Will Morrisey Reviews

Book reviews and articles on political philosophy and literature.

  • Home
  • Reviews
    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
  • Contents
  • About
  • Books

Recent Posts

  • The French Malaise
  • Chateaubriand in Jerusalem
  • Chateaubriand’s Voyage toward Jerusalem
  • Hitler’s Intentions
  • The Derangement of Love in the Western World

Recent Comments

    Archives

    • May 2025
    • April 2025
    • March 2025
    • February 2025
    • January 2025
    • December 2024
    • November 2024
    • October 2024
    • September 2024
    • August 2024
    • July 2024
    • June 2024
    • May 2024
    • April 2024
    • March 2024
    • February 2024
    • January 2024
    • December 2023
    • November 2023
    • October 2023
    • September 2023
    • August 2023
    • July 2023
    • June 2023
    • May 2023
    • April 2023
    • March 2023
    • February 2023
    • January 2023
    • December 2022
    • November 2022
    • October 2022
    • September 2022
    • August 2022
    • July 2022
    • June 2022
    • May 2022
    • April 2022
    • March 2022
    • February 2022
    • January 2022
    • December 2021
    • November 2021
    • October 2021
    • September 2021
    • August 2021
    • July 2021
    • June 2021
    • May 2021
    • April 2021
    • March 2021
    • February 2021
    • January 2021
    • December 2020
    • November 2020
    • October 2020
    • September 2020
    • August 2020
    • July 2020
    • June 2020
    • May 2020
    • April 2020
    • March 2020
    • February 2020
    • January 2020
    • December 2019
    • November 2019
    • October 2019
    • September 2019
    • August 2019
    • July 2019
    • June 2019
    • May 2019
    • April 2019
    • March 2019
    • February 2019
    • January 2019
    • December 2018
    • November 2018
    • October 2018
    • September 2018
    • August 2018
    • July 2018
    • June 2018
    • May 2018
    • April 2018
    • March 2018
    • February 2018
    • January 2018
    • December 2017
    • November 2017
    • September 2017
    • August 2017
    • July 2017
    • June 2017
    • May 2017
    • April 2017
    • March 2017
    • February 2017
    • January 2017
    • December 2016
    • November 2016
    • September 2016
    • August 2016
    • July 2016
    • June 2016
    • April 2016
    • March 2016
    • February 2016
    • January 2016

    Categories

    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
    • Uncategorized

    Meta

    • Log in
    • Entries feed
    • Comments feed
    • WordPress.org

    Powered by Genesis

    A Chinese Tocqueville?

    August 8, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Wang Huning: America Against America. No publisher listed. 1991.

     

    In 1988, a thirty-five-year-old Chinese professor spent six months in the United States. Based at the University of Iowa, he found time to visit some thirty cities and twenty universities in an attempt better to understand the United States. Today, Wang Huning serves as a principal adviser to Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping, as he did to the two previous chairmen. He is a member of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee and the CCP Secretariat, having recently stepped away from his role as director of the CCP’s Central Policy Research Committee. Someone in the Party hierarchy must have liked his book.

    Whereas Tocqueville visited America in order better to understand ‘democracy’—by which he meant a civil society in which no titled aristocrats existed—Wang wanted “to get to know this number one capitalist country in more detail and in a more realistic way” than had been possible for recent Chinese scholars. He was particularly interested not so much in the American economy, however, in American capitalism, but in “the political management processes of American society.” He does, nonetheless, hew closely to Marxian categories as he proceeds.

    “Why is there an America?” Wang means this not as a historical question but a question of comparative politics. “The United States, like China, constitutes a special phenomenon of humanity in the twentieth century,” but whereas the “ancient civilization” of China “has declined in the modern era,” “lagging behind the modern nations of the world,” America, with its “short history of only two hundred years, has become the world’s leading developed country today.” As of 1991, Americans had ‘solved’ the problem of modernity; Chinese had not.

    This doesn’t mean that America faces no serious problems, Wang hastens to remark. His title, “America Against America,” means that the United States features both “positive and negative forces” arrayed against one another in “inherent contradiction”—as of course Marx would have highlighted in his analysis of any capitalist society. Democracy in America is shaky, at best, since “powerful groups that dominate politics are above the common people.” These groups are “private consortia”—oligarchs who hold no official place in the government. This notwithstanding, Americans continue to think of their regime as democratic. “My idea is to oppose the imaginary America with the real America,” the American dream with the American reality.

    Wang writes that Marx and Engels had predicted the collapse of capitalism, inasmuch as capitalists produce “their own gravediggers,” namely, the industrial workers or ‘proletariat,’ who eventually will rise up and overthrow the bourgeoisie and institute state socialism. “After all these years,” Wang quite sensibly admits, “it should be said that capitalism is still developing and cannot be underestimated.” To be sure, “the judgments and analyses of historical materialism are correct in terms of historical development,” but that development is still in the capitalist stage, awaiting “the maturation of historical conditions.”

    As for China, Wang cautiously suggests that its difficulties come from a dogmatic ideology which featured “a total rejection of capitalism,” preventing Chinese from “learning from the advanced experience of other countries.” All human societies have “conflicts and needs.” Therefore “it should be useful to understand what methods different human societies use to resolve contradictions, mitigate conflicts, and meet needs.” His “original intention” is to analyze such methods as now established in the (real) American regime—just at the time the Soviet regime and empire had failed, it should be noted—in order to contribute “to the development and progress of Chinese society.” Indeed, authorial glances at China may be seen throughout the book. The CCP had seen what had happened in Russia; it did not want that to happen in China.

    First and foremost, far from being egalitarian, America is an “uneven land.” This unevenness and indeed contradiction begins with the minds of Americans, who “talk about innovation all day long” but also worry that technological development finally may work “against the nature of man,” leading to his destruction. These worries register the power of a still-powerful tradition, by which he must mean Christianity and perhaps natural right. “When you walk into America you walk into this kind of doubt.”

    These doubts notwithstanding, America has in practice embraced modern technology, part of the “modernization process.” Can this process be advanced under public ownership of the means of production? And does modernization require political democratization? These are the questions Russian communists had failed adequately to answer, questions Chinese rulers must answer.

    Wang observes that the international status of the U.S. dollar stems from the post-World War II Bretton Woods agreement; that status underwrites American economic power in the world. The implication is obvious: If China is to accelerate its climb to replace the U.S. it must work to get rid of Bretton Woods and to establish a new financial order, preferably with its own currency as the centerpiece.

    Technology as seen in American capitalism has contradictory effects. What Wang calls the “Four Cs”—cars, calls (phones), computers, and credit cards provide the means of “political socialization and political communication,” but these are ‘externals’; “the only real consolidation [of a political community] is when the system is actually infused into the lives of the people”—what Aristotle calls the Bios ti, the way of life of the regime. On that score, Wang follows Marx’s critique of capitalism, claiming that it leads to universal ‘commodification,’ the practice of treating everything as a saleable commodity. “Even people become commodities.” That is, insofar as America can be described as a coherent regime, its organizational principle is dehumanizing.

    Capitalism also spurs vastly increased demands and an increasingly complex system for supplying them. Such demands and complexities filter into non-capitalist societies, as well. The resulting “complex intertwining of modern society, politics, economics, culture, entertainment, health, art, transportation and other fields, have posed a serious challenge to the management system of society. Can a political and administrative system bear all the burdens of modern society?” Wang observes that “no political and administrative system has the capacity to directly manage and assume all the responsibilities,” except in small places like Singapore and Hong Kong. The United States and China alike must face this problem, presenting rival solutions to it. 

    It is this analysis, in the opening pages of the book, that induced many of Wang’s readers in the West to take him for a ‘liberal.’ He is not. He has no principled attachment to liberty, only a pragmatic sense that the sort of ‘totalitarian’ tyranny attempted by Mao Zedong is impossible to achieve. The past three decades have seen substantial improvement in technologies of control; the Chinese Politburo hasn’t hesitated to avail itself of them. Liberty might be justified by natural right, as seen in the American founding, or even by certain forms of historicism which esteem liberty as a permanent instrument of human progress. Wang endorses neither of these defenses of liberty. The liberty he endorses can (and has been) here today, gone tomorrow.

    In the United States, he claims, associations are made possible by commodification. “The real essence of commodization [sic] is not that everything becomes a commodity, but that the commodity is in a rational mechanism of operation.” People voluntarily organize businesses, markets, unions, and even social groups because such associations are useful for production and commerce. “The development of the commodity economy has led to a dual structure of governance in society: the social self-organized system is responsible for all kinds of specific matters, and the political system is responsible for coordinating the various self-organized systems.” Government “still as to regulate activities in various fields, only now it has changed from direct to indirect.”

    Contradiction arises in this modern form of capitalism because commodification “corrupts society and leads to a number of serious social problems,” problems government then must address. True, “the political an administrative system will be more powerful and effective [when] managing dozens of large self-organized systems than managing thousands of specific activities,” but the challenge remains.

    The psychic costs of commodification have been resisted by a few small groups in the United States. Since “the real driving force of modernization is in the inner world of people,” and some people reject the effects of that force, one sees such folk as the Amish (“simplicity, nature, and self-sufficiency”) and the Amana communalists in Iowa. With the Amish, fear of “the disappearance of the safe environment, modernization, and even any social change will encounter an incomparably strong resistance”; it is likely that Wang intends his reader to draw the parallel between the Amish and the Chinese peasants. As for the Amana, they abandoned collectivism in 1932, partly because too many of their members were freeloading but mostly because the religious zeal for it had faded. “Under the powerful lure of this prosperous society, the younger generation turned to other values,” and “once this shift occurs in the younger generation, it is difficult for any force to ensure the longevity of the institution.” Here, it is likely that Wang intends his readers to think of China’s changes from the two Maoist generations, including the fanatical Red Guards of the late 1960s, to the somewhat more relaxed governance that prevailed in the years after the tyrant’s death. The Chinese Communist regime thus faces two types of challenge: one from ‘conservative,’ Amish-like peasants, the other from young people who resist the austerity imposed by their rulers. Mao undertook to solve the first problem by murdering 20 million or so peasants; he undertook to solve the second problem by inciting youth to attack those elements of the ruling elites Mao regarded as insufficiently strict, turning youth rebellion into an instrument of his own ruling power. Wang likely finds both of these remedies unpalatable and unnecessary.

