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    The Nuclear Arms Moratorium: A Critique

    February 23, 2016 by Will Morrisey

    Report prepared for New Jersey State Legislators
    1982

    In 1982, several anti-war and anti-nuclear groups proposed a nuclear arms moratorium or `freeze’ resolution for placement on the November ballots as a referendum. My home state of New Jersey was one of the states in which the `freeze’ advocates were most active. The following report was prepared for New Jersey Senate and Assembly members, who were scheduled to vote on whether or not to approve the measure for ballot placement. `Freeze’ referenda proved popular that year for several reasons: in the 1980 presidential election campaign, Ronald Reagan was painted as a warmonger, and a certain percentage of those who made that claim believed their own polemics; there had also been several books and one televised film depicting the devastation that a large-scale nuclear war would cause; finally, in an off-year Congressional election, left-of-center political operatives saw advantage in placing such a measure on the ballot, as it would increase the numbers of voters sympathetic to their candidates.  

     

    INTRODUCTION
    According to representatives of the New Jersey Coalition for a Nuclear Arms Freeze, United States Senator Mark O. Hatfield stated “most eloquently the basis of the concerns and convictions that motivate us.” In a letter written in March of 1981, Senator Hatfield wrote, in part, “It is only on the basis of a nuclear moratorium that we can begin to reduce the arsenals of both sides and to convince other nations of the world to adopt a moratorium on nuclear proliferation.”

    Perhaps because it is clear that the likes of Colonel Khaddafi and the Ayatollah Khomeini would not necessarily agree to forego nuclear arms merely because the superpowers agree to restrain themselves, the nuclear non-proliferation aspect of the argument has not received much play. The principal rationale is the hope of ending the U. S.-Soviet nuclear arms race.

    In New Jersey, the campaign has focused on S-1080 and A-799, bills that would place the issue of a nuclear arms moratorium on the November ballot as a public question. This report analyzes the language of these identical bills, concluding that the proposal as it stands is unworkable and misleading to the public. The report includes a proposal for an alternative bill.

    PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2
    “WHEREAS, The continued escalation of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States exacerbates the ominous threat of nuclear war between those nations; and
    “WHEREAS, Our national security is thereby reduced, not increased;”

    The language is imprecise. The acceleration of an arms race in and of itself neither “exacerbates” nor lessens the possibility of war. War usually occurs after one adversary calculated that he has achieved militarily significant advantage. The Soviet Union is rarely at a loss for reasons to exploit an advantage, military or otherwise. But it has to achieve a militarily significant advantage over the United States in nuclear arms.

    The current American arms buildup aims at assuring that the Soviets fail to achieve any such advantage. In FY 1964, we spent $25.6 billion on strategic forces; in FY 1983, the Reagan Administration plans to spend $23.1 billion–less than half of the 1964 amount, as measured in constant dollars. While our real spending on strategic forces has declined in the last decade-and-a-half, Soviet spending has increased. In the period 1976-1980 alone, the Soviets deployed four new intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Backfire bomber, and the SS-20 missile; they developed four more ICBMs and a missile-carrying submarine. In 1956, the Soviets had 625 land-based and submarine-based missiles. By 1980, they had 1,398 land-based missiles and 1,003 submarine-based missiles. Today, they have a total of 2,2798 to our 1,944. Although the United States retained the lead in nuclear warheads during this period, we went from a 2-1 advantage in missile “payload” to a disadvantage of 3.385 million pounds to the Soviets’ 11.75 million pounds. Fortunately, our superior technology enables us to build more accurate missiles, which decreases the disadvantage in firepower. The extent to which it decreases that disadvantage is a matter of controversy among technical experts.

    The point of citing these facts is not revive the perennial question, “Who’s ahead?” but to show that our security was not threatened by our strategic arms buildup–which, in practical terms, barely existed in the last decade–but in the Soviet buildup. Not an arms race but Soviet power threatens the peace of the world.

    PARAGRAPH 3
    “WHEREAS, nuclear arms escalation imposes a tremendous strain upon the human and financial resources of the United States government, lessening the availability of those resources to meet domestic social goals;”

    While the cost of strategic nuclear arms is substantial, it does not impose “a tremendous burden” upon our resources. According to figures published recently in the New York Times, the Reagan Administration proposes an FY 1983 defense budge of $257.5 billion; of this, we would spend $23.1 billion for strategic forces. In FY 1984, we are scheduled to spend $30.3 of $284.7 billion; in FY 1985, $33.2 of $330.9 billion. The bulk of U. S. defense funding goes to general purpose forces, personnel, and maintenance.

    Inasmuch as the federal budget deficit for FY 1983 is estimated to be in the neighborhood of $100 billion, the elimination of all strategic spending for the next three years would not even cover the deficit for one year. To tell our people that these savings could be used for social programs is to make them a promise we simply cannot keep.

    Nor do we have any guarantee that we could use any of this money for relief of budget deficits. If the Soviets halt nuclear weapons production, testing, and deployment, they might very well increase other military spending by an equal amount. This would require us to spend more money on so-called conventional forces–a more expensive proposition for us than for them because we pay our troops far more than they pay theirs (this, even allowing for the fact that their troop strength considerably exceeds ours.)

    As for the human resources expended in developing, deploying, and maintaining our nuclear arms, the same argument holds. We have no guarantee that Soviet cutbacks in one area would not yield Soviet increases in other areas. This would mean greater manpower requirements for the United States, not lesser ones.

    PARAGRAPH 4
    “WHEREAS, A mutual United States-Soviet `freeze’ on further testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons has been advanced by prominent political, scientific and religious leaders as an effective method of arresting the continued development of the nuclear danger;”

    The overwhelming majority of these “prominent leaders” are longtime advocates of a minimalist U. S. defense strategy. Such men as Richard Barnet, Harvey Cox, Richard Falk, and John Kenneth Galbraith are well known to academic specialists in the field. This is not an ideologically balanced mixture, by any means.

    An immediate nuclear arms moratorium, called for in the proposed public question, is not an effective way to arrest the nuclear danger because it has no basis in the economic or political reality of the Soviet Union.

