Will Morrisey Reviews

Book reviews and articles on political philosophy and literature.

  • Home
  • Reviews
    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
  • Contents
  • About
  • Books

Recent Posts

  • Orthodox Christianity: Manifestations of God
  • Orthodox Christianity: Is Mysticism a Higher Form of Rationality?
  • The French Malaise
  • Chateaubriand in Jerusalem
  • Chateaubriand’s Voyage toward Jerusalem

Recent Comments

    Archives

    • June 2025
    • May 2025
    • April 2025
    • March 2025
    • February 2025
    • January 2025
    • December 2024
    • November 2024
    • October 2024
    • September 2024
    • August 2024
    • July 2024
    • June 2024
    • May 2024
    • April 2024
    • March 2024
    • February 2024
    • January 2024
    • December 2023
    • November 2023
    • October 2023
    • September 2023
    • August 2023
    • July 2023
    • June 2023
    • May 2023
    • April 2023
    • March 2023
    • February 2023
    • January 2023
    • December 2022
    • November 2022
    • October 2022
    • September 2022
    • August 2022
    • July 2022
    • June 2022
    • May 2022
    • April 2022
    • March 2022
    • February 2022
    • January 2022
    • December 2021
    • November 2021
    • October 2021
    • September 2021
    • August 2021
    • July 2021
    • June 2021
    • May 2021
    • April 2021
    • March 2021
    • February 2021
    • January 2021
    • December 2020
    • November 2020
    • October 2020
    • September 2020
    • August 2020
    • July 2020
    • June 2020
    • May 2020
    • April 2020
    • March 2020
    • February 2020
    • January 2020
    • December 2019
    • November 2019
    • October 2019
    • September 2019
    • August 2019
    • July 2019
    • June 2019
    • May 2019
    • April 2019
    • March 2019
    • February 2019
    • January 2019
    • December 2018
    • November 2018
    • October 2018
    • September 2018
    • August 2018
    • July 2018
    • June 2018
    • May 2018
    • April 2018
    • March 2018
    • February 2018
    • January 2018
    • December 2017
    • November 2017
    • September 2017
    • August 2017
    • July 2017
    • June 2017
    • May 2017
    • April 2017
    • March 2017
    • February 2017
    • January 2017
    • December 2016
    • November 2016
    • September 2016
    • August 2016
    • July 2016
    • June 2016
    • April 2016
    • March 2016
    • February 2016
    • January 2016

    Categories

    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
    • Uncategorized

    Meta

    • Log in
    • Entries feed
    • Comments feed
    • WordPress.org

    Powered by Genesis

    Archives for April 2018

    A Question of Integrity: Wolgast’s Critique of Rawls

    April 11, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    John Rawls: Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

    Elizabeth H. Wolgast: “The Demands of Public Reason.” Columbia Law Review. Volume 94, Number 6 (October 1994), 1936-1949.

     

    John Rawls distinguishes public discourse—in which the only legitimate appeals are to be consonant with the overlapping consensus of what’s held to be reasonable—from private discourse—discussion among family members, friends, and other groups that do not represent the public at large. Private discourse may rightly include appeals to ultimate ends and comprehensive doctrines not shared by the general public. Public-discourse appeals, by contrast, must be stated in rational terms, terms by nature open to public inspection in the sense that they presuppose no special revelation or exclusive knowledge. Democratic discourse must be rigorously exoteric.

