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    Machiavelli in Florence

    September 1, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Miles J. Unger: Machiavelli: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011.

    Heinrich Meier: “The Renewal of Philosophy and the Challenge of Revealed Religion: On the Intention of Leo Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli.” In Political Philosophy and Revealed Religion. Robert Berman translation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017.

     

    In February 1513, Florentine authorities arrested Niccolò Machiavelli for plotting to overthrow the new oligarchic Medici regime which, after overthrowing the republic, had dismissed him from his position as Second Chancellor. He survived torture while remaining an atheist. And so his enemies subjected him to a fate worse than death, exile to the countryside, where “few people were as ill suited” as Machiavelli, no Epicurean amenable to a “quiet life” cultivating his garden. As is well known, Machiavelli wrote The Prince as an attempt to ingratiate himself with the Medici. “I love my city more than my own soul,” he averred, and Unger goes along with that, saying that Machiavelli’s patriotism burned brighter than his loyalty to republicanism. As is also well known, “while The Prince failed in its immediate objective to restore him to the good graces of the lords of the city, it has secured him a permanent place in the history of ideas.”

    Born in 1469 to a middle-class family in the minor nobility, his father a respected citizen, an attorney esteemed as a man of learning, Machiavelli grew up in a condition of “insecure respectability,” sufficiently distant from the Florentine grandees to give him a sense of being an outsider, on the margins of the ruling class. The family had shared in the prosperity of the city, which “was becoming a center of trade, manufacturing, and finance,” but the young and ambitious man needed a career, choosing the civil service, a vantage point that “provided vital insight into the cruel economy of power.”

    His ancestors were Guelphs, partisans of the pope, not Ghibellines, partisans of the Holy Roman Emperor. By this time, the Guelphs had triumphed, but “the crumbs of the victory had barely been cleared when they themselves split into rival factions—the Blacks and the Whites—who now went about slaughtering each other with equal gusto.” In this struggle, Machiavelli’s family joined the Blacks, who won, while not-yet-eminent Dante Alighieri “had the bad luck to belong to the Whites.” In the event, The Divine Comedy was the best revenge. For his part, looking back on that time in his Florentine Histories, Machiavelli found such violent factionalism to have been a tonic not a curse. Florence had become greater because of them, and in The Prince he would reverse the teaching of the Bible, saying that there is greater life in cities animated by hatred than those whose rulers attempt to govern by love. In such struggles, men of virtù could rise up and replace complacent ancestral lords. His father chronically in debt, preferring such activities of amateur scholarship as the compilation of an index to Livy, to the son “would fall the honor and the burden of carrying on the family name.”

    “One way the Medici consoled their compatriots for the loss of any real say in their own government was by keeping the city prosperous and splendid.” Wealth and architectural grandeur left Machiavelli unimpressed, but the future philosopher did take interest in the intellectual eminences who gathered “at the home of Florence’s leading citizen, Lorenzo de’ Medici.” These men included Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. “Educated Florentines like Machiavelli found their moral bearings not by emulating the lives of the saints but by studying the deeds and adopting the attitudes of the ancient Greeks and Romans,” in liberal studies “worthy of a free man,” as the scholar Pier Paolo Vergerio wrote. If Florentines no longer really practice civil liberty, they could still think about it. For now, safely ensconced in the civil service, Machiavelli could seek to rise socially and politically through literary achievement. He was handicapped, however, by “his prickly personality” and spent rather too much of his time frequenting brothels and taverns, before and after his marriage. 

    Such a place may well attract religious reformers. In 1498, Machiavelli, now in his late twenties, witnessed a fire and brimstone sermon by the Dominican monk, Girolamo Savonarola. “One would be hard pressed to find two men who embodied such divergent and mutually uncomprehending philosophies,” Unger writes; more, one might say that Savonarola was no philosopher at all but a pious rhetorician of the first rank. In his sermons, Savonarola made bold to excoriate Pope Alexander VI, who did indeed deserve rebuke on Christian terms. The dispute between these men re-factionalized not only Florence by all of Italy, which “descended into chaos” and “put an end to the golden age of the Italian Renaissance.” Crucially, it left Italy open to conquest by the French king, Charles VIII, who swept aside the small Italian city-states, one by one. A few years before Machiavelli heard Savonarola’s sermon, Charles had been unwisely invited to intervene in Italian politics by Ludovico Sforza, the king of Naples, who supposed that Charles would end the internecine wars; he did, but not to the advantage of Naples or any other Italian city. 

    By then, Lorenzo de’ Medici’s haughty, cruel, and incompetent son ruled Florence. Treating with Charles, he sacrificed the Florentine claim to Pisa in exchange for a continuance of himself in power. Enraged Florentines, who had long considered the city a prize they deserved to rule, drove out the Medici. Charles then occupied the city, and Savonarola greeted him warmly as the answer to one of his prophesies, which predicted the coming of a second Cyrus who would purge Italy of its sins. But Charles, too, soon retreated in the face of the Florentines’ rage. After his departure, that rage once again turned inward, with the ottimati or optimates, the oligarchs, fighting the populari or populists. Savonarola now “jump[ed], body and soul, into the political arena,” on the side of the populari, declaring their cause to be in accordance with “the will of God.” Be that as it may have been, his side won and formed a republican regime (modeled on that of Venice) ruled by the Great Council, a body “open to a wide spectrum of Florentine citizens,” eventually some 3,500 strong, including shopkeepers and artisans. Like Venice, the regime was no democratic republic, but it was a broader-based oligarchy than its predecessor. This was the regime Machiavelli joined, serving his entire career in the civil service under a regime which numbered a fervent Catholic preacher as its most eloquent founder. Machiavelli benefited from the republic but found it ill-designed, unable to last because it “did not satisfy all the parties among its citizens.” No regime in that city-state could survive if it “did not take into account the Florentines’ natural love of liberty.” 

    Charles VIII assuaged his disappointment by going on to take Rome, Vatican City, and Naples. But these conquests only served to unite Italians against him in the Holy League, nominally under the rule of Pope Alexander VI. “The only major Italian power that refused to join this sacred cause was Florence, which, under the leadership of Savonarola, had its own ideas where righteousness lay”—hardly with the Pope. Florentines still wanted to reacquire Pisa, which the Pope and his allies were loath to do. In the Battle of Fornovo, “one of the bloodiest battles ever fought on Italian soil,” neither the French forces nor those of the League won a conclusive victory, but Charles’s troops suffered such attrition that he had no choice but to quit Italy, “the land that not many months before had seemed so ripe for the picking.” Now, Savonarola and his Florentines became the objects of the Pope’s rage. The dissident preacher organized not troops but a “bonfire of the vanities,” a city-wide destruction of luxury items intended to appease the God who seemed to him angry at the Florentine sins. Excommunicated by the Church, Savonarola was exposed as having been quite as sinful as his compatriots. As Machiavelli would later remark, “unarmed prophets” do not fare well against those who are armed, whether they claim the gift of prophecy or not.

    A Franciscan priest challenged the Dominican Savanarola to a trial by fire, having long resented Dominican preeminence in the city. Prudently, neither man undertook the trial himself, preferring to hire substitutes. Rains came, forcing the postponement of the blessed event, but by now the people were out of patience with their erstwhile champion. Angry mobs attacked Savonarola’s “most prominent supporters,” and the people wrested Savonarola himself from the high altar of his church where he had gone to pray; they tortured and hanged him, burning his body for good measure. A few months later, Machiavelli was elevated to serve as Second Chancellor of the Republic.

    This was a paid office; such offices were called the utili. The higher offices, the oneri, were reserved for gentlemen who needed no salaries. Machiavelli got the job in part because he was known to be a critic of Savonarola. As Second Chancellor, he managed the republic’s correspondence, heading an office of fifteen notaries and secretaries, “learned men of modest means who had the skill and command of both Latin and the vernacular to convert the often-garbled instructions of their superiors into comprehensible documents crafted in a fine, legible hand.” The republic also sent Machiavelli on occasional diplomatic missions, one involving an unsuccessful negotiation with the Countess of Forli, the lady who makes a memorable appearance in The Prince as its sole example of a woman of virtù.

    Louis XII now occupied the French throne. “More able and less impulsive than his predecessor,” “less prone to chase half-baked dreams of glory,” Louis nonetheless “had no intention of abandoning what he believed were France’s legitimate claims in Italy.” The secular head of the Holy League, Ludovico Sforza of Milan, had alienated the other members with his schemes to boost himself over them. Pope Alexander, who attended no less to the winds of political change than to the Holy Spirit, “reversed his previous antipathy toward the French, concluding he could more easily advance his family’s fortunes”—he was a Medici—by “allying himself with that kingdom.” This left Ludovico isolated, then defeated by the invading French. But that expedition, too, was “doomed from the outset.” France and its ally, Florence, had different war aims, Florence wanting Pisa but France caring only for acquiring Naples. (“The truth was that Florence needed France more than France needed the militarily insignificant republic.”) On their way to Naples, greedy and undisciplined French troops wasted too much time extorting money and provisions from the towns along the way. By the time they did reach the place the Florentines coveted, “the puny city of Pisa” had organized themselves sufficiently to hold them off. This failure “revealed the weakness” of both France and Florence; “with Italy fast becoming the proving ground for the armies of Europe, such an opening could not remain long without someone walking through it.”

    That man was Cesare Borgia, son of reprobate Pope Alexander VI and himself a cardinal in the Church hierarchy. After clearing a principal rival, his brother, out of the way by murdering him, he won the promise of a dukedom from the French king. When Milan fell to the French, leaving the Countess of Forli without her protector, Cesare threw her in prison. The alarmed Florentines sent Machiavelli as part of a two-man team to negotiate a treaty with France, hoping to secure the city’s continued independence against conquest by this formidable new prince. In the negotiations, Machiavelli argued that France was allowing the Papacy to grow to great in the person of the ambitious cardinal. More persuasively still, he offered a bribe, and the king reined in Cesare. “After more than thirty directionless years,” Machiavelli “had found his calling.” In exchange for continued monetary support from the wealthy republic, Louis would protect Florence from the Borgias. Cesare would continue his conquests, albeit at a slower pace, and himself extracted money from Florence, whose rulers believed in hedging their bets.

    Machiavelli’s “calling” entailed much more than diplomacy and public correspondence, as Unger recognizes. He sharpened his observations of politics, too. The courts of Europe “were not places for the faint of heart or the easily deceived,” as “Latin orations modeled on Cicero delivered by ambassadors dressed in cloth of gold and sparkling with pearls” formed a “culture of flattery and obfuscation” disguising “brazen self-interest and naked aggression.” With such teachers, Machiavelli continued his education.

    By the autumn of 1502, Italian military leaders met to plot Cesare’s overthrow. Many were the Cardinal-prince’s own captains, fearful for their own lives under the rule of their mercurial commander. Distrusting both sides, Machiavelli temporized. His experience in Italy and elsewhere taught him to understand political history “not as the unfolding of impersonal forces,” as Hegel and Marx would do, some three centuries later, but as the rivalries of persons. “Politics as the clash of personalities was an approach that came naturally to someone raised in a city where everyone knew everyone else and where one’s political views were shaped by patronage and family rivalries.” In his own political maneuverings, however, Machiavelli “was the least Machiavellian of men,” having little of the deceptive fox about him,” to say nothing of the powerful lion. His “excessive candor” consistently held back his advancement to any greater office. 

    Upon the death of Alexander VI, Giuliano della Rovere took the papal mitre under the name of Julius II. Cesare, ill and inexplicably trusting of his enemies’ diplomatic guarantees, was reduced to “peevish rantings” which Machiavelli found “so distasteful that [he] wanted to flee his presence.” He soon met a still greater man, however: Leonardo da Vinci, who had apprenticed in Florence but removed to Milan after being accused of sodomy. “Both men make a virtue of marginality,” Unger remarks, each “a new kind of man,” one “free to discover new ways of looking at the world” beyond the sight of “men whose only claim to superiority was an accident of birth.” Even as Machiavelli would later advise princes to master Fortuna, so Leonardo worked to master “the forces of nature,” seeking “to harness wind, water, and even sunlight to serve the purposes of mankind.” Machiavelli returned to Florence but did not forget Leonardo. In 1503, returning to Florence after the controversy died down, Leonardo proposed to defeat Pisa and win it back for his city by diverting the Arno River, which would cut off the city’s lifeline to the outside. Initially, the Council rejected the plan as unrealistic, but Machiavelli and his ally Gonfaloniere Piero Solderini, saw promise in it and eventually persuaded the others. In the event, the workers botched the job and the rulers turned against Machiavelli and Solderini. 

    But the Council soon had more serious worries. At the end of 1503, the French army that protected the city lost a battle to a Spanish army under the command of Gonzalvo de Cordoba. The Florentines panicked. Fortunately for them, the Spanish had insufficient troops to venture any farther than Naples and agreed to a three-year truce. Impatient with his city’s military weakness, which made it dependent upon foreign protectors and an admirer of Switzerland’s citizen-soldiers, Machiavelli began to push for a strengthened army, to be composed not of mercenaries but of citizen conscripts. Not only would this “require a reversal of almost two centuries of military policy,” it “would involve a radical shift in the way the citizens viewed their obligations to the state.” Hitherto a commercial people, Florentines “had long since forgotten the discipline of war.” With their “low sense of civic duty…they would howl at any attempt to drag them from their comfortable homes to drill on the parade ground” in preparation to “endanger[ing] life and limb on the field of battle.” For their part, the aristocrats feared arming the populace. Machiavelli eventually was permitted to put together a militia recruited from the neighboring peasantry, not the city-dwellers. The Council appointed Machiavelli himself as chancellor of the body that governed these troops. 

    In the summer of 1509, Florence finally conquered Pisa, partly on the strength of its newly formed militia. Machiavelli rode with the troops as they entered the city in triumph. “He had succeeded where others far better versed in the military arts had failed.” He carefully saw to it that his troops “maintained the discipline that would help reconcile” the Pisans to their new, lowered, status. He assured the Pisans that Florence planned to be clement; “most adjusted to the new state of affairs.” Over time, however, having been neither caressed nor annihilated, the Pisans began to plot their revenge. And Machiavelli’s fellow Florentines, after the first glow of his success had worn off, began to feel what Unger calls “a peculiarity of human nature,” ingratitude. 

    Florentine and Pisa themselves formed part of Italy’s ever-diminishing geopolitical significance. The Mediterranean itself, where Italians had plied their trade for centuries, had begun to lose economic and military importance as Portugal and Spain built armadas venturing out onto the Atlantic Ocean. Even the Mediterranean saw a new naval rival, the Ottoman Turks. Spain and France had become “the two greatest powers on the Italian peninsula,” and the new pope’s attempts to rule it only “seemed likely to unsettle further an already unsettled situation.” France attempted to foment a schism in the Church to weaken Julius, intending to hold a rival Church council in Pisa. Since that city was now under Florentine control, this would have proved embarrassing to the Florentines, who dispatched Machiavelli to the French court. Louis didn’t care, “demanding that the government of Florence offer safe passage” to the handful of cardinals (all of them French) who had the stomach for schism. The pope placed Florence under interdict and ignored the feeble schismatics.

    “Soft power’ having failed, Louis returned to planning a military invasion, which began in the winter of 1512. The French won the Battle of Ravenna that spring but lost their general. Julius had his own problems, as his Holy League army consisted mostly of Swiss and Spanish soldiers, no less foreign to Italy than the French invaders. Still, he succeeded in driving away the French.

    Machiavelli still faulted the Church. It could not unify Italy, even if it could prevent anyone else from unifying it. He predicted another war between France and the pope. Meanwhile, his enemies in Florence sharpened their knives. 

    The crisis came in the form of an alliance between the pope, who wanted to remove the annoying republican regime in Florence, and the Medici brothers, Cardinal Giovanni de’ Medici and his younger brother, Giuliano, who wanted to return their family to power there. “This was the direct thrust at Florence that Machiavelli and his colleagues had long feared and had strained every fiber to avoid,” now forced to match their militia troops against “a professional army bent on their destruction.” The war went well for Florence at first, as the Florentines defeated Spanish troops under the command of the enemy. But Soderini foolishly rejected the Spanish offer to withdraw in exchange for a trivial payment. The Spanish won the next battle, and the Council forced Soderini to resign. The Medici took the city, called a mass meeting of the citizens who, “surrounded by armed men who made the consequences of dissent immediately apparent,” bowed to their conquerors’ intention of putting an end to the republican regime. Machiavelli allowed himself to entertain the hope that he might remain untouched; “there may [have been] an element of wishful thinking here,” Unger drily remarks.

    Unger explains Machiavelli’s vain attempts to ingratiate himself to the Medici as an obtuse overestimation of “people’s capacity to listen to unpleasant truths, which tended to get him into trouble with his colleagues and contributed to his posthumous reputation as the world’s greatest scoundrel.” In fact, Unger claims, he was quite the opposite, a man who made naïve and tactless attempts to instruct the Florentines, assuming that “any opinion honestly given would be welcomed in the spirit in which it was offered,” to paraphrase the epistle dedicatory to The Prince. In this, it is more likely that Unger is the naïve one. As he makes clear, Machiavelli got in trouble with the Medici because he opposed them politically. The spirit with which The Prince is offered is very much open to interpretation; the phrase may have a certain irony loaded into it.