    According to the Carter Administration’s Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William R. Perry, the Soviets outspent us by $240 billion on military items during the 1970s. Yet the total output of the Soviet economy remained much smaller than ours. The percentage of their GNP spent on the military rose from an estimated 11-13% in the period 1965-1978, when their economy was doing relatively well, to 12-14% in 1979, to 13-15% in today’s hard times. American military spending fell from 8% of the GNP in 1956, a time of prosperity, to 5.&% in 1981. This is the reverse of the Soviet sacrifice. The Reagan Administration proposes to raise the percentage closer to the 1964 level over the next five years.

    For this reason, halting any aspect of the military buildup, including the buildup in strategic nuclear arms, would force the Soviets to throw the economy into far severer dislocations than we would have to do. What appears as a perfectly symmetrical proposal actually demands far more of them for the balance of the decade.

    Proponents of the moratorium will reply that this would improve their economic strength in the long run. This is true, insofar as Soviet rulers conceive of their country’s economic interests as consumer-oriented. But they do not.

    The Soviet rulers view consumer economics with distaste. As the Polish crisis reminds us, they quite reasonably regard an economic system that exalts the desires of the people over the military and political aims of the Communist Party as a threat to their power. Once the consumer becomes sovereign, the government hears no end of grumbling–as Americans know. Repeated Soviet fulminations against `bourgeois life’ and `Western decadence’ hardly spring from a sense of morality outraged; `President’ Brezhnev and his comrades enjoy the use of country dachas, caviar, Robert Trent Jones golf courses, and numerous other oligarchic amenities. Such pronouncements issue from Politburo recognition that money is power, and that money in the hands of the people is power in the hands of the people. Safer to let them eat cabbage.

    It is also well worth noting that an immediate `freeze’ would leave the Soviets unable to respond to any future nuclear arms buildup by the Communist Chinese. The latter have never even consented to halt above-ground testing of nuclear weapons; they are highly unlikely to `freeze’ their stockpiles at current levels merely because the Soviets and the Americans agree to do so. Indeed, they might well regard this as an excellent opportunity to catch up.

    In sum, this paragraph fails to consider the proposal from the Soviet point of view. It is unrealistic for that reason.

    PARAGRAPH 5
    “WHEREAS, There is an urgent need to create broader public awareness of the specter of nuclear holocaust and to provide a means whereby the concerns of New Jersey’s citizens may be communicated to our national policymakers:”

    This final “Whereas” clause is perhaps the most disturbing of all. If we are to put a matter of national defense on the New Jersey ballot as a public question, the last thing we need is a campaign of scare tactics. Yet that is exactly what the bill invites. Instead of an appeal to fear, we need an appeal to courage. For the fact is that “the specter of nuclear holocaust” cannot loom very large as long as the Soviets have no reason to suppose that they could gain anything by initiating one. This has been true throughout the last three decades and remains true today.

    Vivid and grisly descriptions of the effects of nuclear radiation do not help us to maintain the kind of calm and rational public mood that gives our arms negotiators the backing they need. Panic and hysteria do not conduce to the sober conduct of foreign policy–particularly when Soviet negotiators feel no similar pressures.

    THE PROBLEM OF VERIFIABILITY
    The public question calls for a “verifiable” moratorium. Unfortunately, this is physically impossible. The New York Times editorial of March 21, 1982 notes that “There is no way to verify a ban on missile production without the intrusive on-site inspection that Moscow has always rejected. Nor is there any known way to locate concealed stocks of warheads.” Obviously, the Soviets or the United States could manufacture such warheads and store them in underground shelters near the launching sites without fear of detection. Spy satellites do not have x-ray eyes.

    It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of this point. If the bill passes in its present form, the public will be voting on a public question that is worded in a misleading way. If we are to have such referenda, it is the Legislature’s responsibility to frame the questions in such a way that the publican vote for something that is, at least, technologically feasible.

    ANOTHER CHOICE
    The call for an immediate nuclear arms `freeze’ and a dedication of monies saved to “human needs and services” has no relation to economic, military, or political reality in the contemporary world. This is why we should hesitate to advocate referenda on issues of national defense; a superficially attractive proposal may have serious liabilities that are difficult to communicate effectively in this age of mass electronic information media. A battle of slogans will not do.

    As an alternative to the current bill, we respectfully suggest the following language:

    WHEREAS, The Carter Administration proposed a mutual reduction in strategic nuclear arms during the course of the SALT II negotiations; and

    WHEREAS, the 1980 Republican Platform pledged that “A Republican Administration will continue to seek to negotiate arms reductions in Soviet strategic weapons”; and

    WHEREAS, the hope of mutual nuclear arms reductions animates all men and women of good will, regardless of party affiliation; now therefore

    BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey that the President of the United States is hereby memorialized to press ahead with negotiation that would gradually, mutually, and verifiably limit and reduce the stockpiles of nuclear launchers in the United States and the Soviet Union.

     

    2016 NOTE: The last phrase, calling for the limitation of nuclear “launchers,” addresses the verifiability issue. Nuclear warheads are very hard to track because they are not very large; the strategic launchers–long-range missiles, submarines, and aircraft–are larger and much easier to detect by technological means.

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Tocqueville and American Foreign Policy

    February 18, 2016 by Will Morrisey

    Co-authored with Paul Eidelberg

    Published Spring 1981

     

    Upon becoming a born-again foreign-policy `realist,’ then President Jimmy Carter confessed his astonishment at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Those who had tried to achieve with words what the Soviets achieved with action–not the conquest of Afghanistan but the arousal of Mr. Carter from his dogmatic slumber–could honestly say they had told him so. Others, long-time proponents of détente with the Soviet Union, disingenuously complained that everyone always knew the Soviets are like this–that they are, as one genteel analyst understated it, “not nice people.” But that knowledge, they usually added, never stopped us from dealing with the Kremlin before, so aren’t we overacting, causing “war hysteria,” now?

    It is useless to note that the Soviets do not wax hysterical over war, they make it. Facts leave the faithful undaunted, which leads us to wonder: What is it about some Americans that causes them to believe their enemies may metamorphose into friendly enemies if baptized in the miraculous waters of American good will? The question lingers, for while Mr. Carter has left his high office, his intellectual and moral kin-especially numerous in government, the media, and the academy–remain vociferous and unchanged.

