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    The “New Atlantis”; Utopia or Dystopia?

    February 9, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Francis Bacon: The New Atlantis.

    Kimberly Hurd Hale: Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis in the Foundation of Modern Political Thought. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.

     

    Francis Bacon follows in the wake of Machiavelli’s repurposing of political philosophy and of politics at the service of the mastery of Fortune animated by the desire for acquisition of rule. Bacon adds the indispensable ‘modern’ nuance: That this mastery must be achieved by means of the conquest of nature, which underlies the verdicts of Fortune. Men can effect the conquest of nature “for the relief of man’s estate,” as Bacon famously put it, by means of empirical experimental science, with which he would replace what he regards as the brilliantly misdirected efforts of Scholasticism, in its efforts to reconcile the speculative philosophy of Aristotle with the teachings of Scripture. Bacon rejects Aristotelian natural science and the spiritual content of Christianity while, as Hurd puts it, “co-opting” one element of Christianity, its “compulsion toward universal charity” as “essential for the acceptance of modern science by the public.” Bacon’s final book, The New Atlantis, sketches the portrait of a new regime dedicated to that (as moderns came to say) project.

    In the body of his written works, Bacon wanted The New Atlantis to be placed immediately after his Sylva Sylvarum, a work on natural history. Uniquely among his writings, The New Atlantis is a fiction. It takes the natural science of the Sylva Sylvarum and ‘projects’ it into an imagined regime that deploys such science as both the purpose and the method of political rule.

    The narrator describes a sea voyage from Peru, its intended destinations China and Japan. But the ship and its crew sailed at the mercy of the wind, of nature. Driven off course, they ran out of food; they prayed, and their prayers seemed to have been answered when they sighted land—a “good haven” occupied by “a fair city,” “not great indeed, but well built.” The inhabitants initially refused to permit them to land, instead sending a party of eight out to the ship. After interviewing them briefly, they permitted the crew to come ashore for sixteen days to resupply themselves with water and food and to obtain materials for repairing their vessel. It transpired that the city residents knew the classical languages and used Christian symbols on their official documents, a seeming combination of classical and Christian motifs that suggest the Scholastic intellectual horizon the European sailors knew, however dimly, from church in their native Spain. Acting in a spirit of reciprocity, the ship officers offered pistols as a sign of friendship, but the city man “took them not, and would scarcely look at them.” It will transpire that they possessed more impressive weapons of their own, and quite likely regarded the gesture as a bit like offering beads to ‘savages.’

    Three hours later, another delegation arrived, asking the crew, “Are you Christians?” After having the shipmates swear they were not pirates, the city representative granted them permission to land. The eminent man in the boarding party expressed concern about any diseases the men may have and was reassured that any diseases they suffered were not infectious. He provided them with a fruit that evidently had medicinal properties. The same man refused the pistols the shipmates again offered, explaining that he already had a salary and did not want to be “paid twice.” Another man might say ‘bribed,’ but even the word seemed not to exist in the citizen’s usage. They were taken to the Strangers’ House, receiving a civil welcome from the townspeople who gathered along their route. Of the 150 sailors, seventeen were ill. During their three-day quarantine, they were fell fed; the sick men were given more of the medicinal fruits and a course of medication. During this initial period, the narrator, the captain of the ship, delivered a speech to his men, telling them to be on their best behavior, to “reform [their] own ways”—presumably, to restrain themselves from acting like sailors on shore. They “promised me to live soberly and civilly.”

    The Strangers’ House has a governor, a Christian priest, who brought word that they had permission to stay six weeks, with the possibility of an extension of their stay. He told them that they were the first residents of the House in 37 years. In still another gesture of hospitality, the government would defray all their costs. He set down one prohibition: Do not go more than a mile and a half beyond the walls of the city without permission. The sailors wondered at “this gracious and parentlike usage.” “It seemed to us that we had before us a picture of our salvation in heaven, for we that were awhile since in the jaws of death were now brought into a place where we found nothing but consolations.” The men thought “we were come into a land of angels.” The city residents seemed both benevolent and superhuman to them, and they found themselves (it is implied) happily in the status of children under the welcome authority of wise, even godlike fathers. That is, instead of the usual adventurers’ tale of civilized men encountering savages, the narrative begins to look like the reversal of such, an instance of primitive Europeans ‘discovering’ a superior people

    Hence the name of the city, Bensalem. Traditionally held to mean “possession of peace,” Jerusalem combines the Hebrew shalem, completeness, with jeru, ‘they will see the awe.’ Combined, then ‘Jerusalem’ means ‘they will see the completeness in awe.’ Zechariah 8:3 describes Jerusalem as the City of Truth, God’s dwelling-place on earth. ‘Bensalem’ combines completeness with the Hebrew word for ‘son,’ and so, ‘Son of Completeness.”  Jesus of Nazareth is surely the Son of Completeness, and the sailors asked the priest/governor of Strangers’ House who their apostle was—who brought Christianity to this isolated island—he was pleased to tell the story. In 20 A.D., the islanders saw a “pillar of light” one mile offshore. One of “the wise men of the society of Salomon’s House” saw that this was the “Finger” of God, a miracle. He saw the Completeness in awe. God left the islanders an ark with both the Old and New Testaments in it; the New Testament hadn’t yet been written down for the churches in the West. There was also a letter from Bartholomew, a servant of Jesus Christ, promising “salvation and peace and good will from the Father and the Lord Jesus.” Each one of the diverse collection of islanders—they included Hebrew, Persians, and Indians—could read these documents “as if they had been written in his own language.” “And thus this land was saved from infidelity,” the governor concluded.

    The sailors assured the governor that they thought of this “rather as angelical than magical,” godly not satanic. And they wondered how it is that the islanders know about Europe but Europeans know nothing of Bensalem. He explained that “three thousand years ago,” approximately 1,400 BC, ocean-going travel was much more extensive than it is today. Many nations visited the island, which may account for the origin of its ethnic diversity. At that time, Atlantis existed, as described in Plato’s Timaeus and Crito. Atlantis was located in what is now called America on a hill that could be ascended like a “ladder to heaven”; it had a temple and a palace. Its King, Altabin, was “a wise man and a great warrior.” The city perished in a deluge, which explains why the natives of North America today are “a thousand years at least from the rest of the world” in their civilization. Since Atlantis was the island’s chief trading partner, the islanders lost much of their commerce with the outside world while navigation declined in the other parts of the world, perhaps because they were ruined by wars or because they declined in “a natural revolution of time.” 

    In the ensuing centuries, the islanders maintained their navigational capabilities and resumed their shipping. But they preferred to “sit at home.” This policy was instituted by the wise King Solamona, who ruled about 1,900 years ago, approximately 300 B.C. Solamona was the lawgiver of Bensalem, “a divine instrument thought a mortal man.” That is, Bensalem’s laws were framed by a man named after Jerusalem’s proverbially wise king. In China, the prohibition against foreign travel has been “a poor thing and hath made them a curious, ignorant, fearful, foolish nation.” But Solamona’s policy has had a different effect because he ordained that any foreign visitors be treated so well that they would not want to return to their native countries. Only thirteen—the symbolic number of atheism—have done so, and “whatsoever they have said could be taken where they came but for a dream.”

    Solamona also ordained the establishment of Salomon’s House, which contains a natural history that the original Hebrew Solomon wrote, lost to other nations. If this New Jerusalem is also the New Atlantis, it combines Christian wisdom with the wisdom of natural science, ascribed not to the Greeks but to a wise Hebrew. Salomona then founded the College of the Six Days Works,” dedicated to “the finding out of the true nature of all things”—advancing natural science beyond the bookishness that might have restricted it, had the new Solomon, Salomona, rested satisfied with merely conserving the knowledge of his namesake. [1] Nor was Salomona content to ignore any scientific discoveries in other parts of the world. He set a policy of sending missionary expeditions to be carried out by Fellows or Brethren of Salomon House. At any given time, three such persons will be voyaging abroad, gathering knowledge of “affairs and state” in other countries, with special interest in the sciences and the arts, particularly manufactures and inventions—what we now call the applied sciences or technology, a word that combines ‘art’ and ‘reason’ or knowledge. “Thus, you see,” the governor told them, invoking the ‘seeing’ of Jerusalem as it relates to ‘Solomonic’ natural science, “we maintain a trade, not for gold, silver, or jewels, nor for silks, nor for spices, nor any other commodity of matter but only for God’s first creature, which was Light, to have light (I say) of the growth of all parts of the world.” Light is the first principle of nature. Understand the first principles of science as seen in scientific discoveries found everywhere (is nature not universal?) and you will maintain the advantages you received from possessing the only surviving account of Old Testament natural science and from the first available written version of the New Testament. Writing permits the Bensalemites to preserve what they have learned, while forging ahead with new research. Light also recalls the Pillar of Light, the supposedly miraculous Giver of the three sacred (but also natural) books, a miracle carefully interpreted by the Brethren of Solomon’s House.

    “We were all astonished to hear so strange things so probably told,” the narrator recalls. “We took ourselves now for free men” (although in fact they were well restrained); we “lived most joyfully,” meeting with men of “such humanity and such a freedom and desire to take strangers, as it were, into their bosom as was enough to make us forget all that was dear to us in our own countries,” for “if there be a mirror in the world worthy to hold men’s eyes, it is that country.” That is, the Bensalemites’ policy of hospitality toward strangers—a seductive hospitality that makes strangers forget their homelands and to want to stay—alters the Platonic-Socratic notion of learning as ‘remembrance,’ learning described as a recollection of the ‘forms’ or ‘ideas,’ which men, sunk in their bodies and in the customs of their cities, have ‘forgotten’ and can only recover through a dialectical ascent from the ‘cave’ in which they can only see the shadows of physical idols on the walls, far from the natural light of truth. The forward-looking natural science of Bensalem proceeds by a forgetting of the political caves of the diverse sailors by the sailors. But would the sailors ascend to the light of truth sought by the Brethren of Solomon’s House? Or would they merely luxuriate in the benefits of the technologies discovered by the Brethren?

    The Brethren culled two of the voyagers from the rest, inviting them to a ceremony called the Feast of the Family, “a most natural, pious, and reverend custom” which shows the nation of Bensalem “to be compounded of all goodness,” the narrator exclaims. All goodness consists, as he had already learned, of a reconciliation of natural science and religion, of the Solomon met in the Old Testament with the Solomon revealed in his lost book. A Feast of the Family, paid for “by the state,” is “granted to any man that shall live to see thirty persons descended of his body alive together, and all above three years old.” That is, the Feast rewards generativity, longevity, and healthy offspring—natural vigor. The Father of the Family, called the Tirsan, is attended by all family members. During the attendant ceremonies he serves as a judge, settling “any discord or suits between any of the family,” in keeping with shalem or completeness, a term reminiscent of shalom or peace. The governor of the city executes “by his public authority the decrees and orders of the Tirsan,” although these are seldom disobeyed, “such reverence and obedience” do the Bensalemites “give to the order of nature.” That is, the Bensalem regime’s combination of Biblical piety and natural science tends to make piety reinforce science. What Bensalemites ‘see in awe’ is the completeness of an island at peace, thanks to the wise application of scientific knowledge. 

    The Tirsan also designates one of his sons to live with him in the Tirsan’s house; the son’s title is “Son of the Vine.” That is, the practice of conventional aristocracies, primogeniture, inheritance of the father’s estate by the firstborn son, is replaced by the rational or quintessentially natural principal of choosing the son worthiest in his father’s judgment. The Son of the Vine is the son of nature, a natural version of a biblical Son of God. Perhaps nature replaces God in Bensalem? The Feast features a ceremonial hymn praising Adam and Noah, who peopled the world, and Abraham, Father of the Faithful; here, the Faithful duly celebrate natural generativity, and indeed the Bensalemites “say that the King is debtor to no man but for propagation of his subjects.” They add thanksgiving for our Savior. The Tirsan blesses his descendants, one by one, in the name of “the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, and the Holy Dove,” thereby combining natural, familial piety with Christianity, understood first of all as the rule of peace, of shalom.

    After this, the narrator next met with Joabin, a Jewish merchant. It is noteworthy that the audiences granted to the voyagers moves from many to few to one. Jews, we learn, are left “to their own religion” in Bensalem. The Christianity of the city tolerates them, and why not? Solomon himself was a scientist, according to the book held at Salomon’s House. The graciousness is reciprocal. Unlike Jews elsewhere, Bensalemite Jews “give to our Savior many high attributes, and love the nation of Bensalem extremely.” That is, the Jews of Bensalem are Bensalem’s Jews, patriotic Bensalemites and admirers, if not worshippers, of Jesus. The narrator praised the Feast of the Family to Joabin, saying, “I had never heard of a solemnity wherein nature did so much preside.” This insight shows that the rulers of Bensalem have chosen well the man they’ve singled out for unique treatment. He understands the regime, at least on the simplest level.

    For his part, Joabin praised Bensalem as the most chaste nation in the world in body and in mind. Here, as the narrator has witnessed, the natural family is indeed respected and fostered in the manner commanded by God. He criticized European brothels and marriage customs. In Bensalem, he said, there are no brothels, no homosexuality, and no polygamy. Joabin promised an opportunity to see not only a natural father but a Father of Salomon’s House, who was returning from a twelve-year voyage as one of the scientific (not proselytizing and religious) missionaries to foreign countries. The Brethren were evidently also Fathers—Brethren amongst themselves, ruling Fathers of the people? There is the nature of the body and the nature of the mind. Ordinary fathers are fathers of the body, generating offspring under the grateful eye of the King, ruling by choice, by reason, insofar as they judge intrafamily disputes and select their successor. The Brethren who are Fathers of the mind may have a far more comprehensive, complete, ‘shalem-ic’ status.

    The returning Father did indeed invite the narrator to a private audience, after courteously meeting, then politely dismissing, the other foreigners. He began with a benediction and a promise: “God bless thee, my son; I will give thee the greatest jewel I have. For I will impart unto thee, for the love of God and men, a relation of the true state of Salomon’s House.” He outlined what he would say, “to make you know the true state of Salomon’s House,” repeating the last phrase for heuristic emphasis. God and love of God, love not merely of neighbor but of men, men everywhere, issue in knowledge, not so much knowledge of God or neighbors but (as will soon become known) of nature. Like Aristotle, the Father considered knowledge of a thing to entail knowledge of four causes: the ‘final’ cause or purpose of the thing (“the end of our foundation”); the ‘efficient’ or first cause (“the preparations and instruments we have for our works”); the ‘formal’ cause (“the ordinances and rites which we observe”). But in place of the ‘material’ cause—for example, the elements comprised in a compound—the Father substituted what might be called a ‘locomotive’ cause, the energy seen in the thing. For Salomon’s House, this consists of “the several employments and functions whereto our fellows are assigned.” The reason for this substitution can be seen in the purpose of Salomon’s House: “the knowledge of Causes and secret motions of things, and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible.” The Fellows of Salomon House intend to overcome material causes with human functions founded upon the human knowledge that can be acquired through intelligently directed human action. To use language Bacon uses elsewhere, they will experiment on nature, torture her to force her to reveal her secrets, conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate. 

    The locomotive causes of Salomon’s House are extensive. In deep caves (not natural but dug by men), “remote alike from the sun and heaven’s beams and from the open air,” they coagulate, indurate, refrigerate, and conserve bodies, produce new artificial metals, and even to cure some diseases, prolonging the lives of “some hermits who choose to live there.” They also experiment with soils and compound cements in the caves,” as “the Chineses do their porcelain,” although we have them in greater variety, and some of them more fine.” 

    Opposite this, the “Lower Region,” the Bensalemites had built the “Upper Region,” with its high towers, some set on mountains so that the highest extend three miles into the sky. These might recall the Tower of Babel, but unlike the systems of philosophy and perhaps of religion that center human intelligence on words, these towers also serve as sites of action, experiments in isolation, refrigeration, conservation, astronomical bodies and meteorological forces. The towers also have their resident hermits, “whom we visit sometimes, and instruct what to observe.” 