    The Medici removed Machiavelli from office in November 1512, as part of a general purge of populani partisans. After his arrest on suspicion of participating in an assassination plot against Giuliano de’ Medici, he seems to have been nearly as tortured by the sound of prayers offered by persons outside the prison than he was by the physical ordeals he underwent. While jailed, he wrote sonnets which courted no sympathy and expressed no love or hate, instead “depicting their author as a hapless wretch, a figure of fun rather than pity.” He was released in March 1513 and sent into exile.

    Somewhat astonishingly, but in keeping with his portrait of Machiavelli-the-Naïf, Unger asserts that “few works of political philosophy are more sincere than The Prince.” By this, he means that Machiavelli “treat[s] people not as children of God but as independent adults, forced to make choices without guidance from an all-seeing Father and to suffer the consequences of their mistakes,” as he had done. But of course Machiavelli’s atheism, while it can be deduced from his arguments, does not lie on the surface of his writing. He writes sentences that appear to respect God. This being so, sincerity isn’t exactly the word to describe his book.

    As for the philosophers, Machiavelli judged that they had “ignor[ed] the actual conduct of real men and women” in favor of moralizing, offering pictures of imaginary republics, not real ones. Both Aristotle and Christian Aristotelians like Aquinas and Erasmus “predicate their philosophy on the assumption, so deeply held as to remain largely unexamined, that the universe is essentially rational; that it promotes virtue and punishes wickedness; that society yearns to achieve a more perfect union, no matter how far short it falls in practice.” For Machiavelli, by contrast, the world is “governed by caprice,” the caprice of “the trickster goddess” Fortuna. “The very notion of a fixed morality is preposterous in a lawless world,” and the way forward is to “master capricious fortune.” “We would be far better served if instead of building models of perfection we concentrated our efforts on cobbling together a serviceable government for the moment recognizing we must adapt our solutions to evolving circumstances.” Unger relates this teaching to the life Machiavelli experienced in Florence, the commercial republic characterized by economic ups and downs, “boom and bust.” Here, the problem isn’t so much a misunderstanding of Machiavelli as a misunderstanding of Aristotle, who equally insists on adapting conduct to circumstances. What Aristotle would want to know is how one defines “serviceable.” That is Machiavelli’s real departure from ‘the ancients.’

    Unger therefore rightly asks, “What exactly are those ends toward which Machiavelli’s famously unpleasant means are pointing us?” But he evades the question, claiming that The Prince, “like all how-to manuals,” “assumes the ends are self-evident and sets them aside in order to concentrate on demonstrating the best way of achieving them.” Unger somehow divines that Machiavelli regards “right and wrong” to be “determined not in the individual conscience but in society, whose ultimate expression is the state and whose preservation, in peace and security, is necessary to human happiness” because it serves as “the vital bulwark against the forces of chaos,” of Fortuna. Once again, however, Aristotle wants to know what happiness is. If men are beasts, or at best centaurian half-men, half-beasts, their happiness cannot be happiness as understood by Aristotle. Might it not rather be pleasure, whether the libidinous pleasures of the brothel or the pleasures aimed at by the libido dominandi? That is, Machiavelli despises Epicureanism not because it is a materialism aimed at pleasure but because it is insufficiently political, just as its stern critic, Christianity, is held to be. (In this, Machiavelli anticipates Hobbes, whose doctrine has been described as political Epicureanism.) At any rate, what Unger admires as “brutal frankness” may be more rationally disputable than he supposes, and may even be a sort of temptation, not so frank at all, another instance of Machiavelli’s praise of “the strategic uses of cruelty and deceit.” 

    And where does this leave Machiavelli’s supposed patriotism? “He was above all an ardent patriot.” In what sense? In averring that he loved his country more than his soul, what weight does that have for a man who denied the existence of the soul as understood either by previous philosophers or Christians? If “experience is his guide and expedience his god,” then why would he, or his prince, not throw his country to the wolves, if he judged that to be expedient? 

    Unger rightly contrasts Machiavelli with another exiled public figure and political philosopher, Cicero. Cicero prized his banishment because it “allow[ed] him the serenity to turn his mind to timeless truths.” Not so, Machiavelli, who “thought the life of the mind poor compensation for what he had lost,” and rejected the traditional esteem for leisure as necessary “to the cultivation of the public spirit.” He did whatever he could think to do to persuade his enemies to bring him back into government. Even his life in the countryside seemed to him not a platform for leisure but for squabbling with the cheating locals over cards—petty competitions that mirrored the great competitions of lo stato. In this, Unger regards Machiavelli not as a philosopher in the traditional sense at all, not a man who has thought his way out of the ‘cave’ that represents conventional opinion but as “a true child of Florence, product of a merchant culture that valued work and carried in its collective consciousness a memory of the battles required to free itself from the grasp of the feudal aristocracy,” a product specifically “of the Florentine professional class, that pool of educated men dependent on their wealthier patrons for their livelihood.” Not for them, or for him, “a life of pampered indolence.” In Machiavelli, Unger senses “the bourgeois’s fragile vanity, where servility wars with pride and feelings of shame at his neediness are alleviated by a healthy sense of his own abilities.” For all his acknowledgment of Machiavelli’s sharp departures from his religious and philosophic predecessors, Unger finally (mis)understands him in historicist and indeed largely Marxist terms, a man of his time, place, and social class.

    This notwithstanding, in “the fullest account of his political philosophy,” the Discourses, Machiavelli turns out not to have been quite so sincere as he seemed to Unger in The Prince. “Machiavelli was not the first to recognize that it was impossible for a politician to live according to the precepts set down by Jesus and his disciples, but he was the first to openly endorse appearing to live by one set of standards while secretly adopting another.” In openly endorsing prevarication, does Machiavelli not raise the question of how open his openness really is? In any event, he urges “nothing less than a revolution of values to complete the revolution of taste,” the Renaissance love of all things ‘ancient’ and therefore pagan, which had “already occurred.” That is, he intended to extend his contemporaries’ love of ancient art and thought to politics and religion as the ancients really practiced it—not as thought by Plato or Aristotle but as practiced by world-conquering Alexander. But what if Machiavelli intends rather not to raise up the ancients at the expense of the ‘moderns’ or Christians, but to offer a third, different way of life? “Much of the tension and many of the apparent contradictions in both The Discourses and The Prince stem from this clash between the Christian faith in which he was raised, and which provided a conventional moral frame that not even he could escape”—in what sense?—and “the pagan virtues of strength, boldness, and civic-mindedness he admired,” the “unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable, dissonance between morality and utility.” Unger himself involves himself in an irresolvable dissonance. Earlier, he had openly and frankly acknowledged Machiavelli’s atheism, but now he maintains that “while future generations, reading between the lines, have detected in his writings the suggestion that God is indeed dead, Machiavelli himself never went so far”; “he was probably not an atheist.” “Metaphysics simply did not interest him, and he may well have retained some vestige of belief simply because he lacked the passion required to demolish it.” Or simply the caution that steered him away from writing like Voltaire?

    “Machiavelli is concerned with the practical effects of an idea rather than its abstract or metaphysical qualities.” Very well, then, how does he judge whether a practical effect is good? Can the good be reduced to the desirable, and if so, how? If “the man who uses violence to spoil things, not the man who uses violence to mend them, that is blameworthy,” then why is mending preferable to spoilage? If the republic of virtue, as understood by Plato and Aristotle, must give way to the republic of “interest,” if virtue must give way to virtù defined as prowess in the pursuit of utility in pursuit of individual and political interest, why is ‘must’ really ‘must’? And if necessity is all there is, simply, then how can a prince even partially master Fortuna? Or does Fortuna (to borrow a later philosopher’s formula) force one to be free? Unger now defines Machiavelli’s conception of the course of events as “a Sisyphean exercise in futility,” with “temporary improvement” possible but no permanent human, let alone divine, salvation on the horizon. But such a Sisyphean exercise isn’t really futile, if it causes men to cultivate virtù, generation after generation, strengthening not-so-invisible human hands. To what end, though, if not the satisfaction of the libido dominandi? 

    By 1516, now securely in control of Florence, the ottimati allowed Machiavelli to return to Florence, limiting him to activities within literary circles while keeping him well away from any governmental office. He “reinvented himself” as a playwright, his productions staged by friends for audiences of friends, not in public theaters. That La Mandragola eventually was performed for the pope opens a window into the soul of Leo, who remained more a child of the Medici than a child of God. By the time of his death at the age of forty-five, he “had worn out his welcome and his body through dissipated living” and by “devoting his energies to aggrandizing his family rather than bolstering the moral reputation of the Church or the prosperity of his native city,” leaving the Church vulnerable to Martin Luther’s contemporary thundering and the later subordination of Florence and indeed of all Italy to a foreign ruler, which Leo didn’t live to see.

    In yet another of Fortuna’s whimsies, after Leo’s successor died, Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, a friend of Machiavelli, was elected to the papacy in 1521, reigning under the name Clement VII. He granted Machiavelli and audience a few years later, on which holy occasion he received a copy of The Prince.

    In a way, one wishes the story had ended there. But it turned out that Clement was no more a Machiavellian prince than a genuinely Christian prelate. The Holy Roman Empire had by now defeated France, leaving Italy open to conquest. Machiavelli recommended that the Papal States form a militia, ready themselves to do battle with their own arms. But the key state of Romagna, governed by Machiavelli’s intellectual rival, Guido Guicciardini, balked at the proposal, which Guicciardini deemed impractical; in an ironic twist, he had judged Machiavelli to be a man lacking in political and military realism. Clement vacillated and Machiavelli returned to his farm, expecting the worst. It came, delayed slightly by another war between the Empire and France, now allied with Venice, Florence, Milan, and the papacy. Clement even named Machiavelli secretary of a commission charged with supervising refurbishing the walls around Florence. But all to no real effect, as the imperial troops sacked Rome and captured Leon in the spring of 1527, leaving Machiavelli “an emissary to an army that was now leaderless from a government that no longer existed.” “For someone as politically astute as Machiavelli, it is remarkable how often he seemed to back the losing side,” and puzzlement Unger explains by describing “Machiavelli’s misfortune” as devotion to the state “in an age when the state was dysfunctional,” still vulnerable to Fortuna’s moods. But more tellingly, Unger quotes one of Machiavelli’s contemporaries, who wrote that the people hated Machiavelli “because of The Prince; the rich thought his Prince was a document written to teach the duke how to take away all their property, from the poor all their liberty; the piagnoni [the pious] regarded him as a heretic; the good thought him sinful; the wicked thought him more wicked or more capable than themselves—so they all hated him.” Machiavelli himself teaches that although it is better to be feared than loved, one must avoid being hated. One can avoid that by dissimulating, but Machiavelli, without being sincere, nonetheless made his acts of dissimulation too flimsy to cover his intentions. He died in June 1527 from complications of an emetic he’d given himself, an end which suggests the limits of self-reliance.

    Later that year, Emperor Charles V released Clement from captivity. The two men now had a formidable common enemy—no longer France but Henry VIII of England, who intended to divorce Charles’s aunt, Catherine of Aragon, to marry English Anne Boleyn. Since only the pope could grant the divorce, “the Emperor had a powerful incentive to mend fences with Clement.” Henry went ahead and broke from the Church, establishing his own Anglican Church in its stead and acquiring the bride he wanted. As for Florence, it had briefly restored the republican regime under French protection, but now that France was forced to retreat, the Medici returned with the blessings of the Medici pope and his ally, the Emperor, who ensured that the city henceforth would be “little more than a feudal vassal of the Holy Roman Empire.” 

    Could Machiavelli then be said to have lost? Only if one takes him for a true Florentine and/or Italian patriot. Charles V and Henry VIII, winners of this latest round, strike one simply as bigger fish swallowing the now-little Italians. In Prince-ly principle, could Machiavelli really object? He was more than merely a product of his class, his city, his nation. His teachings, if mistaken, did at least transcend their time and place, and were intended to do so. Henry VIII’s England became an exemplar of a moderated form of Machiavellianism, seen in the writings of Locke, along with those of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, who taught that “selfishness is the strongest bias of men,” but preferred to confine the art of acquisition primarily to the art of commerce, not the art of war. The English brought this sensibility to North America, where the Founders “rehabilitated Machiavelli as a humane philosopher who laid the foundations of the modern state by recognizing that political institutions could be built only on interest rather than virtue.” This ignores the clearly stated purpose of those institutions, however, seen in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the lives not only of a man like Benjamin Franklin but of George Washington, whose Farewell Address repudiates Machiavellianism in morals and whose life partook more of Ciceronian Stoicism than Machiavelli’s less-than-realistic realism.

    Unger writes as a historian. As such, he provides excellent information concerning Machiavelli’s milieu and the actions he took in it. He is less impressive as a reader of Machiavelli. For an appreciation of Machiavelli as a philosopher, one must turn elsewhere—first of all to careful study of his books.

    One such study, Leo Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli, has itself found a commentator in Heinrich Meier, who devotes a substantial chapter to an inquiry into Strauss’s intention. “The only book in which Strauss chooses a title that refers to his own activity,” the Thoughts amounts to “a theological-political treatise” which engages the confrontation between philosophy and revealed religion “in the most detailed way.” 

    Socrates famously brought philosophy down from the heavens, engaging his fellow-citizens of Athens in dialectical conversations rather than attempting to understand nature as a whole directly, as the earlier, stargazing ‘natural philosophers’ had done. Aristotle called this “political philosophy.” Strauss sees in Machiavelli a philosopher, a claim never explicitly stated before by any philosopher. In his Thoughts, then, Strauss addresses two problems: “the problem of Socrates” and “the problem of Machiavelli.” Why did they insist on philosophizing as it were through the lens of politics? 

    On the surface, Strauss criticizes Machiavelli as the founder of modern philosophy, which Strauss seems to consider inferior to the philosophy of ‘the ancients.’ Strauss thus comes across as a traditionalist. But Meier identifies three “innovations” Strauss proposed: “Strauss is the first philosopher to give a coherent presentation of the art of careful writing, which consists of an exoteric teaching and an esoteric (let us call it a) suggestion; “no philosopher before Strauss stressed with similar emphasis that philosophy has to be conceived as a way of life”; and this “concept of the philosophic life stands in the closest connection with the concept of political philosophy,” a concept “Strauss makes into the veritable guiding concept of his oeuvre.” “The highest subject of political philosophy is the philosophic life”; political philosophy both defends and rationally justifies philosophy, “consequently answering the question, Why philosophy?” In the Thoughts, Strauss relates Machiavelli’s writings to these themes. Can he show that Machiavelli addresses them? And if he does, how does he address them?

    Meier’s chapter consists of three numbered sections, in addition to a preface and an epilogue. Although many scholars (see Unger, above) have argued that Machiavelli’s core teaching occurs in The Prince and still more have assigned that status to the Discourses on Livy, Strauss was “the first to offer the argument that Machiavelli asserted in the dedicatory letters of both books that each of them contains everything the author knows.” This “reduces the Florentine to a political partisan or to an ideologue,” a reduction that “blocks access to the philosopher Machiavelli,” who, unlike Machiavelli the citizen, could stand outside the political parties, and outside Florence itself, scrutinizing them.

    Strauss distinguishes between Machiavelli’s teaching, Machiavelli’s enterprise, and Machiavelli’s thought. Machiavelli’s enterprise, according to Strauss, consisted of “a new political founding, of the discovery and implementation of new modes and orders, of a thoroughgoing change of the world,” by “a new kind of philosopher,” a “philosopher-warrior, philosopher prince, philosopher-craftsman,” whom Machiavelli understands himself to be the first but does not want to be the last. To perpetuate his philosophic ‘institution,’ Machiavelli “relies on propaganda as the decisive weapon in the struggle against the power of Christianity and has for its true goal the establishment of stable order on a solid foundation grounded in sober knowledge.” He does this (as Unger sees) by making his enterprise seem to be “ruled by the absolute primacy of practice,” making philosophy into an instrument “for the purpose of the transformation of human living conditions” conforming to “the absolute will to rule.”

    Strauss presents Machiavelli’s enterprise in two ways, “the one striking, the other subtle.” Strikingly, Strauss “makes clear the revolutionary character of Machiavelli’s enterprise as it was never before made clear”; subtly, Strauss “situates Machiavelli within the fundamental continuity that links him to philosophers before and after him.” Machiavelli was a revolutionary political philosopher, but he remained a political philosopher. That is, Strauss’s teaching on Machiavelli, influential among many of his readers, points to Machiavelli as the new Prince, the modern Moses, the Anti-Christ, the founder of the Enlightenment. Machiavelli blasphemes, thereby compelling his reader to think blasphemous thoughts, tempting them. Even and especially by concealing some of his teaching, making them less than explicit, Machiavelli draws the reader into completing the teaching, entangling them still further. Like Socrates, he can be accused of corrupting the young. 