    One customarily refers all important questions concerning American politics and society to Tocqueville. For only the obtuse regard Democracy in America as a mere historical document, a portrait of a simpler time and place. We recognize ourselves in Tocqueville’s Americans, despite industrial development and the abolition of slavery.

    Still, one does not usually refer questions concerning foreign policy to Tocqueville. Do we not live in a unique `nuclear age,’ a time in which the isolation Tocqueville described as “providential” has disappeared forever? We can no longer say, with Tocqueville, “The foreign policy of the United States is eminently expectant; it consists more in abstaining than in acting.” This notwithstanding, the end of our isolation, while transforming our circumstance, has not significantly transformed our national character. Nor has it entirely transformed our political institutions. We remain democrats and Americans. We can still learn from Tocqueville.

    Tocqueville sees equality or “equality of conditions” as the “primary fact” in democratic America, meaning by this that there are no rigid class distinctions here: no one is bound by law or custom to the station of his birth, and all may ascend the social or economic ladder. America is the land of opportunity. This is what gives equality its power, its “charms,” which “are every instant felt and are within the reach of all; the noblest hearts are not insensible to them, and the most vulgar souls exult in them.” So pervasive is the power of this equality that it affects the mentality of Americans, the educated no less than the uneducated. Tocqueville, then, regards democracy as inevitable not because `History’ makes it so, but because it appeals to human nature.

    With democratic egalitarianism come two principal characteristics–one moral, the other intellectual. Morally, egalitarianism emancipates the individual so that, thrust upon himself, he becomes animated not by class interests–class affiliation having lost its compelling character given America’s lack of a strong hereditary European-style aristocracy–so much as by self-interest. At the same time, however, his very independence renders him virtually powerless. Accordingly, he must combine with others, moderate his egoism, and learn the give-and-take of democratic life if he is to pursue his interests intelligently. Democracy thus cultivates what Tocqueville calls, famously, “self-interest rightly understood,” a middling or mediocre virtue which, like the charms of equality, “lies within the reach of all capacities.” Unlike virtue pursued spontaneously and for its own sake, self-interest rightly understood consists of thing that one serves one’s own material interests by practicing such modest virtues as self-restraint, honesty, and regularity. The pursuit of this kind of self-interest serves the community, if indirectly. And the community takes note of it, deploying such slogans as “Drive safely, the life you save may be your own.” Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, self-preservation, along with comfort, is at the heart of American foreign policy.

    Intellectually, democracy cultivates what Tocqueville calls the “philosophical method” of Cartesian skepticism, which moves the individual “to evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and better; to seek the reason of things for oneself, and in oneself along; to tend to results without being bound to means.” Of these characteristics–and note how they describe contemporary pragmatism–Tocqueville points to one “which includes almost all the rest,” namely, that in which most of the operations of the mind each American appeals only to the individual effect of his own understanding.” “Think for yourself” is indeed a democratic-American imperative. It correlates with, and is essential to, the morality of restrained self-interest for the pursuit of which democracy cultivates that “homely species of practical wisdom… that science of the petty occurrences of life which is called good sense.” This, too, les within the reach of all, or almost all capacities.

    This morality has somewhat contradictory results. Tocqueville foresees that enlightened self-interest can yield “virtuous materialism,” the gratification of petty desires if not of extreme passions. Virtuous materialism “would not corrupt, but enervate, the soul and noiselessly unbend its springs of action.” He also sees that the democrat’s restrained selfishness coexists with compassion, as egalitarianism causes the extension of one’s sensibility to all men, who, by the grace of democracy, “think and feel in nearly the same manner.” These tendencies toward selfish-but-restrained materialism and compassion persist in America today.

    Intellectually, common sense combines with moral egalitarianism to produce superficiality. In day-to-day affairs, common sense is enough; we readily learn to be smart `consumers.’ Because most of the people we meet resemble us, we habitually consult our own thoughts and feelings as reliable guides to those of others. Transposed to the domain foreign policy, common sense, suffused with moral egalitarianism, yields what is known as `mirror-imaging.’ Disastrous consequences follow.

    Mr. Carter came into office repeating the oft-heard anti-anticommunist refrain that the `Cold War’ is over. Exuding moral egalitarianism, he told the American people, most of whom dislike and distrust the Soviets, that “in every person there is something fine and pure and noble;” that “the great challenge we Americans confront is to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that our good will is as great as our strength, until, despite all obstacles, our two nations could achieve new attitudes and new trust.” The first of these statements could lead to the comforting conclusion that the Soviets are at heart decent folk, like Americans in general; the second to the self-deprecating conclusion that they have as much reason to distrust us as we have to distrust them. This democratic leveling of distinctions between an imperialistic oligarchy with global ambitions, one based on the primacy of force ad fraud and a regime inclined toward peaceableness if only because it is based on the primacy of consent rather than conquest makes it easier for the latter, especially when given to virtuous materialism, to pursue a policy of phased unilateral disarmament. And so Mr. Carter cancelled the B-1 bomber, shelved the MX mobile ICBM system and the neutron bomb, drastically reduced the range of the cruise missile, and postponed the production of other weapons systems, all in the hope that such demonstrations of American good will (however influenced by economic factors) would induce the Soviets to reciprocate. They didn’t.

    The Soviets are not motivated by virtuous materialism. They are motivated by dialectical materialism, which puts class conflict ahead of feeling good about oneself. The Kremlin preens itself in claiming that they are the vanguard of the vanguard class, internationally, that the Soviet Union must impose sacrifices on its peoples in order to defeat the reactionary forces of capitalist America. With less than half of America’s GNP, the Soviet Union has continued to outspend the U. S. on strategic and conventional arms.