    Although commodification has led to a certain kind of organization of civil society, Wang also seeks to understand the spirit of American politics, which he understands in historicist terms as “the product of the interaction of inheritance and environment.” He begins with Henry Steele Commager’s book, The American Spirit, published in 1950, which takes the decades between 1880 and the 1940—that is, the Progressive era—as crucial to understanding the ethos of Americans. According to Commager, Americans during that period undertook a “highly selective” attitude toward the political inheritance handed down to them by previous generations of Americans and by Western civilization generally. In his view, “the political system and judicial system have changed very little in two hundred years, but the social organization has changed radically, and the psychological aspects have been revolutionized.” It isn’t clear how it had changed, as the character traits he cites—optimism, ‘can-do’ attitude, broad vision, materialist sensibility, a practical approach to politics, innovativeness, common sense, and a practical religiosity—seem not that much different from the spirit of 1776. In an obvious instance of mirror-imaging, Wang claims that Americans “despise other nations and peoples almost to the point of paranoia.”

    He agrees with Tocqueville on the social, if not economic, egalitarianism of Americans, although he denies that Tocqueville’s claim was empirically true, citing the status of slaves, women, and Indians. This egalitarianism, as far as it goes, has resulted into some unusual features of American life: “parents rarely control their children and children rarely respect their parents, but family life is happy”; “the military is lax in discipline but can fight wars.” This egalitarianism extends to intellectual life. “Hegel was convinced that he had discovered the ‘absolute spirit,'” but “the spirit of the American people is that there is no ‘absolute spirit.'”

    As to the Spirit of ’76, it instanced “the spirit of bourgeois revolutions at the same time,” particularly the English revolution of 1688. “Its basic principles were the creations of English and French thinkers during the bourgeois revolutions in Europe.”  Those principles—again, conceived in more or less Marxist fashion as the products of historical circumstance as driven by socioeconomic conditions—included freedom, equality, individualism, democracy, and the rule of law. These are sentiments, not products of reason; the syllogistic form of the Declaration of Independence doesn’t register in the mind of Mr. Wang. Indeed, these sentiments have “no definite meaning because they have no definite content,” a claim that would have surprised Thomas Jefferson, who found so many of them in Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, and Sydney—not a sentimentalist among them.

    Wang departs from Tocqueville, however, in contending that the strongest sentiment among Americans isn’t the love of equality but the love of freedom. This is because (contra Tocqueville and also contra himself, a few pages earlier), “the equality guaranteed by the Western system is only formal political equality, not social or economic equality”—a charge familiar to readers of Marx and his epigoni. It is precisely liberty that interferes with the establishment of social and economic equality, “especially the right to freedom of private property.” Liberty is the sentiment associated with the spirit of individualism; in “today’s world,” animated by that spirit, “equality can hardly be the dominant value,” which is undoubtedly why pretended egalitarians who organized dictatorships ‘of the proletariat’ work so hard to stamp it out.

    Turning to the U.S. Constitution, Wang finds the same bourgeois spirit. “Its basic provisions were certainly designed to safeguard certain interests.” This constitution “reflects a pessimistic, not an optimistic view of human nature,” which he deems “a major difference between Western culture and Eastern culture,” which does indeed lack the notion of innate depravity in human beings, although it manifests such depravity with as much vigor as anywhere else in the world.

    The three basic institutional principles established by the Constitution are representative government, decentralization (he is fascinated by the New England town meeting), and limited government, including the limitations established by the rule of law. All this notwithstanding, “it must not be thought that those who framed the Constitution had all the toiling masses in mind and were framing the Constitution for them”; rather, “what they had in mind at that time was first of all to maintain their interests, a new ruling group”—the oft-refuted claim of the Marxist historian, Charles Beard. Wang sees clearly and accurately that the Constitutional changes which have prevailed in the last 100 years often have come through judicial interpretations, really reinterpretations, of the meaning of the document, not by the difficult process of formal amendment. “The path to a society’s political development lies in turning political principles and beliefs into political rules and political traditions,” and it is to political scientist Theodore J. Lowi to whom Wang turns for an account of the American regime has changed since the Founding.

    In The End of Liberalism, Lowi identifies three republican regimes in the United States: the federal republic of the Founders, which lasted until the 1930s; the New Deal republic founded by FDR, which centralized more power in the national government, which deployed the theory of John Maynard Keynes, regulating economic activity more vigorously and redistributing wealth; and “judicial democracy,” whereby judges effectively take over many of the legislative functions by artful reinterpretation of the Constitution. The American Third Republic has reacted to the excesses of the Second Republic, which committed the country to various ‘programs’ which proved too expensive to maintain. At the same time, the Americans wanted somehow to retain the benefits they had been receiving from the Second Republic, which has led to yet another instance of ‘America against America.’

    Despite its divisions, America does have a “national character”—and a “colorful” one, at that. Although “the most innovative people in the world,” Americans remain “conservative in the realm of values.” They bring this off by maintaining “a clear line of distinction between value and technology and materiality,” the first seen in the “public sphere,” the second in the “private sphere” of production and consumption. This demarcation (as it were) forces Americans to be free, to innovate and thereby make money, if they want to enjoy material comforts. This was especially true in the early decades of American settlement, as Europeans struggled and won a war against primeval nature, but the same spirit endures. With no ruling aristocracy to impede this progress in the name of a morality that might have inhibited it (Wang may well have Confucianism in mind), Americans saw no real contradiction between their Christianity and their quest for material progress. Add to this Americans’ national pride, their desire to be “first in the world,” their individualism, and their democratic-egalitarian willingness to let people get what they want, and you get a dynamic society—highly productive but also perpetually threatened by instability. Wang doubts that Americans’ “values” can be maintained in the face of such disruption.

    “American society is the least mysterious society”; its denizens do not regard the heavens, nature, man, politics, society, or education as imponderables. This contributes to its characteristic innovative materialism but such “demystification [also] has the tendency to make people lack authority, neutrality, self-sufficiency, self-confidence,” living as they do in “a society in which everyone harbors the idea that everything must not be finally believed.” No society can survive on an ethos of undiluted skepticism; skepticism “can be the greatest driving force” for innovation or “the greatest destructive force.” In this, America exemplifies with unusual clarity “the conundrum of human society” as such: “we can’t have mystification and we can’t have no mystery.” By contrast, China has been a “defensive culture,” one which has resisted the challenges of modernity. Wang seems to want a more ‘balanced’ China, a China which has abandoned its defensiveness but does not go so far as the “aggressive culture” of Americans. Except, perhaps, in one area: “Sometimes it is not the people who master the technology, but the technology that masters the people. If you want to overwhelm the Americans, you must do one thing: surpass them in science and technology.” Mr. Wang’s elevation to the Chinese Communist Politburo suggests that the Chinese oligarchs took the point.

    To do this, Wang avails himself of Rousseau’s notion of civil religion, whereby society “sanctifies” the secular. American has done this to some degree with its culture of two political parties, its political heroes, and its ‘celebrities.’ “In such an individualistic, self-centered society, sanctification is the best mechanism for spreading core values.” More seriously, Americans have a strong “work ethic,” which he deems “society’s most valuable asset.” To establish that habit of the heart, a society must “find a way to make each person feel that they are working for themselves, not for others.” As a matter of fact, social organizations “rarely allow everyone to work for themselves,” exclusively, as that would mean “that society would not be a society.” “The key thing is to make people feel this way, this belief.” Civil religion, indeed, if not exactly along Rousseauian lines. 

    “At the core of American life is the protection of the private sphere,” the source of America’s power. This has its disadvantages, however. Friendships are superficial, since Americans move around a lot in search of material gain. Families suffer, for the same reason. Sexual liberation has prevailed, but the benefits promised by the likes of Herbert Marcuse have not, in Mr. Wang’s polite phrasing, become “obvious.” The individualistic American heart is a restless “lonely heart.” “I am afraid that in America, the best can exist and the worst can exist.”

    How does such a society govern itself? To some extent, the largely independent private sphere of commerce and industry runs smoothly, thanks to the operation of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” guided mildly by some government regulation. “Money becomes a fundamental medium in the management of society,” as “people manage money, and at the same time they use money to manage people.” “This system is independent of the government, independent of the political system,” “undertak[ing] a large and complex management process by itself.” Here, Wang again follows Marx, who contended that “the commodity economy is [only] apparently a relationship between things, but in fact it is a relationship between people,” and the “non-governmental money mechanism regulates people’s thinking, emotions, and behavior.” True, “Americans like to be governed least, but they like money most,” and “the logic of money is to lead people to be governed” by those who have it. Today, the American national government has a lot of money; it can control the people “indirectly by legal means,” which include the direction of tax revenues. Indeed, American tax laws are “most detailed.” Everyone “has to report income to the government. In this respect, Americans are the least free.” This does focus their attention on political life, however. Those who give “a certain amount of money to the government” feel “a responsibility to monitor it,” knowing “they have a vested interested in who they elect.” “The tax system fosters a sense of responsibility, however passive it may be.”

    Another means of governing the American individualists is through science and technology, which require specialization (an instrument of division, not of union), obedience to machine processes, and well-organized networks to discover and communicate discoveries. “Today, the application of technology has become one of society’s most powerful means of managing people. To a large extent, American society is governed by technological processes.” “People obey technology more than they obey politics,” as “education constantly derives [sic] and develops the energy of technological governance and the culture of technological governance.” This “logic of science and technology is inevitable” in modernity, and it must be said that Mr. Wang’s Politburo acts as if it is.

    Still a future member of that body, Wang deplored American political parties. They lack what he considered the characteristics a real political party to be. Although both of the major parties “represent the ruling class of society,” the capitalist class, they are mere “rabbles” with no membership criteria, no “systematic theory,” no “complete platform” that binds members, and no “tight organization” sustained between elections. Rather, each resembles “a national franchise, with each branch doing its own thing to sell its products. This is almost “unbelievable” to a Chinese Communist, but it does generate the energy in each party to contest elections vigorously, and electoral victory is the only thing the party chiefs care about. Elections matter because the ruling class is far from homogeneous, consisting of a variety of interest groups (“one of the characteristics of capitalist societies”) including business, labor, and farming. Political competition has led Americans to develop a political culture consistent with capitalism. Its political advertising, its lobbyists (sellers to the elected buyers of policies), and the advantages joined by “the wealthy and powerful groups” all leave politics with “no special status.” It’s all just business. This might be undermined by “a few more serious recessions,” which might enable the now-insignificant radical parties to find a ‘market’ for their offerings; such economic pressure can happen if “one day the economic level between the East and the West is reversed.” But endemic to the competitive system itself is the very undemocratic esteem for the winners, for “excellence.” “Many scholars have recognized that the phenomenon of rule by excellence is contrary to the principle of popular democracy,” although it “is produced by” that democracy. Since “worship” of excellence exhibited by the American civil religion “undermines the principle of democracy,” another tension setting American against America arises, and “which direction it will go cannot be predicted yet.”

