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    Heidegger’s Consequences

    December 2, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Waller R. Newell: Tyranny and Revolution: Rousseau to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Conclusion: The Fragmented Legacy of the Philosophy of Freedom.

    Michael Millerman: Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida, Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political.  London: Arktos, 2020.

     

    Notoriously, Martin Heidegger’s philosophy had not only philosophic but political consequences. Its political consequences are more notorious than its philosophic consequences, thanks to Heidegger’s endorsement of the Nazi Party in Germany and his refusal entirely to repudiate Nazism, even after its genocidal murderousness had been fully exposed. After examining the connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics, Newell turns to his philosophic consequences as seen in the doctrines of critical theory (as urged by Jürgen Habermas), postmodernism (Michel Foucault), and hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer). Beginning not with Heidegger’s antecedents but with Heidegger himself, Michael Millerman examines a somewhat larger selection of thinkers, including Leo Strauss, who rejected Heidegger’s philosophy and politics ‘root and branch.’

    Newell observes that Habermas accepts the doctrine of historicism while rejecting Hegel’s historical teleology. There has been, and will be, no ‘end of history’ in which the longing for wisdom becomes wisdom itself. Habermas confines himself to “a formal or procedural ethic,” the “ideal speech situation,” which retains Hegel’s esteem for rationality, for “discursive coherence,” with the “practical pluralism” that allows everyone his say, so long as one follows the procedural ethic. In practice, this has “amounted to a politically moderate social-democratic stance”—albeit, rather more notoriously with the addition of an administrative state that curtails citizen self-government. The recent offshoot of Hegelianism, Critical Theory, aims at “salvag[ing] what can be useful taken away from Hegel, Kant and Marx without succumbing to their totalizing claims.” Absent a historical telos, one must ask, useful for what? Evidently, useful for the avoidance of ‘totalitarian’ tyranny but, beyond that, no clear end but an end to be constructed ad hoc as humanity putters along, freely but with political purposes that are likely to shift with whatever the ‘critiques’ of the moment discommend and commend (the latter, if only by a sort of inertia). Critical Theory’s most prominent thinker, Jürgen Habermas, expects the several “horizons” of doctrines to “fuse” into one horizon (rather like Hegel) but without the eventual permanency of an End of History. It is ruling by consensus—the “consent of the governed” phrase of the Declaration of Independence with all that pesky stuff about unalienable rights subtracted. [1]

    By contrast, Foucault’s postmodernism radicalizes the post-rationality of Nietzsche and even Heidegger, completely “uncoupling…the rational and irrational dimensions of the Philosophy of Freedom; the uncoupling of a historical dialectic from the underlying ontological premise of sheer self-origination.” If, as Foucault claims, society consists of nothing but “a field of power centers,” then all previous doctrines of political legitimacy are mere tools “by which the dominating power coerces the subordination of the others.” Although he hopes to win freedom from all of these tyrannies by encouraging “the growth of dissenting powers” to counteract all such monopolies of morality, politics, and thought, why does this lead not to liberation but simply to new arrangements of powers, with every shake of the philosophic and political kaleidoscope? If “Habermas would have concluded that Foucault’s postmodernism supplies no structure for public debate and the emergence of consensual norms from currently conflicting groups,” would Foucault reply that he wants a sort of permanent revolution (a comprehensive Trotskyism) whereby the shaking goes on forever, to no other end but freedom? Leaving us the question: Why freedom?

    Since Habermas never engaged Foucault, we cannot know what they would have said to one another. But he did engage Gadamer. Gadamer’s hermeneutical school of interpreting ‘texts’ remains even more vague than the agenda of Critical Theory, “entertain[ing] no political project,” “not even general principles of legitimacy.” Why engage ‘texts’ at all? Because Gadamer wants “liberal learning and aesthetic taste to cushions against the transmission of traditions of liberal learning and aesthetic taste, opening up havens of reflection within the prevailing horizon of technology.” (As Newell notes, in this he resembles not Hegel but Schiller.) This is a civil-social project of sorts, “relying on a renaissance of liberal education to offset the modern emphasis on economic self-interest while avoiding any revolutionary political crusades (which he had witnessed firsthand under the Third Reich).” Gadamer does borrow Heidegger’s “notion that we are always already engaged with the past and with past texts and art,” an engagement whereby they change us, and we change them, as the texts both reveal themselves to us and conceal themselves from us.

    Foucault demurs, vehemently, charging Critical Theory as Habermas conceives it too conducive to complacency, too optimistic in its hopes for gentle social and political change. Foucault goes so far as to abandon the modern state “as the most reliable and successful vehicle for achieving modern freedom both of individuals and of society as a whole.” So does his fellow postmodern, Jacques Derrida, who “called for a new global civil society of the marginalized and dispossessed” to be located beyond states’ sovereign powers. In this, he recurs to a Marxism-Leninism without the proletariat, or at least without it alone, as the revolutionary class, and without the iron laws of history that Marxists imagine will bring about communism after the modern state withers away.

    Newell rightly remarks the several attempts to combine neo-Marxism with Heideggerian existentialism. “Under the influence of Heidegger’s existential analytic of everyday life, our alienation from modern bourgeois capitalist society is expanded in meaning beyond the socioeconomic dimension stressed by orthodox Marxism to include psychological, spiritual, erotic and aesthetic varieties of alienation, nothing less than what Heidegger termed our ‘alienation from Being’ as such.” The Left needed this expansion of its political base, given the decline in numbers and power, to say nothing of the embourgeoisement, of the industrial proletariat Marx had expected to lead humanity to socialism under the guidance of the vanguard Communist Party. This had been understood as early as the 1920s by the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci—the same decade when Heidegger came to prominence. By the late 1960s, the New Left, spurred by the Freudo-Marxian Herbert Marcuse and the socialist of ‘Third Worldism,’ Frantz Fanon, were more influential among intellectuals in the democratic-republican regimes than the now moribund hacks in the Kremlin.

    Today, the most important theorist internationally among the Heideggerians is the Russian Alexander Dugin, who has “basically transferred Heidegger’s notion of the German people as the ‘people of destiny’ caught between the pincers of West and East in the 1930s, capable of making a stand for its destiny that would redeem all mankind, to the position of Russian today, which Dugin envisions as leading a revolution of ‘archaic values’ against the bourgeois world headed by the United States”—although evidently not located between the “pincers” of the United States and China. Exactly how “archaic values” comport with the Russian taste for high-tech weaponry remains as much of a question as it was for Heidegger when he looked back at the Nazis after World War II.

    Michael Millerman rather likes Dugin. Dugin “begins with” Heidegger in four ways. Heidegger’s notion of “inceptual thought,” of returning to original, pre-Socratic philosophy “seen from the end of the philosophical tradition” does in fact begin with the beginning insofar as anyone not present at the beginning can do. Second, the four thinkers he has selected for discussion—Strauss, Richard Rorty, Derrida, and Dugin—all “began their own activity as political theorists in response to the challenge of Heidegger.” Third, Socrates’ new beginning, his turn to political philosophy, embodies “the sometimes troubling relationship between philosophy and the political.” Heidegger “is perhaps the main case of that strange relationship” in the modern world. Finally, “taking all these three meanings together,” “from the standpoint of a prejudice in favor of inceptual thinking, four responses to Heidegger that begin from a recognition of his philosophical-political priority are considered, the better to grasp issues associated with the theme of the philosophical constitution of the political.” Modern politics has indeed been decisively inflected by notions derived from philosophic thought and, Millerman rightly observes, “since the beginning of the twentieth century, the rational foundations of liberal democracy have been attacked and undermined by anti-liberal philosophers.” Many previous anti-liberals had criticized liberal democracy from the religious standpoint of ‘throne and altar,’ although of course Hobbes had criticized modern republican regimes more or less avant la lettre according to his own natural-rights philosophic criteria. But the major philosophic assault did indeed begin with Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth century, his influence advancing into the twentieth and, now, beyond. Since Heidegger responded to, and radicalized, Nietzsche (as Newell has shown), Heidegger makes sense as the starting point for examining “the post-Heideggerian left and right as well as the liberal center” today, thus “bring[ing] into relief the theoretical issue of competing philosophical constitutions of the political.”

    Heidegger claims that “the major concepts from the Western philosophical tradition are historically constituted, rather than universal or timelessly true.” Millerman goes so far as to claim that Heidegger “showed how such concepts arise from finitude and history, and even from the inauthentic relationship of man to his own true self” as a historical being (emphasis added). That is, while philosophy constitutes (modern) politics and politics may well influence philosophic concepts, both of these actions are ‘historical’—that is, changeable over time and necessarily so, since Being itself is ‘historical.’ Millerman’s forthrightly admitted “prejudice” in favor of Heidegger’s inceptual thinking provides, he says, “more fundamental access to a broader spectrum of philosophical-political topographies than another starting point might.” For example, while “it is possible to reconstruct an argument for natural right as a response to Heidegger, but comparatively difficult on the basis of natural right to make sense of inceptual thinking,” the prejudice is justified. It must be remarked, however, that these are two different tasks. To make an argument for a doctrine isn’t the same thing as making sense of an opposing doctrine. To make sense of inceptual thinking “on the basis of” natural right would indeed be difficult, since the underlying assumption of the natural right teaching contradicts inceptual or historical thinking, but to make an argument for natural right in response to historicism need not, must not, take natural-right concepts as axiomatic when defending them—as indeed the term “concepts” already concedes something to the historicist principle of ‘man-as-maker.’

    Millerman recounts his own ‘beginning’ in philosophy, his road to Heidegger. He developed “a prejudice in favor of Heidegger’s inceptual thinking well before I knew what that was,” have been “interested in beginnings” and initially approaching them through “theological thought,” through the teaching of God as creator. He saw that this teaching begs the question of “the origin of the creator himself,” which might be answered, faithfully, that God’s origin simply cannot be explained or, alternatively, that God had no origin, that God is eternal. To this, an atheist will respond that if so, “why can we not say the same about the universe and save ourselves the trouble of positing God?” Millerman replies that God and the universe are “different sorts of being”: God is “not manifold, material, or extended”; the universe is. This comports with “Heidegger’s distinctions between being and beings, and between original being (“beyng”) inceptually understood and later, ‘metaphysical’ interpretations of being as ‘essence,’ ‘idea,’ ‘actuality,’ etc.”

    Moreover, the mystics’ practice of non-rational ascent to the origin of Being also interested Millerman. Eastern Orthodox spirituality, heavily influenced by neo-Platonism but rejecting Platonism’s rationalism, adopted the philosophic term, theoria, to denote the light manifested to Jesus’ disciples at the Tranfiguration; theoria lights the way to theosis, “in which one beholds God—evidently the spiritual equivalent of the philosophers’ noesis. “It has been my tendency to read theory as theosis, and hence political theory as mystical political theology. If that is an error,” he cheerfully concedes in a sort of philosophic prayer, “may it at least prove to be a fruitful one.” When he encountered Hegel he therefore took him as a rational mystic, that is, as a thinker who proceeded on a path to enlightenment, albeit without the aid of the Biblical God.

    Leo Strauss’s writings introduced him to the political, raising the question of how his “initial interest in theology, mysticism, ontology, and phenomenology” intersected with politics. It was Strauss who taught him that philosophic empiricism wedded to the principle of infinite progress not only informs much of modern politics but grounds politics on “the belief that being is irretrievably mysterious,” the future into which we are ‘progressing’ being a thing unknown. That is, much of modern rationalism has unwittingly opened itself to the rationally unknowable. This, too, built up a prejudice in favor of Heidegger’s thought. 

    Given this this bundle of similar yet disparate interests, Millerman wanted to understand the criteria for judging among several “philosophical-political topographies.” And “what would it take to displace one from a commitment to or prejudice in favor of one approach to an alternative,” e.g., to replace a commitment to Straussian natural-right teaching to Derrida’s deconstructionism? Natural right or history? Considered as a political question, the criterion might be an aversion to the Nazism espoused by Heidegger; his radical historicism did not prevent, and in some sense led him to, sympathy with Nazism. But (as Millerman doesn’t recall) Strauss himself mocked the argumentum ad Hitlerum as an insufficient criterion for philosophic or even political judgment, inasmuch as even an “insane tyrant,” as Strauss described Hitler, might have some sane notions kicking around in his crazed and vicious head—an esteem for public health, for example, limited though it was to his fellow ‘Aryans’ and malignant though it was towards everyone else.

    “Strauss wants to protect politics from both excess and lack of philosophy and to protect philosophy from political persecution and corrupting influences.” This is commendable, in Millerman’s estimation, but it doesn’t prove that natural right as opposed to historicism is true. At the same time, insofar as one philosophizes one leads a philosophic life, that is, a way of life that is not some other way. The question of the soul’s conversion or ‘turning around’ at the prompting of the love of wisdom raises the question of “sovereignty”—both the question of Socrates’ philosopher-king who rules his City in Speech and the question of undertaking a way of life, a regime of the soul, a ruling spirit that may well not be the same as the spirit which faithfully obeys the ruling Spirit of the Bible. In Millerand’s Heideggerian formulation, “Philosophical conversion effect existential transformation.” This new being, what “Heidegger sometimes names ‘Da-Seyn,'” implies that “the compelling sovereignty of the primordial refers to the fact that one’s star is the highest law.” In this beginning, this “existential conversion,” there “occurs the emergence, birth, or inception of philosophy from the chaos of one’s Dasein“—that is, from the competing and contradictory “interests” the pre-conversion human person has entertained. It should be noted that by Millerman’s own testimony his pre-conversion ‘self’ was not entirely chaotic. It featured certain homologies, albeit in the form of prejudices. He did not replace chaos with order, but what he takes to be a less comprehensive and coherent order of thinking and of soul for a more comprehensive and coherent order.

