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    Rousseau’s Solitary Walker

    December 2, 2016 by Will Morrisey

    Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Reveries of the Solitary Walker. Translated with preface, notes, and an interpretive essay by Charles E. Butterworth. Hardcover editions: New York: New York University Press, 1979. Softcover edition: New York: Harper and Row, 1982.

    “[C]ompletely faithful to Rousseau’s manuscript,” according to translator and editor Charles E. Butterworth, this edition of the Reveries does justice to a philosopher in the best way most of us can: by letting him speak for himself. Rousseau insists on that—the first word of the Reveries is “I”—but as if to confirm its author’s blackest suspicions of men, even the French editions of this “final statement of his thought” (ix) contain numerous errors, errors uncorrected in the two centuries since its posthumous publication. Butterworth gives us the real text of the Reveries for the first time, albeit translated.

    “I am now alone on earth,” Rousseau begins, “no longer having any brother, neighbor, friend or society other than myself” (1). Detached from others, “what am I?” he asks—posing the question of his nature so as to assume man’s natural asociality, while simultaneously courting men’s pity. If, as Rousseau asserts elsewhere in his writings, human nature is fundamentally asocial, then the Solitary Walker has returned to man’s natural state, despite being “the most sociable and the most lovable of humans” (1). Among the themes of the First Walk are hope and fear, sentiments often associated with religious faith. Resigned to his exile from human society, Rousseau has abandoned hope in his fellow men for tranquility. That exile has also banished his fears; no one can injure him any more than they have already done. He has undergone a kind of creation, falling from order to chaos to a new order, now “unperturbed, like God Himself” (5), beyond hope and fear—both created and Creator. The Solitary Walker does not walk with God, but as a sort of god. He “find[s] consolation, hope and peace only in myself” (5). He even offers a prayer to himself: “Let me give myself up entirely to the sweetness of conversing with my soul, since that is the only thing men cannot take away from me” (5-6). Modestly (and, it will prove, falsely) averring that this book is “only a shapeless diary of my reveries,” a mere “appendix to my Confessions” (6), he intends by writing it “to make myself aware of the modifications of my soul and their sequence” (7). “My enterprise is the same as Montaigne’s, but my goal is the complete opposite of his: he wrote his Essays only for others, and I write my reveries only for myself” (7). It so happens that Montaigne actually said that he wrote for himself alone, but Rousseau doubts him. We may then be permitted to doubt Rousseau. This notwithstanding, Rousseau’s “self” may indeed differ radically from that of Montaigne, which seeks, among other things to impress us with its erudition, to ‘socialize’ with poets, philosophers, historians of the past.

    But is Rousseau entirely alone? In the Second Walk, he writes that “These hours of solitude and meditation are the only ones in he day during which I am fully myself and for myself, without diversion, without obstacle, and during which I can truly claim to be what nature willed” (12)—the obvious implication being that there are other hours of the day when he is not solitary. Be this as it may, to be alone and meditating proves that “the source of true happiness is within us” (13). The Solitary Walker tranquilly meditates on his memories, but the memory he recalls turns out to be a memory of an unusual sort: a memory of lost memory. Knocked over in a collision with a large dog, and rendered unconscious, as he regained consciousness he had the feeling of being born—born again, so to speak, a fortunate fall indeed. “I knew neither who I was nor where I was; I felt neither injury, fear, or worry,” only “rapturous calm” (16). The remainder of the Second Walk consists of less tranquil memories, memories of his persecutors, those who plotted against him to push him out of society. Most prominent among these was a woman, perhaps Eve-like in her betrayal?

    Consistent with true wisdom acquired in his second birth, in the Third Walk Rousseau condemns the wisdom that comes with age. By the time we acquire it we are ready not for life but for death—a glance, perhaps, at the Socratic claim that philosophy teaches one to learn how to die. Nor is true philosophy social; thinkers who write for others do not know themselves but act out of “literary vainglory” (31)—a dart aimed again at Montaigne, among others. Nor will Descartes do. Reading the “modern philosophers” didn’t remove Rousseau’s doubts or end his irresolution but rather shook “all the certainty I thought I had concerning the things that were most important for me to know” (32). So much for the clear and distinct ideas offered by the Cartesians. Hope and fear determine the content of one’s faith, Rousseau argues, implicitly rejecting the concept of grace and also the Christian doctrine of divine punishment for erroneous faith. If, after consulting “one’s own feeling” and “choos[ing] it with all the maturity of judgment one can put into it,” we nonetheless “fall into error,” we “could not justly suffer the penalty, since we would not be at fault (34). This puts his own sense of justice against that of the Christian God. Butterworth observes that “the philosopher is necessarily something of a solitary walker,” separate from the religion that binds society (178).

