforth walk not as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their mind” (4:17). Through His apostle, the head of the Church ‘body’ directs its members onto the way of life of the regime of God, and away from the regimes of other nations insofar as they depart from God’s regime. In its vanity or futility, the natural human mind (in fact unnatural, not in accordance with God’s original intention for it) leads all other regimes to some extent into wrong ways of life. Under those regimes, their “understanding [is] darkened,” “alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart” (4:18). They are blind, alienated, and ignorant because they are animated by the wrong love, erotic or possessive love.

    This leaves room for acknowledging that some regimes lead citizens and subjects in worse ways than others do, depending upon how much their ways intersect with Christian ways. Paul’s teaching also explains why he, and many other Christians, wind up in prison, or on other forms of the Cross. Christians live in the regimes of man, ‘the City of Man,’ while reserving their final allegiance to the regime, the City, of God. This may provoke the wrath of the regimes of men in which they live, which quite often dislike competition over the question of who rules and who does not rule. Christians live in the City of Man, but the City of God lives in them. That conflict will remain as long as the earth is not yet the new earth, under the rule of Jesus Christ.

    As Christians, human beings who now acknowledge that “the truth is in Jesus,” men have “put off” the “old man,” who is “corrupt according to the deceitful lusts” of erotic love, and are “renewed in the spirit of your mind,” “put[ting] on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness” (4:21-24). Without feeling the need for the competition, the wars, resulting from erotic or possessive love, Christians no longer feel the impulse to lie. A Christian can “speak truth with his neighbor, for we are members one of another” (4:25).

    Paul is no utopian. He does not claim that Christians will no longer become angry. Indeed, Jesus Himself became angry on occasion, expelling money changers from the Temple at Jerusalem in one notable instance. There is righteous anger, and there is sinful anger; righteous anger is for the defense of God’s regime, whereas sinful anger serves the ‘lusts’ or erotic love of the one angered. “Be ye angry, and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath,” giving no “place to the devil,” the prince of anger. Similarly, given our existing physical nature, we must eat. We must still acquire things, possess things, satisfy bodily eros to some extent. Therefore, “Let him that stole steal no more: but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth” (4:28). As for the natural mind, “let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying, that it may minister grace unto the hearers” (4:29). In each case, anger, greed, and the power of speech and reason are not only moderated—let not the sun go down on the first, let one work for bodily things, not steal them, let the mind use speech for truth-telling, not lying—but redirected agapically toward the good of others—indignation at offenses to God, charitable giving of the fruits of labor, Christian witness to partners in conversation.

    With the right kind of love, Christians can begin to “put away” bitterness, wrath, anger, clamor, and evil speaking, along with “all malice” (4:31). With the right kind of love, Christians can instead “be kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ’s sake hath forgiven you” (4:31). The grace-beyond-justice of God should be reciprocated not toward God, who doesn’t need our grace, but toward one another as citizens of God’s regime. Christian love of God is just gratitude; Christian love of men, whether fellow-Christians or even enemies, is graceful, more than just.

    This brings Paul to his third “therefore” clause: “Be you therefore followers of God, as dear as children” (5:1)—children of God, not vacillating children of men. Children of God imitate God, “walk[ing] in agape, as Christ also has loved us” (5:2). Erotic love must not be perverted to fornication, uncleanness, or covetousness, for the sake of the ‘name’ or reputation of the Church, the honor God’s regime ought to merit. The speech of Christians should be centered on their gratitude to God, not “filthiness, nor foolish talking, nor jesting” (5:4). Persons who speak and act in that way, who walk in that way of life, have no “inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God” (5:5). As with speaking, so with listening: “let no man deceive you with vain words” (5:6), words empty as the wind that carries them to your ears. 

    If there are citizen-subjects of God’s regime, and also those alien to it, foreigners, how to tell the difference? There are no physical markers; there aren’t even political borders to cross or town walls to protect. This too is a problem of knowledge, a difficulty in discerning truth, separating it from falsehood. The best human beings can do to distinguish “the children of light” from the children of darkness is to observe “the fruit of the Spirit” (5:8-9). The observable actions of men are the most reliable windows into their souls. “The fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness and righteousness and truth”; this is the proof or test of Christian citizenship. Typically, the “unfruitful works of darkness” are hidden from men because they are shameful, but there can be no shame in exhibiting the fruit of the Spirit—and no pride, either, inasmuch as they are the fruit of the Spirit, not the fruit of our own natural virtues. Evil things are “made manifest by the light”; ‘shining a light on them’ makes them visible. The Spirit is the light, and that light shines forth from its fruits, with neither shame nor pride.

