Daniel J. Flynn: The Man Who Invented Conservatism: The Unlikely Life of Frank S. Meyer. New York: Encounter Books, 2025.
Born a few years prior to the First World War, Frank S. Meyer began his political life as a member of the Communist Party, which seized control of Russia a few years after his birth. After nearly two decades as a successful Party organizer, he rejected both the Party and the Marxism-Leninism that animated it, becoming one of the most important post-World War II American conservatives, both as a theoretician and a practitioner of the politics of liberty. The thing he intended to conserve was, in the words of his biographer, “the ordered freedom inherent in the American Founding.” To do so, he worked to form an alliance between the two main groups who esteemed the Founding and opposed Communism, democratic socialism, and Progressivism: the “traditionalists” and the “libertarians.” He succeeded, and although he didn’t live to see it, his efforts helped to bring about the election of Ronald Reagan and, as a consequence of that, the defeat of Russian Communism in the Cold War.
A New Jersey boy, Meyer was the son of a wealthy German-Jewish manufacturer in Newark, a man whose political hero was Woodrow Wilson. The boy was a rebel from the start, admiring Satan in Paradise Lost and, in a Nietzschean stroke, writing a poem hailing Dionysus. As a young man in the 1920s, he despised “the Judeo-Christian moral code” that upheld sexual abstinence as a conspicuous virtue, calling it “disgusting, dangerous and indecent.” He lasted for three semesters at then-conservative, monied Princeton before leaving for England and Balliol College, Oxford. There, he became a Marxist and founded the October Club—named after the Soviet revolution, of course—and guided it into the Communist Party of Great Britain, “an instrument of the Soviet Union,” then ruled by Stalin. Thus, “an American ran this youth wing of Great Britain’s Russian-directed Communist Party,” giving much needed life to a small and moribund organization, one long characterized by British dottiness. In that capacity, and quite possibly thanks to his rich-kid connections, he met any number of luminaries: Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, David Loyd George, Harold Laski, T. S. Eliot, George Bernard Shaw. He earned the attentions of the British security service, too.
Laski became his teacher when he enrolled in the London School of Economics in 1932, as did the eminent ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski. Meyer’s doctoral dissertation in the anthropology department was a study of Mexican and Pueblo Indian culture, but his academic career failed to interest him so much as Communist Party activism. By the mid-1930s, the Party was organizing mass rallies of the Popular Front, events with such titles as the “World Congress Against War” and the “European Anti-Fascist Workers’ Congress.” Continuing his work as a youth organizer, he won the approval of the Comintern hierarchy in Europe. No wonder: he had taken Communism at Oxford “from nothing to three hundred members” and prepared the favorable reception of the “King-and-Country” pledge (“This House will in no circumstances fight for King and Country but will do all in its power to prevent transfer of arms to belligerent countries”), which originated at Oxford but carried the day at the London School by a vote of ten to one, “illustrat[ing] the seizure of campus politics by his Marxist clique.” As is well known, the pledge unintentionally served to buoy Hitler’s hopes that the Brits wouldn’t fight.
LSE administrators wearied of his activism. “The student leader’s conspicuous presence as an activist and a playboy, and his conspicuous absence from the classroom” along with his “scoffing at the edicts of the school’s director,” earned him expulsion from the university. The government soon followed, expelling him from the country in the spring of 1934. He left for—where else?—Paris, working for Walter Ulbrich, the future Communist Party leader of East Germany, his fellow dedicated (to use the current term of praise) Stalinist. But he soon returned to the United States, landing at the University of Chicago, where he “looked forward to again using the cover of academia to recruit party members, promote Marxism, and capture institutions for Stalinism.” Edward Shils, who eventually became an eminence among American sociologists, described his contemporary as “a demonic figure with flashing black eyes, a mop of black hair before mops on the head became the fashion, shabby in dress, eloquent, voluble, excitable,” and a born “mischief maker.” Meyer quickly established connection with the burgeoning “peace movement” in the American Popular Front, which combined Communists with Quakers and other fauna of the non-Communist American Left. “Communists found the campus liberals useful,” and Meyer did use them. That didn’t prevent him from criticizing the very liberal University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins for promoting his “Great Books” curriculum, a project that gave scant encouragement to Marxist ideologues. He was expelled from the Ph.D. program in 1938.