    Finally, there is the “Middle Region” of this man-made universe, not so much geocentric as anthropocentric. On it we have “great lakes both salt and fresh, whereof we have use for the fish and fowl” and for experimenting with the effects of earth, air, and water on “natural bodies.” We have desalinization and resalinization pools (surely of interest to the English, living on their island in the ocean). We also experiment with what much later generations would call ‘alternative’ energy: water power, wind power. They do experiments on chemicals—producing, among other things, the “Water of Paradise,” an elixir “very sovereign for health and prolongation of life,” along with medicines. Bacon’s mentor, Thomas Hobbes, identified the ruling passion of human beings as the fear of violent death. Salomon’s House aims at curing human bodies and, to the extent proven possible by experimentation rather than by prophecy or speculation, ‘curing’ or at least warding off death itself.

    The Fellows also use the Middle Region agricultural experiments—for grafting and inoculating plants to cause them “to come up earlier or later than their seasons, and to come up and bear more speedily than by their natural course they do.” We also make them bigger, their fruits more appealing than they are naturally. “We have also have means to make divers plants rise by mixtures of earths without seeds, and likewise to make divers new plants differing from the vulgar, and to make one tree or plant turn into another.” That is, the Fellows of Salomon’s House have conquered the natural ‘kinds’ God ordains in the Garden, mastering the limits of nature. As for the animals, we keep them in “parks and enclosures…not only for view or rareness but likewise for dissections and trials, that thereby we may take light what may be wrought upon the body of man.” Godlike, we can resuscitate “some that seem dead in appearance.” We can kill, too, using the animals to test poisons “and other medicines.” Animals are useful to learn more about the techniques of surgery. As with plants, we can make them bigger or smaller, more fruitful or less, and we can produce new “kinds” of them, too. “Neither do we this by chance, but we know beforehand of what matter and commixture what kind of those creatures will arise.” Those saltwater and freshwater pools stocked with fish enable us to perform similar experiments on them. 

    The Fellows have learned to manipulate all the bodily senses. We stimulate taste with new drinks, breads, meats; we stimulate sight by altering light and learning about precious stones, fossils, and minerals. We can alter sound with several technologies, including hearing aids. We can appeal to the sense of smell with manufactured perfumes. Regarding the body as a whole, we conduct experiments on furnaces and other heating technologies and use engine houses for the development of submarines and flying machines. Nor do we restrict our experiments to mineral, vegetable, animal, and human matter. We address the mind in the mathematics house within the Salomon House complex and we also debunk the “deceits of the senses”—conjurors’ tricks and optical illusions. The Father hints that these are the real bases of so-called miracles. We could perform such illusions ourselves, but “we do hate all impostures and lies,” and have “severely forbidden” such activities to “all our Fellows, under pain of ignominy and fines.”

    They don’t entirely reject impostures and lies, or at least concealments, when it comes to their foreign policy. Twelve Fellows are selected to voyage to foreign countries, in ships flying false colors to avoid identification of their origin. These men bring back books, abstracts, and plans of experiments from these places. “These we call the Merchants of Light”—perhaps in truth more like pirates, since there is no mention of any fair exchange for the materials gleaned, although I may be a reader of too suspicious a cast. This, at any rate, is Bensalem’s approach to commerce, which aims exclusively at what the Fellows of Salomon’s House consider the true riches, the riches of the human mind.

    Meanwhile, back in Salomon’s House itself, there are those more ominously named “Depradators,” who collect records of the experiments culled from foreigners. The “Mystery Men” gather “all the experiments of all mechanical arts, and also of practices which are not brought into arts.” The “Pioneers or Miners” actually try these new experiments and the “Compilers” organize the data from the experiments, “to give better light for the drawing of observations and axioms out of them.” The “Dowry Men” or “Benefactors” consider these experiments, “cast[ing] about how to draw out of them things of use and practice for man’s life, and knowledge as well for works as for plain demonstration of causes, means of natural divinations, and the easy and clear discovery of the virtues and parts of bodies.” “Then, after divers meetings and consults of our whole number to consider to consider of the former labors and collections, we have three that take care, out of them, to direct new experiments of a higher light, more penetrating into nature than the former. These we call Lamps.” The “Inoculators” conduct the experiments so ordained. The Fellows avoid sinking into an exclusively ‘applied’ science by designating three of their number to “raise the former discoveries by experiments into greater observations, axioms, and aphorisms.” These ‘theoretical physicists,’ as it were, are the “Interpreters of Nature.” 

    Salomon’s House thus has its carefully ordered regime. This includes not only the Fellows but also “novices and apprentices” who insure that “the succession of the former employed men do not fail.” That is, this regime has its own form of royal succession or aristocratic primogeniture, evidently based not on bloodlines but capability. There are many “servants and attendants, men and women.” All “take an oath of secrecy for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret, though some of those we do reveal sometimes to the state and some not.” If, someday, they were to learn how to split the atom and weaponize the energy released, the discoverers and inventors themselves would decide whether to share this knowledge with the day-to-day rulers of Bensalem. In this important sense, then, the Fellows of Salomon’s House rule Bensalem, constituting a sort of ‘deep state’ of natural philosophers or scientists. 

    The fourth, ‘formal’ cause of Salomon’s House, its ordinances and rites, consists of two exhibition galleries. In the first we exhibit “patterns and samples of all the more rare and excellent inventions”; in the second we exhibit statues of “all principal inventors” and discoverers, including “your Columbus,” who sailed from the narrator’s native Spain. In the Politics, Aristotle deprecates the practice of rewarding reformers of the laws and institutions of the polis. In The New Atlantis, the Father lauded not so much political reformers but ‘reformers’ of human knowledge. Since advances in human knowledge might lead to political reform or even revolution, the Fellows evidently take some care in selecting the knowledge they release to the ‘civilians.’ They visit Bensalem’s major cities, revealing “such new profitable inventions as we think good” and also declaring “natural divinations of diseases, plagues, swarms of hurtful creatures, scarcity, tempests, earthquakes, great inundations, comets, temperature of the year, and divers other things,” adding “counsel thereupon what the people shall do for the prevention and remedy of them.” Natural-philosophic revelation replaces divine revelation; natural prophecy replaces divine prophecy; natural providence replaces divine providence.

    Not to seem to neglect piety, the Father mentioned “certain hymns and services” observed by the Fellows in which they praise and thank God “for his marvelous works,” asking also for “his aid and blessing for the illumination of our labors and the turning of them into good and holy uses.” One of those holy uses, the Father announced, concerned the narrator. “God bless thee, my son”—the narrator has been adopted—and “God bless this relation [i.e., this narrative] which I have made. I give thee leave to publish it for the good of other nations, for we here are in God’s bosom, a land unknown.” This marks an apparent change in Salomon House’s foreign policy. The Father thus deputized his new ‘son’ not as a merchant of light but a messenger of light, the light that emanates from the methods of experimental natural philosophy, with its reconception of both nature and of man’s place in it. There is no record that he gave the narrator a navigational chart whereby voyagers from other nations might come to visit Bensalem. And, given the careful policy of disseminating scientific knowledge firmly in place, the Father may not have worried much about other nations attacking or eventually dominating the greatest empire of knowledge in the modern world.

    As Kimberly Hurd Hale remarks, in his attempt to coordinate theory and practice, natural philosophy and what we would call applied science, including technology, Bacon failed in the short term but succeeded (in many ways spectacularly) in the long term. As an experimental scientist, he didn’t amount to much, and although his “tenure as Lord Chancellor is perhaps the closest the world has come to witnessing a philosopher king,” he “attempt to guide the political development of England failed,” his reputation tarred by accusations of corruption. Nonetheless, “his political and philosophical influence resonate through the centuries,” far beyond the borders of England. Machiavellian politicians, builders of the modern state, aspirers to the mastery of Fortuna, found ready use for Baconian scientists, aspirers to the conquest of nature. In their turn, the scientists have found in the modern state protection for and support of their research. The symbiosis makes sense, as Bacon was a careful student of Machiavelli, (even as Hobbes was a careful student of Bacon, and Locke of Hobbes); in the spirit of modernity, no philosopher in this line left his predecessor’s work unrevised, and indeed Machiavelli himself was a careful student, and reviser, of ‘the ancients,’ whose “wisdom” Bacon himself extolled, with some irony.

    Hale’s own innovation in scholarship is to claim that the New Atlantis, which “initially reads as a utopian tale,” actually serves as a warning against the possible excesses of “scientific rule,” a regime quite “removed from the type of society he advocates elsewhere.” The book, his only work of fiction, “expresses both his great hope and his deep reservations” about his own ‘project.’ 

    Like Machiavelli, Bacon knows “that Christianity and Christian charity have irreversibly changed the world. Science offers a way to channel the charitable compulsions of Christian Europe into a less destructive path,” the path of religious warfare, which Europeans would continue to trod for several generations after Bacon’s death. If the mythical Atlantis described by the ancients ended in telluric catastrophe, the New Atlantis might not, if the natural forces which wiped out its forebear could be tamed, and if the religious forces that threatened to inundate could be made to subside. Hale contends that Bacon also thinks “that modern science could easily sink modern society beneath the seas,” that the modern solution to the theologico-political crisis of modernity might itself ignite an equal or worse crisis, which could only be managed by attending to the wisdom of the ancients, judiciously revised. As she puts it, “Bacon recognized that modern science would irreversibly change political society; the New Atlantis shows us what that society could become without a strong commitment to liberal principles,” including political liberalism or republicanism, “and philosophical questioning,” now primarily in the form of scientific experimentation.

    Hale first looks as the old Atlantis, as sketched by Critias in Plato’s dialogues, the Timaeus and the Critias. In the Timaeus, Socrates meets at night with Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates, along with an unnamed fourth person. Critias begins a speech about Atlantis, defeated long ago in a war with Athens. He “pauses for Timaeus to give a speech about the origin and nature of the cosmos” before resuming his speech in the dialogue named after him. “His speech concerns the structure and regime of the city of Atlantis”; Critias never gets around to narrating the war. Since Hermocrates never offers a speech, and since he played a role in the impending, disastrous war Athens waged against Hermocrates’ “native Sicily,” Hale suggests that the now imperial Athens military defeat, narrated by Thucydides, parallels the defeat of imperial Persia by the old Athens, the history narrated by Herodotus. Hermocrates’ ‘missing’ speech would be spoken by Thucydides, who “argues that stasis is impossible in politics,” even as it permeates nature, according to Timaeus’ speech. In his dialogues, Plato himself frequently “chang[es] the horizon and show[s] philosophy how to adapt to political reality in a way that allows it to shape political reality.” 

    Timaeus is no “true philosopher” but a knower, lacking “the erotic yearning toward truth” that animates the philosopher’s soul. He is at home in the polis, unlike Socrates, the persistent questioner. Timaeus is a lecturer, and Socrates here a listener, a learner who wants to hear speeches describing how the regime he outlined in his dialogue the Republic will look if it were realized in practice, and thus subjected to motion. If it must change, what will it change into? In the end, according to what we learn in the dialogues, it will turn into the regime described in the Laws, a regime less just but more “robust” than the regime of the Republic, which can be sustained only so long as it remains a ‘city in speech.’ The real, imperial Athens is about to endure a great motion—the greatest the world has ever seen, according to Thucydides—and it will not end as well as the regime of the Laws, with its more modest and realistic adjustments to the city in speech.

    Critias, chronicler of the old Atlantis, is no Thucydides. He is a poet telling a traditional tale “passed down through his family from Solon,” the founder of Athens, not a philosophic historian narrating the events of a real war. “Critias embodies the love of one’s own,” the handed-down traditions of his own family and city, “that makes the Republic‘s city impossible,” as it identifies wisdom “with the memory of one’s own past, rather than philosophical striving,” identifying “the good with the old.” This is not simply to denigrate poetry. In telling the story of Atlantis, Solon tells a myth, the stuff of poetry; as a “consummate statesman,” Solon “does not disparage poetry” any more than Plato does, not only in packing his dialogues with such stories but in portraying the life of philosophical striving in dialogues, in dramas, not in treatises. “Poetry is extremely powerful, especially when woven with reason and truth,” as Bacon evidently understands in his own turn to storytelling about the new Atlantis.

    Critias tells the story of Solon’s meeting with Egyptian priests. Although Solon initially “tries to impress the learned priests by reciting the events and genealogy of human beings after a devastating flood,” the priests deprecate this effort as childish because such natural disasters “erase vestiges of ancient ways.” The Greeks know how to rebuild, how to innovate, but they “need myths to teach them piety and prudence”; they “lack ancient wisdom,” which Egypt has retained—Egypt, the land of the changing, flooding Nile, but also of the prudent use of the Nile and its rhythms for agriculture. Plato takes the priests’ point. Not only Greeks, but most men everywhere need civic myths because they, like children, do not have “fully developed reason.” Therefore, “political philosophers,” as distinguished from the childlike natural philosophers who preceded Socrates, “must employ myths if they are to educate the city.” In this, however, he surpasses the Egyptian priests in prudence. The priests believe that their myths are historically true, that their “wisdom is knowledge of the historical past and truth is pure facts.” They describe the myth of Phaethon as symbolic of “the movement of heavenly bodies and the periodic outbreak of wildfires, while completely missing the lesson of the myth: those who seek to rule to prove their wisdom and excellence will cause the destruction of themselves and their societies.” Plato suggests that the priests’ “scientific analysis of myth” because “it ignores the larger truth conveyed by the myth and because scientific-philosophical discourse is devoted to discovering truth, and thus should not be used in the service of interpreting myths.” Natural philosophers or scientists are literal-minded, all too literal-minded, as “the literal truth or falsity of a myth is irrelevant” to the more important question of “whether or not the myth is helpful or harmful to the young” in years and the young in mind.

    The natural philosophers of Salomon’s House diverge from both of these courses. Uninterested in educating their citizens in science, they “use their scientific understanding to create myths and miracles.” “There is no possibility of philosophic education in Bensalem,” Hale contends, although it would be more accurate to say that there is no possibility of a general philosophic education there, since someone has educated the Fathers of Salomon’s House. The Fathers are “both scientists and priests” who “do not merely regulate religion,” as the philosophers in Plato’s city in speech do, but “actively create it.” 

    Critias describes Atlantis as “an alliance of kings who rule over a wide-spread empire.” The Athens that defeats it is a self-governing polis whose statesmen make alliances with other Greek city-states on an as-needed basis—the foreign policy of the philosopher-kings of Plato’s city in speech. Athens defeated imperial Atlantis (even as the real Athens defeated imperial Persia), but both succumb to the overwhelming natural disaster, the flood. Critias, an aristocrat “who helped overthrow Athenian democracy,” hopes to “legitimize Socrates best regime by showing that not only could it exist, but a form of it has existed in the past,” in old Athens. Plato and his Socrates doubt it. Critias’ poetizing unrealism becomes obvious when he claims that the topic of war is more difficult to discuss than the origin of the cosmos, Timaeus’ topic. In upholding the love of his own, familial piety, he sharply departs from the Guardians in the city of speech, who don’t know their own children, hold their wives in common, unrealistically (because unnaturally) placing “civic virtue above love of one’s own.” He understands neither natural science nor Plato’s ironic political philosophy; he is unrealistic about nature as a whole and unrealistic in his interpretation of Platonic political philosophy, which produces a regime that Critias’ beloved Athens cannot embody, as Critias hopes, because no polis can ever embody it. Critias is no more a philosopher than Timaeus. He serves Plato’s purposes in showing “how a man inclined to politics and open to philosophy can become a tyrant,” a man who will overturn the democratic regime of contemporary Athens. 