    Rousseau makes this separation even more apparent in the Fourth Walk, which he begins by announcing that Plutarch is “the author who grips and benefits me most,” and not (for example) Matthew, Mark, Paul, Luke, or John. On the question of truth and knowledge, his criterion is justice, as determined by “moral instinct,” not reason (48). Neither the divine Logos of the Gospels nor the logic of the philosophers reveals truth. Considering both self-deception and deception of others, Rousseau supplements his memory of his betrayal by a woman with a memory of having betrayed one, when he lied about a theft he committed and implicated an innocent chambermaid in the crime. But he immediately raises the question of whether we owe the truth to others. If one “gives counterfeit money to a man to whom he owes nothing, he undoubtedly deceives the man, but he does not rob him” (45). He concludes that we owe others the truth when it affects justice; a truth concerning something that does not affect justice, an “idle fact” (46), is not owed to another at all. “Truth stripped of every kind of possible usefulness cannot therefore be a thing owed, and consequently he who suppresses it or disguises it does not lie at all” (46). Conversely, “useful fictions” (including the stories in the Reveries?) are “true lies” (48). On this, Butterworth observes that Rousseau can prudently resolve to lie no more because he now lives in solitude (187)—or perhaps more precisely, lives in part-time solitude.

    Rousseau’s newborn faith includes a paradise. As fortune would have it, it’s named St. Peter’s Island, and the Fifth Walk contains its description. This paradise exists in this life, not in the next, and it requires only an appreciation of “the sentiment of existence” to achieve (69), not any striving for a telos beyond ourselves, nor any filling of the soul by the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Rousseau teaches that “we are sufficient to ourselves, like God” (69). “I would like this instant to last forever” (68): an eternal present. Reverie consists of a “thorough conjunction” of fictions and realities, he also teaches. Butterworth observes that this “passively sensual” experience discards reason, traditional faith, and action. On this rock Rousseau builds his church. If philosophy consists of a rational ascent from the cave of public opinions and customs, and if the first political philosophers took this ascent to be the dialectical investigation of those opinions, then it is fair to say that philosophers beginning with Machiavelli took a different turn. Machiavelli advises the Prince not so much to engage the opinions and customs of his city but to withdraw from them—more, to withdraw from his own beliefs and feelings in order to consult his inner nerve of libido dominandi. Philosophers following in this Machiavellian line undertake a similar mental operation, whether it be Descartes’s cogito ergo sum or Hobbes’s fear of violent death or Locke’s “simple ideas” or sense impressions. Rousseau undertakes the same inner-looking quest, the same attempt to eschew public opinion in the search for a solid, custom-uncluttered starting point for thought, while playfully mocking his predecessors, philosophic and Christian alike.

    And so, in the Sixth Walk, he asserts, “There is hardly any of our automatic impulses whose cause we could not find in our heart, if we only knew how to look for it (74). Having treated faith and hope in the Third Walk, he now turns to the third theological virtue, charity. His charity has a natural, not divinely inspired character; it is a sentiment that society corrupts by transforming into a duty. Rousseau prefers to treat men with “a universal and perfectly disinterested benevolence” (81), although he modestly declines to accept, even in fiction, the godlike power of the ring of Gyges to go with this godlike morality. Could one say that Rousseau’s literary skill is a sort of ring of Gyges, making him elusive if not invisible to many readers, while granting him near-creative power over others? Butterworth remarks Rousseau teaching his readers that “By nature, all men are good.” he makes this observation without explicitly contrasting it with the Christian teaching. While thus rejecting social duties (“I have never been truly suited for civil society where everything is annoyance, obligation, and duty” {83]), Rousseau also rejects what Aristotle calls the moral failing of democrats, namely, to define freedom as doing what one wants. “I have never believed that man’s freedom consisted in doing what he wants, but rather in never doing what he does not want to do” (84). This negative freedom permits a sort of virtue, a virtue animated by natural sentiments susceptible to corruption by society and its opinions. We are led to suppose that Rousseau never would have betrayed that chambermaid if he had not been so worried about what others thought of him, and what they might do to him. Such temptations can be resisted only if you walk away, in solitude, leaving servility to others behind along with the concomitant fearful need to dominate them. This is Rousseau’s reply to Machiavelli, Hobbes, and other, previous philosophic individualists, and it is his reply in advance to the philosopher who set out to ennoble their teachings, Friedrich Nietzsche.

