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    Strauss’s Critique of Hegel

    December 9, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Leo Strauss: On Hegel. Paul Franco, editor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019.

     

    Most readers of Strauss begin with Natural Right and History. There Strauss contrasts classical or ‘ancient’ political philosophy with ‘modern’ political philosophy. As Paul Franco remarks in his cogent introduction to On Hegel, “For Strauss the fear of violent death in Hobbes plays the same foundational role with respect to modern moral and political philosophy that radical doubt plays with respect to modern metaphysics.” Both radical doubt and fear of violent death derive “from distrust of nature”—to say nothing of God—rather than “grateful acceptance of it,” resulting in the characteristically modern philosophic attempt, instantiated in the technologies developed by modern scientists, “to actively control nature” instead of contemplating it.

    In Natural Right and History Strauss remarks another contrast, one within the framework of this modern enterprise. Although the moderns would control nature, they nonetheless continue to appeal to nature, specifically human nature, as the source of moral and political right. In doing so, they also ‘lower’ the moral standard that human nature sets, inasmuch as they do not think very highly of human nature. Accordingly, thy replace the greatness of soul Aristotle upholds as the crown of ethical striving with the principles of self-preservation and acquisition. But these are still natural criteria for human conduct, down-to-earth though they are.

    The tension between the attempt to conquer nature while upholding one part of nature, human nature, as the moral standard, heightens with Rousseau, in whom Strauss discerns a conception of human nature as being so malleable as hardly able to establish a usable standard at all. And so, Strauss argues, philosophers began to look elsewhere for a source of moral guidance. In the final section of Natural Right and History, Strauss finds in Edmund Burke’s celebrated denunciation of the French revolutionaries and their appeal to the natural “rights of man” a first attempt to derive right from “history”—meaning, the long course of human events which constitute the living tradition of a given people, or indeed of a given civilization. Strauss calls this new philosophic doctrine “historicism.”

    Strauss’s selection of Burke as his specimen historicist may well puzzle his readers. Burke sometimes continues to profess natural-right principles and is in any event first and foremost a statesman rather than a philosopher. Just as puzzling, Strauss scarcely mentions G. W. F. Hegel, a philosopher par excellence, who elaborates an explicitly “historicist” doctrine in full and indeed systematic detail. [1]

    Moreover, as Franco observes, there is a firm link between Hegel and Hobbes. “Hegel agrees with Hobbes on [the] foundational point” of modern political philosophy, locating “the origin of self-consciousness in the slave’s fear of violent death in his life-and-death struggle with the master”—the “struggle for recognition.” Hegel ‘historicizes’ the Hobbesian principle by putting it in the course of events, not in human beings as such. Under Hegel’s formulation, human nature can be as malleable as Rousseau said it was, without the consequent undermining of morality. Further, the modern project of controlling nature remains; indeed, the now-historical quest for human freedom from natural constraints makes possible not only (in Franco’s words) “the actualization of the best regime”—as Hobbes and Locke wanted to do—but (now going beyond Franco) makes his quest ‘nobler’ in its purpose than the low-but-realizable commercial monarchies and republics earlier moderns supposed possible. For Hegel, the modern state becomes not only useful but thoroughly rational to a degree even modern proponents of ‘Enlightenment’ though impossible.

    Yet Strauss largely neglects Hegel in his published writings, with the exception of his exchange with the Hegelianizing Marxist and apologist for Stalin, Alexander Kojève, née Kojevnikov. That is, in the books and articles he published in his lifetime Strauss never addressed Hegel’s thought directly or in any detail. Between his accounts of Rousseau and Burke in Natural Right and History and his several engagements with Nietzsche, that grand historicist critic of Hegelian historicism, he leaves a hiatus, indeed a gulf. One wants to ask, ‘But Mr. Strauss, what about the master-historicist himself?’

    We now have Strauss’s considered remarks on Hegel in the form of a well-annotated transcript of a graduate seminar on The Philosophy of History he conducted at the University of Chicago in 1965. Many of his classes were tape recorded by his students; typewritten transcripts of somewhat uneven quality have circulated for years as a sort of Straussian samizdat. In this seminar Strauss offered an interpretation of Hegel’s historicism remarkable not only for its acuity but for its equanimity. Far from a historicist himself, Strauss never descends to the level of polemical ‘critique’ so typical of latter-day adepts of ‘post-modernism.’ Indeed, he does not hesitate to correct students eager to judge Hegel too harshly and hastily.

    An extraordinary caliber of students he did attract. We hear from “Mr. Shulsky”—Abram Shulsky, author of a study on Aristotle’s Politics and co-author of a standard text on the techniques of espionage; “Mr. Glenn”—Gary D. Glenn, long a mainstay of the political science department at Northern Illinois University; “Mr. Bruell”—Christopher Bruell, author of noteworthy treatments of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle; and “Miss Heldt”—the redoubtable Catherine H. Zuckert, whose scholarship has ranged from Plato to Machiavelli to American novelists. On Hegel makes it easy to see why Strauss drew them to his classes. To l’esprit de géométrie and l’esprit de finesse he added l’esprit de politesse —a formal, old-world charm blended with witty use of American advertising slogans and news events in side-comments that obviously took his students by surprise, not expecting him to know about such things.

    Strauss begins by asking: Why study Hegel “in our capacity as political scientists”? Because Hegel influenced Marx, whose latter-day disciples ruled a substantial portion of the world population at the time; because Hegel redirected intellectuals’ attention from the state to “culture” (and especially religion) “as the comprehensive theme of reflections of human society”; because The Philosophy of History consists of a series of lectures to university students, making its arguments “much more easy to follow” than those encountered in Hegel’s formal writings; and, above all, because “Hegel was the first to make the understanding of the history of political philosophy an essential ingredient of political philosophy itself.”

    Strauss then introduces Hegel historically, without conceding anything to historicism as a philosophic doctrine. (“I am not a Hegelian, and I do not believe that one can say that history is rational.”) For example, he explains that “the simple formula of Hegel’s philosophy of history” is “order comes out of disorder without being intended.” In this he is obviously indebted to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” But Hegel “enlarged this” to encompass “the whole of history”; the moral sentiments Smith attributes to nature, and indeed nature itself, are reconceived by Hegel as part of a blind yet orderly movement, unfolding via rationally discernible laws, towards a fully “rational order,” one entirely conscious of itself as an order.

    But how is it possible for the historically-determined philosopher to know that the ‘end of history’ has occurred? “Hegel was the first to face this difficulty: If the philosophy is the son of his time, how can he have found the eternal truth?” And Hegel’s general answer is: He can, if he lives in the moment “in which time as it were coincides with eternity,” if he lives in what Strauss calls the “absolute epoch” or “absolute moment” when the owl of Minerva not only takes flight but lands, the moment in which the love of wisdom, philo-sophia, has become wisdom itself. In this moment, the philosopher (it happens to have been Hegel, but that is of no importance) can solve the fundamental problem of Plato’s “dialectics of the ideas.” Platonic dialectic poses the problem of how the ideas, beings of a different order of being from the things we see around us, somehow generate those things? Hegelian dialectic, understood for the first time at the end of history, because of the end of history, reveals how this happens—why “the whole realm of ideas necessarily externalizes into nature on the one hand and mind on the other hand”—by the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute Spirit (which Hegel also calls “God), its dialectical work now completed. Hegel’s new theory of logic posits a dialectic that doesn’t merely catch opinionated folk in self-contradiction but rather works through contradictions, through the clash of contradictory opinions and actions (such as wars and factions) toward ever-grander syntheses of opposites, culminating in the final synthesis, the end of history. [2] With Hegel’s new logic, reason doesn’t simply discern contradiction; “reason thinks through contradiction.” In this, Strauss says, “Hegel surely is the most radical rationalist that ever wrote,” the one who understood reason as “something which is not merely a faculty of man” but instead subsumed all of being under the rubric of a reason not ‘above’ empirical reality, as in Plato, but as immanent in it, and immanent in the course of events in the empirical world. “God” isn’t transcendent but immanent. “There is nothing outside of reason, nothing which is not rational.” 

    Politically, this means that political life is no longer architectonic, as Plato and Aristotle maintained. “The political life is part of a larger whole,” the life of the “collective mind, folk-mind”—a “culture” consisting of language, religion, arts, and (on the material side) natural descent, climate, and geography. “The folk-mind is the mediation between nature and mind.” No folk-mind dies but instead “becomes the matter for a higher principle embodied in another people”—a rational process in Hegel’s sense of the dialectical, namely, the clash of opposites leading to a new synthesis. In turn, “each folk-mind is a part, or facet, or stage of the mind, the world-mind” or Absolute Spirit, “and this is therefore a reconciliation between the universal and the particular.” It is also a reconciliation of good and evil, inasmuch as both are necessary elements of the world-historical dialectic. In this, Hegel satisfies himself that he has solved the theologians’ ‘problem of evil,’ while at the same time vindicating the religions, especially Christianity, as philosophically necessary steps toward full human self-consciousness or wisdom. His new dialectic also solves the philosophic problem posed by Hume, the problem of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought.’ Contra Hume, at the end of history one can indeed see how the ‘ought’ derives from the ‘is,’ because what is has worked toward what ought to be, what must be, namely, the end or purpose of history.

    These matters being so, after his philosophic introduction Hegel divides his lectures on the philosophy of history into four parts, each corresponding to a culture, a folk-mind: the Oriental world; the Greek world; the Roman world; and the Germanic world, wherein the historically-unfolding Absolute Spirit or World Mind has reached its culmination in Hegel’s comprehensive rational system. Even in ‘pre-history,’ in Africa, we already see the human intention to oppose itself to external nature in the practice of sorcery and even of cannibalism, which form parts of African religion. But Asia is where history proper began. In Africa and elsewhere, the sorcerer assumes that the world around him “remains subject to arbitrariness”—manipulable at his command; he is a radical ‘subjectivist.’ The Chinese were the first to understand the world around them as ‘objective,’ as having a stubborn reality of its own. But in making this advance, Chinese civilization (and Asian civilization generally) run to the opposite extreme. They lack “an inner sense, pointing in the right direction,” instead obeying the Emperor’s commands “as a matter of course” because they are supposed to be the “Mandates of Heaven.” this paternalism and its accompanying rule by administration, leads finally to cultural-political ossification, as “there is no life, so to speak, in the state. it all depends on the man at the top.” In such civilizations as China, India, or ancient Judea there can be no “science and political liberty” because while there is an understanding that the world has an objective integrity of its own, there is no sense of rational opposition of human beings to this given order. This (Strauss emphasizes) has nothing to do with biological racialism; he quotes Carl Schmitt as saying that “the moment Hitler came to power…Hegel died” in Germany.

    India is superior to China in that for the Chinese the highest thing is “a visible heaven,” whereas Hindus “go beyond and peer through heaven, as it were, and discover a spiritual principle—nothingness as the ground of everything—and this is an act of liberation.” It is not a liberation of reason, but it is a precondition of reasoning. In Persia we see another advance. The Persians “view the whole historical process as a fight” between opposites, between light and darkness, goodness and evil. “The point is that this highest, the light, does not absorb the individual things or human beings but lets them be what they are; whereas for the Hindu, nothingness leads to the negation of the particulars, Nirvana.” The Persian insight provides a foundation both for dialectic and for individuation—not yet understood rationally, but posited.

    Notice that as Hegel uncovers these gradual advances in human thought in Asia, he moves geographically closer and closer toward the West. Phoenicia is the next step, where a a people goes to sea, trading as far away as the British Isles, and therefore needing a plan, needing to engage in practical if not theoretical reasoning about how to survive at sea, pursuing an active way of life, industrious and not merely agricultural or ‘vegetative.’ what is more the Phoenician god, Adonis, dies: “The death of God is the highest point of Phoenicia, and Hegel implies that there is some connection between this concept of the death of God—that the negativity belongs to the spirit itself—and what he had said about the industrial character of Phoenicia.” Neither commerce and industry nor a religion in which God dies bespeaks a way of life settled in a condition of changelessness. It prefigures Christianity and the Cross. “In the Old Testament there is indeed for the first time the primacy of the spirit,” the Persian light now the first sign of a Creator -God, a god of freedom, superior to material ‘givenness.’ In this, Hegel takes up Burke’s distinction between the beautiful—the harmonious, the natural, the created—and the sublime—the creative, but also the suffering, the sacrificial, the dialectical—and this may be the link Strauss sees between Hegel’s progressivism and Burke’s traditionalism. “For Hegel, the true is radically distinguished from the beautiful and higher than it,” while for “Plato and Aristotle, somehow the true and beautiful coincide on the highest level, the ideas.” But they did not set out to conquer nature, only to contemplate and apprehend it.

    Yet Asia still does not produce the rational. The rational came to light “in the free, joyful spirit of Greece,” in the Apollonian command, “man, know thyself.” In answering the riddle posed by the Asian sphinx, Oedipus “overthrew the sphinx from the rock,” liberating the Oriental spirit, “which Egypt had advanced so far as to propose the problem.” “The answer is “that the inwardness of nature is the thought that has its existence only in the human consciousness.” In the realm of historical action, the same transition occurred when the Greeks defeated the Persians at Salamis, marking the limit of Persian imperialism, an imperialism that could never form itself into “a harmonious whole” and which now retreated against “Greek organization,” itself an expression of the liberated human spirit.