No worries. He became the director of the Chicago Writers’ School, which “attracted non-Communists as it imparted undiluted Marxist theory to the initiated.” Meyer taught the latter, using as his text The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a tome written by some of Stalin’s close colleagues “and revised by them whenever a line changed or a Communist fell from favor.” Flynn adds, “Both occurred often when Meyer served as director from 1938 to 1941,” the years of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, a treaty that signaled the end of the Popular Front, too many non-Communist members of which couldn’t quite stomach the alliance of fascism and communism. Following orders, Meyer relinquished his role as a teacher and went into Party organizing as an assistant of Morris Childs, a veteran Communist, close associate of CPUSA chairman Earl Browder, who did espionage work for the Soviets for many years before turning his coat and working for the U.S. government as a double agent after the Second World War. In the wake of the controversial Pact, Party discipline and fundraising were more important than ever; Meyers’ “history of catalyzing the student movement in England and transforming campus activism at the University of Chicago provided the ideal background” for that work.
This didn’t mean he abandoned his ideological efforts. In the sort of implausible ‘synthesis’ that made the CPUSA ‘line’ increasingly notorious, “the budding party theorist attempted to meld the American Founding with Marxism,” arguing that the ‘capitalist’ and ‘treasonous’ Federalist Party had opposed the Democratic Party’s “progressive war” against the British in 1812, just as today, in 1941, “the forces of reaction are dragging our country” into a war, but “a very different kind of war, a war of imperialist conquest” on the side of Great Britain against those laudable allies, the Soviet Union and National-Socialist Germany. Flynn remarks that “this propaganda piece bore an unfortunate publication date of July 1941,” a couple of weeks after Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union. Recovering quickly, a year later Meyer cranked out another piece, averring that just as we “must fight shoulder to shoulder with all who will carry the struggle against the Axis tyranny” today, “so in Jefferson’s day, the United States had to make its alliances, to bind itself closely with the forces which were fighting against the enemies of progress, and especially with the militant democracy of revolutionary France.” Inasmuch as militant, democratic, revolutionary France had arisen after the American alliance in the 1770s and early 1780s, and had disappeared into Bonapartist despotism by 1812, Meyer might be described as suggesting a chronological marvel, although it is conceivable that he identified yesterday’s Napoleon with today’s Stalin, the latter the leader of the only genuine democracy, according to contemporary Communists. “He reached,” Flynn suggests. Reached for the bleach, your rhyming reviewer adds.
Having gone “from vehemently denouncing Nazi Germany to opposing any war effort against it as imperialism to urging the taking up of arms against the Third Reich,” Meyer asked his Party bosses permission to enlist, overcoming their initial refusal and joining the U.S. Army in the summer of 1942. This gave him his first experience with real proletarians, and it proved enlightening. From their own point of view, the Communists were right because, “like a cult member separated from the group,” Meyer “developed independence of mind.”
He did not initially break from the Party, instead “wonder[ing] if he could reform it.” Fat chance of that, to employ a proletarian expression of the time, but his initial efforts actually enhanced his standing with Browder and Company, who had begun to wonder the same thing. Was class warfare really “the best road to socialism,” given real proletarians’ preference for beer and bowling, and given Americans’ aversion generally to “democratic centralism,” as Stalinist dictatorship of the worldwide Communist movement was so ringingly called. Meyer doubled down on his proposed synthesis of Communism and Americanism as a way of fashioning “a Marxism that appealed to his countrymen. “This will only come about,” he wrote, “when our leaders from top to bottom are as familiar with the struggles of Jefferson and Jackson and Lincoln, and what we have inherited from those struggles, as they are with 1848, 1902, 1917, and fuse these understandings into one tool.” American Communists should, as Flynn puts it, present Marxism as a doctrine “growing organically out of the Declaration of Independence, Federalist Papers, and Constitution”. Sure enough, Comrade Browder, “whether coincidentally or consequentially, pursued almost all” of Meyers’ recommendations, “particularly fusionism.”