    Considering human nature sans custom will make members of a predominantly Christian society think of Eden. In the Seventh Walk Rousseau turns to considering the larger nature, outside civil society, which encompasses human nature. He makes this turn while leaving ratiocination behind. “I have always thought rather deeply, but rarely with pleasure, almost always against my liking, and as though by force” (91); thinking feels suspiciously like socially-imposed duties feel. “Reverie relaxes and amuses me; reflection tires and saddens me; thinking always was a painful and charmless occupation for me” (91). And so when the Solitary Walker explores his Edenic island, he botanizes in a way unlike that of Adam (charged with the duty of classifying plants) or of modern scientists (who search for their medicinal properties, often for material interest, profit). He instead appreciates their color and structure—what would soon be called their esthetic qualities. “My ideas are now almost nothing but sensations, and the sphere of my understanding does not transcend the objects which immediately surround me” (96); Rousseau soaks in Locke’s simple ideas without striving for the complex ones. Botany, the study of plants on the surface of the earth, avoids the unhealthy, effortful study of minerals in the earth and the bloody vivisection of zoology; it is “a study for an idle and lazy solitary person” (98), so long as he resists the temptation to put what he learns to some use, whether for material profit or worse, for fame, for the satisfaction of amour-propre. On the seventh day, Rousseau rests content.

    He can do so because in his botanical study he tastes fruit supposed poisonous, which turns out not to be so. “No pleasant-tasting natural product” is harmful “to the body” (102). He is silent concerning the soul. Botany “recalls to me both my youth and my innocent pleasures” (103); one might call it the prelapserian science. Butterworth remarks, “Because [Rousseau] does not think it possible to explain the whole, he insists that all one can do is to enjoy being art of the whole” (211).

    The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Walks are unfinished—unintentionally so, as far as anyone can tell. The Eighth Walk concerns fortune, which Rousseau calls the basis of public opinion, and which Machiavelli had adjured the Prince to conquer. “I no longer saw in [the public’s “interior dispositions”] anything more than randomly moved masses, destitute of all morality with respect to me” (114), mere products of passions and the prejudices those passions produce; “even when [people] judge well, these good judgment still frequently arise from a bad principle” (113). An “innocent and persecuted man” such as himself had better withdraw “into [his] own soul,” renouncing the “comparisons and preferences” that society with its instrument, amour-propre, wields so foolishly (116). “All other old men are worried about everything; I am worried about nothing” (117). “As soon as I find myself under the trees and in the midst of greenery,” away from society, “I believe I am in an earthly paradise” (119).

    Insofar as public happiness or civil contentment is possible, it requires equality, according to the Rousseauian implication uncovered by Butterworth in his interpretation of the Ninth Walk. Inequality requires forceful, hurtful assertion of the superior over the inferior, and may provoke the forceful, hurtful rebellion of the inferior against the superior. As all atoms are created equal, one might add that this equality has a kind of justice to it. (If we become curious about what such a civil society might look like, that is what the Social Contract is for). For a Rousseau, of course, a different justice applies. He is sufficiently bold to tell us that he writes his Tenth Walk on Palm Sunday, the fiftieth anniversary of the day he first met his mistress, Madame de Warens. The Solitary Walker’s entry into the new Jerusalem coincides with his memory of his Eve. The final word of the Reveries, by intention or fortune, is “her”. This completes his reverie of paradise.

    Butterworth concludes that what Rousseau embraces philosophically as his (as it were) spiritual mistress is a refined nihilism. Be that as it may, Rousseau does set out to annihilate previous religious and philosophic teachings, even as he follows the path of ‘individualism’ set down by Machiavelli.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Origins of the “New Left”

    November 27, 2016 by Will Morrisey

    Review of George Friedman: The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.