    Such an altered sovereignty within the ‘self’ “should result in the reconfiguration or reconstitution of the field of the political,” inasmuch as the philosopher is perforce a member of a political community and his thoughts about that community will change as a result of his conversion. As Newell has observed and Millerman confirms, “it is hard to say in advance precisely what that might look like in practice, particularly because Heidegger did not give many indications along these lines” about “the possible shape of ‘Da-Seyn politics.'” It might be thought that the conception of inceptual thought, with its emphasis on the seemingly infinite possibilities available at the inception of Being itself, might make any such projection more or less impossible, potentially leading to catastrophic misjudgments about, say, Nazism.

    ‘Be’ this as it may, Millerman contends that Strauss, for all his political sobriety, does not adequately address the matter of philosophic conversion. “Strauss does not describe the becoming-philosopher of the philosopher from the perspective of the philosopher: Heidegger, however, does.” This charge, however, ignores Strauss’s emphasis on Platonic political philosophy, which addresses exactly the issue of philosophic conversion, explicitly or implicitly, in (one is tempted to say) every one of the dialogues.

    At any rate, as an unconverted-to-Socratic-philosophy Heideggerian, Millerman identifies several “becomings or conversions” philosophers experience: becoming-philosopher; being-a-theorist (hypothesizing and then perceiving noetically); and becoming the bearer of an essential claim or doctrine about what one has perceived. This does not imply “static thinking”—an oxymoron in any case?—or “something stable, unchanged, pre-constituted, known, predictable, objective, and dogmatic about a single thing, called ‘the relationship’ between two pre-constituted realms”—he may well be thinking of Strauss’s distinction between the philosophic and the political, among others—but rather a historicized, ever-changing, fluid relational kaleidoscope in which what all such concepts mean “varies as a function of the transformative potentials of inquiry.” Here, he avails himself of Foucault’s distinction between “truth,” a simple act of knowledge possessed by the knower, and “spirituality,” which takes the possession of knowledge to transform the knower. “Philosophy,” in Millerman’s estimation, “aims at knowing the nature of the political” but nature itself is historical, ever-transforming and ever-transformative. “Regimes of political life and regimes of political thought and theory can be traced back to the ‘shelterings’ or existential embodiments and elaborations, of these ‘grantings,’ or conversion-encounters”—encounters, that is, in which Being reveals or grants access to itself, as a transforming and transformative agent. In this way, Heidegger takes philosophic conversion to be an analogue to Christian religious conversion. As the Apostle Paul avers that his old ‘self’ is crucified with Christ, that “not I but Christ liveth in me,” so too the Heideggerian convert crucifies his ‘I,’ his “individual subjectivity” and yet opens himself to the revelation of Being and is transformed by it from Dasein, the being who questions, to Da-seyn, a reborn being. Da means “localization,” within oneself; Seyn means the revelation of some hitherto concealed aspect of Being, in time and not ‘for all time,’ since both Being and the being granted noesis of Being change over time. Indeed, as a result of the revelation both the being and Being are changed by their encounter with one another.

    Since, as Millerman remarks, Heidegger never wrote a Republic or a Laws, and indeed wrote no dialogues at all—as Newell says, he deploys little if any irony, unlike Plato’s Socrates— since he “presents his profound meditations on being and truth directly,” his directly expressed “philosophy of resoluteness and German rebirth” has made many observers understandably nervous about his “involvement” with the Nazi Party. Some try an equally direct tactic, cutting the Gordian Knot by either by dismissing Heidegger’s philosophy as self-contradictory or by resolving the supposed contradiction by treating his Nazism as epiphenomenal. The Straussian Harry V. Jaffa argues that to say all truth is relative to a time is to make a universal and atemporal and therefore self-contradictory claim. Millerman objects that while this argument refutes any facile relativism it “fails to deal” with Heidegger’s notion of “being as time.” (While this may be true, Heidegger’s claim itself requires some convincing evidence that being is time, as distinguished from the evidence that time is one aspect of being.) The Nazi deniers, on the other hand, either sacrifice “the claims of theory to the exigencies of practice” or transfigure “practice in theory’s all-consuming fire.”

    The latter, theory-dominated defenders of Heidegger have been convinced that “key concepts of the philosophic tradition have been destabilized and uprooted in Heidegger’s writings, revealing them as unauthentic incrustations formed over a long-forgotten original experience.” Being is temporality. While the first philosophers, the pre-Socratics, “underwent a fundamental experience of being as emergence and concealment,” Plato and subsequent philosophers overemphasized what had emerged at the expense of considering what remained concealed, setting forth Being as if what is visible to the eye and to the ‘mind’s eye’—nature and ideas, “presence”—as if it were Being tout court. Platonism and subsequent philosophies “forgot” the original experience of Being. Owing to this crucial misunderstanding, “Being withdraws itself from constant presence into concealment” and, in doing so, brings on the modern attempt to conquer what remains visible by the means of modern science. But this means nihilism, the attempt to dominate all Being. At the same time, nihilism may produce a reaction against itself, “another inception of philosophy from out of its most original and concealed wellsprings,” an eschewal of ‘Platonism’ in the broadest sense in favor of not a simple return to the pre-Socratics—philosophy has experienced Socrates, since then—but to the Heideggerian transformation of “the human being” into Da-Seyn and the consequent “ground[ing] and shelter[ing] [of] the truth of beying amidst beings.” Some Heidegger-influenced thinkers (Derrida, Rorty) stop short of that new beginning; others (most prominently, Dugin) “leap into” it. The timid ones won’t jump, eyeing the dangerous political-historical consequences of Heidegger’s philosophic radicalism. The bold ones do jump but in a different direction, seeing that Heidegger didn’t elaborate a fully articulated political theory, one that might have prevented him from his entanglement with Nazism. This brings Dugin, for example, to “criticize Nazism as incompatible with inceptual thinking, following Heidegger’s own muted theoretical criticisms of Nazism” but unmuting them and elaborating upon them. In this, he does not abandon reason (and thus the political limits reason more than suggests) but urges human beings to “situate our self-understanding on a level that precedes the division between rationality and irrationality,” moving beyond our self-understanding of the human being as the rational animal and toward Da-Seyn, a being which “transforms our understanding of reason.” With Heidegger (and Nietzsche), Dugin abandons the idea of human rights, one of the many ideas or “worldviews” that “block access to a genuine grasp of our authentic existence.” But this, he insists, will lead us not to tyranny, not to the rule of unreason, the rule of an insane tyrant, but to a philosophy which is “primarily questioning,” not doctrinaire (liberal, fascist, communist). 

    If so, such a philosophy, like the philosophy of the pre-Socratics, cannot be political, except insofar as its ‘politics’ is the politics of the permanent revolution, a never-ending quest in action parallel to the never-ending questioning in thought. Millerman evidently sees this, or something like it, quoting Heidegger as writing that philosophy is both “immediately useless” and “nevertheless sovereign.” “There,” Millerman adds, “is the rub.” Philosophy rules in the sense that it has the capacity “to reconfigure other fields essentially”—to turn contemplative philosophers into nature-conquering scientists, for example—but other fields cannot reconfigure philosophy; only philosophy can reconfigure philosophy. “It is our task here to explore some of the ways in which [Heidegger’s] philosophical reflections configure or threaten to reconfigure the constitution of the political.” In this, he follows Sergey Horujy, an Eastern Orthodox thinker influenced, oddly enough, by Foucault, who supplements Heidegger’s philosophy of Being with what he calls “synergic anthropology,” or “post-humanity.” After all, if Being transforms itself, if human being transforms itself, might human being not transform itself out of its humanity altogether? “By the conclusion of this study, it will become clear that Heidegger alone is not enough.” This is the final meaning of “beginning” with Heidegger.

    Somewhat perplexingly, Millerman invokes the tarot deck as an image of political philosophy, in the sense that one ‘card’ alone will not suffice. The Strauss card, the Rorty card, the Derrida, Dugin, “and even” the Heidegger card are “spokes in the ‘wheel of tarot’ that ‘speaks’ both ‘law’ and ‘love.'” “Rota Taro Orat Tora Ator: thus the strange axiom of this study.” Strange, indeed: the phrase (itself a compound of words taken from several languages) means “The wheel [or cycle] of Tarot speaks [or teaches] the law [Torah] of Hather.” The Tarot-Torah pun associates the Book of Thoth, the Egyptian moon god and equivalent of Hermes, god of knowledge, with Biblical law. But this law isn’t God’s law, since Hather is another Egyptian deity, the goddess of love or (for the Greeks) Aphrodite. So, the Tarot teaches the law of erotic love. This is quite in keeping with the man who invented the Tarot cards (Heidegger points us to origins, so the point is fair): the Germanophiliac English mountebank, occultist, and probable Satanist, Aleister Crowley, an insatiable libertine and lifelong scoundrel. One hopes Millerand is having a bit of fun.  

    Millerman offers an overview of Heidegger’s thought, beginning with his 1925 lecture, History of the Concept of Time: A Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of History. In it, Heidegger distinguishes the natural sciences, which investigate the “domain” of nature, from the human sciences, which investigate the domain of history. (It is of course noteworthy that in this early writing Heidegger signals a ‘historicist’ orientation in so describing the human sciences.) The problem faced by both sciences is simple: “there is no guarantee that the thematized domains provide access to ‘the actual area of subject matter out of which the thematic of the sciences is first carved'”—the word “carved” signaling the assumption that the sciences are ‘made,’ that we know what we make. After all, the sciences as presented in universities may be conventional categories unrelated to “the authentic reality of history,” unable to enable us “to see history in its historicity.” What is more, there may be an “original and undivided context of subject matter” common to both sciences, which their division obscures. What is the genesis of these sciences in “pretheoretical experience”?

    Nature and history: from what did these categories originate? Human beings conceived of them at some point in time. What, then, is time? One can investigate the various conceptions of time that have prevailed in the past, but, as Heidegger says, “it is precisely the understanding of the phenomenon of time, worked out in advance, which permits us to understand earlier concepts of time.” We need to know what we’re looking for before we can go looking for it. (Is this true? One might, after all, consider the opinions about what people have called ‘time’ as those people understood the idea. That would be Socrates’ approach, which Heidegger will reject.)

    Heidegger instead points to the pre-scientific notion of time, and thus of both ‘nature’ and ‘history,’ by “an analysis of that being for whom the meaning of being is or can become a question, namely Dasein.” He surveys the discoveries of the phenomenologists, particularly Husserl. There were three basic discoveries: intentionality, “categorial intuition,” and a new conception of the a priori.

    Dasein is “intentional,” that is, self-directed toward something. I direct my attention toward a chair. Initially, I perceive the chair as an “environmental thing,” as this chair and none other; I will also perceive it as a “natural” thing, not of course in the sense that is not man-made but in the sense that it falls when lifted and released, consists of a certain material, etc. I can also perceive the chair “in its very ‘thingness,'” thinking of qualities it shares with all other material objects—materiality, extension, coloration, local mobility, and so on. And (still pre-scientifically), I can think of the chair in terms of my intentions regarding it, whether I like it or dislike it. Phenomenologists do not limit this understanding of things to material things; a thing may be a thought or an image.

    How do I know if my perceptions are true? Precisely because Dasein is an intentional being he needs to know that he cannot eat that wooden chair. This necessity leads him to think in categories of things. Phenomenologists identify three “concepts of truth”: “demonstration fulfillment,” the intuitive envisaging of a thing, seeing it in ‘the mind’s eye’; sense perception; and the fulfillment of both of these in noesis (theosis in religious thought). If I say, “this chair is yellow and upholstered,” I am saying something more than what sense perception tells me; the words “this,” “is,” and “and” register nonsensory perception, giving me the full, or at least a fuller, perception of the chair and its properties. (In this, one might observe, Heidegger tracks Hegel’s short essay, “Who Thinks Abstractly?”). What we call an ‘objective’ description of a thing is much more than what we perceive through our senses alone. Heidegger says that these “categorial forms,” which are not “made by the subject and even less something added to the real objects…actually present the entity more truly in its ‘being-in-itself.'” The pre-Socratic philosophers aimed at exactly this; phenomenology has “arriv[ed] at the form of research sought by ancient ontology,” as “scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology.” In Heidegger’s estimation, phenomenologists have returned philosophy to it origin, before the ‘Socratic turn’ toward political philosophy.

    The third basic discovery of phenomenology is its new understanding of the a priori, the structure of knowing in the subject, in the one who knows. This is not necessarily ‘subjective’ in sense of biased, emotive, partial. Rather, “a sense of being is presupposed in the notion of the a priori,” quite apart from the philosophical doctrines (most notably those of Plato) which have attempted to explain being. Philosophers want to know what ‘being’ means; it is in this question, this quest, that what’s now called ‘ontology’ arises, and this quest can be renewed only if philosophers recover that original notion, now buried beneath philosophers’ doctrines. Dasein is the entity that questions; our own being even questions itself. What is our own ‘a priori’?

    Heidegger continues this quest in his best-known book, Being and Time. There, Heidegger seeks to clarify what being means by interrogating “the privileged being, Dasein,” the one which, “in its being is concerned about its being.” He addresses this interrogation on two levels, the “ontic” and “existentiell,” which consists of particular cases, and the “ontological” and “existential,” which concern the constitutive structures of Dasein. Ontically, Dasein’s “essence lies…in the fact that in each instance it has to be its being as its own”; each individual Dasein has potential beings. Each individual “can show itself to itself on its own terms.” But these terms typically find themselves obscured by entanglement in the world and its readymade categories, which tempt the individual to “interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light.” An additional layer of obscurity comes from tradition, which Dasein often accepts as a set of givens, instead of seeking “the original ‘wellsprings’ out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn.” 