The 1943 Tehran Conference, with its seeming thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, made the Browder-Meyer line plausible. “It all recalled the Popular Front period of the mid-1930” and its slogan, “Communism Is Twentieth Century Americanism.” Now, with President Roosevelt commuting Browder’s prison sentence for passport fraud, Browder could predict “postwar unity” between the two countries. This was too much, even for such ardent American Communists as William Z. Foster and Sam Darcy, who denounced such meliorism as a betrayal of Marxism, a move that earned Foster a reprimand and Darcy expulsion from the Party. Communist fusionism ruled the day, to the extent that the Party itself was dissolved and replaced by “a political association” carrying forward “the traditions of Washington, Jefferson, Paine, Jackson, and Lincoln, under the changed conditions of modern industrial society.” Browder went so far as to begin his speeches with “Ladies and Gentlemen” instead of “Comrades.”
This softening of the previous hard line had an unintended consequence in the mind of Frank Meyer. The publication of F. A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom in 1944, with its powerful challenge to policies of centralized economic planning, came at a hitherto unaccustomed moment of intellectual openness. Hayek, he wrote in a review for the Communist publication, New Masses, argues that the necessity to implement plans ‘from above’ “will in the end amount to the choice being arbitrarily made by those who exercise the power,” which obviates the possibility that they will be made democratically, even in a republic. The rulers “will then have continually to increase their use of sheer power to enforce those decisions,” resulting in “a completely regimented society in which the individual would have no freedom and no real voice.” Understandably, that was Meyer’s last article for New Masses. Moscow itself clinched the matter, changing its policy of detente and rehabilitating the hard-liners. Meyer denounced this move as warmongering. This, and Meyer’s refusal to turn away from The Daily Worker‘s editor Leo Budenz when he converted to Catholicism, spurred the Party to order Meyer’s wife and fellow Communist, Elsie to file for divorce. She refused and, with the collapse of Browderism, Meyer was adrift. “In what did he believe?” He also considered himself and his family to be in physical danger; in the years immediately following the war, not only were many American Communists expelled from the Party but some 500 to 1,000 were murdered by Stalin’s political police.
By 1947, as the danger eased, he was earning money as a lecturer, simultaneously studying the thought of Henry Adams, Thomas Aquinas, Arnold Toynbee, and André Malraux—the latter a former ‘fellow traveler’ from the Popular Front days, by then a firm anti-Communist and political ally of Charles de Gaulle. And in 1948 he joined with his childhood friend, Eugene O’Neill, Jr., himself a former Party member, in backing Harry Truman for president against Henry Wallace, the muddle-headed former vice president, now the candidate backed by the reconstituted CPUSA. He also read Richard Weaver’s seminal Ideas Have Consequences, “a book that so profoundly influenced him that he later called it the fons et origo of the conservative movement” in the United States. He agonized over an invitation to testify against former comrades accused of violating the Alienation Registration Act, a 1940 law making it a crime to “knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the Unted States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.” The Act, colloquially known as the Smith Act for its sponsor, Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia, was aimed at Nazis and therefore initially backed by the CPUSA. “Whether the law violated the Constitution became the subject of a fierce debate, but not until the government began using it on Stalinists.” In the end, Meyer did testify, earning denunciation from the editorialists at The Daily Worker, who tagged him, in their typically colorful manner, as “an unscholarly scholar, fished from the cesspools of intellectual decay.”
In testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1957, Meyer concurred with Josephine Truslow Adams, who had previously testified that she had acted as a link between President Roosevelt and Comrade Brower. As Meyer remembered his conversations with Adams, FDR was “convinced that the Soviet Union would move from its lack of civil liberties toward civil liberties while the United States moved from it constitutional and free enterprise situation to socialism, and both would end at the same point”—what would later be called the ‘convergence theory’ of U.S-U.S.S.R. relations. Years later, questions arose regarding Adams’s mental stability and hence the validity of her claims; it is unlikely that she actually visited the White House, although she did send numerous letters to the president, receiving mostly perfunctory replies. “Meyer forever believed Adams,” as did Robert Morris, the chief aide to the Subcommittee, but the preponderance of the evidence is against the charge. On ‘convergence theory,’ however, there is no doubt that many liberals of the FDR stripe believed it, and there is also no doubt that it was mistaken, at least on the Soviet side of the ledger. Before Stalin, during Stalin’s rule, and until the Soviet Union finally collapsed, there was no plan to ‘converge’ with liberalism within the walls of the Kremlin.