    For this reason, Jesus commanded the dead to awaken and arise, “and Christ gave them the light” (5:14). If you awaken you need the light to see the way, and not to stumble over things you otherwise would not see. “See then that ye walk circumspectly, not as fools; but as wise, redeeming the time, because the days are evil,” “understanding what the will of the Lord is” (5:15-17). Unlike the will of a human being, the will of God is by definition wise, inasmuch as God is the ultimate reality; insofar as human beings are given to know the will of the Lord they are wise, enlightened, “filled with the Spirit” (5:18).

    In this, Christian unity means both sameness and differentiation: sameness in the sense that all understand the will of the Lord, as given by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, itself delivered to them by God through His prophets; differentiated in that members of God’s regime should speak to themselves “in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing and making melody in your heart to the Lord” in gratitude” (5:19). Each singer brings his own voice. In this Paul sees what Aristotle saw about unity in a sound political regime. Some would-be regime founders, Aristotle writes, attempt to homogenize the many elements of the polis. But this is to reduce “a theme to a single beat.”

    Closely related to anger, but in appearance opposite to it, is fear. Just as there is good anger and bad anger, so there is good fear and bad fear. Bad fear is the fear of men. Good fear is fear of the Lord, which the prophets of Israel called the beginning of wisdom. Although Paul emphasizes the obligation of love of God and neighbor over the obligation of fear of God, he never forgets the necessity of fearing God. “Submit yourselves one to another in the fear of God” (5:21); “wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands as unto the Lord,” because “the husband is the head of the wife”—giving direction to the household—even “as Christ is the head of the church” (5:22-23). Further, as Christ is the savior of the Church, so the husband protects the household. This leads to Paul’s next “therefore,” which is really an argument from analogy: “as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing” (5:24). Those who assume that this spells tyrannical rule of husbands over wives should guess again. Paul writes “as the church is subject unto Christ.” The Church is rightly subject unto Christ because Christ loves the Church not erotically but agapically, and husbands are to follow His standard. “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it,” sacrificing his life under torture (5:25). His purpose in so doing was to “sanctify and cleanse” the Church, “washing [it] with the water of the word,” so that “he might present it to himself a glorious church,” a church “holy and without blemish” (5:25-27). “So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself.” (5:28) This is why a man shall “leave his father and mother,” his flesh and blood, “and shall be joined with unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh” (5:31).

    If Paul and Aristotle concur in understanding a sound regime as analogous to a musical harmony, blending many into one, they diverge somewhat in their understanding of marriage. Aristotle regards the family as the foundation of the polis. The husband is the head of the household, but rule over the children and slaves within the household is shared by husband and wife, who rule reciprocally, “ruling and being ruled in turn.” This is the political relationship, strictly speaking. In Paul, the husband rules absolutely, as Christ does His Church, but with the agapic love that seeks the good of the beloved. The closest thing to absolute rule with agapic love in the Aristotelian family is the rule of the parents over their children, a rule that aims at the good of the children. 

    Christ’s love of the Church, the Church’s status as “members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones,” is “a great mystery” (5:30, 32). Paul doesn’t say why it is mysterious. It may be because the head of the body would usually sacrifice the other members of the body to preserve itself, but Christ is the head of the body of the Church, yet He sacrificed Himself for the sake of His members. The mystery, however, dissolves with His resurrection, his placement at the Father’s right hand; His sacrifice was real, but it issued in His return to rule over His church on earth, from a seat above the heavens. As to husbands still on earth, “let every one of you in particular so love his wife even as himself; and the wife see that she reverence her husband” (5:33). Do husbands not sometimes go so far as to sacrifice themselves for their wives and children? When they do, they imitate Christ.

    This brings Paul to consider the children in the family. “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right” (6:1). This isn’t blind obedience, but obedience in the Lord, who gives light. Honoring your father and mother brings the benefit of living well and long. Just as fathers should be reverenced by their wives, they should be honored by their children, but again with indispensable condition that they do so lovingly, not provoking their “children to wrath”—that is, to the natural, unrighteous anger Paul has already criticized. “Bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord” (6:4). The Lord’s nurture and admonition, opposites in one sense, equally bespeak His agapic love. That love frames and pervades the Christian family, even as it frames and pervades the Christian Church or assembly. 