    The subtle Machiavellian thought Strauss thinks concerns “his conception of the good life or the life according to nature as one of alternation between gravity and levity”—the life of “the most excellent man,” the philosopher, perhaps the only kind of “prince” who by his knowledge reaches what Strauss calls “full satisfaction and immunity to the power of chance,” or, as Meier puts it, “a self-sufficiency grounded in knowledge and serenity in harmony with the philosophic tradition.” Shakespeare, too, alternates between gravity and levity, between tragedy and history in some plays, comedy in others, indeed putting comic elements into his tragedies and histories and serious thoughts into his comedies. Strauss associates gravity with knowledge of the truth, the philosopher’s thought, and levity with the way the philosopher communicates that truth, the philosopher’s teaching. The “true addressee” of the political philosopher’s writing will be able to link the levity with the gravity, seeing the gravity in the levity of the mode of communication. That is, the communication is serious, its mode not. Strauss compares the combination or unity of knowledge and its communication to a horseback rider, the “combination of man and horse,” a horse that may seem as comical as Mr. Ed. (Although the comedy of Mr. Ed consisted of the reversal of roles, as the man was clueless, the horse wise.) By inducing “the true philosopher of the future” to “think through the task of his enterprise as a whole,” Machiavelli “ranks among the great renewers of philosophy,” along with Farabi and Plato, whose writings exhibit the ‘twofoldedness’ of irony, both in imitation of the master ironist, Socrates. But what does it mean that Machiavelli presents his figure of wisdom not as a man riding a horse but as a centaur, a creature half-human, half-bestial? For starters, one might answer, the centaurs were warriors, like Machiavelli’s philosopher-princes, themselves new forms of Socrates’ ironically presented philosopher-kings. But that is only for starters, as Meier shows.

    “At the center of interest of Thoughts on Machiavelli stands the confrontation with revealed religion,” a circumstance that has two dimensions: “the historical answer to the altered political situation that the role of revealed religion created” and “the philosophical answer to the challenge implied by the claim to truth of revealed religion.” Revealed religions challenge the truth claims of philosophy by commanding “faith in an omnipotent God as creator of the world, ruler and judge of human beings.” Strauss understands Machiavelli to regard the claim to truth of revealed religion as “all-important,” “an expression,” Meier notes, “that Strauss does not employ very often.” This associates Machiavelli with Socrates, who also defended the philosophic life against the claims of religion, albeit not a revealed religion like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

    Machiavelli’s response to the two dimensions of the confrontation consists of two responses. In The Prince, he describes the prince as a “founder,” “the bringer of new modes and orders.” He lists Moses as an example, along with Solon and Lycurgus. In the Discourses, by contrast, he discusses not ‘the one’ but ‘the many’—the people “as the maintainer of established modes and orders, or the repository of morality and religion.” The Bible’s truth claim, its account of why the people come to be the repository of morality and religion, rests on “the phenomenon known as the conscience,” which takes the place of the philosopher’s effort to perceive truth noetically through reasoning. Founders of Biblical religion convince the people of the truth of their prophetic speech by appealing to the conscience of each person. “The demands of morality,” registered by the conscience, “presuppose the truth of religion, without whose main concept and center they lose their obligatory character.” How does Machiavelli, as a philosopher, respond to these demands, which include both moral and even what we now call ‘epistemological’ claims?

    In chapter IV of the Thoughts, Strauss begins with the historical circumstance Machiavelli faced. Strauss writes that for Machiavelli “the moderns are primarily the Christians.” As is well known, Machiavelli charges that Christianity has weakened the world by directing their hearts and minds toward Heaven, away from ‘the world,” along with the flesh and the Devil. Machiavelli regards Christians as thereby “unarmed” against its enemies in the world. Strauss understands Machiavelli as contending, “Where men are not soldiers this is due to the fault of the prince.” The prince in question is the Prince of Peace, adjuring His followers to make spiritual warfare against principalities and powers and disastrously neglecting the discipline of physical warfare. The Founder of Christianity commends “humility, abjectness and contempt for things human.” This “consecrat[es] humility and weakness.” Strauss contrasts this with the religion of the ancients, which commended “greatness of mind, strength of the body and all other things which are apt to make men very strong” as the highest good. The gods of the Athenians may have misled the minds of the citizens, but at least they did not weaken, and evidently strengthened, their hearts for battle in this world. “It is not a historical decline in itself, but rather the central place of Christian humilitas…that blocks access to classical magnamitas.” That “good arms,” physical and moral strength in this world, “are the one thing needful” is “the anti-Biblical truth par excellence.”

    Thus, the discussion moves from Machiavelli’s historical circumstance to “the decisive level, when his statements and determinations are applied to philosophy and the life of the philosopher.” In that life, depending upon your own arms means “insight grounded on the free use of one’s own reason,” in contrast with “a life that wants to understand itself on the basis of the obedience of faith.” The philosopher will not live his life “bound in advance to any obedience.” To the religious man, this is pride; to the philosopher it is self-sufficiency.

    Politically, revealed religion has a similar effect, namely, the rule of priests instead of self-government. “The criticism of the rule of priests, who trace their authority to the highest authority of revealed religion, unites Machiavelli with all political philosophers who come after him.” (Not quite all. There is Richard Hooker.) This criticism also unites him with “all political philosophers who came before him,” most notably Plato, whose proposed “rule of philosophers is meant to replace the Egyptian rule of priests.” (Perhaps not quite all, depending upon how one understands Thomas Aquinas.)

    The problem with Machiavelli’s predecessors, in Machiavelli’s view, was that it not only failed to prevent the triumph of Christianity, much to the detriment of the philosophic life, but “without intending to, contributed to it” by giving Christians “the knowledge and education to carry out its mission in all heavenly directions, the arms and the instruments to rule for the next millennia.” In this, philosophy failed to transcend the ancient cave but merely supplemented the arts and sciences of their fellow ‘ancients,’ turned by Christians to their own use with the “pious cruelty” of devotees of the jealous God of the Bible. For Machiavelli, God is a tyrant who “makes thoughts, which cannot be commanded, into a sin, which makes disobedience, which thinking is, into a crime,” thereby criminalizing the philosophic life. Such an assertion of authority will require arms commanded by priests to enforce it and (since it makes free thought “a crime against the holy God,” equally commands an eternity in Hell for those who question.

    Strauss argues that the idea of original sin is self-contradictory and therefore very much open to question, because “a punishment for sin which compels men to sin still more…does not appear to be wise.” (A Christian might reply that it is very wise indeed, if the punishment prepares men to depend not on themselves but on God.) An unwise God is hard to have faith in. By contrast, “Natural Theology” asks the question, “What is a God?”—denoting “an endeavor of reflection and criticism.” Meier takes care to distinguish Natural Theology from Natural Religion, sometime called ‘the religion of the philosophers,’ which provides a teaching or doctrine to non-philosophers, supplying their “need for belief with what reason can give it.” Natural Theology, however, “has its raison d’être in the self-understanding of the philosophers,” that is, lovers of wisdom. As such, philosophers are “not shaken by the whims of fortune”; “thanks to their knowledge of the world, their knowledge of nature, their insight into necessity, they lead their life in an even temper, without hope and without fear o trembling” (as per Kierkegaard). Such men mix gravity with levity, regarding (in Strauss’s words) humanity or generosity, the willingness to share their thoughts with qualified young persons, as “the virtue opposite to pride or arrogance, not humility.”

    Strauss next proceeds to the particular doctrines or teachings of Christianity. The philosopher needs to prepare himself for the kinds of objections religious men will make to his way of life. He begins with the doctrine of conscience because it connects so intimately with the human mind. Will conscience command you to desist from the philosophic life, “counsel[ing] against philosophy as a persistent repetition of the Fall”? Why, if man is compelled to sin, if he has a ‘sin nature,’ should he have a bad conscience in sinning, Strauss asks. This suggests that the promptings of conscience have the same status for a philosopher as conventional opinions have in Plato’s Republic.

    The second religious doctrine Strauss addresses is the providential God, the God Who affects not so much our mind but our actions. This discussion, occurring in the twenty-sixth paragraph of chapter IV of The Prince, “not only brings together Machiavelli and Aristotle but also has the God of the Bible encounter the God of the philosophers”; Meier suggests that this “can be considered with reason as the culmination of Thoughts on Machiavelli.” The problem here is that “there is no evidence supporting the Biblical teaching,” only the assertions of the Bible itself. The Bible speaks truth, unqualifiedly, if it truly is the Word of God. But to assert that it is the Word of God is to assume what needs proving. In moral terms, the requirement that we obey God’s Word requires humility. What will replace humility if, as Machiavelli does, one questions the existence of God? Machiavelli proposes humanity or generosity, but Strauss demurs. Humanity as a principle raises man above humility while failing to point “man beyond himself.” [1] Not humanity but magnanimity is the virtue that beckons the man of moral virtue beyond himself. The portrait of the magnanimous or great-souled man can inspire a morally serious man beyond the cardinal virtues of courage, moderation, justice, and prudence, towards a sort of master virtue which combines all of these virtues in one soul. Here, Strauss argues, Aristotle is superior.

    How about the philosopher, the man preeminently ruled by reason, whose moral virtues come to him not through a teaching but by his own rational powers? It, too, looks ‘up,’ this time at the wisdom the philosopher loves. Aristotle’s supreme god, the Unmoved Mover, issues no commands; it attracts, beckons us beyond ourselves by distilling in its being the most difficult-to-achieve result of reasoning, self-knowledge. This “teaching about God”—and notice it is a teaching, not the thought of the philosopher—does “not conceal philosophy but rather points to the philosophic life.” Such a teaching partakes of a significant strength of religion by being “capable of being handed down to serve the philosopher as a medium of self-reflection, and self-criticism.” What began as a critique of providence, of God’s effect on action, has circled back to a consideration of the human soul and the mind within that soul.

    The first pair of Biblical doctrines, conscience and providence, refer to human thought and human action, respectively. The third Biblical doctrine, the immortality of the soul, returns from the actions of man to the inner man—this time, with emphasis on the soul, not only the mind. Presented as the basis for hope in Heaven and fear of Hell, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul supports the notion of a tyrannical God, enemy of philosophy. The fourth doctrine, creatio ex nihilo, points to another action, even vaster than providence. Meier says nothing much about it, leaving it to the reader to suspect that the philosopher suspects it of self-contradiction, doubting that anything can be made to come into being out of nothing. Aristotle’s God, it will be recalled, is an unmoved mover of a cosmos that already existed, a nature that has always been.

    For all the differences between Machiavelli and Aristotle, then, “in the innermost core of Machiavelli’s thought we encounter Aristotle,” namely, the philosophic life. Contra the Epicureans, both men insisted that philosophy must be political, and especially in the sense of ‘politic’ or prudent. Seeing the challenge to philosophy sharpened by the advent of revealed religion as distinguished from paganism, Machiavelli seeks to regulate that religion, to “transform transpolitical religion into a civil or religion, or to constrain revealed religions by a Natural Religion,” by the laws of nature and of nature’s God. “The intention to help establish the primacy of politics over religion Machiavelli has in common with his successors and his most important predecessors.”

    One might add that there is a sense in which “transpolitical” religions—religions which reach beyond the political limits, the borders of political communities, universal religions—nonetheless feature the central characteristic of politics. Each religion commands a particular regime—a ruler, God; a form or set of ruling offices, the Church or the Ummah; a way of life (‘My way, commands the God of the Bible, not the way of the Amorites, the Jebusites, the Philistines, the Sabaeans); and a purpose, a telos—the salvation of souls. Similarly, the philosophic life consists of a regime, despite its transcendence of the idols of any particular political ‘cave.’ In this sense, political philosophy confronts religion in a way that is politic but more fully political than it seems at first sight.

    Having identified the initial object of philosophic thought, the need not simply to ‘philosophize’ about nature but to take account of the “political or human things,” at least partly in order to defend the philosophic life itself, and having then, centrally, shown “the rational justification of the philosophic life, Strauss moves in the third part of his book to the consideration of all of these matters “as the locus of the philosopher’s self-knowledge,” the philosopher’s imitatio Dei, the closest he will get to pure thought thinking itself.

    Socrates’ political philosophy included a public defense of philosophy; the Platonic dialogue featuring that defense is indeed title The Apologia of Socrates. Strauss summarizes that defense, which consisted of praising the philosophic life as exhibiting “the highest virtue,” a life pleasing to the gods and worthy of reverence among citizens. Machiavelli did much the opposite, seeking “to protect the philosophic life by concealing it as much as possible”—so much so, that few people recognize Machiavelli as a philosopher at all. Insofar as political philosophy surfaced as public philosophy, Machiavelli justified it as socially and politically useful, advice to princes and peoples. With Socrates, Meier writes, the “essentially private” task of philosophy “comes to be a public power”; Machiavelli objects that this has had the unintended consequence of “undermin[ing] political communities” because political communities make only particular claims to rule, claims to rule within their own territorial boundaries, whereas philosophy makes “a universal claim” based on its inquiries into nature, first of all human nature. This finally left philosophers nearly defenseless against the competing universalist claims of revealed religion, as it retreated to monasteries and “assimilated by the teachers of the church to the Christian vita contemplativa,” a move that can and sometimes did confuse philosophy with piety. But Christian life, with its universalist claims and its denigration of the ways of the world, itself suffered from the same political weakness philosophy now suffered.

    Considering this new circumstance, Machiavelli concludes that since philosophers are few and the faithful are many, philosophers now need to come out of the cloister, as it were, clarify their understanding of their task and become political again, this time by adopting the strategy of concealing their thoughts and promoting their actions on grounds the many will understand, namely, service to themselves, utility. This “reestablishment of politics” as apparently in control of philosophy “succeeds only at the price of an obfuscation of philosophy.” By writing in a guarded manner about philosophy, even as he writes openly and even a sort of impious cruelty about politics, Machiavelli deliberately diverts the attention of his readers from the philosophic life. “With the exception of philosophic natures,” who won’t be distracted but will figure him out with only the slightest hints from the new prince of philosophic princes.

    As for Strauss, his own “enterprise of renewal…takes into account the effects and consequences of both traditions,” the Socratic and the Machiavellian. Like Socrates, he “moves the philosophic life into the center,” giving “the philosopher a new visibility by making the concept once more into a concept of distinction and by helping to provide it with concrete clarify through exemplary confrontation,” seen in his writings on Socrates as presented by Plato and Xenophon and on Machiavelli. Strauss shows that philosophers need “awareness of the repercussions that every public presentation has on philosophy”; it might be added that, as a refugee from Nazi Germany and a witness (thankfully from afar) of Soviet Russia under Lenin and Stalin, Strauss had occasion to think about such repercussions. A philosopher who achieves this awareness, it might be added, will gain in the self-knowledge that he seeks as a high good.

    More specifically, Strauss employs a “double strategy” in response to this “double tradition” of political philosophy. He contrasts ‘ancient’ or classical political philosophy with modern, Machiavellian political philosophy, very much to the advantage of the classics. He also examines Machiavelli’s political philosophy with great, indeed book-length, care, “bring[ing] to light what he has in common with the philosophers of the Middle Ages and antiquity,” namely, the philosophic life itself. Philosophy stood in need of renewal, given the threats posed to it by modern tyrannies and its academic institutionalization in liberal regimes, which tends to petrify philosophizing into a set of techniques.

    “For the philosopher, everything depends” upon the fact that “there is no mean between the obedience and disobedience of thought.” If thought is held to obedience to received doctrine, it can no longer philosophize. In Strauss’s time, certain philosophic teachings, especially those that derive from the claim that ‘History’ encompasses and determines all thought—a sort of ‘totalitarianism’ that lends itself to the characteristic political tyranny of Strauss’s time—must be opposed by a political philosophy that is genuinely political, not tyrannical, a political philosophy that leaves philosophers free to pursue their way of life, so long as they practice some degree of prudence in living that life, some consideration of the dangers of philosophizing in an unphilosophic ‘city.’

    “The command of prudence has for [men of the highest excellence] compulsory power.” They aim at the wisest goal “possible under the prevailing circumstances,” correctly judging “what necessity allows in the best case and demands in the given case.” This requires knowledge of both necessities—insight “into the necessity that underlies all knowing” and “insight into one’s own nature.” Contra advocates of divine and natural law, and contra Kantianism, “there is no Pure Ought or Universal Law.” This virtue is “a gift of nature” which differentiates “great men” from ordinary ones. “The particular nature of a man, far from being determined by his choice or free will, determines this man, his choice or his ‘free will.'” Such a man may be honorable/moral or wise/philosophic, but the wise man is the more excellent, since honor-lovers depend to some extent on the opinions of others, as seen in the young Abraham Lincoln, whose announcement that he was running for public office described him as one who desired the esteem of his fellow citizens. But the virtue of the honorable man, the “republican virtue,” mixes with “collective self-interest.” The common good may very well not include the good of the uncommon. The “glorious patriot Cato,” the republican honor-lover, may be less favorable to the philosophic life than the emperor Marcus Aurelius, “a prince who might have understanding, greatness of mind, strength of will at his disposal.” The Roman Empire, where the monarch tended to “matters of state,” while poets like Ovid but also, in a different way, philosophers tended to intensely private “matters of love,” “corresponds to the difference between gravity and levity, mentioned earlier. In the circumstance given him in the modern world, the Machiavellian political philosopher unites these, knowing that there is nothing more ‘in common’ than the truth philosophers seek in private.