    Critias’ Atlantis is a hereditary monarchy, prosperous, and dedicated to technological progress, which “ensured that they were twice as prosperous as if they had relied on the gods and nature alone.” Hale pauses to observe that too many harvests will deplete the soil, although she does not observe that the Bensalemite scientists have remedies for such hazards. She also observes that the Atlantean monarchs, “relentlessly progressive,” did “not seek stasis, unlike Bacon’s Solamona.” But does Bensalem’s founder really seek stasis, or rather controlled progress? At any rate, Critias holds that “human nature is not oriented to virtue, it is oriented to luxury,” and he worries that the slow inundation of virtue by the flood of naturally luxury-loving human beings must finally ruin a city. But he “fails to address the possibility of a regime that can cultivate virtue in the people.” “He seeks virtue, but he does not understand how virtue is achieved in political society.” 

    Hale suggests that Bacon sees and accepts Plato’s ironic teachings about utopias dreamed up by natural philosophers and politicians who get both nature and politics wrong. Unlike Aristotle, “Plato does not argue that men are political animals; men form political associations because nature does not fulfill all their needs. Anti-Aristotelian, but Platonic Bacon’s attempt to overcome nature in the service of human progress is merely an extension of this idea.” But is it? Would Plato, or Plato’s Socrates, or Plato’s Athenian Stranger, regard the project of overcoming nature scientifically, with a new form of natural philosophy, as any more plausible than the attempt to overcome, as distinguished from moderating, nature in the city in speech’s quest to fully instantiate the idea of justice? Granted, that “the ideal city of the Republic will always be misunderstood and corrupted by political men seeking to glorify themselves or their cities”; granted, that “philosophers are always in danger of aiding tyrants”; granted, that “a political philosophy that understands these dangers can be found” in Plato’s account of Atlantis. The question Hurd wants to answer in the affirmative, that such a political philosophy can also be found in Bacon’s account of the old and especially the new Atlantis, is the one to which she now turns.

    “Bacon does not disparage the Christian virtue of charity; he rather reinterprets it to support a much more robust, self-interested Christianity,” one fully consistent with the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate. Like Machiavelli and the Tudor dynasty of his own time, Bacon “approves of a Christianity that is molded to serve the best interests of the political state.” He will ‘nationalize’ Christianity, divide and conquer it, while at the same time replacing Christian Aristotelianism with the “new learning.” (“He vehemently opposes the Schoolmen.”) In this, “his project is far more comprehensive, more ambitious, than that of Machiavelli,” the “scope of his imperial ambitions” far wider. Machiavelli would master Fortuna; Bacon would master nature. Also unlike Machiavelli, Bacon would not attempt to wipe out the regimes of ‘the few’ in favor of regimes of the one or the many. He wants “a highly structured class society, one where philosophers serve as the educators and advisors of princes.” He will replace the old aristocracies of Catholic priests and feudal grandees with a new aristocracy of natural philosophers. Although at times Hurd describes Bacon as a republican, he is no James Madison, no democratic republican. He wants aristocratic republics, ruled by a new aristocracy. Bacon understands that “science, a wholly undemocratic enterprise, is forever beholden to the public for support and resources. Public opinion matters in scientific research; therefore, it is essential that scientists study the public,” develop a new political science, lest they suffer the fate of Socrates. 

    Bacon therefore regarded dissimulation as “the mark of a wise statesman.” A philosopher-statesman might then turn to poetry, “a product of imagination,” as the mode “best suited to make the harsh truths of political life palatable to society.” As Bacon teaches in his Advancement of Learning, some things are secret because they’re hard to know, others because “they are not fit to utter.” “Wisdom without rhetorical skill is useless for those engaged in public life”; the existence of a public requires publicity—in any regime, no matter how many or how few rule it. In this, he resembles the God of the Bible and His Solomon, who wisely work invisibly, but also Plato. Even while making his “break from the ancients” he uses “tools he learned from Plato,” very much including the practice of poeticizing harsh philosophic lessons. Further, with his experimental science he proposed a sort of neo-Socratism, confessing knowledge of his ignorance while insisting that the experimental “torture” of nature, making her reveal her secrets, will advance knowledge far more effectively that Socratic dialectic, which shares the ‘verbalism’ of the Scholastics even as it rejects their claim to encyclopedic knowledge, “replacing dialectic with induction.” Experimentation goes beyond induction, however, by torturing nature to compel her to reveal her secrets. This isn’t far removed from mastering Fortuna by beating her down, one might add. Bacon proposes to combine Socratic inquiry with a decidedly Machiavellian ’empiricism’ and ambition. This nonverbal core of reality will be coated with soothing and even inspiring words. In this way he can rival religious teachings by the same appeal to the imagination the Bible and Christendom’s many great poets deploy. “Poetry, when grounded in solid reason and utilized by careful philosophers, can be a powerful aid to science.” 

    “Providence” may be “man’s ability to mimic God’s power and manipulate natural law to the point of altering human nature.” In doing so, “Bacon collapses the ancient distinction between techne and wisdom.” In his Wisdom of the Ancients, Bacon re-tells the story of Daedalus, suggesting that “envy can be neither controlled nor exploited in the service of progress.” This evidently contradicts the teaching of the New Atlantis, which has the fellows of Salomon’s House treating one another as colleagues in both their research and their ruling of the general population through the putative rulers. This indicates “that a society such as Salomon’s House is simply not feasible. Scientists are human, and possess a human nature.” One might wonder, however, for how long they will possess such a nature. Might they not experiment upon themselves? Make themselves more like the God whose providence they intend to usurp? Hurd insists that “Bacon’s plan, unlike that of the Bensalemites, does not require the forcible or involuntary alteration of ordinary citizens,” much less alteration of the scientists themselves. Rather Hurd considers the science of Salomon’s House to be “a deliberately unrealistic portrait of scientific achievement,” one that, “unfortunately, many of Bacon’s intellectual heirs failed to recognize” as “impossible” to realize. “Bacon cannot be responsible for our own failure to appreciate his warning.” 

    “The uncertainty of all knowledge, including scientific knowledge,” which is in principle perennially revisable, “helps explain the necessity of liberalism for Bacon’s project.” “Liberalism prevents tyranny enacted in the name of ‘truth.'” It also sets scientists free to pursue the truth wherever their experiments lead them. Hence, Hurd argues, Bacon’s approval of Joabin. As a merchant, Joabin participates in international trade and its attendant “dissemination of information.” Hurd holds such trade inconsistent with the Salomon House Fathers’ careful control of information. Bacon thus “shows us…that modernity must be constantly vigilant; science can be tempered by liberty, but a tendency toward despotism may be unavoidable.” To counter this, “an adjustment of Bacon’s project is the only hope for political philosophy,” which must “reclaim our contemplative philosophy by engaging in contemplative philosophy.” Yet Joabin poses no threat to the Bensalemite regime in the eyes of that regime. He says and does nothing to undermine it. “Bacon’s revolution may have humanitarian aims, but it is not humanitarian at its core.” If not, then why is his picture of Bensalem a warning from Bacon? Granted, it may serve as a warning to those who do not share his philosophic purposes.

    Hale therefore proceeds to a consideration of the text itself, in an attempt to show that Bacon imbeds such a warning in it. She begins by examining “the structure and working of the ruling institution” in Bensalem, Salomon’s House. “If I am correct in surmising that Bacon wishes to indicate Bensalem as a false utopia rather than a model society, then the evidence must be present in the life of Bensalem’s citizens.” “How well [do] the scientists understand political rule and how capable” are they “of shaping a robust regime”?

    If most visiting sailors in Bensalem, including these, remain there, forgetting their homes and families like the Lotus eaters of the Odyssey, does that mean Bensalem is bad (as Homer evidently thinks of the Lotus eaters’ condition) or good? Hale says it is bad, claiming also that Bacon thinks so, too. “If the Bensalemites are living in a state of oblivion, their society will be stable but it will also be devoid of any individual liberty or classical virtue,” at least among the ‘civilians.’ “Political scientists” typically regard “the best society” as a balanced combination of “stability, power, and individual liberty.” “If Bacon is to be taken seriously as a political thinker, one must assume that his perfect society would strive toward this elusive balance,” as Bensalem surely does not. This is a humane and reasonable judgment, but why must we assume that Bacon concurs? Does Bacon want to be taken seriously as a political thinker by us on any other terms but what seem to be his own?

    Hale accurately recounts the history of Bensalem, cut off from the rest of the world initially not be its own choice but by telluric catastrophe. Under those new conditions, Bensalem chose isolation from the rest of the world. “Bensalem chose political stasis,” a choice made “by their most celebrated king, Solamona.” Solamona did decreed change, changes wrought by the natural philosophers of Salomon’s House. These would be carefully introduced to the lower orders of Bensalemite society in accordance with the judgment of those philosophers. Hale expects that political science, controlled by the philosophers, might also change the regime, over time. So it might, but again that will be determined by the philosophers; they are, after all, scientists, who insist on rigorously controlled experimentation. If so, Hale observes, “the people [will] not have become more philosophically enlightened.” Indeed not, but does that trouble Bacon? “The attempt to force a static politics and conquering science to coexist is a powerful indication that Bensalem’s project will fail” because he inserts “an independent, obscure government” into the regime. But how independent is it? It seems to be under the thumb of the philosophers. Will they “independent” governor or governors eventually rebel against the philosophers, as the Guardians might someday do in the regime of Plato’s Republic? Perhaps so, but does Bacon want them to? And, if Baconian natural philosophy, undergirding Baconian political science, is as effective in merging theory and practice as Bacon evidently wants it to be, will Bensalem not continue to look more like a much more efficient form of contemporary communist China than like contemporary England? And if, as Hale argues, Bacon indicates elsewhere a sympathy for republicanism, what kind of republicanism does he want? Commercial republicanism, to be sure, but democratic? Or ‘aristocratic’/scientific? Or even a ‘mixed-regime’ republic, with the few enjoying substantially more authority per person than the many? To put it another way, as much as Bacon may prefer Plato to Aristotle, Plato no more understands philosophy in terms of experimental science than Aristotle does.

    Hale excellently brings out the religious side of Bensalem, with its revisions of Christianity. The sailors ran out of food in six months, having provisioned themselves for a year—a result of poor planning, lack of self-control, or perhaps their inability to control nature, if they were becalmed or thrown off course. They offer prayers to God, who, as Hale notes, “showeth his wonders in the deep,” in the oceans, according to Psalm 107. “If man is to imitate God, as the scientists of Salomon’s House intend, he must have similar power.” As far as the sailors are concerned, Bensalem comes close enough, rescuing them from death. “The Christianity of Bensalem is a practical Christianity,” and the sailors are ready converts to it. The narrator of the story evidently numbers among them, and the Fathers of Salomon’s House think so, too, designating him as the one who did not escape to tell thee, dear reader, but who was released to tell thee. 

    Practical Christianity, Hale acutely observes, may be seen in the garments worn by the governor of the Strangers’ House, where the sailors first stay. “Dressed in blue, with a white turban bearing a red cross,” he would have been immediately recognizable by Bacon’s readers as wearing the colors of “the flag of St. George, worn by English Crusaders” in their mission “to spread Christianity and European hegemony throughout the world.” “The governor is no mere state official, however. He is by office the governor and by vocation a Christian priest. This mixture of political authority and religious importance brings to mind Thomas More, whose Utopia serves as a foil for Bacon’s New Atlantis.” Under Bacon, as under the Machiavellian Tudors, the modern state will institute an established church independent of More’s Catholic Church; that church will become part of a new ‘church militant,’ the ‘church’ of modern science. The new religion preaches “brotherly love and the good of the sailors’ souls and bodies,” aiming to “alleviate suffering and poverty, which will enable ordinary people to better serve their church and king.” As Hale puts it, with a touch of irony, “If science can provide physical comfort to the public then the public will see science as a tool of God”; under such circumstances, “the idea of ‘doing God’s work’ takes on a slightly different meaning.” Indeed so.

    And so, as Hale rightly says, the Feast of the Family rewards procreation not virtue, materialism not spirituality. “There is no apparent harmony between the intellectual scientists and the constantly breeding populace.” None, apparently, but then perhaps there is, from the standpoint of the natural scientists. After all, who built those immense caverns and towers, those wide pools, those grand implements of scientific experimentation? If “the state sets the rules for the Feast, funds the Feast, and lends its authority to the enforcement of the father’s wishes,” then “the whole idea of the Feast is a mockery of the natural order of the family” and the “happiness” that serves as both “a justification and a moral grounding for the boundary-pushing science conducted by Salomon’s House” departs substantially from Christian joy or happiness as understood by Aristotle. Machiavelli is more than willing to depart, to set sail for other shores. Is Bacon?

    Hale finds in the name of the friendly merchant Joabin an allusion to Joab, King David’s nephew “and an important captain of David’s army.” Joab turns away from vengeance against David’s rivals in the house of Saul, “relinquishing his claim to revenge” and thereby “enabl[ing] David to unite Israel. That is, under the Bensalem regime, Jews have reunited with Christians under the auspices of the new ‘Christianity.’ Although “Joabin’s status as a merchant” may or may not “mark him as a member of the ruling class of scientists,” as Hale argues, he, and the commerce he practices, are aligned with the regime of the scientists, claiming that it was Moses, “by a secret cabala,” who “ordained the current laws of Bensalem,” despite the overarching story that Bensalem’s lawgiver was Salomona. Such, perhaps, are the ways of reconcilers.

    Joabin’s teaching on marriage and chastity conforms to the regime of the new Jerusalem in which the teachings of Moses and Jesus have been redirected to new purposes. “The foundation of Bensalem’s chastity depends on self-regard,” not on regard for God. Bensalemites regard chastity as “a vice in relation to its consequences,” not “the body is a work of God and must be treated as a temple,” as “borrowed property.” “Bensalem has taken the morality of Christianity to heart, while dispensing with the cosmological motivations behind the moral code,” to say nothing of the spiritual motivations. Bensalemite chastity requires the improvement of human nature by scientific methods, not by the work of the Holy Spirit. Hale thinks that the need for rearing children puts a limit on such ‘improvement.’ “Bacon’s acknowledgement of the insurmountable bonds between parent and child,” seen in the Feast of the Family, “is an admission that all of nature cannot be conquered.” But need it be, if the core of Bacon’s project, including a new regime to go with the new philosophy and the new religion, is to be instituted? “It seems clear that a people consumed solely with the production of children at the expense of the state will not be capable of self-government.” Unquestionably so, but does Bacon’s republic, as distinguished from Madison’s republic, entail self-government among any but the few? It is indeed the case that “Salomon’s House is the defining feature of Bensalem’s society,” its ruling body par excellence.

    How does it rule? Primarily by satisfying the differing desires of the few and the many. “Either the threat of coercion and memory of past coercion are enough to keep the citizens of Bensalem orderly, or the scientists of Salomon’s House have managed to alter human nature”—purging it of “pride, jealousy, ruthlessness or simple stubbornness,” promoting peaceful order but also eradicating the “dynamic competition that lies at the heart of political life” and, Hale maintains, “incapable of defending itself culturally and militarily against a society guided by intelligent self-interest and civic virtue.” For the latter task, “Salomon’s House needs a political scientist in its midst” (“I believe that person to be Joabin”) but this will not bring Bensalem to resemble “the enlightened, rational, secular society envisioned by the founders of the modern scientific project.” This is undoubtedly correct. Bacon is no democratic republican and therefore no ‘Enlightenment’ man in the sense propounded by European intellectuals in the next century. Will it be able to defend itself against such societies? Hale doubts it, although at present “Salomon’s House is a stronger military force than Europe, and will not tolerate European aggression.” The issue would depend upon the maintenance of decisive technological superiority over any rival or set of rivals. Such superiority might be military, but it might also be seductive, Lotus-eating appeals to visiting envoys.

