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    Xi Jinping on the Preeminence of the Chinese Communist Party

    by

    Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. Volume III. October 2017-January 2020. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2020.

    Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. Volume IV. February 2020-May 2022. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2022.

     

    Having set down the fundamental principles and practices of his ideology as enunciated in speeches and other documents in the first four years of his rule, Xi elaborates on those principles and practices in statements issued during the subsequent three years, with emphasis on the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese regime. [1] He is especially vigilant with regard to possible sources of intra-Chinese opposition to Party rule, whether they might issue from the provinces, the military, or from ideological deviationists within the Party itself. In doing so, he must navigate the changes in policy the Party itself has implemented during its now hundred-year history, since those changes might themselves provoke charges of deviationism from the tenets of Maoism. Admittedly, the Party has led “a major turnaround with far-reaching significance,” the move “from a highly centralized planned economy to a socialist market economy” and from a condition of isolation from the outside world to “one that is open to the outside world in every respect” (Speech at the Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party in China, 7/1/21, iv.6). This notwithstanding, he is careful to remark that “the Party has united the Chinese people and led them in writing the most magnificent chapter in the millennia-long history of the Chinese nation,” thanks to “the concerted efforts of the Chinese Communist, the Chinese people, and the Chinese nation” which has remained faithful to the Party’s “founding mission” and “firm leadership, without which “there would be no new China and no national rejuvenation” (ibid.7-9). “The Party was chosen by history and the people”; its leadership must be upheld and strengthened by “follow[ing] the core leadership of the CPC Central Committee,” “act[ing] in accordance with its requirements” as it continues to follow “the path, theory, system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” thereby “unit[ing] the Chinese people,” whose “fundamental interests” it “has always represented,” having “no special interests of its own” (ibid. 9-10). 

    “Marxism is the fundamental ideology upon which our Party and our country are founded; it is the very soul of our Party and the banner under which it strives” (ibid.11). And rightly so, because “the scientific truth of Marxism-Leninism” provided “a solution to China’s problems” and animates “the capability of our Party and the strengths of socialism with Chinese characteristics are attributable to the fact that Marxism works” (ibid.11,13). Against “the three mountains of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism,” the Party combined communism and nationalism to rejuvenate the country (ibid.15). “Realizing our great dream demands a great project,” namely, “strengthening the Party that is building momentum,” the “Marxist governing Party” that is “the vanguard of the times, the backbone of the nation” (ibid.17). Consonant with this, “our Party—the “highest force for political leadership”—has “continued to uphold dialectical and historical materialism” (ibid.19), combining “the tenets of Marxism with China’s conditions and the outcome of a range of innovations in theory, practice and system” in accordance with “the wisdom of the Party and the people” (Speech to the Second Full Assembly of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 10/31/19, iii.144).

    Regarding the military, it is an “irrefutable truth that [the Party] must command the gun and build a people’s military of its own,” maintaining “the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s armed forces,” taking “comprehensive measures to reinforce the political loyalty of the armed forces” (ibid.12-13). Under that rule, the military will both protect “our socialist country” from foreigners, “preserve national dignity,” and “protect peace in our region and beyond,” inasmuch as “peace, concord and harmony are goals that China has pursued and carried forward for more than 5,000 years,” although (he assures his listeners) “the Chinese nation does not carry aggressive or hegemonic traits in its genes” (ibid.13). Peace, concord and harmony include “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification” as the Party’s “unshakeable commitment,” “tak[ing] resolute action to utterly defeat any move towards ‘Taiwan independence'” (ibid.16). 