    The great man’s given nature may be modified by habituation, but not fundamentally changed. The greatness, the wisdom of founders derives from this natural gift. One is reminded of Nietzsche, who writes that deep down in every person lies a core of fatum. He is what he is, ineluctably.

    In response to his own inner necessity and the outer necessities imposed by circumstances, the Machiavellian political philosopher does to the few, now the priests, what would-be monarchs in Rome did to the few, the patricians, in the older times: win over the minds and hearts of the people. This “democratic turn of philosophic politics” hides the essentially ‘aristocratic’ character of the philosopher, denying at least outwardly “the radical distinction between philosophers and nonphilosophers.” In taking over the function of serving the people, the philosophers assume the role that priests had taken, in this case by saving bodies if not souls by their scientific inventions.

    What if those inventions, instruments of the conquest of nature, in turn threaten humanity’s survival? Eventually, some ‘telluric disaster,’ some worldwide catastrophe occurs, wiping out technological advances and forcing the survivors to begin anew. It is not inconceivable that such a disaster could be a result of technology itself, since a thoroughgoing conquest of nature, a denaturing of nature, might not go well.

    “Strauss takes account of a threefold movement: The ascent from an opinion about the world to the inner necessity of philosophy; the renewal of a traditional teaching by recourse to the genuine philosophic activity that precedes every teaching; and, uniting all three movements in one, the turn from the historical experiences that separate the philosophers to the fundamental experiences they have in common: the liberating force of knowledge, the eros of thought, the deepening of reflection, the happiness of understanding.” The philosophic life “according to their nature finds its eloquent expression in the art of writing,” and art that leads “kindred spirits to the philosophic life.” This contrasts with the life of the Sophists, who “believed or tended to believe in the omnipotence of speech.” With this allusion of the doctrine of John the Apostle, Meier concludes his book.

    Unger’s biography provides impressive detail regarding the nonphilosophic element of Machiavelli’s life. On the real character of that life, Meier is the better one to consult.

     

    Note

    1. Machiavelli substitutes Fortuna for divine providence. He urges the Prince to master Fortuna, or chance, which is what he thinks providence really is. This project, the distinctively Machiavellian project later made the foundation of modern science as the conquest of nature, propounded by Bacon, a project that has proceeded relentlessly to our own time, makes humanity an end in itself, assumes that man fundamentally has nothing to aspire to, beyond the satisfaction of his own desires for security and comfort, for which reasoning now serves as an instrument.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    What Is Statesmanship?

    August 25, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Daniel J. Mahoney: The Statesman as Thinker: Portraits of Greatness, Courage, and Moderation. New York: Encounter Books, 2022.

    Jon D. Schaff: Abraham Lincoln’s Statesmanship and the Limits of Democracy. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2019.

     

    In every generation, people commonly deplore the paucity of it. But what is statesmanship? What exactly do people feel their politicians lack?

    Daniel J. Mahoney and Jon D. Schaff take up this question. Although both books are historical studies, the authors intend to understand virtues that their readers can profitably think about, because such virtues remain possible today, and are, as always, much needed. In Schaff’s words, “the power of Lincoln’s thought is precisely its continued ability to speak across time to our present situation.” Mahoney ranges widely (one of his favorite words is “capacious”), writing chapters on Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and Vaclav Havel. Schaff attends to Lincoln alone; the only other politician to whom he devotes his attention is Lincoln’s successful rival in the 1858 Illinois U.S. Senate race, Stephen A. Douglas, who might be described as an extraordinarily gifted non-statesman. Mahoney’s interest in statesman-to-statesman comparison derives from his interest in greatness understood as magnanimity or greatness of soul. Perhaps because Schaff finds ‘greatness’ conceived unmagnanimously by Donald J. Trump entirely distasteful, he concentrates his attention on moderation and prudence, on self-government as the rule of reason in the individual soul and, sometimes, in what he calls “the soul of democracy”—its way of life and its ethos. Contemporary Americans very often define liberty in the way Aristotle identifies as typical of citizens in a democratic regime: ‘doing as one likes.’ Neither Aristotle nor Lincoln regarded that as an adequate definition. “The central argument of this book,” Schaff writes, “is that for free people remain free, they must live within limits,” limits finally imposed on them by themselves. Not easily done: that’s where statesmanship comes in.

    Beyond moderation and prudence, Schaff identifies an intellectual or ‘theoretical’ virtue in Lincoln, one that provided him with a standard for political thought and action. “He seemed able to stand both inside and outside democracy at the same time,” understanding and explaining the principles of the Declaration, which reflect human nature as such, while offering “friendly critiques of democracy’s excesses,” the excesses of the regime that aims at securing unalienable natural rights but has the potential for “democratic despotism.” To show this, Schaff accounts for the well-worked ground of Lincoln’s critique of slavery (and of abolitionists) prior to the Civil War and his justification of making war in defense of the Union, but he also calls particular attention to the neglected area of Lincoln’s domestic policies: the protective tariff, the Homestead Act, the National Bank Act, among others. He considers not only Lincoln’s virtues but his policies to “provide lessons to our contemporary readers seeing to find solutions to the stresses put on our political system through such phenomena as the globalization of economics and the rise of a presidency-centered government.” We need to think more seriously about virtue, natural right, and policy because “we cannot assume the continuation of that democracy [Lincoln] sought so nobly to advance”—an assumption Lincoln himself rejected as a young man in his Address to the Young Men’s Lyceum at Springfield, Illinois. 

    Schaff begins his definition of statesmanship with what one might describe as a ‘Heideggerian’ move. “The idea of statesmanship can be explained via the concept of time.” His point is (thankfully) quite un-Heideggerian, however: whereas the ancients conceived of time cyclically and the moderns have often conceived it linearly, even as an onward-and-upward progression, time in fact “partakes of both of these characteristics, both continuity and change,” fitting the image neither of circle nor line but of spiral. A spiral is a continuous line; in terms of morality and politics, over time we return “to certain fundamentals, enduring ideas, practices, or self-conceptions.” Yet, as Aristotle famously insists, we do so “in the light of new circumstances.” Since “certain foundational ideas or principles recur across time” under new conditions, “a statesman is needed to interpret these foundations anew” or more precisely to adapt them to those practices which are possible under those conditions. “In Lincoln’s case, he needed to explain natural rights, the rule of law, and the role of the presidency to a new generation of Americans whose vision of the founding ideas of the nation was already dimming.” This needs doing because democratic citizens incline to push aside natural rights and constitutionalism in order to be ‘free,’ in order to get what they want. Lincoln aimed at persuading his fellow citizens to live within the limits of the “rule of law, natural rights, powers of government, political economy, and presidential power” as granted by the Constitution—a “political gospel of limitations” animated by “humble expectations” respecting “democratic politics.” 

    With Aristotle, Schaff understands politics as architectonic, a means of reinforcing certain human characteristics and weakening others. Lincoln would inflect “democracy’s soul,” the character of the average American, the moral atmosphere the nation breathes by exemplifying “the political virtues of prudence and moderation,” by upholding the natural rights citizens would secure through their political institutions, and also by upholding the natural rights those citizens would secure by the form of political economy that best conduces to genuine liberty. 

    “Two central political ideals that govern the statesman are prudence and moderation, but our contemporary political discourse tends to denigrate or misunderstand these two grand principles,” mistaking pragmatism and even opportunism for prudence mistaking political centrism, splitting the difference between two political parties, as moderation. Aristotle offers a superior definition of prudence: “practical wisdom is right reasoning about good ends.” As for moderation, it consists in intentionally limiting one’s passions and appetites, disciplining their excesses while avoiding their starvation. In politics, this means the recognition and rejection of demagoguery, of speech that either inflames the desires or leaves citizens cringing in fear; it also means recognizing and rejecting ideology, systems of thought that mischaracterize philosophy in the way best stated (and in the end exemplified) by Marx, not as a passion of the head, the erotic longing of the mind for knowledge, but as the head of a passion. The ideological “quest for an unsullied politics is at the heart of the fallacy ‘Voting for the lesser of two evils is still voting for evil.’ It is not. It is voting to mitigate an evil, which is good.” 

    In his Temperance Society Address, for example, “Lincoln warns against the temptation toward denouncing our political opponents as merely evil,” in the “tendency of ideologues,” assuming that we “have nothing to learn from those who disagree” and therefore “dismiss[ing] them with a fair hearing.” The Address “sets out many themes that would dominate his antislavery rhetoric in the 1850s”: the total eradication of the consumption of alcoholic beverages is impossible; “those who do not drink are not morally superior to those who do,” as “abstinence is not usually a sign of virtue but an absence of appetite”; and finally, “before changing the laws the statesman must change public opinion.” Abolitionists of alcohol resembled abolitionists of slavery, inclined to break a law they detested rather than working to change it, and instead imprudently attempting to overleap public opinion instead of persuading fellow citizens—that is, rather than treating them as fellow citizens. Not only immoderate and indeed violent actions, in the manner of a Carrie Nation or a John Brown, but “fiery denunciations,” immoderate speech fails to convince opponents that you “mean them well.” “In this way moderation is the handmaiden to prudence for democratic statesmen. By recognizing the legitimate claims of all, they open more ears to their message, making their own success more likely.” 

    Regarding slavery, then, moderation “does not necessarily mean a middle ground between abolitionists and the ‘positive good’ school of slavery that had taken hold in the South.” Lincolnian, statesmanlike, moderation “took into account he many competing goods in the American democratic order, of which the natural equality of man is only one.” For example, in the 1844 presidential election an abolitionist third party, the Liberty Party, likely won votes that otherwise would have gone to Henry Clay instead of proslavery James Polk, who promptly supported the admission of Texas to the Union as a slave state. The moderate position consistent with natural right was rather to contain slavery, leaving it alone where it exists but preventing its spread to the territories that will become new states. This policy, he argued, would lead Southerners eventually to discard slavery in order to compete with the more prosperous, genuinely republican, states which recognized the moral and economic benefit of freeing all men to contribute to American prosperity by having them work for themselves, not for a master. “This would allow for the end of slavery without violence and within the confines of Southern constitutional rights.” In a republic, “what is the use of advocating something that not only cannot succeed”—in this case, the immediate abolition of slavery—but “will alienate the majority of one’s constituency”—a prospect no serious republican politician will entertain, given the foundation of the regime not only on the natural rights to life and liberty but to the consent of the governed that those rights imply.

    While esteeming moderation in politics, one must take care not to confuse it with the fake moderation propounded by Senator Douglas. Douglas decried Lincoln’s claim that a house divided cannot stand, that the United States could not remain united if half-slave, half-free. He claimed that it could be so maintained if residents in the Western territories settled the matter by a vote, on the basis of popular sovereignty. Lincoln reminded Illinois voters in the 1858 election that popular sovereignty can only be just if the people rule in accordance with the natural rights that their sovereignty aims at securing. “While rhetorically supporting self-government, Douglas was undermining true self-government by declaring himself indifferent as to whether an entire class of men and women could legitimately be bound into slavery.” For Lincoln, slavery could finally be abolished but only if the Union were preserved “as the surest way to bring about the end of slavery.” One might add that the Confederates agreed, which is why they rebelled.

    In so arguing, Lincoln did not place himself “above reproach”—and would not, holding as another instance of human equality that no human being is above reproach—but “perceived correctly the competing claims regarding the goal of ending slavery” while making “a good faith effort to adjudicate among those claims.” Had an abolitionist like his future Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase won the presidency, the border states would have left the Union, empowering Confederacy to succeed, frustrating the abolitionist cause once again. In “balanc[ing] legitimate claims”—as, for example, the right of slaves to liberty and the right of the families of slaveholders to rest secure in their lives on their land—the statesman moderates passions on both sides, whether they are self-righteous moral indignation or excessive fear. And in terms of the rule of law, the Constitution did indeed give protection to slavery, but the rule of law itself cannot survive half-obeyed and half-disobeyed. To change the law in the direction of justice in a republican regime, “government must rule by the people’s consent,” eschewing today’s tactic of “crude denunciation.” “Lincoln’s example has never been more essential.” 

    Moving from the statesmanlike virtues to the principles those virtues should embody and defend, Schaff turns to Lincoln’s defense of natural rights, which he “intended to shape public opinion and rededicate the American people to the proposition of natural rights expounded in the Declaration of Independence.” The Declaration respects consent, respects regimes of popular sovereignty, but uphold “a standard outside of majority rule,” limiting majority rule by that standard. “Lincoln’s advocacy of natural rights was part of a conscious attempt to shape the opinion of the people in the direction of limiting their own rule.” In this, once again Douglas was his most formidable opponent. Schaff explains that Douglas wanted the main east-west rail line to run through Illinois. That was no fault in a man elected to represent Illinois. However, to accomplish this the Northwest Territories would need to be admitted to the Union, territories in which slavery had been prohibited by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. By invoking what he called “the great principle” of popular sovereignty unconstrained by natural right regarding slavery in the territories, he tacitly disposed of natural right in favor of economic prosperity. He did, Schaff concedes have one thing right: Lincoln’s policy of keeping slavery out of the territories could, and in the event did, lead to secession and war. His approach, Douglas contended, would save the Union by keeping the decision on slavery local, not national. In this sense, Douglas in effect argued that “the only equality that mattered was the equality of states,” which is indeed a feature of the constitutional design of the national government. But this didn’t make Douglas the moderate on the speaking platform, the upholder of unqualified popular sovereignty as the middle ground between abolitionism and slaveholding. It made him merely a centrist, a split-the-difference man who jettisoned the moral principle that recognized his own rights as a man. Laws designed by popular sovereignty without regard to human nature and its unalienable rights could be overturned quite readily by the Supreme Court in its infamous Dred Scott decision, which already had denied that a black man had any rights a white man needed to respect—a claim that confuses skin color with human nature.

    Lincoln instead held that Douglas’s version of popular sovereignty “taught a dangerous indifference toward natural rights by failing to treat slavery as a wrong,” a tyrannical form of rule that had no right to be extended into territories where it did not exist. In making this argument, he invoked not only the arguments of the Founders, particularly the logical syllogism of the Declaration of Independence, a declaration of the rule of reason against tyranny, but also the authority of the Founders, the veneration for them still felt by Americans. Obviously, today’s efforts to cause Americans to despise the Founders aims at destroying the heartfelt admiration for them that animateded previous generations, while appeals to passion (and not only or even mainly by Mr. Trump and his supporters) erode the practice of deliberation, of practical reasoning in our political life. In advocating unconstrained popular sovereignty, Douglas seemed to believe that original sin had skipped Americans,” who needed no statesmanship because they “needed no improvement.” He would replace monarchic despotic rule, ‘I am the law,’ with the democratic despotic principle, ‘We are the law.’ And without even the pretense of divine right to cover his tracks. “This is the rule of the mob, a majority that confuses justice with whatever the majority wills.”

    Political rhetoric, however well-considered and eloquent, cannot gain consent from an unreceptive people. To perpetuate American political institutions and to secure the natural rights of American citizens, Lincoln advanced civic and scientific education. Aside from their rights, another distinctively human characteristic is the capacity to improve the techniques by which he shapes natural objects in order to preserve and enhance human lives. As Schaff writes, beavers “fell trees the same way they have always done, but humans “invent new and better ways of cutting down trees.” Human inventiveness, rightly applied, “enhances human freedom by making man more efficient in his labor,” spending less time making a living and more time living well. This also means that (as Aristotle suggests) slaves could be replaced by machines. But the observation, reflection, and experiment required for discovery require education. “Further, his ability to analyze problems and argument and to cultivate his higher mind and morals makes an educated man more fit for self-government.” Slaveholders kept their slaves illiterate and were none too scrupulous about ensuring public education for poor whites, either. Scientific and civic education must remain together, neither the property of ‘the few.’ Not only can the few rule, aping the habits of the European aristocracy, over a slave plantation, but in subsequent decades a new oligarchy would arise, “mating technology with advanced bureaucracy,” a condition Tocqueville calls as “soft despotism” and what Schaff describes as “the systematic abuse of human dignity in the name of progress.” On the contrary, “all progress must be consistent with the dignity of the human person, as that is a good superior to the goods of comfort and ease.”

    In sum, “a Lincolnian approach to rights would take into account prudence and moderation in addition to the appeals to abstract ideas,” discerning “where rights are less applicable or when the application of rights-theory would lead to obvious absurdities,” such as claiming that one has the right to enslave another, prostitute oneself, or addle one’s mind with drugs. Personal dignity and the common good count for something, too, and indeed provide the framework for identifying and understanding rights. Rights limit the authority of government to tell me what to do, but rights are rightly to be defined, limited by the nature of a human being.  “When rights-talk is used to argue for autonomy without limit” it is a sure sign that a country lacks “statesmen to teach the people the limits of the limit of natural rights.”