    A Father of Salomon’s House enters the part of the city where the narrator and the other sailors are staying, either returning from abroad or simply coming down from Salomon’s House. He enters on horseback, reaffirming his superiority to all who see him. Dressed in garments and carrying implements denoting religious authority, he is followed by the officers of the trade guilds; “Salomon’s House incorporates both religion and trade into its scientific endeavors.” Hale charges that the presence of such oligarchs, who “organize complaints against the government and establish common pricing and standards,” amounts to “an acknowledgment that economic injustice, or at least economic conflict, is present in Bensalem’s economy.” Their presence, and the general orderliness of Bensalem society, also suggests that these complaints are resolved. Hale asks, “the people are well-fed, but are they happy?” Even if “happiness for many people could very well be comprised of physical comfort and relaxed sexual mores,” but there evidently remains nothing of “the longing for the rare, the beautiful, and the great,” at least among those who are not natural scientists. “Bacon’s tale shows what unregulated science can accomplish, and it also hints at what is lost in such a world.” This begs the question, does Bacon mind? If ordinary people are satisfied, and the extraordinary among them rise to fellowship in Salomon’s House, is Bacon content with that regime?

    The Father’s speech to the narrator begins with a promise to reveal “the true state of Salomon’s House,” its regime. The purpose of the regime is not to glorify God, as the Governor of the Strangers’ House had claimed, but to know the causes and secret motions of things in order to “enlarg[e] the bounds of Human Empire to the effecting of all things possible.” While “Plato expresses wonder at an incomprehensible whole,” Bacon “rejects the idea of incomprehensibility altogether,” collapsing “Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge.” Given this task, especially given the experimentalism it entails, and given the fact that “Bacon could not know where modern technology might lead,” either the Father “has too much assurance in his ability to control science” or “his absolute political control makes science less dangerous.” Since “science in a republic is a very different creature than science in a monarchy,” and “capitalism likewise drastically changes the way technology will be used,” Hale doubts that such control will be possible. Again, this depends upon the nature of the republic—specifically, upon how democratic it is. There is no indication that it is anything but aristocratic. As Hale later states, Salomon’s House resembles a modern scientific version of the Nocturnal Council described in Plato’s Laws.

    Salomon House’s substantial control over nature enables the natural philosophers to attempt to replace God by empowering them to prolong life indefinitely, thereby increasing their authority over the many, less inclined to risk death in rebellion if human rulers are the sources of their hope for perpetual life. The natural philosophers, like God, can rule minds as well as bodies, “choos[ing] to share what to share with the public and with the government” and are “very effective in deceiving human senses.” The natural philosophers can even “create life out of nothing, the ultimate challenge to God’s authority.” Indeed, they can simulate life, including human life, having designed robots, a point that leads Hale to “wonder about the strangely affected behavior of the people of Bensalem.” Is Bensalem animated not by a noble lie but an ignoble lie? Can the natural scientists “guard against the lie in their own hearts”? “The evidence suggests that the scientists of Salomon’s House think man can be God’s equal, practically speaking.” Hale does grant Bacon superiority over many of his successors. “Truth is not an unmitigated good and technology cannot be allowed to proliferate without guidance. This is the essential point of Bacon’s thought that is missed by modern science.”

    Having learned all this, “the narrator kneels before the Father,” who adjures him to spread the good news of modern natural philosophy to the world. The narrator, if not Hale, is a convert. But why would a modern natural philosopher want to exercise such charity toward his subjects, let alone foreigners? “Perhaps it is as simple as the compulsion to put knowledge into practice.” After all, “the pursuit of scientific knowledge and the knowledge of their power,” taken together, “are the sources of their pleasure.” This, Hale says, obscures the “future tyranny inherent in modern science.” She considers the Bensalem regime and the fate of its people “tragic,” its tragedy potentially “the tragedy of England if thinkers like Bacon do not rise to the occasion” and warn of the dangers of such a regime, and if “the terrible potential of technology and charity cannot be controlled” despite the “best efforts” of such thinkers. She doesn’t believe it can be controlled, once Bensalem “is exposed to the outside world” and the natural philosophers can no longer “control the flood of information to the people.” “Bacon’s tale demonstrates how carefully English scientists must foster liberty, while still seeking to persuade the public about the virtues of science. His plan only works if two conditions are met. First, science must be virtuous. Second, the people must be able to recognize virtue when they see it.” Warrants for pessimism, indeed, whether Bacon actually advocates or expects the advent of a democratic form of republicanism as the consequence of modern natural philosophy. 

    Accordingly, Hale devotes a chapter to sketching the effects of Bacon’s philosophy on “his closest successors.” The young Thomas Hobbes knew Bacon, sharing his intention “to use modern science to improve the comfort and security of man.” Hobbes does much more to describe the political institutions of a modern, centralized state, his “mighty Leviathan”—a “liberal” or commercial monarchy, not a republic, liberal in its political economy if not in its political form. Founded in 1660, England’s Royal Society resembles a Salomon’s House but without the political ambitions. Although ‘the moderns’ have adopted Baconian science, “modern political society did not follow the course hoped for by Bacon.” This was especially the case in France, as “few movements in modern political history express the great hope and great danger of the Enlightenment more clearly than the French Revolution,” preceded by the philosophic thought of the marquis de Condorcet (to say nothing of the marquis de Sade) who eventually fell victim to the Jacobin Terror. The Jacobins were too impatient, lacking the patience of the true scientists’ experimentalism. “Condorcet and his fellows could into control the beast they created,” having divorced Baconian science from what Hale takes to be Baconian philosophy in its ‘politic’ dimension. One might add, more specifically, that the philosophes were egalitarian to a degree Bacon would not admit and, very much to her credit, Hale does acknowledge this: “While Bacon hinted at science’s compatibility with republicanism, Condorcet attempts to make science democratic,” its progress “eventually lead[ing] to total enlightenment and the perfection of human nature.” She then takes that back, remarking that “Condorcet acknowledges that science cannot be democratic, especially in a large society.” Perhaps she means that the natural philosophers will undemocratically lead the way to democracy, rather as Marx holds out proletarian dictatorship as the means to the future abolition of all socioeconomic classes. This would be consistent with another of Condorcet’s proposals, familiar to our own contemporaries: “an international association…formed to pursue things like a universal language” and similar ‘good works’—a Salomon’s House writ large. Hale has her doubts.  As she politely remarks, “Even among allies, the idea that sovereign nations would forgo the economic and military benefits stemming from such research clearly indicates that Condorcet is working from a conception of human nature unfamiliar to any previous thinker.”

    What prevails today? “Natural science is now almost wholly based in experimentation, while political philosophy has so lost sight of the question of the nature of the whole that its students can barely understand the actions and consequences of science. Philosophers cannot effectively guide the political regulation of scientists, because philosophers have either accepted science’s primacy or refuse to accept science’s intractability.” Bacon’s successors have “failed to grasp how comprehensive and careful the reform of philosophy and politics had to be.” “Condorcet and his contemporaries attempted to overthrow the old society in the name of science; they dismissed Bacon’s warnings about the dangers of unmooring society from tradition,” of despising the religious rites and symbols the Fathers of Salomon’s House take such care to preserve. “Bacon’s successors could not keep his project anchored in tradition and the lessons of Plato’s philosophy, too seduced by the promise of modern technology to heed his warnings,” too unready to use Bacon’s “decidedly unscientific tool, namely poetry,” humanely to conceal the harshness of modern science even as it is deployed to alleviate human suffering. “Affecting political policy without compromising genuine philosophical questioning,” including self-questioning and self-rule, “requires extraordinary rhetorical skill.” “Bacon possessed such skill,” but do we?  

     

     

    Note

    1. For an example of a learned man in an almost exclusively ‘bookish’ university, see Brunetto Latini: The Book of the Treasure. Paul Barrette and Spurgeon Baldwin translation. New York: Garland Publishing, 1993.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Sallust in Defense of History

    February 2, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Sallust: The War with Catiline. Loeb Classical Library.

     

    Born in 86 B.C., Sallust became a member of the Roman Senate in his late twenties, then a tribune of the plebs a few years later. He therefore can be said to have had first-hand dealings with both the ‘few’ and the ‘many’ at an early age. No aristocrat, initially he seems to have inclined in favor of the plebs, a preference that may have contributed to his expulsion from the Senate for alleged corruption—the sort of crime which, had it been acted against universally, might have severely depopulated the Senate of his time. In the civil war that ensued a few years later, he sided with Julius Caesar—that noteworthy example of the rule of the ‘one’ who wins power by appealing to the many—obtaining an appointment as government of Numidia; for his pains, he was again charged with corruption, although this time his patron got him off the hook. He retired in 44 B.C., and in the ten years remaining to him he composed a substantial body of work, of which The War with Catiline and The War of Jugurtha survive extant. His five-volume history of Rome is lost.

    Why history? Sallust begins his book on the Catilinian conspiracy with a defense of historiography, a defense intended particularly for Romans, who at that time had written so much less of it than the Greeks. “All human beings”—the one, the few, and the many—who “are keen to surpass other animals had best strive with all their vigor not to pass through life unnoticed, like cattle, which nature has fashioned bent over and subservient to their stomachs.” Unlike animals, “all our vitality” resides in both soul and body, with the godlike soul properly ruling the beast-like body. “Therefore, it seems to me more right to seek renown, that we should employ the resources of intellect than of bodily strength, and since the life we enjoy is itself brief, to make the memory of ourselves as lasting as possible.” The best way to do that is to cultivate “manly virtue,” a “shining and lasting possession,” unlike “riches or beauty,” the renown for which doesn’t last. 

    Sallust thus begins his history with a justification of the life of the mind in ‘thumotic’ or aristocratic terms. For Plato’s Socrates, thumos rules the bodily appetites; while they love physical pleasures and fear pain, thumos or spiritedness loves honor and fame, detesting the way bodily appetites drag human beings down to the level of brutes. Logos or reason, in turn, rightly rules thumos, and through it the appetites. Hence the ‘philosopher-king’—king, at least, of his own soul, ruling it in accordance with reason, the distinctively human characteristic. Sallust, however, makes an appeal to the honor-lovers, the aristocrats or patricians: If you want fame, if you seek renown, if you would achieve something like godlike immortality, use your souls to achieve manly virtue. Unlike Socrates, Sallust puts the mind to the service of honor-loving spiritedness. Or, perhaps, that is his argument in justifying his own way of life, his own life of the mind, his historiography, to patricians, to men who scorn mere words and seek glory in great actions.

    He knows that the thumotic few have long debated the priority of soul to body or body to soul. “For a long time, there was a big dispute among mortals whether military sucess depends more on bodily strength or strength of soul.” It is true that both are needed to win battles, and the renown such victory brings. “In the beginning,” kings—for “that was the first title of rule on earth”—chose between the two ways of life, “some training their intellect and others their body.” At that time, a third choice. covetousness, wasn’t seriously considered by such men. “But after Cyrus in Asia and in Greece the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians began to subdue cities and nations, to suppose the lust for dominion a pretext for war, to consider the greatest empire the greatest glory, then finally men learned from perilous enterprises that qualities of intellect can accomplish the most.”

    Sallust makes several noteworthy observations in that sentence. The first kings confined their rule to poleis, to city-states. There, the question of strength of soul, and especially of the intellect, versus strength of body really was a question; city-states are small, and a man of exceptional physical strength, surrounded by friends or kinsmen nearly his equal in prowess might well rule the merely intelligent, as anyone who has experienced a high school gym class has learned. Ruling a vast empire is another matter; physical force doesn’t travel well, at least under the conditions prevailing in the ancient world, without long-range weapons. (And even such weapons require intelligence to design.) Second, the discovery of the superiority of mind to bodily strength in the pursuit of imperial rule and fame occurred both in Asia and in Europe; it was a ‘cross-cultural’ discovery, not limited to any one civilization but a discovery about human nature—one made, moreover, not by philosophers but by the rulers themselves and their subjects, proven in action, not in thought. The human mind proved itself in practice, not in the theory at which it excels more obviously. Finally, “covetousness” found its first expression not in commerce but in conquest and in ruling. It was not first of all a matter of ‘economics.’

    With this discovery, however, a new question or problem came to sight. Manly excellence of soul works well in war, as the great empire builders demonstrated. Surprisingly, it works less well in peace. If it did, “you would not see rule passing from hand to hand and everything in turmoil and confusion.” You would not see empires break up, rebellious provinces, palace revolutions, factions fighting each other in the streets. It is true that “rule is easily retained by the qualities by which it was first won”; a prudent emperor readily maintains his authority. But those very qualities decline with that very sustained imperial rule. As years wear on, “sloth has usurped the place of hard work, and lawlessness and insolence have superseded self-restraint and justice.” With this, “the fortune of princes changes with their character,” as men of real virtue overthrow their complacent superiors. 

    This is true not only in politics but in agriculture, navigation, and architecture. Success in those endeavors also “depends invariably upon manly virtue.” There, too, however, “many mortals, being slaves to appetite and sleep,” slaves to the bodily appetites, “have passed through life untaught and untrained,” living ways of life “contrary to Nature’s intent,” wherein “the body [is] a source of pleasure, the soul a burden.” Such men are “on a par” with one another in life and in death,” since “no record is made of either,” no fame distinguishes them or raises them above animals. They have achieved equality, but it is an equality of obscurity, of slavish subservience to their own mediocrity. “In the very truth, that man alone lives and makes the most of life, it seems to me, who devotes himself to some occupation, seeking fame for a glorious deed or a noble career.” Nature provides many paths to the same end, using the human characteristic closest to the gods, the power of the mind, to win the fame that constitutes the closest men get to divine immortality.

    Here the practice of history arises. “It is glorious to serve the Republic well by deeds; even to serve her by words is a thing by no means absurd; one may become famous in peace as well as in war.” That is, the peace of empire need not bring sloth in its train, nor factitiousness. For “both those who have acted and those also who have written about the acts of others receive praise.” The poet Homer, the historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius have won fame for themselves with their words by preserving the fame of doers in those words. Rome has had no such historian, before Sallust. In Rome, “by no means equal renown attends the narrator and the doer of deeds, nevertheless the writing of history is an especially difficult task: first, because the style and diction must be equal to the deeds recorded”—as with poetry, art should imitate nature—and also “because such criticism as you make of others’ faults are thought by most men to be due to malice and envy.” With the artistic challenge, the historian faces a moral challenge, not unlike that faced by the man of action, whose every move is prey to malicious and envious rivals. Further, men notoriously believe only what they want to believe, and what they believe they measure by their own capacities. “While everyone is quite ready to believe you when you tell of things which he thinks he could easily do himself, everything beyond that he regards as fictitious, if not false”—a lesson Thucydides had taught, centuries before. Whether you praise great men of action or blame them, you will endure much the same egalitarian animosity, the same growling of men who remain too near the level of beasts, as those you write about must endure. Sallust thus moves to win the sympathy of the few, the men who look down on those who teach, who work with words, instead of doing. 

    He turns to autobiography to increase this sympathy. As a young man, he entered public life, finding “many obstacles, or instead of modesty, incorruptibility, and honesty, shamelessness, bribery, and rapacity held sway,” captivating his ambitious young soul, in “my youthful weakness.” He went along to get along. He exited public life into enforced leisure. But “it was not my intention to waste [that] precious leisure in indolence and sloth,” the bane of peace, “nor yet to turn to farming,” like Cincinnatus, or to hunting—which he deems “slavish employments.” “On the contrary, I decided to return to an undertaking and pursuit from which the harmful craving for advancement had held me back, and to write of the deeds of the Roman people, selecting such portions as seemed to me worthy of record.” With a soul “free from hope, and fear, and partisanship,” he has chosen to write on the conspiracy of Catiline,” a history that deserves “special notice because of the novelty of the crime and of the danger arising from it.” History well written might change the course of events in his country, if citizens understand the way of tyrants, the unnatural way of their nature. 

    What was his nature, his character? A patrician, Lucius Catiline “had great vigor both of soul and body, but an evil and depraved intellect.” Sallust makes no attempt to account for the origin of that nature. It may be that some tyrants are born, not made. However it may have been with Catiline, “from youth up, he reveled in civil wars, murder, pillage and political dissension, and amid those he spent his early manhood.” “His soul was reckless, cunning, treacherous, capable of any form of pretense or concealment,” and he put it to use in a life of covetousness, but not the covetousness of a Cyrus or a Pericles. Like Aristotle’s tyrant, he bent his ambition toward gain for himself, not for his country, a country that already ruled the world, with nothing more to covet. A man of “violent passions,” he threw away his own property while seizing the property of others; “he possessed a certain amount of eloquence, but little discretion.” His was the wrongly ordered soul par excellence, one that “ever craved the excessive, the incredible, the impossible.”