    Hegel ignored the Greek understanding of art as imitation. Greek art, preeminently Greek poetry, is in his view rather a form of religion. “That is its peculiar greatness and freedom,” seen in the triumph of the Olympian gods over the old cthonic gods, Chronos and Ouranos. The freedom implied in art is not yet the full, modern freedom, as it retains what Hegel calls “an essential relation to some stimulus supplied by Nature,” something external to the human spirit. “Nevertheless,” Strauss says, “the freedom of the mind is recognized within these limits, and therefore Greece is higher than the Orient.” Among the arts practiced by the Greeks was rhetoric, the art of debate, the art of democratic politics, the nucleus of Socratic debate or dialectic. In negating traditional opinions and practices (and getting himself killed for it) Socrates and his dialectic still come from them, in some sense express them.

    The defect of the Greek world is seen in the slavery that undergirds its democratic politics. For the Greeks, freedom consists of controlling the passions; they do not see that innate freedom of the human mind “by virtue of which every man is by nature free,” responsible, “and therefore an object of respect.” There is reason in Greece, but no “right of subjectivity,” no conscience—only the virtue of the self-governing citizen. The self-governing citizen shares in ruling the tiny polis; there is no central state, no sense of “a distinction between the people and the government,” and thus no realm of privacy, of personal subjectivity, and therefore of individual rights. Socrates provides the beginning of the salutary corruption of the Greek folk-mind by causing “the awakening of subjectivity.” But a fuller freedom of spirit, of conscience, and of individual rights must await the founding of Christianity.

    But first came the conqueror of Greece—its dialectical opponent, Rome. Rome would eventuate in Christianity, “the complete break with naturalness” and its replacement (or at least displacement) in the Christian soul with Spirit. Before this though could occur, there needed to be a midway point; classical Rome provided this with the concept of personality. “Personality,” Strauss remarks, “is not individuality.” “The concept of personality is a legal concept”; in Rome, all men were understood to be “legal persons,” human beings with ‘standing’ in court. “Out of the full person of formal law there will grow the fuller individuality later on.” At the same time, legal standing in court implies conventionality, artificiality. The emphasis on the Roman citizen as a legal person comports with the fact that “Rome was from the outset not natural in any way; nor did it have the originality going together with naturalness.” On the contrary, it originated in fratricidal violence, the story of Romulus and Remus—a story, Strauss emphasizes, that the Romans told about themselves. “A nation which can tell this story about its own origin thereby reveals its soul,” whether the story is factually true or not.”

    Rome “constitutes a progress beyond Greece” because “there is no longer the tutelage of nature which is in Greece,” no longer “the charming union of nature and mind which is charming and therefore also deceptive and untrue.” Rome’s origins were ugly and it ended in the ugly rule of emperor-tyrants. Rome had a civil religion but according to Hegel (following Machiavelli) it was a sham. The emptiness and misery of classical Rome was called ‘sin’ by Christians. And the sin it lived by—especially its unending, unjust imperial wars—aspired to universality, to worldwide empire. In attempting to save the old republic, Cicero wasted his time.” “Looking at this thing in hindsight,” Hegel “sees what wonderful things came out of this terrible Caesarism, namely, the emergence of Christianity and the modern world.”

    Hegel’s “section of Christianity…is in a way the most important part of the whole work.” Roman imperialism brought the Romans to Transalpine Gaul, Germany, and Britain—to the Europe which would become the center of Christendom and then the center of modernity. Rome also prepared for Christianity by its universality of thought as well as action, by “purif[ying] the human mind and heart from all particularity because it recognized only the individual as an abstract legal person.” Christianity would take the Jewish claim that man is sinful, “wholly alienated from God and yet to be redeemed by God,” combine it with Roman universality while rejecting Rome itself as sinful, and finally give all of these themes a “visible, sensual certainty” by worshipping Jesus, “God’s son…incarnated as man.”

    The final step will be the “spiritual” understanding of Jesus “as opposed to the carnal understanding,” that is, a fully rationalist form of ‘Christianity’ now purged of the miracles and the doctrine of sanctity or holiness. Science will replace miracles, mastering nature; immanence will replace the separation of Spirit and human nature. “The recognition of the rights of man, the recognition of the infinite value of the individual…this is the full realization of Christianity” according to Hegel. The rational Absolute Spirit replaces the Holy Spirit.

    Strauss distinguishes Hegel’s philosophy of history from political philosophy. Political philosophy “was based from the very beginning on the difference between the good and the ancestral; the agathon and the patrium,” as seen in the second book of Aristotle’s Politics. To Plato’s Socrates, inquiring after the good in the Athenian marketplace by rationally testing the opinions of his fellow citizens, “the various forms of the ancestral” to which men characteristically appeal when struggling to define the good “are divinations or fragments of the good, and even souled fragments of it.” “Hegel says: No, there is an order among these ancestrals”—indeed, “an ascending order,” as they appear over the centuries. “Not only is the end toward which they point…rational, the way towards the end is itself rational” and therefore as necessary in its progress as a logical proof. “At the end there is complete reconciliation of reason and tradition” in the fully rational administrative state.

    Classical philosophy was “cosmological,” “concerned with men within the cosmos,” with natural beings within the natural order. Changes in “human thoughts and human societies” were understood “within the cosmic context,” within nature as a whole. Well before Hegel, modern philosophy had rejected this. Hobbes asserts that “we understand only what we make, i.e., if we merely discover something, it is essentially unintelligible”; Descartes agrees, as for him “the beginning is the thinking ego, not the cosmos.” For the moderns, “the thinking, understanding subject is the origin of all meaning,” and the rights of man are “subjective rights.” As early as Machiavelli, one sees disdain for the “imagined commonwealths” of the ancients, pagan and Biblical—commonwealths said to be outside and indeed above men. Modern ‘subjectivity’ is, Strauss maintains, “the necessary but not sufficient condition of the discovery of history.” Modern ‘subjects’ or ‘selves’ consult their own desires and reach out to grasp, to manipulate, to control external nature, not to guide themselves by its laws or by some idea of the good discernible in it. This project of the conquest of nature is understood to be progressive.

    “All of these kinds of things came together and made it compelling for man in the eighteenth century to say that the human mind necessarily progresses and its results necessarily spread. And then by the spread of knowledge the people become enlightened and opinion is changed; and if opinion is changed, power is changed, because power will now move in a different direction than it moved before it was enlightened.” This “altered the nature not only of political philosophy but of political life very profoundly.” Hegel synthesized all of these elements into his philosophy; this synthesis was the “absolute speech” in which Christianity, itself predicting the advent of a new heaven and a new earth, “becomes completely secularized,” instantiated by human rationality. “Christianity has become fully understood, i.e., religion has been transformed into philosophy by Hegel at the University of Berlin.” Similarly, the arts that once depicted the gods—whether Athena or Christ Pantocrator—are replaced by “philosophy, including science,” and especially the scientific art, technology, and by “the rational state, revealing itself in reasonable laws,” implemented in accordance with the principles of scientific administration. This is no longer political philosophy because it is no longer political—no longer an interplay of ruling and being ruled but instead a matter of consensual obedience to rational regulation. And it is no longer philosophy, either, but the wisdom for which philosophers had long searched but never found until the dialectic of the Absolute Spirit rested in Hegel’s fully rational and comprehensive system of thought and of action, now unified.

    How would Hegel reply to what now calls itself ‘postmodernism,’ the refusal of the authority of the administrative state and indeed of reason itself? Hegel as illuminated by Strauss makes this quite clear: The ‘end of history is the peak of the roof, but the owl of Minerva which takes wing from it descends to catch rodents. From the heights, history has nowhere to go but down, or perhaps around. And so it has, into a democratized Nietzscheism for the Last Man.

     

    Notes

    1. For a step-by-step exposition of The Philosophy of History, see the five articles posted in the “Philosophers” section of this website.
    2. See Stanley Rosen: G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), discussed in “Historicity and Reason: Two Studies,” on this website in the “Philosophers” section of this website.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    What Will Russia Be?

    December 1, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Between Two Millstones. Book Two: Exile in America, 1978-1994. Clare Kitson and Melanie Moore translation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020.

     

    In Between Two Millstones Solzhenitsyn blends several literary genres—autobiography, essay, and a touch of diary.  Volume I consists of his memories from his first years of exile, following his departure from the Soviet Union in 1974, years in which he lived for a time in Western Europe before settling in Vermont. There, as Daniel J. Mahoney observes in his excellent Forward to this volume, “above all, he found a place to work” and “a serene and welcome home for his family.” [1] His main work consisted of researching and writing The Red Wheel, a vast historical novel tracing the origins of first the Russian and then the Bolshevik Revolutions, beginning in 1914. [2] His subsidiary work consisted of fending off both the blandishments and irritations of life in the great Western democracy, from speaking invitations to polemics to lawsuits—all swirling around him like mosquitoes in a Siberian summer. Whether great or petty, all of these activities centered on a central theme of his life: What will Russia be? What moral, spiritual, and political regime will replace the sordid rule of the Communists, by now in welcome but dangerous decline? These are the ruling questions of Volume II, which consists of Millstones parts two, three, and four.

    Perhaps the most important spokesman for the alternative anti-Communist regime to the one that Solzhenitsyn prayed for, dedicated his life’s work to preparing, was the courageous dissident Russian physicist, Andrei Sakharov. Sakharov was the quintessential ‘modern.’ Impatient with what he took to be the dead hand of the past, he wanted a rapid, revolutionary change in Russia, a regime change countering the malign revolution of the Bolsheviks, but just as dramatic. He thought this both possible and desirable because he expected the new, ‘democratic’ regime to be democratic in the modern sense: a regime in which progressive-minded secular elites would lead the people to life modeled on the ideas of Enlightenment rationalism—technocratic, urban, internationalist. As Solzhenitsyn observes, Sakharov represented the democratic socialism that lost, violently, to the dictators of the proletariat in 1917, individuals who detested tyranny but also despised Russia —the Russia of Orthodox Christianity and farming villages, priests and peasants.

    Such a revolution would not only bring violent conflict, Solzhenitsyn warned. It would also fail because its organizers did not understand what a regime is, and therefore would prove inept in founding one. A regime is more than a set of purposes, however ‘enlightened’ they may be. A regime is more than a set of institutions, however intricately designed. A regime is a way of life. What kind of democracy can ignore the way of life of a country’s people, those persons who wield sovereignty in any democratic regime worthy of the name? Without the patient cultivation of a way of life conducive to popular self-government, a regime change in the name of democracy must either dissolve into anarchy or lead the way to a new oligarchy—or both, in a fatal circle of self-destruction.

    Solzhenitsyn completed the first volume of Between Two Millstones in 1978. [3] Volume Two consists of three such chronological sections, covering the periods 1978-1982, 1982-1987, and 1987-1994, the year when he and his family returned to Russia. He wrote each segment during the last year of each period of time, giving his memoir a ‘diaristic’ or contemporaneous quality, wherein he sets down his thoughts soon after the events he recounts, providing a sort of step-by-step assessment of his years in exile. Readers encounter a great-souled Russian and Christian man in medias res, as he thinks, feels, lives his way through the years of separation from his beloved homeland.

    He launches his numerous and sharp criticisms of America from an underlying platform of gratitude. Where else was he, where else could he have been, so productive? In Vermont he lived in the “happy solitude” a writer needs, “and I never ceased to be surprised and grateful,” as “the Lord had indeed put me in the best situation a writer could dream of, and the best of the dismal fates that could have arisen, given [Russia’s] blighted history and the oppression of our country for the last sixty years.” Under the American regime he “was no longer compelled to write in code, hide things, distribute pieces of writing among my friends.” [4] He could conduct research freely. “I did not have to rush from pillar to post to survive,” having royalties from the worldwide sales of his books protected by copyright law and the right to the keep his earnings. With this “total independence”—broader “in scope and more effective than freedom alone”—the busy life of commercial republicanism “has flowed past me, having no effect on the rhythm of my work.” 

    Unlike the Communists, Americans never attempted to separate him from his family. His wife and sons united with him; “the very spirit of our family and the unceasing, impassion work Alya and I were doing together also had its effect on our sons, ” as “they grew up friends, with a sense of family unity and teamwork.” “The alien environment,” too, “bound them together,” with “a consciousness of our unusual burden” as exiles, but exiles with a profound and noble mission: “to fill in the Russian history that’s been lost” for the sake of the Russians who would someday find themselves liberated from Communist tyranny. This purpose “communicated itself to all three of them.” “When you are immersed in a once-in-a-lifetime piece of work, you don’t notice, aren’t aware of other tasks.” “If the truth about the past were to rise from the ashes in our homeland today, and minds were honed on that truth, then strong characters would emerge, whole ranks of doers, people taking an active part—and my books would come in useful too,” restoring not only a true sense of the past but the moral compass that can only point ‘due North’ if magnetized for that.

    By “happy solitude,” then, Solzhenitsyn means anything but being alone, or even being alone with God. He shows the reader how he and his wife could become the most intimate of collaborators in the work. “I have never in my life met anyone with such an acute lexical feel for the specific word needed, for the hidden rhythm of a prose sentence, with such taste in matters of design, as my wife, sent to me—and now irreplaceable—in my insular seclusion, where the brain of one author with his unvarying perceptions is not enough.” The Red Wheel‘s Russian steppes-like vastness required a second set of eyes, a mind with an unerring sense of direction, to prevent Solzhenitsyn from wandering off track, circling around to unintended repetition, losing himself in unclarity. “Living in isolation, it would have been impossible to manage such a massive job adequately. Alya didn’t allow me to lose my faculty of self-criticism,” “subject[ing] every phrase to scrutiny, as I did myself.” It was America, and Vermont in particular, that enabled the Solzhenitsyns to live the way of life they needed to live to continue and above all to continue their spiritual, moral, and political calling, and to complete the work they were called to.