    The third pillar of Lincoln’s political architectonics, a set of activities in which virtues and natural-rights principles come together, consists of political economy under a government that gives scope to agricultural, commercial, and industrial activity. For this, Americans need neither the “minimalist state” of the libertarians nor the regulatory state of the Progressives but “a strong and active but limited government.” Lincoln derived his core political-economic policies from Alexander Hamilton, the early advocate of commercial republicanism, import tariffs, public finance, and a vigorous executive. (It has been said that Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers pursued Jeffersonian ends—equality, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—with Hamiltonian means, although Hamilton in fact preferred constitutional means, as the Supreme Court vainly attempted to maintain in the mid-1930s. It is rather than Hamilton pursued those same Jeffersonian ends by Hamiltonian means.)

    Henry Clay and his Whig Party carried Hamilton’s policy into the middle of the next century, calling them collectively “The American System.” As the Framers of the Constitution had intended, so the Whigs intended to “link together the large republic,” increasingly threatened by the dispute over slavery, “through economic ties”—the blood that coursed through the veins of Mr. Madison’s anti-Leviathanian “extended republic.” For this, not only a national bank and a protective tariff but also internal improvements (as we now say, infrastructure) would link farmers to industrial workers and the rising urban middle class, moderating the class-hatred factionalism seen in modern states and, indeed, in political communities of any size and antiquity. Lincoln was no agrarian, unlike the Jeffersonians of the past and the Bryanites of the future. He had done legal work for railroads and endorsed the full Whig program, helping to carry it into the new Republican Party. 

    He also, and surprisingly, when one looks at his non-war policies, practiced the Whig approach to the president’s relations with Congress. Well known for his vigorous prosecution of the Civil War, which “necessitated extreme actions by the chief executive that would normally be unconstitutional,” Lincoln let the legislative branch take the lead on, well, legislation. “Innovative and nationalistic proposals such as the Homestead Act, the Pacific Railroad Act, the Legal Tender Act, and the National Bank Act were enacted by [the Thirty Seventh] Congress and were in perfect harmony with Lincoln’s Hamiltonian and Whig roots.” Congress could enact these laws because Southern agrarians had chosen to stay at home and attempt secession instead of reporting to Congress and voting. Schaff rightly observes that Lincoln’s approach to domestic policy as president belies the claim of many Progressives, including Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt (during his post-presidential career), Herbert Croley, and such lesser lights as Mario Cuomo and George McGovern, who claim him as their distinguished predecessor. “The main differences between Lincoln and the Progressive concern a belief in the power of centralized government, advocacy of a strong presidency, and a rejection of the founders’ basic political science as inadequate for modern times”—to say nothing of the Progressives’ replacement of natural rights with rights derived from allegedly ever-progressing ‘History.’ Centralized government, yes: but limited by the Constitution. A strong presidency, yes, but primarily in exercising war powers. In view of political science, has the Progressives’ main institutional innovation, the administrative state, improved the security of Americans’ lives, liberty, and pursuit of happiness? Woodrow Wilson’s “living constitution,” ever evolving away from the limiting, balanced constitution of the Framers, attractive only insofar as he could reject (as he did) “the natural rights foundation of the republic” as “abstract, sentimental, and rationalistic, rather than practical,” more French than American, has undermined the democratic character of the society it purports to enhance by establishing a ‘new class’ of bureaucratic oligarchs, directly wielding both economic and governmental power at the same time.

    Unlike Progressive presidents, and even their ‘conservative’ counterparts, Lincoln never pretended that the diverse interests of Americans could find “representation in one man” who styled himself as their ‘leader’ on the ‘cutting edge of History.’ He made no domestic policy statements before his inauguration, “simply referring interrogators to the Republican platform,” and took no public positions on such policy after his inauguration, either. He instituted no permanent bureaucracies and fomented no ‘wars’ on poverty, disease, or drugs—that is, the extension of executive war powers to domestic ills. Would such an approach meet the challenges American face today?

    This question brings Schaff to what he calls a “provocative in the best sense” suggestion, that Lincoln evidently neither a libertarian in our contemporary sense nor a socialist in any sense, might have proved sympathetic to the political economy of Distributism, as enunciated in Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 tract, Rerum Novarum, and seen in the United States with the initiation of the Catholic Land Movement. Both Lincoln’s notion of free labor and “the distributist vision” combine economic and political theory in a manner that opposes the moral anarchy and oligarchy of undiluted capitalism as well as the oligarchic violation of property rights of socialism. Schaff thus finds “a surprising congruence” between Lincoln and the Pope. As he explains it, Distributism counters the separation of labor from ownership and formal ownership of corporations by stockholders who in fact wield little or no power over corporate policies with an economy of small farms and workshops along with joint ownership of large corporations by “workers of hand and brain.” Under the principle of subsidiarity, whereby self-government begins with families and local associations, and solidarity or the common good, the improvement of the bodies, souls, and property of each citizen, Distributism decentralizes both economic and political life.

    How does this compare with what we know about Lincoln’s understanding of political economy? Lincoln’s economic thought was influenced by not only by Hamilton but by contemporary economic theorists Francis Wayland and Henry C. Carey, who asserted the superiority of free labor over slave labor, the “right to rise” in prosperity over the condition of a hireling or (as Marx memorably put it, a ‘wage slave’), and the direction of citizens who do work for wages towards self-employment in small farms and shops they own—a “bulwark against despotism.” It must be said that the last plank in that platform looks more like the economic notions behind Jeffersonian democracy than those underlying Hamiltonian federalism. Lincoln also followed Wayland and Carey in espousing the labor theory of value, maintaining that nature provides only a small percentage of the humanly usable value of any product, with human beings supplying the much larger balance; this theory was first formulated by John Locke (and later abused by Marx); all three men derive their economic thought from a rather un-Catholic thinker. Schaff sees this latter point, noting that the Distributists were explicitly Christian in a way Lincoln was not, and less Lockean-‘individualist,’ too. Still, in arguing for a political economy by saying that “material well-being is good, but not as good as being independent of crowned-kings, money-kings, and land-kings,” Lincoln and the Distributists concurred. On the question of statesmanlike prudence, however, one might wonder if Lincoln had lived on past 1865, he would have aligned himself with a Catholic social movement. In those years, Catholicism wasn’t as controversial as slavery had been, but it was a largely Protestant country.

    Schaff’s argument on Distributism occupies the center of his book. From there, he turns to a more detailed consideration of Lincoln’s more strictly political policies: the claim that he effected a “Second American Revolution,” the genesis of the realignment of American politics from the failure of the Whigs to the longstanding success of the Republicans, and his continued fidelity to the Constitutional prerogatives of Congress.

    Schaff argues that contrary to Progressive and indeed Marxist historians like the Beards and many ‘conservative,’ especially Southern ‘Redeemer’ historians alike, Lincoln’s presidency precipitated no revolution in America. After all, the Republican Party took its name from the kind of regime the Founders established, a regime of popular sovereignty under the moral limitation of natural rights and the political limitation of separation of powers, among others. And it organized itself first locally, then nationally, not under the ‘leadership’ of one or a few partisan heroes. Lincoln himself didn’t join the party until 1856, two years after its founding.

    The Republicans’ antecedents, the Whigs, themselves organized in opposition to the administration of Andrew Jackson, whom they styled “King Andrew” for what they took to be his overbearing use of executive power—for example, his role in dismantling the second iteration of the national bank and his populist rhetoric. The Whigs soon collided with the rock of slavery, however. Frustrated by the party’s weak stance on that issue, Salmon Chase organized the Free-Soil Party in the late 1840s, which took over the Northwest Territory doctrine of no slavery in the territories. “A free West settled by small farmers would promote the respectability of labor so undermined by the quasi-aristocratic plantation system of the South.” The Compromise of 1850, with its strengthened fugitive slave provisions and its repeal of the Missouri Compromise, put the Free-Soilers on the road to extinction, just as the Kansas-Nebraska Act would prove the beginning of the end of the Whig Party, a few years later. The Democratic Party, controlled by the Southern oligarchs, controlled the regnant American party, but their triumph proved Pyrrhic, as Douglas’s popular sovereignty energized Northern Democrats who wanted to bury the slavery issue without vindicating slavery and the Republican Party organized as a force dedicated to defending the principles of the American regime as the Founders had designed it.

    For their part, Republicans saw that opposition to slavery wouldn’t suffice as a campaign issue after the defeat of their first presidential candidate, John C. Frémont, in 1856. They adopted the Whigs’ American system program, which proved timely when the country suffered a recession the following year. When the Democrats opposed homesteading, they lost votes in West, but had the endorsed it they would have lost votes in the South, where the oligarchs wanted assurances that the new territories would admit slaves. 

    With secession, Republicans had a free hand in implementing their platform. President Lincoln did exert some influence on Congress, ‘jawboning’ members at the White House and writing letters, but for the most part kept hands off. Congress members wrote and introduced the laws, with the Lincoln administration providing information but exerting no real pressure. Lincoln did delegate Treasury Secretary Chase to work with Congress on the Legal Tender and National Bank acts, deploying him much as Washington had done with Hamilton. The difference between Lincoln’s approach and that of Progressive presidents was that Lincoln never spoke publicly about any of the domestic measures he supported. His many speeches concerned secession, the war, and slavery insofar as it could be abolished as a means of winning the war. Nothing could be further from the Wilsonian practice of serving as the nation’s ‘opinion leader.’ Being a natural-rights man, not a progressive-historicist imagining himself on the cutting edge of ‘History,’ Lincoln had no reason to suppose that he needed to overstep his Constitutional duties as the executor, not the framer, of laws. “It is fair to say that Lincoln’s participation and actions in the legislative process were few and judicious,” and he established no substantial White House staff that could have “regularized the president’s legislative and political operations,” as things stand now. He was, in short, “a Whig in the White House,” depending not on an administrative state but on party members to implement his policies. 

    The party system had its faults, “such as corruption,” but it also “advanced certain goods.” To win elections (and thereby government jobs for their loyalists), party bosses needed to form broad coalitions. These were easily disrupted when a group within the party perceived a threat to some fundamental interest, as seen in the fissures within the Democratic Party in the 1850s, resulting in the electoral debacle of 1860. “A coalition-based system” thus “encouraged moderation,” not only in campaigning but in governing, since the same people who organized and won the election campaign often went into the new government. Following the excellent scholarship of James W. Ceaser, Schall remarks that the candidate-centered political campaigns of today put a premium on raising money from interest groups and on spectacular appeals drawing attention to themselves and to the alleged perfidy of their opponents. When such politicians govern, the show never stops, leading to the atmosphere of perpetual crisis and rhetorical sensationalism we now see. “Lincoln shows us a better way.”

    “Lincoln was not a revolutionary statesman of any sort,” but rather a defender of the founding, a true moderate, who ruled by law except in those instances when the supreme law of the land itself, the Constitution, would have been threatened by over-scrupulous adherence to one of its provisions—the famous example being the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in a capital city with a large population of quislings, one of whom eventually murdered him. In non-war matters, he respected Constitutional limits on presidential power. “There is nothing here that could not be defended by the typical American founder.” 

    “Lincoln’s defense of natural rights and the rule of law and his respect for public opinion showed the profound recognition that to be an advocate of democracy, one must be a moderate advocate.” Democracy untethered from natural rights and the rule of law become majority tyranny; untethered from public opinion, it becomes despotism. “Democracy is only good as long as it serves to protect natural rights.” That is, the statesmanlike virtues of moderation and prudence must be combined with a sound theory of justice. A democratic statesman can do no less.

    Daniel J. Mahoney understands statesmanship as a form of human excellence encompassing the classical virtues of moderation, prudence, justice, and courage, but also greatness rightly understood as greatness of soul, magnanimity, and often a touch of genuine philosophizing. Maintaining continuity with Schall’s fine study, I shall begin with Mahoney’s understanding of Lincoln’s statesmanship, then work backward to and forward from that chapter to give an account of the book as a whole.

    Democracy or popular sovereignty inclines citizens to “impatience and ingratitude in the best of circumstances,” Mahoney begins, but today’s “highly ideologized climate marked by collective self-loathing and an unremitting desire to repudiate the inheritance of the past, ingratitude becomes inseparable from a vulgar and destructive nihilism.” No matter that George Washington fought bravely in two wars, leading Americans to victory in their war for independence; no matter that he presided over the Constitutional Convention with dignity and skill; no matter that he eschewed any hint of the military dictatorship that King George III cynically expected him to establish, throughout “subordinat[ing] narrow personal ambition to an austere sense of public duty and reptation well earned.” He was a slaveholder—to be sure, a slaveholder who freed his slaves in his Last Will and Testament, setting an example which, if followed by his fellow plantation grandees, would have ended slavery in the United States before a civil war could have been fought over it. Never mind: “The fact that he owned slaves must negate everything else,” according to our contemporaries. This “tyrannical ‘presentism’…drives out both patriotic attachment and a capacity for measured judgment and admiration” in souls burning with “a moralistic rage that owes little or nothing to authentic moral and political judgment.”

    Abraham Lincoln, who “would complete the founders’ work by saving a union dedicated to the great proposition of liberty and equality ‘under God,’ defeating a Confederate rebellion dedicated to the indefinite perpetuation of chattel slavery, freeing the slaves, and pointing toward ‘a new birth of freedom,'” nonetheless now comes under polemical fire for allegedly racist remarks he made during his debates with Senator Douglas, remarks which were in fact anything but racist if read with care and in context. Mahoney sees through such nonsense, calling Lincoln “the greatest of our presidents and surely the most philosophically minded,” a statesman who “knew human nature and human right, its limits and possibilities,” thereby becoming “the greatest American defender of natural right and of the requirements of mutual accountability and responsibility of free men under both the political and moral law.” In so doing, he removed any doubt (which should never have arisen in the first place, given the example of Washington) that natural right entails moral duty, that even the elemental right of self-preservation doesn’t obviate “one’s obligation to respect the rights of others.” If, as Aristotle maintains, politics means reciprocity, ruling and being ruled in turn, that political reciprocity requires the moral reciprocity between right and duty.

    In this, Lincoln corrected or perhaps clarified the account of natural rights seen in Locke and in the principal author of the Declaration of Independence. At least as he it is usually interpreted, ‘Lockean liberalism’ puts rights first, making duties ancillary to them. It may be argued that Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education exhibits a sufficient degree of Stoicism to call that claim into question, but however one resolves the matter it is the ‘individualist’ dimension of Locke that impresses most readers today and, as Mahoney notes, Locke’s Second Treatise on Government does uphold a right and duty to self-preservation above one’s duty to his “station” in life—which might be guard duty at a military encampment. Jefferson, too, defended slavery, which he loathed, on the grounds of self-preservation, famously explaining that slaveholders “have the wolf by the ears” and dare not let go of their mastership lest freed slaves kill them. On the other hand, Jefferson’s Declaration ends with the signatories pledging to each other of their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor—a decidedly un-‘Lockean’ thought, indeed.

    Be this as it may, Lincoln rebalanced any tendency toward simplistic ‘rights-talk’ while rejecting Caesarism. In this, Mahoney sees a comparison to Cicero, the “philosopher-statesman and great-souled man who opposed despotism “in the twilight years of the Roman Republic.” More, Lincoln succeeded in defending his republic. 

    No less than Schaff, Mahoney finds “prudence at the service of principle…to be the quintessence of morality applicable to the political common good,” and finds Lincoln exemplary in that regard. Without a “due respect to public opinion,” “there could be no movement toward ‘a new birth of freedom,’ only moral posturing and impotent rage” as seen in Abolitionists and slaveholder apologists alike. And the new birth of freedom, freedom for the slaves, accompanied both the preservation of the Union, “one nation,” and the firm acknowledgment of the providential God whose citizens governed themselves “under God.” The young Lincoln began as an atheist, a rationalist, and a fatalist. The mature Lincoln felt the gratitude democrats too often carelessly forget. The young Lincoln knew his own genius, relying on it to carry him ahead; the mature Lincoln saw more than his own, and even more than his nation’s efforts in the vindication of natural right for all Americans which the cataclysmic war, self-sacrificial war had made possible.

    Accordingly, with his Second Inaugural Address “Lincoln reached the heights” of “philosophical-minded statesmanship.” “In it, poetry and theology meet philosophy and the highest tasks of statesmanship geared to civic reconciliation without forgetting or eschewing the requirements of natural and divine justice.” If both sides in the Civil War “prayed to the same God and read the same Bible,” shall the victors judge the losers harshly after the war is over? The slaveholders were wrong, and God’s Providence went against them, but now is the time not to judge, lest the victors (some of whom had profited from slavery without owning slaves themselves) render themselves incapable of reconciliation, necessary to preserve the Union and the republican regime dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, for which the war had been fought. “Judge not that we are not judged,” the Biblical judgment that Lincoln quotes in the Second Inaugural, remains in his mind, as it was in the minds of the first Christians, utterly foreign to the “moral relativism or the moral indifference that today goes by the name of ‘nonjudgmentalism.'” “If Lincoln had survived Booth’s assassination attempt, he would have promoted Reconstruction”—regime change in the oligarchic Southern states—with “the same mixture of principle and refined and morally serious practical wisdom that guided his struggle against efforts to extend slavery to new states and territories.”