It was in a book review for The American Mercury in 1953 that Meyer first used the term “fusionism” to refer not to the Popular Front-type strategy he had advanced when a Communist but to a possible alliance between traditionalist conservatism and “individualism” or liberalism. Meyer published “a respectful if mixed review” of Russell Kirk’s The Conservative Mind, which to this day finds many readers among American conservatives; Kirk pointedly excludes Thomas Jefferson and Herbert Spencer from his pantheon of intellectual heroes, and that was the rub. Kirk rejected natural right as a dangerous abstraction, the source of Jacobin fanaticism, holding up Edmund Burke and English traditionalism as the antidote to both. A decade later, Meyer would reply with a book of his own, In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo. [1] In the meantime, and on the level of practice, “fusionism slowly morphed from Browderism to an alternative to the popular conception of conservatism to, ultimately, conservative itself.”
Rose Wilder Lane, daughter of Laura Ingalls Wilder, hurried Meyer along in his intellectual struggle. Lane pushed him to answer the question, “What do you believe?” Meyer answered: “The West was the first civilization to break through [the] worship of Necessity and to give a charter to the individual. Freedom is not for Western man ‘freedom to do right,’ but freedom to choose right or wrong—the only kind of freedom that has meaning in individual terms. That, from another point of view, is original sin, a fearful burden and a gift of freedom.” Lane, a libertarian, identified such individualism not as a charter written by “the West”—she “regarded Europe as cultivating collectivism” in the form of nationalism, monarchy established religion, and aristocracy—from which the early Americans aimed to escape. Meyer persisted, noticing that such thinkers as Locke and Montesquieu were, after all, Europeans.
The founding of National Review by William F. Buckley, Jr. in 1955 gave Meyer a new platform on which to enunciate his thoughts. Buckley described the conservative literary magazine as “out of place” in contemporary America, in the sense that “literate America” had “rejected conservativism in favor of radical social experimentation.” Russell Kirk was among the magazine’s editors and columnists; to his displeasure, Meyer signed on as a “contributor,” with his own column. Buckley soon brought in Robert Morris’s former assistant on the Internal Security Subcommittee, William Rusher, as the magazine’s publisher; Rusher’s political activism proved congenial to a man of Meyer’s background and predilections, although some of the editors and contributors dismissed him as “a rigid ideologue.” Buckley eventually appointed him as the editor of the “Books, Arts, and Manners” section, in which he published such academic literary luminaries as Hugh Kenner and Guy Davenport, the young Garry Wills, and Whittaker Chambers, who wrote a devastating review of Ayn Rand’s novel, Atlas Shrugged.
Meyer’s main rival on the editorial staff was James Burnham, author of The Managerial Revolution, an early account of the administrative state reviewed memorably by George Orwell, and Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy, published in 1953 and very likely the source of the President Reagan’s complementary policy aims vis-à-vis the Soviets in the 1980s (“We win; they lose.”) Burnham wanted to turn National Review in a more popular, somewhat less conservative magazine, befitting his deprecation of ideas and his attitude of ‘realism’ or Machiavellianism in politics. In Meyer’s words, Burnham, as a “positivist and relativist” of the “Machiavellian-Paretan” stripe, “both in metaphysical and political-philosophical terms, stands outside of conservatism.” Flynn puts the matter in more biographical terms: “Meyer converted to conservatism” from Marxism; Burnham, also a lapsed Marxist, “turned to [conservativism] as a last available option after not just the left but liberals regarded him as persona non grata.”
Meyer had a rather different sense of the real. In 1960, he argued that conservatism was gaining political ground but that President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon, his heir apparent, were moving the Republican Party leftward, making it more and more like a moderate form of New Dealism. Meyer judged that to be a mistake. In fifteen to twenty years, he predicted, conservative “intellectual leadership” will translate into “political reality.” The American people may well lose confidence in the Establishment, including ‘liberal’ Democrats and ‘moderate’ Republicans, turning toward conservatism. Therefore, in the run-up to the Republican Party nomination, National Review should endorse neither Nixon nor his liberal-Republican rival, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, but conservative Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater. Goldwater won’t win the nomination, Meyer readily conceded, but the important think was to hammer a stake into the ground, for future reference.