    Heidegger presents two parts of a “preparatory analysis” of Dasein. Dasein is in the world. What is “being-in-the-world”? He argues that this is a “unified phenomenon,” not a dichotomous ‘me’ separate from a world ‘out there.’ Dasein is in the world. I encounter the world beyond my own body as a set of “useful items,” a status that makes them meaningful to me. I don’t ‘add’ their usefulness to them; they are intrinsically useful to me, related to me, relevant to me. Dasein is the only being which has no utility; the world Dasein finds useful is thus crucially related to “Dasein’s self-understanding.” If Dasein fails to understand itself in relation to the world it will misuse the world. This is the basis of Heidegger’s critique of modern technology.

    There is also a ‘Who’ of Dasein, its relation to other Dasein-beings as part of the world. “Dasein is essentially being-with” other Dasein-beings; we alienate ourselves from them if we pass one another by, treat one another with indifference, as ‘theys.’ This is the basis of Heidegger’s critique of both modern democracy, which “flattens” other individuals as if we knew them, and of modern bureaucracy, which claims to make everyone manageable, robbing each of his responsibility for himself. Such a relationship is “inauthentic.” 

    To overcome these deficits, to reach self-understanding, Dasein can draw upon its ability to introspect. If we do so, we sense that we have been “thrown” into the world, but we can become “attuned” to it. We can also come to the condition of “understanding,” that is, seeing ourselves as beings capable of “being-possible.” Dasein “is always being projected,” always exploring multiple possibilities for itself. Among such projections are political regimes; a people, a group of ‘who’s,’ has several to choose from. In Heidegger’s words, “Only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless,” authentic or inauthentic, choosing among the ready-to-hand things that can serve the purposes “projected in understanding.” “Interpretation” of the world makes this understanding explicit. I am in the world, but I am also constantly ‘thinking ahead,’ weighing my own possibilities. Care is integral to Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

    Constantly, but not forever. Dasein is limited by death, by the fact that someday I will no longer ‘be here.’ We are thrown into the world, then eventually thrown out of it. I should therefore anticipate death as an act of self-knowledge, not flee from my mortality, the non-being intrinsic to my being, into “the everydayness of entanglement and the they.” This is what links Heidegger to what Newell calls the philosophy of freedom—in Heidegger’s case, freedom from everydayness and from indifference to other Dasein-beings. Freedom is resoluteness. “Upon what does Dasein resolve itself in its resoluteness? To what should it resolve itself?” he asks. “Only the resolution itself can answer this,” in the concrete situation Dasein finds itself at the moment it resolves. Only in confronting its own finitude in having been born and eventually to die, in its thrownness, can Dasein resolve itself “authentically.” This is Dasein’s “historicity”; “Dasein is existentially historical.” It chooses its “fate.”

    Being and Time is incomplete, lacking the projected analysis of time itself in relation to being. Millerman accordingly turns to Heidegger’s later writings, beginning with his 1941 lecture, “Basic Concepts.” Elaborating on his account of historicity, Heidegger explains that history vulgarly understood defines old and new superficially, by the time of its appearance. Yet what seems new, what is ‘new to us,’ may be old; only its revelation may be new. More, as Heidegger puts it, “The earliest…can also be the first according to rank and wealth, according to the originality and bindingness for our history and impending historical decisions.” He calls such phenomena “the incipient,” and they carry with them a “Call,” a beckoning to us, insofar as we have wandered from this architectonic beginning. For Europeans, the inquiries of the pre-Socratic Greeks—philosophers and poets—provided this archē. “The ‘earliest’ is accessible to us when we are ‘transported into the essential’ by being called back to our ownmost relation to being, out of our everyday falling prey to beings in the world.” This is at far remove from mere antiquarian curiosity about ‘the ancients.’ Heidegger writes, “The measure of whether remembrance of the inception is genuine can never be determined from an interest in reviving classical antiquity but only from a resolve to attain and essential knowledge that holds for what it to come.” The essential past, and the essential, architectonic past alone, deserves to be carried into the future, as the authentic, inceptual thinker experiences “being-embraced-into the ‘essence’ of the ground,” thus “standing in an abode laid out be being itself.

    To convey something of the radical character of his project, Heidegger invents some novel vocabulary. Being conceived inceptually becomes “beyng”—an appropriately more archaic spelling. The Dasein who so conceives beyng becomes “Da-Sein” or even “Da-Seyn,” to “mark that he is no longer dealing with an analytic of the given Dasein, but rather with something to be earned in a fundamental ontological transformation.” 

    In his later work, Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), Heidegger provides an overview of his project, careful to describe it not as a system (which would smack of Hegelian rationalism) but a “conjuncture” consisting of six junctures. They are: “the resonating”; “interplay”; “the leap”; “the grounding”; “the futural thinkers”; and the “Last God.” The resonating and the interplay prepare for the leap; grounding, futural thought and thinkers, and the Last God follow from the leap. 

    What resonates with us today is the crisis of modernity. In this age, “in which humans dominate beings as objects,” in which beyng has concealed itself from us so thoroughly, our alienation has become so acute that we have been unwittingly prepared for a new revelation of beyng, one comparable to the architectonic revelation experienced by the preSocratic Greeks. Science means knowledge, but modern science has become so entangled with the attempt to conquer nature that it has buried the true meaning of science, which is knowledge—specifically, the quest for the knowledge of beyng, not the chasing after profit that has made modern science a sort of “business establishment,” ensconced in universities that subsist on corporate and government grants, all aimed at progress toward the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate. Millerman rightly observes that Heidegger’s remarks here “are not insignificant for an understanding of the fields of political philosophy and political science,” themselves inhabiting ‘departments’ in ‘the university system.’ Beyng has abandoned us; hence our alienation, our foreignness to the roots of our own being as Dasein.

    By the “interplay,” Heidegger means the history of metaphysics, that is, the wrong turn taken by Plato and all subsequent philosophers until Heidegger, who intends to overcome metaphysics “out of its ground” by reviving the question of being on the inceptual level, recovering “a primordial sense of being,” “confronting and passing beyond Platonism.” By Platonism, Heidegger means the interpretation of beings in terms of the Idea, “the ‘constant presence’ that makes a thing a thing.” For Plato, the Idea is “the most beingful being”; among the many ideas, the supreme idea is the idea of the good.” Heidegger rejoins: Plato’s “questioning asks only about beings and their beingness” and therefore “can never detach itself from beings and strike up against beyng itself.” For Plato, beings and being are visible, the ideas visible to the mind’s eye. But beyng conceals itself (rather like the Biblical God, one must note). 

    “The interplay prepares the decision to leap.” Why a “leap”? Because to abandon the visible, the rational, the noetically perceptible conceived ‘ideationally,’ takes daring. It takes daring because we do not, and cannot, see what we are leaping into. The leap, necessitated by our crisis, is a leap of faith, not the rational philosophic ascent from the ‘Cave’ of a given regime’s opinions and customs described by Plato’s Socrates. 

    Once we have made that leap, Heidegger avers, the human becomes Da-sein, “the site for the grounding, preservation, and stewardship of beyng.” In the stage of the grounding, Da-Sein is beyond humanity, the “highest possibility” human beings can attain, a condition of life which can endure “the truth of beyng,” first and foremost human mortality, the very opposite of Plato’s eternal ideas or the Bible’s promise of eternal life. The “future ones,” the “futural thinkers,” are the few “who linger in what is most questionworthy.” Concurring with Nietzsche’s judgment that the Biblical God is dead, Heidegger plays off Nietzsche’s satirical portrait of the Last Man, positing the “Last God” as the god of the futural thinkers, “the other beginning of the immeasurable possibilities of our history.” The Last God “awaits the grounding of the truth of beyng and thus awaits the leap of the human being into Da-Sein.”

    Why is this good? Heidegger claims that “being itself has a history, or ‘is’ as history.” “The history of Being is something is something essential to Being itself,” not “a product of human thought, but as it were the producer of human thought about being.” In this, Heidegger recalls not Platonism but the thought of Heraclitus, for whom ‘everything flows,” for whom nothing is eternal except change itself. “Heidegger tries to let Being speak though him,” regarding “his speaking as not his own, but as Being’s speaking in him”—rather as a Biblical prophet understands the work of the Holy Spirit. If Heraclitus is the Moses of Being, Heidegger is the vessel of “Being’s second beginning,” its second coming-into-view. Beyng originates Being, Being the beings (including ideas). “What must be noticed” by the Heideggerian ‘archaeologist’ is that Beyng and all that flows from it “has a history,” and (therefore) “truth, too has a history, inseparable from the history of Beyng.” Truth always changes, along with Beyng; truth must be “wrested from” self-concealing Beyng. The good for Da-Sein, the being that questions Being, is Da-Seyn, the manifestation of Beyng in Da-Sein. This is a historical event, “a movement, an essential occurrence.” ‘The good’ is no idea but that which “lends to the knower the power of knowing”—knowing in what once again must be described as a quasi-Biblical sense of intimacy, union, and transformation. 

    According to Millerman, Leo Strauss gets it all wrong. In addressing Plato, Heidegger considers the Theaetetus and the Sophist, but Strauss insists on including the Statesman. “What does it mean to say that the ‘statesman’ belongs to the study of philosophy? For Strauss, it would seem to mean that the horizon that opens up the question of Being is fundamentally the political horizon: the question of Being passes through or is raised on the basis of the question of the city, i.e., of law.” But Heidegger regards the ‘cave’ of political law and custom to be “the philosophic tradition itself, rather than the political cave.” Indeed he does, but Strauss does in fact understand that the “philosophic tradition” has become partially integrated into modern politics. To ignore this is to allow oneself to contend, as Millerman does, that “Strauss’s treatment in his book on natural right [Natural Right and History] does not rise to the level of philosophical analysis.” If Millerman’s Heidegger rises through to the level of philosophical analysis by his critique of the philosophic tradition, and Strauss also offers a critique of the philosophic tradition, albeit one that sharply differs from Heidegger’s, then Strauss at least might be philosophizing, too.

    Millerman observes that Strauss centers philosophic inquiry on the distinction between phenomena that are natural and phenomena that are conventional. “Heidegger would retort, or would have grounds to retort, that the very concept of ‘nature’ is already ‘historical’ or already an interpretation of the more fundamental ‘event,’ occurrence, or happening (unfolding, unfurling, temporalizing) of ‘Beyng.'” Yes, he would so retort, but at this level the retort is mere assertion. Straussian political philosophy looks first at the forms of political life, working up from them Socratically, by showing the contradictions of the legal and customary assertions regime partisans make about the beings they suppose lend the regime its authority—typically, the gods. Finding such claims dubious, the Socratic philosopher only then considers what Strauss calls the “natural articulation” of the whole, the cosmos that has arisen out of “the roots out of which the completed whole…has grown.” He attends to the forms, the results of change, the ‘looks’ of things. The roots of things, which Heidegger so ardently seeks, are highly unlikely ever to be discovered; hence the ‘Socratic turn’ away from philosophy that attempted to discover those roots by observing the cosmos directly to political philosophy. Millerman quite rightly quotes Strauss’s remark in The City and Man: “Socrates conceived of his turn to the ‘what is’ questions as a turn, or a return, to sanity, to ‘commonsense,’ as refuge from the stupefying study of the mysterious and ‘hidden’ roots of the whole.” But in claiming that this turn is “subphilosophical” because “it fails to respond adequately to Heidegger’s movement beyond Plato and the ideas to the truth of beyng” equates political philosophy with “the political rhetoric needed to serve philosophy’s interests.” But is it only that?

    Strauss considers political philosophy to be immoderate in its quest but measured in its expectations—zetetic or skeptical, not assertoric. To attempt to uncover the roots, the origins of nature, is precisely to take a sort of leap of faith; it hopes for certainty without claiming to know exactly what certainty it will find, while at the same time asserting that what it will find is historical, not eternal. Millerman claims that “Strauss regards classic natural right as precisely ‘political philosophy’ not because it deals with a ‘political’ topic, ‘right,’ but because in sticking to the idea, i.e., to the look, to ‘the surface of things,’ it preserves the politically necessary characteristic of moderation, lost, with disastrous political consequences, when one’s emphasis shifts ‘beyond being’ to the ‘roots.'” Whereas “Heidegger regards the idea-interpretation of Beyng as fatefully, philosophically erroneous,” Strauss “regards it as the correct and prudently deliberate marking of the boundary between the study of the part (being/idea) and the study of the whole (beyond being), straddling the boundary between the political or the moderate and the philosophical, which exceeds the immoderate.” Millerman dislikes this because “at most,” Strauss’s “‘refutation’ of Heidegger is the…’refutation’ on the plane of political philosophy.” But it clearly is not, since Strauss in effect challenges Heidegger to prove that ‘Beyng’ is what he says it is. Heidegger asserts that Beyng is historical. Does Strauss really fail to address this question?

    At this point, one must turn not to Natural Right and History, which concerns itself primarily with the distinction between classic natural right and modern natural right, only introducing the modern shift to historicism near the end of the book, to what Strauss actually wrote about Heidegger, particularly in his 1956 lecture, “Existentialism.” [2]. Strauss clearly identifies the disagreement between Platonism, which contends that “pure thought, being ‘anonymous,’ transcends every dynamic context”—that is, ‘history’ or change—whereas historicism contends that “at least all concrete or profound thought essentially belongs to a concrete dynamic context.” Existentialism contends that “all principles of understanding and of action are historical, i.e., have no other ground than groundless human decision or fateful dispensation” of that decision. “There is no room for politics in Heidegger’s work, and this may well be due to the fact that the room in question is occupied by gods or the gods,” that is, by the rationally unknowable. Hitlerism is intimately connected “with the core of his philosophic thought” because the supposed “inner truth and greatness” of Nazism consisted of the existential leap from the rationally knowable whole of measured, articulated political life within a measured, articulated cosmos to the rationally unknowable origins of the cosmos, tyrannically (if incoherently) embodied in Nazism’s attempts to invoke the roots, the archaic origins, of Germanness. Strauss soberly but also philosophically regards these as “fantastic hopes.” He sees that Heidegger must assume that he lives at an “absolute moment in history,” a moment in which Beyng has revealed himself through himself. But he sees no reason to believe him.