    Against any suggestion that such centralized authority might yield tyranny, Xi claims that “a hallmark that distinguishes the Communist Party of China from other political parties is the courage to undertake self-reform,” practicing “effective self-supervision and full and rigorous self-governance” (ibid.15). In an earlier speech, he had affirmed that the “people’s democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class based on an alliance of workers and farmers” assures that “all power of the state belongs to the people” (Speech at the First Session of the 13th National People’s Congress, 3/20/18, iii.168). Now, he asserts that “orderly and law-based” succession of Party leaders proves that “a country’s political system is democratic and effective,” along with law-based governance generally, the expression of public opinion “through open channels,” whether government offices are distributed “by way of fair competition,” and “whether the exercise of power is subject to effective checks and oversight” conducted by the self-governing Party (Speech to the Central Conference on the Work of People’s Congresses, 10/13/21, iv.297). That is, Chinese “democracy” is to “should be judged” by the Chinese people, “not by a handful of meddlesome outsiders” such as international human rights organizations (ibid.298). “There is no uniform or single model of democracy; it comes in many forms,” and it is “undemocratic in itself to measure the world’s diverse political systems against a single criterion” (ibid.298). In China, for example, “the people exercise rights by means of elections and voting,” although of course this means the affirmation of candidates selected by the self-supervising Party (ibid.299). Quoting his predecessor, Deng Xiaoping, “we cannot adopt the practice of the West” since “the greatest advantage of the socialist system is that when the central leadership makes a decision, it is promptly implemented without interference from any other quarters” (ibid.299). Such decisions are always in accordance with the rule of law, inasmuch as “leadership by the CPC is the most fundamental guarantee for socialist rule of law,” a rule that “must benefit and protect” the people because the Party acts as their vanguard, “lead[ing] the people in enacting and enforcing the constitution and the law” (Speech at the first meeting of the Commission for Law-based Governance under the CPC Central Committee, 8/24/18, iii.332-333, 334). “Under no circumstance should we imitate the models and practices of other countries or adopt the Western models of ‘constitutionalism,’ ‘separation of powers,’ and ‘judicial independence'” (ibid.333). If some of this sounds a bit like circular logic, well, “socialist rule of law must uphold CPC leadership, while CPC leadership must rely on socialist rule of law,” a rule in which “leading officials, though small in number, play a key role in implementing the rule of law” (ibid.334, 336). This will lead to “social harmony without lawsuits” and the emphasis of “moral enlightenment over legal punishment”—sometimes called ‘re-education’ (ibid.333). In this, “upholding CPC leadership and socialist rule of law must be the fundamental requirement for legal professionals” (ibid.344). “The Party’s leadership, the people’s position as masters of the country, and law-based governance form an indivisible whole” (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 10/18/17, iii.4).

    Given its huge membership of 89 million and 4.5 million “grassroots organizations,” preserving and developing the Party’s Marxist character “is not easy” (Speech at the Sixth Group Study Session, Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 6/29/18, iii.114). The improvement of “the institutions and mechanisms by which the Party exercises leadership” includes “the reform of the national supervision system,” with “checks and oversight over the exercise of power” by the Central Committee (ibid.5), which will “ensur[e] that the Party exercises overall leadership and coordinates work in all areas” (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, op.cit. iii.74). In appointing officials, for example, the Party will emphasize “political performance,” meaning the willingness to “follow the leadership of the CPC Central Committee and act in accordance with its requirements” with “full confidence in the path, theory, system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” that is, in conformity to Xi Jinping Thought. That thought follows the principle of Mao, who “said that politics meant making more people support us and fewer people oppose us”—the “key to the Party’s success in leading revolution, economic development, and reform” (“Speech at the first meeting of the Commission for Law-based Governance under the CPC Central Committee, op.cit.347). This is what “the sense of responsibility” among Party members means (ibid.347). “The fundamental purpose of strengthening the Party’s organizations is to uphold and improve overall party leadership and provide a strong guarantee for advancing the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics” arming members with “the theoretical weapons of Marxism” and teaching them how to use them in order to “improve our ability to apply theory in practice” (Speech to the 21st group study session of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 6/29/20, iv.581, 583). At times, Xi’s conception of the Party resembles that of a Christian church: “A political party must have faith. For the Communist Party,, this refers to the faith in Marxism, communism and socialism with Chinese characteristics,” fortified by reading “more Marxist classics and classical works on adapting Marxism to the Chinese context,” in order to “truly understand the Marxist stance, viewpoint and methodology, and internalize them so that they uphold faith in Marxism and persevere in pursuing their ideals with strong convictions,” ideals that “should be the beacon of faith for Party officials (Speech to the Second Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/11/18, iii.585-586).