    Few Russian émigrés could join them, although there were some million and a half of them living in the West. “Clearly, we are not able to hold out when dispersed—it’s a defect in the Russian spirit: we become weak when not close together, in serried masses (and being told what to do).” The pull of the democratic republican regimes wrenched the Russianness out of almost all his countrymen, as they became “absorbed into alien soil, bringing up an alien generation.” “Russia’s salvation” can “only come from whatever Russia itself does within its borders,” too often by means of “a powerful hand to bring us together” and not from carefully cultivated self-government, which remained Solzhenitsyn’s preference from beginning to end. At this point, in 1982, he could only place his hopes in the “village prose” writers, the best-known of whom was Valentin Rasputin, men who faithfully sketched life in the countryside, among Russian country folk. The émigré writers, by contrast, too often aped their Western counterparts, wasting their time at ‘literary conferences,’ and at their best only rising to the level of Vladimir Nabokov’s brilliant but shallow avant-gardism or Andrei Sinyavksy’s satire. It was Sinyavksy, along with the ex-Communist dissident writer Lev Kopelov and the Paris-based novelist and translator Olga Carlisle, who built a cage around Solzhenitsyn’s reputation in the West, calumniating him as “a monarchist, a totalitarian, and anti-Semite, an heir to Stalin’s way of thinking, and a theocrat”—never mind the incommensurability of the items on the list.

    In this, they reinforced American, and Western, confusion of the Soviet regime with the Russian nation. This helps to account for “the malice toward Russia” Solzhenitsyn often saw in his exile. “What brutes, they say, those Russians, not able to resist Communism while we [the West] managed to hold out.” The dogged secularism of the Russian exiles finds its enthusiastic echo among “the hostile pseudo-intellectuals” of the West. Despite his independence in America, Solzhenitsyn, and despite his freedom from house searches and interference with his writing, “I am not genuinely free” here, as writing is one thing but publishing another, and he was having trouble publishing his current writings in the United States. Between the United States and Russia under Soviet Communism, “the world is big, but there’s nowhere to go,” caught as he was between “two millstones.”

    Despite venomous claims to the contrary, as a Christian Solzhenitsyn eschewed Russian nationalism, especially in the increasingly coarse and inept forms it took in the years just prior to the 1917 revolutions. At that time, “Russian nationalists emerged, of the kind who rushed to renounce Christianity” as well as socialist internationalism. Nationalists of this type “call on us to renounce our historical memory, to adopt a new paganism, or else be ready to adopt any faith you like from Asia.” In their more malignant forms, they do indeed incline to fascism. Not Solzhenitsyn. 

    It was the repulsiveness of such a nationalism and the degradation of “the Bolsheviks’ murderous steamroller” that the “generous, educated ‘pan-humanism'” of Sakharov resisted. He was brought up in “that very milieu”; as a result, “he considers even the idea of nationhood, any appeal to the nation rather than the individual, a philosophical error.” “In nothing that he’d ever said or written was there any whiff of a recollection that our history was over a thousand years old. Sakharov does not breathe that air.” His genius at physics has only accentuated his intellectual and spiritual abstraction from the concrete nature of his own country. He looks at the Russian bear, with its ferocity, its love of its own, its determination, its restlessness—all of its characteristics, good and bad—as if it were a set of molecules in motion, not much different in that way from any other creature in the forest. His hopes for Russia were indistinguishable from the hopes of secular intellectuals in the West: “infinite scientific progress; universal (in other words not national) education for all; the need to overstep the bounds of national sovereignty, a single world legislation; a supranational world government; and economic development that mustn’t remain within the purview of the nation,” which must not “be in charge of its own way of life.” “What must such a worldview inevitably come down to? Nothing but ‘human rights,’ of course”—specifically a “human-rights ideology,” or “rights elevated”—some might say degraded—to “the rank of an ideology.” But ideas unmoored to the realities of life in a specific community can only derange any community they attempt to rule, and fail to rule; they amount to “our old friend anarchism.” But as the pre-revolutionary statesman Pyotr Stolypin understood, alone among his generation of Russian politicians, “civil society cannot be created before citizens are, and it is not the freeing up of rights that can cure an organism comprising a sick state and a sick people but, before that, medical treatment of the whole organism.”  Sakharov averred that true “homeland is freedom,” offering a ‘modern’ parallel to the apolitical Roman-Epicurean mot, “Where I am happy, there is my homeland.” “But if homeland is nothing more than freedom” (or nothing more than happiness), “why the different word?” 

    “So much unites Sakharov and me: we were the same age, in the same country; we both rose up at the same time, uncompromising against the prevailing system, fought our battles at the same time and were vilified at the same time by a baying press; and we both called not for revolution but for reforms.” All this notwithstanding, “What divided us was—Russia.” Russia as distinct from the West, as distinct as Orthodox Christianity is from Roman Catholicism and the Protestantism of Wittenberg and Geneva, and as distinct as all forms of Christianity are from the ideology of modern scientism. 

    Against the ethos of the modern West, in Europe, in America, and among ‘modernized’ Russians, Solzhenitsyn did not retreat but rather advanced into his own thinking and writing—advanced by returning to the men and women of the revolutionary time. The most important dimension of his exile in the United States is also the hardest to convey to readers, namely, the experience of writing The Red Wheel. The historical figures who peopled his novel preoccupied not only his waking thoughts but his dreams. He had vivid dreams of Czar Nikolai II, dreams in which he discussed Russian foreign policy and the royal succession (“he shook his head sadly that no, [his son] Aleksei could not rule as czar”). He dreamt of generals and agitators, monarchists and Bolsheviks. There was nothing mystical in this: “Surely this was bound to happen when I was spending hours looking at pictures of them, pondering them, thinking myself into their characters.” “For me, they had become the most contemporary of contemporaries and I lived with them day in, day out for weeks and months at a time, an many I quite simply loved as I wrote their chapters. How could it be otherwise?” At the same time, every character must be inserted, as in life, into “the framework of events” as they actually occurred. “If an author sets himself no such objective, all he can do is surrender to an irresponsible play of the imagination.” Irresponsibility was never Solzhenitsyn’s moral métier, it may be safely said.

    Given his capacious yet intense, precisely focused spiritual and intellectual task, all the more dispiriting was the response of American literati and journalists to the translations of Solzhenitsyn’s previous work, much of it now appearing in English for the first time. While the new edition of The Oak and the Calf, his memoir of his years struggling against Communism while living in Russia, evoked “dead, dogmatic formulas” of condemnation from the Soviet press, this “mechanical” critique suggested “no personal animosity towards me,” only the reflexive defense of a nearly played-out regime, an empty ritual. But “I was not inveighed against with such bile, such personal, passionate hate, as I was now by America’s pseudo-intellectual elite.” Solzhenitsyn challenged their unimpeachable moralistic amoralism, their moral relativism. How, they demanded indignantly, “could I be so certain I was right”? Does Solzhenitsyn not know that “no one is in possession of the truth, indeed the truth cannot exist in nature, all ideas have equal rights”? “And since I do have that certainty, I must imagine myself a messiah.” “Here is the cavernous rift between the Western Enlightenment’s sense of the world and the Christian one.”

    How to respond? Ignore it, as much as possible. “I easily resisted the temptation in the West to become a mere exhibit, a tub-thumper,” a ‘public intellectual.’ “I buried myself in my work, I didn’t bother anyone.” That didn’t stop the noise from “the irrepressible gutter press,” by which Solzhenitsyn doesn’t mean the gossip mags (which, thankfully, mostly passed him over for the more profitable targets, the celebrity entertainers and politicians) but the “creeping host,” the popular press—such publications as Paris-Match, France-Soir, and Stern, their reporters (as it were) annoying him with their “petty scurrying”—with their “tiny sorties on so many little legs,” a “creeping horde” of untiring writer-ants. “In any corner of the earth, any degenerate reporter can write any lies whatsoever about me—this is what their sacred freedom consists of! their sacred democracy! How am I to live here?” Worse, the lies in the Western press were more likely to be believed than those of the notoriously propagandistic Soviet press. To this were added frivolous but draining lawsuits by persons eager to tap into those newly-available publications royalties. 

    True, it was not the Gulag. “What was this compared to the fact that others of my fellow-countrymen were being oppressed every day?” Yet no real writer can fail to understand. “The insignificance of the conflict compared to the work in hand was the killer. Indeed, that’s what they mean by it’s not the sea that drowns you but the puddle. It was the Western puddle now.” And that “puddle” might grow into a sea, “deluging not just me but the whole of Russia in waves of calumny, setting the all-too-ready West against her.” Or, shifting metaphors, “convincing the West that Russia and Communism had the same relationship as a sick man and his disease was clearly not in my power.” The “policy-makers” in Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin “actually understand [this] very well; they just won’t say it out loud,” for fear of offending the professional ginners-up of public opinion, ever aiming at flattering their readers’ sense of superiority to those benighted Russians. “The only efforts it’s sensible to make are very moderate: to create, in whatever way possible, a more benign attitude to the real Russia.” With the election of Ronald Reagan to the U. S. presidency in 1980, a man who well understood the difference between Russia and its current regime, a man who understood the regime to be transient, the nation long-lasting, Solzhenitsyn hoped for a step forward in this task. Unfortunately, one of Reagan’s principal foreign-policy advisers, Richard Pipes, had made his academic bones by propounding the thesis that Russia produced Russian Communism, that the regime followed logically from the state. Pipes delayed and eventually helped to block a proposed meeting between Solzhenitsyn and the president.

    In Part Three Solzhenitsyn chronicles the core years of the Reagan Administration, 1982-1987. He began them with visits to Japan and Taiwan, rimland bulwarks against the Communist regimes in Moscow and Peking. “In Japan, I discovered that you cannot fall in love with a country if its food is incompatible with you.” He also found Japanese religiosity perplexing. “The Japanese use Shintoism for all their happy occasions—but Buddhism for anything sad, and for funerals. All Japan’s cemeteries are Buddhist; there is no other kind.” He asks, “Is this an encouraging sign for the future of humanity, or a recognition that both religions are inadequate?” Both exemplify “divine worship,” and “undoubtedly” so. But in visiting the shrines he experienced “a pervasive sense of extreme otherness, an abyss between us.” “What is God’s intent” in separating the human race by religion? He remarks the presence of Orthodox believers, finding it “touching to see Japanese people in an Orthodox church and to hear our hymns in Japanese.” Many Western readers will be equally moved, as they do not know that Solzhenitsyn was a ‘liberal’ when it came to religious toleration, though scarcely a relativist.

    Still, the foreignness of Japan struck him. “I traveled to Japan hoping to make sense of the Japanese character; its self-restraint, industriousness, and capacity for small-scale but intensive work. But, oddly, I experienced there an insurmountable alienation. Just you try and understand them.” He satisfied himself with attempting to convince them that Communist China wasn’t a land of peace, debating former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Shinsaku Högen, who claimed that “China was a kindred country to Japan, and Communism there was not all that dangerous” because the Chinese “are a very intelligent people,” one “moving in the direction of progress.” For his part, Solzhenitsyn “sought passionately to prove that it was just the same kind of Communism as in the Soviet Union, that Communism was the same the world over.” From the vantage point of nearly forty years later, one can see that the Chinese Communists were indeed more intelligent than the Russian ones, but their notion of progress consists in keeping the Chinese Communist Party firmly in power, and in expanding that power assiduously, by no means neglecting military power.

    In Taiwan, the food was better and so was the reception, his hosts having had every reason to share Solzhenitsyn’s revulsion at Chinese Communism. No Shintoism there—only Buddhism, whose “pursuit of immensity and quantity is hard to understand; I cannot grasp how it is connected to the transience of existence, which they preach.” And of course Confucianism, which reminded Solzhenitsyn a bit of Tolstoy. Although the Taiwanese responded to his anti-Communist message with enthusiasm, the president was too cautious to meet with him, fearful of needlessly offending Peking or Moscow. “The Taiwan government would like to achieve success without taking any risks.” In his speech he hinted that the United States might someday abandon Taiwan (Americans were still optimistic about relations with ‘the Mainland’), and it would be a bold thing to deny that possibility, even as Americans have awakened themselves to the malignity of the regime there.

    Completing his journey to three geostrategic island nations, Solzhenitsyn went to Great Britain, meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She set him straight on the preponderance of nuclear forces favoring the Soviets, saying that a rapid buildup by the West would solve that problem; by 1987, as he wrote this section, he saw that “with Reagan’s help, she turned out to be right.” He wanted to criticize her for defending the minor British colony on the Falkland Islands against seizure by the current Argentine despot, thinking that “this insignificant bit of land” could hardly be worth the bloodshed on both sides. But as always his capacity for imagining himself ‘into’ the person in front of him prevailed: “Thatcher had such an awful cold and such a hoarse voice that I couldn’t launch that debate.” He chalks up her policy to “personal pride” and a desire for “success for her party” in the impending parliamentary elections.” “I left feeling a bitter sympathy for her,” but determining to “abandon all hope of ever urging any politician to make ethical decisions.” He was right not to engage her, but it isn’t hard to see Thatcher’s defense, indeed on moral grounds. If the Conservative Party government was leading to British economic revival and to successful resistance to Soviet plans for Europe (as it was), and a Conservative Party electoral victory was indispensable to the continuation of her government (as it was), and if what Solzhenitsyn calls a “fine and noble” relinquishment of the Falklands was likely to hurt her party’s chances (as she evidently thought), then why was the Falklands War not an important act in fighting the Soviet regime Solzhenitsyn deplored? 