    This doesn’t mean that existentialism has no philosophic value. It “has reminded many people that thinking is incomplete and defective if the thinking being, the thinking individual, forgets himself as what he is.” Insofar as it has done this, it has helpfully repeated “the old Socratic warning” against the nature-philosophy of the preSocratics, who could not explain themselves by their investigations of the cosmos. [3] Modern science is no better, in this regard, having “increased man’s power in ways that former men never dreamt of” yet nonetheless “absolutely incapable to tell men how to use that power.” The question of what or who I am “cannot be answered” by science, and if it cannot answer that question, it cannot tell me what the good is, what good the power won by modern science should serve. Heidegger further understands that “the inner time belonging to the pure consciousness cannot be understood if one abstracts form the fact that this time is necessarily finite and even constated by man’s mortality.” That Plato’s Socrates understands this as well as Heidegger may of course be seen in the Apology. Politically, although modern tyranny has led to disaster, the regime of liberal democracy has its own problems, and “it would be wholly unworthy of us as thinking beings not to listen to the critics of democracy even if they are enemies of democracy—provided that they are thinking men and especially great thinkers and not blustering fools” like Mussolini and Hitler.

    Strauss tellingly observes that Heidegger himself came to see difficulties in his own ‘existential’ stance. Heidegger rejected Christianity while appropriating such Christian concerns as mortality, anguish, and conscience (one might add the ‘absolute moment’ in which the mysterious God reveals Himself, the “Call” to a leap of faith). He worried that his insistence on the existential “choice” was too arbitrary. How do articulated beings arise from inarticulate Beyng? And “how can finiteness be seen as finiteness if it is not seen in the light of infinity?” Finally, does his “synthesis of Platonic ideas and the biblical God,” a synthesis “as impersonal as the Platonic ideas and as elusive as the biblical God,” really cohere, or is its brilliance more dazzling than clarifying? Heidegger’s “historical consciousness” itself amounts to an interpretation of phenomena that were interpreted quite differently by the Socrates one meets in Plato and Xenophon. It is the moderns, beginning with Machiavelli and Hobbes, who demote nature into the realm of matter in motion, rightly ruled by purposeful human beings, who prepare “historical consciousness,” which seeks to recover a sense of the noble denied by thinkers who reject nature as the standard for human conduct, which is what ‘natural right’ is. For historicists, nature has been still further demoted, the idea of nature now regarded as only one nomos or law/custom among many. For them, all of being, natural and conventional, changes constantly; change is the only ‘constant.’ For earlier historicists, this change was rational, ‘dialectical.’ Not so, for Nietzsche or Heidegger. And, in Heidegger’s estimation even Nietzsche’s will to power operates within the eternal return and therefore lacks pure historicity. For Heidegger, “the leap through which Sein is experienced is primarily the awareness-acceptance of being thrown, of finiteness, the abandonment of every thought of a railing, a support”; the eternal return is yet another mental crutch. Heidegger claims that “out of nothing every being as being comes out.” “This could remind us of the Biblical doctrine of creation,” except that “Heidegger has no place for the Creator-God.” 

    This is why Strauss repeats the Socratic turn. Plato departs from pre-Socratic nature philosophy because the stars of the cosmos are “mute riddles,” Strauss writes to Karl Löwith. [4] Modern experimental science, one might add, amounts to a mute dialectic, torturing stubbornly mute nature to compel her to reveal her secrets wordlessly, in action. This mute dialectic has indeed wrested far more truth from the cosmos than the pre-Socratics could discover by their investigations guided by reason informed by the ‘naked eye.’ But being mute, it still cannot tell us what the good is, especially since it conceives of nature as non-teleological. The philosophers of freedom have attempted to recover humanity’s moral and political bearings by substituting custom (Hume), the categorical imperative (Kant), utility (Bentham), the Absolute Spirit (Hegel), dialectical materialism (Marx), the will to power cum eternal return (Nietzsche), and now Beyng (Heidegger). Each of these attempts has resulted in a moral and political dead end. This suggests to Strauss that the overcoming of modernity cannot be overcome with “modern means” but only insofar as we understand that “we are still natural beings with natural understandings,” even as ‘the ancients’ understood themselves to be. To Löwith’s reply—that there (a) can be no return to nature because Christianity has “fundamentally modified ancient ‘naturalness'”; that (b) history is “deeply anchored” in man; and that (c) all political orders or regimes are contra naturam, Strauss observes that Socratic philosophy “is the attempt to replace opinions about the whole with genuine knowledge of the whole,” whereas for you, Löwith, “philosophy is nothing but the self-understanding or self-interpretation of man” as “historically conditioned,” dependent upon ever-changing “culture.” But “the fact that [the polis] is institutional is still not proof that it is contra naturam: some institutions assist natural tendencies.” Plato and Aristotle indicate how a “surveyable, urban, morally serious society, based on an agricultural economy, in which the gentry rule” is “the most reasonable and the most pleasing” form of life for most men, even if I, Strauss would not necessarily want to live in “such a polis,” since “for philosophers moral-political considerations are necessarily secondary” although not for that reason inconsiderable. For this reason, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle themselves preferred the Athens’ democratic regime to Sparta’s aristocratic regime. In weighing the ways of life of different political regimes against the way of life of the philosopher’s way of life, the philosopher’s personal ‘regime,’ his own rightly ordered soul, one begins to think philosophically precisely by not undertaking the leap of faith into the unknowable, in either politics or in the whole.

    Strauss remarks to Löwith that the later ‘moderns,’ beginning with Rousseau, needed to “learn to see again from Plato the problem with ‘science-politics,'” namely, that it cannot discover justice and therefore cannot fully account for human nature, which requires justice in order to survive and flourish. In reviving the pre-Socratics, Heidegger sparks the same crisis Socrates and Rousseau saw in the philosophic teachings of their times and places, illuminating once again the need for political philosophy.

    Millerman identifies Heidegger’s most cogent contemporary follower as Alexander Dugin of Russia, author of four books on the German. In Dugin’s words, “the main strategic task of the Russian people and Russian society” is the study of Heidegger as “the key to the Russian tomorrow.” For his part, Heidegger himself wrote, “The history of the earth of the future is reserved within the essence of the Russian world, an essence that has not yet been set free for itself.” How this might happen, given his prior claim that one can only philosophize adequately in ancient Greek or modern German, is difficult to assess; Millerman doesn’t try.

    Dugin understands that the impasse stems from the Westernizing and modernizing reforms of Peter the Great. All attempts to graft Western ideas and practices onto the Russian tree must fail; such attempts only engender “bizarre monstrosities,” not happy Hegelian ‘syntheses.’ From Eastern Orthodox Christianity to the Russian soil itself, the archē of Russia rejects the West—including, finally, Marxism. As Millerman puts it, “There can be no possible adequate compromise between the two poles” of East and West.

    It may seem odd that a thinker intent on establishing a uniquely Russian ground for philosophy would turn to a German thinker for guidance, but Heidegger’s insistence on returning to the archē invites this move anywhere. As in Heidegger, Dugin points to the ‘archaic’ not as something merely ‘ancient’ but a beginning; this beginning has been obscured by subsequent overlays from foreign sources. Dugin calls for a new beginning for Russian thought, one “correlated with the West in a radically opposite way like truth is correlated with deceit.” More radically, Heideggerian post-metaphysics can provide Russian thinkers with the philosophic means of uprooting the fundamental Western deceit, which is philosophy itself. Heidegger harkens back to the pre-philosophic roots of the West, to its “conception of being.” “In the Russian context,” Millerman observes, “the task is the destruction of not metaphysics, which Russia never had, but Archeomodernity”—the futile attempt to graft modernity onto Russia—in “the service of a fundamental ontology of Russia’s first beginning.”

    What do we know about the Russian archē, prior to further ‘archaeological’ inquiry? “The Russian person is always integrated into a whole and perceives himself as part of the whole,” the narod or people, Dugin teaches. The parallel to Heidegger here is the German volk. As with the Heideggerian (and in this case the National-Socialist) volk, “the Russian person exists not by himself. but through the narod.” No modern-Western ‘individualism’ can make sense for the Russian Dasein. 

    In Western religion, speaking metaphorically, the ruling sense is hearing, listening to God’s revelation. In classical Western philosophy, the ruling sense (as it were), the metaphor for knowledge, is sight, standing for the noetic insight achieved after rational inquiry. In modern philosophy, and in Machiavelli explicitly, the ruling sense is touch, which both perceives empirically and seizes, controls, shapes what it so perceives. But for Russians the ruling sense is taste; being is “so close for the Russian” that he need not have faith or reason or even experimental science. “It is not we who must study and strive toward understanding,” Dugin writes, “but rather we are to be studied and attempted to be understood.” Slavs have no philosophy and need none “because we differ principally from other Indo-European peoples in how we regard ourselves in relation to being”—intimately, with immediacy. Europeans experience being as division, dialectic, conflict, tragedy (hence Nietzsche’s tracing of the pre-philosophic West to the ‘birth of tragedy). As Heidegger shows, Western Dasein “always hangs over an abyss,” anxious about death, which it typically attempts to overcome by the will to power. In diametrical contrast with Western care and thrownness, identified by Heidegger, the Russian Dasein has no such tensions because “Russian Dasein is entirely inclusive.” Millerman worries that this might provide the foundation for a vast imperial project, which Russian history itself more than suggests, but Dugin will deny this. 

    Dugin asserts that a Russian Heideggerian would title his book not Being and Time but Being and Space. (And it is at least true that Russia is a spatially impressive place.) Time suggests mortality, but space conceived as territoriality, as ‘country,’ suggests continuity, even immortality, one that is pre-rational. This provides no ‘ground’ for imperialism, however, because each country has its own being, within its own “horizon.” Like languages, being is “local.” This notwithstanding, these various territorial beings converge “in the depths of the earth,” as each territory on the earth’s surface ‘points down’ to the earth’s core. Thus, as Millerman paraphrases it, “whereas from the perspective of logos and order, chaos”—the archaic core of being—seems “to be ir-rational, dis-order, and the opposite of what is regarded as good, from the perspective of chaos itself, chaos includes logos, rationality, and order in its bosom.” In this, too, Millerman shows, Dugin follows Heidegger exactly. In the Western sense, he writes, there is not and should not be philosophy in Russia, but the true, all-inclusive, “Russian philosophy as the philosophy of chaos” is indeed possible. Or, as Millerman elaborates, “the new beginning of chaotic philosophy in the Russian Dasein is not only the liberation of Russia for itself, but also the salvation of the West from itself.”

    In theological language, this means that in Western religion Dasein yearns for God, but “in the Russian case it is God who intends and the Russian people who are intended”; they are the new Chosen People. In accepting Christianity in the form of Russian Orthodoxy, Russians “accepted it in accordance with their inner structure.” The Russian need not think because “God thinks for him, and, what is more, he is himself a thought of God, not as a person and all the more not as individual, but as the Russian people, as the Russian church.”

    To understate the matter, this is a long way from politics as ordinarily understood. Dugin aspires to “the Seyn-Political,” which he defines as “simultaneously meta-politics and even contra-politics, since it does not raise and does not resolve any of the task and problems that politics deals with,” while simultaneously serving as the ground of politics. The Seyn-Political, then, takes the place of divine right and natural right and even historical right as (mis)understood by Western rationalists like Hegel, Marx, and Dewey, which leads to the technocratic politics of Western modernity, despised by Heidegger and Dugin alike. To take the Heideggerian “leap” into the Seyn-Political future will be to surpass time, to break free of time, and to achieve life in accordance with the archē, which exists in the past, present, and future. True, Dugin writes, to make the leap will bring on “suffering, anxiety, horror, fear, adversity and catastrophes,” but it will end in “triumph, victory, the descent to Earth of the Heavenly Jerusalem, the universal revealing of eternity and the abolition of death.” The task of “conservatism” is “to fight on the side of the coming-to-be” against the “coming-forth” of the Anti-Christ in the form of those miseries. 

    “At heart, Dugin proposes to apply to anthropology the operation that Heidegger applied to questions of being.” By aggregating “all individuals past and present,” then “abstract[ing] what is common from the aggregate, that gives us what Dugin calls “the broadest, most acceptable, well-known, and universal model of anthropological thought.” This so-to-speak horizontal move precedes a ‘vertical’ one, whereby the individual overcomes himself through his nation’s “national genius.” As already established, one national genius or “Angel” differs from another; Russians, for example, “need to be with the King, for him to rule over us.” Finally, every people, led by the Russians, will constitute the “existential City,” but many among those peoples will be excluded, inasmuch as “all those who do not philosophize at all or philosophize poorly are excluded from the projection called the existential City.” Thus, Dugin gives a vigorous nod to Plato’s ‘republic,’ after all. “Man can ‘be-with’ only with those who exist. He who exists intensively dwells fully in being-with only with those who exist as intensively. The philosopher lives alone, as though surrounded by animals, until he sees another philosopher; then Mit-Sein begins, then the politeia begins.” Millerman cites Dugin’s distinction between his own philosopher-kings and those of Socrates; in Plato’s Republic, the politeia follows ‘from above’; it is deduced from the Idea of justice. For Dugin, the existential City “is projected from below through Dasein’s authentic existence, whereby the Heideggerian leap or decision may find an affirmation from “being itself.” This affirmation is the Last God. “Man can create a political system; he is able to organize a cosmos; but by himself he will never be able to replace the Theopolis, Heavenly City, with himself and his constructs.” But “nothing guarantees the last god’s arrival,” unlike Plato’s politeia, which consists of an imitation of a noetically ‘seen’ Idea. 