    Was Lincoln, then, a Christian? “Not in any simple sense, perhaps, but certainly in a sublime philosophical sense that is unthinkable without Christianity.” His statesmanship defended not only a political union but a union of “principle and prudence in a manner worthy of classical wisdom,” of Cicero, “while allowing God’s mysterious Providence to guide him in the inner struggles that afflicted his soul”—his “sublime, anguished but charitable soul”— “drawing on the ennobling resources of both reason and revelation.”

    Can Americans now “still be trusted to hold on to” the principles Lincoln vindicated and the Union he saved? “Not if we ignore the wisdom of Lincoln and the Founding Fathers who inspired him. The choice is up to us in a union gravely divided once more.”

    In Mahoney, we see an understanding of statesmanship, and of Lincoln’s statesmanship, that shares Schaff’s insight into the moral and political necessity of prudence, moderation, justice, and courage. Schaff presents far more of what Lincoln actually did, what policies he pursued in order to secure the Union as a true commercial republic. Mahoney points more to the capstone of classical virtue, magnanimity, and to the spiritual dimension of statesmanship in a democratic but also largely Christian nation—Christianity being, as Tocqueville saw, the mustard seed of modern democratic society. What accounts for Mahoney’s emphasis? He explains his intention in the introduction to his book.

    “There is virtue in the gaze of a great man.” So Chateaubriand writes, recalling his dinner with Washington at Mount Vernon. What does he mean?

    A great man likely knows himself to be your superior in mind and heart. Yet, being genuinely great, he does not look askance at you, down on you, or with the air of an entomologist studying a beetle. He looks at you as an equal, not in mind or heart but in your personhood, in your rights, in your humanity. He seeks to govern with you, not over you or against you, because his soul is always greater than the authority he wields. His soul is the real basis of his authority, and you can see that in his eyes.

    So unlike Napoleon. André Malraux described him as a great mind but a small soul. As Mahoney puts it, “Bonapartre revealed the false allure of greatness shorn of the cardinal virtues” of courage, moderation, prudence, and justice, “first discerned by the ancients and further developed by Christian thought,” virtues that form “the core of genuine political greatness.” The statesmen he studies here exhibit a “rare combination of magnanimity and moderation,” good judgment, and a firm commitment to the good of their political communities.

    The American Founders, “inspired by the accounts of political nobility” seen in the works of Cicero and Plutarch, prudently understood, in Madison’s words, that “wise statesmen will not always be at the helm.” Accordingly, they designed “political institutions where ‘power checked power,’ institutions that would make political greatness less necessary if not superfluous.” With the flourishing of democratic or egalitarian minds and hearts within that institutional framework, Americans over time began to succumb to a “doctrinaire egalitarianism or relativism that many today confuse with democracy,” falling into the habit of liking instead of admiring, captious sneering instead of stern judgment. In their fallacious egalitarianism, they misunderstand politics by thinking of it in such subpolitical categories as ‘power’ or ‘race, class, and gender’—categories that prevent them from understanding politics as a distinctly human activity, an exercise in deliberation rather than mere assertion and dominance. “One cannot promote justice on the ‘willful’ premises of Machiavellian (and Nietzschean) premises” because “if one begins with nihilistic premises, if one reduces every argument to a pretense for domination and exploitation, one necessarily ends with the self-enslavement of man,” the negation of “our civilized inheritance despite the perfectionist or utopian veneer that invariably accompanies it.”

    With such an unsteady foundation (which includes going so far as to deny that it, or anything else, has any foundation at all), Machiavellian political philosophy and social science “veer incoherently between false realism and an idealism that acknowledges no constraints on the power of the human will to remake human nature and society.” At one moment, we hear calls for ‘transhumanism,’ at another we see the treatment of human beings as if they were beasts—aborting them, manipulating them, murdering them en masse. Aristotle described the person who lived outside the political community as either a god or a beast; to so conceive persons who live inside the political community is to destroy that community.

    “What is needed is a return to true realism, to a moral conception of politics that is fully realistic but that also acknowledges that the good, the search for legitimate authority or even the best regime, the exercise of the practical virtues…are as real as, and certainly more ennobling than, the reckless and groundless pursuit of power as an end in itself.” One of Machiavelli’s most eminent philosophic enemies, Cicero still provides in his “thoughts and deeds much ballast or a morally serious and authentically realistic political science that avoids the twin temptations of dogmatism and cynicism.” This needn’t mean “a return to classical politics per se,” which would lead us on a quixotic quest for the dissolution of modern states and the reconstitution of poleis. What we can retrieve from ‘the ancients’ is that “judicious mix of realism and moral aspiration” the classical philosophers commended, exemplified by the statesman. Such men can and have existed in the modern world of large and centralized states, and Mahoney offers six examples: Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Lincoln, Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and Vaclav Havel.

    As philosopher and statesman, “Cicero despised the Epicureans, whose reduction of the good to the pleasant encouraged an abdication of moral and political responsibility on the part of the one, the few, and the many”—the components of any political regime—leaving “no reason to be brave or courageous or to make sacrifices for one’s country.” Cicero opposed not only the rule of the appetites in the human soul but also the rule of the spirited, thumotic part, standing instead for civilian rule in Rome, a country that valorized military prowess a bit too much for its own good. “His standard was ‘honestum‘—the fine, the noble, the honorable—at the service of civilized liberty.”

    Although “half-classical modern democratic statesmen” such as de Gaulle and Churchill (half-classical because their minds and hearts were decisively inflected by Christian civilization, as well) “embodied important aspects of this Ciceronian ideal,” even as they “lived in an era strikingly different from Cicero’s, an era in which the technological achievement of modern science made new, all-encompassing tyrannies and worldwide wars possible,” while at the same time softening democratic souls with “creature comforts,” making pacifism in the face of such tyrants “a much more powerful temptation” than it had ever been. In the world of our time, “the Ciceronian statesman must spend as much time warning against pacifist illusions as in reminding warrior republics of the ultimate superiority of the urbane virtues to military courage.”

    Although Machiavelli charges Christianity, not the modernity he in crucial ways inaugurated, with the folly of pacifism, and even Churchill mistakenly concurred, “there is no evidence that the Prince of Peace espoused pacifism in politics or was providing anything other than the demanding requirements of discipleship form a radically perfectionist or eschatological point of view.” There are indeed “enduring and abiding tensions between classical honor” and “Christian ethics understood as beneficent mercy and at times great forbearance in the face of evil,” but Churchill’s own “mixture of fidelity, forbearance, goodwill, classical honor, and moral realism” proved that the great-souled man need not lack ‘Christian’ virtue, as seen (it should be noted) in the writings of Seneca, who writes not only of magnanimity and the rule of reason over anger but also of mercy and the doing of favors, the human equivalent of grace. For his part, in his De Officiis Cicero “spiritualiz[es] magnanimity,” pointing to “humility and restraint much more than self-assertion or precipitous adventures” as characteristic of the great-souled man.

    In forming their understanding of politics, Aristotle and Cicero studied the character and actions of a real statesman, Solon, that mediator between the claims of ‘the few’ and those of ‘the many’—a “just and honorable mediator between the enduring political distinctions,” a task that mimics in politics the moral task of finding the virtuous mean between the vicious extremes in the human soul. “Like Solon, Cicero defended the inviolability of private property against rapacious oligarchs, thieving tyrants, and men of ‘unbalanced soul,'” to use one of Solon’s turns of phrase. This was no defense of oligarchy as a regime, as Cicero himself was a ‘new man’ who had advanced in Roman politics on the strength of his own virtues. Nor was it a denigration of Rome’s “industrious and law-abiding plebeians.” It was an attempt to secure what Aristotle had called the ‘mixed regime,’ a regime designed so that the few who are rich and the many who are poor must cooperate by deliberating together, by ruling and being ruled in turns, identifying the public good as consisting of laws and actions that benefited both ‘sides’ and the political community as a whole. In this, statesmanlike greatness of soul works for political moderation, even as men like Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte despise moderation as mediocrity, a thing beneath their ‘Machiavellian’ virtù.

    For a careful examination of what greatness consists of, Mahoney turns first not to his statesmen but to political philosopher Robert K. Faulkner’s 2007 study, The Case for Greatness. Faulkner contrasts Lincoln’s ambition to preserve his country, winning the just esteem of his fellow citizens, with the imperial ambition that fired the souls of Cyrus the Great and Napoleon—the first limited to the defense of justice, the second unlimited and despotic. This serves as an introduction to a careful analysis of Aristotle’s account of the magnanimous man, which the philosopher intends to be read not in isolation but with his account of justice, the common good, the rule of law, patriotism, public spiritedness, and his balanced, ‘mixed’ regime. In Faulkner’s view, “Aristotle moderates the autarchy or self-sufficiency of the great-souled man by tying his greatness to the common good of a fee and civilized polity and to a deeper thoughtfulness about the ends and purposes of human life,” whereby the moral virtue of magnanimity takes its bearings from “the self-knowledge made possible by philosophical reflection.”

    Mahoney isn’t quite buying it. Faulkner “goes too far in simply identifying the great-souled man with the public-spirited gentleman-statesman.” The great-souled man isn’t so easy to ‘domesticate’; his insistence on self-sufficiency rests uneasily with Aristotle’s understanding of man as a ‘political animal.’ Such statesmen as Washington, Lincoln, and Churchill filter the coruscant light of magnanimity through the Christian-democratic lens of “common humanity,” along with “Cicero’s republican appropriation of a qualified Stoicism” (a politically aware Stoicism), and “the modern doctrine of the rights of man.” Given these refinements of Aristotle’s portrait, Mahoney prefers to think of a tradition of magnanimity which these later statesmen refined in the circumstances of their own countries and times. “This tradition moderated magnanimity while acknowledging its just and elevating claims.” With that, he turns to the statesmen themselves, beginning with Burke.

    In Burke, Mahoney finds prudence, but a noble prudence, aristocratic in the best sense and enlightened by the theoretical wisdom of political philosophy. Mahoney disputes two influential interpretations of Burke: the conservative-romantic picture of a traditionalist denouncer of political rationalism and the Straussian presentation of Burke as the founder of philosophic historicism, a predecessor of Hegel.

    Burke was neither the “enemy of human reason” nor an early proponent of historicist rationalism. As he watched the French Revolution careen toward self-destruction on a field of blood, he saw that “any ideological project to remake society de novo” as “the triumph of madness,” of unreason masquerading as enlightened vindication of the rights of man. The French revolutionary conception of rights altogether severed itself from prudential-political reason. Hence Burke’s preference for “the great primeval contract of eternal society,” the centuries old partnership in science, art, and virtue that has actually happened, and may continue, if men are not beguiled by the myth of some original ‘social contract.’ Even in its own devastating civil wars of the 17th century, English liberty survived, uniting conservation of what Western civilization had discovered and built with necessary and well-considered reforms. The French should have followed this example, as the Old Regime deserved reform, not the kind of radical revolution attempted by the revolutionaries, with their “politicized atheism” ginning up what Burke calls a secularized “bigotry of their own.” The Jacobins not only committed regicide, they gloried in it, holding up the bloodied, severed heads of the royal family to jeering crowds. They denied property rights to aristocrats if not to themselves; they even practiced cannibalism, all in an effort to eradicate the religious dimension of French society while retaining the fanaticism of the worst Christians. “The enemy of Britain and the civilized world was not historic France but an ‘armed doctrine’ that had conquered and warred on the France that was an integral part of European and Christian civilization.”

    As such, Burke was no moral, cultural, or historical relativist. He adhered to the natural law doctrine, which had been incorporated into the Western tradition but was not itself merely a matter of tradition, if tradition is to be equated with convention. He well-known esteem for prudence or practical wisdom with theoretical wisdom, inasmuch as (in a vintage Mahoneyan aphorism) “prudence needs principle as much as principle needs prudence.” Political reason remains, well, rational. And “tradition is indispensable to political reason precisely because it is a powerful vehicle for passing on the inherited or tried-and-true wisdom of the human race,” not some “‘mystical’ or irrational substitute” either for theoretical or practical reason. Burke is a critic of an all-encompassing political rationalism but never of political reason within its legitimate sphere.”

    This makes Burke “the first and greatest critic of the ’emancipation of the will’ from natural and divine superintendence,” the confusion of consent with mere assent. The emancipation of the will can lead to anarchy, including the anarcho-capitalism of radical libertarians, or to an especially lethal form of tyranny, as seen in Leni Riefenstahl’s glorification of Hitler, aptly titled The Triumph of the Will—a catastrophic and short-lived triumph, as it turned out. Despite their ritualistic denunciations of ‘fascism,’ too many self-styled social democrats today assert individual and collective autonomy, willfulness concealed as egalitarianism, “a conceit that enslaves human beings under the pretext of making them gods.” 

    With their reductionist misunderstanding of human nature, anticipating later reductionisms which came to deny human nature altogether, Burke remained “above all a partisan” of what he called “the unbought grace of life,” life that has never been purchased with either money or political power. Put to the test in practice, Enlightenment rationalism “was not so reasonable after all,” forgetting the moral limits human nature defines for itself precisely by being a nature distinct from the natures of other natural kinds and from nature as a whole, even as it forms part of nature as a whole and limited by it.

    Burke thus “remains very much our contemporary,” so long as we understand that he stood in circumstances quite different from our own. He lived in a Europe in transition “from the old regime to the world of modern liberty,” from the rule of titled aristocrats to the rule of the people, democracy. We live in a world in which that transition has been fully effected. Yet the political prudence Burke lauds and once embodied remain indispensable in this new world.

    Tocqueville understands the Burkean regime of noble prudence while accepting the circumstances of his own France in his own century, where democracy had triumphed. Identifying equality as the democratic principle, liberty as the aristocratic principle, he argued for “liberty with a modicum of greatness” under democratic conditions. “It is beyond the ability of nations today to prevent conditions from becoming equal,” he wrote, “but it is within their power to decide whether equality will lead them into servitude or liberty, enlightenment or barbarism, prosperity or misery.” To accomplish this, statesmen will need to cut “any remaining links between democracy, rightly understood, and the revolutionary spirit of destruction and negation.”

    Thus, during the revolution of 1848 Tocqueville worked “to defend a lawful republic,” the Second Republic, “against both the radical let and the Bonapartist right.” Bonapartism had already failed: Why would its reprise end any differently? As for the socialists, they shared the materialism of their ‘capitalist’ enemies, while intending to deploy the powers of the modern state, much enhanced, to place the French on “a new road to servitude.” A few years later, these efforts, considered calmly, brought him to distinguish the imprudence and injustice of the First Republic, reprised by the socialists of ’48, from the fundamental decency of the Second, which he took to be an attempt to re-enact the moderate early phase of the First, the phase of Lafayette and the still-reasonable republicans who took their principles from Montesquieu, not Rousseau.

    Although Tocqueville himself found himself tormented by doubt, having abandoned his Catholic faith at the age of sixteen and becoming a sort of Pascalian without the Bible, “he remained a broadly theistic thinker who repeatedly expressed confidence in the existence and providence of God,” a Being whose will transcends the human will. Beneath that wise and good Being, human beings can reason politically, “more or less content with what he called ‘probabilistic truths,'” truths that deny the overconfident assertion of historical ‘laws’ seen in “various forms of historical and racial determinism.” By their fruits we can know such doctrines, witnessing “their deeply pernicious effects on liberty and the human soul.” As a student of Solzhenitsyn as well as of Tocqueville, Mahoney well knows that in the century after Tocqueville wrote those effects would multiply themselves far beyond anything Tocqueville anticipated. It was anguish enough that the Revolution of 1848 set back his hopes for “moderate regulated liberty disciplined by faith, moeurs, and laws” by “another generation or two,” that is, after the disappearance of, first, the “bourgeois king,” Louis-Philippe, and the Bonapartist Napoleon III. The Third Republic allied with Britain and the United States to defeat the military oligarchy of Kaiser Germany, in the process putting itself on the short slope to disaster in 1940, but in the meantime it had revived something of the political spirit that neither the ‘bourgeois’ principle of enrichissez vous nor the stifling of that spirit under a new Napoleon (who exhibited all of his ‘great’ ancestor’s smallness of soul but none of his military genius) could, or would, encourage.

    He saw the best hope for republican liberty under democratic social conditions in the American regime, although he worried about the expansion of slavery in the 1850s, dying the year before the election of Abraham Lincoln. Like Lincoln, he longed for a new birth of freedom, not only in the American republic but someday, somehow, in Europe. Indeed, as Mahoney has designed his book, Lincoln’s statesmanship in many respects concluded the conflict and the dialogue between aristocrats and democrats which Burke and Tocqueville had considered with such care.