    With voters in the public spheres and stockholders in the private sphere, America sees formal democracy but substantive oligarchy. Here, he cites Marcuse with approval: “The space of the private has been violated and reduced by the realities of the technological world. Mass production and mass distribution demand total appropriation of the individual.” Marcuse intends this as a critique of capitalism; it isn’t clear that Wang objects to it, so long as the Communist Party—a real party—remains in control. Indeed, he also agrees with Alvin Toffler’s argument in The Third Wave, that majority rule has “become increasingly obsolete.” “Behind the façade of ‘participatory democracy,’ the process of centralization is accelerating dramatically,” as a substantial percentage of Americans now work for a governing body as bureaucrats. This has been allowed to happen because democratic elections and the other practices and institutions of formal democracy, especially if expanded to an ever-widening electorate endowed by the government with an ever-lengthening list of ‘rights,” distract the people from the real rule of the bureaucrats, the public-sphere counterparts to the private-sphere capitalists. “There’s a wonderful thing about the American political system: you can’t say it’s undemocratic, and you can’t say it’s democratic.”

    While competitive elections make it “possible to tolerate dissent,” inasmuch as “those who disagree” with the majority of voters “are voted out and do not have a lot of grievances or grudges against anyone,” candidacy in those elections is unattractive. “Being a candidate” in an American election “is very hard. There’s a lot of running around and doing a lot of things during the day.” Congressional elections are not “attractive and inspiring, and most people seem to be indifferent.” The indifference of democratic citizens to the means by which they are (at least ostensibly) governed leads Wang to intone, “It has been said that the greatest enemy of democracy…is not tyranny, but democracy itself.” 

    Once elected, successful candidates become part of the American “political pyramid.” “For large countries, finding the right kind of institution is more beneficial than anything else. Federalism has unwittingly served precisely that function in the United States.” (“Unwittingly” betrays the fact that Mr. Wang never quite got around to reading The Federalist, but the fundamental point is right.) Always with one eye on China, he quickly adds, “of course, not every country has the conditions for federalism”—quite possibly a reference to the history of the provincial rulers who have rebelled against Chinese emperors more than once in the country’s long march through the centuries. For example, in America county government “is pivotal in political life,” its functions being “closest to the voters.” But again, there is “no apparent backwardness or ignorance in the counties of the average agricultural region” an “important condition for county politics to work”—one that he may not see in China, and one that Chairman Mao most assuredly did not see. “The county is small enough that everyone can see what the country officials are doing,” voting them in or out accordingly. “In political life, the people have nothing to say about national politics or state politics,” where “class interests” are more “directly reflected.” “But they have a real say in grassroots politics.” Wang sees in local governments the “feet” and the “hands” of the central government. “With effective local governments, the central government will be like a tiger with wings, like a fish in water.” But how can this be, if the counties are democratic, the states and federal government oligarchic?

    The answer is bureaucracy, a civil service system that extends to the local level. “The functioning of the administrative system is the part of the iceberg that is underwater, and party competition is only the part of the iceberg that is exposed to the air…. The machinery of the administrative system is the civil service, which is the cornerstone of the American political system.” Whether it is with the Congressional liaison offices, which spend the bulk of their time linking constituents to the bureaucrats, or with such mundane (and therefore habitual) operations as issuing driver’s licenses (managed by departments of transportation, but accessible by the police), the practices of “soft governance” contribute to American social stability in a “capitalist society” that would otherwise be untenable. 

    With respect to capitalism, Wang shows considerable interest in the way capitalists and workers have reconciled, to some extent, in the United States. “Such a provision would have been unthinkable in the West fifty years ago”—counting back from 1941, at the time Stalin was entrenched in the Soviet Union and Mao was a few years away from seizing rule on mainland China. Marx’s ‘scientific’ predictions were based on the prevalence of what Wang calls “hard regulations,” regulations governing the production process; these tend to alienate labor from capital by enforcing production quotas, hours of work, product quality. But contemporary automation and electronics “make these regulations redundant,” shifting managers’ attention to “soft regulations.” By these he means the way in which workers now control the machines; today, Lucy Ricardo and Ethel Mertz simply would have paused the assembly line. “Thanks to automation, management has become easier” because the automated factory changes the psychological condition of the worker, shifting his mind and heart from feelings of powerlessness to (apparent) empowerment. Thus “the development of capitalism has used technology to resolve the conflicts that may arise between labor and management over technology,” “easing social conflicts” while improving productivity and profit margins. “In Marcuse’s words,” American business “has been rationalized.” One problem persists: reconciling “people’s inner worlds” with what remains an irrational commitment (in Marxian eyes) to working hard for the profit of someone else, not society as a whole. “This will be a difficult problem for Western society for a long time.” Or not.

    What especially disturbs Wang is the impersonality of American business. “American management is rigid and strict,” one might say rule-driven. Chinese management “is about flexibility and mobility,” by which he really means it centers on “interpersonal relationships.” Family ties and payoffs are more prominent in that model. “It is worth exploring what path Chinese society should take to create a better organizational mechanism for political development.”

    Moreover, quite apart from capitalist management in businesses, “the inhuman phenomena of capitalist society depicted and criticized by Marx, Engels, and Lenin have now been resolved by the government” through the institution of “legal and political regulation” of civil society and the provision of social services. Here, Wang foresees a circumstance in which the American regulatory and welfare state will run out of money in the face of ever-increasing worker demands, causing “political upheaval.”

    Much of the inner world of American workers and capitalists alike centers on religion, “a fundamental part of [American] social life.” “Many Americans are psychologically dependent on religion or religious organizations,” although for some churchgoing serves primarily as a means of social connection, not so much of worship.

    Wang is dubious. Admittedly, “religion has a social function,” but “the problems of religion are also obvious and cannot be denied.” Religion “constitut[es] a strong system of organization”; in doing so, however, it “can independently organize the people who belong to it according to its own principles”—principles which might contradict those of the ruling party. Similarly, religion has “the ability to constitute an ethical value system that guides and coordinates people’s behavior,” potentially at the expense of the authorized morality. And its ability “to form a powerful radiating system that can spread its activities and ideas to the community as a whole” might come to rival the state apparatus. Hence “in many societies religion is the main cause of social unrest.”

    The solution consists, first, of a strict “depoliticization of religion”; “religion cannot be the instrument of politics”—as seen in countries with an established church, which Wang calls “authoritarian foolishness”—or “become the master of politics,” which brings on ” kind of foolish tyranny.” Second, religion must not be allowed to become a superstition, by which he means it must not make pronouncements on matters scientists consider. “Religion lies more in the cultivation of personal moral sentiments, the pursuit of self-discipline and devotion.” When it poaches on science, it substitutes “blindness and fear of self”—i.e., fear of believing your own discoveries, unaided by divine revelation—for “rational process.”

    Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and other “great thinkers” have extolled “the indispensability of religion in an ideal society,” and (in very un-Marxian fashion) Wang proposes that “a society without religious life would lose an important self-governing mechanism,” so long as that life is coordinated by the regime and “not allow[ed]…to transgress common norms.” The United States has accomplished this. “Americans are very rational about religion, just as they are about science and technology.” They bring this off because “the high level of development of science and technology constrains the potential for irrationalization of religion.” By a “strange process,” in America “the more knowledge advances and the less dangerous religion becomes, the more active religion becomes,” confining itself to the realm of moral sentiments but powerful within that realm.

    Science and religion both animate the regime of education, to which Wang now turns. He is interested in American education primarily as a means of supporting the regime from one generation to the next—the problem Abraham Lincoln addressed in his address on “the perpetuation of our institutions” to the Young Men’s Lyceum in Springfield, Illinois. “The strongest foundation for the existence of an institution is the identity of a society. Whether the new generation agrees with this identity or not is related to the question of whether a certain social system can be reproduced. The most important mechanism of institutional reproduction is the education of society.” Additionally, in democratic America, education replaces aristocratic inheritance, becoming “the passport into the upper class” for persons of no wealth. [1]

    ‘Aristocracy’ thus reappears in the school system itself. “Teachers are often distrustful of school committee people; they believe that educational policy should be in the hands of teachers and that education should not contain a political element.” Wang quite sensibly remarks, “In reality this idea is unrealistic; I am afraid there is no education without politics, and I am afraid there is no politics without education.” Thomas Jefferson and Mao Zedong didn’t agree on much, but they agreed on that.

    As usual, Wang associates this point with his own regime’s obsession with modernization. As he puts it, society should become “a grand furnace of science and technology that smelts the spirit of modernization”; “in a society that keeps the achievements of modernization closed, it is the human spirit that is ultimately closed.” Therefore, “the most important function of higher education is not to produce excellence, but to equip each generation with a sense of modernity.” Exhibit A among the universities he selects for consideration is Massachusetts Institute of Technology, not Harvard, Yale, or Princeton. He marvels at the size of MIT’s budget and also at the fact that most of its funding comes from private sources. In China, this would not be allowed, except in the sense that the regime suckers Western business corporations into the country and then pirates their inventions—thus maintaining the regime while taking advantage of private enterprise, after the manner of V.I. Lenin’s New Economic Policy.

    Harvard comes next, but not Harvard as a whole. Wang studies the Kennedy School of Government, which he calls “the cadre school of America”—a “cadre” meaning the ruling elite. Whereas “the traditional European conception is that politics can be treated as an art,” the “American conception is that politics can be treated as a technology,” turning policymaking into “a science.” As he rightly observes, this approach comports with administrative statism, with bureaucracy as the new ruling class. This is even more obvious at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, “the first school of public administration in the United States,” established in 1924. There, the focus isn’t so much on policy as on administrative technique itself, training administrators for entry into the civil service system. “The purpose of the civil service system is not to recruit the best people in society, but to absorb the most talented people in society for government management” by subjecting them to “rigorous” but not “overly theoretical and academic” training.

    Military matters being never distant from the Chinese regime, Wang also visited the U.S. Naval Academy. He was surprised by its large political science department, which aims at acculturating future Navy officers to the American regime, thereby making military coups less likely—a point surely to be taken by the Chinese Communist Party. In America and everywhere else, “spreading the basic principles of a society among the military is a strategic measure for socio-political development.” Remarkably, Wang writes that “in developing countries, the first step should be to spread the concept of democracy among military personnel,” although one’s astonishment fades in reflecting that “democracy” means something quite different in the People’s Republic of China.