    Millerman caution his readers not to jam Dugin into an ideological classification. He is neither liberal, leftist, nor fascistic. Nor is he a vulgar relativist, inasmuch as each people, with its own ‘gods,’ to be sure, nonetheless aims at truth or unconcealment. Millerman recommends “withhold[ing] judgment” on this point “until it has been better understood,” especially since Dugin himself “is exploratory, not dogmatic, on the issue of existential plurality” of nations. Zeteticism, after all, then?

    Inceptual thinking eschews Platonism, returning in a sense to pre-Socratic thought but replacing the nature-philosophy of the pre-Socratics and the creationism of the Bible with the historical archē of Being. Yet the problem remains in crucial respects just as Socrates found it. The origin of Being not only provides no serious guide to political life, to the condition of reciprocal ruling and being ruled, but offers an extraordinarily vague and indeterminate beginning for rigorous thought of any kind. The refusal of Heidegger to anticipate where his ‘leap’ would land him suggests as much. And his followers have in fact leapt into all manner of things.

     

    Note

    1. Almost predictably, when in spring 2022 the South Dakota Commission on Social Studies Standards included learning the Declaration as an important feature of the draft Standards, one of the first attempts to alter the Commission’s document was to excise the first sentences of initial sentences of the Declaration and to begin with “the consent of the governed.”
    2. Leo Strauss: “Existentialism.” Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy.  Volume 23, Number 3, Spring 1995.
    3. See also Leo Strauss: “The Problem of Socrates.” Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy.  Volume 23, Number 3, Spring 1995.
    4. Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss: “Correspondence Concerning Modernity.” Independent Journal of Philosophy. Volume IV, pp.105-115.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Mobbed by Consent

    November 18, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Note: This article was written in response to a brief excerpt from Daniel J. Mahoney’s book, Recovering Politics, Civilization and the Soul: Essays on Pierre Manent and Roger Scruton (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2022). The excerpt was published by The American Mind on November 16, 2022, the response on the same date. Reprinted with permission.

     

    Rights unfettered by natural law are also undefended by it. Most states in today’s United States periodically undertake the task of revising academic standards for their public schools. Recently, in one such exercise, a member of the commission charged with reviewing the standards for social studies moved to omit the first sentence and a half of the Declaration of Independence—all that stuff about the Laws of nature and Nature’s God, self-evident truths, and unalienable rights that governments are instituted to secure. Sounded like a violation of the separation of church and state to him. Instead of learning such unconstitutional heresies, the reformer suggested students should begin their study with the phrase, “Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.”

    Under this proposed dispensation, “consent” means assent—freedom from those bothersome constraints imposed by anyone or anything beyond the inclinations of the agreeing parties—which Daniel J. Mahoney here wittily calls “the categorical imperative of individual choice.” Kant, however, might not be amused—or, if amused, sardonically. Hardly an orthodox Christian or even a natural law man himself, even he wanted religion to live within “the limits of reason” not in accordance with the limitless scope of human desires.

    “Consent” and “choice,” redefined as desire, define much of modern “individualism,” whose non-negotiable imperative is “I want what I want.” In one sense, modern individualism fits neatly into modern democracy. “Who died and left you in charge” is a rhetorical and egalitarian question that shuts down a lot of arguments, neutralizing unwanted commands.

    Still, democracy is above all a name for a sort of regime, a ruling order: authority may no longer be allowed to come from above, but it does come at you from all sides, as the experience of high school (with or without a curriculum that includes the Declaration of Independence) emphatically teaches. What democratic egalitarianism gives—entitlement to dismiss all opinions but one’s own—it readily takes away, inhibiting any expression of opinions at variance with those around us, on pain of social ostracism. Regimes include and exclude: democracy is no different than any other in that way. So I have my rights—until I don’t.

    Rights are insecure in contemporary American democracy, because they are neither limited nor defended by the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God. Our individual agency can only withstand the assault of other people’s collective agency if each understands himself beholden to some absolute standard, rather than the mere unfettered will of the majority. 

    When rights conceived as inherent in individuals meet societies organized democratically, the result has been not rugged but harried and timid individualism, as described by Tocqueville. Overwhelmed by the loud importunities of the crowd, the intimidated individual withdraws from public engagement, the only effective means of securing rights. Against this, Tocqueville famously commends the American practice of civil association, whereby individuals form small but sturdy local organizations—clubs, churches, schools, political parties—still democratic but humanly scaled, agents of resistance against the weight of mass democracy.

    So long as federalism was respected and natural rights upheld this worked tolerably well. Self-government in civil associations and town meetings guaranteed that people argued with people they knew about things they knew about. The power of the knowing eye-roll kept most people within the bounds of common sense.

    But for a century or more, natural rights wielded by self-governing citizens active in civic associations and local governments have slowly yielded to claims of ‘historical’ rights advanced by a variety of Marxist and Marxisante thinkers. To conceive of rights as historical, evolving in accordance with vast historical forces said to be physically and even morally irresistible, is to reintroduce the ‘massifying’ and isolating effects of democracy under an increasingly centralized administrative state.

    This in turn trains citizens to hope for a defense of their rights not by themselves and their elected representatives but by the only institutions powerful enough to manage such forces—the administrative state itself and the equally bureaucratic modern corporation, often in collusion with each other and always with the increasingly fearsome resources of digital technology at their disposal. 

    Under the new regime, citizens are not really wanted Indeed, they are inconvenient. Travel down an American highway to see the proliferation of billboards touting marijuana dispensaries and online gambling. A satisfied, stupefied, and indebted populace can no longer want to declare it independence, feeling more threatened than fortified by such notions as the Laws of Nations and of Nature’s God, taking license for liberty and self-will for self-government.

    Filed Under: American Politics

    The Nature of Politics

    November 11, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Mark Blitz: Reason and Politics: The Nature of Political Phenomena. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021.

     

    This review first appeared in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 49, Number 1, Fall 2022. Reprinted with permission.

     

    Our contemporaries incline to reduce politics to subpolitical categories—race, class, gender, power. Mark Blitz resists this parade of idols, reclaiming the indispensable link between the human capacity to reason in speech and the human capacity to join with others in the task of self-government. He clearly sees the impediments which have been erected to hinder this effort; while his subtitle mentions nature, the criterion for political judgment among ‘the ancients,’ it equally mentions phenomena, a distinctly ‘modern’ locution, often used to blur or to deny the distinction between nature and convention. On the contrary, he argues, the ‘phenomena’ of political life have a nature, and “to explore the nature of political phenomena is equivalent to exploring what is reasonable about them” since the term ‘nature,’ for human beings at very least, “is the correlative of reason.” Correlation means not only relating our thoughts about things to the things themselves but relating our actions to those thoughts. Each of Blitz’s chapter titles begins with the phrase “The Nature of”: the nature of practical action, freedom and rights, power and property, virtue, what is common, and goods. In each instance, he intends to connect politics to nature by means of reason, itself the distinctive characteristic of human nature.

    By the “nature” of a thing, Blitz means “what in it we do not produce, what is common or pervasive in it, and what is essential to it.” In identifying the nature or essence of a thing we identify “what is always there that is important, not trivial, and that forms the thing’s other characteristics,” what distinguishes it from other things. What is natural is “unmade, general, and essential”; this is “what reason qua reason seeks to know,” going beyond sense impressions of particular physical things and classifying them into kinds.

    But does politics have a nature? Is political life not conventional, man-made? Not simply, or even at its core: “political life serves an understanding of what can be good, pursued by actions that are more or less just.” If “what is good and just are natural and reason can know them, politics need not and, indeed, cannot be irredeemably conventional.” This is not to say, on the other extreme, that politics is or can be entirely aligned with goodness and justice, given the stubborn persistence of “what is particular and impure” in all human life, and in all humans. Rather, “my goal is to bring out what is rational in what is contingent, or not simply rational, in us.” This goal does not encompass all of politics, given the complexity of our particularities and impurities, which vary from time to time, from place to place, interacting with other times (past and future) and other places (near and far). This is another way of saying that political life cannot achieve mathematical certainty and precision; it leaves room for “disputability in judgment and choice.” Attempts to remove disputability in judgment and choice from political life do not end well, even if firm judgments and choices must be made in every political community. Nonetheless, the inadequacy of mathematical or apodictic reasoning in approaching politics does not consign politics to the sphere of irrationality.” “The central political phenomena are speech- or opinion-laden and are thus open to becoming conceptually understood.”

    Who cares? What makes “political phenomena” worth our attention, indeed worth philosophic attention? Because our lives are diminished when we do not pay sufficient attention, as seen in opposing but complementary syndromes of the antipolitical ‘politics’ we suffer now: a passive moral relativism or lassitude on one hand and self-righteous, self-interested, impassioned self-assertion on the other. And failure to attend to human nature as manifested prevents us from intelligently addressing the potential of technology, and therefore of technologists, to alter human nature, “to reduce everything human to the molecular and mathematical, perhaps, indeed, to make us over.” Before doing that, might it not be better to understand the human nature we seek to alter in the terms in which we present that nature to one another—as social and political beings?

    Hence we need clarity of thought about political things. To achieve clarity, we need to find some sort of “initial intelligibility.” The very notion of intelligibility has attracted considerable philosophic dispute. The good news here is that the dispute is indeed considerable, thinkable. To begin this inquiry, the quest for some “indubitable or certain beginning”—Cartesian, Lockean, or some other kind—may “not be the correct starting point.” “It is not evident that certainty is the appropriate goal for truly understanding the matters we are studying.” Here, such recent thinkers as Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Leo Strauss, and Jacob Klein prove helpful in their insistence in recognizing “the importance or inevitability of beginning not from supposedly timeless yet in fact inherited concepts but, rather, from one’s own immersion in one’s own world.” Given the very sharp disagreements on the cognitive status of one’s own world seen in the writings of those thinkers, such a beginning “does not presume that thought must remain relative to one’s time and place.” Still, “the need to begin from things as we deal with them, our reliance on ordinary practical intelligibility, shows the importance of grounding all our concepts in ordinary contexts and ultimately, I will argue, in political ways of life.”

    Ways of life: this is one of the four dimensions of what Aristotle calls a politeia or regime, along with the purpose, the rulers, and the ruling “forms” or offices of the political community. Of these, Blitz has chosen the one most “near to hand,” as Heidegger would say, consisting of the “particular activities and contexts” informed by an “understanding of justice or righteousness” that gives those activities and contexts their direction. “Justice, moreover, embodies and serves an understanding of happiness, excellence, what is god, and what is appropriate.” This in turn suggests that any particular regime or way of life, “however close knit,” “cannot encapsulate experience fully,” as human beings “can observe moderation and courage” and other virtues, to say nothing of vices, “apart from the orders within which we practice them.” “This dialectic or spiral of the closedness of a way of life and openness to what is independent from it indicates the complexity of human experience, and the possibility of exploring matters theoretically.” And this in turn raises the question, and the questionability, of the opinions that prevail in a given political community, questions arising from within it, within a framework of “law and culture, or in divine writings and priestly control,” even as they point beyond it, beyond the city, the res publica, the public thing (in modernity, usually the state), and the regime that rules it, profoundly influencing the minds and hearts of its residents.”

    In order either to defend or to attack a given regime, one must take action. Therefore, “my first effort is to investigate practical activity and the place of context in understanding it,” especially “the power of opinion,” our inclination to “live our lives primarily within what we take for granted and do not explore,” our “common sense.”

    Practial actions are those taken for reasons other than knowledge, simply; they aim at knowledge “embedded in the activity itself,” requiring not only thought but experience. Practical actions are contextual, involving “the interrelations among the things to which one is attending, which are largely ordered in terms of their purpose.” “Common sense” is constituted to a great extent in naming things, thereby bringing out the relevance of things and fixing their meaning in terms of the actions for which we intend to use them. Thus “truth about much in practical affairs is not ‘certainty’ in the Cartesian, mathematical, or scientific sense.” “Meaning” itself has “two fundamental elements” intelligibility or description and evidence. With regard to intelligibility, we thereby see that the child is kicking the ball and why he is kicking it. In this sense, “a meaning is an explicable or rational fit that allows it to be intelligible,” free of self-contradiction. With regard to guidance, meaning “tells us what is important” about an action, how it affects, compels, or engages us, why we devote ourselves to it. Clearly, meaning understood as “guiding, orienting, intelligibility” connects us with opinions about “justice and goodness.” And we will want to know meaningful activities, understood as just or unjust, good or bad, interrelate in an overall regime. Because our understanding of activities and regimes seldom if ever achieves apodictic certainty, it mounts to knowledge of probabilities, of likelihoods. It might be added that what we now call ‘conspiracy theories’ or master plots amount to attempts to make the uncertain certain We would all like to be ‘in the know, for sure.’ It is part of the beginning of political wisdom not to indulge this desire too far.

    The relations among these probabilities include personal relationship. Common sense in a particular context, very much including a political regime, involves “the general sense one has of others’ trustworthiness and reliability, the character and ordinary practices one implicitly expects on which one depends in business, politics, and elsewhere.” Is this street safe for me to walk down? Can I confide in you and trust your promises? This kind of common sense constitutes the social bonds that unify the political community. frayed or severed, they cause faction, even civil war They can be reinforced or weakened by prior regime or way, especially “the religious and traditional ways…that precede civic regimes.” These habits of mind and heart, a Tocqueville calls them, provide “an implicit understanding or meaning…composed from sense of goodness and justice,” which forms the ineluctable starting point of philosophizing.”

    Mind and heart are not identical, so “a good moral education may differ from a good intellectual one.” The cultivation of the moral sense derives from our “embedded expectations” about our regime, derived from that regime, as “expressed here and now in our particular affairs” In the American regime, opinion about equality and liberty, to say nothing of the pursuit of happiness, “govern what we can say respectably”; those who intend to change the regime will attempt to re-channel what we can say respectably about those opinions. Indeed, “public discussion is increasingly governed by a presumption in favor of the identical respectability and availability of all modes of living that do not question this equal propriety,” making “proper distinctions difficult to state and defend publicly,” as such distinctions are now “seen only as assertions of power.” Even the realms of art and of intellect have been classified as “cultural ‘products,'” and thus expression of the will to power, in a sort of democratized or egalitarian deformation of Nietzsche’s thought. “This is the chief problem of our culture” now.