     

    Founded in 1923 in Frankfurt Germany, the Institute for Social Research “developed a unique and powerful critique of modern life,” providing “the basis of much of the student movement of the 1960s” (13). Its luminaries included Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and (most famously) Herbert Marcuse; thinkers closely associated with the Frankfurt School included Walter Benjamin and Erich Fromm.
    George Friedman wrote this book under the guidance of the late Werner Dannhauser, that witty and humane scholar whose mastery of Nietzsche must have proved helpful, inasmuch as the Frankfurt School pioneered the appropriation of Nietzsche’s thought by the ‘Left.’ This was a move by no means obvious to make, but the technologized horrors of the First World War convinced many socialists that Marxian social-class analyses could not adequately explain the modern world. By the time Adorno and Horkheimer wrote Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1944, revulsion against Nazi and Communist mass-murder had convinced anyone with eyes to see that the great diagnostician of nihilism spoke more immediately and more profoundly to the crisis of the West than anything Marx had to say.
    On a visit to Auschwitz, I saw the remains of a small death factory. Nearby, at Birkenau, I saw a vast space where the Nazis undertook murder on a truly industrial scale. And all so meticulously organized. “In our time,” Friedman writes, “we have discovered the darker side of reason. We have found that along with great triumphs, reason has also brought great brutality. The Frankfurt School set itself the task of defining the relationship between reason and brutality” (13-14). From Machiavelli, who advises the prince to pull back from all beliefs and sentiments in order to master Fortuna, to Bacon, who would harness experimental science in order to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate, and culminating in Hegel, who claimed that the course of events itself unfolded rationally, ‘dialectically,’ and had reached its logical conclusion in his own system of thought—replacing philosophy or the love of wisdom with sagacity, wisdom itself—”modern philosophy… is marked by a radical self-confidence” (14). It “believes that all things could be as they ought to be,” that “the real and the rational had become one” (14).
    But had it? Reason understood as modern rationalism has indeed given human beings power over nature. But given that power, how shall we use it? The world wars and the concentration camps show that scientific, world-transforming rationalism can serve the purposes of insane tyrants as well as humane democrats. Hegel pointed to the administrative state as the means of making societies rational, but Auschwitz deployed the science of administration in a slaughterhouse for humans. “Auschwitz was a rational place, but it was not a reasonable one” (15). “It was this unreasonable rationality, this modern paradox, that was the great concern of the Frankfurt School,” whose members saw in Auschwitz the abandonment of critical reason (16). To make social science ‘value-free,’ as social scientists had tried all too successfully to do, left social science intellectually and morally powerless against the use of social science by tyrants.
    Accordingly, “the Frankfurt School denied modernity’s complacent certainty of its progressive excellence”—its claim that the course of events or ‘History’ unfolds logically to a good conclusion–while nonetheless “affirm[ing] modernity’s confidence that all things human could be known, or at least sensed, however dark their origins.” These scholars “condemned modernity’s sense of itself without denying its project”—which is probably why Friedman carefully avoids using the fashionable term ‘postmodernism’ to describe them (16).
    The Frankfurt School followed a longstanding line of modern thought, beginning with Rousseau, which directs its ire at the characteristic modern social class, the bourgeoisie. In the Anglophone world alone, we have seen the Romantic poets, Victorian essayists like Carlyle, Emerson, Thoreau, Arnold, and Ruskin, down through the ‘counterculture’ writers of the second half of the twentieth century, alit with loathing for the materialism and pedestrianism of bourgeois life. Frustratingly for these thinkers, the working class upon which anti-capitalists pinned their hopes have continually sided with the bourgeoisie, because the bourgeoisie delivers the material goods that the workers want every bit as much as the businessmen do. And so the central dialectical clash of post-Rousseauian modernity has turned out to be not the bourgeoisie against the proletarians (as Marx and his followers expected) but the bourgeoisie against the ‘intellectuals’—very often the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie, rebelling against the boring banality of life dedicated to comfortable self-preservation.
    “The Frankfurt School took on as its political project an attack on bourgeois philistinism,” understanding that the real struggle was esthetic, not economic, a matter of sensibility not sense (18). Marxism in both its dictatorship-of-the-proletariat, Bolshevik form and its democratic-parliamentarian social-democracy form had failed by valorizing the same mindless ‘work ethic’ touted by the bourgeois. Bourgeois or modern-liberal thought had aimed its ire at religious fanaticism; in taming religious passion, it had gone a long way to conquering not just nature but the human sense of the sacred, making of religion into mere moralism.