    He saw the dictatorship of Lucius Sulla in the years 83 to 79 B.C. The Romans appointed dictators in times of emergency. “Seized with a great passion of seizing control of the republic,” Catiline understood that he could “make himself supreme” only if another crisis occurred. He couldn’t wait for one to occur by chance, however. Indebted by his own extravagance, vulnerable to prosecution for his crimes, his “fierce soul” was “spurred on, also, by the corrupt public morals, which were being ruined by two great evils of opposite character, luxury and avarice”—public parallels to his own private vices—he needed to foment such a crisis as soon as he could.

    Sallust here pauses to explain how “the public morals” of Rome had “ceased to be the noblest and best,” in accordance with “the institutions of our forefathers in peace and in war,” and thanks to the way those men “governed the republic” within the framework of those institutions, only now to “become the worst and most infamous” of countries, one in which a Catiline might arise. The city of Rome was founded by the Trojans, who arrived in an Italy populated by native, “rustic” folk who had no laws of government, living “free and unrestrained.” Although different in race, language, and way of life, these people “were merged into one with incredible facility,” thanks to its founding lawgivers. But the very prosperity of Rome, as it grew “in population, civilization, and territory,” fostered envy in the surrounding peoples, who “put [the Romans] to the test of war.” Their friends in Italy for the most part looked the other way, forcing the Romans into self-reliance. They “defended their liberty, their country, and their parents by arms,” becoming a powerful military republic. Their victories enabled them to turn to their erstwhile allies and political friends from a position of strength, “establish[ing] friendly relations” with them “rather by conferring than by accepting favors,” in liberty not dependency.

    The regime, “founded on law,” was a monarchy in name, an aristocracy in fact. The patricians were elders, called “Fathers,” their bodies “enfeebled by age,” their intellects “fortified with wisdom” at the service not of themselves but of “the welfare of the republic.” That is, even before embarking on empire, they had already answered the question emperors had settled, the question of whether the soul’s intellect or the body should be authoritative in human life. When the monarchic element of the regime so strengthened as to overbear the few, establishing tyranny, in 509 B.C. the patricians wisely “altered their form of rule,” changed the regime, by appointing two consuls with one-year terms, thereby checking and balancing what would later be called ‘executive’ power while ensuring that no one man or combination of two men could become ensconced in power over the Senate. This again shows the importance of the human mind; the bicephalous executive was designed to “prevent men’s minds from growing insolent through unlimited authority.”

    This reform affected the spirit of the whole population, not only the spirit of the one and the few. “Every man began to distinguish himself and to put his native talents forward.” The Roman regime now brought out what Sallust has called the best of human nature in all its citizens. The Romans used their minds to strive for fame. Although in perpetual danger from its enemies, the Romans’ “civitas, once liberty was won, waxed incredibly strong and great in a remarkably short time, such was the desire for glory that had arrived on the scene.” Its young men consented to the “vigorous discipline” of army life, learning and practicing the “soldier’s duties” enabling them to endure “the hardships of war.” For such men, “valor mastered all obstacles.” Their “greatest struggle for glory” came not from their battles with foreigners but “with one another,” as each strove to surpass the others in striking down enemies, in performing feats of military prowess. “This they considered riches, this fair fame and high nobility:” “this fame they coveted.” They sought “only such riches as could be gained honorably,” their aim being “unbounded renown” not luxury.

    And it is precisely in this that Rome has suffered. The goddess Fortuna “rules everywhere.” One expects Sallust to write that the strong Roman people found themselves overmatched by her, and for the historian to draw from this a lesson of humility. Not at all. Fortuna worked against Rome not in ordaining its downfall but by exercising her capacity to “make all events famous or obscure according to her pleasure rather than in accordance with the truth.” The Athenians performed “great and glorious deeds,” but the fame of those deeds surpasses their true worth “because” Fortuna would have it so. “Athens produced writers of exceptional talent” to laud them, men of “great intellect” who more than matched the deeds with “words of praise.” “The Roman people never had that advantage, since their most prudent men were always engaged with affairs; no one employed his intellect apart from his body; the best citizen preferred action to words and thought that his own brave deeds should be lauded by others rather than that theirs should recounted by him.” (Julius Caesar would become the exception to this rule.) Not only should Romans not denigrate their historians, but they should also understand that the fame they seek can last only in their words.

    In the Rome Sallust admires, the one whose history he would write, “good morals were cultivated at home and in the field…thanks not so much to laws as to nature,” the nature cultivated by the regime, animated by its spirit. Romans reserved their quarrels for their enemies, as “citizen vied with citizen only for the prize of merit.” With respect to money, “they were lavish in their offerings to the gods, frugal in the home, loyal to their friends,” exhibiting “boldness in warfare and justice when peace came.” In war, they observed the mean between extremes, exacting punishment on a soldier for attacking contrary to orders or for leaving the field of battle too reluctantly when so ordered. Thumos, yes, but thumos in right measure. When at peace, “they ruled by kindness rather than fear, and when wronged preferred forgiveness to vengeance,” centuries before Christianity would adjure them to do so. ‘Kind’ also means ‘nature.’ 

    It was only “when our country had grown great through toil and the practice of justice” that Fortuna “began to grow be savage and to bring confusion into all our affairs.” The regime of military republicanism needs adversaries to continue in the spirit of courage, moderation, and justice. Under the austere conditions of danger, “leisure and wealth” were desirable, but under the conditions of world empire they were “a burden and a curse.” Longterm rest imperils the regime of active warrior-citizens by turning their ambition toward wealth and rule not over foreigners but over one another. Avarice ruins honor, integrity, and “all the other noble qualities,” replacing the virtues of the few with insolence, cruelty, impiety—the thumotic impulses gone wrong. Romans began “to set a price on everything.” They began to conceal their corrupt natures from one another, pretenders to the virtues they once openly displayed, showing “a good front rather than a good heart.” They surreptitiously, each in his own heart, raised not the battle standard of Rome but “the standard of self-interest.” 

    Because their ethos had been a warrior ethos, their souls initially “were activated less by avarice than by ambition.” But after the rule of Lucius Sulla had “brought everything to a bad end from a good beginning, all men began to rob and pillage.” This occurred not only through his bad example, bringing out the selfishness which had by now risen dangerously near the surface of Roman souls, but because he corrupted the army. Having led it to Asia, to lands ruled by despots wallowing in luxury, he secured the loyalty of his soldiers to himself, not to Rome, but “allow[ing] it a luxury and license foreign to our ancestral customs”; “those charming and voluptuous lands…easily demoralized the warlike spirit of his soldiers.” The most active and austere segment of the Roman people “learned to indulge in women and drink, to admire statues, paintings,” stealing exquisite vases from private houses and public places, pillaging shrines, and “desecrat[ing] everything, both sacred and profane.” If “prosperity tries the souls of even the wise,” why would it not ruin the souls of soldiers? This is how Sulla made an army of Rome his own private army.

    These men returned to Rome with their trophies and, worse, their newfound vices. “As soon as riches came to be held in honor,” mingling with ambition and the desire for glory and for rule, virtue no longer became a source of honor among honor-lovers. “Luxury and greed, united with insolence, took possession of our young manhood,” those the would-be tyrant needs to boost himself into power. Their ancestors had “adorned the shrines of the gods with piety,” not gold leaf; they had adorned their homes with glory, having taken nothing from the vanquished but “the license of doing harm” to Rome. They lived mindfully, doing honor to their human nature. “The men of today, on the contrary, basest of creatures,” no longer fully human, “with supreme wickedness are robbing our allies”—not only their vanquished enemies—of “all that those most courageous men in the hour of victory had left them; they act as though the only way to rule were to wrong.” They have destroyed friendship among themselves and with Rome’s allies, weakening Rome both internally and abroad.

    In the new Rome, men level mountains and extend their villas on jetties into the seas, abusing nature and squandering money for the gratification of their own pleasure. “Men played the woman, women offered their chastity for sale.” Driven by such “self-indulgence,” young men ran themselves into debt, turning to crime to pay the bills. 

    “In a city so great and so corrupt Catiline found it a very easy matter to surround himself, as by a bodyguard, with troops of criminals and reprobates of every kind.” What Sulla had done in Asia Catiline did in Rome, militarizing vice. A self-ruling republic requires a self-ruling citizenry, but the would-be tyrant wanted neither. This is why “most of all Catiline sought the intimacy of young men,” as “their souls, still pliable as they were and unstable, were without difficulty ensnared by his deceits.” After “carefully studying the passion which burned in each, according to his time of life, he found harlots for some or brought dogs and horses for others,” thus “mak[ing] the dependent and loyal to himself,” borrowing the technique from Sulla. Dependency on ‘the one’ replaced self-governing liberty among the many and the few in the rising generation.

    Catiline himself seems to have needed no such seduction. “Even in youth [he] had many shameful debaucheries,” notably with a woman named Aurelia Orestilla, “in whom no good man ever commended anything save her beauty,” as Sallust finely phrases the matter. In order to clear his way into her household, Catiline murdered her stepson. Sallust suggests that Catiline may have hastened his political conspiracy because “his guilt-stained soul, at odds with gods and men, could find rest neither waking nor sleeping so cruelly did conscience ravage his overwrought mind.” That is, the tyrannical mind, impassioned by the prospect of physical pleasure but then tormented by what remains of its true nature, drives itself insane. “His very glance showed the madman.”

    To blood his young hounds, he kept them busy with crimes, including murder, preferring “to be vicious and cruel rather than to allow their hands and souls to grow weak with lack of practice.” This is the perversion of martial discipline, impossible without an ethos of military discipline to pervert. This is how the military republic can be re-founded as a tyranny. Catiline now needed only the opportunity, the circumstances in which he could make his move with a chance of success.

    He made that decision, however, not in liberty but out of necessity. Both he and the veterans of Sulla’s campaign he counted on for backing were deeply in debt, thanks to their extravagances. There being no foreign lands for them to conquer, they could only plunder Rome itself, becoming “eager for civil war.” The great general Pompey was in Syria and would not be able to return in time to counter the planned coup. Most of the senators suspected nothing, except those who were in on the plot. “All was tranquil and secure; this was a straightforward opportunity for Catiline.” One of the few great men of the time, Marcus Licinius Crassus, may have been in on it, too. Rival of Pompey, “he was willing to see anyone’s power grow in opposition to the power of his rival, fully believing meanwhile that if the conspiracy should be successful, he would easily be the principal man among them.” Catiline would then prove a useful tool, easily discarded if broken in the work.

    Catiline first attempted to murder his way to power. In 66 B.C., after having been charged with extortion and prevented from standing for the consulship because he hadn’t met the deadline for announcing his candidacy, he and his co-conspirator Publius Autronius met with “a reckless young noble,” Gnaeus Piso, who proposed that they arrange for the murder of the two newly elected consuls and several of the senators. Then Catiline and Autronius could seize the consulships, sending Piso to grab two Spanish provinces ruled by Rome. “Had Catiline not been over-hasty in giving the signal to his accomplices in front of the senate-house, on that day the most dreadful crime since the founding of the city of Rome would have been perpetrated.” But thanks to one of his own vices, impatience, Catiline ruined the scheme by calling for action before a sufficient number of conspirators had assembled to carry it out effectively. Curiously, Piso’s ‘punishment’ consisted of being sent off to Spain with military powers; the senators wanted to get him away from them and to use him as a counterbalance to Pompey, now in Spain and himself feared by the senators. Piso was murdered there, perhaps by “the barbarians” there or by some “old and devoted retainers of Pompey.” Thus ended the first Catiline conspiracy.

    As yet uncharged with any crime against the government—evidently, he had covered his tracks—Catiline addressed his co-conspirators, whom he lauds as “brave and faithful to me.” He tells them that his soul therefore “has had the courage to set on foot a mighty and glorious enterprise.” This recalls Sallust’s teaching, that the soul should rule the body for the sake of honor. Catiline, too, understands this, in his own perverse way. Indeed, “I perceive that you and I hold the same view of what is good and bad; for agreement in likes and dislikes—this, and this only us what constitutes firm friendship.” Just so, but one must consider the like-mindedness he invokes. It consists of fear (consider “under what conditions we shall live if we do not take steps to emancipate ourselves”); a desire for liberty that is really license (emancipation from debts brought on by their own extravagance); resentment (we, the “energetic, [the] able” have been reduced to the status of “the common herd,” ruled “a few powerful men” who control a vast empire); libido dominandi (we are the ones who would be “the objects of fear” for our current rulers, were they subservient to us); impatience (“How long will you endure this, O bravest of men?”); hope (“victory is within our grasp”); contempt (“we are in the prime of life,” but they are in a condition of “utter dotage”); spiritedness in the cause of justice defined in terms of envy (“what mortal with the spirit of a man can endure that our tyrants should abound in riches?”); desperation (we have nothing to lose); ‘wokeness’ (“Awake then!”); pride (“use me as your leader or as a soldier in the ranks,” as “my soul and my body shall be at your service”); and shame (surely, I do not “delude myself and you are content to be slaves rather than to rule”). He takes the vices of his like-minded, like-impassioned followers and ascribes them to their enemies, right down to the claim that the ‘exploitive’ few who rule Rome cannot even rule the riches they have amassed—exactly the fault of Sulla’s ‘Asianized’ soldiers.

    Catilinean like-mindedness lacks mindfulness, except insofar that it ‘awakens’ or brings to consciousness a perfect storm of passions, supposedly in service of his confederates but designed to render them subservient to himself. A tyrant would rule for himself, but he cannot rule by himself. He needs allies, the more impassioned the better. Stooping to conquer their minds, he perorates, “Use me either as your leader or as a soldier in the ranks”—small chance of that—either way, “my soul and my body shall be at your service.” Sallust has presented exactly the kind of speech an aspiring tyrant would make. If you hear a man speak like this, he tells his fellow Romans, understand his real nature and his means of persuasion. He hasn’t yet the power to enforce; he must begin with persuasion. He uses his own mind to reinforce the passions of his followers, attaching them to himself even as the Roman generals had already begun to attach their soldiers to themselves, not to Rome. A military republic cannot easily or quickly be redirected into commercial republicanism, but its military republican virtues he had described at the beginning of his book can be perverted toward license and tyranny, redefining liberty as the fulfillment of libido dominandi, introducing the harshest spirit of imperialism inflicted on followers into Roman politics itself.

    The men wanted to know how all of this could be done. Catiline answered by telling them what they need to do to achieve “the prizes of victory.” These included (he assured them) the abolition of debts, the proscription of the current authorities, secular and religious, and “plunder.” After “heaping maledictions upon all good citizens,” he demonstrated his intimate knowledge of each man, praising them by name and reminding each of his particular interest in the enterprise, whether it was escape from poverty or prosecution, or the fulfillment of hitherto thwarted ambition. “When he saw that the souls of all were aroused, he dismissed the meeting.” He may or may not have sealed their allegiance by having them drink a concoction compounded of human blood and wine—themselves agents of heatedness— although Sallust admits he has “too little” evidence to confirm that this actually happened. Whether factual or not, the story makes sense in that it bespeaks a new, decidedly uncivil religion in Rome, replacing the old religion of Jupiter and Juno, Mars and Venus. The purpose of these “solemn rites” was to render each conspirator “more faithful” to the others, sharing “the guilty knowledge”—the content of minds—of “so dreadful a deed.” By refusing to insist on the truth of this detail, Sallust himself exemplifies the way a true, rational mind thinks, inviting a sober form of faith in his readers, trust in his own reliability as a historian.