    “On the way back from England, Alya and I came to a firm agreement: now, finally, I would draw inward to work.” No more traveling, no more interviews. “Not a peep!” “Falling silent was also right for another reason: who was I to judge the West? I’d neither devoted my full attention to studying it nor observed it much at first hand.” [5] Far from the self-righteous ‘messiah’-figure his enemies depicted, Solzhenitsyn came away from his experience of foreign countries, East and West, with a deepened Christian humility. “I’ve fallen silent since 1983—towards both sides” in the Cold War. “In actual fact, the problems of the twentieth century cannot all be laid at the door of current politics,” anyway; “they’re a legacy of the three preceding centuries.” Only in the welcome, “boundless silence” of his home in exile, in the Vermont woods, could he read, write, deepen and refine his thoughts, work with his wife (“my soulmate”), consider his boys as they grew up in America but with an eye toward returning to their native country. “I still have my full strength—it must have been given me for a reason.”

    Although Solzhenitsyn intended to withdraw from contemporary controversies, his enemies had other ideas, preferring to drag him in. He describes this aspect of his struggle with the apt phrase, “ordeal by tawdriness.” “Tawdriness is the preferred weapon of baseness, when outright violence is unavailable.” The Soviet rulers assassinated characters when they could not assassinate persons, a technique Lenin taught them, one he had learned from reading Marx. It was hardly unknown in the West, as seen in the work of Solzhenitsyn’s American biographer, Michael Scammel. “Uniformly lacking in elevated emotional and intellectual understanding,” taking “a low view of lofty subjects,” Scammel proceeded by two methods: first “to reduce my actions, movement, feelings, and intentions to the mediocre”—motives “that make most sense to the biographer himself”; second, to side with Solzhenitsyn’s detractors on all key issues, “probably not out of malice towards me but because, by his reckoning, it’s the best way to secure” the ‘sane and balanced,’ ‘even-handed’ stance of objectivity. In other words, Scammel was a journalist. So, for example, in Solzhenitsyn’s refusal to meet the celebrated Jean-Paul Sartre, a shameless apologist for a then-quirky brand of Marxism-cum-Heideggerianism which has now come into its own in the European and North American universities, Solzhenitsyn ‘must’ have been motivated by “a combination of pride and timidity.” “He doesn’t allow that I might have simply despised Sartre.”

    From the ‘Left,’ the ubiquitous Sinyavsky never let up, calling Solzhenitsyn “a cancer on Russian culture” and insinuating that he was a warmongering anti-Semitic religious fanatic. This sort of thing even reached the floor of the United States Congress, where the solons reasoned along these lines: Solzhenitsyn has defended Stolypin; Stolypin was assassinated by Dmitri Bogrov, who was Jewish; Solzhenitsyn has condemned Bogrov; ergo, Solzhenitsyn must be anti-Semitic. The syllogism isn’t air-tight, but America’s Radio Liberty, which broadcast into the Soviet Union, was reprimanded for reading portions of August 1914 on air, thus presenting the work of an author who (in the locution of one Congressman) could be perceived as anti-Semitic.

    Meanwhile, from the ‘Right,’ a much less prominent writer, Lev Navrozov, whose main journalistic outlet was the widely-unread New York City Tribune, managed to mount a conspiracy theory according to which Solzhenitsyn was really a Soviet Fifth Columnist, a KGB plant sent out to deceive the West. “Right-leaning America was rattled, became alarmed—and began to distance itself from that Solzhenitsyn.” I rather think Solzhenitsyn exaggerates Navrozov’s influence, but this is understandable. First, the firmly anti-communist Tribune may have had many New York City Russian émigrés in its readership. More important, “Alya suffered from this constant assault on us—suffered acutely,” as he, “unlike me,” “felt she really lived in this country” as the one who packed the children off to school in what was for them “their only country,” and where they heard questions and perhaps taunts from their classmates. Despite their agreement in 1982, by 1986 “Alya wanted me now to start actively defending myself.”

    It was the Soviet regime that came to the rescue, unintentionally and sooner than expected. Even timely. A massive effort such as The Red Wheel may be easy to start, but it is damnably hard to finish—not only in the sheer volume of work involved, but in knowing when to stop the narrative. In a sense, he might have taken it to August 1918, a full four years after the ‘guns of August’ precipitated the events leading to revolution. But no: “By May 1917,” five months before the Bolsheviks took control, “the liberal ‘February fever'”—the euphoric intoxication of the people after the overthrow of czarism and the apparent triumph of democracy—was “utterly supine, sickly, doomed—anyone could come along and seize power, and the Bolsheviks did.” He could finish the novel with April 1917. Clearly, this would mean finishing the book with stern warning against precipitous democratization when Communism in Russia would join its czarist enemy in the proverbial dustbin of history. 

    By the middle of 1986 the Solzhenitsyns were hearing reports of Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s apparent preparations for as yet unspecified changes in the country. He seemed to be attempting to gather support from writers (Communist Party loyalists, to be sure) for reform. “What on earth was going on?” “A new way of life,” Alya ventured to say. He released Sakharov, although it was true that the physicist had announced his opposition to President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, a.k.a. ‘Star Wars,’ as his adversary Senator Edward Kennedy called it, adroitly making a defensive weapons program sound like a preparation for warfare waged from outer space. Nonetheless, Solzhenitsyn sensed “the internally driven collapse of Communism,” which he had long predicted—death from premature decrepitude, because its earthly ‘religion’ has proved short on spiritual endurance; “the pool of willing sacrifices for the sake of a radiant future has run out and, resting on their laurels, both bosses and foremen have turned swinelike.” And the economy had failed. Indeed, Gorbachev’s “only success has been his cult in the West,” a cult that has maintained itself in the subsequent decades.

    “Will God allow us to return to our homeland, allow us to serve? And will it be at a time of its new collapse, or of a sublime reordering?” With this dyad (we can now see) Solzhenitsyn was too ‘apocalyptic.’ Neither utter collapse nor sublimity awaited; reordering did, but it has proven unsublime. Having served as “a sword of division” (as a Christian often will do) for so many years, Solzhenitsyn hoped now “to bring together everyone” his heart could reach, “to act as a hoop binding Russian together.” “That, after all, is the real task.”

    In the final section of his book, Solzhenitsyn recounts the event of 1987-1994, the year of his family’s return to Russia. But before departing from Part Three, two additional insights Solzhenitsyn came to during those years demand attention—one spiritual, the other moral. While preparing a speech in response to receiving the Templeton Prize (established “to call attention to a variety of persons who have found new ways to increase man’s love of God or man’s understanding of God,” according to the brochure he received), he determined to use the occasion to deepen his own “understanding [of] earthly life as a stage in the development of eternal life,” aiming at ending one’s earthly life “on a morally higher level than that dictated by one’s innate qualities.” In this, “a fellow countryman came to my aid,” Igor Sigorsky, the aircraft designer, “who also happened to be interested in the philosophy of creation.” Sharing Solzhenitsyn’s mathematical and scientific background, Sikorsky suggested a train of thought that led Solzhenitsyn to “grasp why suicide is such a great sin: it is the voluntary interruption of growth”—of the spiritual growth attained by facing our suffering squarely and opening our soul to God—the “pushing away of God’s hand,” the hand that would injure us for our own good, then guide us toward seeing that suffering prepares mind and heart for God, for precisely that task of moral heightening, of overcoming the sins that beset every human soul.  

    On a major moral issue that came under heightened scrutiny during the Reagan years, Solzhenitsyn considers nuclear weapons. The West, America particularly, “had immorally introduced the atom bomb to the world—when they were already victorious!—and dropped it on a civilian population.” As so often with Solzhenitsyn, however, he brings an important nuance to this often-heard criticism. In his Templeton address “I came out against” U.S. “nuclear achievements” and indeed against “the whole idea of a nuclear umbrella.” At the same time, and unlike the ‘nuclear freeze’ advocates in the United States and the anti-nuclear protestors in Western Europe (the latter obviously “being fueled by the Soviets”), he argued that that “the moment it reached for the diabolical gift of the nuclear bomb, the West went out of its mind” in the sense that such “fine men of the West” as Bertrand Russell, George Kennan, Averell Harriman, and dozens of others” started to urge “their compatriots to make more, more, and still more concessions to Communism, anything to ensure there was no nuclear war.” “I never believed there would be: it would obliterate the Creator’s plan for humanity.” But it might lead to the moral and political collapse of Western resistance to the Soviet empire.

    Instead, however, it was that empire which collapsed, an empire ruled by the charming but inept Mikhail Gorbachev. (“He had nothing—just the inertia of Communist Party succession.”) “Gorbachev was giving speeches laden with promises, but clinging on frantically to Party power and the banner of Lenin.” It should have been obvious to anyone with an acquaintance with the history of the Soviet Union that Gorbachev’s so-called economic liberalization was nothing more than a dusted-off version of Lenin’s New Economic Policy of the 1920s—window-dressing gestures toward capitalism intended to draw in Western investors, who alone could prop up a failing socialism. And this went on with more than a hint of Stalinism lurking in the wings, if needed: Gorbachev “had entrusted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the head torturer of the Georgian KGB.” The centerpieces of Gorbachev’s propaganda campaign were “Perestroika” (“restructuring”) and “Glasnost” (“openness”). “No one, it seemed, even in the Soviet Union, understood what, exactly, [perestroika] consisted of.” Local cooperatives and small village enterprises were envisioned, implemented, but almost immediately dissolved. Meanwhile, in the bureaucracy, “all the old nomenklatura” remained in place, “us[ing] the nation’s wealth to line their own pockets.” Swinelike they may have been, but Gadarenian they were not; they had no intention of throwing themselves off a cliff. “Glasnost” was more promising; Solzhenitsyn had called for it, some twenty years before. And Russians did talk freely. “Yes, they talked, oh how they talked—but was anyone doing anything?” Well, no. “Everything that was being done (apart from Glasnost getting under way) was so insubstantial, shortsighted, or even damaging that it was clear they were beginning to thrash about: they had no idea where to go next”—un-Gadarenian, indeed.

    “In the meantime, all over the West, Soviet Perestroika and Glasnost were giving rise to unabated jubilation.” Solzhenitsyn’s silence perplexed the pundits. But it simply registered a discreet refusal to be bamboozled. His own books remained on the proscribed list, a fact that made “openness” look rather less wide-bordered than the Kremlin wanted it to seem. The excuse, as usual, was that Solzhenitsyn was too dangerous to read. As usual, Sinyavsky chimed in, complaining that Solzhenitsyn was “against” Perestroika, although Solzhenitsyn had neither said nor written anything about it. “With renewed vigor the essayist threw himself into an international tour to oppose me, and neglected no opportunity.” Sinyavsky updated his usual tropes: “Solzhenitsyn is the standard-bearer of Russian nationalism!” “He’ll return in triumph and take the lead in a clerical fascist movement!” He “is a racist and monarchist, and in five years he’ll be running Russia!”

    For his part, Sakharov attempted more constructive activity, standing for a seat in the new national Congress, where Gorbachev quite literally silenced him on one memorable occasion simply by turning off his microphone. The move backfired. “During the course of the Congress, Sakharov won for himself the role of de facto leader of the opposition,” winning the role of the “persecuted defender” of the Russian people. “Thus the year 1989 marked the finest hour of Sakharov’s life.” Unfortunately, his actual proposals for Russian regime change were ill-conceived. He wanted to replace the over-centralized pseudo-federalism of the Soviet Union with what would have amounted to a loose system of sovereign states, each with its own citizenship, monetary system, armed forces, and police agencies, each “independent of central government” but, tellingly, “subject to the laws of a World Government” and thus not genuinely sovereign at all. As in all ‘act locally, think globally’ formula, this one deprecated the middle ground, the nation-state. “Russia would have been fatally splintered and weakened” by Sakharov’s plan, lacking as it did “even a scintilla of consciousness of Russia’s history and its spiritual experience?” Sakharov died soon afterwards. “In his Christian smile and his sad eyes, something fatal, unavoidable, had always been reflected.”

    The Communist regime “had allowed the whole body of our country, its whole population, to become rotten.” In turmoil under these conditions, it isn’t the cream that rises to the top but the “scum.” Preoccupied with his great novel, “I had not rendered any useful assistance against the tumult and confusion of minds in the Soviet Union, either in untangling the mess of ideas or giving practical advice.” Although “the collapse of the Soviet Union was irreversible,” and a good thing, too, “how could we prevent historical Russia also being destroyed in its wake?” Solzhenitsyn’s pithy Rebuilding Russia, which he now wrote, recommended “moral cleansing,” “self-limitation,” and, institutionally, a real not phony reconstruction of local institutions of self-government. [6] Gorbachev condemned the book as, somehow, monarchist, knowing that he could rely on the reputations Solzhenitsyn’s enemies had already constructed both Solzhenitsyn himself and for Gorbachev himself. “I was not too late,” Solzhenitsyn remarks; “I was too early.” Time would indeed tell, whether Gorbachev’s scam would endure.

    It didn’t, and Boris Yeltsin ousted Gorbachev. “But Yeltsin could not discern any overarching sense of history, or any of the splendid prospects opened up by this successful coup; it seemed that the only significance he saw in it was his victory over the man he hated, Gorbachev.” Under his less-than-vigilant eye, the rulers of the several ‘republics’ of the ‘federation,’ formerly “Communist masters,” now “turned into fervent nationalists and, one after the other, proclaimed ‘sovereignty and separation'”—reaffirming borders drawn not by the several nations but by Lenin and Stalin, who had deliberately mixed existing nations in order to keep them from launching any successful rebellion against the Soviet Union. 

    Of all this, Western journalists remained unknowing. They simply wanted to know if Solzhenitsyn favored what they supposed was “Russia’s move to a market economy.” “Americans are genuinely unaware of the existence of Russia, even before the great October Revolution”—not literally, of course, but in the sense of “the whole mass of Russian history and Russian problems since the end of the nineteenth century,” upon which Solzhenitsyn had spent his life considering. “To Americans, did there exist, apart from the Market, any other characteristic, any trait, any aspect of a nation’s life?” Admittedly knowing America little more than Americans knew Russia, Solzhenitsyn would have found the answer to that question in President Washington’s Farewell Address, had he studied it. There, he would have seen that Americans very often want commercial, not political relations with foreign countries. But this doesn’t prevent them from defending their own political union, which, as Washington shows, consists of much more than a free-trade zone, though it does consist of that.