    Following Heidegger, the Frankfurt School approached philosophy through textual explication or “critical theory,” but “under the apparently dispassionate exegesis moved a radical purpose: to comprehend modernity in order to undermine it,” and to recover, through what seems at first an esthetic project, “a politics of principle rather that of mere effectiveness” (20)—”to formulate a theoretical exegesis of the sociocultural crisis of the contemporary world and to prepare the theoretical ground for practical activity” (22) freed from the morally neutral inability to exercise moral judgments which enabled the tyrannical enormity of Auschwitz to occur. Not in foolishly optimistic progressivist historicism but in a return—Friedman calls it “nostalgia”—to the ideational roots of modernity and even (in Benjamin’s case) to the pre-modernity of Judaism we can think and feel our way out of the “brutal catastrophe” of Marxist and other historicist rationalisms (25). The Frankfurt School urged modern man to move away from rationalist utopianism back, but also forward, to a renewed Messianism; “they craved the Messianic from the bitterest roots of historical despair” (26).

    Friedman divides the body of his book into three parts: a nine-chapter section on the philosophic roots of the Frankfurt School (in which Heidegger appears as the central figure); four chapters on the problem of modernity; and three chapters on the “solution” to that problem, which is most emphatically not a ‘final’ solution in either the straightforward, Hegelian and Marxist sense of an ‘end of history’ or in the sinister genocidal sense we associate with Nazism. Indeed, the Frankfurt School’s distinctive break from the ‘Left’ philosophies and ideologies which they had imbibed may be seen in this refusal of historical finality, which they had come to associate with the tyrannies now described (following Mussolini) as ‘totalitarian.’ Out of “the complex of antibourgeois thought that emerged from the nineteenth century” (29), they “appropriate[d] the criticism of the mass”—the esthetic and political culture of democracy or egalitarianism—”for the Left” (30) (italics added). At the same time, they opposed the old Left, the Marxist Left, because “they did not share Marx’s idea that the perpetual rationalization of the human condition is a good and inevitable thing” (31).

    What would later become known in the United States and elsewhere as the New Left selected a few thoughts from Marx while eschewing Marx’s proudest claim, to have discovered laws of historical development modeled on those of Hegel—complete with the notion of an unfolding ‘dialectical’ clash of opposites leading inevitably to the end, the purpose of that conflict. Having learned from Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Freud, “they simply were no longer Marxists in any ordinary sense” (37). They regarded Marx’s deterministic laws of history as themselves products of late capitalism, “not an insight into the nature of human history but rather an attitude of a corrupted age,” “humanly false and evil” (38). While retaining some of Marx’s class-based analysis of social development, they rejected the actual self-understanding of proletarians, which they regarded as bourgeois-too-bourgeois. Instead of claiming that proletarians and the middle classes would lose their false consciousness by their decline into impoverishment, as class divisions under capitalism widened, the Frankfurt School expected these classes to confront an ever-increasing sense of the meaninglessness of lives devoted to comfortable self-preservation. Socialism will occur not because social change will lead to psychic transformation but rather psychic transformation will spur social change (41). This line of argument eventually appealed less to proletarians than to the disaffected sons and daughters of the middle classes, now at university en masse. It also dovetails with the growing ‘environmentalist’ movement of the 1960s; “the conquest of nature becomes the ratification of repression rather than the preface to heroism”; “a rationalized existence is antithetical to a free one,” they averred, in their “most profound break with Marx” (48). Marx had supposed that fully-instantiated human rationality would both construct and deconstruct, both affirm ‘History’s’ progress and cunningly advance it. But “to the Frankfurt School, reason had become affirmative”—justifying the worst crimes—”and seemed to have lost its cunning” (48), and indeed its common sense.