    The problem with conspiring with evil men is that one or more of them may lack even the modest degree of virtue required to keep his mouth shut. Quintus Curius, “a man of no mean birth but guilty of many shameful crimes” and expelled from the Senate for them, preened himself in the presence of his mistress, Fulvia, who retained some traces of the old Roman patriotism. Having “had no thought of concealing such a peril to her country,” she gossiped about the conspiracy to “a number of people,” while concealing the name of her lover. The senators became sufficiently alarmed to bestow the consulate upon Marcus Tullius Cicero, whose ancestors had achieved no office distinguished enough to cause him to merit such an honor under ordinary circumstances. “But when danger came, jealousy and pride fell into the background.”

    Despite Cicero’s election, “Catiline’s frenzy did not abate.” He stashed arms “at strategic points throughout Italy”; borrowed still more money and sent it to one of his allies, Manlius, who would command troops in the planned civil war. He appealed to slaves in Rome, avid for emancipation, to prepare to set fires in Rome—the imagery of fire, again—at the appointed moment. He enlisted the assistance of Sempronia, a woman “who had often committed many crimes of masculine daring”—but nonetheless refined, “able to play the lyre and dance more skillfully than a virtuous woman need do.” “There was nothing which she held so cheap as modesty and chastity,” “her lust [being] so ardent that she pursued men more often than she was pursued by them,” but she “could write verses, raise a laugh, and use language which was modest, or tender, or wanton,” being possessed of “a high degree of wit and charm.” She, too, enjoyed a sort of life of the mind.

    With such friends in his train, Catiline spent the year scheming against Cicero, “who, however, did not lack the craft and address to escape” the traps set for him. Indeed, Cicero induced blabbermouth Curius to reveal Catiline’s plot. He also took the precaution of agreeing to offer his consular colleague, Antonius, a richer province than the one he had received as a reward for winning high office. Cicero also prudently “provided himself with a bodyguard of friends and dependents.” Sallust’s Cicero understands politics, ‘low’ as well as ‘high’; he isn’t Shakespeare’s windbag. When Catiline attempted to gain election to the consulship the following year, he lost.

    Having failed in Roman politics, politics in the capital city, Catiline moved to activate his military strategy with the provinces. He sent Gaius Manlius, Septimus of Camerinum, and Gaius Julius, among others, to various parts of the empire to prepare for civil war. He would soon turn to them because a plot to murder Cicero failed, thanks again to Curius’ timely warning. [1] Gaius Manlius was particularly successful in gathering support for rebellion because the Etrurians he rallied had been abused by Sulla during his governorship of the colony. In this case, the many had just complaints. (Not to be uncatholic in his recruitment, he also enlisted local “brigands” in the cause.) When Cicero reported these stirrings to the senators, they voted him emergency powers as dictator. 

    The thirty-first, central section of The War with Catiline recounts the reaction of the now-corrupt Romans to their peril. In the earlier centuries of the republic, shared danger had reinforced self-discipline and noble rivalry in service of fame and the public good. Now, “in place of extreme gaiety and frivolity, the fruit of long-continued peace, there was sudden and general gloom.” “The women, too, whom the greatness of our country had hitherto shielded from the terrors of war, were in a pitiful state of anxiety, raised suppliant hands to heaven”—suddenly remembering Roman pietas —bewailed “the fate of their little children, asked continual questions, trembled at everything, and throwing aside haughtiness and self-indulgence, despaired of themselves and their country.” 

    In response to Cicero’s condemnation of him in the Senate [2], Catiline denied everything, asserting that he ought to be believed because he, a man of high birth, could not possibly benefit from revolution in Rome, whereas Cicero, whom he lyingly described as a resident alien, was suspect. The senators were hearing none of that and shouted him down. Invoking the imagery of fire Sallust has attributed to Catiline throughout, the accused man, “in a transport of fury,” screamed “Since I am cornered by my enemies and driven to desperation, I will put out the fire which consumes me by general devastation.” His hope of fighting passion-fire quite literally with fire in the streets were frustrated when the slaves he had engaged to set fires throughout the city were prevented from doing so by watchmen deployed by Cicero, who knew about this tactic from his interviews with Curius. 

    Catiline fled Rome, instructing those followers remaining in the city “to make ready murder, arson, and other deeds of war” within the city, preparatory for his own return at the head of a rebel army. His ally, Manlius, wrote to a loyal Roman general, who had been sent into the provinces to quell the rebellious forces, invoking the gods and men alike as witnesses to their grievances. We are crushed by debts imposed “by the violence and cruelty of the moneylenders”; there is precedence for the forgiveness of debts by senatorial decree. “We ask neither for power nor for riches, the usual causes of wars and strife among mortals, but only for liberty, which no true man gives up except with his life.” With no little effrontery, he concluded with a plea to the general “to restore the protection of the law.” For his part, the general could only reply that if the rebels had any request to make of the Senate, they must disarm themselves “and set out for Rome as suppliants.”

    Catiline deployed the same rhetorical appeal on behalf of the many in a letter to the Senator Quintus Catulus. No longer denying that he had rebelled, he instead argued for the “justice” of his rebellion. “Provoked by wrongs and slights, since I had been robbed of the fruits of my industrious labor”—true enough, as his criminal plots had come to ruin—I “followed my usual custom and took up the general cause of the unfortunate.” A true social justice warrior, he has “adopted measures which are honorable enough considering my situation.”

    These measures, Sallust informs us, included arming the provincial populace Manlius had roused to revolt, joining Manlius in his camp, taking care to bring with him “the fasces and other emblems of authority”—actions that earned him and his chief accomplice designation as “enemies of the state” by the Senate, which decreed that the consul Antonius bring an army against him while Cicero remained to keep watch over Rome itself. “At that time,” Sallust remarks, “the rule of the Roman people, it seems to me, was by far the most pitiable. Although the whole world, the rising to the setting of the sun, had been subdued by arms and was obedient to Rome, although at home there was peace and wealth, which mortals deem the foremost blessings, nevertheless, there were citizens who from sheer perversity set out to destroy themselves and the state.” Lamentably, no one stepped forward to desert Catiline’s conspiracy, symptomatic of “a disease of such intensity as the plague which had infected the souls of many of our citizens.” “Eagerness for change,” animated by envy of wealthy men, hatred of everything old and of “their own lot” as spendthrift debtors who had “squandered their patrimony in disgraceful living,” animated the souls of men with as little respect for the republic” as “they had for themselves.”

    Worse, the disease infected even hitherto respectable citizens. Previously, during the consulship of Pompey and Crassus, “the greater part of the nobles strove with all their might, ostensibly on behalf of the senate but really for their own aggrandizement. For, to tell the truth in a few words, after that time, whoever disturbed the state under the guise of honorable slogans—some as though defending the rights of the people, others so that the senate’s influence might be dominant—under pretense of the public good, each in reality strove for his own power.” Neither the party of the few nor the party of the many “showed moderation in their strife; both parties used victory ruthlessly.” When the pretended populist, Gnaeus Pompey, was sent to wage war overseas, “the strength of the plebians lessened” for a time, but once this new prospect of revolution came to view, “the old contest aroused their passions once again.” Sallust’s remark about the self-interest of both the few and the many should be kept in mind as he proceeds to recount the actions and words of the Romans.

    Catiline’s ally, Lentulus, continued his recruitment of “anyone he thought ripe for revolution by disposition or fortune.” Among these he counted the Allobroges, a Gallic people, debt-burdened and, being Gallic, “by nature prone to war.” He detailed a man named Publius Umbrenus to approach their envoys in Rome. The envoys were receptive but cautious. They engaged in what our contemporaries would call a process of rational choice utility maximization: recognizing the superior power of the Republic, they saw a chance to gain rewards from Rome “in place of [the] unsure hope” of success with the conspirators. Through the Roman noble who served as their patron in the city, they informed Cicero of the plot.

    Cicero then conspired against the conspirators. Pretend to join them, he advised; that way, their guilt will be brought “out into the open” and there will be evidence sufficient to convict them in the eyes of the senators. This they did, and the plotters moved their plans ahead. Once Catiline arrived near Rome with his army of provincials, they would publicly charge Cicero with fomenting civil war. Their people in Rome would then set fire to “twelve strategic points in the city” in the hope that the “ensuing confusion” make it easier to attack Cicero and other key senators. Additionally, the restive sons of aristocratic families “were to kill their fathers.” All of this would make Rome vulnerable to attack by Catiline’s waiting forces.

    Duped by Cicero’s counterplot, the conspirators were arraigned before the Senate. Cicero was ambivalent about the matter, “rejoic[ing] in the knowledge that the disclosure of the plot had snatched the republic from peril” but worried because main conspirators were “citizens of such high standing.” “He believed that their punishment would produce trouble for him personally, that failure to punish them would be ruinous to the republic.” He chose the patriotic course and the in the event, the senators judged them guilty. As for the plebeians, they proved fickle, changing from their “desire for revolution” to denouncing Catiline and praising Cicero. Sallust takes the disclosure of the plan for arson as decisive to them, since fires would burn their own property.

    Part of Cicero’s apprehension proved valid. A witness came forward, claiming that the exceptionally wealthy and powerful Crassus was part of the conspiracy. This was too much for some of the senators to believe, and the ones who did believe the man kept silent because they were in debt to Crassus. As for Crassus himself, he blamed Cicero, claiming that he had induced the witness to perjure himself. The enmity of Crassus would indeed produce trouble for Cicero, later on.  

    Subordinates of the convicted conspirator Lentulus attempted to “rouse workmen and slaves in the neighborhoods of Rome to rescue him from custody, while others sought out leaders of mobs who had made it a practice to cause public disturbances for a price.” When Cicero learned of this, he convened the Senate in order to hasten the determination of the punishment of all the main conspirators. Consul-elect Decimus Junius Silanus arose to argue for a harsh punishment. Caesar opposed this, delivering a carefully worded speech, reasonable on its face if perhaps self-serving under the surface. 

    He began with an appeal to the rule of the rational part of the soul over the passions. “All men who deliberate upon difficult questions,” he told his colleagues (in what then was the world’s greatest deliberative body) “had best be devoid of hatred, friendship, anger, and pity,” since affects hamper the soul’s attempt to “discern the truth.” What kind of reasoning, then? “No one has ever served at the same time his passions and his best interests.” Sallust has already told his readers that Romans by that time inclined toward conceiving of their best interests as their self-interest. Caesar gives two examples of such “bad decisions [made] under the influence of wrath or pity”: in the Macedonian war, Rome was deserted by the Rhodians, its putative allies, yet “our ancestors let them go unpunished so that no one might say that war had been undertaken more because of the wealth of the Rhodians than their misconduct”; in the Punic wars, despite “many abominable deeds” done to Romans by the Carthaginians “never did likewise when they had the opportunity,” but maintained their “dignity” against strict justice. Both of these claims undergird an appeal to the Romans’ honor, their reputation, not their virtue. Further, Caesar overlooks the punishment that was imposed upon the Rhodians, who were deprived of their territories on a strategic mercantile territory in Asia Minor. The “best interests” of Rome, then, evidently require ranking dignity over the virtues.

    In this case, Caesar continued, we should again prefer our “good name” to righteous indignation. “What is the aim of that eloquence” which denounces the conspirators by invoking “the horrors of war”? We senators hold “great power” (magno imperio); men such as us hold a “lofty station” visible to “all mortals,” unlike the many. With the eyes of all upon us, we enjoy “the least freedom of action” of any class of men because we are judged more harshly. “That which is called wrath” among ordinary men is termed haughtiness and cruelty in persons having power.” While admitting that rage at the Catiline treason is just, inflicting a just punishment will provoke just such a claim; people will remember the punishment more vividly than they remember the crime because “most mortals remember the recent past.” Therefore, just punishment of the conspirators is “contrary to the best interests of our republic,” which (Caesar seemed to know) the senators incline to mingle with their own “best interests.” And it is not even just, as death will relieve the malefactors of the “grief and wretchedness” of life in confinement.

    Not one for oversubtlety, Caesar invoked “the immortal gods” in opposing Silanus’ proposal. Setting the “bad precedent” of capital punishment for treason will invite our successors to turn the tables on us. Covetous men will accuse and convict innocents because they want to acquire their houses. To be sure, “I fear nothing of this kind in Marcus Tullius or in these circumstances, but in a great polity there are many and various geniuses”; some consul in the future, given the near-dictatorial power Cicero wields, may have “no limit” to his actions and no one to “restrain him.” He concluded his speech by proposing the exile of the conspirators from the city, the confiscation of their assets, and their imprisonment in several towns throughout Italy. 

    This speech persuaded the senators, until Marcus Porcius Cato (‘Cato the Younger’) spoke. “My judgment is very different,” he began, bluntly. Our first concern should be to guard the city against the remaining conspirators, not to consult with one another regarding the punishments appropriate for those we now have in custody. Without the city, which remains in danger, there will be no capacity to judge or to punish. With sharp irony, he “call[ed] upon you, who have always valued your houses, villas, statues, and painting more highly than the nation”: If you want to remain free “from disturbance for indulging your pleasures, wake up at last, and lay hold of “the reins of government.” Caesar’s invocations of the wrongs of Rome’s allies or are wealth” stray from the point, which is, “our liberty and our lives are in doubt.” I, Cato, “have often deplored the luxury and avarice of our citizens,” thereby making enemies. But that was when we were prosperous and could afford such complacency. “Now, however, at issue is not the question whether our ethics are good or bad, nor how great or magnificent the empire of the Roman people is, but whether all this, of whatever sort it appears to be, is going to be ours or belong to the enemy along with rule over our very lives.” Knowing the less than noble character of the patricians of his time, Cato concentrated their minds on the low but solid ground of survival, while at the same time shaming them in their decadence.

    He then made a critical point about language. “In these circumstances, does someone mention to me clemency and compassion? To be sure, we have long since lost the true names for things.” The right use of words requires moral as well as intellectual rigor. “It is precisely because squandering the goods of others is called generosity, and recklessness in wrongdoing is called courage, that the republic has been placed in a crisis.” If it is “the fashion of the time” to be “liberal at the expense of our allies” and “merciful to robbers of the treasury,” at least do not be “prodigal of our blood, and in sparing a few scoundrels bring ruin upon all good men.”

    In Caesar’s appeal to self-interest in the guise of prudence, Cato recognized an unstated atheism. When Caesar said that a life in prison is worse than death, he tacitly denied “the tales which are told concerning the inhabitants of Underworld.” As for his proposal to disperse the prisoners to prisons throughout Italy, this would only risk their rescue by their fellow plotters or by hired mobs; indeed, such audacity has “greater strength where the resources to resist it are weaker.” Caesar’s advice is therefore “utterly worthless, if Caesar fears danger from the conspirators”; moreover, “if amid such universal dread he alone is not afraid, there is all the more reason for me to fear for your sake and my own,” implying that the alternative to Caesar’s overconfidence is a secret alliance with the conspirators. Not only Caesar’s atheism but the scope of his ambition may lurk beneath the surface of his rhetoric. Better to deter the conspirators who remain at large by vigorous action, for “if they detect even a little weakness on your part, they will all fiercely make their presence immediately felt.” The real source of our ancestors’ greatness was not in arms or even their dignity but in their nobility, seen in their industriousness at home, their just rule abroad, and “in counsel a soul liberated from the enslavement of misdeed and of passion.” With us, including Caesar, our intellects and our language fail us because our character has failed, as we live in “extravagance and greed, public poverty and private opulence, lauding wealth and pursuing idleness,” and for that reason making no distinction “between good men and bad,” a moral relativism that frees “ambition [to] appropriate all the prizes of merit.” No philosophy is needed to understand this, and so Cato exclaims “No wonder!” No need for Socratic dialectic, here. “Each of you takes counsel separately for his own personal interests”—instead of truly deliberating in common for the public good—and “when you are slaves to pleasure in your homes and to money or influence here, this gives impetus to an attack upon the defenseless republic.” Hypocrisy of words, words bent away from the shape of truth, results from hypocrisy of character.