    “In 1992, the gigantic, historic Russian Catastrophe began to unfurl: the nation’s life, morality, and social awareness unraveled, unstoppable; in culture and science rational activity ceased; school education and childcare descended into a fatal state of disorder.” He had “feared this,” but had he foreseen it? “Not this particular form of collapse—no. But I did see that the situation could go astray and become another February [1917]—that had for a long time been my greatest fear.” Together, the rivals Gorbachev and Yeltsin and precipitated and then accelerated the collapse. 

    “But just where in Russia were the Russian patriots? Alas!—the patriotic movement these days had become hopelessly entangled with Communism.” This, because initially Stalin had linked the survival of the Communist regime against Hitler’s onslaught to a rhetorical appeal to the defense of the ‘Russian homeland,” a strategy that Communist scoundrels in the several ‘republics,’ including Russia proper, had lately resorted to, giving the world yet another instance of the old riposte about patriotism and scoundrels. For his part, Yeltsin managed to triple the size of the already “ponderous apparatus of the Soviet state,” making it look “like either a monster or a joke.”

    In December 1993, at the age of 75, Solzhenitsyn learned that he could return to Russia. But there was one more blow, the worst yet. In March 1918 his oldest son died suddenly, leaving his wife and infant daughter. “We buried him in the Orthodox corner of the ever-green Claremont cemetery” in Vermont. “And so we left a tomb in America. Such was our farewell.”

    “I had to get to Russia in time to die there.” And not only to die. “I’m thirsting to get involved in Russian events—I have the energy to get things done.” And he will return to political allies his enemies do not have. “I count as friends the vastnesses of Russia. The Russian provinces. The small and medium-sized towns.” “And if people come to understand Russia’s interests rightly, my books could also be needed much later, when there has been a more profound analysis of the historical process,” an analysis illuminated by the God who will not fail.
     

     

     

    Notes

    1. Mahoney is the author of the best introduction to Solzhenitsyn’s thought in English: The Other Solzhenitsyn: Telling the Truth About a Misunderstood Writer and Thinker (Notre Dame: St. Augustine’s Press, 2014).
    2. On this website, see “Solzhenitsyn on the Russian Revolution,” a discussion of his March 1917: The Red Wheel, Node III, Book I.
    3. For discussion see “The Temptation of the West: Solzhenitsyn in America,” on this website.
    4. In his own day, V.I. Lenin denounced “the accursed Aesopian language” he had undertaken when writing his anti-czarist polemics in the years before the Bolshevik Revolution; see his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Preface. Such a response to ‘logographic necessity’ is one of the very few commonalities between the Marxist Lenin and the Christian Solzhenitsyn. 
    5. This wise self-admonition, like many such, didn’t prove easy to uphold. Some pages later, balking at applying for U.S. citizenship, Solzhenitsyn asks, rhetorically, “Really, what sort of country is America? Naïve (although supposedly so enlightened and democratic): through a clutch of its professional politicians, it blithely betrays itself on a daily basis, yet will fly into a sudden brief fury—but an utterly blind one—and destroy whatever is in its path.” He is thinking especially of such phenomena as vigilante actions by Americans against Russian churches and families in response to Soviet outrages overseas, as when a Russian Orthodox church was vandalized in response to the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner. “Russian soil may not be accessible to me for a long time to come, perhaps until death, but I cannot sense American soil as my own.”
    6. On this website see “Solzhenitsyn on Russian Reconstruction” for discussion of Rebuilding Russia and The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century.

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Reconstituting Natural Philosophy

    November 21, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Nicholas Maxwell: In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life. Montreal: McGill-Queens University, 2017.

     

    Before Socrates, philosophers attempted to understand nature by direct observation. In doing so, they ignored the reputation of philosophy and of philosophers—soon considered at best odd and laughable, at worst dangerous to the city and deserving of exile or death. They also ignored the distortions to their own quest for wisdom imposed upon them by the opinions and customs of their political communities—unexamined assumptions that they had never considered philosophically. The polis endangered philosophy in two ways, one ‘external’ the other ‘internal.’ Externally, it threatened the lives and way of life of philosophers. Internally, it interfered with self-knowledge and therefore with the philosophic quest for wisdom; nonetheless, if considered carefully, political life might prove ‘epistemologically’ useful to philosophers. [1] By turning to political philosophy as the gateway to philosophy, by showing how philosophy might be both ‘politic’ and political, Socrates as presented by Plato and Xenophon showed how philosophers might better guard themselves from persecution while enhancing the philosophic way of life, refining its understanding of the nature philosophers had characteristically inquired into.

    For more than a century, philosophy as practiced in academia has eschewed both political philosophy and the natural philosophy it corrected. Politics has been consigned to the realm of the irrational (‘values’) and sub-philosophical ratiocination (‘facts’ uncovered by ‘political science’). Nature has been consigned to ‘science,’ consisting of theorizing founded upon mathematics and of practical, empirical experimentation intended to test the theories mathematics generated and, when confirming them, to put meat on their bones. Maxwell sets out to redeem philosophy as originally understood, as natural philosophy. “The central thesis of this book is that we need to reform philosophy and join it to science to recreate a modern version of natural philosophy; we need to do this in the interests of rigor, intellectual honesty, and so that science may serve the best interests of humanity.” “The best interests of humanity” suggests politics, although not the real politics of existing political communities; it suggests the politics or quasi-politics of some future ‘world state,’ the politics of ‘globalism.’ At the same time, the task of defining “the best interests of humanity” might well lead some academic philosophers to a renewed version of the Socratic turn, once they see that there is no such things as “humanity” as a politically organized entity. Maxwell himself hasn’t quite seen that, yet, looking instead to an imagined future wherein “our immense global problems” can be addressed “in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, thus helping us make progress towards a good world—or at least as good a world as possible.” This best of all possible worlds might leave little room for politics as such, and, if so, might not be the best of all possible worlds. Or so a Socratic philosopher might suspect.

    Maxwell does see this latter point when he looks around his own setting in a university—universities being eminently political institutions, where ‘ruling’ and ‘being ruled’ go on all the time. “We urgently need to reorganize universities so that they become devoted to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means—as opposed to just acquiring knowledge, as at present” or, one might add, just advancing ideological dogmas, as at present in so many of them. This means regime change for the academy. “Academic inquiry needs to be reorganized so that its basic task becomes to seek and realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge, technological know-how, and understanding, but much else besides.” The regime of the modern university remains Weberian, affecting “our very psyches” by “the way we split off reason and intellect from feeling and desire, fact from value, science from art.” As Socrates might put it, modern academic philosophy has taken the philo out of philo-sophia.

    Modern science emerged from modern philosophy, and not always by turning away from political philosophy, as any reader of Francis Bacon will attest. Yet some of modern science at least seemed apolitical. Maxwell thus can assert, “Modern science began as natural philosophy,” as “one mutually interacting, integrated endeavor” aimed at “improv[ing] our knowledge and understanding of the universe” and “improv[ing] our understanding of ourselves as a part of it.” Natural philosophy made “profound” and indeed “unprecedented” discoveries then, in the seventeenth century, beginning with Galileo and Kepler, reaching its peak with Newton, ending with Locke. “And then natural philosophy died,” splitting “into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other.” “But the two fragments, science and philosophy, are defective shadows of the glorious unified endeavor of natural philosophy.” This is “at root, a philosophical blunder” or series of such.

    What made modern natural philosophy modern? Galileo affirmed the atomism of the ancient natural science of Democritus, founded on “the key metaphysical tenet” that “the universe is made up of atoms in motion or, more generally, of physical entities in motion whose physical properties can be depicted in mathematical terms.” By so doing, Galileo “invok[ed] a key paradox inherent in the new natural philosophy: on the one hand there is an appeal to observation and experiment, while on the other hand, the new (or revitalized) metaphysical vision of the universe—atomism, or the corpuscular hypothesis—tells us that perception is profoundly delusive,” since we can’t see atoms with ‘the naked eye.’ “This paradox, unresolved, played an important role in driving science and philosophy apart.” Where the ancient atomists were sure of themselves, the modern atomists were not. Perhaps with a glance over their shoulders at revealed religion, eminently sure of itself, modern atomists saw in their atomism a claim that rested too much on faith to be quite scientific but too much on observation of nature to be religious.

    The sundering of philosophy from natural science did not and could not happen quickly because modern science needed philosophy; “natural scientists disagreed about crucial questions of method,” of how to go about the quest for knowledge, which is what ‘science’ means. “Should evidence alone decide which theories are accepted and rejected, or does reason play a role as well?” Like the ancient natural scientists, the moderns looked to the heavens rather than to the political regimes immediately before them, but in doing so they understood that “mathematics had an important role to play in science, along with observation and experiment.” Since “mathematical truths can be established by reason alone,” reason must “have an important role in science.” Modern natural scientists disagreed on what role that should be. Some held that “all knowledge comes through the senses, via experience”; reason plays the role of handmaiden to such ’empirical’ knowledge. Where, for example, does mathematics fit into Locke, that admirer of the eminently mathematical Mr. Newton? “Others—most notably Descartes and Leibniz—held that reason plays a vital role in natural philosophy,” developing new and powerful mathematical ways of knowing such as the calculus. 

    These controversies had both intellectual and moral implications. Given atomism, “how is it possible for human beings to acquire knowledge of the universe”? And “how is it possible for people to be conscious, free, and of value if immersed in the physical universe,” a universe consisting of nothing but “colorless, soundless, odorless corpuscles which interact only by contact”—that is, randomly? In sum, how can I know? And how can I choose? 

    Aristotle had answered these questions by positing four causes of natural effects: efficient, material, formal, and final. In his theory, “change comes about because objects strive to actualize their inherent potentialities, much as an acorn strives to actualize its potential to become an oak tree”; “purpose, goal-seeking,” ‘final’ causation “is built into the constitution of things.” Aristotle additionally claims that the earth, located at the center of the universe, exhibits “imperfection, change, decay,” none of which “observe precise, mathematical laws,” in contrast to the heavens, where “perfection, no decay,” prevail and “the motions of heavenly bodies” do observe precise mathematical laws.” In this sense the heavens are ‘above’ the earth both literally and in the sense of full self-realization. The new astronomy removed the earth from its cosmic centrality, seeing it as only “one planet among the others that encircle the sun,” partaking both of the mathematical precision observed in orbiting bodies. This means that “apparently wayward, haphazard terrestrial phenomena such as weather, growth, and decay, all occur, perhaps, in accordance with unknown, mathematically precise law.” At the same time, this also “may be taken to imply that since the earth is a part of the heavens, and imperfection, change, growth, and decay are everywhere apparent on earth, all this obtains on other heavenly bodies too.” ‘They’ are no better than ‘we’ are; as Tocqueville might have put it, modern science discovered that there is more democracy in the universe than Aristotle had thought. Begun by Copernicus, the culmination of the astronomical revolution culminates in Newton, via Kepler and Galileo (who, “more than any other single individual, was responsible for the demise of Aristotelianism”) and the adoption of the ‘mathematical’ understanding of nature, “or what we now call modern science.” If the moon has mountains and craters, if Jupiter has four moves revolving around it, where does that leave Aristotelian physics? [2]. No thoroughgoing empiricist, Galileo insisted that “physical objects and natural phenomena exhibit mathematical structure.” While appealing to “observation and experiment,” he equally insisted that “the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics,” and ultimately of simple mathematics, especially geometry. Empiricism and reason, experiment and mathematics: natural science. 

    For his part, with the help of the calculus—the geometry not of stable forms but of changing ones—Newton “put forward the first fundamental dynamical theory of physics ever,” the theory of gravitation. His Principia of 1687 “demonstrated how his universal law of gravitation was able to predict and explain the motions of the planets, moons, and comets of the solar system, together with a wealth of other phenomena as well.” Universal: the law of gravitation prevails on earth as it does in the heavens, and it explains why “the motions of the moons and the planets must deviate slightly from perfect Keplerian motion due to mutual gravitational attraction—the final, devastatingly convincing evidence in support of Newtonian theory.” 

    Newton made another natural-philosophic ‘move’ that had serious effects on subsequent philosophy. Asserting that he had derived his theory from observing the phenomena, he admitted (as he wrote) that he had “not been able to discover the cause of [the] properties of gravity from the phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.” In experimental philosophy, “particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction.” The subsequent Enlightenment movement, advanced most notably by the French Encyclopedists, taught that “no longer do natural philosophers need to engage in fruitless debate about metaphysics, philosophy, epistemology, and methodology.” Indeed, by the middle of the eighteenth century ‘metaphysics’ had become something of a byword for fruitlessness, and not incidentally a means of dismissing revelation even as it narrowed the scope of scientific reasoning. Under this dispensation, “new theories, in order to be acceptable, must meet two requirements: they must accord sufficiently well with the new metaphysical view of the universe” (namely, an atomism whereby the behavior of atoms conforms to “precise mathematical laws”); and “they must meet with sufficient empirical success, as tested by “the empirical method of careful observation and experimentation.” Only by meeting these requirements will science be “an endeavor that seeks to make progress in knowledge,” although (as Maxwell cautions) this progress must not to be taken as inevitable or even good.