    Wang illustrates the American art of war by describing a football game the Midshipmen played during his visit. Football reflects the “American focus on honor,” which supplements the love of money. “Americans are all about strength”; unlike Chinese, they use “no very subtle tactics,” exerting “strength to get there fast.” This even extends to speech, as “Americans are very outspoken” (especially at football games, one might note). Wang doesn’t say it, but his Chinese readers will recognize the distinction between, for example, chess and go, a distinction that can carry over into military and political strategy.

    In sum, “the purpose of education is first of all defined as the training of qualified citizens. From this, we can see that the young generation, no matter what kind of school they enter, whether it is a general university or a military academy, [has] to be baptized with the American spirit.” Today, Mr. Wang would immediately recognize what is at stake in the Leftist takeover of many American universities. He and his colleagues doubtless welcome that. 

    Complementing the universities are the ‘think tanks’ or, as Wang calls them, “thought factories.” These organizations formulate public policies, publicize them, and monitor the results of policies implemented. Wang evidently regards as distinctively American the practice of explaining policies clearly, not only when think tanks do it but also, perhaps especially, when public officials do it. “In contrast, the political spirit of many societies is not so, but to avoid explanation. This is also a political art under certain conditions”—conditions that obviously prevail under the Chinese regime. American openness follows from its spirit of free commerce—commerce in ideas, not only in material goods. To some extent, this is good, since knowledge won’t yield “social progress” unless it is disseminated. “There [was] no shortage of ideas in ancient China that were outstanding for their time, but none of them became the driving force behind the progress of this society, much to the sigh of relief” among the ruling class. Chinese has lagged in the race for modernization because it has had no such “dissemination mechanism.” “The role of information dissemination”—the Enlightenment project—in “the evolution and development of Western societies cannot be underestimated.” In America, not only universities, think tanks, and public officials but libraries, museums, and similar institutions constitute a decentralized network of knowledge dissemination. Such decentralization provides the additional benefit of relieving the central government of many burdensome expenses.

    The theme of decentralization leads Wang to consider small cities in America. Iowa City, for example, features so many shops, such good houses and utilities that “except for young people who have the idea of going out to make a living, the general public is emotionally stable”—so much so, that many “have never been out of Iowa.” This is a benefit of the prevailing “commodity economy.” “If there were any forces that could restrict people from getting rich, small towns would not have developed.” And once they did develop, they contributed a much-needed measure of social stability to American life. Overall, “the modernization of American society is not based on big cities like New York, but on thousands of small towns, and big cities are just the top of the hill.”

    Nonetheless, all is not well. The individualism Tocqueville saw has finally yielded a decline in marriage, as seen in ever-higher divorce rates and children born out of wedlock. Parents do less than they once did to care for their children and children often do not support their aged parents. By contrast, “Chinese culture contains a strong element of raising children for old age, and filial piety is one of the basic concepts of Chinese culture.” Even so, disruption of the traditional family may come to China, too, since “raising children for old age is a product of agricultural civilization”—the small farm has always been the family farm—and “is bound to diminish under the impact of industrial civilization,” which the modernizing Mr. Wang and his colleagues advocate.

    So what? “Aristotle said more than 2,000 years ago that the family is the cell of society.” Aristotle sees in the family the three forms of rule: marital/political, parental/kingly, and masterly/tyrannical. That isn’t Wang’s point, however. In a society like America, where the individual is “the real cell of society,” not only material support for the aged but the resolution of disputes becomes increasingly a burden of the state. No longer does the paterfamilias judge disputes among his relatives; these now end up in family court, probate court, or civil court. “This has become a major problem for economic and social development,” leading to higher rates of poverty and of crime. And “all the government can provide is the material conditions; who will regulate the emotional problems?” The dilemma has reached China’s doorstep, as Singapore, “a Chinese society and a newly industrialized country,” now sees “the danger of family disintegration.” Whereas Marcuse hoped to replace the “civilization of technology” with “a civilization of love and lust,” Wang more sensibly asks, “What kind of emotions should human society maintain in addition to sexuality?”

    American society also neglects the young in its education system, leaving them ignorant, faithless, and undisciplined. Wang dismisses the claim that increased funding for teachers’ salaries alone can meet the crisis. True, “in a commodity economy, the power of money is irresistible;” “without a force to guide it, people will be profit-oriented.” so salary increases would lure more people into the teaching profession. But what will they teach?

    No wonder, then, that “the concept of America, in today’s world, must be associated with drugs”: “No drugs, no America.” China saw this when opium importers from the West infested their country in the 19th century. In today’s America, the wave of drug use “exceeds the various forces that have impacted the country throughout history.” Because “Americans believe in the right of each individual to determine his or her own destiny, a right to personal freedom that cannot be taken away,” why would many not claim a right to use drugs? This claim challenges the Western concept of liberty. “It is unrealistic to say that a person can enjoy full rights,” but Locke, Rousseau and others “failed to address practically” the limits of liberty, and Americans have yet to do so, either. “I am afraid that we still need to do some re-conceptualization of human beings.” One might add that such a reconceptualization did occur in China, as its rulers embraced the militant and decidedly anti-individualistic charms of Maoism. 

    Drugs fund organized crime. “These groups threaten society,” as well, building up what is in effect a rival regime within the country. Wang argues that the American regime cannot counteract this challenge to its authority for two reasons: the legal principle that an accused person is to be considered innocent until proven guilty; and the principle of social liberty, whereby “it is a right for anyone to organize themselves.” Under the innocence principle, “no one’s behavior can be criminalized and prohibited at the outset.” And under the liberty principle, “anyone can associate,” including criminals. As a result, crime runs out of control, beyond the power of government to stop it. 

    It must be said that Wang here shows his true political colors. In the name of fighting crime, he advocates preemptive state action. No need to prove guilt, and no need for any association not sanctioned by the state. Clamp down on people before they get the chance to act badly. “The American political system is a very successful one in terms of giving and allowing, but it is not a commendable one in terms of prohibiting and preventing.” How one somehow reconciles “giving” with prohibiting and allowing with preventing, he does not say. Americans have reconciled them by passing laws prohibiting certain actions, funding police who arrest and interrogate suspected criminals, then putting those criminals on trial with a presumption of innocence. Similarly, some associations are legal, some not, but whether a given association is judged licit or illicit depends upon it having its ‘day in court,’ where it can defend itself against its accusers. To put it mildly, the Chinese regime doesn’t think so.

    Other social problems include poverty (especially “dull-eyed, slow-moving” panhandlers) and racial tensions between whites and black and between whites and Indians. Americans “are outwardly polite and respectful of a set of different cultures, but in reality they despise” those cultures—as clear an instance of ‘mirror-imaging’ by a Chinese scholar as one is likely to find.

    Wang’s account of America’s “spiritual crisis” parallels his treatment of the criminal threat. Citing Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind, with its critique of cultural relativism and nihilism, especially in academia, he leads his reader to a decidedly un-Bloomian conclusion. “If society is left to develop naturally, traditional values will be difficult to preserve, and the trend of social development will always be to constantly eliminate the past,” as “the new generation will inevitably have no concept of the past, and without education there will be no continuity.” This is most acutely true in a democratic society. “Who, then, will perform this social function?” We know who the Chinese Communist Party thinks should perform it. This isn’t to say that Wang isn’t on to something, since what Bloom was excoriating was precisely the failure of university educators to preserve not only ‘the tradition’ but the philosophic way of life. Regrettably, Chinese Communists would preserve neither.

    In his final chapter, Wang discusses the challenge Japan then posed to American economic dominance. With no little exaggeration, he claims that the Japanese “now have control over the U.S economy” via investments in American companies and domination of American markets. The Japanese have pitted their “collectivism” against American individualism, personal devotion against American personal enjoyment or hedonism, and regulation against liberty. But Japan is only “the first nation to challenge the United States” (presumably, in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union); “in the next century, more nations are bound” to do so, as well. “It is then that Americans will truly reflect on their politics, economy, and culture,” as “the unstoppable undercurrent of crisis” reaches the surface. Obviously, Wang numbers China as one of those “collectivist” rivals to America, and it is likely that he expects China to win.

     

    Note

    1. Indeed, “one of the major defects of human beings is that the cultural knowledge and ethics acquired by the previous generation cannot be inherited and must be reacquired by the next generation”; the titled aristocrats can give birth to persons entitled to rule by law but not by natural right, if cultural knowledge and ethics are inherently worthwhile characteristics of any ruler.

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Vico’s Periods of History

    July 25, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Giambattista Vico: Principles of the New Science of Giambattista Vico Concerning the Common Nature of Nations. Books III, IV, V. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch translation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

     

    Vico titles the third, central, book of The New Science “The Discovery of the True Homer.” Why is the true Homer so important?

    He has already demonstrated to his satisfaction that “poetic wisdom was the vulgar wisdom of the peoples of Greece, who were first theological and later heroic poets” (III.780). But Plato “left firmly fixed the opinion that Homer was endowed with sublime esoteric wisdom,” and “all the other philosophers have followed in his train” (III.780). But was “Homer ever a philosopher?” (III.780). If not, Vico’s central book consists of a refutation of all previous philosophers on the status of philosophy itself, which, Vico has already asserted, developed much later than the savagery of the early centuries of human history. “Such crude, course, wild, savage, volatile, unreasonable or unreasonably obstinate, frivolous, and foolish customs” as then prevailed “can pertain only to men who are like children in the weakness of their minds, like women in the vigor of their imaginations, and like violent youths in the turbulence of the passions; whence we must deny to Homer any kind of esoteric wisdom” (III.787). For example, King Agamemnon sacrifices two lambs to consecrate the Greeks’ declaration of war against Priam and Troy, “an idea we would now associate with a butcher!” (III.801). This leaves readers to wonder what Vico thinks of similar acts of the Jewish Patriarchs, whose laws Vico has associated with the true God.

    Homer’s poetic characters are conceived not in terms of rational ideas, as Plato would do, but in terms of “imaginative universals” (III.809). So, for example, the character of Achilles embodies “all the properties of heroic valor, and all the feelings and customs arising from these natural properties, such as those of quick temper, punctiliousness, wrathfulness, implacability, violence, the arrogation of all right to might” (III.809). For his part, Ulysses embodies “all the feelings and customs of heroic wisdom; that is, those of wariness, patience, dissimulation, duplicity, deceit, always preserving propriety of speech and indifference of action, so that others may of themselves fall into error and may be the causes of their own deception” (III.808). That is, these characters didn’t spring full-blown out of the mind of Homer, who was only “a binder or compiler of fables” (III.852). They were “created by an entire nation” in accordance with their “common sense” and “powerful imaginations” (III.809). Vico observes that “poetic sublimity is inseparable from popularity,” and that nations who imagine such characters then take judge their customs by the example of the heroes they themselves have drawn out of their “common sense”—that is, the sense of reality they hold in common (III.809). No esoteric, philosophic wisdom inheres in these poems. In imagining that it does, the philosophers have been as fanciful, indeed more fanciful, than the old poets. 