    Nor will piety do, if misunderstood. True, “the immortal gods,” invoked by Caesar, “have often saved this republic in moments of extreme danger.” But the gods don’t respond to “vows” or to “womanish entreaties.” The gods help those who help themselves “by means of watchfulness, vigorous action, and good counsel.” But “when you surrender yourself to sloth and cowardice, it is vain to call upon the gods; they are offended and hostile.” Thus “in the days of our forefathers” a general commanded that his son be executed after the young man, in a display of “immoderate valor,” “fought against the enemy contrary to orders.” In light of that, “do you hesitate what punishment to inflict upon the most ruthless traitors?” No: punish them “after the manner of our forefathers.” And so the senators did. 

    At this point Sallust intervenes to deliver judgments in his own voice. “Now, for my own part, while reading and hearing of the many illustrious deeds of the Roman people at home and in war, on land and sea, a desire happened to stir in me to give thought to what factor in particular had made possible such great exploits,” whereby “a handful of men had done battle with vast enemy legions,” waging war against “powerful kings” with “small resources,” enduring “the cruelty of Fortune.” The Greeks had been more eloquent; the Gauls had won more “martial glory.” What was it, then, that made Rome great? “It became clear to me after much deliberation that many things were in motion and that all had been accomplished by the distinguished courage of a few of the citizens, and that as a result of this, poverty had triumphed over riches, and small numbers over a multitude. But after the civitas was corrupted by luxury and sloth, the republic still sustained the vices of generals and magistrates by its very magnitude, and just as the vigor of parents is exhausted by childbearing, so many storms had exhausted Roman virtue, and there was no one great in virtue remaining in Rome.” 

    This defense of the virtue of the few, of aristocracy, inclines toward Cato’s side of the argument. However, Sallust immediately adds that “within my own memory there were two men of towering virtue, though of opposite character, Marcus Cato and Gaius Caesar.” They were “almost equal” in ancestry, age, and eloquence, equal in “greatness of soul and in renown,” but “each of a different sort. “Caesar was considered great because of his benefactions and lavish generosity, Cato for the uprightness of his life.” Consequently, liberal Caesar provided “refuge for the unfortunate,” severe Cato “destruction for the wicked.” In peace, Caesar worked hard, remained vigilant and often “devoted himself to the affairs of his friends at the neglect of his own,” but he really desired “a major command, an army, a new war in which his merit might be able to shine forth.” Cato instead “cultivated moderation, decorum, and above all sternness,” vying not “in riches with the rich, nor in factitiousness with the factious but with the strong in virtue, with the moderate in moderation, with the innocent in integrity. He preferred to be, rather merely to seem, virtuous,” and “hence the less he sought renown, the more it overtook him.” It is well known that in his youth Sallust allied himself with Caesar. Having retired from political life, he now offers the verdict of his mature judgment.

    Cicero ordered preparations for the execution of the conspirators. Lentulus thereby “found an end of his life befitting his character and his deeds,” as did the others. As for Catiline, still backed by his ally, Manlius, and two legions of poorly armed troops outside Rome, he first attempted to retreat over the mountains into Transalpine Gaul. The Romans cut off that route with three legions already on guard in the Picene district; meanwhile, troops under Antonius’ command pursued him from Rome. Trapped, with no choices but surrender or defiance, he chose defiance, exhorting his men in a speech blaming Lentulus’ failure to foment sufficient disorder in Rome for their plight and invoking their “brave and ready soul.” “We must hew a path with iron “to win “riches, honor, glory, and on top of that, liberty and your native land.” Our enemies only “fight on behalf of the power of a few men.” Coming as it does after Sallust’s praise of aristocratic virtue, this description of a ‘populist’ or ‘democratic’ argument shows that Sallust’s history takes up Aristotle’s theme of the claims to rule by the few and the many, in this case a ‘few’ that has largely declined from true aristocracy, the ‘rule of the best,’ to oligarchy, the rule of the merely rich. Catiline hopes that he can inspire the many to rise up to the virtues of the few who ruled Rome in generations past. So far, however, he has failed to triumph precisely because the many have declined in virtue as badly as the few. He would fortify their remaining aspirations to virtue and their desire for material and political goods with the claim of necessity: “In battle the greatest danger always threatens those who show the greatest fear; boldness serves as a rampart.” And so, “your soul, youth, and valor encourage me, not to mention necessity, which makes even the timid brave.” 

    In the battle, Catiline’s men faced off against the seasoned professional troops led by Marcus Petreius, Antonius’ deputy commander who was pressed into battlefield leadership by his boss, who was suffering gout. Both sides fought courageously. “When Catiline saw that his troops had been routed and that he had been left with a few comrades, mindful of his birth and his former standing, he plunged into the thickest of the enemy and while fighting there was run through.” None of his men had retreated, as “all had fallen with wounds in front.” No freeborn citizen was taken prisoner. The Roman army “had gained no joyful or bloodless victory,” as “all the most resolute had either fallen in the battle or come away with severe wounds.” Therefore, the surviving victors were “affected with exaltation and mourning, lamentation and gladness.”

    The regime of the few rich thus preserved itself, not because its troops were any more courageous than the regime’s enemies but because they were better armed and more experienced in battle. A commander with better resources, appealing to the many, might have prevailed. Eventually, Caesar did. Cato won the debate, Caesar the empire.

     

    Note

    1. Not that Cataline gave up his hopes of murdering Cicero, the one man in Rome who as “a serious obstacle to his plans,” as a man of genuine virtue.
    2. Cicero: “First Oration against Catiline.” In this brilliant speech, Cicero not only presents the evidence against Catiline and his confederates but recommends a course of action superior to the ones proposed by Caesar, some years later. Cicero urges the Senate not to jail the conspirators, as Caesar would advocate, but to expel Catiline from Rome, along with the other conspirators, let them concentrate their forces outside the city, then deploy the superior Roman legions to crush them.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Bonaventure on the Distinction between “Conscience” and “Synderesis”

    January 26, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Bonaventure: Conscience and Synderesis. Arthur Stephen McGrade, John Kilcullen, and Matthew Kempshaw translation. In McGrade, Kilcullen, and Kempshaw, eds.: The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts.  Volume II: Ethics and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

     

    The Franciscan theologian Bonaventure flourished in the middle of the thirteenth century, eventually serving as Minister General of the Franciscan order and Cardinal of Albano, having first come to prominence in Paris as a lecturer on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Conscience and Synderesis is a commentary on Lombard’s book.

    Following the structure of that book, Bonaventure divides his commentary into two articles, the first on conscience and the second on synderesis. He calls conscience “a certain directive rule of the will,” whereas synderesis “is called the spark of conscience.” Synderesis thus seems to be something like what Aristotle calls the “efficient” or originative cause of conscience, its archē. 

    He intends to answer three questions about conscience: Is it in the cognitive part of the soul or the affective part? In its origin does it exist by nature or is it acquired? And in its effects “does every conscience obligate?” Or can one rightly refuse to obey it?

    There are five arguments for conscience as existing in the cognitive part of the soul. First, Ecclesiastes 7:22 describes conscience as something that knows; in that passage, the prophet observes that a wise man knows that even righteous men have sinned by cursing others. Second, Damascene calls conscience “the law of our understanding,” and Scripture “directly respects the understanding,” presumably in the sense that divine Revelation tells the truth to human souls. The third argument is etymological: the word for knowing, scientia, is built into conscientia. Conscius means awareness of something in a sciens or knower, a person who has experienced a cognition. Fourth, conscience could be right or wrong. Since making a mistake “relates to a habit or act of understanding”—a passion in itself cannot make a mistake, although of course it can be misdirected by a part of the soul that is mistaken—it “seems that conscience resides in a cognitive power.” Finally, cognition acts in certain ways. It reads, judges, directs, witnesses, and argues. These are all rational acts, not (for example) sense perceptions or appetites. “But all these acts are attributed to conscience, for conscience is a book in which we read, conscience judges inwardly, conscience witnesses, conscience argues, and conscience rule and directs.”

    There are five arguments for conscience as existing in the affective part of the soul. A passion cognizes nothing; a habit is ingrained, unchanging once established, hence unlike knowledge, which changes readily and substantially. But if conscience is cognitive, and “the cognitive power is concerned with everything,” both action and contemplation, conscience would “extend not only to moral matters but also to things taught in the various disciplines, which is obviously false.” Second, understanding is to the true what affect is to the good. Conscience has to do with the good; it is a matter of agapic love, of caritas. Third, “the law of the flesh fights against the law of the mind”; both are “motive powers,” not cognitive. Conscience has to do with motive, with fighting the good fight, and hence ranges itself “on the side of the affective.” Fourth, conscience can cause remorse, “a certain grief and passion.” Finally, “the pleasant and the painful reside in an affective power; for example, “the damned will be in great pain from the gnawing worm of conscience.” 

    Bonaventure resolves the question by classifying conscience as a form of cognition, not as cognition simply, in the broadest sense. He begins by remarking that just as the term “understanding” can be understood in three ways—as the power to understand, as a habit, and as a principle that is understood—so “conscience” can be taken “as the thing of which one is aware” (“the law of our understanding,” as an earlier theologian put it), as a habit (“that by which we are aware”), and as “the power to be aware” (a “natural law written in our consciences”). Bonaventure chooses the definition of conscience as a habit, that by which we are aware; this is what the term is “more commonly taken” to mean. By this definition conscience must be “a habit of the cognitive power,” since awareness is a cognitive capacity, not an affect. [1]

    However, there are two ways of knowing. There is “speculative” or theoretical knowledge: knowledge of natural laws, for example. And there is practical knowledge, which aims at right action. Aristotle draws this distinction, saying that theoretical and practical understanding are equally matters of cognition, but they have different aims. Theoretical knowledge is knowledge ‘for its own sake,’ aiming only at the satisfaction of the human desire to know. Practical knowledge is knowledge of ‘what to do’; it “dictates and inclines to movement.” An example of theoretical knowledge is ‘Every whole is greater than its part’; an example of practical knowledge is ‘God should be honored.’ The habit of knowledge simply is called scientia; the habit of practical knowledge is called conscientia. Conscience “does not perfect the speculative power in itself but as it is joined in a certain way to affection and activity.”

    Therefore, in reply to the five arguments claiming that conscience is not cognitive, Bonaventure says that insofar as conscience is a power it is a power “applied to knowing about conduct or morals.” As a habit, it can be either natural or acquired, and as such it can go right or wrong, either purifying or defiling the soul. Insofar as it is good it “dictates and inclines to good and draws back and flees from evil.” That doesn’t make it “affective,” only that “it has a certain concomitance with will and affection.” And while it is unquestionably true that the law of the flesh is opposed to the law of the mind, the law of the flesh “presupposes a disordered representation of carnal things in fantasy and cognition”; it has a cognitive element, albeit a mistaken one. The remorse we feel after violating conscientious knowledge is of course affective, but that feeling is not itself conscience. Similarly, the painful and pleasurable feelings we experience in response to our thoughts and actions may well be conscientious but are not conscience itself. The conscience testifies and judges, the feelings of remorse or rejoicing follow from those cognitive perceptions.

    It might be suggested that the question of conscience as Bonaventure addresses it points the way to a distinction between Christian Aristotelianism and classical philosophy generally. The classical philosophers understand the soul as a natural entity with a firmly established and well-articulated set of characteristics. In the relatively simple description offered by Socrates in Plato’s Republic, the soul has three parts: logos or reason, thumos or spiritedness, and the epithumia or appetites. In Christianity, the human soul proves more malleable. The first human being was made in the image of God, but the image has little of the Original’s firmness. Eve is readily beguiled by the Serpent; as far as the reader can tell, Adam simply goes along with her offer of the forbidden fruit of moral knowledge. Even the chosen nation, Israel, wavers repeatedly between obedience and disobedience to God’s commands. And in the New Testament, the soul appears as a battleground on which much more powerful forces, divine and demonic, struggle for rule. This may explain why in Christian thought, including that of Bonaventura, Socratic thumos is replaced by the will. Spiritedness has a firm object: it loves honor. (In Augustine, closer to Platonism than many Christians, this takes the evil forms of pride and love of domination.) In Christianity, however, the will tends to waver, even before its corruption in the Garden of Eden. Will is ‘free’; it can incline one way or another, depending upon which external spiritual forces seize control of it. Bonaventure’s treatment of conscience as a natural habit as it were borrows some of the solidity of Aristotelian ‘naturalism’ for Christian purposes.

    Bonaventure moves next to the question of whether conscience is an innate or an acquired habit. There are six arguments for its innateness. In Romans 2:14-15 the Apostle Paul remarks that gentiles without the divine law are nonetheless “a law unto themselves because they show that the work of the law is written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them.” Scripture itself testifies that “conscience bespeaks a habit naturally inscribed in the human heart.” Augustine concurs; human beings have “a natural judicatory” within them, a standard of conduct. Another Father of the Church, Isidore, teaches that “natural right is that which nature has taught animals,” and if animals have so been taught, “much more has it taught human beings, who excel all animals.” Further, “the cognition of natural right is nothing other than conscience.” Moreover, “we have a natural instinct to seek blessedness and honor” from our parents; since we could not be this way “without some prior cognition,” and conscience is a kind of moral cognition, conscience must be innate. As a consequence of these first four arguments, Bonaventure remarks that since human beings cognize natural law, that cognition must occur “either by acquisition or by nature. If the former, it is similar to “the political virtues.” If by nature, “the cognition of natural law is nothing other than conscience. Finally, “natural right binds the will naturally.” But to be bounded, the will needs to know what it is that it is to do; “understanding precedes affect.” Conscience is the cognition of natural right or law.

    Against the claim that conscience is innate, opponents make six arguments of their own. In On the Soul, Aristotle compares “the soul at birth” to a blank tablet with nothing inscribed on it. (By this reading, Aristotle anticipates Locke.) If so, the soul can have “no innate cognition.” Augustine adds a Platonic argument: Yes, the soul has knowledge in it at birth but “burdened by the weight of the body, it forgets the things it used to know.” However, Augustine cites this argument in his Retractions. “He would not retract this unless he held it to be false,” and indeed Augustine did convert from Platonism to Christianity, necessitating exactly this kind of retraction. The opponents’ third argument is more elaborate. To know something complex, we first need to know the simple elements that compose it, the “incomplex.” For example, we can’t know a principle “unless we have cognition of its terms.” So far, this accords with Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. But—and here again, the opponents come across as proto-Lockean—we know the “incomplexes” only through the senses; no one understands color without sight, and to lose a sense is “necessarily [to] lose knowledge.” Therefore, “all cognition of complexes” too “is necessarily acquired and taken from sense.” Conscience being “a cognition of a complex”—of what Locke calls a complex idea—namely, natural right—conscience must be an acquired habit, not an innate, natural one. Similarly, if conscience aims at practice, at conduct not theory, and “things pertaining to conduct are as difficult or more difficult to know than those pertaining to simple contemplation,” conscience must be an acquired habit, a thing gained from experience not simple sense perception. Sense perceptions, moreover, are infallibly correct, although we may misinterpret them. Since conscience can err, it must be an acquired not a natural habit. Finally, “natural habits are present in everyone and at all times, because those things are natural which are the same for all and which go with a nature inseparably. But consciences are not the same in all,” nor are they present in the same person at all times. The opponents give the example of a person entering a religious order who develops “a conscience that forbids acting against the counsels [of perfection], a conscience one did not have before.” Therefore, conscience is acquired, not natural.

    Dismissing the Platonic argument that both Augustine and Aristotle have refuted, Bonaventure isolates “three opinions among the learned about the origin of cognitive habits,” all of which hold that they are both natural and acquired. These opinions “differ, however, in assigning the ways in which these habits are innate and acquired.”

    The first formulation distinguishes the “active understanding” or “active intellect” from the “possible understanding” or “possible intellect.” It is the possible understanding that begins as a blank slate, then receives sense impressions, with no assistance from the active understanding. Bonaventure rejects this. If the active understanding has cognitive habits, why would it not “communicate them to the possible understanding without help from the senses”?