    Mr. Carter’s mirror-imaging mindset toward the Soviet Union did not begin, nor can it be expected to end, with him. It may be traced back to 1946, to a most influential book sponsored by the Yale Institute of International Affairs under the title The Absolute Weapon. Written by academic strategic theorists, the book maintains that nuclear weapons have an “absolute” character in that there is no defense against their utterly destructive power. In nuclear war, we are given to believe, there can be no victor and no survivors. Hence war is no longer a “rational” policy. Moreover, in an era of absolute weapons, military superiority ceases to be meaningful. All one needs is enough missiles to be able to threaten a potential aggressor with unacceptable levels of destruction. Thus was born the American doctrine of mutual–actually minimum–deterrence, or what has come to be known as Mutual Assured Destruction. This doctrine, it should be noted, was concocted without reference to the character of the Soviet Union then ruled by Stalin. It was merely assumed that Russian Communists would think and feel like American democrats about nuclear war. As one contributor put it: “Neither we nor the Russians can expect to feel even reasonably safe unless an atomic attack by one were certain to unleash a devastating attack on the other.”

    The conclusion of the Yale study eventually became official American policy. In 1965, when the United States had roughly four times as many ICBM launchers as the Soviet Union, it decided to stop their production and allow he Soviets to achieve parity so as to encourage them to engage in strategic arms limitations talks. The Soviets caught up in 1969, the talks began, and, three years later, SALT I was produced-by which time, however, the Soviets had 1,618 ICBMs while the United States had 1,054. Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of SALT I, was merely translating into policy the mirror-imaging and non-ideological mentality  of the authors of The Absolute Weapon. As he said iat a news conference, “What in God’s  name is strategic superiority? What do you do with it?” Or as he explained while still an academic: “The traditional mode of military analysis which saw in war a continuation of politics but with its own appropriate means is no logner applicable.” Exit Clausewitz.

    But not from the Soviet Union. This may be seen in the November 1975 issue of Communist of the Armed Forces, the USSR’s foremost military journal: “The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons lead war outside the framework of policy, and that nuclear war ceases to be an instrument of policy, and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary…. The description of the correlation between war and policy is fully valid for the use of weapon of mass destruction.” Unlike mirror-imaging American strategists, Soviet strategists do not consider nuclear war as `unthinkable’ or as `unwinnable.’ In the words of Colonel A. Sidorenko, one of the Red Army’s leading theoreticians, “Pre-emption in launching a nuclear strike is expected to be the decisive condition for the attainment of superiority over [the enemy] and the seizure and retention of the initiative.” The Soviets regard the doctrine of mutual deterrence as “bourgeois pacifism.” The aim of Soviet military is to win by means of a first strike on the United States, a strike that would preclude the United States from launching a retaliatory strike.

    They are working hard to achieve this outcome. The vast sums of money they devote to research and development in strategic arms confirms this. So does their billion-dollar-a-year civil defense program, which includes the dispersal and bomb-resistant construction of industries, the stockpiling of food and fuel, civil defense training for all Soviet subjects, and the organization of cadres for evacuating key urban centers within 24 hours. None of this means that, once such a capacity for a preclusive strike were achieved, the Soviets would necessarily launch their missiles, but what they would “do with it,” in Mr. Kissinger’s phrase, could easily be to tell the United States to jump, and to expect a docile response of `How high?’ Or else. Moral egalitarians given to mirror-imaging might be reminded that those who rule the land of the Gulag Archipelago do not have the same regard for human life as, for example, George F. Kennan, the scholar-diplomat whose influence on academic thinking and official attitudes toward the Soviet Union is second to none–Kennan, who could say that statements about communist brutality and aggressiveness “impute to Soviet leaders a total inhumanity not plausible in nature.”

    Clearly, the influence of egalitarianism on the intellect and sentiments of Americans extends to `realists’ and `idealists’ alike. the absence of hierarchy in American society inclines us, over time to level or simplify the thinking of intellectuals as well as that of the man on the street. The formulation of foreign policy is simplified if the people on the `other side’ think and feel as we do. In fact, to the extent that most Americans do concern themselves with foreign policy, they usually harbor doubts about foreigners. This common sense, although superficial, may impute to Soviet rulers the inhumanity denied by Kennan, the implacable hostility piously obscured by Carter, and the goal of world conquest ignored by Kissinger.

    Nevertheless, common sense will not suffice in the domain of foreign affairs, especially when rendered more superficial by another aspect of democracy revealed by Tocqueville. Because Americans find themselves in an egalitarian but competitive society where everything is in motion, a society that assigns to no one a permanent place but instead requires each to be many things in many places in one lifetime, such persons develop relatively broad but hurried minds, minds which care “more to know a great deal quickly than to know anything well.” “The habit of inattention must be considered as the greatest defect of the democratic character.” Tocqueville thus anticipates the familiar lament that Americans have short political memories, suggesting that we do not remember partly because we do not really pay attention in the first place. In addition, we often refuse to take unpleasant facts seriously–something that requires more than common sense–as this might entail burdens and sacrifices beyond the capacity of virtuous materialism. Common sense, which “suffice[s] to direct the ordinary course of society,” does not always suffice to direct “relations with foreign nations.” Tocqueville continues, “a democracy can only with difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.” Despite the homogenization of mankind throughout much of the world, foreigners remain foreigners–peoples not fathomable by simple introspection and common sense.

    While dealing with foreign countries, democratic politicians must also deal with three groups in their own country, aside from fellow-politicians and the general public. Corporate business owners, who partake more of virtuous materialism than of compassion, intellectuals (academicians and bureaucrats) who aspire to partake more of compassion than of virtuous materialism, and soldiers, who are expected to partake of neither, all reflect the moral and intellectual habits Tocqueville describes.