    In her lucid critique, Elizabeth H. Wolgast raises a concern that Rawls also sees. Does democratic public discourse as Rawls defines it not yield a sort of forced Averroism? The “demands of public reason” seem to require an unnatural or even hypocritical separation of “the values leading to one’s position from the public argument given for them. How, one asks, can a person’s responsibilities as a citizen require this?” (1939)

    It’s clear, I take it, that it is often prudent to argue in the manner Rawls commends. If I am a Hindu and you are an evangelical Christian, I cannot persuade you to ban meat eating by appealing to the doctrine of reincarnation. I will need to say something consistent with your principles as well as mine. Vegetarianism will solve many public health problems (I might argue); it will end much cruel treatment of animals; it will help to save the ozone layer from dangerous bovine omissions. Et cetera. Wolgast concedes this point: “Rawls’s proposal does reflect the real world of public debate,” in which “a wise citizen often will refrain from invoking parochial religious and moral values… in order to maintain communication with and even persuade someone who holds different views” (1948). But neither Rawls nor Wolgast can rest content with prudence. Rawls wants a ‘freestanding’ political argument that has the same legal features as Kantian morality and politics (without the need publicly to invoke Kantian morality and politics). Wolgast seems morally and politically dissatisfied with Rawlsian liberalism, claiming that without moral integrity the public sphere will break down, undermining the stability of the overlapping consensus of rational public discourse. Toleration of opposing views is at most a feature of democratic praxis, but it can have no rational foundation in a theoretical sense.

    I shall focus on Wolgast’s concerns about “personal integrity in debate” (1941). She asserts that “the representative who recasts his objections to conform to public reason… argues with less than maximum force” (1943). That is, the integrity of the argument is compromised inasmuch as the speaker cannot fully integrate all of his objections into one coherent statement. She also asserts that such a representative “speaks disingenuously”; his personal integrity is also compromised (1943). I shall argue that Rawls’s argument can be defended from this two-pronged criticism on principled as well as on the above-mentioned prudential grounds, without conceding that prudence itself stands as a central moral virtue in politics.

    Wolgast gives the example of a Congressman who is a Christian Scientist. Under the Rawlsian regime he is stymied from objecting to a public inoculation program on religious grounds. He must argue not that inoculation is against the law of God but that inoculation violates his First Amendment right of free exercise of religion. “Framed in this cooler, more legalistic way, some of [the argument’s] power has been lost” (1943).

    Not necessarily. Some of the passion has been lost but, given the fact that few people share that passion, the only persuasive power that seems lost is the inability to rally believers. Even this power has not been lost; the Congressman can rally his co-religionists in communications to them, without violating the rules of public discourse. Further, Wolgast does not show that there exists any principled civic obligation to encourage a citizen to maximize the rhetorical effectiveness of his argument. To rule out publicly unreasonable arguments does not necessarily “vitiate just the kind of open and rational atmosphere that Rawls, among others, identifies with liberal society” (1942). To the contrary, it may make such a society practicable by cooling passions and forcing each citizen to think about others outside his own group.

    Wolgast also claims that “the religious argument [against inoculation] raises the First Amendment issue in its full power and necessity, refreshing one’s sense of its importance, while the other does not” (1943). Again, not necessarily. The Congressman can paint an attractive and affecting picture of life according to the precepts of Christian Science in terms consistent with the overlapping consensus. He can appeal to citizens’ sympathy for the underdog, saying, ‘Do not compel us to compromise our religion, for your religion might be the next one on the chopping block.’ The “full power and necessity” of the First Amendment lies there, else it never would have made it into the Constitution in the first place. To defend free religious exercise one need not absolutize it. Religious absolutists may drift away from modern republicanism, toward theocracy.

    With respect to the integrity of the Congressman himself, Wolgast argues that a Christian Scientist who makes appeals not based on Christian-Science doctrines speaks “disingenuously” (1943). “[I]t is dishonest to misrepresent our reasons for a view” (1944); dishonesty undermines public discourse itself by concealing true intentions, harboring secret doctrines.

    It would indeed be dishonest to misrepresent one’s reasons for a view. But there is no reason why a Rawlsian citizen would need to do so. An openly Christian-Science Congressman would not be misrepresenting his views at all if he argued against inoculation on public health grounds, if he sincerely believed that inoculations are medically unnecessary or harmful. Nor would he misrepresent his view if he hung his argumentative hat on the First Amendment. He could simply say: ‘I personally am opposed to inoculation first of all on religious grounds, but I recognize that most of my fellow citizens do not stand with me on those grounds. I hold that they should oppose inoculation on public-health and Constitutional grounds.’ It is precisely an instance of integrity to admit personal reasons for advocating a given policy and then to argue in terms that others can accept as well, if you also believe in those terms.