    The fact that the American regime has changed since the time of the American founders adds to the evidence that it, like all regimes, does not perpetuate itself. As noted, every regime retains a degree of openness to thoughts not consistent with the thoughts it commends. This is why political founding is possible in the first place. “Founding institutes a form and an end that derive from what is general,” not specific to the existing regime, “even if not simply understood.” A common source of political founds is the tension between or among various social groups, “rich and poor, above all,” which “keeps this basic awareness” of possibilities beyond the regime “alive” in the minds of citizens. Another source of such innovation is war; another is “the press of desire” for things not offered within the existing regime; still another is statesmanship, which discerns possibilities not realized with the regime. “Plato likens statesmanship to weaving, medicine, gymnastic training, piloting, architecture, and other arts,” a ruling art that weaves “the virtues of several” of the arts together, defending the existing regime but also altering it, making it more durable.” 

    Statecraft takes a ‘modern’ turn when statesmen, or would-be statesmen, turn not so much to religion or to natural right as the source of moral and political authority but to an account of the course of events, that is, to ‘history,’ as that source. Recourse to history may look to scientific discovery, novel religious revelation, or “new drives and passions,” sometimes thought to follow an orderly, rationally discernible pattern (as in Hege and Marx), sometimes following no pattern at all, arbitrary. Blitz suggests that even this might actually be understandable in terms of the ‘ancient’ understanding; for example, “perhaps we can explain the source of religion sufficiently naturally,” a point to which he will return in his later discussion of reverence. At any rate, “it is not evident that we need to account for what seems to be new in historicist terms.”

    Another form of historicism, devised by the aforementioned Heidegger, locates human historicity not in a set of laws of historical development but in “factic” life, our immersion in our “particular existence” here and now. From the fact that “we always already exist in a word of meaningful things,” as Blitz readily admits, Heidegger goes on to claim that “my possibilities are always transmitted in historically limited fashion,” one so limited by the “world” or “context” as to make us blind to anything else. (Hence, perhaps, Heidegger’s insistence that one can properly philosophize only in one of two languages Greek and—conveniently enough—German.) to this, Blitz replies that our contexts or regimes “also carry their grounds before me in a manner that detaches me from here and now (myself and us) at the same time that I am immersed in them,” that this “movement is not only horizontal or historical but vertical, too,” and always incomplete,” beckoning us “beyond finite heritage.” To be sure, “every regime limits certain possibilities,” but “it cannot do this simply; what may be good or just more generally announces itself,” over the din of the loudspeakers. This goes for individuals and also for political communities. “Heidegger’s connecting all our possibilities to a particular people rather than also to what is more cosmopolitan than (and may conflict with) my people is an important intellectual ground of his support for the Nazis. In contrast to Heidegger’s view, the ‘temporal’ properly includes the aspiration to perfection and completeness it includes what I will examine in what follows as the erotic as well as the spirited.”

    In sum, practical activity has a certain nature. It entails “the purposes and orders that form and direct what we expect”; it entails “the purposes and orders that form and direct what we expect” it extends to “the way of life in which we live” and “the character, virtues, or pious ways” the regime “promotes”; this way of life is formed by “the approach of what allows things to be good” and “the justice that seeks to achieve goods,” thereby enabling us to rank the elements of our way of life. and this way of life is never “strictly rigid,” inasmuch as “we can attempt to examine its elements and activities on their own,” that is, beyond the intellectual and moral limits of the regime.

    But is our practical activity determined by chance or some form of necessity? If not determined, by what criteria should we act? Blitz moves to a discussion of the nature of freedom and rights.

    One meaning of freedom is to be unbound, either in a good way—poised for choice and action—or in a bad way—lost, wanting direction but having none. Another meaning of freedom is to be self-directed, self-ruling. This suggests that “freedom’s openness and self-direction occur in relation to activity and thought and the intelligibility that makes these possible.” We want to know where we are freely going, and why, and to be able to sustain our freely chosen action, “not to be battered from side to side” by forces not our own. Freedom “involves self-binding,” the capacity to stay the course we have set for ourselves or to “leave the path” if and when we so choose. Isaiah Berlin’s well-known distinction between “positive” and “negative” freedom, between freedom to do something and freedom from something, must be supplemented with a teleological point: that we want our freedom to choose the actions and goods toward which we direct ourselves or are hindered in directing ourselves.

    “Another central experience of freedom is its necessity,” by which Blitz means that we cannot avoid choosing because we are human. “To be free is a necessary or essential component of what we are,” a point succinctly expressed some decades ago by Henry Kissinger, who titled one of his books the Necessity for Choice.

    In view of these observations, full exercise of our freedom may require us to submit to unfreedom. That is, in order to achieve what we freely intend to accomplish, we may well need prior restraint: if I freely choose to cross the street, please grab me if am about to step out in front of an oncoming truck, lest I never get to where I want to go; if I freely choose to learn Latin, please put me under the authority of someone who knows how to teach me. “The goods one feels, experiences, and joys are linked to the soul that masters them,” and that soul mut be ordered in a certain way, often by taking on a set of habits, in order to obtain the ends it chooses.

    Stated formally, “freedom is our movement and direction toward and unhindered immersion in accessible things, together with our movement toward and unhindered immersion in their initial and continuing intelligibility and guidance, that is, their meaning.” Politically, this means that “we must…consider goods and the common good more fully in order to grasp toward what the soul’s full movement, its direction, unencumbered readiness, and attentive binding are oriented” in terms of our public life, our regime, which after all sets many of the conditions of action.” The regime of liberal democracy, with its “free political institutions,” serves “the free and equal self-directed attempt to satisfy desire.” Hence its “liberal” or free character, featuring a government that limits itself, or rather is limited by the sovereign, self-governing people, “employing and enhancing the character I need to execute and secure my freedom, and by advancing self-government.” Freedom of religion, of speech, and of self-government generally will require a degree of unfreedom, of “excellence of speech or reason,” including some degree of the rule of reason over desire the rule of speech over force This freedom “is not limited to liberal political freedom” but also “points to liberal education.” All of this suggests that freedom rightly and comprehensively defined necessitates a way of life or regime—not necessarily a modern liberal democracy, but surely not a tyranny, ‘ancient’ or ‘modern.’

    How one understands or defines the basis of freedom will vary, and Blitz stipulates a capacious range of definitions. For the classical political philosophers, freedom means, primarily, a rightly ordered soul participating in civic rule; for the moderns, freedom means primarily freedom of thought and action, certain rights exercised in civil society within the framework of a centralized state. But freedom might also concern “not only the classic soul or the one who holds rights but also the transcendental will in Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, and Heidegger’s Dasein.” Whereas “for the classics…the abilities of soul have full or proper natural uses and objects,” the abilities of the transcendental will “are linked to what they productively shape or to that in which they are freely immersed as material to shape.” For Kant, this means “the self-effected moral ought or Idea”; for Nietzsche, creating and overcoming, for Heidegger, “fated being,” but for all of them freedom is still “poised and self-moving immersion in what is (for these thinkers) most open or available.”

    Against freedom, some thinkers claim doctrines of determinism. These may be material, historical, divine, psychological, sociobiological, or economic. One often hears such doctrines asserted regarding matters involving “criminal blame”; Tom Dooley may well hang down his head and cry, not out of guilt but out of having been buffeted by circumstances he could not have controlled. To these claims, Blitz opposes the ineluctable fact that almost always one’s actions present themselves as choices. For example, “One cannot (or cannot yet) even fully describe what happens in thought, in virtuous action, or complex emotion at the molecular level, let alone show how it determines the other.” Our judgments may be determined in some way, but “making the statement and expressing the judgment” cannot account for the meaning of the judgment, tell us whether they are right or wrong, good or bad, beautiful or ugly. “The virtuous act qua virtuous act has meaning apart from and no meaning strictly in terms of the material, which is at best a condition of but not equivalent to the motive or ground of what we must describe and approach in some other way.” David Hume’s celebrated distinction between “Is” and “Ought,” predicated on the claim that nature is only purposeless matter in motion, does not require us to convince ourselves that our manifest sense of being able to make choices has not reality. There is no sufficient reason to permit ourselves to be talked out of it.

    “Arguments to this effect are made with special force by Heidegger,” quite apart from his malign political opinions. We understand ourselves as open to being, an openness that “belongs to our temporality or finitude, the fact that we are not eternal or outside of time but always project a future, bring forward a past in doing so, and are immersed in a related present.” Our resoluteness, or decisiveness, in this moment bespeaks our freedom to take responsibility for ourselves and for our understanding of the “entities” behind, around, and before us. Heidegger “means to show that freedom from, freedom for, self-determination, self-legislation, and standing within and freely choosing good and evil are grounded in the free openness of being as he understands it.” Being itself opens itself to our choosing. In Heidegger’s words, “Determinism denies freedom, and yet by denying it, already must presuppose a certain idea of freedom,” namely, the freedom to deny freedom. “Therefore,” he continues, determinism “remains outside of freedom from the start.” Blitz concurs to some extent, writing that “because of the irrelevance for choice of believing all outcomes to be determined, current and future arguments about determinism should not affect one’s practice.” For example, when Aristotle defines distributive justice as “equal to equals and unequal to unequals,” it is “hard to see how the meaning and fact of this just distribution are caused by the power of what the material can effect or condition rather than limiting and in that sense directing the material.”

    “The fullest expression of freedom would involve recognition of and unhindered immersion, explicit directedness, and lingering movement within the fullest context, the fullest ends and intelligibility.” Such freedom can be seen in the philosophic life, in greatness of soul, and in the full (Madisonian) responsibility of the liberal statesman citizens generally exercise it in thought, in speech, and in a certain kind of learning, liberal education.

    Freedom implies motion. Motion concerns not only “physical matters” but politics, soul, and thought, all of them meaningful, purposeful. “The free movement of the soul,” for example, “is oriented to things in their meaning—what is good about them (their goodness) and our expectations about their availability, that is, how one can move or proceed toward them, how they can be distributed, and their possible independence.” To elaborate this point, Blitz turns not to Heidegger but to Plato—specifically, to Socrates’ account of erōs and thumos. Love is needy, aiming union with the beloved, but it can also be observant; that is, it may not wish “to incorporate, use, or join with “the beloved “as if it has no independence but, rather, to be together with it as the very thing it is,” to admire, to “liv[e] up to the perfection one admires and wishes to be with,” transporting the lover and uplifting him without the desire to “merely combine.” And when a lover does want to combine with the beloved, he “distinguishes the one loved from all others,” intending that a loving pair will form, in turn distinguishing themselves from all others. In this love moves from “something that seems complete to what is more complete”—a couple, a family, eventually a political community.

    For its part, “spiritedness is also a movement,” not of combining or admiring but of “separating, identifying, protecting, and, even, withdrawing”—movements regarding lovers and those persons, ideas, or things they love. We associate spiritedness with anger, pride, self-defense, “and hence with rights,” since “rights are grounded in reverence for what is inviolable in oneself.” Politically, spiritedness “defend[s] courageously what it separates if it is just and good” and attacks or defends against what seems to threaten one’s independence. If aiming at the unjust and evil, however, spiritedness may seek “dominance of oneself alone, one’s name, what one does not share.” 

    When it supports the understanding reason seeks, love “tends to see things in their wholeness,” seeing distinct things in right combination, now or in the future. When it supports understanding, spiritedness “tends to see things as recalcitrant, unyielding, perplexing single units and necessities,” inclining toward attempts “to absorb or agglomerate them into a more expansive unit or one,” as in mathematics and “the modern conquest of nature” or other forms of manipulation “When the dialectic of the movement of eros and spiritedness accompanies thought, it seeks eventually to bring them together,” with the virtue of eros being moderation, the virtue of spiritedness being courage. both are connected, or at least should be connected, to freedom, although in their vicious form they tyrannize the souls in their grip.

    Returning to the regime that justifies itself in terms of freedom, Blitz addresses the familiar notion of rights, which “we often call…our freedoms.” “A right is a deserved authority, mastery, freedom, or choice,” an “authority, ownership, mastery or freedom to dispose of or to direct.” “My right is my authority,” my deserved claim freely to direct, master, lead, or guide myself, and therefore seen in what the Declaration of Independence calls the consent of the governed. In terms of the Declaration, certain individual rights are authorities by nature primarily, rightly instantiated in human custom and in law but ordained by the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God. The “democracy” part of liberal democracy means that rights so conceived shall be equal, under law. Such rights most especially turn out to be right concerning desires everyone shares, what Locke identifies as pleasure or “the relief from unease,” that low but solid ground upon which all of us stand, even philosophers.

    Other forms of authority include parental authority, natural at least until the child reaches maturity and also an important conduit of traditional authorities including religion, class, and occupation. The ground of parental authority is “care, attention, love of one’s own, and, for a while, greater knowledge and experience.” Beyond that, the natural right/authority of consent or rational assent should prevail. A difficulty has arisen, however, with the institution of a ruling class of professional administrators, the asserted rule of the few based on “expert knowledge of ways and means” to accomplish public actions; nevertheless, under liberal democracy the many retain the authority to set the purposes administrative experts undertake to fulfill. “Indeed, the ordinary grasp of these goals may be superior to the experts’ opinions.” Still another form of authority is legitimacy, which focuses not on means or ends but on origin, whether it be monarchic or aristocratic birthright, election, or appointment.