    Xi quotes Lenin: “The proletariat can, and inevitably will, become an invincible force only through its ideological unification on the principles of Marxism being reinforced by the material unity of organization”—a strength, Xi adds, that “no other political party in the world has” (ibid.583, 584). This effort is especially important with the “primary-level Party organizations”—i.e., the ones at the grassroots—which directly oversee the people (ibid.585). “Managing human resources, including officials and talent, is essentially a matter of how to put people to good use” under the system of “democratic centralism,” the “fundamental organizational and leadership principle of our Party” (ibid.587). Taking “strong action to transform lax and weak governance over the Party” by “follow[ing] the core leadership of the CPC Central Committee,” its authority and “centralized, unified leadership” by “tighten[ing] political discipline and rules” will “ensure that political responsibility for governance over the Party is fulfilled at every level of the party organization” within a strong “cage of institutions” (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, op.cit.iii.8,9). Thus, “we will continue to strengthen the Party’s ability to cleanse, improve, and reform itself, and forever maintain its close ties with the people” (ibid.iii.27). This will combat formalism and bureaucratism (“the obsession with official posts and power”) within the Party (Speech to Commission for Discipline Inspection at the Third Plenary Session of the CPC of the Central Commission, 1/11/19, iii.581, 582). There are, he warns, “cliques bound together by political and economic interests attempting to usurp Party and state power” practicing “unauthorized activities fanned by factionalism that sabotage the Party’s centralized and unified leadership” (ibid.587). Only if the Party can “cleanse itself’ of such elements, terminating their activities, can China “break the cycle of rise and fall,” by which he means the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties seen throughout the country’s history (ibid.592).

    “No matter what kind of work they do and how high their rank” Chinese Communists “are first and foremost Party members” whose “primary duty is to work for the Party” (Speech at the National Conference on Strengthening the Party in Central Party and Government Departments, 7/9/19, iii.125). That is, “political awareness is not abstract” but always to be manifested by the principle, “Be loyal to the Party,” its beliefs, organizations, theories, guidelines, principles and policies” (ibid.125). As Mao said during the Korean War, “The enemies have more steel than morale, while we have less steel but higher morale” (ibid.126). By “democratic centralism” Xi means the practice of “solicit[ing] opinions from a certain number of Party members”; “of course, after collecting opinions and advice from all parties involved, it is the Central Committee that makes the final decision,” given the fact that in “such a huge Party in a vast country like ours if the final and sole authority of the Central Committee were undermined, the decisions of the Central Committee were ignored, and everyone followed their own way of thinking and worked their own way, nothing would be achieved” (Speech at the Second Full Assembly of the Third Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 2/28/18, iii.196, 197). “Delegation of power,” under the Chinese Communist regime, thus means top-down rulership, after consultation with “a certain number” of Communist Party operatives. “Weak political commitment and a lack of regular and sound political activities” must never be permitted (Speech to the Second Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, op.cit.584). To ensure that this will happen, “we will establish supervision commissions at the national, provincial, city, and county levels,” an “anti-corruption working mechanism under the Party’s unified leadership” (ibid.593). “This will make some people unhappy” (ibid.594). Needless to say, “discipline enforcers must first discipline themselves,” being “a key target of people with ulterior motives” who “seek to corrupt them.” (ibid.iii.594). “We cannot allow ourselves any respite” (Speech to the Study Session on implementing the decisions of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 1/11/22, iv.38). “Self-reform is key to ensuring our arty never betrays its nature and mission” (Speech to the Second Full Assembly of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 11/11/21, iv.629). Since “the history of our Party is like a most lively and convincing textbook,” in 2021 the Central Committee launched “an education campaign on CPC history in the whole Party and society to review, study and promote the Party’s history,” which will give Party members “a better understanding of our cause, firmer commitment to our ideals, higher standards of integrity, and greater determination to turn what has been learned into concrete actions” (Speech at a criticism and self-criticism meeting on the education campaign on CPC history to the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 12, 27-29,/21, iv.634). Such study will buttress an overall campaign to combat the “hedonism and extravagance” concealed under formalism and bureaucratism (Speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/18/22, 641). 