    “Who,” Wolgast asks, “being persuaded to a position by his moral and religious values, would not believe that these values have the greatest persuasive power and thus greater power for change?” (1944) No one, I reply, except two types of people: those who assume that the “values” that resonate most powerfully with themselves necessarily resonate most powerfully with everyone else; and those who are convinced that such values, once stated and defended, can and will persuade most people. The first type of person makes an unreasonable assumption that will quickly yield to real-world experiential refutation, if only in the form of ending the Congressman’s career. The second type of person will not be precluded from making ‘conversion’ arguments under the Rawlsian regime, so long as he does not make them in public policy debates. In a Rawlsian republic, the Reverend Billy Graham could still bring his crusade to Madison Square Garden and a television near you. If he converted a workable majority of any political community to his views, many of these would then become part of the overlapping consensus. Rawls makes this point in Chapter 6, where he cites Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, with its invocation of Biblical themes. “Lincoln does not violate public reason as I have discussed and as it applied in his day—whether in ours is another matter—since what he says has no implications bearing on constitutional essentials or basic justice” (254). This implies that the overlapping consensus, the sphere of public reason, is open to change as demographics and private convictions shift. What was reasonable in 1865 is not necessarily reasonable in 1997. Increasing secularization—or the reverse—can occur in civil society before it is expressed in public discourse. The overlapping consensus isn’t an unchanging quasi-Platonic essence but a matter of circumstance, given the existence of the intermediate, third ‘sphere,’ civil society.

    What about Wolgast’s hard case, that of the challenging the modern republican regime itself? The regime could not, on Rawlsian grounds, be challenged immediately in public discourse. But it could surely be challenged in private and civil-society discourse. If fundamentalist Islam swept through American civil society—as it could do, given the First Amendment—and in the year 2065 there came to be the same percentage of Muslims as there were Christians in 1865, why could some new Lincoln not appeal to Islamic themes in public discourse? More radically, if the citizens were by then convinced that republicanism is an unreasonable regime, given these new terms of public discourse, why could they not introduce new modes and orders, ending republicanism altogether? This would run afoul of Rawls’s neo-Kantianism, but that is a moral not a political theory. Rawlsian liberalism is thus indirectly open to change, even to its own replacement by consensual means.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Derrida and ‘Deconstruction’

    April 11, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Jacques Derrida: “History of the Lie.” In Without Alibi. Peggy Kamuf translation. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

    Hannah Arendt: “Lying in Politics.” In Crises of the Republic. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1972.

     

    Derrida wants to defend ‘deconstructionism’ from Plato, lurking in the guise of Hannah Arendt. But, for political purposes, he also wants to be able to say, ‘J’Accuse!’ from time to time. This is a dilemma.

    The sophists and rhetoricians of antiquity did not find this to be (how-you-say?) problematic until Socrates came along and spoiled the party. Now that Socrates has come along, his spirit lingering despite his execution, he pesters word-manipulators and world-manipulators like, well, a gadfly. Not Athenian poison, not Machiavellian stilettos, not the heavy artillery of Hegel or Nietzschean firebombs can quite transport the old boy’s shade to the Blessed Isles.

    Derrida wants to historicize, first, the concept of lying—contrast it with non-Western traditions—and, second lying itself—its genesis and peregrinations within the Western tradition. Together, these historicizations will amount to “a true history” of the lie, for which his essay will serve as prolegomena. This may of course turn out to be an unfinished work.

    He discusses Arendt, who discusses a new kind of lie, “the absolute lie,” the lie used deliberately to erase and replace what everyone knows to be true. ‘Image’ no longer refers to ‘Original’ but destroys and replaces it like a Social-Darwinian survivalist. Derrida worries that the Absolute Lie might merely shadow Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, and be equally vulnerable to Nietzschean ripostes.