    It is noteworthy that Maxwell himself pays no attention to the moral and political foundation of modern science in Machiavelli, namely, the invitation to conquer Fortuna or, as his follower Bacon put it, to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate. Even on his own, strictly ‘natural-scientistic’ terms, however, Maxwell shows that modern science makes a metaphysical assumption, an assumption that underlies its physics. “A central concern of this book is to demonstrate that empiricism is not enough. Science needs evidence and metaphysics.” And if so, “we need a new conception of science which acknowledges explicitly metaphysical assumptions of science so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved.” He calls this new conception of science “aim-oriented empiricism,” a term which suggests that some form of teleology must be brought back into our understanding of nature and of science or knowledge of nature. The very notion of a scientific method itself suggests that there must be some telos the method aims at, and that there might be madness in one’s method, or sanity, because of that.

    Maxwell next considers modern natural science in more detail. As noted, Newton “makes the amazing claim to have derived his law of gravitation solely from the phenomena by induction,” a claim that led eventually to the abandonment of natural philosophy, its split into ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ begun in the eighteenth century and effected thoroughly by the nineteenth. But Newton has a method, his “rules of reason,” all of which “concern simplicity or unity” and “in effect make implicit metaphysical assumptions concerning the simplicity or unity of nature.” That is “a big assumption,” and a metaphysical one at that. So, for example, Newton’s first rule of reason tells us that “Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes” (very democratic, Tocqueville would smile)—obviously “a big, highly problematic metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe.” What is more, despite his avowal of strict deduction of the law of gravitation from observation of the phenomena, elsewhere “Newton is quite explicit himself that metaphysical hypotheses are involved and required” in his science. “Could it even be that Newton here knowingly practiced something like a confidence trick?” Was he an ‘politic’ writer, after all, a practitioner of exoteric writing, including the art of deliberate self-contradiction, at the service of an esoteric teaching? Is Newton’s natural science more Socratic than it seems?

    As Maxwell remarks, in subsequent editions of the Principia he replaced his rules of reason with “nine propositions, all baldly entitled hypotheses.” “Newton had powerful motives for attempting to convince his readers that his law had been derived solely from the phenomena,” at least in the first edition of his book, being “fully aware of the fact that his law of gravitation, apparently postulating the existence of a force operating across empty space, without any agency to convey it, would be found by some to be thoroughly objectionable”—some and perhaps most, being theologians committed to the notion of divine providence, others being natural scientists committed to atomist-empiricist induction. “Newton hated controversy,” and “may have hoped that his claim” in the first edition “to have derived his law solely from the phenomena would mean that the law [of gravitation] would not become a matter of controversy.” At the same time, Newton also rejected the metaphysics of the new science, that “the universe has a harmonious mathematical structure, and that all natural phenomena are the outcome of particles interacting in accordance with precise physical law.” Newton professed to affirm the theologians’ well-known ‘argument from design,’ that (as he put it) “this most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Maxwell quotes a letter Newton wrote in 1692, saying, “When I wrote my treatise about our [solar] system, I had an eye on such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a deity; and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose.” In sum, Newton engaged in “a conscious cover-up,” first seeming to accept the Baconian, empiricist-experimentalist understanding of science as “derived by induction from the phenomena, solely from evidence,” and then following this revision of modern science with a revision of Christian theology whereby certain natural phenomena really are thoroughly natural—not providential in any immediate sense but nonetheless derived from the deity’s initial rational act of creation. 

    This might have led to a debate over what Newton’s real method was. What actually happened was a debate in which Newton’s putative empiricist inductivism was ranged against the ‘rationalism’ of Descartes, a contrast (one might add) that eventually broadened into the familiar claim that the English are empirical, practical, soberly down-to-earth, and that the French are abstract, theoretical, and dangerously utopian. “No one thought to distinguish Newton’s physics from his [self-advertised] methodology.” Instead of comparing and contrasting Newton with Kepler and Galileo, contemporaries focused on “the great battle” between Newton and Descartes. As is well known, Descartes answered the question of skepticism by the method of skepticism itself, by doubting “everything it was possible to doubt,” including both his own senses and his reason. “But he could not doubt that he was doubting, or, in other words, thinking”; ergo, “I think, therefore I am.” “Having established beyond doubt that his conscious mind exists,” Descartes went on to claim that because he can “entertain the idea of a Being more perfect than himself,” such a Being “must exist, since, if He did not, He would lack perfection.” This second claim, the dubiousness of which Maxwell hints at, contrasts noticeably with Newton’s argument from design, which is perhaps no more demonstrable but rather more plausible. In any event, Descartes then argued that because such certain and distinct ideas as “I think, therefore I am” form the basis of knowledge, this royal road to knowledge leads us to acknowledging the clear and distinct science of geometry as the master science. In turn, the empirical phenomena may, must, be understood geometrically, insofar as we can attain any certain knowledge of them. This in turn led to him to claim that nature consists of atoms—invisible, intangible “corpuscles”—which are “whirling about in space in vortices,” that is, in geometrically measurable patterns. Descartes puts natural-science atomism firmly under the rule of geometric patterns In his own exercise of doubt, Maxwell observes that “the difficult and profound mathematical structure of modern theoretical physics hardly seems to bear out” the reduction of physical laws to clear and distinct ideas. However, whereas the Cartesians’ insistence that any empirical success in scientific discovery which contradicts “the Cartesian idea that natural phenomena are the outcome of the motion and impact of extended particles” must be invalid partakes of dogmatism, they “were absolutely correct to demand that physical theories must comply with metaphysical principles (in addition to empirical considerations) in order to be acceptable.” That their metaphysics was false is no objection to metaphysics itself.

    Nonetheless, the French Enlightenment did just that. Voltaire, for example, in his Lettres Philosophiques sided with ‘England,’ “praised Bacon, Locke, and Newton at the expense of Descartes,” promptly earning himself condemnation by the French Catholic Church and what would have been a prison term in the Bastille, had he not exiled himself. “Voltaire cast Bacon as the founding father of English empiricism, and even claimed he had anticipated Newton’s law of gravitation.” The Church knew a competing set of saints when it saw one. “With the defeat of Descartes and the triumph of Newton, and Newtonian empiricism, in France around 1750, modern science was well on its triumphant way,” beginning to act independently of philosophy, even if its practitioners refrained from declaring that independence, still calling their task “natural philosophy.” Metaphysics was scrupulously ruled out of rationalism, “empiricism dominated subsequent scientific developments, and authentic natural philosophy became all but invisible.”    

    But Einstein brought on his revolution in modern physics not by following the method of experimentation but with mathematics. His discovery that space-time itself is curved by matter, and matter by space-time, shows that there is no force of gravity at all, but rather a set of necessary pathways along which matter travels—at the same time without necessarily colliding, as in modern atomism. Quantum theory took this even further, proposing that particles of matter “exhibit wave-like features, and wave-like entities such as light exhibit particle-like features too.” Quantum theory replaces the Newtonian and Einsteinian deterministic theories with probabilistic ones. 

    Well and good, empiricists will reply, but how can you seriously question the spectacular real-world success of the experimental method in science? And how do you explain the failure of philosophy, or what is left of it, to make any noticeable progress at all? The Apostle Paul’s mockery of philosophers as men who are ever seeking but never finding finds its parallel in the critique of philosophy by defenders of modern science. The endless and often trivial wrangles that characterize ‘analytic philosophy,’ dominant in many Anglo-American philosophy ‘departments’ to this day, seems to confirm that critique. [3].

    In a sentence that may surprise and delight contemporary defenders of political philosophy, Maxwell contends (in language almost identical to that of Leo Strauss) that “the proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness, in the public domain, of our most fundamental problems, our fundamental problems of knowledge and understanding, and our fundamental problems of living, personal, social and global—especially those that are most important and urgent.” To this, Strauss would replace “global” with “political,” and remark that a philosopher will seek criteria by which to define the important and the urgent. He would nonetheless surely endorse Maxwell’s claim that “philosophy has the task of keeping alive awareness of the important role that fundamental problems, and our attempts at solving them, have in all aspects of life and thought.” Strauss doubts that philosophy should “encourage everyone to become philosophers,” but he would undoubtedly concur with Maxwell in maintaining that philosophy “does not have its own particular intellectual territory, its unique field of expertise.” Philosophy orients itself by “the fundamental problem of all of thought and life”: “How can our human world, and the world of sentient life more generally, imbued with perceptual qualities, consciousness, free will, meaning, and value exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe?” From this question flows other “slightly less fundamental problems, ranging from “the fundamental nature of the physical universe,” to the connection (if any) between free will and physical determinism, and to questions concerning justice, friendship, and love. In a paraphrase of Weber’s lament about specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, Maxwell writes, “relentless, unmitigated specialization has produced a situation such that our fundamental problem is scarcely considered at all in the university,” or in education and research generally.

    It was David Hume, Maxwell sees, who called attention to the unclothed condition of the emperor, Induction. According to the doctrine of “standard empiricism,” evidence “decides what theories are accepted and rejected in science”; “in science, no factual thesis about the world, or about the phenomena, can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of empirical considerations” as established by careful observation and experimentation. Hume argued that “for all we know, the course of nature may suddenly change, so as to falsify any or all” existing scientific theories, however well established they may be. “It is not evidence that rules out” any alternative theory “but some kind of underlying assumption of uniformity or unity.” That underlying assumption amounts to “some kind of assumption about the nature of the universe”—what Karl Popper would call a “conjecture,” “no more than a guess about that of which we are most ignorant, the ultimate nature of the universe.” “Rationality requires that assumptions that are influential, problematic, and implicit be made explicit so that they can be subjected to imaginative and critical scrutiny, in an attempt to improve them.” Like Socrates, scientists need to be brought to the knowledge that they do not know. But this means that they need to become more like philosophers, less like ‘knowers,’ that is, ‘scientists.’

    The grand assumption of science, and of philosophy generally, is what Maxwell calls “physicalism,” which he may mean literally as “naturalism” (‘physis-ism), as distinguished from ‘spiritualism’ or the belief that “spirits, demons, gods, or God govern the way natural phenomena occur.” Given the latter assumption, it’s “quite rational to adopt such methods as prayer, sacrifice, consultation of prophets, oracles, omens and dreams.” Absent that assumption, one will prefer to deploy mathematics, experimentation, and thinking generally governed by reason, by thought governed by the principle of non-contradiction. This means that “metaphysics determines methodology.” Choosing the wrong metaphysics will likely result in ineffectual methods of attempting to produce desired results. Witch doctors typically enjoy less discernible success than medical doctors, even if good results sometimes follow from incantations, bad from prescriptions. This fact doesn’t necessarily faze us, as “humanity has found it extraordinarily difficult to accept that mere impersonal regularities govern natural phenomena.” Hence Babylonians “failed to develop astronomy” even as they took “very precise astronomical measurements,” and China “made a wealth of technological discoveries” without developing science. Both of these regimes were quite ’empirical,’ but in both cases, “the one element missing was the vital metaphysical view of physicalism,” the concept of nature.

    Given this “big, persistent, metaphysical assumption,” the next questions are: “What ought this metaphysical thesis concerning the unity of nature to be? How can we best go about improving it?” Maxwell proposes “aim-oriented empiricism” as the way to reestablish natural philosophy. Aim-oriented empiricism consists of a hierarchy of seven assumptions. They are:

    1. That the universe is partially knowable. “If this assumption is false, we will not be able to acquire knowledge whatever we assume.” Just because, as Aristotle says, man wants to know doesn’t mean he can. Nonetheless, to say we know that we do not know is itself knowledge, and would mean that the assumption must be true. If instead we say we don’t even know that, then we are claiming to know that we don’t know that we don’t know—the regression is infinite.
    2. That the universe is meta-knowable. By this Maxwell means that “there is some rationally discoverable thesis about the nature of the universe which, if true and if accepted, makes it possible progressively to improve methods for the improvement of knowledge.” By “rationally discoverable” he means that the thesis “is not an arbitrary choice from infinitely many analogous theses.” “Not only can we acquire knowledge; we can acquire knowledge about how to acquire knowledge.” 
    3. That the universe is comprehensible. This means “that the universe is such that there is something (God, tribe of gods, cosmic goal, physical entity, cosmic program, or whatever), which exists everywhere in an unchanging form and which, in some sense, determines or is responsible for everything that changes (all change and diversity in the world in principle being explicable and understandable in terms of the underlying unchanging something).” Maxwell additionally claims that this “something” is “present throughout all phenomena,” although that may imply an additional assumption of ‘pantheism,’ the denial of a Creator-God, separate from His creation.
    4. That the universe is physically comprehensible. That is, “the universe is made up [of] one unified self-interacting physical entity (or one kind of entity), all change and diversity being in principle explicable in terms of this entity.” This means “that the universe is such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified physical theory of everything is true.” “Physicalism” is the name Maxwell gives to this thesis.
    5. The best current specific version of physicalism. Maxwell’s term for this is “the blueprint,” and, like all blueprints, it is subject to alteration or to rejection and replacement.
    6. Accepted fundamental physical theories. Currently, they are general relativity and quantum mechanics.
    7. Empirical data.

    Far, then, from being the most certain of all, empirical data are the most subject to change, whereas the thesis that the universe is partially knowable could only be revised if we obtained a sort of God-like knowledge, albeit quite likely without God-like power, and could therefore assert, ‘The universe is not only partially but entirely knowable, and we know this because we have attained thorough knowledge of it.’ As it is, however, every one of these categories is open to revision, revisions being increasingly more difficult as one goes up the scale.

    Maxwell considers aim-oriented empiricism to provide physics “with a meta-methodology which facilitates improvement of the metaphysical assumptions and associate methods as physics advances…. As knowledge in physics improves, so metaphysical assumptions and methods improve as well, or, in other words, knowledge about how to improve knowledge improves.” An example of this might be the discovery of an impasse, an aporia, as seen in Socratic dialogues. Consideration of such a logical impasse, or an empirical impasse, can lead to improved understanding of what the problem is, and eventually to a possible rational resolution of it. 