    Homer himself probably didn’t exist but was rather another imagined universal or “idea,” rather like ‘his’ characters (III.873). If Vico’s critique or ‘deconstruction’ of Homer resembles later Higher Criticism of the Bible, this may be, as Strauss remarks in his 1953 class, owing to the fact that both Vico and the Higher Critics took their cue from Spinoza. [1] However that may be, “the philosophers did not discover their philosophies in the Homeric fables but rather inserted them therein” (III.901).  This does not mean, however, that Homer has no value for philosophers. On the contrary, “it was poetic wisdom itself whose fables provided occasions for the philosophers to meditate their lofty truths, and supplied them also with means for expounding them” (III.901). Theological and heroic poetry keeps philosophers, beginning with Plato’s Socrates, grounded in political reality. It suggests to them the central importance of political philosophy to all philosophizing.

    Vico additionally redirects political philosophy. Rather than attempting the Socratic ascent from the cave of opinion and convention, Vico uses the poets as guides to seeing the nature philosophers seek in the opinions and conventions recorded in poetry, poetry understood as a window into not only ancient beliefs and practices but into the nature those beliefs and practices reflect and refract. This means that he integrates both the poets and the historians into philosophy much more tightly than philosophers had done hitherto. The results may be seen in Book IV, “The Course the Nations Run”—that is, the pattern of events poets and historians record.

    The course nations run consists of three stages: human beings who conceive themselves as gods, or as consorting with gods; human beings conceiving themselves (or some among themselves) as heroes or demigods; human beings who understand themselves as men, simply. There are eleven triadic unities that track these stages, three kinds of natures, customs, natural laws, civil states, languages, (centrally) characters—i.e., symbols or letters—jurisprudences, authorities, reasons, judgments, and sects. All of these were “embraced by one general unity,” namely, “the religion of a providential divinity” (IV.915). Whether the religion of a providential unity rightly understands the nature of providential divinity as divine has already been cast into doubt earlier in The New Science, but readers should follow this theme here, as well.

    The three kinds of natures—all of them natures of human beings or proto-humans—are poetic/creative, heroic, and human. Poetic humanity or pre-humanity sees beings ruled by a powerful imagination; reason is weak. “Creative” means “divine”; these proto-men are fierce and cruel but also fearful (if indeed fearful of only animistic ‘gods’ formed by their own imagination), and hence susceptible to a higher order of religion, which teaches that the fear of the divine is the beginning of wisdom. Heroic semi-humans have emerged from this nature; they are no longer bestial, having gradually been tamed by their fear of the gods (IV.916). Finally, human nature is intelligent, modest, benign, and reasonable—genuinely human. Similarly, the three kinds of customs seen in these eras are religious and pious, choleric and punctilious (cf. Achilles), dutiful and civil. Fully human beings have become the political animals described by Aristotle.

    The first of the three kinds of natural law is the divine law, law supposed to have been given by the gods or by a god. The fact that Vico classifies “divine” law under natural law indicates his judgment regarding that supposition. Heroic law is the law of force. “This law of force is the law of Achilles”; one sees here the likely source of Simone Weil’s famous essay (IV.923). Human law embodies “fully developed human reason,” now possible in the era in which reason has established some control over imagination and passion (IV.924).

    As to civil states or government, “divine” government is theocratic. “Men believed that everything was commanded by the gods,” ordained by oracles (IV.925). Heroic government was aristocratic, rule by “armed priests in public assembly,” that is, by a regularized rule of persons claiming authority derived from the gods, backing their claims with force (IV.926). In these regimes, civil rights were “confined to the ruling orders of the heroes themselves” (IV.926). Plebeians, typically enslaved under the protectorate of an aristocratic master, had no rights not revocable by the master. Human governments, by contrast, derive authority and rights “in virtue of the intelligent nature which is the proper nature of man,” and “all are accounted equal under the laws” (IV.927). This form of rule may be popular or monarchic, inasmuch as both republics and monarchies aim at such civic equality, albeit quite differently.

    Each stage has its own form of language. The poetic/creative beings express a “divine mental language” in the form of mute religious acts, ceremonies (IV.938). This language “concerns [religions] more to be reverenced than to be reasoned” (IV.929). Heroic language consists of blazonings, coats of arms “in which arms are made to speak,” consistent with the rule of authoritative force (IV.930). Finally, articulate speech betokens fully-formed or true humanity, consistent with political life, ruling and being ruled primarily by speech, only secondarily by force.

    Characters comprise the central triad—central because characters are as it were the elements of the languages philologists study. The first kind of characters, characteristic of the poetic/creative era, are hieroglyphs, symbols that register the “imaginative universals” discernible in the documents that have come down to us from that time (IV.933). Hieroglyphics are “dictated naturally by the human mind’s innate property of delighting in the uniform,” but since the proto-humans’ power of reasoning was weak, they “could not achieve this by logical abstraction” but instead had recourse to the “imaginative representation” seen in pictographic writing (IV.933). The “heroic” characters “were also imaginative universals,” but now in speech, not in pictures (IV.934). The epic poets sang the fables they had heard and assembled. The singers sang of the heroic demigods who embodied the most admired qualities of the several nations, as mentioned before. The last historical era has seen “vulgar” characters, words written down by the commoners in the form of letters (IV.935). And indeed the materials thereby conveyed are themselves ‘literal’; instead of saying “the blood boils in my heart,” a man in the “human” era will say, simply, “I am angry” (IV.935). “Such languages and letter were under the sovereignty of the vulgar of the various peoples, whence both are called vulgar. In virtue of this sovereignty over languages and letters, the free peoples must also be masters of their laws, for they impose on the laws the senses in which they constrain the powerful to observe them, even against their will…. This sovereignty over vulgar letters and languages implies that, in the order of civil nature, the free popular commonwealths preceded the monarchies” (IV.936).

    Mystic theology heroic wisdom, and human practical wisdom comprise the three kinds of jurisprudence. Mystic theology is “the science of divine speech” or ‘divining’; it aims at interpreting the gods immanent in nature, gods who command the proto-human giants (IV.938). Heroic jurisprudence may be seen in “the wisdom of Ulysses,” who “obtains the advantages he seeks while always observing the propriety of his words” (IV.939). Ulysses negotiates with gods and his fellow heroes. Human jurisprudence “looks to the truth of the facts themselves and benignly bends the rule of law to all the requirements of the equity of the causes”; this form of jurisprudence is possible only in “enlightened” nations” (IV.941).

    The three kinds of authority correspondent to the three stages of human development are divine, heroic, and human. In the first stage, “everything belonged to the gods” (IV.944). In the second stage, authority rested in the senate and the laws enacted by the senators. In the third stage, authority depends upon trust in persons of experience, persons who exhibit in practical matters and “sublime wisdom” in intellectual matters (IV.942). This is true whether the regime is a republic or a monarchy; in the latter, the wise are the monarch’s counselors.

    Reason appears in three kinds. Lacking any strong form of reason in the proto-human stage, the giants “know of it only what has been revealed to them” (IV.948). “In God who is all reason, reason and authority are the same thing; whence in good theology divine authority holds the same place as reason” (IV.948). Unlike Augustine, who regards messages taken from auspices as likely demonic, the proto-humans listened to the auspices believing them to be from god. Heroic reason no longer depended upon the gods. It consisted of raison d’état and was known only to “the few experts in government,” the aristocrats. In aristocratic states, “the heroes each possessed privately a large share of the public utility in the form of the family monarchies preserved for them by the fatherland; and in view of this great particular interest preserved for them by the commonwealth, thy naturally subordinated their minor private interests,” magnanimously defending “the public good, which was that of the state” (IV.950). Vico here shows why the giants, “the cyclopean fathers,” were “induced to abandon their savage life” in the wilderness “and cultivate civility”: as aristocratic landowners and patriarchs, they maintained the authority they had enjoyed in the wilderness, but as beings honored by all, their “great private interest identified with the public interest” (IV.950). It was a rational choice.

    Reason in “human times,” when “citizens have command of public wealth,” inclines to the detailed and utilitarian, aiming at equality of these “private utilities” (IV.951). This “natural reason,” the “only reason of which the multitude are capable,” attends not to large ‘reasons of state’ but to calculations about whether you are getting more than I am (IV.951). When such polities have monarchic regimes, the counselors who do think of the public good are few, leaving the many to their petty devices. Monarchy alone, however, can “make the powerful and the weak equal before the law,” inasmuch as both aristocracy and democracy are factional, securing the good of the few or of the many, but never of both (IV.953). 

    With respect to judgments, in the proto-human era the patriarchs could only complain to the gods, there being no civil authorities to appeal to. “The rights secured by these divine judgments were themselves gods, for in those times the gentiles imagined that all institutions were gods” (IV.955). In practical terms, such judgments came about by dueling or by revenge for an alleged wrong effected by the injured party. In the heroic stage, judgments were for aristocrats only and consisted of conforming to rigorous legalist punctilio, as seen in the saying, “He who drops a comma loses his case” (IV.965). That is, the formula was sacred, as it is in a religious rite, where every detail must be performed if the sacrifice is to be acknowledged. This was a way of moderating men such as Achilles, who inclined to “measure all right by force” (IV.966). Finally, in the third stage, “human” judgments prevail, meaning “the governing consideration is the truth of the facts” (IV.974). 

    The eleventh and final triad consists of “sects” or ways of life of three “times”: first, the religious times, then the punctilious times, and finally “the civil or modest times”—the habits and practices that prevail at a given stage of human development (IV.9976-978). “The customs of the age are the school of princes.” (IV. 979). Radicalized, such periodicity would yield historical relativism, and although Vico stays within the framework of nature, the later historicist philosophers would claim him as an ancestor, even as the heroes and humans must own the giants as proto-men. He identifies three sets of customs: those of “religious times” (the superstitious giants), those of “punctilious times” (the rule of the heroic aristocrats), and those of “civil or modest times” (which see both regimes of “popular liberty” and monarchic regimes) (IV.976-977). One reason for the transition from aristocrats to the popularly-based regimes, whether democratic or monarchic, was that the many plebeians destabilized the regimes of the few but strengthened the regimes of the many and of the one. The people often have found an ally against the aristocrats in the monarch “because monarchs desire all their subjects to be made equal by their laws,” lest the grandees wax too grand (IV.1023). There was no lack of what we now call propaganda along these lines, as well; Vico cites the example of Augustus, who artfully declared himself “the protector of the Roman people” (IV.996). (In this sense, one may contend that monarchies are “popularly governed,” dependent upon the opinions and sentiments of the many) (IV.1008). In terms of legitimacy, “the natural law which had previously been called that of the gentes or noble houses…was now called the natural law of nations after the rise of the popular commonwealths (in which the entire nations are masters of the imperium) and later of the monarchies (in which the monarchs represent the entire nations subject to them)” (IV.998). More specifically, “the natural royal law” consists of “eternal utility,” that is, the need for a strong and decisive leader in times of crisis (IV.1008). In fine, “the brooding suspicions of aristocracies,” with the plots and counterplots amongst the ruling class families, “through the turbulence of popular commonwealths, nations come at last to rest under monarchies” (IV.1025). What began with patriarchal monarchies within the families of the giants ends with civil monarchies in fatherlands.