    On the other side, Arendt also discusses the Kantian absolute—not cognitive but moral—never to lie. The truth is “the trace of fugitive gods,” original and sacred. A lie is always harmful, polluting the spring of right, ruining the social bond. Lying is not universalizable (if you want society—a point Kant elides, in his attempt to dump teleology). Derrida, with Arendt, prefers not to be so severe.

    Getting down to cases, Derrida looks at France’s then-president Jacques Chirac’s public acknowledgment of French guilt for the deportation of Jews under the Vichy regime. Derrida rightly sees that Charles de Gaulle, in studiously ignoring this French crime, refused to recognize the Vichy regime as genuinely French. (To be sure, it was headed by no less a French hero than Marshall Pétain, de Gaulle’s former mentor, but it was forced upon France by the Nazi conquerors.) In light of this, who is lying? De Gaulle or Chirac? Derrida makes a Socratic move by means of a French proverb: “It is not good to tell every truth.” Truth-telling is not always good because the knowledge of the truth may in some circumstances dispirit citizens, make them incapable of getting on with their lives in a none-too-friendly world, a world that might use not ideas but truth itself as a weapon, injuriously. This means that truth-telling is not always good. It may also mean that the truth itself is not always good—that, contra Nietzsche, Socrates is neither a nihilist nor an optimist. Derrida wants an idea of the good, but as a historicist he knows no stable one, and as a deconstructionist he wants no such stable good to await us at ‘the end of History.’ Therefore, he is forced, reluctantly, to treat what he calls “performative truths—conventions settled by force—as truths simply, rather than as facts. With no real idea of nature, much less of natural right, for Derrida conventions become more formidable. By what can one call for their change? And was not the Vichy regime a “performative truth,” as long as the Nazis made it so?

    (Before leaving this topic, Derrida makes the eminently Socratic (and also Hegelian) point that the city risks “perverting” the truth into “dogmatism or orthodoxy.” Now there is a legitimate target for deconstructionists: but only in the sense that the city is perverse and not necessarily in the sense that the city necessarily lies. Again, Derrida offers no transhistorical—and, therefore, no genuinely transconventional criterion with which to criticize conventions. Is he left with the triumph of the will, as is Nietzsche? Or must he wait for Godot, at some Heideggerian station?)

    Derrida’s next move is to settle a score with his critic, Tony Judt. He may be said to be motivated by the Socratic quest for justice, although, unlike Socrates, he is demanding justice for himself, and, also unlike Socrates, he can point to no stable definition of justice. Judt had accused Sartre, Foucault, and Derrida himself of failing to protest against the longtime ‘ignoring’ of Vichy’s crimes by subsequent French authorities. Calumny! Derrida charges. He had signed a petition in 1992 calling upon then-president Mitterand to come clean. Judt stands convicted not of lying but of another kind of moral failure: lack of assiduousness in seeking the truth. This failure is related to self-deception, so-called, which rests on an unconscious aversion to the truth. Judt’s soul is insufficiently—or at least inadequately—erotic, Socrates would say.

    Thus Derrida suggests, both that truth-telling is not always good, and that truth-telling about Derrida is. He holds journalists not to higher standards than politicians, but to more rigorously factual ones. How, then, can deconstructionism give a history of veracity and the lie without collapsing the distinction between them?

    He begins (as Arendt did, years before) with a consideration of modern tyranny or ‘totalitarianism.’ Totalitarianism (as Dostoevsky foresaw) is utilitarianism or pragmatism absolutized. Totalitarians use ideas as weapons, call upon us not to understand the world but to change it. (Thus Derrida silently rejects the core of Marxism, while applauding, later on, Marx’s critique of ‘ideology.’) Derrida evidently sees that ‘deconstructive’ techniques might easily serve a ‘totalizing’ agenda, and that’s one ‘prolegomena’ he’d rather not see written. Similarly, Nietzsche sees that the bland demi-relativism or soft nihilism of late nineteenth-century Europe might easily be kayoed by some forthright nihilism, itself the prelude to some ‘totalizing’ superman. Derrida differs honorably from Nietzsche in not licking his chops at this prospect. “Ethical, juridical, or political responsibility, if they exist [!], consists in deciding on the strategic orientation to give in this problematic….” (emphasis added). It sure does. It even burdens ‘totalizing’ tyrants with the problem Arendt sees: You can’t utterly reconstruct the world without deceiving everybody, at lest initially. So how will you keep your story straight?