    Xi does not fail to invoke a sort of populism, having learned from Russian and European communism generally the danger of allowing deep-seated popular resentment of Communist Party rule. “One main reason for [the] failure of communism in Russia “was that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union became detached from the people and turned into a group of privileged bureaucrats who only served their own interests,” “imperil[ling] the fruits of modernization” (Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 1/11/21, iv.197).  He associates populism with the anti-corruption campaign, remarking that “the people resent corruption most,” making it “the greatest threat our Party faces” (XXX, 10/17/18, iii.72); “it may even lead to the loss of power” (Speech to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, Commission for Discipline inspection, 1/22/21, iv.589).  More generally, the “centralized, unified leadership” of the Party takes a “people-centered approach” to his work, he assures his listeners, as “the people are the creators of history,” the “fundamental force that determines our Party and our country’s future” (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, op.cit.iii.23). “The fundamental goal for the Party since its founding, in uniting the people and leading them in revolution, construction and reform, is to give them a better life” (Speech at the deliberation session of the inner Mongolian delegation to the Third Session of the 13th National People’s Congress, 5/22/20, iv.61). If the Party becomes “detached from the people” it will lose the “vital force” of the people’s creativity (Speech commemorating the 120th birthday of Zhou Enlai at the World Leadership Alliance, Imperial Springs International Forum, 11/30/17, iii.161).  “The people are our Party’s greatest strength in governance,” and “the Party works for the people’s interests and has no interests of its own” (Speech at the Conference on the Aspiration and Mission Education Campaign, 5/31/19, iii.163). The Party leadership guarantees “that the people are the masters of the country”—hence the Leninist formula, “people’s democratic dictatorship” (Report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, op.cit.iii.37-38). He promises to “expand the people’s orderly participation” within that regime, presumably with emphasis on the “orderly” (ibid.39). Party committees “should strengthen democratic oversight, focusing on the implementation of the major principles, policies, decisions, and plans of the Party and the state” (ibid.40, emphasis added, although it may not be needed). When it comes to the many ethnic groups within China, the CPC will lead all of them toward “Chinese socialism,” inasmuch as “the Chinese nation is a big family”; to “uphold socialist values,” the Party will build ” cultural home shared by all ethnic groups” by “highlight[ing] China’s cultural symbols” (Speech at National Conference commending Model Units and Individuals for contributing to Ethnic Unity and Progress, 9/27/19, iii.351-353). “Having a stronger sense of national identity is essential to defending the fundamental interests of all ethnic groups,” and this can be achieved by “build[ing] a cultural Great Wall for safeguarding national unity and ethnic solidarity, pool[ing] efforts of all ethnic groups to defend national security and maintain social stability, and effectively combat[ing] infiltration of extremist and separatist ideas and subversion” (Speech at the Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs, 8/27/21, iv.279). “Chinese culture is like the trunk of a tree, while individual ethnic cultures are branches and leaves; only when the roots are deep and the trunk is strong can the branches and leaves grow well” (ibid.1v.281).

    Chinese culture, under Xi’s definition, is fundamentally non-Chinese—specifically, Marxist. “Why does Chinese Socialism work? Because Marxism works.” (Speech to the Study Session on implementing the decisions of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 1/11/22, iv.35). He repeatedly elaborates on the Marxist character of the regime, lest there be any misunderstanding of this. “We need to uphold and apply the worldviews and methodologies of dialectical and historical materialism” and to apply “Marxist views on practice, the people, class, development and contradictions, and truly master and apply well these skills” “so as to better transform such ideas and theories into a material force for understanding and changing the world”—adapted, to be sure, to Chinese circumstances (Speech Commemorating the Bicentenary of the Birth of Karl Marx, 5/4/18, iii.97). He quotes Marx himself as writing that “Chinese socialism may admittedly be the same in relation to European socialism as Chinese philosophy in relation to Hegelian philosophy” (Second Full Assembly of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19the CPC Central Committee, 10/31/19, iii.145). “We should uphold the guiding position of Marxism in the ideological field, base our efforts on Chinee culture, and continue to guide agricultural development with the core socialist values” (Speech to experts and representatives from education, culture, health and sports sectors, 9/22/20, iv.357). “It is the sacred duty of Chinese Communists to develop Marxism,” to “open up new prospects for the development of Marxism in contemporary China and the 21st century” (ibid.98). As a historicist, he avers that “the era is the mother of thought; practice is the fount of theory” (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, op.cit. iii.28). Literature, the arts, and social science must “foster and practice the core socialist values,” “consolidating the guiding role of Marxism,” “strengthen[ing] confidence in the culture of Chinese socialism and better present[ing] China to the world” (Speech at the Joint Panel Discussion of members of the literary, art, and social science circles during the Second Session of the 13th CPPCC National Committee, 3/4/19, iii.376). The “fundamental issue” is to know “who we are creating and speaking for”: the people, who are “the source of inspiration for literary and artistic creations” and the field of study for the social sciences (ibid.378). Literary and artistic works should “create an enduring epic about the people” (Speech to the 11th National Congress of China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and the 10th National Congress of the China Writers Association, 12/14/21, iv.372) while “present[ing] China as a country worthy of friendship, trust and respect,” which would undoubtedly serve the interests of Chinese diplomacy (ibid.376).