    The Romans governed these regime changes with considerable skill, Vico maintains. “The praetors and jurisconsults put forth every effort to ensure that the words of the Law of the Twelve Tables should be shifted from their original and proper meanings as little and as slowly as possible”—a practice that may explain why “the Roman Empire grew so great and endured so long” (IV.1003). Although Polybius attributes Roman greatness to the religion of the nobles, Machiavelli to “the magnanimity of the plebs,” envious Plutarch to mere “good fortune,” Vico credits prudence among those who tended to the fundamental laws of the regime (IV.1003). 

    Like all ancient law, Roman law was “poetic,” by which Vico means that legal rights were “invented by imagination” (IV.1036). “It rested its entire reputation on inventing such fables as might preserve the gravity of the laws and do justice to the facts,” putting “truths under masks” (IV.1036); “thus all ancient Roman law was a serious poem, represented by the Romans in the forum, and ancient jurisprudence was severe poetry” (IV.1037). Philology as it were unmasks the fables, enabling scholars to understand the truth beneath the surface.

    After they came to rule, after the “human times” began, the plebeians brought “common rational utility” to lawmaking, de-fabulizing it, making it more prosaic (IV.1038). “The ratio, or reason, of the law is a conformity of the law to the fact”; the plebs made the law more ‘down to earth’ (IV.1039).

    Despite the substantial changes wrought by the Gentiles in the various stages of human development, Vico insists that time itself neither creates nor destroys a right. Rights are eternal; ergo, they must come from God. All the various rights honored among peoples are “diverse modifications of the power of the first man,” who owned all the earth (IV.1039). By Socrates’ time, popular rule had established “an idea of an equal utility common to all [Athenians] severally” (IV.1040). In undertaking the task of political philosophy, Socrates “began to adumbrate intelligible genera or abstract universals by induction” (IV.1040). Such genera or universals are suggested by the legal criterion of equal utility, inasmuch as they result from abstraction of commonalities from particulars. The “human” or “common” way of life makes philosophic abstraction possible. “We conclude that [the] principles of metaphysics, logic, and morals issued from the marketplace of Athens,” as philosophy emerged from the laws governing that marketplace and the laws emerged from the “popular commonwealths” which put a premium on the prosaic task of buying and selling (IV.1043). “This may serve as a specimen of the history of philosophy told philosophically” (IV.1043).

    In the fifth, final, and shortest Book, Vico turns to the question of nations “when they rise again.” His example, remarkably, is Christendom—not the first collectivity that comes to mind when thinking of nations in the ordinary sense of the word. In this case, by the Christian nation he evidently means the Christian regime, the Christian ecclesia. “When working in superhuman ways, God has revealed and confirmed the truth of the Christian religion by opposing the virtue of the martyrs to the power of Rome, and the teaching of the [Church] Fathers, together with miracles, to the vain wisdom of Greece, and when armed nations were about to arise on every hand destined to combat the true divinity of its Founder, he permitted a new order of humanity to be born among the nations in order that [the true religion] might be firmly established according to the natural course of human institutions themselves” (V.1047). That is, Vico considers the rise of Christianity a return to heroic times, the return of a severe, forceful aristocracy which, among other things, imposed slavery on Muslims captured in war. These, then, were “the new divine times,” when the barbarian who had sacked Rome and brought on the Dark Ages, were, like the cyclopean giants of the wilderness, driven to the “comparatively humane” Christian priests—that is, the new aristocracy (V.1056). Thus, Christian history recapitulates the Gentiles’ history everywhere else, in a prior time.

    Eventually, in feudal times, many members of this Christian aristocracy served not only in the monasteries and churches but in ‘the world,’ ruling fiefdoms. This branch of the aristocracy had recourse to many aspects of the Roman law, emphasizing the right of rule by arms, not by utility. But as before, this too has changed, as the commoners rose up and shouldered the aristocrats aside, only to find that they need to call for a king to guard them against the vengeful, still-ambitious, aristocrats. “In proportion as the optimates lose their grip the strength of the people increases until they become free; and in proportion as the free people relax their hold the kings gain in strength until they become monarchs” (V.1084). Now, “just as the natural law of the philosophers (or moral theologians) is that of reason, so this natural law of the gentes is that of utility and of force” (V.1084).

    Today’s Europe sees “only five aristocracies,” namely, Venice, Genoa, Lucca in Italy, Ragusa in Dalmatia, and Nuremberg in Germany—and mostly small places, at that (V.1094). “But Christian Europe is everywhere radiant with such humanity that it abounds in all the good things that make for the happiness of human life, ministering to the comforts of the body as well as to the pleasures of mind and spirit” (V.1094). “Even for human ends, the Christian religion is the best in the world,” uniting “a wisdom of [revealed] authority with that of reason, basing the latter on the choicest doctrine of the philosophers and the most cultivated erudition of”—yes, indeed—the “philologists” (V.1094).

    But philosophers and philologists alike should take care. “Without order (which is to say without God) human society cannot stand for a moment” (Conclusion, 1100). Epicurus, Machiavelli, and Hobbes believe that chance rules the world; Zeno and Spinoza say it’s fate that does. But the true “political philosophers,” “whose prince is the divine Plato,” maintain that “providence directs human institutions” (C.1109). What providence provides is religion, the only thing that can draw proto-humans and barbarians out of savagery and keep them out of it. The Roman jurisconsults and Cicero followed in the Platonic line, knowing that “if religion is lost among the peoples, they have nothing left to enable them to live in society: no shield of defense, nor means of counsel, nor basis of support, nor even a form by which they may exist in the world at all” (C.1109).

    Enlightenment philosophes like Bayle do not recognize the feebleness of their “reasoned maxims” (C.1110). Many religions have served the salutary purpose of maintaining political communities, but only Christianity is true, the others false. The divine grace enjoyed by Christians “causes virtuous action for the sake of an eternal and infinite good” by “moving the senses to virtuous actions” (C.1110). One may say that Vico ends his symphony on the “new science” with a note of piety.

     

    Note

    1. In his class on Vico, Leo Strauss makes the important suggestion that Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are stand-ins for the Old and New Testaments, respectively. For example, Vico calls Homer the “father” of a nation, but no one before him had done so, whereas many commentators had referred to Moses as the father of is nation. It is easy to see parallels between the warlike characters of the Iliad and those of the Old Testament, but what parallel can be drawn between the wily Odysseus and Jesus and His apostles? If one prefers to avoid blasphemous comparisons, one might point to Jesus’ admonition to the disciples: Be you harmless as doves, prudent as serpents.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Seeking Wisdom in Poetry: Vico’s Philology

    July 14, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Giambattista Vico: Principles of the New Science of Giambattista Vico Concerning the Common Nature of Nations. Book Two: Poetic Wisdom. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch translation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

     

    “The nature of everything born or made betrays the crudeness of its origin”—man very much included (II.361). “Throughout this book it will be shown that as much as the poets had first sensed in the way of vulgar wisdom, the philosophers later understood in the way of esoteric wisdom; so that the former may be said to have been the sense and the latter the intellect of the human race” (II.363) (emphasis added).

    By “wisdom,” Vico means “the faculty which commands all the disciplines by which we acquire all the sciences and arts that make up humanity,” the faculty that perfects both intellect and will or spirit (II.364). Whereas the highest things are oriented toward God, the best things are oriented toward “the good of all mankind”; lest anyone take him to mean that the highest, divine things are not the best, Vico immediately adds that “true wisdom…should teach the knowledge of divine things in order to conduce human things to the highest good” (II.364). 

    How to achieve, or at least approach, wisdom? “Divination” or the knowledge of good and evil was prohibited by God, and this prohibition is the foundation of Judaism and Christianity (II.365). Human beings must understand God’s intention in this: hence theology. There are three kinds of theology: poetic theology, embodying “the civil theology of all the gentile nations”; natural theology, propounded by metaphysicians; and “our Christian theology, “a mixture of civil and natural with the loftiest revealed theology,” united “in the contemplation of divine providence” (II.366). Vico thus directs his reader’s attention to the providential or ‘historical’ aspect of the divine instead of (for example) God’s attributes. This is because poetic/civil, natural, and revealed theology appeared in that order, over time. “Divine providence has so conducted human things that starting from the poetic theology which regulated them by certain sensible signs believed to be divine counsels sent to man by the gods, and by means of the natural theology which demonstrates providence by eternal reasons which do not fall under the senses, the nations were disposed to receive revealed theology in virtue of a supersensual faith, superior not only to the senses but to human reason itself” (II.366). The New Science, “our science” of philology, “comes to be at once a history of the ideas, the customs, and the deeds of mankind. From these three we shall derive the principles of the history of human nature, which we shall show to be the principles of universal history, which principles it seems hitherto to have lacked” (II.366). The eminent Bishop of Meaux, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, had written his Universal History in the previous century. Vico evidently is not impressed with the work of the eminent Catholic divine.

    Vico gives an example of how philology works to uncover the truth about ancient peoples. Throughout their history, he writes, the Hebrews remained men of “the proper stature” for human beings because their laws required cleanliness of them (II.371). Meanwhile, gentile children wallowed in their own filth, absorbing “nitrous salts” which fertilized them, making them grow to gigantic stature. In those days, there were giants, and that is why (II.371). The Cyclopes lived in caves, had no civic life. According to philology, the Greek word for polity, politeia, derives from the Latin politus, which means clean, neat. Gentiles only came out of their caves, out of the woods, when the founders of the first settlements enforced cleanliness, bringing the inhuman or pre-human gentiles back to the right size. 