    Taking the businessmen first, it is fair to say that Armand Hammer’s dealings, beginning in Lenin’s time, have attracted the most comment from critics of American corporate relations with the Soviet Union. But in an interview given to U.S. News and World Report, Mr. J. Paul Lyet, Chairman of Sperry Rand Corporation, revealed the assumptions behind such dealings more openly than Hammer has done. Asked about “proposals that we should use trade generally to weaken the Russians,” Lyet replied, “I’m no politician”–which, we must interject, is a humble-seeming rhetorical self-pat heard all too frequently in business circles. “I’m just a businessman trying to make a living–so you may think this is self-serving–but I would think that trade builds bridges. When you think back to the situation in the `40s and `50s at the height of the Cold War–well, it’s a lot better. I don’t subscribe to the Russian system. But eventually there’s going to be a coming together–peaceful coexistence, if you want to call it that. I think that the more their people see our system and how it works, the more it’s going to moderate their views. There just somehow seems to be more freedom in nations where economic freedom is stressed. I would like to assume that economic growth in the Soviet Union will lead–even if slowly–toward more freedom for the people of that country as well as a more accommodating attitude toward world peace.” As Mr. Lyet tries to make his living, limping along on his six-figure salary, he rightly notices that trade builds bridges; he might add that it also builds trucks with which to invade Afghanistan. Things are indeed a lot better now than they were in the `40s and `50s–for Mr. Lyet, if not for our military planners, Americans generally, and the free world. As for the prediction of increased if gradual Soviet moderation, liberalization, and peaceableness, this hoped-for embourgeoisement of the Kremlin has hit a bit of a snag, lately.

    We can’t say Tocqueville doesn’t warn us. He observes that the en who constitute America’s so-called ruling class are, for the most part, the sons of wealthy men born of poor or middle-class origins: “born, it is true, in  a lofty position, but their parents were humble; they have grown up amid feelings and notions which they cannot afterwards easily get rid of.” These feelings and notions are commercial ones, and they remain so even if the manners of commerce are rejected for more elegant customs and more refined tastes: “Commerce is naturally averse to all the violent passions; it loves to temporize, takes delight in compromise, and studiously avoids irritation. It is patient, insinuating, flexible, and never has recourse to extreme measures until oblige by the most obvious necessity.” Tocqueville is thinking of domestic revolution–the unlikelihood of it–but his suggestion applies to foreign policy as well. Tocqueville fears not revolution but stagnation in democracy, the development of a people who “so entirely give way to a cowardly love of preset enjoyment as to lose sight of the interests of their future selves and those of their descendants and prefer to glide along the easy current of life rather than to make, when it is necessary, a strong and sudden effort to a higher purpose.” The average American today, the average businessman, has yet to reach this state of moral torpor, but the tendency persists.

    Above all, it is a tendency that brings with it the decline of honor. Tocqueville contrasts the sense of honor cultivated among the feudal aristocracy with democratic honor. Aristocrats honor military courage, loyalty to one’s leaders, the pride that finds satisfaction in vast enterprises, and a liberality based on magnanimity, greatness of soul. Democrats replace military courage with what can only be called commercial or economic courage: risking one’s capital or the brave endurance of financial loss. They replace loyalty to leaders with patriotism and substitute for grand pride the smaller pride in lesser achievements. They base their liberality not on magnanimity but on compassion (at best) or expediency, honoring “all those quiet virtues that tend to give a regular movement to the community and to encourage business.” “The American lauds as a noble and praiseworthy ambition what our own [i. e., European and aristocratic] forefathers in the Middle Ages stigmatized as severe cupidity, just as he treats as a stupid and barbarous frenzy that ardor of conquest and martial temper which bore them to battle.” If that American is a contemporary international businessman, he is less given to patriotism than to insisting that he is just trying to make a living and that trade builds bridges. His sense of honor gradually becomes more obscure because the social distinctions between men which gave rise to aristocratic honor have faded–`ruling class’ or no `ruling class.’ Meanwhile, he real ruling class in the Soviet Union follows the example of the principal secretary of Alexander the Great. Plutarch tells us that Eumenes made it a practice to borrow money from his enemies, because an enemy would then “confide in him and forbear all violence to him for fear of losing his money.” Bridge-building, indeed.

    In and out of government, our intellectuals present a different aspect of the same American mindset. Tocqueville correctly predicted that “If the entire existence of the Union where perpetually threatened, if its chief interests were in daily connection with those of other powerful nations”–if America were in Europe–“the executive government would assume increased importance.” With the invention of self-powered ships and aircraft, rapid means of communication, and all the other technological devices that effectively shrink the distance between the United States and foreign powers, we have indeed developed such an executive, aided by a pseudo-aristocracy that deals with foreign policy–one that, if nothing else, rarely stands accused of limiting itself to democratic common sense. Selected, not elected, it thrives in the university and the bureaucracy, protected by that quasi-aristocratic institution, tenure.

    Like our corporate `oligarchs,’ our foreign policy `aristocrats’ have democratic origins and tastes, regardless of the invincible snobbishness cultivated by some of them. Historically, they are heirs of Woodrow Wilson’s politics of compassion–Wilson, the eminent political scientist who imbued them with the ideal of “a government rooted… in the pains and sufferings of mankind… a government which is not pitiful but full of human sympathy.” The egalitarian compassion of these `aristocrats’ assures them of their righteousness, which only reinforces their snobbery. Indeed, their snobbery owes much to the feeling that they are plus populaire que la populace, members of ever-progressing `History’s’ enlightened and enlightening vanguard.

    This accounts for their mortification in the late 1960s. Ridiculed as hypocrites and timeservers by the New Left, not only did progressives lose their belief in themselves as a vanguard unchallenged by all except `reactionaries’ and communists; they also lost much of their faith in progress itself, the foundation of their legitimacy. Having lost that faith, they could no longer support anything so stern as a war against communists in Vietnam. So, while the progressive-liberals of the 1940s could easily excoriate those who opposed involvement in the world war as cowards and/or fascist sympathizers, they could not bring themselves to charge the moralists of the New Left with cowardice; they ceded that task to the Veterans of Foreign Wars and other groups and persons which the liberals themselves had long dismissed as Neanderthals. In the `60s, those who did not move to the left or the right became self-doubting apologists for a failed dream. By 1968 they were divided against one another, ready to assist their own defeat.

    Once again, Tocqueville anticipates this sort of thing. In his time, American universities were church-affiliated, and seriously so. The intellectual class, if not entirely religious, was noticeably shaped by religion; even men like Jefferson, who had died only a decade before Tocqueville’s visit, retained many of the sturdier qualities that religion fosters: discipline, perseverance, wholehearted dedication to a cause. From Puritanism on, Americans had found in their religion means of both spiritual and temporal satisfaction. By “giving men a general habit of conducting themselves with a view to eternity,” religions reveal the great secret of success” in this world; they teach men not to “turn from day to day to chase some novel object or desire,” but to “have settled designs which they are never weary of pursuing.” The social stability provided by the belief in eternity served as ballast for a ship that otherwise would have swayed uncontrollably in the unpredictable gusts of democratic opinion.