    Nor did the critique of Marxism lead them back to Hegelianism, although they shared Hegel’s obsession with “the problems of history and reason”(51). They rejected Hegelianism on four grounds: Hegel’s dialectically unfolding Absolute Spirit leads to a final synthesis of opposites, an affirmation of “the prevailing social order” with no room for any further negation or critique of that order; his claim that the Absolute Spirit proceeds according to rational laws embodied in the sociopolitical institutions of each historical epoch; his “positive faith in the dialectical certainty of history”; and his “actual social and political prescriptions”—most notably, his esteem for modern, statist bureaucracy animated by the spirit of the science of administration (51). To put it in the language of modern philosophy, which distinguishes sharply between the thinking ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ the thinker thinks about, the attempt of Hegelian rationalism to make the thinker’s logical/dialectical thought objective, to fully instantiate that thought in the world around him via the science of administration, destroys human freedom; at the moment this project is realized, it “makes itself and what it rules unfree by forcing them into its necessarily formal confines” (55). A fully rationalized world leaves no place for human freedom, but ossifies into a ‘totalitarian’ structure that leaves no room for criticism. For the Frankfurt School, “the rationalized world [of the administrative state] constituted the gravest threat to authentic being” (60). Enlightenment, culminating in Hegelianism, “had not driven away darkness; it had caused the darkness to descend more thoroughly than ever” (61). Less metaphorically, “Reason, which had existed to discover authentically true horizons, had succeeded only in abolishing the old and false ones. Reason had become its own horizon, and the formal and objective requirements of the logic of reason had supplanted an authentically useful horizon” (62), leaving only two possibilities remaining: positivism or a retreat to some outmoded metaphysics.

    Nietzsche and Heidegger to the rescue—remarkably, to the rescue of the Left. Nietzsche’s slashing attack on all of the “transcendental and antisensual moralities” had “made real the possibility of the sensually erotic life, which was the true intention of the Frankfurt School” (63). Reason or Enlightenment rationalism had merely established itself as a new myth, but one without content, “incapable of supplying anything but facticity and doubt” (63). Fully-developed Enlightenment rationalism (and indeed, Nietzsche argued, reason itself, beginning with Socrates and his enunciation of the principle of non-contradiction) “must deny the autonomy of any part [of the world] excluded from its reality,” most notably the “autonomous will” of the thinking subject” (64). But to give oneself over entirely to ‘objectivity’ one must deny self-consciousness; since the self-conscious or self-knowing subject is the ground of reason, “reason, in order to conclude its own conquest must regress, since it must deny the one thing that would allow will: consciousness” (65). Positivism or brute facticity then reigns supreme; what began in mindfulness drowns in a sea of mindlessness. “Reason, therefore, must deny what it had initially promised: freely realized humanity”; “modernity is catastrophic for man” (65).

    Mass culture exemplifies this mindlessness. The high culture of the old aristocracies has become subordinate to “the demand of the social mechanism” (65), the philistine tastes of an egalitarian society. Nietzsche excoriates this as decadence. Adorno called upon the few persons of taste now remaining “to withdraw from the culture that makes one ill—which is illness” (67). However nostalgic this may seem, the Frankfurt School rejected the path of Romanticism, believing, with Nietzsche, that there is no road back to high culture. Nor, of course, did they return to the historical teleology of Hegel or Marx, these being manifestations of the rationalism which caused the problem in the first place. Rather, they followed Nietzsche in the willed rejection of all systems, valorizing negation or critical thinking. They most emphatically did not follow Nietzsche (and indeed seemed to ignore Nietzsche’s teaching) in claiming that deep inside every individual there is a small but ineluctable core of fatum, of fatality. Rather, more optimistically, they contended that the right response to the banality of mass culture is to negate, negate, and negate again, to exercise critical rather than positivist thinking.

    Most tellingly, the Frankfurt School refused to follow Nietzsche in his radical individualism. Unlike Nietzsche, they could not bring themselves to reject compassion or to deny the social circumstances in which they lived. They endorsed revolution, not the Superman. Centrally, they turned to Heidegger (Marcuse had been his student), but turning him politically leftward, away from fascism. Heidegger takes from Marx the concept of the alienation of modern man in the face of unlivable social conditions, and the resultant search for authenticity. Marx and Heidegger adopt, but also adapt Hegelian historicism—the latter following Nietzsche in rejecting the rationalist dimension of all previous forms of historicism.  “The Frankfurt School occupies the nexus connecting the two giants” (72), Marx and Heidegger—rejecting Marxist rationalism while accepting Marx’s socialism, rejecting Heidegger’s national socialism or Nazism while accepting his emphasis on authenticity as non-rational. Whereas historicist rationalism succumbs to the error of positing a fully rationalized world that leaves no room for the human subject, its will and its consciousness, Heideggerian irrationalism refuses “to allow Being to become identical with a being in the world” that would at the same time reserve to itself the power to criticize or negate elements of the world (74).  What is invaluable in Heidegger is his acknowledgment that the human subject is a historical being, not a natural being; Heidegger in this sense not only remains a historicist but radicalizes historicism; and he does this without abstracting the human subject from its authentic, non-rational essence, without making the subject a rationalist, Cartesian ego cogito, a being which imagines its ability to think proves that it exists. In the eyes of the Frankfurt School, “Heidegger’s search for being was the search for an authentic whole” (74). He failed because he “grasps at an illusion,” namely, “a Being radically free of its social context” (75). “He fails to place Being into practice” (76), succumbing instead to the uncritical endorsement of the existing social condition of his time and place, Nazism.