    Crucial to this ‘cultural’ Marxism is the “education campaign” directed at members of the Chinese Communist Party itself, a campaign intended to inculcate “deeper understanding, firmer commitment, greater integrity, and stronger action” at the service of the Party (Speech at the preparatory meeting for the education campaign on CPC history, 2/20/21, iv.592). Marxism has been enriched and broadened with contributions from Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and, of course, Xi Jinping himself. Marx and Engels “systematically revealed the historical law that socialism would eventually replace capitalism,” a “trend of human society” that is “irreversible” (ibid.593). Today, a new education campaign “will help all Party members to be clear about China’s strategy of realizing national rejuvenation within the context of a wider world that is undergoing change on a scale unseen in a century” while maintaining the Party’s “distinctive features as a Marxist party” and affirming what Mao called its “magic weapons”: its “united front, armed struggle, and strengthening the Party,” thereby “carry[ing] forward the revolutionary spirit” “through to the end”(ibid.594-595, 597,599). At a seminar with “teachers of political philosophy,” Xi identified “the key to improving our education in political philosophy” as “fully implement[ing] the Party’s policies on education” for the purpose of “ensur[ing] that the younger generations can shoulder the responsibility of rejuvenating the Chinese nation” along Marxist lines (3/18/19, iii.382). Teachers educating Chinese students in this system should “have strong political convictions,” “love the country and the people,” “learn to use dialectical and historical materialism,” “broaden their vision of knowledge, the world and history,” “exercise strict self -discipline online and offline,” and “have an upright character” (ibid.384). They will “integrate political principles with scientific rationale,” that is, “integrate theory and practice,” obedient to the Party because “China’s success hinges on our Party” (ibid.384, 385). This goes for school administrators, as well, and of course for the Party secretaries who supervise them. This will be a moral as well as a “scientific” education because “selfless devotion and being open and above board are our defining qualities as Communists” (ibid.604). Here is where Confucius may be brought in, properly subordinated to Communist “political philosophy,” since the sage enjoins us, “When you meet people of virtue and wisdom, think how you should learn to equal them; when you meet people with poor moral standards, remind yourselves against such behavior” (ibid.604). This notwithstanding, Marxism and not Confucianism remains “an instrument to transform our objective and subjective world” (Speech at the 15th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 6/24/19, iii.617). “We will foster a Marxist style of learning” (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, op.cit.iii.68), as party members “consciously guide practice with theory and ensure that all aspects of our work better conform to the demands of objective and scientific laws” (Speech at the First Plenary Session, 19th CPC Central Committee, 10/25/17, iii.85).”Struggle is an art, and we must be adroit practitioners” of Marxian dialectics (Speech at the Central Party School 9/3/19, iii.265). “Once a communist party loses its ideals, it is no different from other political parties”; in losing “this motivating force and inner bond, it will become a disjointed group, doomed to failure” (Speech at the opening ceremony of a training program for young officials at the Central Party School, 9/1/21, iv.607). It is easy to maintain ideological discipline in revolutionary times but “in times of peace” one must “safeguard the authority of the Central Committee and its centralized, unified leadership,” “faithfully follow the Party’s theories, guidelines, principles and policies, and implement the decisions and plans of the Central Committee to the letter,” strictly aide by the Party’ political discipline and rules, be honest with the Party,” and “put the cause of the Party and the people above anything else” by obeying its commands (ibid.609, 619). 

    The Party will also rule the political economy of China, sometimes directly with state-owned enterprises, sometimes by its supervision in accordance with the laws the Party enacts. In November 2012, the same month Xi assumed the office of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the 18th National Congress of the Party established the “Two Centenary Goals” for building “socialism with Chinese characteristics”: achieving “a moderately prosperous society” by the year 2021, the Party centenary, and “a modern socialist country” by 2049—that is, a fully modernized, prosperous nation, “democratic” and “harmonious” in Xi’s meaning of those terms, and (obviously, if unstated) the dominant world power (iv.82 n.1). Against the slogan, “The American Dream,” Xi lauds “the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” now that “socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era” (“Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 10/18/17, iii.1). Moderate prosperity will entail “poverty elimination,” for which the “top leaders” in each district (especially rural areas) “are the first persons responsible” for “research[ing] and formulat[ing] an action plan on poverty elimination” and “set[ting] a timetable and roadmap for ending extreme poverty in three years” (Speech to a seminary on targeted poverty elimination, 2/12/18, iii.182). “Extreme poverty” has “shackled the Chinese nation for millennia,” but with such “targeted measures” as relocation businesses from “inhospitable areas,” state-funded job opportunities and subsidized housing renovation, along with better education and health care, the poor can be motivated to work harder and not to live their lives on the dole (ibid.185-186). This program includes a Chinese equivalent of Lenin’s New Economic Policy—reducing administrative regulations, permitting a limited free market, and granting property rights. The intra-Party campaign against corruption comports with this program. “A new type of cordial and clean relationship between government and business should be established” (Speech at a meeting on private enterprise, 11/1/18, iii.313). To be sure, “entrepreneurs should cherish and maintain a positive social image, love the motherland, the people and the Party, practice the core socialist values, and promote entrepreneurship,” including international ventures (ibid.315). [2]