    For “no sooner do [men] despair of living forever, than they are disposed to act as if they were to exist for a single day.” This is the moral and social dilemma caused by the apparent liberation of what’s come to be called secularism: “In skeptical ages it is always to be feared… that men may perpetually give way to their daily casual desires, and that, wholly renouncing whatever cannot be acquired without protracted effort, they may establish nothing great, permanent, and calm…. In those countries in which, unhappily, irreligion and democracy coexist, philosophers and those in power ought to be always striving to place the objects of human actions far beyond man’s immediate range.” Not for nothing did Charles de Gaulle, more than a century after this, hold before his countrymen the lure of la grandeur–re-founding French republicanism, establishing a foreign policy independent of the two `superpowers.’ Tocqueville would oppose the indulgence of fickle appetites with discipline and spiritedness. He would have democracies “teach the community day by day that wealth, fame, and power are rewards of labor,” and arrange things so that no greatness should be of too easy acquirement.” Tocqueville hoped thus to achieve the effect of religion without the strict rule of religion seen in the aristocratic Europe of the Old Regime; he suggests that these practices might even bring an irreligious people back to religion.

    As religious faith declined among the intellectuals in the latter half of the nineteenth century and was replaced by faith in science and social progress, institutional Christianity metamorphosed. It did not disappear but became secular, materialist, with a worldly compassion and a worldly paradise replacing caritas and Heaven. Woodrow Wilson, his father a preacher, was already heading in this direction, and many of his contemporaries (John Dewey the most important) were already there. Still believing in a sort of eternity–the end of `History’–the intellectuals could discipline themselves and find the courage to fight for something.

    But simultaneously, other intellectual trends undermined the liberalism of historical progress. Existentialism questioned the grand narrative, and indeed rationalism itself. In recent years there has been an attempt to synthesize Heidegger (after all, a Nazi) with some sort of `Left’ ideology. But the most important intellectual preparation for the weakening of progressive-liberalism and the rise of a new Left was moral relativism. Tocqueville comes very close to anticipating this phenomenon. This may be seen by recalling his description of the “philosophical method” of the Americans. He notes that, under conditions of equality, not only does each individual seek the reason of things by himself alone, but equality tends to invade the intellect in such a way that the individual becomes the “source of truth.” Relativism reflects this form of egalitarianism, for it consists in believing that there are no objective standards for determining whether the way of life of one individual, group, or nation is superior to that of another. To admire a Socrates or a Charles Manson; to condemn PLO terrorists or to call them `freedom fighters’; to prefer liberal America to Soviet Russia–all these so-called value judgments are deemed `subjective.’ Relativism thus regards all moral principles (which it calls `values’ as opposed to `facts’) as theoretically equal. Relativism dovetails with the esteem for science, described by its advertisers as `value-free.’

    Visible not only in the writings of the most ardent proponents of détente, moral relativism appears in writings by men now regarded as `hawks.’ Here are Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington in their 1963 book, Political Power: USA/USSR: “We are students of politics; we write this book in that capacity. And here we are concerned not with vices and virtues but with strengths and weaknesses. Moral judgment have been passed often enough–an with predictable results–on both sides of the Iron Curtain.” Such talk obscures the fact that virtues and vices are strengths and weaknesses, depended upon and routinely exploited by every politician, ever person, who ever lived. It also reflects the partial moral relativism of numerous contemporary intellectuals, `left’ and `right,’ who imagine an `end of ideology’ in what Brzezinski later would call the “technetronic era.” According to his teachings, we must abandon our prejudices about individual, group, or national superiority and enter a period of universal toleration and–no surprise–egalitarianism. Marxism, too–which Brzezinski, reflecting Tocqueville’s observation about the superficiality of the democratic mind, links to a variety of humanitarianism–has contributed and will continue to contribute to the eventual convergence of all nations into–what?

    Into, as it turns out, theologian Harvey Cox’s “Secular City,” which “provides a setting in which a hodgepodge of human purposes and projects can thrive because each recognizes itself as provisional and relative.” The secular city is a vaguely and indeed groundlessly humanitarian place which President Carter may have had in mind when he predicted, during his trip to Poland in January 1978, that East and West will someday transcend their ideological differences. After all, any “posture based on ideological considerations” has become passé in the estimation of his National Security Adviser, Dr. Brzezinski. In view of the impossibility of sustaining any humanitarianism, however vague, on terms of moral relativism, this posture will likely consist of bending over backwards.

    Tocqueville would understand. Social egalitarianism inclines minds and hearts toward moral egalitarianism, which yields self-interest rightly understood. Self-interest rightly understood, unchecked by discipline and spiritedness, yields virtuous materialism, which yields moral enervation. As long as a strong religious faith (a precious legacy from aristocratic times, Tocqueville calls it) or even a strong secular faith inspires a people, democracy thrives; when the faith declines to the level it reaches in Cox and Brzezinski, discipline and spiritedness will be difficult to arouse. The keepers of a lukewarm faith cannot appeal to positive belief alone, whether it be the deference seen in aristocratic societies, he religious man’s faith in in God, or the democrat’s faith in his country; they must, rather, urge us on by means of the disspiriting lure of moral relativism. We are to pursue, with good will toward friends an adversaries alike, a morally neutral or non-ideological foreign policy, a policy which, by definition, can only be motivated by material interests. How far such `even-handedness’ will take progressive-liberal America vis-à-vis communist Russia is not difficult to see. As a censor at the USSR Press Department confided to Malcolm Muggeridge, “Those who are not against us are with us.”