    Regarding the third element of the household, the slaves, they too shall obey their masters “according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ” (6:5). They should obey their masters “not with eyeservice, as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart” (6:6). In Aristotle’s household, the husband and wife rule the slaves absolutely, aiming at the good not of the slaves but of themselves. (This is why Aristotle may be said to subtly question the moral foundation of slaveholding.) In Paul, slaves obey masters not insofar as the masters are human—human nature as it exists now is no badge of honor, and no measure of justice—but because in doing service “in good will” they serve Christ, indeed imitate Him (6:7). And they do so “knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free” (6:8). This is the equality of master and slave. In ordinary life under the nations’ regimes, slaves are not citizens. But they are citizen-subjects under God’s regime, a kingdom not a tyranny because the Ruler rules for the good of His people.

    What kind of military protection does this regime need? Being a spiritual regime, without physical power on earth, the Church may seem weak. On the contrary, Paul insists. It is strong in the way that it needs to be strong in order to fight the war it must fight. “Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might. Put on the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil.” (6:10-11). This strength, this armor, consists first of wisdom, ‘theoretical’ and practical, second of the moral strength to resist temptation. Both wisdom and moral strength are crucially informed by the Holy Spirit, with whose wisdom and strength Christians can “wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places” (6:12), a struggle they must lose, and were losing, without the Holy Spirit. “Wherefore take unto you the whole armor of God, that you may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand” (6:13). As Stott remarks, “A thorough knowledge of the enemy and a healthy respect for his powers are necessary for victory in war” (58). 

    Paul’s final set of metaphors consists of the armor and weaponry for the spiritual warrior who defends and advances the spiritual regime. His belt is truth; his breastplate is righteousness; his marching boots are “the gospel of peace”; his shield is faith; his helmet is salvation; his sword is “the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God” (6:13-17). The sword of the spirit thus hangs on the truth; righteousness protects his heart; salvation protects his head, which directs the course of the rest of his body. His boots protect his feet, which march in either defensive or offensive operations; since the aim of any war is peace (as Aristotle observes) the Christian war aims at peace, peace on the only terms that can endure, the peace of agapic not erotic love. The shield of faith is “above all” the other accoutrements of battle, as it enables him “to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked” (6:16). Paul puts the defense of the faith above its advancement, although he was himself perhaps the most effective evangelist the Church has seen; he doesn’t want to extend the range of Christ’s regime at the expense of allowing it to rot from within. Hence his epistles to the several Christian churches.

    What action does Christian warfare consist of? Prayer and vigilance: Christians should be “praying always with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance and supplication for all saints” —with guidance from God and care for all members of God’s city. What role will Paul play in this war? As God’s ambassador: He shall “open my mouth boldly, to make known the mystery of the gospel,” its witness to Gentiles as well as Jews; even in the prison, “I am an ambassador in bonds,” an ambassador who, unlike other ambassadors, stays in one place and speaks not ‘diplomatically’ but “boldly, as I ought to speak” (6:19-20). He is an ambassador who appoints his own ambassador, who is not imprisoned but free to travel to Ephesus, so that “you may know our affairs, and that he might comfort your hearts” (6:22), showing them how Paul bears witness to the Gospel even as he sits in a jail of the Roman regime. The epistle itself shows that, too.

    Paul ends with a blessing. He wishes peace to his brothers in the Christian family. He extends agapic love and faith to them, as well. This peace and this love are from “God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ” (6:23). This peace, and not any peace, is the aim of Christian warfare. To peace and love with faith he adds the wish for the grace of God for all those who “love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity” (6:24). Just as agapic love must be protected by the shield of faith, that love itself must be real, not feigned, in a spiritual regime, a regime not satisfied with mere outward compliance with its laws.

    Paul thus contributes to the founding of the Christian regime in Ephesus and, by extension, anywhere. He identifies its Ruler; he describes its way of life; he discusses its purpose. Of the four elements of a regime identified by Aristotle, he takes little note of the regime’s form or structure, its ruling institutions, although he does list the functions of its several officers, including his own. The unique character of this regime is its spirituality. It does not fight physical wars. It exists within other regimes, threatening them in challenging their spiritual foundations. With regard to those other regimes, the Christian founding is at once the least threatening and the most dangerous of all foundings. It in no way resists the physical power of those regimes, posing no military threat, no threat of domestic insurrection. It does resist—more threatens—their underlying claims on the human soul.

     

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

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