    Maxwell takes his example from physics, as befits his natural-philosophy approach. “Einstein first discovered general relativity in the form of a metaphysical idea: gravitation is the variable curvature of space-time induced by matter and energy. He then had to work hard to turn this into a precise, testable physical theory.” With Newton, however, “not only did the then-current metaphysical ideas not lead to the new theory—they actually obstructed the correct interpretation of the new theory once it had been formulated.” The “standard empiricism” of Bacon, which Newton initially claimed as his own, “is refuted by its abject failure to solve the problem of induction,” as standard empiricism can’t even explain “the way theories are selected in physics.” “In physics only unified theories are ever accepted, with endlessly many empirically more successful disunified theories invariably being ignored: this means physics makes the big, implicit assumption that the universe is such that all disunified theories are false.” An assumption Newton shared with all physicists—this being an ’empirical fact’ about physicists, so to speak. Aim-oriented empiricism, by contrast, “faces no such contradiction” because “it openly acknowledges that persistent preference for unified theories in physics means that physics accepts a highly problematic metaphysical conjecture concerning the underlying unity of the universe,” part of the “hierarchy of conjectures” Maxwell has itemized. “What is really decisive is that aim-oriented empiricism succeeds in solving the problem of induction,” a problem fatal to the standard empiricism that denies the empirical reality of what physicists actually do. “Far better to adopt the view that physics does accept a substantial metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe, even if this thesis is a pure conjecture.” “The key argument for authentic natural philosophy” is the need to acknowledge that this assumption, that there is an underlying unity of the universe, “may be critically assessed, developed and, we may hope, improved.” Aim-oriented empiricism enables natural philosophers to discover their self-deceptions “because it requires us to explore the widest range of possible metaphysical conjectures, and associated methods, at different levels” of Maxwell’s ‘assumptions’ hierarchy. 

    There are two grounds for accepting such meta-knowability. First, throughout “the human endeavor to improve knowledge” there has been “a positive feedback between metaphysical conjectures and associated methods, on the one hand, and the growth of empirical scientific knowledge.” Otherwise, “we would still be stuck with Aristotelian science, or even the practices of witch doctors and shamans.” Inquiry into nature “becomes more rigorous intellectually if implicit assumptions are acknowledged explicitly,” whether or not such rigor results in empirical successes. Second, “as a result of accepting meta-knowability, our pursuit of knowledge may have much to gain and little to lose” because in that acceptance “we decide, in effect, that it is worthwhile to try to improve knowledge about how to improve knowledge.” Is it possible “that in the future intrinsically unpredictable changes in the laws of nature may occur which render our current knowledge obsolete”? Yes, but one gains nothing from “foregoing the attempt to acquire knowledge” for that reason.

    “Hume famously argued that what exists at one moment cannot necessarily determine what exists at the next moment”—the application of the critique of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy to the idea of physical causation. But the argument does not show that such necessary causation is impossible. The assumption of such causation is less absurd than its denial, given the observable regularities we find in the sequence of events. “Meta-knowability implies that, if we have no experience of them,” apparently causeless events “do not occur.” This is the empirical part of aim-oriented empiricism. The “aim-oriented” part of it acknowledges the act that “even our most modest items of common sense knowledge” imply major metaphysical and physical assumptions—that, for example, some undetected cosmic fire will not engulf me before I finish writing this sentence, an event that might make my effort to do so vain indeed. “Practical certainty has this usually unacknowledged conjectural and cosmological dimension inherent in it.” “If the success of science is illusory in a way we could not in principle discover, then this is a possibility we face whatever we assume; it is not something we can do anything about, and deserves to be ignored. If, on the other hand, the success of science is illusory in a way which can in principle be discovered, then aim-oriented empirical science provides us with the best means of unmasking the illusion. Either way, physicalism deserves to be accepted even in practical contexts.”

    What, then, of the most practical “context” of all, ethics? Our “most fundamental problem of all” is the question, “How can our human world, and the world of sentient life more generally, imbued with perceptual qualities, consciousness, free will, meaning, and value, exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe?” Descartes “quite clearly attempts to solve this problem” of the apparent contradiction between the human world and the physical universe by embracing it—by positing a dualism of morality and nature founded upon the distinction between the mind understood as wholly immaterial and nature as wholly material; the mind imposes its forms upon inchoate matter. But if so, how can the immaterial mind and the physical brain interact? “Given Cartesian dualism, there can only be free will if physical laws are violated in the brain,” but how can this be so? Worse, how can the clear and distinct ideas we conceive in our minds tell us anything about “the universe around us”? “How can experience deliver knowledge about the real world around us” to a mind that has no physical nature? From Locke to Berkeley to Hume to Kant to the analytic philosophers, the dilemma has persisted. The ‘analytics’ finally dismissed the problem as meaningless.

    But no one really thinks that it is. To solve it in terms of aim-oriented empiricism, Maxwell has recourse to a form of historicism. Being an empiricist, he cannot adopt the ‘idealist’ version of historicism propounded by Hegel. He instead invokes Darwin’s evolutionism, which “helps explain how and why purposeful living things can evolve—have evolved—in a physicalist universe.” Maxwell corrects Darwin’s Darwinism (or perhaps simply emphasizes the teaching of The Descent of Man, in which Darwin himself extends the claims of The Origin of Species) by saying that “the mechanisms of evolution themselves evolve as life evolves, purposive action playing an increasingly important role, especially when evolution by cultural means comes into play as a result of learning and imitation.” In this way “Darwinian evolution merges seamlessly with human history.” The mind-nature dualism of Descartes troubles itself with the false assumption “that physics could be in principle comprehensive and complete about the world around us,” whereas in fact physics “seeks to depict only a highly selected aspect of all that there is—the causally efficacious aspect, as it might be called, which determines how events unfold.” That is, theoretical physics “seeks to depict that which everything has in common with everything else.” That “does not mean that a complete physics would tell us everything factual about the world around us”—i.e., “what things look like, sound like feel like, or what it is like to be a certain kind of physical system (such as a living person.” A person blind from birth doesn’t know what redness is, but is not “debarred thereby from understanding all physics, including optics and the theory of color perception.” Physics “must omit these experiential qualities,” as to attempt to do so “would destroy the unity and explanatory power of physical theory.” Maxwell traces this distinction between the physical and the experiential to Spinoza, and then to Darwin, whose theory of evolution tells us what common sense also tells us, that “animals which could not see aspects of their environments, but only the contents of their own minds, would not last long in the real world.” The philosophers who follow Descartes “made a bad mistake” by supposing that “we really, most directly see, not aspects of the things in the environment around us, but rather the contents of our minds.” This subjectivist “blunder, perhaps more than any other, has condemned so much philosophy to irrelevance, and triviality.” This “initial blunder” severed philosophy from science. But “the insoluble consciousness/brain problem is created by the failure to formulate it properly in the first place.” This has led to what amounts to a political problem, the problem of the regime of modern academia, which restricts inquiry “to specialized research…ill-equipped to help humanity resolve problems of the real world.” Thus “humanity suffers from the failings of modern philosophy—failings most philosophers, even today, seem entirely unaware of.”

    Modern philosophy makes a mistake in abandoning modern science to scientists. But does modern science really need philosophy? Maxwell argues that it does because aimed-oriented empiricism can improve science in ways the standard empiricism scientists typically adopt cannot. Among other benefits, aim-oriented empiricism can tell scientists what the greatest scientists (Isaac Newton, James Clark Maxwell, Albert Einstein) actually did, which was not ’empirical’ as that term has come to be defined by modern scientists. As the term implies, aim-oriented empiricism raises the question of what modern science is for. Following Machiavelli, Bacon assigned science the task of conquering nature for the relief of man’s estate. But is that what science should be for? And is the answer to that question outside the realm of science. It is, but only if science is conceived as sundered from questions of ethics and politics, only if science is ‘value-free.’ But is it? 

    Maxwell isn’t out to return to pre-modern science. “If Aristotle’s view of the cosmos had led to a much more empirically successful research program for physics than Galileo’s Aristotle’s vision would be today accepted…instead of physicalism” in the modern sense. Modern physicalism is “empirically fruitful.” What does it mean to say that? “A metaphysical thesis, B, is empirically fruitful if a series of theories, T(1), T(2), [etc.], each more empirically successful than its predecessor, can be regarded as drawing every closer to capturing B in the form of a testable theory,” that is, if the series of theories can be unified. “The demand that a theory must be unified to be acceptable is thus a quasi-empirical demand. It commits physics to accepting the hierarchy of theses” outlined in Maxwell’s seven-level list, “all of which could be false, and could, in increasingly extreme circumstances, require revision.” Standard empiricism, strictly applied, can’t establish such hierarchical differentiation. Aim-oriented empiricism can. 

    Maxwell illustrates this point by arguing that Newtonian physics might have been led to Einsteinian physics more rapidly, had it been undertaken in the spirit of aim-oriented empiricism. That form of empiricism would also have quickly suggested that “the apparent contradiction between ‘waves’ and ‘particles’ in quantum theory must be addressed by “develop[ing] a version of quantum theory which specifies precisely what electrons, atoms, molecules may be when not undergoing observation.” In both of these cases he suggests ways in which scientists might have proceeded, both of which involve the thesis that “nature might be fundamentally probabilistic,” not deterministic in the strict way in which determinism is typically conceived. His point is not to prove such a hypothesis (he readily concedes that he isn’t a physicist or a mathematician) but that such matters “cannot really be discussed within standard-empiricism physics” at all. “The correct interpretation of Newtonian theory, Maxwellian electrodynamics, and quantum theory have all been delayed, for several decades, because persistent attempts have been made to interpret these theories in terms of outdated metaphysics.” 

    Consider, he suggests, cosmology, and think of a pivotal event in ancient natural philosophy. “Parmenides held that the universe is an unchanging homogeneous sphere” in which “all change and diversity is…an illusion” because change and diversity involve contradiction. Democritus rejoined that change and diversity do exist, but so does nothingness. The cosmos consists of atoms in motion, each surrounded by nothing, their collisions and combinations accounting for change and diversity. “Physicalism as I have formulated it” in its modern sense “emerges from Democritus’ reply to Parmenides.” But what if we “declare that Parmenides’ homogeneous sphere is a state of the entire universe, exhibiting unity, at a very special time, namely the moment at or just before the big bang,” that “state of extreme unity” that preceded the atomistic world (considerably revised from that of Democritus) that we now accept? The ‘big bang’ was then “an instant of spontaneous symmetry-breaking: the outcome is a multitude of virtual prior-to-big-bang states, virtual Parmenidean spheres, as it were,” from then on “unfolding” by means “of the interactions between these multitudinous virtual prior-to-the big-bang entities.” The cosmos “is composed of billions upon billions of fleeting virtual big-bang cosmic states of supreme Parmenidean unity.” Whereas Democritean atomism posits a dualism of empty space in contrast with solid, un-splittable atoms, “cosmic atomism” holds that being and nothingness inhere in everything, that change and diversity inhere “throughout all phenomena,” determine, perhaps probabilistically, the evolution of all phenomena. Maxwell does not claim that this conjecture is true, but rather that it is an atomism more consistent with Einsteinian physics, which posits space as curvilinear, and therefore not empty or shapeless. And he adds that standard empiricism rules out such conjecture, to the disadvantage of physics theorizing.

    More generally, “there is no agreed, acceptable, unproblematic metaphysical blueprint for physics today.” Contemporary physics confronts “four fundamental problems”: 1) Is nature deterministic or probabilistic? 2) How “is justice to be done to the quantum domain without any appeal being made to measurement? 3) How are general relativity and quantum theory to be unified? 4) How, and to what extent, is matter-and-force on the one hand, and space-time on the other, to be unified? Maxwell contends that metaphysics will form the prelude to new physical theories that address these problems, as indeed metaphysics did in the thought of Newton and of Einstein, whether they admitted it or not.

    What about the natural sciences—chemistry and biology, among others? Each division of natural science “needs to articulate and implement its own version of aim-oriented empiricism.” Not only will this acknowledge that scientific methods will vary from one division to another, and not only will this acknowledge that the aims of each division will differ somewhat from the aims of the others, but, “and most important,” aim-oriented empiricism “facilitates positive feedback between improving scientific knowledge and improving aims and methods (improving knowledge about how to improve knowledge” because aim-oriented empiricism is hierarchical, thereby enabling the scientist to ‘classify’ each step of his thinking in a coherent order.. “This positive feedback feature is, in my view, the nub of scientific rationality.” 

    Take, for example, scientific aims. Standard empiricism cannot say what scientific aims should be. Yet, ’empirically’ or as a matter of fact “all branches of natural science seek truth that is of value, either intrinsically or intellectually because of its inherent interest to us, or in a amore utilitarian way in that it can be used to obtain other things of value—health, prosperity, travel, entertainment, that is, the whole technological panoply of the modern world.” “We want science to discover that which is significant or of value”; “values, of one kind or another…pervade all of science.” Maxwell cautions that this doesn’t mean that “considerations of value can be permitted to influence judgments of truth”; “that it would be desirable or of value for something to be true does not, in itself, make it more likely to be true,” and we are better off not with wishful thinking but with skeptical thinking, with rigorous testing of happy-sounding claims of truth. We need to know what we don’t know, but we also need to know what we need to know, while never confusing what we suppose we know about what we need to know to be genuine knowledge. “Standard empiricism prohibits all this, in demanding that metaphysical ideas, and ideas about what is of value, are excluded from the intellectual domain of science.” If modern science “cannot determine what is just, or good” then it is intrinsically aimless, unable to distinguish trivial knowledge from important knowledge and therefore unknowing. This is why “we need to see science, ultimately, as a part of , or as contributing to, philosophy, rather than see philosophy as something that needs to be excluded from science.”