    Natural rights imply equality of some sort, inasmuch as we see that other human beings have by nature the same power of self-direction that we enjoy. We see this most clearly when it comes to “satisfying desires,” as “such goods are most clearly equal” and “most visibly separable from the mass spirituality and otherworldliness against which modern thinkers rebelled.” But not all desires are created equal. “Securing equal individual rights as the heart of justice is coordinate with understanding goodness as what relieves unease.” Thus, “in the American world of John Locke,” “rights are not found in a mysterious world of freedom separated from ordinary human motives and facts,” as they are in the Kantian realm of noumena. But neither are they found in “mere calculation,” as argued by the early Utilitarians. rights are found in “the truth of human self-direction and inviolability.” To see that is to involve the spiritedness described by ‘the ancients’ along with desire and security—that low-but-solid preoccupation of the ‘moderns.’

    The sense that our rights are unalienable or inviolable derives from our sense of, and love for, ‘our own,’ “the experience of one’s separateness and unity.” My own includes my body, but it also includes my thoughts and emotions; even when I am “lost in thought” this “is still my being lost in thought” (emphasis added). “My own is first or primarily the experience of the movement of separation that freely directs the things and powers one masters or controls,” an “experienced movement of pushing away from or enclosing and absorbing.” Blitz identifies spiritedness as “the ground of this understanding” in nature while remarking that the development of it in individuals “differs in different regimes.” Regimes founded on natural and civic equality will incline both to emphasize the development of a strong sense of individual rights while at the same time centering citizens’ attention on the “average, universal, or equal way” of interpreting those rights, not on the noble way of interpreting them seen in man monarchies and aristocracies. This liberal but perhaps especially democratic interpretation of spiritedness “connects the self to goods, and pleasures that it is difficult to doubt.”

    Human nature being more than bodily and material, however, even in liberal democracies, “individual rights also speak to reverence for the individual” as part of the ground of equal authority. “Such reverence is the experience of attention to what is high in oneself, what gives one pause in dealing with oneself, in relation to good and what is high in them.” This in turn “speaks to the role of reason in directing our powers,” reason being both a distinctively human characteristic, and therefore ‘high,’ while also being universal in human beings as such, and therefore universal. “Rights interpret this reverence in a certain way—in an egalitarian way with egalitarian goods.” Even our passions are intellectual “in the sense that we experience them together with reason, with combining, separating, and directing.” This makes opinion “important in experiencing justice, goodness, and virtue,” and in comparing one way or set of ways to another and questioning our own ways. “Reverence belongs to the noetic passions,” that is, to the higher passions, those more likely to find guidance in reason. Rights generally “belong to the experience of honoring oneself, one’s separateness in deserving honor,” thus in spiritedness, that part of the soul that craves honor, respect. Rights “combine one’s spirited separateness as the one who asserts, wills, and chooses with the erotic movement toward excellence or perfection.”

    Excellence might aim at the sublime or the beautiful, or both. The sublime sublimates all else to the holy. In admiring someone or something holy, we mix admiration with awe and fear. By admiring the beautiful, especially in philo-sophia—the wondering love of, the eros for beautiful wisdom—the soul “lacks fear.” “The ‘holy’ is what one protects in its beauty, purity, separateness, nobility and wonder rather than simply possessing it, and this protection is then also compatible with knowing and admiring it, which is erotic.” Rights combine these two understandings of excellence, as when we become indignant over being ‘used’ and we insist on being recognized for our efforts “One sees this in Locke’s understanding of value as coming almost exclusively from human effort, not from nature, and in Hegel’s understanding of property.” There is spiritedness concealed in ‘the bourgeois,’ which may account both for his willingness to fight for his rights and his enemy’s surprise when he does so.

    Blitz identifies three “elements in instituting and securing rights.” The first is to seek the source of “one’s own authoritative self-direction and assertion” in “what deserves to be revered rather than bowing down to priest as the only guardians of the pure.” This evidently links the modern sense of rights to Protestant religion rather than to Catholicism. The second, as mentioned, is to connect rights to “meeting ordinary desires and producing ordinary pleasures,” the relief of “unease.” The third is virtue, “in particular responsibility” (As James Madison so clearly sees), responsibility “understood as protecting rights.”

    “Virtue specifies the character one needs—the human type one needs—fully to enjoy justice and goodness in a regime.” Responsibility is the liberal-democratic virtue equivalent to, but not identical with, the magnanimity, the greatness of soul, upheld by Aristotle and exemplified by so many of the heroes of antiquity. Magnanimity “is higher than responsibility but less equal,” more aristocratic, “and the good with which it deals is not a momentary resting but a kind of burgeoning and expansiveness.” Responsibility comports with liberal democracy because citizens in that regime readily expect their elected representative to ‘respond’ to their rightful demands, and typically insist that all of their fellow citizens ‘take responsibility’ for their own actions under the rule of law, whereby everyone is to be equally protected.

    Self-government, then, to be sure, but how shall one understand the responsibilities of the ‘self’? By what standards shall one judge it? Rights, yes, but with a sense of not only what an individual self is, by nature, but also of what it can become, the extent to which it can be brought to embody the most distinctively human dimensions of that nature—the end(s), the purposes(s) of that nature. Further, “this judgment involves understanding the full use of the powers” seen in the individual, “oriented to one’s way of life and, ultimately, to the true whole that any way of life, any order of justice,” any regime, “imitates” Finally, our standard of judgment involves “seeing what most fully allows the other element in one’s regime—the virtues and other ends of individuals—their natural independence.” Even in liberal democracies, founded upon natural rights which inhere in individuals, we discover the ineluctably political character of human beings.

    Blitz will continue his consideration of virtue. Before that, however, he addresses an element of politics which enables the virtuous and the unvirtuous to take actions in accordance with the standards they wish to enforce: power, something “central to any political discussion.” Power, he observes, means not only coercive force but also ability, as when we say of someone that he has outstanding intellectual powers. Such powers or abilities provide those favored by the possession of them to acquire property, thereby widening the range of their natural powers. The unequal distribution of natural powers results in unequal distribution of property. This, notoriously, leads to disputes over whether the existing distribution of property within a political community is just.

    First and often foremost, power is strength. It “involves speed and force—movement—that tends to destroy or break up (separate)” but also may “hold fast against destruction and may then reassemble or put together.” Considered as strength, power might be concentrated, as when we describe an odor as powerful; it may also be expansive, as when a river floods.

    Second, as mentioned, power is ability—for example, a hummingbird’s power of hovering. “How full the gathering of something’s ability is, moreover, is a central measure of its excellence, although not its only one.” This means that power is not necessarily a morally neutral phenomenon, since excellence in human beings obviously betokens goodness of one sort or another. And although goodness at, say, swinging a baseball bat and hitting a ball has no intrinsic moral significance, the purpose of that activity implicates us in the question of whether playing baseball is a good activity for human beings to undertake. (I once read about a recently arrived European immigrant to the United States who, upon witnessing a baseball game, warned the young men in his congregation against becoming “a crazy American runner.”)

    A distinctively human power is speech or reason. This suggests that “our powers…are not efficient causes but, rather, the defining elements in what we do, especially one we see this in the light of our perfections.” Speaking and reasoning are as central to political life, and are as much powers, as is coercive force. Both involve considerations of justice, as “proper power is a measured concentration on proper tasks or movements that allows one and others to follow their natural inclinations and, consequently, sometimes to improve their immediate inclinations,” whereas “improper force is destroying something’s form or independence, controlling and misdirecting not only its own abilities and inclination, but its unity itself.”

    Political philosophers have had a thing or two to say on this. For Hobbes and Locke, “a power is a means to what helps relieve unease or satisfy desires,” a quest that “ceaseth only in death,” as Hobbes famously contends (Leviathan, chapter 11). This move by modern political philosophers splits power “from specific abilities connected to specific forms, areas, and completions—that is, it is in line with the rejection of the idea that human nature has a telos or purpose distinct from other animal species. These philosophers advocate “moving things away from their natural inclinations and separating and putting them together as one chooses,” manipulating the control “of any motion or of things in motion as one sees fit.” The conquest of nature in an act of the human soul reconceived as a “free self,” a “calculating self” intent on self-motion and autonomy “from all claims that are not authoritatively chosen” by other human beings in contractual association with one another.

    In this, modern liberal democracy resembles “classical democracy” in being based on liberty and equality. It differs from classical democracy in its “greater denigration of pride, honor and nobility, the reduction of full virtue, the justification of the utility and not only beauty of scientific knowledge the abolition of slavery, the civic equality of women, the favoring of economic expansion the narrowing and equalizing of pleasure, the permitting of toleration, the (relative) separation of the private from the public, the existence of [political] representation, and, starting with Locke’s separation of powers, the utility of internal clash or dissent within government.” An extensive list, one deriving from the initial move, namely, the substitution of the self, which aims at its own commodious preservation, for the soul, which aims at that, but even more at honor among men and even honor before God—salvation, not mere self-preservation. What satisfies the self “is only what is for myself and my security with no independent excellence in things.” “What common ground could there be” between that and “classical nobility”? Hence Nietzsche’s rebellion against earlier modern, one that remains, however, within the framework of power, now understood as creativity, “not as making new products, but as ordering and reordering, for “treating as one’s creation what has been fated for one historically.”

    To all the moderns, Blitz rejoins that power has limits. It aims at some result, whether proper or improper. That goes both for power as strength and power as ability. This fact compels one to return to the question of telos. And thus back to virtue.

    “The question now is whether this orientation to proper use is also true of our other distinctive powers.” Each of the twelve virtues enumerated in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics “deals with the passion or good in question in a measured way: one seeks, enjoys, or deals with it in the right way, at the right time, for the right reason, with the right people, a measured by practical reason.” “Our virtuous choices and actions involve measured thought and, therefore, point to properly measured thought.” Measured though means rational thought; “human experience is inseparable from reason,” the human power which enables us to make distinctions, to consider both our ends and the means by which we intend to secure those ends. Power as strength finds its limit in (for example) exhaustion; power as ability finds its limit in nature, as when a boy figures out that he will never play first base in the majors. Both also find a limit in ends, which are rationally discernible and rationally open to question, to discernment, to making distinctions.

    Regimes set purposes and ways of life, bringing out some virtues (if bad, some vices) and pushing others into the background. The virtues fostered by ancient regimes often conduced to “noble action,” to “beautiful purposes and satisfactions.” “These satisfactions and purposes differ from the restlessness of modern desire” highlighted by Tocqueville, “fostered by the ways of life in modern regimes.” Blitz does not judge modern regimes lacking in virtue altogether. They do not admire greatness of soul, but they do admire responsibility, its equivalent “in liberal democracy.” More widely, “the liberal democratic virtues of industriousness, tolerance, and civility differ in their generality from political and military effort, piety, and aristocratic friendliness or noblesse oblige.”

    Many of the modern virtues center on property—so much so, that James Madison argues that even as we have a right in our property, we have a property in our rights. Material property “is especially interesting” to Blitz “because it is a visible place where we humanize ordinary material (most clearly the land and what grows on it), where we transform it or take it up into what is human, where we limit, rearrange, and even to some degree bring out and develop it element and give them added meaning.” Further, in order to protect property, we must engage in political life, raising questions about justice, rightful ownership.

    For the ‘ancients,’ just ownership means fitting property to nature, assigning the bigger coat to the bigger boy, the smaller coat to the smaller boy. This standard may also be seen in Locke, particularly when he addresses human relations outside of civil society, as when he argues that a people which uses more land than it needs is rightly pushed off that land by another people whose land is overpopulated, or even that one can use the land more efficiently, in a more civilized manner. “But who in practice is to judge this?” Blitz asks. Plato’s Socrates recommends the rule of the wise, but does so ironically, knowing that “the wise are not simply wise” but wise primarily in their knowledge of their own ignorance “and, consequently, would not wish to spend time distributing property (or other goods and opportunities), which they would do inadequately in any event.” The same problem arises with the rule of the virtuous, as seen in “the actual aristocracies or semi-aristocracies that have existed in fact in Great Britain and Europe.”

    A more down-to-earth justification of property roots possession in “being oneself, being one’s own”—that Madisonian property in one’s rights—or “in what one needs to be one’s own rather than in better or best use.” Everyone “wants good things for oneself, not only for the one who uses them best.” That is the kind of property right more readily secured in practice. It does so in large measure because, in defending what is my own, I quickly recognize that I must grant a reciprocal right of self-defense to others, lest they gang up on me and strip me of my possession. Liberal democracy is the modern regime that encourages that way of life, tying property to equality and establishing laws that prevent property from being seized by force. This sets reasonable limits on both property ownership and property use.

    What about the properties of bodies? “The body is not a mere physical appendage or tool, for ‘I’ feel, use, own, and occupy. This is why violations of the body are violations of the person.” The body is “soul-diffused.” As body, it requires property to “meet necessity”; as the locus of a soul, it needs to use property well, “to use virtuously.” “The experience of things that brings out their powers and properties depends on what allows these activities to occur or to be developed. This is primarily a country’s way of life, its law or justice and the understanding of what can be good to which it is directed. This is one reason why political-philosophical matters are so central.” 

    Having discussed virtues as they relate to political life, Blitz turns to “the nature of virtue” itself. “Virtue of character is an important purpose or element of political life because it is a vital way we deal with and control goods,” along with law and technical skill. What we regard as virtue or good character is inflected by our regime as a way of life embodying as it does “a view of the right way to act and behave.” The several schools of ethics today—’deontological,’ ‘consequentialist,’ and so one—emphasize a section of this more comprehensive understanding of virtues and of ethics. At the same time, no regime “can fully control the experience of its members and citizens,” much as the rulers may try. Opinions about what virtue is are susceptible of reasoned scrutiny, in and across regimes.

    Blitz divides his own effort at such scrutiny into three topics: virtue in relation to goods; virtue in relation to various regimes; and virtue in relation to morality generally “The basic experience of virtue” occurs as we live our live with other people, noticing that they, and we, are better or worse at the tasks they undertake. Children quickly form judgment of their parents’ parenting; they ‘talk back.’