    The divine pervades the first poetry because the giants imagined things they didn’t understand to be gods; they were animists, believing themselves to be surrounded by natural things they supposed divine. “All the theories of the origin of poetry” from Plato to the moderns are wrong (II.384). Homer was no philosophic poet purveying esoteric wisdom founded on reason; “the wisdom of the ancients was the vulgar wisdom of the lawgivers who founded the human race,” giants who brought other giants out of their caves, out of the wilderness (II.384). This wisdom had nothing to do with “the esoteric wisdom of great and rare philosophers,” who, if anything, have prevented the production of similarly sublime poetry by subjecting poetry to rational analysis (II.384). Sublime means a thing that sublimates; ancient poetry and ancient lawgiving were sublime because they sublimated the savagery of the giants. Book Two concerns this poetic or vulgar wisdom.

    It was the ancient lawgivers who turned the superstitious religion of the giants to good use by presenting law as divine, interpreting thunder as the rebuke of the giants’ way of life by angry gods, thereby frightening the giants out of the wilderness, away from their wandering, nomadic way of life, and into the clearings, into settlements, where they could begin to live a civil life. The philological evidence Vico cites for this is that the word for law, ius, is a contraction of ious, Jove. This was the civil theology of the ancients, seen in their poetry.

    Vico considers poetic wisdom in ten dimensions. The first five are human topics: logic, morals, economy, politics, history; the second five non-human physical topics: physics cosmography, astronomy, chronology, and geography. There was a kind of logic in ancient poetry, but it wasn’t syllogistic. Ancient wisdom had a ‘metaphysical’ aspect insofar as it “contemplate[d] things in all the forms of their being”; it was logical “insofar as it consider[ed] things in all the forms by which they may be signified” (II.400). But it did not express these forms in words, as philosophers prior to Vico had supposed. In the beginning, logos was mute; it consisted of ideas of a certain sort. Indeed, “it is the eternal property of religions that they attach more importance to meditation than to speech” (II.401) The ancient poets often produced fables; irony, that technique of Socrates, is the product of a more reflective age. [1] 

    Speech nonetheless existed, even if contemplation or meditation was prior to it. Language should be understood historically. The “first men of the gentile world conceived ideas of things by imaginative characters of animate and mute substances”; that is, they supposed them to be divinities (II.408). They expressed themselves initially not in words but in gestures or by holding up physical objects that served as symbols of their ideas, such as swinging a scythe three times to represent three years. “They thus expressed themselves by a language with natural significations” (II.431). It is this strong connection with nature, albeit nature misconceived as divine, that we owe the diversity of languages. That is, not from a divine curse hurled at the Tower of Babel. The settlements in clearings outside of the wilderness existed in different places with different climates; the peoples thus settled acquired “their different natures and customs,” resulting in different languages (II.445). That human beings are nonetheless all of the same species may be seen in their proverbs, those “maxims of human life” which are “the same in substance but expressed from as many points of view as there are or have been different nations” (II.445). In addition to these national differences originating in nature, each language also registered the difference between the aristocrats and the many, the vulgar, the plebs. “This is confirmed by the two languages of which Homer speaks: the one of gods, the other of men, which we have interpreted as the heroic and the vulgar language, respectively” (II.443). One should pause to admire “interpreted.”

    If we count the languages of gods, heroes, and ordinary men as three languages, all of these “began at the same time,” inasmuch as the gentiles’ gods were imagined by the gentiles themselves (II.446). The three languages differed. The language of the gods remained “almost entirely mute”; the language of the aristocratic heroes mixed articulateness and muteness in equal measure; the language of the vulgar was talkative (II.446). Heroic speech thus began with the compressed, metaphorical language of poetry, not with discursive prose, which may be seen in the fables of the vulgar. Poets form poetic speech “by associating particular ideas,” as in the metaphorical phrase, “the blood boils in my heart” (II.460). Prosaic writers ‘abstract’ from such particularity, taking “the blood, the boiling, and the heart” and making “of them a single word,” anger (II.460). “By means of these vulgar genera, both of words and letters, the minds of the peoples grew quicker and developed powers of abstraction, and the way was thus prepared for the coming of the philosophers, who formed intelligible genre,” making logos into logic, the ability to find contradictions in custom-bound speech (II.460). Significantly, in section 465 Vico folds Hebrew poetry into this ‘gentile’ framework. Later, in a footnote to section 499, he describes Bacon’s inductive method as the logical capstone of philosophy.

    More immediately, the development of language permitted the development of law, said to be divinely inspired (as seen in the philological connection between ‘law’ and ‘Jove,’ mentioned earlier). “This shows that all the nations were born in the persuasion of divine providence,” although it must be said that this persuasion was derived from the imagination (II.473). Here, Vico prudently exempts the Hebrews, who worshipped “the true All Highest, who is above the heavens,” not a natural object or force on earth or in the sky (II.481). Among the gentiles, law and right were derived from strength; the rule of the best, the aristocrats, was really the rule of the strong, “the fathers in the family state” which preceded the civil state, the owners of property (II.490). “The so-called commonwealths of the optimates were also commonwealths of the few”; there was nothing ‘common’ about their wealth (II.490). 

    This “history of human ideas” disproves the “popular belief in the superlative wisdom of the ancients” (II.499). The ancient lawgiver-heroes worked independently of one another, establishing various sets of customs in the various climates in which they settled and began to civilize the pre-human (yet also formerly human, deformed-human) giants, whose inhuman giantism had resulted from childhood wallowing in filth, which acted like fertilizer. There was no universal law among the ancient gentiles, and thus no superlative wisdom worthy of the term ‘philosophy.’ There was a sort of lower wisdom, whereby the heroic lawgivers got the giants out of the wilderness by manipulating their superstitious beliefs in terrifying gods. 

    Poetic morality has a similarly modest origin. The “vulgar virtues” were “taught by religion through the institution of matrimony” (II.502). It is true that “the metaphysics of the philosophers, by means of the idea of God, fulfills its first task, that of clarifying the human mind, which needs logic so that with clear and distinct ideas”—as Descartes had said—it “may shape its reasonings, and descend therewith to cleanse the heart of man with morality” (II.502). But in the poetic age, that was a long way off. The lawgivers of the “poet giants, who had warred against heaven in their atheism,” vanquished the giants with “the terror of Jove, whom [the giants] feared as the wielder of the thunderbolt” (II.502). The lawgivers worked not by reason, which would have had no effect, but “by the senses, which, however false in the matter, were true enough in their form—which was the logic conformable to such natures as theirs” (II.502). The lawgivers made them “god-fearing,” and this was “source of their poetic morality,” which induced the giants “humble themselves” (II.502). To this day, “atheists become giants in spirit,” ready to assail Heaven in their folly (II.502). Thus, “poetic morality began with piety,” as “religion alone has the power to make us practice virtue, as philosophy is fit rather to discuss it” (II.503). Religion simply is “fear of divinity,” and it caused the giants to want to settle in safe places outside the wilderness, not to wander exposed to its dangers (II.503). 

    Sexual activity moved indoors, as fear of the gods led to shame in exposing oneself to their gaze. This enabled lawgivers to introduce the custom of marriage, which removes shame from sexual activity by making it sacred in the eyes of the gods. Religion and shame bind thus bind nations together, while impiety and shamelessness destroy them. Marriage bound families together under the gods, as “husbands shared their first human ideas with their wives” (II.506). “From this first point of all human institutions gentile men began to praise the gods” (II.506). These original gods were a chaste and sober lot. Later depictions of their behavior as amoral merely registers the decadence of the poets of later generations.

    In turn, religion “gave birth to all the arts of humanity” (II.508). It gradually changed the nature of giants, who became “the first men,” who began to exhibit prudence, justice, moderation (as seen in marriage to one woman), and made them strong, industrious, and even magnanimous (II.516). “Such were the virtues of the golden age, which was not, as effeminate poets later pictured it, an age in which pleasure was law” (II.516). The first men “took pleasure only in what was permitted and useful, as is still the case, we observe, with peasants” (II.516). Nor do philosophers guess right when they claim that the golden age men “read the eternal laws of justice in the bosom of Jove” (II.516). “This vulgar tradition together with the false belief in the matchless wisdom of the ancients tempted Plato to a vain longing for those times in which philosophers reigned or kings were philosophers” (II.522). No, these first men had “the virtues of the senses,” mixing “religion and cruelty, whose affinity may still be observed among witches” and were then seen in the practice of human sacrifice, which Vico calls “inhuman humanity”—inhuman in its cruelty but human in its self-humbling piety, its eagerness to appease the feared gods (II.517). The golden age was no age of innocence, whether of innocent pleasure or innocent communion with Jove. Initially, the innocence of the Golden Age was only “the extreme savagery of the Cyclopes” (II.547). “In fact, it was a fanaticism of superstition which kept the first men of the gentiles, savage, proud, and most cruel as they were, in some sort of restraint by main terror of a divinity they had imagined,” poetically (II.518). This is why modern Enlightenment philosophes are wrong. “No nation in the world was ever founded on atheism” (II.518). To do so would only cause men to revert to savagery, as seen in the Jacobin terror and the later, far vaster, reigns of terror imposed by the ideological rulers of modern tyrannies, some two centuries after Vico.

    Vico next turns to the oikonomia or household management of the first humans. The first men, he has said, taught the first women about the gods, after households had been established. Educere, he writes, means education of the spirit or will; educare means education of the body; both mean bringing forth of the human from within the giants’ souls and bodies. “In those times, full of arrogance and savagery because of the fresh emergence from bestial liberty,” there was monarchic rule within each household but not in the societies as such, as “one cannot conceive of either fraud or violence by which one man could subject all the others to a civil monarchy” (II.522). 

    They could, however, subject some of the others. Household economy was based on fathers laboring to leave a patrimony for their sons. Some of the fathers were able to control the water supply, thereby dominating the other families, who became the plebeians. “Apropos of all this, we often read in Holy Writ of Beer-sheba, ‘well of the oath’ or ‘oath of the well'”—another sly blurring of the distinction between gentiles and the Hebrews (II.527). [2] The increasingly aristocratic fathers, who took themselves to be gods, also established property, setting and maintaining boundaries on the earth to supplement their control over water. Pace Locke, this was no “deliberate agreement among men…carried out with justice and respected in good faith”; there was no “armed public force” and “no civil authority of law” (II.550). “It cannot be understood save as taking place among men of extreme wildness, observing a frightful religion which had fixed and circumscribed them within certain lands, and whose bloody ceremonies had consecrated their first walls” (II.550). When Remus jumps over the fence demarcating his property from Romulus’ property, Romulus kills him, “consecrat[ing]” with his brother’s blood “the first walls of Rome” (II.550). This happened everywhere. “The natural law of the gentes was by divine providence ordained separately for each people, and only when they became acquainted did they recognize it as common to all” (II.550). This ‘sanctified’ establishment of settlements, households, and property, ruled by fathers for the benefit of sons, shows why “it was the perpetual custom of the nobles to be religious” and, moreover, why it is “a strong sign of the downfall of a nation when the nobles disprize their native religion,” as occurred in Rome and as was happening in the Europe of Vico’s time (II.551). 