    How can modern natural science be better integrated into philosophy overall? Here is where Aristotle’s idea of teleology re-enters, although Maxwell is too shy to say it that way. “All living things are purposive in character”; they pursue goals. “Darwinian theory tells us what the basic goal of living things is: to survive and reproduce. All other goals pursued by living things contribute to this basic goal.” This doesn’t mean that evolution itself is purposive; Darwin regarded it as determined by “random inherited variations and natural selection,” factors “devoid of purpose.” Nor does this mean that all living things are conscious in pursuing survival and reproduction, that a living thing “knows what it is doing.” It only means that that’s what they do. Now, (and again unacknowledged by Maxwell), Aristotle would regard such a claim as too narrow. Living things do not necessarily act as if they ‘treat’ goals other than survival and reproduction as subservient to (as he puts it) mere life. They rather act, consciously or not, to fulfill their own nature, to flourish in accordance with their nature. Maxwell might or might not admit this, but he would quite likely say, ‘That is why the natural sciences need aim-oriented empiricism—precisely to enable such an Aristotelian considerations to be entertained.’

    Among those organisms that are conscious, observers notice “an enriched form of purposive explanation, which I shall call personalistic explanation,” explanations “enriched by imaginative identification with the person, or being, whose actions are being explained and understood.” Conscious beings are capable of “evolution by cultural means,” by “something like Lamarckian evolution,” whereby behavior becomes inherited, and habitual, inherited traits might eventuate in physical changes via ‘cultural’ selection. “Darwinian theory must itself make use of both kinds of explanation, physical and purposive—or, when sentient and conscious beings are involved, physical and personalistic.” This, Maxwell argues, might “help us understand how purposive, and personalistic, life has come to be in an ultimately purposeless universe.” Purposiveness evidently enhances evolution, in that sexual selection (“typically [by] females”) has the effect of enhancing “certain characteristic features” in a given species; Maxwell gives as his example the peacocks’ “splendid tails,” which have become more splendid over time because peahens have preferred peacocks that are endowed with them. And in the most self-conscious and ‘cultural’ being, the human being, language has developed, endowing human beings and human beings alone with “art, science, democracy, justice, elaborate technology, planned social progress, even wisdom.”

    That doesn’t show how purposiveness originated, only that it was evolutionarily useful when it did. Maxwell can only go so far as to suggest that “we need a new version of Darwinism which interprets the theory to be about life, not genes, which recognizes that all life is purposive in character, and which holds that the mechanisms of evolution themselves evolve so as to incorporate purposiveness in increasingly substantial ways until something like Lamarckian evolution emerges with the arrival of evolution by cultural means.” 

    The cultural means he has in mind primarily is education, which should be reoriented to encourage the “mammalian instinct” of “inquisitiveness.” Without it, “the fundamental impulse behind science has been lost.” To prevent this from continuing to happen in the schools, Maxwell recommends a “problem-oriented approach to scientific education” whereby teachers would set students to attempt to solve a “genuine, even unsolved scientific problem.” This would “cause curiosity to flourish and not die” in part by having students follow up on their “own questions—to transform feeling of stupidity and bafflement into articulated questions” and thus to bring them not only to science but to natural philosophy, to an awareness of the fundamental problems.

    More generally, can aim-oriented empiricism be “exploited by the general human endeavor to make progress towards as good a world as possible,” in personal life as well as public life? In terms of public life, under aim-oriented empiricism “social science emerges, not primarily as a science devoted to improving knowledge about social phenomena, but rather as a social methodology or social philosophy, devoted to helping humanity learn from, and exploit, the methodological methods of natural science in order to make social progress towards as good a world as possible. We especially we need a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic intellectual aim becomes to promote wisdom—wisdom being construed to be the capacity and active endeavor to realize (apprehend and create) what is of value to life, for oneself and others.” [4] In terms familiar to readers of Aristotle, this would entail sophia or theoretical wisdom—culminating in a glimpse of human nature—and phronēsis or practical wisdom, which aims at real-world actions that will induce that nature to flourish.

    Modern science has decisively informed modern philosophy from Descartes onward; “natural science creates the problems philosophy seeks to solve,” the problems addressed by “political philosophy, moral philosophy, aesthetics.” Modern science “has major and very alarming implications for questions about what is of value,” seeming to show that “all of human life” amounts to nothing more than physics, that free will and consciousness are illusions. “Do arguments concerning rival political systems make sense if everything is governed by physical law?” Since “our moral, political, and artistic life takes place in the real world, and it is science that tells us what sort of world this is, what it tells us cannot just be ignored.” Does modern science tell us that “moral nihilism” or moral relativism is true? “Or can we make sense of the idea that value qualities exist in the real world—some people objectively possessing moral qualities such as friendliness or courage, some works of art being objectively beautiful, graceful, passionate, profound? Is our world imbued with value features, or does science prohibit the existence of such features altogether?” It is philosophy which must give aims to aim-oriented empiricism, since standard empiricism rules itself out of so doing. What modern science tells us will set limits to our practical sense of how to realize our aims, but it cannot tell us what they are. That is, instead of reading the morally, politically, and esthetically nihilistic implications of modern science into our aims, it is necessary to see that modern science by its character rules out teleology, and therefore in principle cannot tell us anything about aims. This is a limitation on modern science, not a limitation on philosophy, and philosophic nihilists merely register a category mistake. What is more, the modern “philosophy of science” “helps to undermine the very thing it seeks to understand” by preventing itself from addressing why science is good, in the first place. “Only when science and the philosophy of science join together in creating aim-oriented empiricist science—thus recreating natural philosophy—can we have a genuinely rigorous kind of science.”

    For its part, the rational method of science will “help us improve problematic aims.” One’s “basic aims often are bad choices,” but if we consider our aims in the light of reason we will make fewer such choices. This means that “the whole character of philosophy needs to change” by “ceas[ing] to be a specialized discipline alongside other disciplines, obsessed with its own esoteric, specialized puzzles,” but rather “become again what it once was, that endeavor which seeks to keep alive awareness of our most urgent fundamental problems,” problems that concern “humanity as a whole and planet earth.” “Philosophy needs to become again what it was for Socrates: the attempt to devote reason to the growth of wisdom in life.” 

    Maxwell therefore titles his final chapter “Implications of Natural Philosophy for the Problems of Citizenship.” These implications, he maintains, are “profound and revolutionary,” leading, “potentially, to a new kind of academic enterprise–wisdom-inquiry.” “Humanity faces two great problems of learning: learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it, and learning how to create as good, as wise, as civilized a world as possible.” The first task is a theoretical problem, the second a practical one. “We cracked the first problem in the seventeenth century” with the discovery of modern natural philosophy,” with its “method for progressively improving knowledge and understanding of the natural world”—the “famous empirical method” which Maxwell has attempted to rescue from those who have obscured or misunderstood it along the lines of standard empiricism. “As long as humanity’s power to act was limited, lack of wisdom, of enlightenment, did not matter too much: humanity lacked the means to inflict too much damage on itself or the planet,” but now that the method, so misconceived, has succeeded to the extent that human beings actually can conquer nature—if hardly all of it, enough of it to transform the planet earth and humanity itself— then “wisdom has become, not a personal luxury, but a global necessity.” Having solved the first “great problem of learning,” it has become crucial to solve the second. What is more, we can “learn from our solution to the first great problem of learning how to solve the second one,” to “apply these general, progress-achieving methods to social life—to the unending task of creating a better, wiser world.” Unending: although human beings aim at ends, there will be no ‘end of history.’ Sensibly enough, Maxwell concedes that “the aim of creating global civilization is inherently and profoundly problematic.”

    Indeed so. Maxwell criticizes the Enlightenment for seeking to apply a “generalized scientific method, not to social life, but merely to social science.” It helped social scientists “improve knowledge of social phenomena” without “helping humanity learn how to become more civilized by rational means.” “This is the blunder that is at the root of our current failure to have solved the second great problem of learning.” By “civilized” Maxwell mean “a state of affairs in which there is an end to war, dictatorships, population growth, extreme inequalities of wealth, and the establishment of a democratic, liberal world government and a sustainable world industry and agriculture.” 

    Well, that’s quite a mouthful, and some if it tastes like mush. Here is the problem with Maxwell’s solution to the problem. First, in addressing the problem of how to learn about the nature of the universe, “we” didn’t actually crack the problem. Natural philosophers did, and those natural philosophers lived in the West and nowhere else, indeed in certain countries in the West and not, initially, others. This suggests that Socrates was right: that political philosophy comes before natural philosophy in order of rank, in priority, if not in chronology. If the modern political-philosophic enterprise begins with Machiavelli, then reaches into natural science with Bacon, then ‘we’ in the twenty-first century are looking at a ‘global’ problem of the nations and their political regimes, not simply at a problem for ‘the planet’ or for ‘humanity,’ neither of which exist under one regime. Maxwell tacitly admits this in a “world government” with a particular regime, liberal democracy. Second, this means that the problem of “learning how to create as good, as wise, as civilized a world as possible” can only be addressed, let alone solved, at the level of nations and their political regimes. That is (for example) the problem of education cannot be severed from the problem of regimes as it manifests itself within each nation, but especially the most powerful nations, and as they defend and advance their regime interests and their regime principles in competition (sometimes violent competition) with one another. Why would the rulers of China, of Russia, or of Iran cooperate with the rulers of the United States? As a matter of fact, they don’t, as the cacophony of the ‘United Nations’ attests, to say nothing of cyber warfare, control of information flows, and other forms of conflict so obviously demonstrate. 

    Maxwell sees this, in the end, at least to the extent that he writes, “Politics, which cannot be taught by knowledge-inquiry, becomes central to wisdom-inquiry, political creeds and actions being subjected to imaginative and critical scrutiny.” Indeed, “economics, politics, sociology, and so on, are not, fundamentally, sciences, and do not, fundamentally, have the task of improving knowledge about social phenomena.” They rather “articulate problems of living,” propose and assess policies, ranking those problems and policies into a hierarchy of aims. In this, they share with the humanities the task of “enhancing our ability to enter imaginatively into the problems and lives of others,” especially (one might add) when presented in the literary form of dialogue, as Socrates is portrayed to have done. 

    What can these inquiries into politics learn from natural-science empiricism as Maxwell understands it? Several things. Although human civil societies can scarcely be subjected to the double-blind experimental method—for starters, controlling the variables is a dauntingly balky task—some “proposals for action can be shown to be unacceptable quite decisively as a result of experience acquired through attempting to put the proposal into action.” The attempt to act in accordance with the proposal sometimes wrecks the aim of the proposal, as for example the many attempts to impose civil-social equality by empowering a centralized state charged with enforcing it, a regime change which more or less universally succeeds in instituting a new ruling class, and the civil-social inequality that goes with that institution. Given the difficulties of rigorously-controlled social experimentation, aim-oriented empiricists will need to resort to thought experiments and to ‘comparative politics’ (whereby they consider the results of regime paths actually taken); the sloppiness inherent in such inquiries counsels the virtue of patience, especially inasmuch as “humanity does not have the aptitude or desire for wisdom that scientists have for knowledge,” as Maxwell drily remarks. 

    What institutional reforms could be attempted? Maxwell ends by thinking about the regimes he knows best, those of the modern universities. “Every national university system needs to include a national shadow government, seeking to do virtually, free of the constraints of power, what the actual national government ought to be doing. The hope would be that virtual and actual governments would learn from each other.” This may strike one as a wan hope. At present, it is as likely that virtual and actual governments would corrupt each other, primarily because that is what they have been doing, lately. Modern university administrators are anything but “free from the constraints of power.” Almost all of them depend upon monetary support from governments, support that quite understandably comes not with strings but often with chain attached. Further, they have increasingly accepted constraints imposed by militant student groups, often egged on by faculty, to bend the educational purposes and methods of the universities in directions not suggested by aim-oriented empiricism. 

    “The world’s universities need to include a virtual world government which seeks to do what an actual elected world government ought to do, if it existed,” “working out how an actual democratically elected world government might be created.” But why would this happen? Why would a consortium of the world’s universities instead replicate that other world-government experiment, the woebegone United Nations? More fundamentally, would a world government, even one (somehow) democratically elected, be a good thing for humanity to have? 

    The good thing about “aim-oriented empiricism” is that it does allow the intellectual leg-room to walk into and around such a question, and many others. In this, Maxwell is a good Peripatetic. 

     

     

     

    Notes

    1. On the philosophic necessity of political philosophy, see Delba Winthrop: Aristotle: Democracy and Political Science (2019), reviewed on this site under the title, “What Good Is Democracy?” and Heinrich Meier: “Why is Political Philosophy?” in Meier: Political Philosophy and the Challenge of Revealed Religion (2019), discussed on this site under the title, “Chateaubriand and Political Philosophy.”
    2. For a defense of Aristotelian physics in light of modern physics, see David Bolotin: An Approach to Aristotle’s Physics: With Particular Attention to His Manner of Writing (1997), reviewed on this site under the title, “Aristotelian Physics.”
    3. See Stephen Schwartz: A Brief History of Analytical Philosophy (2012), reviewed on this website under the title, “What Is Analytic Philosophy?” For critiques of analytic philosophy, see Henry B. Veatch: Two Logics: The Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy (1969), reviewed on this site under the title, “Is Logic ‘About’ Anything?” and Stanley Rosen: The Limits of Analysis (1980), reviewed on this site under the title, “Delimiting Philosophy.”
    4. Maxwell elaborates this point in two books: From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities (London: Pentire Press, 2007) and Science and Enlightenment: Two Great Problems of Learning (Cham: Springer, 2019).

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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