    Insofar as he acknowledges the need for an orientation (strategic or otherwise), Derrida rediscovers a Platonic thought. The remedy for the Absolute Lie cannot be the Absolute Truth. Given the inevitable dogmatization of Absolute Truth in politics, a ‘totally’ transparent society would leave no place to hide. (Unless the philosophers were kings, in which case they could hide behind the purple, in the Nocturnal Council. This is a highly unlikely outcome.) Derrida very sensibly objects to Alexandre Koyré’s lumping-together of the Marranos with Spartan and Indian warriors, and with Jesuit warriors-of-the-Spirit. The transparent society, perhaps in contrast with the ‘open society,’ would make the self-defense of the heterodox impossible.

    In order to vindicate the truth, one should not expand the political realm but delimit it. In this enterprise Derrida holds the solitary philosopher on the one hand and (following Arendt) such institutions as the judiciary and the universities on the other. Judging from his occasional hints, he knows very well that these institutions cannot be apolitical, and that even the solitary philosopher must understand politics well enough to know how to govern his solitude (and perhaps his dialogues, with philosophers living and dead).

    For all his (somewhat surreptitious) Platonizing, Derrida wants to hold onto his anti-Platonic ontology. As a historicist, Derrida denies the stability of truth. To believe in the stability of truth is to be too optimistic, he writes, following Nietzsche. To believe in the stability of truth “makes of history, as history of the lie, the epidermic and epiphenomenal accident of a parousia of truth.” But (in truth) Plato never makes much of “history.” History, in the sense of a pattern of events rather than an account of events, does not exist in Plato. Plato makes myths, not histories. Further, if lies are as enduring as Derrida says (and maybe they are), might that not mean that they track the truth, like a shadow, and thus bespeak the stability of truth? Or, alternatively, might such perdurable lies not have some truth mixed in with them—and therefore not be lies at all, but myths or fables? Without examples, it is hard to judge.

    Well, after all, it’s only a draft of a prolegomena to a history of the lie. I solemnly swear not to treat Derrida as Tony Judt does, or to behave like a captious book reviewer who complains that a 400-page book doesn’t tell ‘the whole truth.’ Surely ‘the whole truth’s’ very wholeness suggests limits? Truth may be ‘tyrannical’ in the sense that it dictates to us, telling us that such-and-such is so, like it or not. But it cannot be ‘totalitarian’—else there would be no need for the notion—of truth, of totalitarianism, or of any other notions, which after all require definition.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    What Does Not Kill Schell’s Argument Makes It Stronger

    April 11, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Jonathan Schell: The Time of Illusion: An Historical and Reflective Account of the Nixon Era. New York: Vintage Books, 1975.

     

    Upon being told that an unadmired acquaintance was a self-made man, Oscar Levant asked, “Who else would have helped?” This is the dilemma of Machiavelli’s prince: Having created a world of effectual truth, with yourself as its god, how do you know you didn’t botch the job? And if you did, will your confederates help you to recoup, or leave you to twist in the wind? Jonathan Schell’s book provides an American object lesson on a Machiavellian moment, the self-construction and deconstruction of Richard Nixon.

    Given its publication almost immediately after the much-encouraged retirement of our Puritan Alcibiades, The Time of Illusion is remarkably penetrating. But it also bears the marks of the heated political atmosphere of the time, and some of the niaiseries one expects from a staff writer for The New Yorker. The argument can now be strengthened in the revisiting, decades later.