    As Tocqueville would have understood, in America, appeals to moral relativism almost always serve the appellant’s desire for comfortable self-preservation–comfortable self-preservation for all if he is an `idealist.’ Brzezinski himself sees the practical, if not the theoretical problem with this: “subjectivism may not suffice to meet the challenge of subjective activism,” foreign or domestic. Nevertheless, both he and Huntington reject what they derisively refer to as the “black-and-white” image of the Soviet and American political systems. Writing sixteen years after the first edition of their text (and eleven printings later), Huntington began to see that he and his co-author had taught such lessons all too thoroughly. In an article titled “American Foreign Policy,” published in The Washington Quarterly in autumn 1979, Huntington reported that “the more educated people are, the less likely they are to think that communism is the worst form of government, and the less likely they are to see communist governments in Japan, Western Europe, Africa, or Latin  America as threats to the United States.” The same university-educated respondents were also less likely to think that the United States should be stronger than the United  States, and were more favorably disposed to cutting the defense budget. These results may be attributed, in part, to the neo-Marxism infecting American campuses, but more significant is the doctrine of moral relativism which has long dominated higher education in the democratic world, a doctrine which cannot but level moral distinctions and thereby undermine commitment to liberty.

    If corporate business owners and intellectuals are susceptible to moral relativism, what about the soldiers? The left points to Tocqueville’s chapter, “Why democratic nations naturally desire peace, and democratic armies, war,” wherein he argues that the same desire for personal advancement which leads the majority of democrats into peaceful commercial pursuits also inclines the minority who are military officers to desire war, which brings their advancement. The left ignores Tocqueville’s prescription, which is not to weaken the army and to make civilians fear it, but to educate citizens to “a manly love of order” that inclines them to “freely submit themselves to discipline.” Such men, “if they follow the profession of arms, bring into it, unconsciously and almost against their will, these same habits and manners…. Teach the citizens to be educated, orderly, firm and free and the soldiers will be disciplined and obedient.” This was George Washington’s course, and in large measure it has worked, although the left has advocated exactly the reverse for decades.

    And not only the left ha ignored Tocqueville’s further warning: “If the love of physical gratification and the taste for well-being, which are equally suggested to men by a state of equality, were to possess the mind of a democratic people and to fill it completely, the manners of the nation would be so totally opposed to military pursuits that perhaps even the army would eventually acquire a love of peace.” Contrary to pacifist doctrine, “nothing is more dangerous for the freedom and tranquility of a people than an army afraid of war,” because “such an army no longer seeks to maintain its importance and its influence on the field of battle, [but] seeks to assert it elsewhere.” To prevent this, Tocqueville recommends that the love and habit of liberty combat the love and habit of virtuous materialism. In this he follows Pericles, who praised the non-egalitarian virtues of honor, courage, and glory by invoking the democratic love of liberty. Liberty requires the moderate spiritedness that underlies self-assertion, but does not necessarily contradict discipline freely submitted to.

    Confronting a strong and determined Soviet Union, our politicians–no less American, for better and for worse, than our businessmen, intellectuals, and soldiers–must assess democracy’s strengths and vulnerabilities along with the ongoing reassessment of America’s military and economic strengths and vulnerabilities. The ones who conducted the Vietnam War evidently overestimated American capacities, including their own. The ones who conduct détente may well underestimate those capacities by assuming that Americans won’t fight at all. They will fight, politically and economically now, and militarily if needed–but not if their leaders misunderstand their character. That character has changed little since Tocqueville’s day, and politicians will find him a prudent counselor.

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Wiesel’s Testament

    February 17, 2016 by Will Morrisey

    Review of Elie Wiesel: The Testament. New York: Summit Books, 1981.

    Published November 1981 in Chronicles of Culture.
    Republished with permission.

     

    Solzhenitsyn speaks for the Russia crushed but could not kill: the Russia of czarism and the Orthodox Church. He does not, cannot, speak for the old Russian underground. Solzhenitsyn’s master, Dostoyevsky, speaks of, if not for, part of that underground, the pat that dreamed of democracy, or socialism. Neither can speak for the other part of the underground, the only international nation: the Jews.

    For years some Jews allied themselves with the secular underground. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, they were taught, and enemies were never scarce. Still, an unusually large number of Jews not only allied themselves with socialism particularly communism but–to use apt religious language–converted to it. Why?

    Stalin took the precaution of murdering anyone who could have answered. Elie Wiesel, one of the best Jewish writers alive (there are reasons why he will not regard that designation as condescending), undertakes to speak for the dead, to re-member the Russian Jewishness that Stalin tried to dismember.

    The Testament begins in Israel. Wiesel, himself a minor character in the novel, watches Soviet Jews arrive at Lod Airport in July, 1972. From “the realm of silence and fear” they enter Israel silently and fearfully. But memory, memory of lovers, family, and (true) comrades fast overcomes silence and fear. Soon they can laugh and weep, toast life, the future, peace–perhaps their first free expression of feeling in a lifetime of enforced guardedness.

    Wiesel sees a young man who does not participate. He is a mute, the son of Paltiel Gershonovich Kossover, a poet `liquidated’ by Stalin some twenty years before. Taken back to Wiesel’s apartment, he insists on staying awake all night; it will transpire that he wants to write his father’s memoir, his testament, from memory.

    Soviet communism, Judaism travel (or, as is said of Jews, wandering), silence fear, memory, reunion, love, family,, friendship, laughter, life, the future, peace, freedom, poetry: Wiesel presents his themes in the brief prologue. In Paltiel Kossover’s letter to his son, which follows the prologue, we learn the poet’s teachings on some of these themes. “[T]he very essence of the noble tradition of Judaism” consists of a kind of universal memory system, the Book of Creation wherein “all our actions re inscribed.” Memory serves Creation, life (and therefore the future) because without it there is only oblivion. And although Paltiel Kossover does “not know what life is” and will “die without knowing,” he knows that communism, in exacting selective amnesia, does not serve life. “Don’t follow the path I took,” he tells his son, “it doesn’t lead to truth.” “Truth, for a Jew, is to dwell among his brothers. Link your destiny to that of your people, otherwise you will surely reach an impasse.” Although “I lived a Communist… I die a Jew”; having lived, inadvertently, for death, he dies for life–a theme on which Christians have no monopoly.