    The second formulation holds that cognitive habits are innate insofar as the mind perceives universals, acquired insofar as it perceives particulars. A variation of this formulation holds that cognitive habits are innate with regard to principles, “acquired with regard to cognition of conclusions.” This, however, also diverges from Aristotle and Augustine. They both deny the Platonic claim that the mind contains principles innately. On the contrary, “cognition of principles is acquired by way of sense, memory, and experience” (Aristotle) or by means of “a certain unique incorporeal light,” analogous to the way “the fleshly eye sees things in front of it in physical light” thanks to its natural power (Augustine). 

    Bonaventure endorses the third opinion. For cognition to occur, two things must happen: “the presence of something cognizable and a light by which we make judgement about it.” Thus cognitive habits are innate “by reason of an inwardly given light of the soul,” acquired because the thing cognized has a species or form to be perceived by that inner light. Bonaventure calls this natural light “a natural judicatory.” We “acquire” the external species by means of the senses: How else would I perceive the distinction between a whole and a part if I never saw or heard or tasted or touched a whole thing and one or more of its parts? “On the other hand, that light or natural judicatory directs the soul itself in making judgments both about things that can be cognized and things that can be done.”

    Bonaventure adds another distinction. Some cognizable things are “very clearly evident, such as axioms and first principles,” while others are not so clearly evident, such as the conclusion of a geometric proof based on the axioms. The same goes for cognition aimed at practice, for “things that can be done.” It is easy to perceive “Do not do to another what you do not want done to you,” but that cannot tell me what to do if I’m thinking of asking for elective surgery. The innate light of cognition is necessary but not sufficient to reach a scientific conclusion; the same goes for moral conclusions, things “which we are bound to do” that we know not by consulting moral principles but “only through additional instruction.” Hence conscience, which has to do with morality, with choices about actions, is “an innate habit” in one way, “an acquired habit” in another. The “natural light” of conscience “suffices for knowing that parents should be honored and neighbors should not be harmed,” but the species “parent” or “neighbor” doesn’t exist in me prior to sense impressions I acquire from the outside world. The innate, non-sensory cognitions (awareness of God) and the innate, non-sensory “affects” or feelings (love, fear) are what Bonaventure calls “essences.” The awareness of God and of self, love, and fear do not come to us from any acquired cognition through the “outer senses.” This is why Aristotle says that “nothing has been written in the soul”—as Locke claims—not “because there is now awareness in the soul, but because there is no picture or abstracted likeness in it.” Or, as Augustine argues, “God has implanted a natural judicatory in us,” the truth, which “is naturally impressed in the human heart.”

    The third question Bonaventure addresses with respect to conscience is “Must we do everything that conscience dictates as necessary for salvation?” Advocates quote Romans 14:23, “Whatever is not of faith is sin,” drawing the conclusion that since whatever is not of faith is against conscience, “we must do everything that comes from a dictate of conscience.” They also say that laws are obligatory, binding; since “conscience if the law of our understanding,” we must obey it. They also argue that “we must do what a judge commands”; “conscience is our judge”; ergo, we must obey it. Finally, that if I do something I believe to be a mortal sin it is indeed a mortal sin because I show “contempt for God” in so acting. “If we cannot not believe what conscience dictates,” we “sin mortally if we act against it.”

    Those who deny that we must do everything conscience dictates to receive salvation contend that “conscience sometimes dictates doing something that is against God.” It must then be that our conscience is mistaken, not God, and we should disobey our conscience. Further, “conscience cannot obligate to anything to which God cannot obligate, since conscience is below God.” Acting against God’s law is the true sin, not acting against conscience; “conscience does no in virtue of itself bind anything.” Nor can conscience absolve us from any obligation impressed upon us by God or indeed by any other superior authority.

    Bonaventure thinks that some distinctions are in order. 

    1. To what does conscience bind?
    2. Does it bind to everything it dictates?
    3. Is a human being “caught in perplexity when conscience dictates one thing and divine law dictates the contrary”?
    4. To which we owe our obligation, when conscience and “the command of a superior” conflict with one another?

    It depends. Sometimes conscience dictates “what is according to God’s law, sometimes what is aside from God’s law, sometimes what is against God’s law.” This doesn’t apply to counsels or persuasions, only commands—laws being one form of command. Conscience of course does bind when we act according to divine law. If conscience tells us to do something that has no relevance to God’s law, we may do it so long as conscience tells us to do it; Bonaventure gives the example of a conscientious urge to pick up a straw. If conscience tells us to act in violation of God’s law, however, conscience is wrong and God is right. In such instances, conscience actually “puts a human being outside the state of salvation” so long as the urge lasts. If we don’t “set conscience aside” we “sin mortally.” The dilemma is that in acting against conscience we involve ourselves in showing contempt for God, “as long as we believe, with conscience so dictating to us, that what we are doing is displeasing to God, although it may be pleasing to God” in fact. This is the point Paul the Apostle makes in Romans 14 in saying that whatever does not proceed from faith is sin. 

    Why? Because “God attends not only to what we do but to the spirit in which we do it.” If we act against the divine law while our conscience mistakenly tells us we are acting in obedience to it, we act “not in a good but in a bad spirit and because of this” we sin mortally. We should therefore obey the commands of our superiors, as Paul himself tells us to do, respecting the commands of emperors, not only in fear of punishment but in fear of sinning. Conscience “truly is a law but not the supreme law.” At the same time, “whenever we believe we are sinning mortally, we are sinning mortally.” It is only when we knowingly sin against divine law, including the divine law that commands us to obey human superiors, that we sin mortally. “Conscience is like a herald or messenger of God, and it does not command what it says from itself, but it commands, as it were, from God, like a herald proclaiming the edict of a king”; conscience “binds in things that can—in some way—be done well.” In those circumstances in which we “do not know how to judge maters, in that we do not know God’s law, we ought to consult those who are wiser, or, if human counsel is lacking, turn to God in prayer.”

    Bonaventure next turns to synderesis, “the spark of conscience.” Should it be classified as cognitive or affective? Can it be extinguished by sin? Can it become depraved through sin?

    Four arguments support the claim that synderesis should be classified as affective—a feeling, not a form of knowledge. The Church’s Gloss on Ezekiel 1:10 calls synderesis “the spirit that intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words”—as a profound feeling, not as logos. For his part, Ambrose describes men and women as beings who “naturally will the good” even as they are “subject to sin.” Will is affective, not cognitive; it motivates but it does not know. Since conscience aims at knowing, the spark of conscience, the thing that impels it to action, must be synderesis, not conscience itself. Human sinfulness or corruption stems from sensory motives—finding the apple pleasing to the eye and apparently tasty. This “rational motive part,” the thing that inspires conscience, can be “nothing except synderesis.” Finally, “just as understanding needs light for judging, so affect needs a certain heat and spiritual weight for loving rightly,” a “natural judicatory in the cognitive part of the soul.” This is conscience. In the same way, there needs “a weight in the affective part of the soul directing and inclining good.” That is synderesis.

    Four arguments contradict the claim that synderesis should be classified as affective. Jerome maintains that the prophet Malachi’s adjuration to “guard your spirit” and remain faithful to your wife cannot arise from “the animal part” of the soul, which might advise one rather differently, but from the rational part, which Jerome calls synderesis. The Gloss on Luke 10:30 holds that a man’s “sense of reason” cannot be stripped from him even if he is inflicted with a severe beating; since “the sense of reason resides in reason,” and the sense of reason is synderesis, synderesis must be rational. Indeed, if synderesis is the spark of conscience, and conscience is cognitive, why would synderesis not belong to cognition instead of the affective? Finally, synderesis must be a habit by process of elimination. If it were affective, a thing “on the motive side” of the soul, it would be “either a power or a passion or a habit.” It isn’t a passion, since it is not sinful. It isn’t a habit, because a good habit is a virtue, a bad habit a vice, and synderesis is neither a virtue nor a vice. Nor is it a power, because “the power of will is related equally to any object of appetite whatever, including such objects as food and drink. Synderesis is the spark of conscience, not of hunger or thirst. What else can it be, then, but an element of cognition?

    More generally, Bonaventure asks, what exactly is synderesis? How is it related to natural law and conscience? How is it related to the three “powers of the soul” identified by Plato’s Socrates: the rational, the “irascible” or thumotic, and the “concupiscible” or appetitive? Is synderesis a fourth part of the soul, “outside and over” these three powers, an eagle soaring above them all? Or is synderesis a part of one of the three powers or ‘parts’ of the soul already identified by the philosopher?

    One plausible but inadequate account holds that synderesis is part of the rational part of the soul, the “higher portion,” which turns the soul toward God and is therefore always right, in contrast with the lower portion of the rational part, which turns the soul toward earthly things, toward practice, and is called conscience. Synderesis directs us to the divine law, conscience to the natural law. The problem is that, as already established, reason may err, even to the point of committing a mortal sin. Further, as Jesus commands, we must love not only God but our neighbor, who resides in this world and not yet in Heaven. 

    According to “another way of speaking, we should understand motivation insofar as guided by reason to consist of two aspects, the way of nature and the way of deliberation—speculation or theory and practice; similarly, “just as free judgment consists of reason and will as they move deliberatively, conscience and synderesis relate to reason and will insofar as they move naturally. Synderesis, conscience and the natural law “always incline to good, “but free judgment “sometimes inclines to good, sometimes to evil. Synderesis is the power; conscience is the habit; natural law inheres in objects. Since conscience is cognitive, either there must be something that directs us to action other than conscience or synderesis, or that synderesis is that thing which so directs us. 

    Which is it? “There is a third way of speaking”: the understanding “has a light which is a natural judicatory for it, directing the understanding in what is to be known”; affect also has “a certain natural weight directing it in what is to be sought.” The things to be sought are either morally honorable or advantageous. Similarly, cognizable things may be objects of contemplation or those relating to morals. Conscience is the name for the judicatory power that has such a habit, such a way; synderesis is the name for a power “susceptible to habituation rather than a habit.” “Power as thus habituated” urges us toward the morally good, and therefore belongs to the affective side of the soul. When we appeal to God with sighs too deep for words,” we exercise just this affective habit toward the good. Synderesis is the spark of conscience in the sense that “conscience alone,” being cognitive, “can neither move nor sting nor urge except by means of synderesis, which, as it were, urges and ignites.” “Just as reason cannot move except by means of will, so neither can conscience move except by means of synderesis.” Synderesis isn’t “a power of will in general but only will insofar as it moves naturally.”

    What, then, is the relation of synderesis to natural law, as distinguished from deliberation, the realm of virtues and vices? Natural law relates to both synderesis and conscience. “We are instructed by natural law and are rightly ordered by it”—that is, the three parts of the soul attain their right order by conforming to nature, to what a human being really is. Natural law is a habit or way including both understanding and affect, conscience and synderesis. “In another sense natural law is called a collection of the precepts of natural right, and in this sense it names the object of synderesis and conscience,” with conscience dictating and synderesis inclining us either to seeking or to refusing. This latter sense Bonaventure considers the more proper meaning of natural law. Synderesis is then “an affective power insofar as it is by nature easily turned to good and tends to good,” whereas conscience is “a habit of practical understanding.” “Natural law, finally, is the object of both.” Synderesis is the word for “the affective power as its motion is natural and right,” indeed flying like an eagle “over the others,” the other parts or powers of the soul, “not mingling with them when they err but correcting them.”

    But can synderesis be extinguished by sin? The Gloss on Psalm 14:1 states that some men are “devoid of every rational power.” And if you argue, as Bonaventure does, that synderesis isn’t a rational power, there is the Gloss on Psalm 56:2-3, saying that “foolish arrogance is like a numbness, when someone trusting himself neither fears nor is cautious”—a symptom of “spiritual sickness” occurring when synderesis has been extinguished. Too, “heretics endure death for the sake of their errors without any remorse of conscience,” another sign that synderesis “seems to be entirely extinct in them.” Finally, since sin can be “totally extinguished, as is clear with regard to the Blessed Virgin,” so too “synderesis can be extinguished by a multitude of sins.”

    The contrary view hold that the spark of conscience wasn’t extinguished even in Cain, “a great sinner.” Augustine also testifies that there is no shamefulness “so vicious that it makes one lose all sense of what is morally honorable.” Synderesis “is naturally inherent in us,” unalienable; vice “does not destroy the last vestiges of nature.” Finally, even the damned suffer “remorse of conscience,” which can only be ignited by synderesis; indeed, “this remorse is especially intense in them,” one of the worst torments they suffer.

    Bonaventure answers that synderesis can be impeded temporarily but not extinguished because “it is something natural” to us. The “vain and fictive joy” of heretics, who “believe that they are dying for the piety of faith when they are dying for the impiety of error; “the wantonness of pleasure” whereby “a human being is sometimes so absorbed by a carnal act that there is no place for remorse” or for reason, either; “the hardness of obstinacy,” seen in those “who are so far confirmed in evil that they can never be inclined to good”: all these conditions of the soul finally earn the rebuke of conscience, sparked by synderesis—a rebuke “especially vigorous in the damned,” for whom it comes too late. The damned retain their human nature, and with it synderesis, now acting in them “as punishment.” Although “synderesis can be impeded in its act yet never universally extinguished, permanently and with respect to every act.” Adam’s fall did not extinguish his humanity, or ours.

    But, if not extinguished, can synderesis become depraved through sin? Evidently so, some say, inasmuch as there are “shameless sinners” in whom synderesis has been “overthrown.” The Gloss on Jeremiah 2:16 explains, “A malignant spirit reaches all the way from the lower members to the top of the head when the sickness of defiance corrupts the mind’s chaste height,” which is “synderesis itself.” Since conscience can err, so synderesis must be deviant at such times. Sin can rule the soul at the same time as synderesis remains within it; therefore, synderesis can become depraved through sin.

    Those who deny that synderesis can become depraved through sin recall the Biblical comparison of synderesis to an eagle, which soars above the other three parts of the soul, correcting them when they err. Even when I do what I do not want to do (Romans 7:16), synderesis is what tells me I do wrong. “The act of synderesis always reacts against fault, even in the worst sinners,” and so cannot be said to have been depraved, though they are. And finally, we know that even the worst sinners sometimes repent. While there is life there is hope. “But the rightness that adheres most tightly is rightness by way of nature, and this is synderesis”; “therefore, it does not seem that it can become depraved through fault.”

    Bonaventure is especially concerned with answering the claim that sin corrupts the highest part of the human mind. The argument claims that “the higher portion of reason has two ways of moving: either as it is turned toward God and is ruled and directed by eternal laws, and, in this way, sin does not exist in it; or insofar as it is turned toward lower powers, and in this way it takes from them occasion for deviation and can become depraved by sin.” He replies that “synderesis of itself always urges to good and reacts against sin.” Sin is a deliberate act of the will, not an act of the will “as it exists by nature or moves naturally.” What happens when we sin is rather like what happens when a good ruler is overthrown by rebels. He is still good, but the rebels overpower him. “For a lord’s presiding depends on two things, namely, the rectitude of the one presiding and the submissiveness of the one serving.” Synderesis “of itself is always right, yet because reason and will frequently hinder it (reason through the blindness of error and will by the obstinacy of impiety) synderesis is said to be overthrown, in that its effect and its presiding over the other deliberative powers is repelled and broken through their resistance.” For its part, conscience “is always right when it stays on the level of the universal and moves in a single direction,” but when it “descends to particulars and makes comparisons it can become erroneous, because here it mingles with the acts of deliberative reason.” Bonaventure gives as his example the adherence of Jews to the laws commanding circumcision and the avoidance of certain foods. They are right in believing “that God should be obeyed,” a prompting of the “natural judicatory” of conscience. They are mistaken, he claims, in those particulars, which are particular applications of that prompting. In this as in all conscientious mistakes, “it is not synderesis” that is “turned aside, although conscience errs.” Another way of putting this is that synderesis is a natural power, naturally habituated. “Nature, taken by itself, always moves rightly.” But conscience is not only a natural but also an acquired habit, and acquired habits “can be either right or deviant in character,” right or erroneous. Free judgment is under synderesis, not the other way around. 

     

    Note

    1. In this, Bonaventure follows Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094a, where the philosopher writes that “awareness” of the highest good must “have great weight in one’s life,” that is, in our choices and practices.

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