    Problem: As Machiavelli sees, you can’t be an executive unless you can execute, in the several senses of that word. In a government with an extensive bureaucracy (in America, the post-New Deal government), how can any chief executive actually govern his own branch of government? The much-remarked Nixonian feelings of impotence, persecution, etc. had a real structural foundation. The even more-remarked Nixonian tactics of evasion and deception have the same foundation—or rather, the foundation lends itself to those tactics, practices them itself and invites their practice in others, as countermeasures. To the maxim ‘Tory men, liberal measures’ Nixon added McLuhanite (or pop-Machiavellian) means. Nixon wanted simultaneously to remedy, and to take advantage of, the statist labyrinth—rein in Leviathan and to retreat into its belly.

    As far as I can tell, in extreme cases Nixonian problems are only soluble by the route actually taken: Congressional investigation, threat of impeachment. This is a messy and exhausting process, but that’s self-government for you. The Whigs were right: Democracy and distrust go together. Democrats are supposed to harbor “a mistrust of all politicians” (317). When new, technical means of communication—and therefore of deception—are invented, citizens had better figure out how to abuse them, the better to guard themselves from abuse.

    My sermon finished, I turn to a critique of Schell. Generally, I think he wants to center his critique on nuclear-weapons issues, but a better center would be the problem of statism. It’s the elephant, not the duck. Many of my criticisms are trivial and pedantic, but mildly interesting nonetheless.

    1. Schell could not have had much practical political experience at the time he wrote this book. Example: his hand-wringing over Nixon staffers’ practice of writing letters-to-the-editor in support of administration policies, and having party loyalists sign them and mail them in. This is a longstanding gimmick on all levels of politics. Back in the days when I was paid to do it in Monmouth County, New Jersey, I often wondered who my counterpart on the other side was. Similarly, in deploring Nixon’s attempt to “load the world itself with events that would induce the Democrats turn against one another,” one can only ask: Did Schell ever hear of the New Deal? As his admiring biographer James Macgregor Burns remarked, FDR was a fox as well as a lion. Maybe more fox than lion.

    2. Schell writes eloquently about the Constitution, but he doesn’t understand its basis. He refers casually, and incorrectly, to “the sovereignty of the federal government” (133). Notwithstanding the famous New Yorker ‘view of the world,’ even Manhattan is not an outpost of the European state system. James Monroe had it right in his book title: The People, The Sovereigns. Similarly, Schell mis-teaches his readers that “rights are granted to the people, to protect them against abuse of government powers” (157). The Hell they are. Rights are inherent in the people, individually and collectively, then secured by the grantees (or so they hope) when they institute government. Government contradicts its own purpose when it violates those unalienable rights: thus the Americans’ charge that King George III was ‘revolutionizing’ them. Schell wants to be a good Whig, but he doesn’t know how.

    3. Schell can’t quite make up his mind on who ‘the people’ are. Were anti-war demonstrators “the nation” (101)? The majority thereof? A harmless is vocal minority that should never have disturbed Lincoln-bedroom dreams? How unpopular was the Vietnam War when Nixon took office? I understand Schell’s reluctance to sully his prose with polling data, and I know he would regard any such data as compromised by the systematic deceptions of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, but some sort of effort needs to be made.

    4. Schell frequently claims that this or that Nixonian depredation was unprecedented, extraordinary, remarkable, well-nigh sui generis. I would be interested to know if this is true. I rather suspect that the president’s men perfected techniques not unknown to previous Washington pols. One minor example: After an Australian émigré named Dr. Fred Schwarz established a right-wing organization called the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, New Yorker foreign policy hero Senator J. William Fulbright had the Internal Revenue Service audit the books. (They found no improprieties.) Tsk, tsk, Senator ‘Arrogance of Power.’ I am not sure that Washingtonians had the right to be shocked, simply shocked, that wiretapping was going on in this place. Senator Barry Goldwater—a tolerably honest pol, if no genius—probably spoke the truth about that.