    The novel explore the subtleties of these themes, the gaining of these teachings. Wiesel juxtaposes short chapters concerning Paltiel Kossoer’s son–especially his recovery of his father’s memoir–with sections of the Testament, the story of a Jew wandering from his native city in Russia and the faith he learned there to Romania during the First World War, Berlin in the 20’s, Paris in the 30’s, briefly to Palestine and then to Spain during the civil war, to Moscow during the Second World War and finally back to his native city, the prison there and to Jewishness.

    All Jews “were victims of fear” during Paltiel Kossover’s childhood in Russia. There was fear of stern teachers–a fear that led to knowledge something to love–and fear of Christians and their pogroms, which led neither to knowledge nor to love. His mother’s songs (the source of his poetic nature?) soothed the fear of teachers, but the only immediate remedy for the fear of death at Christian hands was silence; the Kossover family hid beneath the door of the barn while murdering toughs shrieked “Death to the Jews!” Throughout The Testament, silence means both the babbling of false prophets and the poetry of true ones.

    The move to Romania brought no real uprooting, for “Jews remain Jews wherever they are: united, charitable, hospitable,” part of “a timeless community” without geographical boundaries. Yet these aspects of Judaism led Paltiel Kossover away from Judaism, as he saw the suffering of the poor and wanted to relieve it. Jewish messianism fascinated him; it also prepared him for communism. Fortune intervened in the shape of a fellow student, “a master at the seduction and corruption of the mind,” who introduced him to Marxist political action and thought, not only as an expression of the will to justice but as a vehicle of the friendship Paltiel craved.

    Wiesel’s best writing arises from his perception that most human beings, even intelligent ones, enact contradictory ideas and feelings while remaining quite decent and only a bit guilt-ridden. Despite his partial conversion to Marxism, on the eve of his departure for Berlin (he wanted to evade Romanian conscription), Paltiel sincerely and doubtfully promised his father to remain a Jew. And in Berlin, further seduced by a nubile young communist who lectured him in bed, on Darwin and historical materialism, h continued to pray, albeit surreptitiously. Only after intense action–a street fight with Nazis–and his girlfriend’s ensuring care did he forget his observances for the first time. Forgetting: few of the great modern anti-religious philosophers believed they could induce men to reject God, but they knew that a certain kind of life, a life of activity in and for this world, might induce men to forget God.

    The triumph of Nazism in 1932, a triumph Berlin’s communist prophets failed to predict, eventually led Paltiel Kossover to Paris. He met two remarkable men: the mysterious David Aboulesia, a wanderer searching for the Messiah, and Paul Hamburger, a brilliant Jewish communist intellectual and organizer. Hamburger saw, as Paltiel did not, that the Moscow trials must involve a grotesque betrayal of the revolution. Before he obeyed Stalin’s order to return to Moscow, he told Paltiel to get out of Paris, to go to Spain.

    Describing the brutality of both sides in the civil war, Paltiel reflects that the Jews fighting there did not share in it. “If he Spaniards massacred one another, if they set their country on fire and bled it, it is because, in1492, they burned or drove away their Jews,” leaving no moderating sense of humaneness in Spain. Jews who were engaged in the internecine struggles on the left developed split personalities; when Paltiel inquired after a friend who had disappeared, a Jewish communist who worked for the security forces offered the Party line in French, sympathy in Yiddish.

    Despite such incidents, Paltiel Kossover returned not to his family in Romania but to the Soviet Union, which he still believed was the messianic country. Upon his arrival, another security man warned him no to talk too much because “a past is only cumbersome.” Memory, Jewishness, speech: “You’re not at the yeshiva here, young man,” a member of the Jewish Writer’s Club in Moscow told him. “Don’t force us to listen to things that must not be heard.” Hitler invaded before the authorities got around to silencing the annoying poet. During the war, Paltiel revealed himself as one of those persons, uncommon but not rare, whose timidity in ordinary life gives way to courage when it matters. Unfit for military service, he displayed heroism as a stretcher-bearer–typically, he seems not to see his own heroism even as he writes about himself years later.

    It is easy to forget in Moscow. Paltiel married the woman who would give him his only son, and he stayed in Stalin’s Russia, ally of the new Israel, after the war. Wiesel depicts neither evil nor stupidity here–simply life, ordinary life with its conveniences and compromises, overcoming memory.

    Stalin, however, preferred extraordinary life for his subjects. The Party line changed, and “a new-style pogrom” began, directed against Jewish writers. “I could not accept that the Party could condemn an entire culture, annihilate an entire literature…. Why attack a language? Why would anyone wish to exterminate Yiddish?” Returning to his native city, Paltiel Kossover also returned to Judaism before his inevitable arrest and torture. Sustained by his memory of family (particularly his father and his son) and friends, he overcame the fear that began in childhood in this city with some, if not all, of the faith he learned there and was punished for there, at the beginning and the end of his life. He answered his own question of the Party in words he spoke before his executioner’s bullet could silence him: “You must understand,” he told a jailer, “the language of a people is its memory.” Totalitarianism, as Orwell knew, as Solzhenitsyn knows, finds memory radically inconvenient. It therefore permits only its own constantly manipulated anti-language.

    What could Solzhenitsyn say to Paltiel Kossover? For the most part he is silent on the Jews. His Russia mistreated Jews before Stalin did–less systematically, it is true, but the fact remains. The wanderer David Aboulesia tells Paltiel, “if hou believe you must forsake your brothers to save mankind, you will save nobody, you will not even save yourself.” He speaks against the communists, of course. But what of the Christ Solzhenitsyn reveres? Beyond the dialogue between international Judaism and international communism, we hear the dialogue between the Jewish nation and the Christian nations. And beyond it we hear another dialogue: the dialogue between Jesus and his fellow Jews. Is there a writer today who can renew it?

     

    2016 NOTE: Although this was not known in the West at the time, Solzhenitsyn–at times unjustly tarred with anti-Jewishness–did not at all remain silent on Jews and Judaism. He wrote a two-volume study of Russian-Jewish relations, Two Hundred Years Together, published in 2002. For an excellent account of this book, see Daniel J. Mahoney: The Other Solzhenitsyn: Telling the Truth about a Misunderstood Wrier and Thinker (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2014).

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

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