    Virtues, taken together, constitute virtue, or character. Character “concerns the way one deals with goods and passions.” Aristotle argues that ethical virtue, good character, in action “constituted happiness” because virtue “enjoys and deals with what is good.” For him, “the most complete or beautiful use of our powers to enjoy the basic goods” is what happiness consists of. For moderns, and especially modern Americans, Aristotelian virtue might well be supplemented by religious virtue—faith, hope, and charity being quite different from, if not contradictory to, courage, moderation, wisdom, and justice—and by the virtues of liberal democracy, responsibility and industriousness among them. However broadly or narrowly conceived, virtue nonetheless “depends on the truth and breadth of our experience and understanding of human powers and their orientation to what exercises and engages them fully.” Children do indeed talk back, but it will take time and though and habituation to bring them to the point of consistently talking back intelligently. “Acquiring virtue and using the mind take time and are not automatic.” Parents retain their say in such matters.

    Political regimes also have their own say, in speech (persuasion) and in action (punishment). “The nature of all virtues, some more clearly than other, is that they require a political community” (emphasis added). That is because acquiring virtue and using the mind do indeed take time are not automatic, and therefore will need the support of the regime within which such cultivation takes place. Further, all of the virtues have implications for the survival and prosperity of the regime: courage “has a natural, spirited, basis” but the battlefield courage needed to defend a regime and the country it rules requires training and public support. The same goes for moderation and other virtues. A given regime will point the intellectual and affective attention of its citizens to particular kinds of virtue by directing them to and along a particular way of life. During the Cold War, the American citizen was not Soviet man; the constellation of virtues that made up the regime’s conception of virtue or character inclined the citizens of the one regime in one way, the subjects of the other regime in another, forming very different character ‘types’ within the respective populations. “Virtues are connected to different regimes for three central reasons: the understanding of justice that constitutes the regime, the basic experience of good that is involved with the regime and its virtues, and the nature of the ‘I’ and freedom coordinate with the regime.”

    With respect to morality, Blitz distinguishes it from ethical character or virtue, although it is of course related to that. Morality consists not so much in the enjoyment of goods as in “restricting one’s actions in order to benefit others but not necessarily oneself.” In this way, morality “is close to law as a command followed by punishment for disobeying the command.” Morality and law are in turn related to the virtue of justice, which concerns both the distribution of goods within the community (which may or may not coincide with my full enjoyment of them), and punishment, which may or may not be ‘for my own good.’

    One moral system influential in liberal democracies for more than a century is Kant’s. Kant grounds moral law “on the freedom of equal individuals as those who have rightful individual authority, those who deserve equal respect.” Blitz criticizes Kant, doubting that our fundamental moral convictions are self-evident and denying Kant’s claim that freedom means “the universal legislating that Kant has in mind, since any number of contradictory things could be universally legislated” (for example, prohibiting or commending theft, as Hegel remarks). Kant also tends to define pleasure “in the narrow or utilitarian sense” brought forth by his philosophic rivals in his own time. Arriving at the right moral conclusion becomes a matter of applying of a rule-based procedure as the guarantee of moral behavior. As a consequence, in political life Kantian morality tends to separate law-abidingness and legal administration “from its purpose—advancing the common good—and increasingly [towards] strict proceduralism.” Such an ethos in turn inclines toward administrative statism, a form of aristocracy or perhaps oligarchy, not toward the political rule liberal democracy attempts to cultivate in modern states. “On the whole, liberal democracy, its ground in natural right, its characteristic virtues, and its predating the absolute moral law of Kant and his successors, is a superior and less fantastic combination of proper choice, satisfaction, and each person’s inviolability.”

    Moral proceduralism thus obscures “the major question to which the virtues point,” namely, the “degree and status of their truth.” If virtues vary from one regime to another, how can we decide which, if any, really do fit the nature of things, including human nature? “What are the beautiful things or true honors, or the true fears and satisfaction?” Enter the Platonic dialogues, wherein such questions animate the interlocutors, not always leading to apodictic conclusions. “The discussions bring out the important fact that what is virtuous and what the virtuous objects are become more visible once we consider the imprecision and unclarity of any opinion we have of virtue, or our experience of it.” Aristotle does not overlook this, although moderns, perhaps intent on rivaling the certainties of religious conviction, attempt to overcome it. In failing, they frequently call morality and virtue themselves into question.

    As a result, the finest eroticism declines. In accepting uncertainty in moral judgment, the ancients leave the soul open to yearning, to striving for a perfection we cannot reach. “One cannot always merge with the beautiful, the good, and the whole of things”; “always incomplete,” we feel the presence of “greater beckoning wholes.” Even in the mild and egalitarian air of liberal democracies, “one cannot be fully responsible,” fully virtuous as we sand on the low but solid ground. A degree of acquaintance with the older philosophers may alert one to that. Otherwise, self-satisfied souls without longing will prevail, entranced with their own technical proficiencies but merely blinking at the stars. “The virtues are initially and for the most part connected to political regimes, or ways of life,” and insofar as the liberal democracies foreclose the experience of greatness of soul or the experience of humility under “divine authority” along a pious way of life, they diminish the persons they intend to protect from those they describe a overbearing aristocrats and fanatic priests.

    This leads Blitz to move from the nature of virtue to the nature of “what is common”—the res publica. To be a member of a polis, empire, feudal society, or modern state means first to be presented with certain things held to be good by the political community, second to find “equal and unequal distribution of tasks, opportunities and goods and their fit or working together, what is proper to be done, by whom.” Both of these features of political communities require “virtue and law.” “Together, the fit of tasks and opportunities to achieve certain goods constitutes what we hold in common in a way of life,” a regime which characterizes but is not the same as the political community, which could have any regime and indeed may undergo regime changes, over time. Among the “commonalities” seen in “the public thing” are organizations, endeavors, “goods that we can produce only in common” such as victory in war or in soccer or in orchestral music, public honors and, depending upon the regime, ruling offices. Commonalities shape the character of those who partake in them, making “understand[ing] virtue and why it is good” the “core issue” in Aristotelian political science.

    The regime of liberal democracy in the characteristic modern ‘public thing’ separates the state from civil society; in that regime, “economic, intellectual, artistic, and religious life is primarily private and the state regulates or tries to ensure equal opportunity but does not direct it.” This separation originates with the philosophic founder of lo stato, Machiavelli, and is elaborated by Hobbes and Locke. They replace “the classical city or political community” with exactly this “difference between state and society, and ‘states’ need not be governments; governments are not politics’ only or primary venue.” This tends to liberate the desires from moral control by governmental authorities, a move intended to unfetter the human capacity to master fortune and nature and to unfetter governments from priestly control. What binds modern states together, aside from force (which can and often does defeat the purpose of liberalism by crushing individual and civil-social enterprise), is patriotism.

    Patriotism is not the same as the public good. “My own, our own, our good, and my good differ.” As “the political love of, the political attachment to, one’s own, patriotism may well attach itself to the existing regime, but then it may not. The American revolutionaries considered themselves patriots. More, the patriot will attach himself, remain loyal to, “practices, conventions, and the current and accumulated opinions about what the justice and goodness of our way of life actually mean.” And it almost always attaches itself to the land, to our own country experienced as home. Patriotism should also be distinguished from nationalism, which in modernity typically refers to ethnic and linguistic commonalities. Blitz again points to Heidegger as the preeminent philosophic theorist of nationalism, who “thinks of authentic politics primarily in terms of the people, the political analogue to the authentic individual.” At the same time, Heidegger is an atypical nationalist, one who held “race and space” to be “significant not as physical or biological causes but as factors made meaningful when they are taken up into people’s pursuit of possibilities.”

    This obviously differs from the Americans’ understanding of “We the People” as a “self-chosen and gathered” assemblage ruling themselves by a self-designed supreme law of the land, itself under the authority of the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God. As Americans, “we are embedded in a particular country, but this embeddedness exists in a circle that opens up and out to questions of truer justice and excellence.” In this, Americans replicate by design the natural tendency of human beings to form families, which Aristotle identifies as the first form of association in which political relations occur. “Our first loving aspiration is to elevate ourselves to another, or to be together with them and then to be attached to what is joint, the child…. This first openness and loyalty, this first combining of man, woman, and child, is crucial as the ground for other kinds of openness, however much the development of the I, the separateness of the couple, or the direction of further excellence depends on one’s overall way of life.” The contemporary plans and experiments to alter the nature of human beings will “not [be] possible without goods being given up, restricted, or distorted—love, loyalty, family, and freedom in various venues—that we also need for what is higher and more complete.” That is, once the modern attempt to conquer nature extends in some systematic and effective way to individual human bodies, the material foundation of the family, bound together initially in bodily desire, likely will destroy more than it gains. “What will be restricted in our aspirations, freedom, and pride by the attempt to completely master and reform the body?”

    As his last topic, Blitz addresses the nature of goods. ‘What is good’ guides actions because it choice worthy, worth being guided by; what is more, “by their nature, goods provide a measure for actions, requiring us to consider what actions are likely to conduce to our securing them. In so acting, we develop other goods, namely, the capacities needed to secure the goods we lack. In acquiring those goods, we move toward perfecting ourselves and the conditions in which we live.”

    What about real goods acquired by bad means? Can there be a “perfect crime,” a good way of doing evil? Not really. “The perfect crime does not use our full powers, it harms others’ goods excessively, and it is unlikely to achieve the full pleasure that is one of its goals, let alone satisfy still other ends.” In contrast, “when Plato and Aristotle claim that the philosophical life is best, they mean that it uses all our human powers most completely, is oriented directly to the unchanging whole without detracting from others, and is pleasant.” And although “statesmanship is not directed to the whole simply, as philosophers seek to understand it,” a “statesman’s life or a life of ethical virtue is excellent or best” in that it is “a full if not altogether complete and pleasant use of our powers that also aids others’ excellence in a common enterprise”—as Charles de Gaulle was wont to say, a grand design.

    Why then, is the good disputed? Blitz identifies seven ways in which we interfere with our perception of it. First, ‘we moderns’ exhibit an egalitarian distaste for ranking goods and the pleasures associated with their pursuit and possession. Second, “the complexity of pleasure,” which may range from philosophic inquiry to drug-induced euphoria, “makes choice, especially common choice, difficult.” It has finally become easy to legalize and commercialize once-illegal drugs and gambling, activities inducing stupidity and indebtedness—that is to say, dependency instead of self-government—in a citizenry rendered increasingly incapable of citizenship because lacking in the virtues that make citizenship a possible way of life. “If there is no public justification for excellent or exceptional powers fully used,” if egalitarian lassitude pervades the minds and hearts of citizens, “it can be difficult for these [powers] to flourish.”

    Third, freedom and individuality are as complex and potentially confusing as pleasure. “Because we are free, we are free to ignore, reject, and make mistakes”—to misuse our reason by, among other things, failing to engage it in the task of “forming desire, spiritedness, and our passions.” “Attempts to live a life that ignores reason—drugs, alcohol, sloth—ignore our powers and fall short of satisfying them.” This makes it difficult for individuals freely “to acknowledge what is better, to and for themselves,” especially since what is good for me is never the good simply but must be adjusted to my own capacities and interests, as well as to the resources available to me, which may be scarce—a fourth source of confusing, raising as it does difficult questions of distributive justice.

    Fifth, reason entails speech, and speech can be deceptive. Speech “often allows fraud to triumph.” “The history of religious obsession and political terror makes this clear.” Opinion and sentiment are manipulable by clever persons who hold out hope, inspire fear, or demand obedience to themselves by invoking long-standing customs, Sixth, and in opposition to long-standing custom, is doubt and rebellion, which may be raised by speech but also by the “compatibility [which] exists among several activities that use our abilities and are pleasurable,” contradicting our existing way of life. As religiously minded persons have long understood, certain kind of music lead to certain kinds of dancing.

    Finally, and notoriously, notions of goodness vary from regime to regime. “In each case, our human choice begins within a form of justice, a presentation of what can be good, and our correlated characteristics.” Regimes set that framework of choice. And even within these limits, one still needs to address the problem of the imprecision of measuring and judging what good is, and what is good. “The most basic criterion is the fullest use of our powers, primarily speech or reason, but also the reasoned experience of passions and ordinary goods”; understanding the good and what is good is a “noetic and discursive” exercise performed within “a just whole,” not a matter of mere calculation at the service of passion. However, the natural standard discoverable by our reason and speech “is both advanced and complicated by one’s pride in self-direction, by spirited self-defense and protecting some level of individual inviolability and fair treatment.” As a college professor, Blitz holds out education as “the central element that makes proper choice more likely,” although it may also be likely that he does not assume that the college classroom is necessarily the best or the only place for such education.

    Such a liberal education requires leisure. We Americans “have a good degree of that,” Blitz remarks, drily. What we lack today, thanks to the egalitarianism fostered by civil-social democracy, is a sense of excellence, except when it comes to activities which give us immediate pleasure, such as watching athletes or listening to musicians. At the same time, Blitz cannot recommend “communities that are or claim to be aristocratic (or religiously aristocratic),” as these are either fraudulent or present other dangers, including habits of subservience. He offers a threefold approach to the issue: “first, individually, the fullest or most virtuous use of our powers and the education that allows and develops this; second, basing this use and education on the natural meaning of trust, love, family, friendship, and limits in resources; and, third, doing this in a community grounded on equal individual choice and pride, on trust whose expectations rest on these virtues and meaning and on understanding our powers and their truly excellent use.” In effect, he would embed the ‘ancient’ or ‘classical’ virtues in civil society, especially through educational institutions, broadly conceived. The existence of a civil society in the modern state, one that is most vigorous in modern states with liberal democratic regimes that protect civil society from overbearing governmental supervision, might serve as a means of resistance to the more dangerous features of modernity, including the radical conquest of human nature proposed by ‘transhumanists.’

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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