    5. Similarly Schell sometimes writes as if ‘public relations’ had been invented by Nixon in collaboration with Pat Buchanan. Walter Lippmann knew otherwise.

    6. As for Nixon’s statement, “the press is the enemy” (55)—well, wasn’t it? How many New Yorker staffers joined in chanting “Nixon’s the One”? No Silent Majoritarians in William Shawn’s shop, I’ll wager. A good example of a fairly typical press-politics tactic may be seen on page 185, where Schell calls attention “once again” to “the affinity of the right-wing strategists in the White House with the left-wing fringe on the streets” (emphasis added). This equation puts New Yorker-ites comfortably in the center of the ideological Downs curve. No such luck!

    7. Schell is at his weakest when considering foreign and military policy. He makes Henry Wallace look like a hard-nosed realist. The “linkage” doctrine of the Nixon administration (196) is nothing other than Mackiinder’s geopolitics—a commonplace among U. S. policymakers by 1945, as it had been among the Soviets two decades earlier (and ever after), the Germans throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the British, the French, and pretty much everyone else. The world, Mackinder sees, is a single system; the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone. While this has always been true geographically, as of the turn of the twentieth century it had become true politically, as well, thanks to transportation and communication technologies along with modern techniques of political organization.

    It is not enough to talk about the motif of nationalism as if it were an alternative to Mackinderian ideas. What is nationalism without foreigners with imperial designs” The world is not a duck. It’s not an elephant. It’s a flying elephant, a vast Dumbo, alternatively soaring awkwardly in the internationalist/globalist empyrean and thudding to the ground of soil and blood. In the event, the Soviets did exploit U. S. disarray in the 1970s, seeing it as providing an opportunity to push ahead in the Third World—where, like the Americans, they appealed to nationalism and their political doctrines. (A lot of good it did them, but that’s another story.)

    What is more, ‘communism’ and ‘democracy’ made two competing claims to nationalism. Democrats said: You can’t have national self-determination without representative government that enables the nation to make determinations. Communists said: Bah! bourgeois democracy is nothing but a superstructural con-game; only the proletarian vanguard can express the will of the nation. In Vietnam, too, many of the people mistakenly concurred with the communists’ line. Elsewhere, they didn’t. Generally speaking, “linkage” was right. Johnson and Nixon failed to see how to apply the doctrine intelligently.

    8. Schell makes some unfathomable objections to Nixon’s carrot-and-stick tactic against foreign rivals, calling them contradictory (327 and elsewhere). Well, yes, a carrot is a reward and a stick is a punishment. To use both is not to contradict oneself; it is to recognize the variety of human motives.

    9. On nuclear-weapons issues, it is nonsense to imagine that Nixon’s policies brought “the entire world… repeatedly… to the verge of war” (343). Americans and Soviets came fairly close to war in 1962, during the Kennedy Administration—de Gaulle rightly refused to be overly impressed by the posturing, during and after the event—and that was about it. The rest in my estimation was nukes-rattling, for foreign and domestic consumption.

    One of the peculiarities of the nuclear arms race with respect to issues of deception may be seen rather in the rhetoric concerning arms build-ups throughout that era. Both sides had a stake in deliberately playing to, and augmenting, the fears of the American public. Because the weapons procurement process is long-drawn-out, the ‘Right’ periodically would warn about missile gaps and present dangers—which were really future dangers, when they were dangers. For  its part, the ‘Left’ tried to frighten people with the Armageddon which was always just around the corner. Both sides were fighting over their share of scarce resources in the New-Deal state. Once the Cold War gave them no cover, the battle shifted to tax cuts on the Center-Right and politics-of-compassion on the Center-Left. Scare tacticians have shifted their focus to the wallet and the child.

    Subtract these errors and misjudgments, and Schell still has an unanswerable case against Nixon. Fewer distractions.

    Filed Under: American Politics

    • « Previous Page
    • 1
    • …
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5
    • 6
    • 7
    • …
    • 9
    • Next Page »