    In the next century, however, all too many regimes not only failed to orient themselves toward Lincoln’s example of statesmanship and the American Founder’s understanding of natural right as the foundation of republicanism, instead abandoning themselves to the hard tyranny of ‘proletarian socialism’ and ‘national socialism.’ Even the republics seduced themselves with historicist dreams, putting themselves at risk for the “soft despotism” Tocqueville had warned against. In the second half of his book, Mahoney shows how Churchill, de Gaulle, and Havel successfully resisted the hard tyrannies without being able much to slow the new oligarchs of the administrative state.

    Given the use of terror as an instrument of rule by the modern tyrannies, Churchill fully displayed what Solzhenitsyn calls “the courage to see,” to identify such tyrannies for what they are, as the indispensable virtue preparatory to resisting them and vindicating genuinely political regimes, the natural rights of human beings, and indeed the Western civilization such tyrannies assaulted. “Among twentieth-century statesmen, only de Gaulle shared this admirable lucidity and the determination to resist the inhuman totalitarian temptation on the intellectual, military, political, and spiritual fronts.” [1] Churchill and de Gaulle “still cared for the West as the West, a civilization worth preserving because it alone fully valorized the dignity of human beings who are souls as well as bodies, persons imbued with dignity and not playthings of ideological despotisms that in decisive respects were ‘beyond good and evil.'” Churchill’s defense of the West included a critique of the political Islam he encountered in Sudan in the 1890s, chronicled in the greatest of his early books, The River War. Fanaticism, fatalism, sensualism, and the abuse of women have “affected almost every Islamic land,” even as individual Muslims show courage and loyalty in battle—at times, in those days, as soldiers in the British Empire.

    Churchill’s religious convictions resembled Lincoln’s. He began as an atheist, although he was never an “open scoffer” at religion, as Lincoln described his younger self. Neither did he become an orthodox Christian, even broadly defined. Like Lincoln, he came to sense a “Higher Power” or providential force at work in his life, “protecting him from death and injury.” His magnanimity, “a quintessentially and initially pagan virtue, was always accompanied by a sense of mercy, chivalry, duty, fair play, and concern for the ‘humble masses’ in their ‘cottage homes’ that took the hardest edges off of classical pride.” By 1932, in Thoughts and Adventures, he could praise Moses and the Israelites he led as having “grasped and proclaimed the idea of which all the genius of Greece ad all the power of Rome were incapable,” that “there was to be only one God, a universal God, a God of nations, a just God, a God who would punish in another world a wicked man dying rich and prosperous, a God from whose service the good of the humble and weak and the poor was inseparable”—a God, moreover, who saw in each human soul His own image, therefore commanding that each one treat all others with “a modicum of respect, charity, and decency.” “Not even classical paganism at its best—say, Aristotle, Cicero, and the Stoics—could claim that. [2] Such Christian virtues made modern liberty, liberty easily overborne by the modern state, possible. Churchill’s soul, with “its admirable mix of magnanimity and moderation…is unthinkable without the Christianity that Churchill could never bring himself to reject.”

    While admiring Churchill, Mahoney considers de Gaulle “perhaps the most impressive statesman-thinker of the twentieth century.” His thought is surely studied less than it should be. [3] From his favorite poet, Charles Péguy, de Gaulle “learned a generous patriotism that tried to bring together the best of France before and after 1789.” With Péguy, he esteemed the warrior-saint Joan of Arc, “who loved God and France with almost equal fervor.” France was worthy of love, having a vocation (in the Christian sense) “to bring liberty, civilization, and enlightenment to humanity.” Although superficial observers, including Franklin Roosevelt, suspected de Gaulle of harboring tyrannical ambitions, he detested the tyrannies of both ‘Left’ and ‘Right.’ Raymond Aron, a man not given to praise, called de Gaulle “an authentically great man,” unlike the tyrant-adventurer, Bonaparte, the risible Boulanger, and the senile Philippe Pétain of the 1940s. Like Washington, General de Gaulle remained a faithful defender of civilian and republican rule. [4]

    De Gaulle reconciled his Christian faith with his own vocation, that of the soldier and statesman, because he “believed that the Christian, too, was called to the path of chivalry and personal and political honor,” as indeed the non-Christian Churchill did. More deeply, he found in his younger daughter, Anne, who was afflicted with Down Syndrome, a blessing and a joy—a joy (as Mahoney puts it so beautifully) “in his suffering and in the love it brought forth for Anne.” For her part, whenever Anne became frustrated and upset, if de Gaulle entered the room and sat beside her, she would find stillness, again. She knew her protector was with her.

    As de Gaulle wrote, the “the man of character is a born protector,” a “good prince” (this, with a glance at Machiavelli’s prince, who has learned “not to be good”). Like Aristotle’s magnanimous man, the man of character “eschews revenge,” although de Gaulle’s magnanimity extends to “salutary action for the common good” as a means of overcoming vengeful impulse. To this moral virtue de Gaulle added the self-knowledge commended by Socrates: “Rarely has a statesman been so self-conscious about his own nature and motives and about the nature of the political whole (and the human world) in which he operates.” He understood the tension between Christianity and the classical moral political virtues, and perhaps some of the modern vices, likely by consulting his own soul, by the means of his self-knowledge, admitting that “every man of action has a strong dose of egotism, pride, hardness, and cunning.” One will not find “evangelical perfection” in the statesman, he observed. As Mahoney puts it, “de Gaulle “was not bereft of Machiavellian virtù.”  He unhesitatingly abandoned the Algerian Harkis, Muslims who had fought with the French against their fellow Muslims in the 1954-62 war of independence when he decided to jettison the colony, which he now judged more trouble than it was worth. [5] But “unlike Aristotle’s magnanimous man, de Gaulle had a gift for seeing greatness in others,” recognizing Churchill and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as his peers among statesmen, and saying of André Malraux’s writings: “Clouds, clouds. But every now and then, a lightning flash.” His friendship with Adenauer (who was granted the unique privilege, for a foreign leader, of dining in de Gaulle’s home in the village of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises) served the noble and indispensable political purpose of symbolizing the reconciliation of republican France and republican West Germany, only a bit more than a decade after the liberation of Paris from the Nazis. 

    Mahoney doesn’t overlook de Gaulle’s errors of judgment. He imagined that Ho Chi Minh, and dedicated Communist, was only a nationalist and more, that Soviet Communism really amounted to an attempt to assert Russian greatness. That is, he inclined somewhat towards taking nationalism as the universal and perennial underlying cause of international poltics. While he correctly anticipated that “Europe would outlast a Communist ideology so at odds with human nature and the wellsprings of European civilization,” he badly misjudged the timing of Bolshevism’s demise, going so far to write to a startled and bemused Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin, “Come, let us make Europe together.” His efforts to pry the Communist ideologues who ruled Poland, Hungary, and Romania from the Soviet empire met with no better success. “This was wishful thinking on de Gaulle’s part,” and wishful thinking doesn’t cut it in a statesman. In such prudential matters, Churchill seems to have been wiser, even if Churchill willingly made deals with Stalin, a tyrant whose crimes far surpassed those of the mediocrities in 1960s Eastern Europe.

    Despite such lapses, de Gaulle stands as a moral and political eminence of the first rank. So much so that even Henry Kissinger thought of himself as his inferior.

    With Czech dissident, then president, Václav Havel, Mahoney completes his set of statesmanly portraits. He cannot be said to surpass Lincoln, who occupies the final place in Mahoney’s first set of three, and Mahoney immediately shows why. Havel “seems to have at least partly bought into the radically ‘individualist’ ethos of the 1960s, at least as regards ‘personal’ morality, “prone” as he was to depression, self-medication, and sexual promiscuity. Although “an intensely spiritual man,” his convictions leaned toward New Age ideology. Despite all that, Havel did think that “everything we do is remembered,” ontologically registered, recorded by “Being”—a thought likely borrowed from the fashionable Existentialism he learned as a student. This “provided cosmic grounds or support for moral responsibility,” carrying him through Czechoslovakia’s Communist years with courage and honor. He never succumbed to the “subjectivism and relativism” which deformed the generation of the 1960s.

    Similarly, while worrying that “modern technological civilization did not have the moral resources to sustain itself and undergo a crisis,” lending himself for measured support for radical environmentalists and other ‘counterculture’ activists, he drew the line on the European peace movement, then intent on unilateral nuclear disarmament. While testing the boundaries of common sense, he never stepped to far over the line, “distrust[ing] Russia” and praising “civic activism” as a counterforce to statist bureaucracy, rather in the manner of Tocqueville. He, too, was a political man, one who considered “Being” as a force that “grounds, delimits, animates and directs” life on earth, very much including political life. “To revolt against its requirements and demands, its limits and obligations, is to succumb to arrogance and hubris and inevitably has ‘cruel consequences,'” as seen of course in the Communist regimes. Such “ideological despotism” finally must bow to the authority of the conscience that attends to the order of the cosmos—a Stoic thought from a not-unfailingly Stoic man. In all, as a moralist-statesman without illusion, Havel “exemplifies those intellectual and spiritual qualities integral to human freedom and dignity.”

    Mahoney concludes with some thoughts on political conditions today. “We have come face to face with a new logocracy,” that is, “a tyranny founded on the manipulation of language and the forced imposition of ideological clichés with little or no connection to anything real or enduring.” Unlike Schaff, he finds some virtue in that “very imperfect man,” Donald Trump, a patriot who opposed “the culture of repudiation” even as he “lacked the self-discipline, the rhetorical precision, the self-control, and the liberal learning to be a true statesman.” Faults and all, he stood above his enemies, who deploy “a new Manichean racialism,” flirtation with neo-Marxist socialism, and the absurd claim that human beings can will their own ‘gender identity’ into an inane amalgam of clowning and malice—all at a time when China, Russia, Iran, and even North Korea openly threaten the country with destruction.

    “Let us return to the heights,” Mahoney writes, not a moment too soon. (“No complications there,” de Gaulle once said.) “Cicero was indisputably right that magnanimity tempered by moderation—noble statesmanship informed by liberal learning, applied political philosophy, and high prudence—is among the best ways of life available to human beings,” along with the lives of philosophic inquiry and religious fidelity. “The choice is ours.”

     

     

     

     

    Note

    1. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher of course confronted Soviet communism, but they were too young to have attained office in time to oppose the Axis Powers. One exception to Mahoney’s claim is Harry Truman.
    2. Perhaps not quite so. See Seneca’s essay, “On Clemency.”
    3. For the best survey of de Gaulle’s thought, see Daniel J. Mahoney: XXXX
    4. As Mahoney sees: “Perhaps only Washington rivals him for the austerity, the seeming inaccessibility, of he man behind the public persona,” sharing with de Gaulle “a stoicism, a recititude, that is all too rare in a democratic age,” even if Washington did keep better control of his temper, in good Stoic fashion. For my own part, I read all of de Gaulle’s published writings before reading more than a few of Washington’s. When I came to study Washington’s collected works, some years later, my first impression was “This man is just like de Gaulle.”
    5. It is noteworthy that de Gaulle’s Christianity comes to light almost exclusively in his private life. His books and speeches bear hardly a trace of it, beyond recognition of Christianity as a central element of French and European civilization. Part of this reticence may be due to de Gaulle’s understanding of the longstanding, sharp divide between Christians and secularists in France, the country he wanted to unite. It may be for this reason that he refused to exacerbate old factions.

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Seneca on Anger: A Second Look

    August 16, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Seneca: “To Novatus on Anger.” In Moral and Political Essays. John M. Cooper and J.F. Procopé, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

     

    Seneca’s older brother has asked “how anger can be alleviated,” and Seneca agrees that it should be, as anger is “the most hideous and frenzied of all emotions,” indeed “utterly inhuman” (I.i.1). Anger “most resembles those ruins which crash into pieces over what they have crushed” (I.i.2). “No plague has cost the human race more,” having emptied cities of human life.” (I.ii.1). “Look upon gathered throngs put to the sword, on the military sent in to butcher the populace en masse, on whole peoples condemned to death in an indiscriminate devastation” (I.ii.1). Thus, Seneca’s first way of alleviating anger is to remind his brother how ugly and destructive its results can be.

    Anger is a distinctively human passion. Human beings become angry because, as Aristotle observes, want to “pay back pain” (I.ii.3). “Wild animals,” Seneca observes, “are angered without being provoked by wrong and without aiming to inflict punishment or pain on others”; they may be frenzied, ferocious, and aggressive, but never angry, strictly speaking (I.iii.3). Only human beings become morally enraged because only human beings reason. “Anger may be the enemy of reason. It cannot, at the same time, come into being except where there is a place for reason.” (I.iii.3). Reason discovers ‘should’ and ‘should not,’ and indeed makes them thinkable. Animals never get that far.

    Does anger accord with nature? No: “What is milder than man, when he is in his right mind? But what is crueler than anger?” (I.v.2). “Human life rests upon kindnesses and concord; bound together, not by terror but by love reciprocated, it becomes a bond of mutual assistance”; anger, however, is “greedy for punishment” (I.v.3). True, punishment is “sometimes necessary,” but it should be inflicted “without anger” and aided by reason (I.vi.1). (Centuries later, John Locke would advise fathers to spank their sons, but calmly. In this, Locke followed Seneca.) Even capital punishment need not be done in anger, as “no one should be put to death save he whose death will benefit even himself” (I.vi.3). Punish not because you enjoy punishing; punish to make the miscreant “an example to all” (I.vi.4). “At least by their death they can serve the public good!” (I.vi.4).

    Seneca criticizes Aristotle’s treatment of anger in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle would “moderate anger, not remove it,” on the grounds that moderate anger “rouses and spurs the mind,” inspiring the soul with courage (I.vii.1). Seneca will have none of that. Anger isn’t natural at all, he argues; it is a deformation of reason. Aristotle proposes something that’s dangerously difficult: “It is easier to admit the forces of ruin than to govern them” (I.vii.2). Further, reason rules only “so long as it remains isolated from the affections,” not “mixed and contaminated with them” (I.vii.3). The passions or affections may be controlled when they first arise, but soon “they sweep us on with a force of their own and allow no turning back,” turning reason into their servant—the guide and scout of the passions, as Hobbes puts it (I.vii.4). Better to practice ‘forward defense,’ stopping the enemy at the frontier. If anger grows strong, reason cannot limit it; if, on the contrary, anger is weaker than reason, then “reason can do without it,” being “sufficient by itself for getting things done,” with “no need for a weaker ally” to screw its courage to the sticking post (I.viii.5). “Virtue needs no vice to assist it; it suffices for itself” (I.ix.1). Aristotle is wrong, by definition: If anger “listens to reason and follows where led, it is no longer anger, the hallmark of which is willful disobedience” to reason, a going-beyond of what reason justly prescribes (I.ix.2). Anger is “as useless a subordinate in the soul as a soldier who ignores the signal for retreat” (I.ix.2). Moderate passion “means simply moderate evil” (I.x.4).

    What, then, does courage consist of, if not of moderated anger? “The surest courage is to look around long and hard, to govern oneself, to move slowly and deliberately forward” (I.xi.8). Courage is a form of self-rule; in a human being, self-rule is the rule of reason, pure and simple. “The good man will do his duty, undismayed and undaunted, and he will do what is worthy of a good man without doing anything unworthy of a man” (I.xii.2). Anything less signifies “a weak mind, not a devoted one,” and indeed to be too eager to punish means you are unfit to punish—little better, maybe worse, than the one you want to punish (I.xii.5). “Reason itself is enough not merely for foresight but for action” (I.xvii.2).

    Why would a good man become angry with wrongdoers? They did wrong out of error, and don’t we all? “How much more humane to show a mild, paternal spirit, not harrying those who do wrong, but calling them back” (I.xiv.3). Chastisement, yes; anger, no. It should be remarked that Seneca mixes no tenderness with his justice, given that tenderness, too, is a passion. One may well need to amputate a limb; what one doesn’t need, what would be irrational to feel, is hating the limb as you amputate it. “We put down mad dogs; we kill the wild, untamed ox; we use the knife on sick sheep to stop their inflecting the flock; we destroy abnormal offspring at birth; children, too, if they are born weak or deformed, we drown. Yet this is not the work of anger, but of reason—to separate the sound from the worthless” (I.xv.2). And in fact we should amputate or kill anger in our souls, as it is “a misdemeanor of the soul” (I.xvi.1). “Killing is sometimes the best form of compassion,” if compassion is understood less as a passion, more as rational mercy (I.xvi.4).

    Passions waver, waxing and waning. Reason hold steady, so long as it makes no concession to passion. “Having judged that something should be done, it sticks to its judgment” because “it will find nothing better than itself into which it might change” (I.xvii.3). Like all the passions, anger is strong while it lasts, but it lacks “staying-power” (I.xvii.4). Because it can’t hold steady, anger rushes to judgment; because it does hold steady, reason takes its time. Like a wise judge, it takes the time to hear both sides of the case, “then demands a further adjournment to give itself room to tease out the truth” (I.xviii.1). While anger flames up at “irrelevant trifles,” reason “considers nothing save the matter at issue” (I.xviii.2). “Even if the truth is put before its eyes,” anger “fondly defends its error” (I.xviii.2); “it rages at truth itself, if truth appears to conflict with its wishes” (Ixix.1). 