    In the targeted year of 2021, Xi declared victory in the Party’s war on poverty. Every year since the announcement of the Two Centenary Goals, he reports, “an average of 10 million people, equivalent to the population of a medium-sized country, have escaped from poverty” (Speech to the National Conference to Review the Fight Against Poverty and Commend Outstanding Individuals and Groups, 2/25/21, iv.147). Nearly 20 million persons received subsistence allowances or other aid, and more than 24 million disabled Chinese had also received subsidies. One of the main jobs provided by the government was forest warden, with more than 1.1 million “impoverished people” now “earning their livelihood by protecting the environment” (ibid.147). “No other country throughout history has been able to lift hundreds of millions out of poverty in such a short period of time,” proving that that the CPC “has unparalleled capacity to lead, organize and implement” as “the most reliable force for uniting the people and guiding them to overcome difficulties and forge ahead”; thus, “as long as we are steadfast in our commitment to upholding the leadership of the Party, we will be able to overcome any difficulties or obstacles on the road ahead and fulfill the people’s aspirations for a better life” (ibid. 151, 154). In turn, the CPC owes its success in this enterprise to Marxism, which recognizes that socialism comes in two stages: “undeveloped socialism,” which lasted in China from the founding of the PRC in the late 1940s until 2012, and “comparatively developed socialism,” the current stage (Speech to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 1/11/21, iv.187). But Marx and Lenin “did not envisage the possibility of a market economy under socialism” (Speech to the Central Conference on Economic Work, 12/8/21 iv.243). Lenin’s NEP was a step in that direction, but it was left to the CPC to establish “the socialist market economy,” looking for a way “to boost the positive contribution of capital…while keeping its negative effects under control” (ibid.243). Capital must be regulated, as “no capital of any type can be allowed to run out of control”; this includes control of profits and prices (ibid.244). The regulation and guidance of “the use of capital” matters not only economically but stands as “a political issue of both practical and theoretical significance,” since capital might undermine the regime of socialism (Speech to the 38th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 12/8/21, iv.251). Capital, he reminds his comrades, can be and is held in public/Party as well as in private hands. In this matter as in all others, “we must uphold Party leadership and the socialist system and keep to the correct political direction” by “prevent[ing] unchecked growth of capital while encouraging investment,” “properly manag[ing] the operation of capital and distribution of gains” not exactly in the communist way, from each according to his ability to each according to his needs (the communist stage of history has not yet been reached) but by the principle from the socialist state to each according to his work (ibid.253, 254). 

    In considering international commerce, Party members must understand that “in today’s world, markets are the scarcest resource” and China has the biggest single market—a “huge advantage for our country,” an advantage of which “we must make full use” (Speech at the study Session on implementing the decisions of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 1/11/21, iv. 204). Competition in the international market (“Chinese enterprises now have interests that extend to many countries around the world”) will firm up the domestic economy, expanding the already “vast domestic market” by making export products and services better and stimulating industrial development (ibid.205). To facilitate such commerce, Xi tells attendees at the World Economic Forum at Davos that the world should “abandon ideological prejudice and jointly follow a path of peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation” (Speech to the World Economic Forum Virtual Event of the Davos Agenda, 1/25/21, iv.535). That is, he artfully downplays the regime conflict that he will advance in non-economic areas in order to strengthen China’s capacity for success in that conflict in the long run. The most famous instance of Chinese economic outreach, the Belt and Road Initiative, “under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee,” will connect China via “hard connectivity” (physical infrastructure) and “soft connectivity” (“harmonized rules and standards” along with “people to people connectivity”) (Speech at the third meeting on the Belt and Road Initiative, 11/19,21, iv.573). This will “expand mutual political trust and strengthen policy coordination to guide and facilitate cooperation” along the Belt and Road corridor—all while “uphold[ing] the centralized, unified leadership of the Party” (ibid.573-574, 576, emphasis added). 