    To avoid the error of his teacher, Marcuse pointed to the individual as the ground of the future revolution: “The revolution begins with the individual and ends with his transformation” (77). “Narcissism” or “self-realization” retains Nietzschean/Heideggerian individualism while remaining cognizant of, and more ambitiously aiming at the radical transformation of society, too. This is Marcuse’s “aestheticization/eroticization of being” (77). Because Heidegger and Marcuse “both render the individual radically important” in their own ways, both must “face the radicalized problem of death,” given the mortality of each individual life (77). Owing to his estheticism and eroticism, Marcuse valorizes art, high culture against low or at least art-as-negation of mass culture; owing to his individualism, he valorizes “a life without metaphysical solace” or “existentialism (78).

    These moves led the Frankfurt School to its fascination with the thought of that odd yet highly suggestive thinker, Oswald Spengler, whom they considered “a great, if limited, prophet” (79). In The Decline of the West, Spengler describes “the dual character of the Enlightenment”—its promise of human liberation via the conquest of nature and its actual “Caesarism,” which was Spengler’s term for a worldwide, scientistic-administrative rule and its “static culture,” all of which meant “that the West would necessarily revert to a barbarism” (80). As we have seen, “these three insights formed the crux of the Frankfurt School’s vision of the West in late modernity” (80). Spengler even saw the function of the communications media within this system, predicting “the coming of Caesars of world-journalism” (81)—William Randolph Hearst and the other ‘press barons’ whose rise complemented that of the ‘robber barons.’ Spengler’s book was “the origin of [the Frankfurt School’s] critique of technology and the culture begotten by technology” (84); in the fully rationalized but unreasonable machine-age, man becomes the object and the machine becomes the subject, destroying human creativity—as seen in a thousand science-fiction novels and as analyzed in Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man. Finally, Spengler warned that the money-cultural, mass-cultural, machinist, prison would find opposition in the bloody horrors of barbaric, technology-driven war, as spirited men rebelled violently against the enclosing, soul-deadening embourgeoisement. “It was Spengler, more than Marx” (or Hegel) “who gave the School their sense of the future” (85). “The crisis is whether any way to breakout can be found” (85), and the Schoolmen entertained few hopes for that, beyond the kind of psyche-transforming revolution they held out in some desperation.

    For investigation of the psyche, the Schoolmen turned to Freud, whose psychoanalytic theory describes the profound tension between reason and desire and speaks of the malign effects of rational and social repression of desire. Freud thus offers a dimension of human life hitherto neglected by the Left, and by the Marxian Left above all. Starkly, “Marx’s failure to consider psychology in a way paved the way for the Russian terror” because “failing to consider subjectivity in a revolution opens the door to reification and tyranny” (88). The inhuman shallowness of Marxist revolution led it first to the violent brutality of state-sponsored terror and then to a philistinism more bourgeois than that of the bourgeoisie, as seen even a century later wherever the remains of Soviet-era architecture pimple the landscape of eastern and central Europe. Marxism leaves no real place for Eros; as such, it must remain fundamentally bourgeois and psychically repressive, as when Soviet premier Nikita Khruschev fulminated like a fundamentalist preacher at the dancers when he visited the Hollywood set where the movie Can-Can was being produced.

    Freud saw something the economic determinist Marx could not see: even with material abundance, “the scarcity of nature constituted a permanent and transhistorical reality” (90) because our erotic desires will remain frustrated even as we eat pineapples on the moon. “The real intention of the School is to deepen the possibility of liberation” to include the erotic desires of the human psyche. This means that the rationalist conquest of nature cannot liberate us. Only the unleashing of “libidinous energy” against the tedious and painful labor commended by both the bourgeois and proletarian work-ethics will do this. Only such a transformed inner, psychic world can satisfactorily transform the social world. By “turn[ing] the revolution inward” (91) as the initial step, the Schoolmen would solve the Marxian problem of alienation in a non-Marxian way by appropriating elements of Freud for their own revolutionary purposes.