    The fact that fathers provided for their children has led both philologists and philosophers mistakenly to suppose that “the families in the so-called state of nature” were what we now call ‘nuclear’ families, consisting exclusively of aristocrats (II.552). Not so. They included famuli, also—the weak, the plebeian, the men whose motive never rose above the useful. Such families were protected by the strong while serving as their slaves. “To distinguish the sons of the heroes from those of the famuli, the former were called liberi, free” (II.556). But this surely did not mean refinement or delicacy, the way of life seen in the modern titled aristocrats. “Among the ancient Romans the family fathers had a sovereign power of life and death over their children and a despotic dominion over the property they acquired, so that down to imperial times there was no difference between sons and slaves as holders of property” (II.556). Rather, liberi meant not only rule over property but nobility, “so that artes liberales are noble arts, and liberalis kept the meaning of well-born, and liberalitas that of the gentility” (II.556). “Only nobles were free in the first cities,” and these were the seeds of fiefdom, Vico maintains in section 556, the central section of the 1744 edition.

    Because there were no contracts in the heroic age, insufficient trust among patriarchs to allow contracts to be struck, barter was the basis of commerce and ground rent was the only kind of rent. There were no partnerships. The rule of ancient civil law was, “No one may acquire by a person not under his power” (II.577). And those under the power of the aristocrats could not form legal marriages, sanctified marriages, only “natural marriages” (II.579). 

    Household life led to political life, the life not of contracts and of democracy but of a severely aristocratic “poetic politics” (II.582). “Since the fathers were sovereign kings of their families, the equality of their state and the fierce nature of the cyclopes being such that no one of them naturally would yield to another, there sprang up of themselves the reigning senates, made up of so many family kings” (II.584). They did this “without discernment or counsel,” uniting “their private interests in a common interest called patria, which, the word res being understood, means ‘the interest of the fathers'” (II.584). The nobles were henceforth called patricians, “the only citizens of the first patriae, or fatherlands” (II.584). In this way, “in the earliest times kings were chosen by nature,” not by deliberation and choice solemnized by contract (II.584). Hence Moses describes the descendants of Esau as “kings” (II.585). Indeed, “one cannot conceive in civil nature any reason why the fathers, in such a change of forms of government, should have altered anything of what they had had in the state of nature, save to subject their sovereign family powers to these reigning orders of theirs”; it is “the nature of the strong…to surrender as little as possible for what they have acquired by valor, and only so much as is necessary to preserve their acquisitions” (II.585). “The eminent domain of civil states” emerged from “the paternal natural domains” (II.585). When we look at Apollo’s lyre, Vico claims, we contemplate the symbol of “the union of the cords or forces of the fathers,” united in their civil authority (II.615).

    Meanwhile, the plebeians, products of natural marriages, “could not name their fathers” (II.587). Resentment and civil war followed, bringing about the formation of cities, again in the self-interest of the patricians. The patrician fathers formed “a closed order against the mutinous famuli,” an arcana imperii or secret set of laws ordained by the heroic senates (II.604). In addition to their superior strength and their superior authority, they now had superior knowledge. The owl of Minerva flies by night, that is, in secrecy, gliding from one patriarch to another while the many are civilly asleep, unaware. The rule of law in cities, of laws formulated in “the dark night of the hiding places,” began to make men more fully human, quite unintendedly (II.590). The goddess Minerva represented as wisdom was a later invention; initially, she represented the “armed aristocratic orders” (II.596).

    Still, the patricians needed the plebeians to serve them. And so, “by a common sense of utility the heroes were constrained to satisfy the multitude of their rebellious clients,” negotiating “the first agrarian law in the world, under which, as the strong do, they conceded the least they could, which was bonitary ownership of the fields the heroes might choose to assign them”—a subordination justified by the protection the heroes provided to the plebeians (II.597). No rights of citizenship were granted, no intermarriage allowed. As the Roman patricians were happy to explain to the plebeians, “if they were to share with them the connubium of the nobles, the resulting offspring would be like Pan a monster of two discordant natures brought forth by Penelope who had prostituted herself to the plebeians” (II.654). Such was aristocratic political science, which Vico defines as “the science of commanding and obeying in states” (II.629). 

    Two political divisions resulted: aristocrat/citizen and plebeian, aristocrat/citizen and hostis—stranger or enemy. Indeed, heroic nations regarded foreigners as “eternal enemies,” one reason why polis and polemos are near cognates, according to Vico’s rather fanciful etymology (II.639). Eventually, the Roman civil structure was re-founded upon a system of classes based on wealth, not birth. Whatever their pedigree, however, whether aristocratic or oligarchic, the rule of the few in the heroic or poetic age should not be confused with later definitions of ‘peoples’ as including the plebeians, or of liberty as a right shared with the many, or of kingship as a regime that offered succor to the many poor. And as for wars in those times, all of them were “wars of religion, which, for the reason we have taken as the first principle of this Science”—that all nations are founded on religion—made them “always extremely bitter” (II.675). “The vanquished were regarded as godless men,” rightly enslaved along with the existing plebeians (II.676). 

    Poetic history is the topic of Book II’s central chapter. Vico re-emphasizes the class division of the heroic age, citing the fable of Cadmus and the dragons’ teeth as an allegory of a conflict over land between heroes and plebeians, and interpreting Achilles shield as a depiction of the history of the world. The warlike but besieged city of Troy represents the plebeians, a hostile city-within-the-city everywhere at that time.

    Poetic physics posited an original Chaos, an image of cosmic forces which Vico claims was borrowed from the condition of “infamous,” Pan-like “promiscuity” among the gentiles (II.688). Out of this, Jove began “the world of men” rather as the heroes began civil life, “beginning the world of men by arousing in them the conatus”—in Spinoza, the innate force in every living creature to preserve itself—which “is proper to the liberty of the mind, just as from motion, which is proper to bodies as necessary agents, he began the world of nature” (II.689). It is noteworthy that Vico associates both human nature in particular and cosmic nature generally with motion, no perdurable form—orderly motion, to be sure, but motion, nonetheless. Although not exactly a ‘historicist’ in the later sense of the word, Vico puts motion first, only then praising the heroic civil beauty embodied by Apollo and the civil and natural beauty embodied by Venus. 

    “The greatest and most important part of physics is the contemplation of man” (II.692). Such contemplation yields the claim that “the founders of gentile humanity in a certain sense generated and produced in themselves the proper human form”; gentile humanity made itself—an act of supreme poetic making (II.692). Vico treats the senses differently than any previous philosopher had done. Others had valorized the sense of hearing (whereby one heeds the Word of God), seeing (whereby one perceives the Ideas), or touch (the source of certain knowledge in Machiavelli). Viconian philology associates wisdom, sapientia, with the sense of taste, with the act of assaying. Taste is “the faculty of making those uses of things which they have in their nature, not those uses which opinion supposes them to have” (II.706). Motion, change, use: thus Vico invites his readers to understand human nature, itself made by neither by prophets, nor philosophers, nor even ‘princes’ of Machiavellian atheism, but by founders who regarded themselves as divine heroes bringing the giants out of the wilderness and into the life of human beings. 

    Like all else in remote antiquity, poetic astronomy sprang from low origins. The first peoples were not scientists. They “wrote in the skies the history of the gods and their heroes”—with each nation writing its own gods and heroes into the skies, inasmuch as “nations, if not emancipated in the extreme of religious liberty (which only comes in the final stages of decadence), are naturally wary of accepting foreign deities” (II.729). For the first gentiles, “the predominating influences which the stars and the planets are supposed to have over sublunar bodies, have been attributed to them from those which the gods and heroes exercised when they were on earth. So little do they depend on natural causes!” (II.731).

    Poetic chronology reaffirms Vico’s contention that monarchy is not the first but “the last form of human government,” one arising “as a result of the unchecked liberty of the peoples, to which the optimates subject their power in the course of civil wars” (II.737). With the aristocrats weakened, monarchs soon take over the rule of the people, whose liberty they initially champion against aristocratic rule but then abolish once firmly in power. The exception to this general rule was maritime Phoenicia, enriched by commerce, “remain[ing] in the stage of popular liberty” because the many had the wherewithal to defend themselves against both the few and the one (II.737).

    Finally, poetic geography may be seen in the tales of the wandering ancient heroes. There were as many as “forty Herculeses among the ancient nations,” learning the features of the earth even as they brought home glory to their peoples (II.761). This manifests “the conceit of nations” (as seen, for example, in the Greeks, “who made such a stir about the Trojan War,” and the Romans, “in boasting an illustrious foreign origin” in the figure of Aeneas of Troy) (II.772). 

    In sum, in these ancient stories “we have discovered the outlines of all esoteric wisdom,” particularly the science of politics, of ruling and of being ruled, written even in the earth, the stars, in all of nature by the founders of the first settlements, who also ‘founded’ or formed the first human beings after the Esavians had been deformed into giants (II.779).

     

    Notes

    1. Vico identifies the lawgiver Solon as the founder who brought about the transition from the fabulous to the reflective way of thinking. “He must have been a sage of vulgar wisdom, party leader of the plebs in the first times of the aristocratic commonwealth at Athens.” Athens was ruled by aristocrats or “optimates,” as was “universally the case in all the heroic commonwealths.” Considering themselves to be of heroic, indeed divine origin (demigods, like Hercules and Achilles), the aristocrats supposed that “the gods belonged to them, and consequently that the auspices of the gods were theirs also.” The auspices were their carefully guarded means of maintaining their authority over the many, the plebeians, “whom they believed to be of bestial origin and consequently men without gods and hence without auspices,” entitle only to “the uses of natural liberty.” Note well: “This is a great principle of institutions that are discussed through almost the whole of the present work.” Solon’s democratizing reform was to tell the plebeians “to reflect upon themselves and to realize that they were of like human nature with the nobles and should therefore be made equal with them in civil rights.” It was not the supposedly divine oracle at Delphi who originated the command to “Know yourself.” It was Solon. This suggests that philosophy could only become possible after a democratizing lawgiver taught the many to know their own nature. 
    2. Two other examples appear fairly soon: in section 542, where Vico integrates the Biblical story of Ezekial into his framework, and section 544, where he does the same thing with the story of Job.

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    • « Previous Page
    • 1
    • …
    • 43
    • 44
    • 45
    • 46
    • 47
    • …
    • 226
    • Next Page »