    Even such carefully regulated openness to international commerce poses obvious threats to “national security,” over which the Party must retain “absolute leadership” (Speech to the National Security Commission, 19th CPC Central Committee, 4/17/18, iii.254). The National Security Commission was founded in 2014 for exactly that purpose, “making sure that the national security principles and policies are implemented, improving the working mechanism making great effort to improve its strategic capacity for understanding the overall situation and for planning future development” not only by technical and administrative improvements to the security apparatus but by “strengthening the Party and its work among national security departments,” “resolutely uphold[ing] the authority of the Central Committee and its centralized, unified leadership so that we can build a loyal and reliable national security force” (ibid.255). “We must assign the highest priority to political security,” “ensur[ing] the security of our state power and political system,” not reactively but proactively (Speech to the 26th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 12/11/20, iv.454, 455). This very much includes “the Party’s centralized and unified leadership over cybersecurity and IT application,” which must be made to “move in the right direction” by regulating, operating, and using the internet “in accordance with the law to ensure that the development of the internet is within the bounds of the law (Speech to the National Conference on Cybersecurity and IT Application 4/20/18, iii.361). 

    As with the national security apparatus, so with the military—another potential source of regime subversion and overthrow. Since Xi’s appointment as Party Secretary, “the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) set about strengthening the military and its political governance,” “emphasiz[ing] the need to promote our Party’s full and rigorous self-governance and govern the military with strict discipline in every respect” (Speech to the Central Military Commission on Strengthening the Party, 8/17/18, iii.445). “Political commitment is the most important criterion and political integrity an essential requirement for our military personnel” (Speech to the Central Military Commission Conference on Talent, 11/26/21, iv.446).To assure “absolute Party leadership over the military,” military officers will receive more intensive “theoretical education” (i.e., Marxist instruction) (Speech to the Central Military Commission on Strengthening the Party, op.cit., 445) to “ensure their absolute loyalty to the Party and the state” (Speech to the Central Military Commission Conference on Talent, 11/26,21, iv.446); Party organizations within the military must be strengthened; Party discipline within the military must be improved and enforced, curbing corruption and “punish[ing] vice”; and, overall, “ensur[ing] Party self-governance with stricter, harsher, and more punitive discipline” (Speech to the Central Military Commission on Strengthening the Party, op. cit.446). While “transform[ing] the military into world-class armed forces,” this ever-enhanced power must be ruled attentively by the civilian Party (ibid.446). With these efforts, “we can build a socialist military policy framework with Chinese characteristics” (Speech to the Central Commission on reform of the military policy framework, 11/13/18, iii.451). The “dream of building a powerful military” can work in accord with “realizing the Chinese dream” (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Part of China, op.cit.iii.6). “The Party must command the gun and build up the people’s armed forces” (Speech to the 32nd group study session of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 7/30/21).

    As with national security, military actions should be ‘proactive.’ Xi cites the example of “China’s resounding victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea” not only as “a declaration that the Chinese people had stood upright and tall in the East” (“ending our century-long history of humiliation following the Opium War of 1840”), and not only as a counter to “the aggressors’ plan to destroy China in its infancy with the troops it had sent to the PRC border,” but as an example of military pre-emption, citing Mao’s maxim, “Throw one hard punch now to avoid taking a hundred punches in the future” (Speech on the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ entry into the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, 10/23/20, iv.83). In “realizing the Two Centenary Goals,” “we must not forget the grueling route to victory in this war” (ibid.86).

    Economic and military policy being closely linked to foreign policy Xi maintains that socialism with Chinese characteristics “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence,” “offer[ing] Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing humanity”—an approach, one suspects, that will eschew any dependence upon the United States or the commercial republican regimes of Europe while substantially increasing dependence upon the regime in Beijing (Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, op.cit.iii.12). The Soviet Union’s disintegration dealt “a severe blow to world socialism” but, as Deng Xiaoping observed at the time, “So long as socialism does not collapse in China, it will always hold its ground in the world” (Speech to the Second full assembly of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 11/11/21, iv.93). Now, more than three decades later, “upholding the authority of the CPC Central Committee and strengthening the Party’s centralized and unified leadership over China’s foreign affairs” will prevent any such thing from happening and moreover “build global partnerships through pursuing a broad diplomatic agenda” that includes “steering reform of the global governance system to promote greater equity and justice”—i.e., world socialism (Speech to the Central Conference on Foreign Affairs, 6/22/18, iii.496). Since “the world is undergoing momentous changes of a scale unseen in a century,” “Remain[ing] loyal to the Party,” Chinese diplomats must “pursue continuous learning and self-improvement,” “gain[ing] a keen understanding of the Party’s theories, principles and policies, as well as Chinese laws and regulations,” practicing the “self-discipline” that stems from the knowledge that “the power to make foreign policy rests with the CPC Central Committee, which exercises centralized and unified leadership over China’s foreign affairs” (Speech at the meeting for Chinese diplomatic forces, 12/18/17, iii.489-491). All of this may well qualify Xi’s praise of “multilateralism” at various international gatherings. [3]