    “Reason does none of this. Silently and serenely, if the need arises, it obliterates entire households; families that are a plague to the commonwealth it destroys, wives, children, and all; it tears down their roofs and levels them to the ground; the very names of foes to liberty it extirpates”—all “without gnashing its teeth or shaking its head or acting in any way improperly for a judge whose countenance should be at its calmest and most composed as he pronounces on matters of importance” (I.xix.2). Since Rousseau, such calmness in severity has been judged inhuman; since Christianity, it has been judged to be reserved only for God, since Christianity holds the passions always too powerful for reason to master. None of ‘the ancients’ better shows the distance between himself and ‘the moderns’ as Seneca.

    Nonetheless, Senecan justice never precludes mercy. The man of reason “often releases a miscreant of proven guilt, if the man’s repentance gives good grounds for hope” (I.xix.5). After all, criminal action stems from error; correct the error and you are no longer criminal. For this reason, the man of reason might punish “a major crime less severely than a minor one, if the one is merely a lapse and not an expression of ingrained cruelty, while the other conceals a secret, hidden and hardened craftiness” (I.xix.6). In this, as Seneca himself remarks, Seneca follows Plato.

    Angry persons intend to terrorize. Don’t be impressed. “Their noise is great and threatening, the mind within terror-struck” (I.xx.5). That is, the angry are the ones gripped by fear, which their anger serves to conceal. They use their anger when they should be using their reason to rule their fear. If you respond as they expect, you will only initiate the same cycle of weakness in your own soul. Anger thus does not enhance but prevents magnanimity or greatness of soul.

    In sum, “there is nothing about anger, not even in the apparent extravagance of its disdain for gods and men, that is great or noble” (I.xxi.1). Achilles is weak, not strong; Homer is right to compare him to raging rivers and wild boars. One might as well call self-indulgent extravagance ‘magnificence’; avarice the token of “a great mind”; lust wide-ranging as it “castrates whole flocks of boys and braves the husband’s sword in contempt of death”; ambition grand when it demands the highest offices for itself alone (I.xxi.1-3). “Virtue alone is exalted and lofty. Nor is anything great which is not at the same time calm.” (I.xxi.4).

    Is Seneca’s critique of Aristotle fair? He overlooks or excludes some features of Aristotle’s treatment of anger. Famously, Aristotle defines each virtue as a mean between two extremes. He, too, considers gentleness a virtue, “a mean with respect to anger” (Nicomachean Ethics 1125b26)—specifically, the mean between irascibility and inirascibility or poor-spiritedness. Mindful of the kind of critique Seneca will advance, centuries later, he also considers the mean difficult to ‘hit,’ to achieve. And of course he lauds the rule of reason in the human soul. “The gentle person wishes to be calm and not led by his passion, but rather as reason may command, and to be harsh regarding the things he ought and for the requisite time” (1126a). He remarks a phenomenon Seneca overlooks, except perhaps when he mentions the calculating criminal: anger doesn’t always flare up and out. There are “bitter” people who sustain their anger for a long time “because they restrain their spirit [thumos],” in effect using reason to maintain a standing reserve of animosity against some real or imagined offense. This abuse of man’s rational capacity accounts for the irascible character.

    That is, to some extent the dispute between Aristotle and Seneca is merely verbal. Aristotle maintains that anger should be governed by reason; Seneca maintains that anger governed by reason is no longer anger. More than that, however, Seneca wants reason to purge the soul of anger altogether, a task Aristotle would likely consider impossible. For his part, Seneca replies that what Aristotle proposes is also impossible or at least extraordinarily difficult because anger so readily overpowers reason. “The downward path to vice is easy” (II.i.1). 

    What makes Seneca’s rationalist absolutism possible, livable? Given his distinction between anger and bestial ferocity, he (like Aristotle) observes that anger starts with a decision, not an impulse. True, “anger is undoubtedly set in motion by an impression received of a wrong” (II.i.3). But that impression as it were filters through the mind of the one who receives the impression. Anger “undertakes nothing on its own, but only with the mind’s approval” (II.4); “it is a voluntary fault of the mind” (II.ii.2). Our indignation may result immediately from some injury, such as physical pain or the experience of of injustice. But anger “is an emotion, which outleaps reason and drags it along” (II.iii.4). He identifies three movements of the soul, respecting anger. “The first is “involuntary, a preparation…for emotion, a kind of threat”; the second movement is “voluntary but not insistent,” a judgment that the injury inflicted upon me is morally unjustified; anger is the final stage, when the emotion ranges “out of control, wanting retribution not just ‘if it is right’ but at all costs” (II.iv.1). The first movement “is a mental jolt which we cannot escape through reason,” an ‘autonomic’ response, as modern psychologists would say. The second movement requires reasoning, a comparison of the injurious act with a standard of justice. It is the third movement that subordinates reasoning to passion, producing the emotion of anger. Emotions jumble themselves with reason, malignantly. Concurring now with Aristotle, Seneca adds that some men become “habitually ferocious,” “rejoic[ing] in human blood” (II.v.1)—irascible.

    By this definition, anger is never righteous but “sordid and narrow-minded” (II.vi.1); “at every moment” the irascible man “will see something to disapprove of” (II.vii.2). This is especially true of the wise man who succumbs to anger; his superior perception will find injustice everywhere, leaving in a perpetual condition of indignation. This is the wrong way to live. “Rejoicing and joy are the natural property of virtue” (II.vi.2) or, as Aristotle maintains, happiness is the telos of human life. “You will do better to hold, instead, that no one should be angry with error” (II.x.1).

    After all, “no one is angry with children who are too young to know the difference between things” (II.x.2). Simply “being human is more of an excuse, and a juster excuse, than being a child” since we humans are “animals prone to ailments of the mind no less than of the body, not exactly stupid or slow, but given to misusing our shrewdness, each an example of vice to the others” (II.x.3). One sees this when people gather in crowds, at the forum or the marketplace: “A gathering of wild animals is what you have here, were it not that animals are calm among themselves and refrain from biting their own kind” (III.viii.3). The wise man rids himself of anger by considering “the sheer multitude of wrongdoers” (II.x.4). Whereas the wise Heraclitus wept over humanity, failing to see that “he himself was among those to be lamented,” wise but more virtuous Democritus “was never seen in public without a smile on his face, so utterly unserious did anything that was taken seriously seem to him” (II.x.5). A wise man should recognize the rarity of men who are wise. Otherwise, melancholy and even misanthropy will be his lot. He should rather view mankind “with the kindly gaze of a doctor viewing the sick” (II.x.7).

    To those who claim that anger is useful because it “enables you to escape contempt and it frightens the wicked,” Seneca replies that a man who can back up his anger with credible threats will inspire “not only fear but hatred” (II.xi.1). That makes it “more dangerous to be feared than [to be] despised” (II.xi.1). And, of course, if you can’t back up your threats you will be despised even more. What is more, to inspire fear has no moral benefit in itself, since physical disease is also feared and has nothing good about it. Fear “impresses little minds,” men of micropsychia (II.xi.5). 

    Because there is always a point when reason can either take or lose control of the passions, it must be that none of them “are so fierce and self-willed that they cannot be tamed by training,” by habituation (II.xii.3). “Anything that the mind commands it can do,” especially if the reward is great (II.xii.3). And it is: “the unshaken calm of a happy mind” (II.xii.6).

    And such self-habituation isn’t even as difficult as it seems. “The way to blessedness is easy,” he tells his brother; “just embark on it with good auspices and with the good offices of the gods themselves” (II.xiii.2). It is instead “doing what you do,” seething with anger, that “is much more difficult”; “nothing is more toilsome than anger” and “nothing more occupied than cruelty” (II.xiii.2). “Every virtue…is easy to guard, whereas vice costs a lot to cultivate”—specifically, an endless cycle of turmoil and crime whereby the wicked are never reformed (II.xiv.3). Admittedly, “sometimes it is necessary to strike into those on whom reason has no effect,” but to do so angrily only repeats the fear-anger-fear-anger dynamic (II.xiv.1). We see this in “all those nations that are free because ferocious,” like “lions and wolves”; “they cannot obey, but neither can they command,” as “no one can govern if he cannot be governed (II.xv.4). Our exemplars shouldn’t be the supposedly ‘noble’ animal species, but the “divine cosmos, which man alone of all animals”—because he “has reason in place of impulse”—can “understand in order alone to imitate it” (II.xvi.1-2).

    And here Seneca himself imitates not only the cosmos, in good Stoic fashion, but Aristotle. “The wise an ought to strike a mean, approaching whatever calls for firm action, not with anger, but strength” (II.xviii.2).

    The remedies for anger fall into two categories. One should avoid falling into it in the first place or, failing that, refraining from doing wrong when in a state of anger. The first defense against anger is education, “to give children from the start a sound upbringing” (II.xxi.1). In early childhood, illness, physical injury, or fatigue can initiate an angry disposition, but “the most powerful factor is habit,” which “feeds the failing” (II.xx.2). Seneca recognizes that “it is hard to change a person’s nature,” since “once the elements have been mixed at birth, to alter them is out of the question” (II.xx.2). Nonetheless, a naturally hot-tempered, choleric child can be given exercise to burn off the steam (“without actually tiring themselves,” which would make them cranky); “games, too, will help,” as “pleasure in moderation relaxes and balances the mind” (II.xx.3). A phlegmatic child, who will tend not to anger but to fear (“nervousness, intractability, hopelessness, suspicion”) doesn’t need anger to rouse him but joyous activities that lift his spirits (II.xx.4). In each case, parents should take care not to tyrannize their children: “The spirit grows through freedom to act, subjection crushes it” (II.xxi.3). And they should avoid too much praise, which “generate[s] arrogance and irascibility” of spirit (II.xxi.3). “Our pupil has to be guided between the two extremes, sometimes reined in, sometimes spurred on,” never made to “undergo anything demeaning or servile” (II.xxi.4). Humility doesn’t develop through humiliation. Reward him, but only “for merit, for past achievement or future promise” (II.xxi.4). And in those games he plays, encourage him to make friends with the opponents he usually faces, “so as to give him the habit, in a contest, of wanting not to hurt, but to win” (II.xxi.5).

    Another means of preventing the development of habitual anger in your son is to “keep him far from any contact with luxury” (II.xxi.6). “Nothing does more to make people bad-tempered than a soft, comfortable education,” which disarms the soul when confronted with “the shocks of life” (II.xxi.6). “They should have their parents’ wealth before their eyes, but not at their disposal” (II.xxi.8). This goes for psychic as well as physical luxury. “If he has never been denied anything, if he always had an anxious other to wipe his tears away, if he has always been backed up against his tutor,” he will expect more from life than he deserves and, upon failing to get what he expects, will rage at the violation of his mistaken opinion of justice (II.xxi.6). He is on the way to tyranny or servility. A genuinely civil social education is indispensable. “Above all, the boy’s diet should be simple, his clothing inexpensive, his style of life like that of his peers. He will not be angry to have someone compared with him, if from the start you have put him on the same level as a lot of people.” (II.xxi.10). Such a child will be on his way to citizenship, to ruling and being ruled in turn rather than to play the master to a world of slaves.

    After childhood, habituation against anger is more difficult. Seneca recurs to his fundamental point: “The cause of bad temper is the opinion that we have been wronged”; that being so, this opinion “should not readily be trusted” by an adult (II.xxii.2). “The greatest harm comes from readiness to believe things” (II.xxiv.1)—malicious gossip or the latest conspiracy theory. Train your soul not to be “irritated by vulgar trivialities”; re-mind yourself by holding your soul above them (II.xxv.1). Since “nothing fosters bad temper more than immoderate, impatient self-indulgence,” avoid the luxury your parents should have shielded you against (II.xxv.4). Don’t become angry at inanimate things, animals, or the gods; things and animals are amoral and, as to the gods, they “neither wish to cause trouble, nor can they,” as “their nature is gentle and kindly, as averse to wronging others as to wronging themselves” (II.xxvii.1). Don’t be foolish: “We are not the world’s reason for bringing back winter and summer” (II.xxvii.2). Natural events “follow laws of their own” and they “govern things divine” (II.xxvii.2). 

    As for our fellow humans, “good magistrates, parents, teachers and judges” have “no wish to harm us” (II.xxvii.3). If they punish us, or even if we encounter bad persons who exercise authority over us, “we should think not only of what we are suffering, but of what we have done, taking our whole life into consideration” (II.xxviii.4). If we do so, we will soon understand “that no one of us is faultless” (II.xxviii.1), a thought that “should make us more reasonable towards wrongdoers, ready to accept reproach, free of anger, at any rate, towards good men” and “above all towards the gods” (II.xxviii.4). The cosmos is not against you. You are the real problem, not it.

    To avoid anger, “the greatest enemy is delay” (II.xxix.29), the proverbial counting to ten. If someone tells you an injury has been done to you by a good man, don’t believe it; if by a bad man, don’t be surprised. “Reckon on everything, expect every thing!” (II.xxxi.4). Even good natures have their rough edges, and “there will always be something to annoy you” (II.xxxi.5). “Each of us has within himself the mentality of a monarch; he would like carte blanche for himself, but not for any opposition” (II.xxxi.3). Work on turning the monarch within into a person truly royal. “The mark of a great mind is to look down on injuries received,” exhibiting megalopsychia not micropsychia. “A great and noble person, like a great beast of the wild, calmly hears out the yapping of tiny dogs” (II.xxxii.3). And if the powerful abuse you, those you cannot dismiss, “it is better to dissimulate than to seek retribution,” putting on “a cheerful look,” not expecting them to reform themselves and knowing you are powerless to do so (II.xxxiii.1). Such men “hate those whom they have harmed”; provoke them no further (II.xxxiii.1). A man who had “achieved that rarest of distinctions at [the royal] court, old age,” explained this anomaly by saying he had adopted a policy of saying ‘Thank you’ to those who wronged him (II.xxxiii.2).

    If, despite your best efforts, you succumb to anger, what can a man do to alleviate it? First, recognize its power. Anger doesn’t creep up on you; “it begins at full strength” (III.i.3). Other passions draw you away from reason but anger rips you away from sanity itself. “Not even failure can weary it,” and “if the adversary has the luck to escape, it turns its teeth on itself” (III.i.5). As suggested earlier, other passions confine themselves to individuals but “anger is the one emotion that is sometimes caught by a whole community” (III.ii.2), which is why “barbarians rush haphazardly into war” (III.ii.6). Seneca repeats his criticism of Aristotle for giving anger a degree of ethical ‘standing,’ again because Aristotle underestimates its power, perhaps especially in politics.

    This is why Seneca recurs to urging Novatus to avoid anger in the first place. Consider its consequences, all of them bad, and bad because unnatural. “Nature exhorts us to love, anger to hatred; nature tells us to help anger to harm” (III.v.7). “While its indignation comes from undue self-regard, which gives it a look of spiritedness, anger is petty and mean, since no one can help being inferior to the man who he feels has despised him.,” whereas the magnanimous soul, “with its true self-awareness will not avenge, since it has not noticed the wrong done to it” (III.v.7). “There is no surer proof of greatness than to be unprovoked by anything that can possibly happen,” as tranquil as “the higher and better ordered part of the world, the part nearer the stars” (III.vi.1). 

    Still, what should you do if angered? Stop it when it first appears; make a joke of the situation; postpone any action while in its grip; exert your mind to suppress it. “If you wish to avoid bad temper, mind your own business” (III.xi.1). Tell yourself, truly, that “reason forbids it, and I have entrusted my life to reason’s governance” (III.xxv.4). It is “more satisfactory to heal a wrong than to exact retribution for it” (III.xxvii.1), as “gentleness is the only treatment for the ungentle” (III.xxvii.3). 

    The recognition of anger’s malignancy should prompt our reason to oppose rational habit to irrational habit. “All our senses in fact, must be trained to endure” frustration; “they are naturally capable of endurance, once the mind stops corrupting them” (III.xxxvi.1). The mind ceases to corrupt the senses when the rational part of the mind summons the mind “each day to give account of itself” (III.xxxvi.1); “your anger will cease or moderate itself, if it knows that each day it must come before a judge” in a case at your “own court” (III.xxxvi.2). In the end, however, “nothing will help more than a meditation on our mortality” (III.xl.2). Life is too short for bringing “turbulent confusion” upon ourselves (III.xl.4). “Fate looms above our heads, chalking up the days as they go to waste, approaching nearer and nearer” (III.xl.4). “Death is on its way, to make you all equal” (III.xliii.1).

    It’s worth knowing that Seneca’s advice may have had a salutary effect. Later on, as a provincial governor, Novatus successfully negotiated a dispute between the rabbis of Corinth and the Apostle Paul.

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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