John Rawls: Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
Elizabeth H. Wolgast: “The Demands of Public Reason.” Columbia Law Review. Volume 94, Number 6 (October 1994), 1936-1949.
John Rawls distinguishes public discourse—in which the only legitimate appeals are to be consonant with the overlapping consensus of what’s held to be reasonable—from private discourse—discussion among family members, friends, and other groups that do not represent the public at large. Private discourse may rightly include appeals to ultimate ends and comprehensive doctrines not shared by the general public. Public-discourse appeals, by contrast, must be stated in rational terms, terms by nature open to public inspection in the sense that they presuppose no special revelation or exclusive knowledge. Democratic discourse must be rigorously exoteric.
In her lucid critique, Elizabeth H. Wolgast raises a concern that Rawls also sees. Does democratic public discourse as Rawls defines it not yield a sort of forced Averroism? The “demands of public reason” seem to require an unnatural or even hypocritical separation of “the values leading to one’s position from the public argument given for them. How, one asks, can a person’s responsibilities as a citizen require this?” (1939)
It’s clear, I take it, that it is often prudent to argue in the manner Rawls commends. If I am a Hindu and you are an evangelical Christian, I cannot persuade you to ban meat eating by appealing to the doctrine of reincarnation. I will need to say something consistent with your principles as well as mine. Vegetarianism will solve many public health problems (I might argue); it will end much cruel treatment of animals; it will help to save the ozone layer from dangerous bovine omissions. Et cetera. Wolgast concedes this point: “Rawls’s proposal does reflect the real world of public debate,” in which “a wise citizen often will refrain from invoking parochial religious and moral values… in order to maintain communication with and even persuade someone who holds different views” (1948). But neither Rawls nor Wolgast can rest content with prudence. Rawls wants a ‘freestanding’ political argument that has the same legal features as Kantian morality and politics (without the need publicly to invoke Kantian morality and politics). Wolgast seems morally and politically dissatisfied with Rawlsian liberalism, claiming that without moral integrity the public sphere will break down, undermining the stability of the overlapping consensus of rational public discourse. Toleration of opposing views is at most a feature of democratic praxis, but it can have no rational foundation in a theoretical sense.
I shall focus on Wolgast’s concerns about “personal integrity in debate” (1941). She asserts that “the representative who recasts his objections to conform to public reason… argues with less than maximum force” (1943). That is, the integrity of the argument is compromised inasmuch as the speaker cannot fully integrate all of his objections into one coherent statement. She also asserts that such a representative “speaks disingenuously”; his personal integrity is also compromised (1943). I shall argue that Rawls’s argument can be defended from this two-pronged criticism on principled as well as on the above-mentioned prudential grounds, without conceding that prudence itself stands as a central moral virtue in politics.
Wolgast gives the example of a Congressman who is a Christian Scientist. Under the Rawlsian regime he is stymied from objecting to a public inoculation program on religious grounds. He must argue not that inoculation is against the law of God but that inoculation violates his First Amendment right of free exercise of religion. “Framed in this cooler, more legalistic way, some of [the argument’s] power has been lost” (1943).
Not necessarily. Some of the passion has been lost but, given the fact that few people share that passion, the only persuasive power that seems lost is the inability to rally believers. Even this power has not been lost; the Congressman can rally his co-religionists in communications to them, without violating the rules of public discourse. Further, Wolgast does not show that there exists any principled civic obligation to encourage a citizen to maximize the rhetorical effectiveness of his argument. To rule out publicly unreasonable arguments does not necessarily “vitiate just the kind of open and rational atmosphere that Rawls, among others, identifies with liberal society” (1942). To the contrary, it may make such a society practicable by cooling passions and forcing each citizen to think about others outside his own group.
Wolgast also claims that “the religious argument [against inoculation] raises the First Amendment issue in its full power and necessity, refreshing one’s sense of its importance, while the other does not” (1943). Again, not necessarily. The Congressman can paint an attractive and affecting picture of life according to the precepts of Christian Science in terms consistent with the overlapping consensus. He can appeal to citizens’ sympathy for the underdog, saying, ‘Do not compel us to compromise our religion, for your religion might be the next one on the chopping block.’ The “full power and necessity” of the First Amendment lies there, else it never would have made it into the Constitution in the first place. To defend free religious exercise one need not absolutize it. Religious absolutists may drift away from modern republicanism, toward theocracy.
With respect to the integrity of the Congressman himself, Wolgast argues that a Christian Scientist who makes appeals not based on Christian-Science doctrines speaks “disingenuously” (1943). “[I]t is dishonest to misrepresent our reasons for a view” (1944); dishonesty undermines public discourse itself by concealing true intentions, harboring secret doctrines.
It would indeed be dishonest to misrepresent one’s reasons for a view. But there is no reason why a Rawlsian citizen would need to do so. An openly Christian-Science Congressman would not be misrepresenting his views at all if he argued against inoculation on public health grounds, if he sincerely believed that inoculations are medically unnecessary or harmful. Nor would he misrepresent his view if he hung his argumentative hat on the First Amendment. He could simply say: ‘I personally am opposed to inoculation first of all on religious grounds, but I recognize that most of my fellow citizens do not stand with me on those grounds. I hold that they should oppose inoculation on public-health and Constitutional grounds.’ It is precisely an instance of integrity to admit personal reasons for advocating a given policy and then to argue in terms that others can accept as well, if you also believe in those terms.
“Who,” Wolgast asks, “being persuaded to a position by his moral and religious values, would not believe that these values have the greatest persuasive power and thus greater power for change?” (1944) No one, I reply, except two types of people: those who assume that the “values” that resonate most powerfully with themselves necessarily resonate most powerfully with everyone else; and those who are convinced that such values, once stated and defended, can and will persuade most people. The first type of person makes an unreasonable assumption that will quickly yield to real-world experiential refutation, if only in the form of ending the Congressman’s career. The second type of person will not be precluded from making ‘conversion’ arguments under the Rawlsian regime, so long as he does not make them in public policy debates. In a Rawlsian republic, the Reverend Billy Graham could still bring his crusade to Madison Square Garden and a television near you. If he converted a workable majority of any political community to his views, many of these would then become part of the overlapping consensus. Rawls makes this point in Chapter 6, where he cites Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, with its invocation of Biblical themes. “Lincoln does not violate public reason as I have discussed and as it applied in his day—whether in ours is another matter—since what he says has no implications bearing on constitutional essentials or basic justice” (254). This implies that the overlapping consensus, the sphere of public reason, is open to change as demographics and private convictions shift. What was reasonable in 1865 is not necessarily reasonable in 1997. Increasing secularization—or the reverse—can occur in civil society before it is expressed in public discourse. The overlapping consensus isn’t an unchanging quasi-Platonic essence but a matter of circumstance, given the existence of the intermediate, third ‘sphere,’ civil society.
What about Wolgast’s hard case, that of the challenging the modern republican regime itself? The regime could not, on Rawlsian grounds, be challenged immediately in public discourse. But it could surely be challenged in private and civil-society discourse. If fundamentalist Islam swept through American civil society—as it could do, given the First Amendment—and in the year 2065 there came to be the same percentage of Muslims as there were Christians in 1865, why could some new Lincoln not appeal to Islamic themes in public discourse? More radically, if the citizens were by then convinced that republicanism is an unreasonable regime, given these new terms of public discourse, why could they not introduce new modes and orders, ending republicanism altogether? This would run afoul of Rawls’s neo-Kantianism, but that is a moral not a political theory. Rawlsian liberalism is thus indirectly open to change, even to its own replacement by consensual means.
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