    In all, “a well-founded system” or regime “is the biggest strength a country has, and competition in terms of systems is the most essential rivalry between countries” (Speech to the Second Full Assembly of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, 10/31/19, iii.144), whatever verbiage on “multilateralism” may purport. The Chinese regime combines “the tenets of Marxism with China’s conditions”; its “innovations in theory, practice and system…crystalize the wisdom of the Party and the people and are in alignment with [China’s] history, theory and practice,” all of those firmly subordinated to the principles of Marxism with Chinese characteristics. In the words of Deng, “By absorbing the progressive elements of other countries [our socialist system] will become the best in the world. Capitalism can never achieve this.” (ibid.149). Ergo, the commercial republics will slowly fall into the dustbin of history.

     

    Notes

    1. See “The Comprehensive Strategy of Xi Jinping, 2012-2017,” on this website under the category, “Nations.”
    2. In this effort, the newly acquired, formerly capitalist regions of Hong King and Macao have had a distinctive role, with investments on the mainland and “a demonstration role in market economy” (Speech at a meeting with delegations from Hong Kong and Macao, 11/12/18, iii.460). Hong Kong and Macao also helped the mainland obtain export orders from the West, given their long and cordial relations with the commercial republics. For its part, the PRC “piloted many of its opening-up policies in Hong Kong and Macao first, gained experience and then introduced them into other parts of the country step by step,” “allowing the country to advance opening up while effectively controlling risks”—i.e., keeping firm control of market forces in the hands of the Party (ibid.461). “Hong Kong, Macao and the mainland work side by side with one heart and one mind” as the formerly separate regions “integrate into the overall development of the country, and share the glory of a strong and prosperous motherland” (ibid.463)—although Xi does hope that they “will integrate their development into the overall development of the country more proactively” (ibid.465) “improv[ing] local systems and mechanism for enforcing the Constitution and the Basic Laws” (ibid.466). This is the real meaning of the slogan, “One Country, Two Systems”: two systems gradually becoming one, under the Communist regime. The same formula will apply to the recalcitrant Republic of China on Taiwan, as the mainland and China “belong to one and the same China” (Speech at a meeting marking the 40th Anniversary of the release of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, 1/2/19, iii.470). “As the Chinese nation moves forward towards rejuvenation, our fellow Chinese in Taiwan should certainly not miss out,” especially given Xi’s assurances that “Taiwan’s social system and its way of life will be fully respected, and the private property, religious beliefs, and lawful rights and interests of our fellow Chinese in Taiwan will be fully protected” (ibid.471, 472). Initially, at least: with regard to religion, for example, Xi has insisted that “religions in China should conform to China’s realities, and we should guide religions to be compatible with socialist society” (Speech at the National Conference on Religious Affairs, 12/3/21, iv.302). Religious believers “must learn more about the history of the CPC, the PRC, reform and opening up, and the development of socialism” while “train[ing] Party and government officials engaged in religious work so that they will have a good command of the Marxist view on religion, the Party’s theory and policies on religious affairs, and increase their knowledge on religion, so as to  raise their capacity to provide guidance” (ibid.304). With regard to any move formally to declare Taiwanese independence, he warns, “those who forget their roots, betray their motherland, and seek to split the country will come to no good end; they will be condemned by the people and indicted by history” (Speech at a meeting marking the 110th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911, 10/9/21, iv. 478-479).
    3. See, for example, Speech at the CPC and World Parties Summit, 7/6/21, iv.499; Speech at the 12th BRICS Summit, DATE, iv. 529; Special Address to the World Economics Forum Virtual Event of the Davos Agenda, 1/25/21, iv.537-542).