The year 1960 also saw the publication of Meyer’s important book, The Moulding of Communists, which remains an excellent account of how Party members are instructed and disciplined, shaping them into men and women who think and act entirely within the parameters of Marxism-Leninism. [2] As Flynn correctly observes, the Communist Party, in Meyer’s description “demands a total-politics mindset,” compelling members “to shut out people, including relatives,” who do not follow them into the Party, which becomes the Communist’s new family. “Meyer experienced in the 1930s what others had not yet experienced by the early 1960s”; as a result, most Americans simply did not conceive of the radicalism of Communism as the secular equivalent of a maximally demanding religion or cult. The book remains relevant today, as it is impossible to understand the actions of the Chinese Communist Party without understanding the mindset of the Soviet-centered Party of Meyer’s day. And although Flynn thinks that Meyer’s analysis, drawing heavily from his anthropological training under Malinowski, precluded its wide acceptance, the book was quite successful commercially as well as critically, to the extent that Meyer was interviewed on television by Mike Wallace.
Editor, author, and pundit, Meyer nonetheless made time for his longtime practical métier, political activism. He advised Young Americans for Freedom and the New York Conservative Party, the latter becoming Buckley’s vehicle for his brio-filled 1965 mayoral campaign against liberal Republican John Lindsey and Democrat war-horse Abe Beame. (Buckley came in a distant third, of course, but not before charming a lot of New Yorkers, who had hitherto supposed conservatives to be crude and rather stupid.) In the background, Meyer, a master of ‘networking,’ brought in much-needed campaign donations and also spoke effectively to local groups around the city. On another front, he joined the Buckley-National Review campaign against the conspiracy-theory conservatism of the John Birch Society, which boasted some 100,000 members and an extensive publishing arm in the 1960s. Canceled subscriptions resulted, but in the end the Birchers declined, and the fusionist conservatives gained.
Meyer began to concentrate more and more on activism, less on editing NR‘s book review section. The balance of editorial power at National Review shifted in the mid-1960s. Willmoore Kendall and L. Brent Bozell both departed, Kendall for the University of Dallas and Bozell for Francoist Spain, for which regime he had developed a some esteem. Both had shared Meyer’s interest in political theory, against Burnham’s deprecation of ‘mere theory.’ Crucially, both could speak to Buckley as equals, Kendall having been Buckley’s teacher at Yale, Bozell being Buckley’s brother-in-law. Without these allies, and without Meyer’s physical presence at the Manhattan office of the magazine—he and his wife had two sons to homeschool—Burnham came to dominate the publication, second only to the editor-in-chief.
With NR increasingly “resembl[ing] Burnham’s vision for it,” Meyer’s “most effective work increasingly took place outside” its pages. While the sales of In Defense of Freedom were modest, its influence on conservatism as a movement was outsized. It did indeed become a “conservative credo” for the core activists of fusionist conservatism. The crushing defeat of Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election disappointed Meyer without daunting him. “When we consider that the campaign represented but a few months of the first opportunity on a road national cale to confute thirty years of Liberal indoctrination,” Meyer wrote, “can the gaining of two-fifths of the vote be considered a practical disaster of momentous consequence”? On the contrary: “You can build a pretty good political movement with a base of twenty-seven million people.”
That is what he set out to do, forming the American Conservative Union as a counterpart to the liberals’ Americans for Democratic Action. The ACU published a study on the Vietnam, criticizing the Kennedy and Johnson administrations for undermining President Ngo Dinh Diem and generally lacking “the will to win” the war, a will that was none too strong among those who set the overall American strategy of containing Communism, worldwide. [3] Meyer also helped to organize the Philadelphia Society, still an organization that brings American conservatives together for semi-annual meetings. It was there that Meyer got into arguments with Harry V. Jaffa over the status of Lincoln and the Confederacy in the American regime, with Meyer denying that Lincoln upheld the principles of the Founding and Jaffa affirming that he did. (Jaffa was right, inasmuch as slavery and liberty don’t mix very well. Moreover, as Jaffa wrote at the time, “If states can declare their right to enslave human person within their borders, what principle is that they appeal to in denouncing arbitrary power in the Federal Government?” Meyer, who saw that any successful conservative political movement would need the support of Southerners, could not afford to answer that.)
It was precisely as an advocate of liberty that Meyer firmly opposed the so-called ‘drug culture’ of the 1960s. LSD destroys “the intellectual ordering of experience, which is the fruit of millennia of civilization.” As for marijuana, he regarded it as an “Eastern, introspective substance” that killed conversation, unlike “the real Western drug,” alcohol which, if properly consumed, promotes conversation.
He became highly critical of what the civil rights movement had become. Likely tracking the statements of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who had moved from arguing from the principles of the Declaration of Independence and American constitutionalism to advocacy of socialism, and also observing the urban riots that contradicted Dr. King’s continued advocacy of non-violence, Meyer demurred. “The movement’s insistence that individuals must cede to government—and to the government most distant,” the federal government—the “novel and great powers” that socialism requires in order “to achieve equality offended his libertarianism”—and, one might add, his commitment to the principle of non-contradiction. He also denounced what he called “the egalitarian myths that anyone who is in any way worse off than anyone else can be so only because of oppression or distortion arising from evil men or evil circumstances.”
The events of the late 1960s jarred him. “The more authorities rewarded disobedience, disorder, and disregard for law, the more disobedience, disorder, and disregard for law proliferated. The damage from nihilism and a West alienated from itself, he concluded, bore this biter fruit of attempted civilizational suicide”—on that, he concurred with Burnham, who had published Suicide of the West in 1964. He continued to disagree with Burnham about what to do about it, politically. Burnham backed Nixon in 1968, Meyer Reagan. Burnham simply couldn’t take the retired actor seriously. Meyer’s main reservation was that in a way Reagan was a bit too serious—serious, that is, about being a Republican, pledging to support whomever the party nominated in 1968, including Nelson Rockefeller. When Nixon’s nomination put an end to the matter, Meyer offered (solicited) advice to his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. He went part of the way toward endorsing the ‘foreign policy realism’ shared by Kissinger and Burnham: U.S. foreign policy should be “concerned with our national interest”; “the social systems of other nations are no concern of our policy.” But he added, “except insofar as they represent armed power ideologically directed toward our destruction.” That is, our foreign policy should be conducted “within broad moral limits.” “The existence of a dynamic and messianic ideology (with much of the fore of a fanatic religion)” which animates “the long-term policies of the second most powerful state in the world” should induce American policymakers not only to contain the Soviet Union but to aim at it “eventual dissolution” precisely because it is “the only major threat to our fundamental national interest.” Judging from the Nixon Administration’s trademark policy of detente with the Soviets, Kissinger evidently took that advice with a grain of salt, as it were. Reagan didn’t, but that didn’t matter, yet.
Frank S. Meyer died in 1972, a few months before Nixon’s landslide re-election over the anti-anti-Communist, George McGovern, the Henry Wallace of his day. The rest of the decade was so dreary that America’s first genuinely conservative president (in Meyer’s sense of ‘conservative’) finally won the presidency in 1980. He won, in part, thanks to the coalition of traditionalists and libertarians that Meyer had assembled, as Reagan himself acknowledged. Flynn concludes, “In the 1940s, Frank Meyer changed his mind. By the end of the 1980s, he had changed the world.” That is the final parallel between Meyer and Reagan, who did both of those things.
Notes
- See “The Conservative Credo of Frank S. Meyer,” on this website under the category, “American Politics.”
- See “Communism as a Regime of the Mind,” on this website under the category, “Manners and Morals.” Flynn dismisses it as “inferior” to In Defense of Freedom, claiming that Moulding is “read only as a curio if at all decades later,” which may well be true and quite telling—about contemporary readers, not the book. Much naivete about the phenomenon of the People’s Republic of China and indeed much of the radical-Left political organizing that goes on in Western commercial republics would be dispelled, had it a larger readership today.
- The political situation in the Republic of Vietnam was complex and difficult to assess. Diem, a Catholic and an implacable enemy of both Communism and corruption, was accused of persecuting Buddhists, although his policies towards them had been generous for most of his career. However, his favoritism toward public displays of Catholic symbols and concomitant suppression of Buddhist symbols grated, escalating to acts of self-immolation of Buddhist monks in 1963. This outraged public opinion in the United States and elsewhere. At the same time, Diem’s willingness to negotiate with the Communists alarmed the Kennedy Administration, which ordered the C.I.A. to back a coup d’état.

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