    Heidegger and Spengler flirted dangerously with contempt for Jews and Judaism, associated as they were in the minds of their enemies with money and cosmopolitanism. Before and especially in the wake of the Holocaust, the Frankfurt School utterly rejected this aspect of these thinkers. Here Friedman turns particularly to the thought of Walter Benjamin, a somewhat marginal figure (he never actually joined the Institute) but an important voice on the non-Marxist Jewish Left. Benjamin and to some degree the core of the Schoolmen understood that supplementing Marx with Freudian psychology would not suffice; the “Jewish Question,” upon which Marx had written and which Hitler had answered with murderous fanaticism, could find no answer in either Marx or Freud. With regard to Freud, it might well be replied that the satisfaction of erotic desires comport quite well with the rule of the administrative state; Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World comes to mind, as does Tocqueville’s description of soft, democratic despotism in Democracy in America. To Marx, “The practical side of Judaism, the god of commerce, had overwhelmed and obliterated he sacred possibilities of man” (93). The answer to the Jewish Question was the abolition of capitalism; the advent of communism—after the seizure of the state by the proletariat, its use to abolish all social classes, and the consequent withering-away of the state itself—amounted to an atheist Messianism: “Marx’s preoccupation with the abolition of Jews has about it a strange and not quite expressed Jewishness” (93). European Jews had embraced the Enlightenment, but Enlightenment liberalism had failed to provide them the protection it had promised. The Schoolmen saw that Marxism didn’t protect Jews, either; Friedman doesn’t mention it, but Stalin eventually came for the Jews, too. The road to liberation could not lead through statism, much less through statist terror, but that is where Marxism-Leninism had tried to lead it.

    In view of concentration camps built by both the tyrannical Right and the tyrannical Left, the Left needed to rethink the Jewish Question. Benjamin understood that the Fifth Commandment, requiring the Israelites to honor their parents, serves as the fundamental bond of society under the Mosaic Law. “The redemption by the son of the promise of the father is what inextricably makes one a Jew” (94). The redemption of Israel and humanity as a whole (for which Israel will serve as the light unto the nations) will require divine intervention in the form of the Messiah. Crucially, the Messianism of a Creator-God, of a Holy Spirit, differs fundamentally from the Messianism of Marxism or of any historicist thinker. Hegelian historicism posits an Absolute Spirit, not a Holy one. The Absolute Spirit is immanent in all things; the cosmos itself is nothing other than the unfolding of the Absolute Spirit, over time. Marx takes the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute Spirit and gets rid of the spirituality, positing an entirely materialist theory of historical development. In radical contrast to these theories, the Creator-God of the Bible, holy (that is, separate from and utterly superior to His creation), creates the cosmos not out of Himself but out of nothing. Thus the Messiah-substitute of Marxian communism issues from rationally knowable laws of History, the predictable development of class conflict; Walter Benjamin knew Judaism teaches that “the Messiah may enter at any moment,” redeeming the sufferings of the parents and all the ancestors, but according to the will of God, not the supposed laws of History. The will of God is knowable to human beings only insofar as God chooses to reveal it to them, and He has not chosen to reveal the time of the coming of the Messiah.

    Benjamin “saw in the Messiah the metaphor for the historical problem” (96). Until now, history has been profane; escape from profaneness cannot come via the historical dialectic, whether Hegelian or Marxist, but only through the unpredictable irruption of a Messianic event. Accordingly, “Benjamin turns Marxism into a Jewish event” (95), an event that can be invoked not through the dictatorship of the proletariat in control of the state but (in a way paralleling a religion of the Holy Word, a religion of the Book) via language. “The intention of the revolutionary, like the Kabbalist, is to discover the formula that will invoke the sudden and miraculous intrusion into history of an exogenous force, thereby shattering the structure of time and opening the path to redemption” (97). The language needed to free humanity from the chains of profane history is not the manipulative language of political rhetoric or propaganda seen in late-modern politics. Again paralleling the Bible, the language needed is the language of naming, seen first in the divine command to Adam in the Garden of Eden. “The name incorporates the thing into the structure of language” (96); what the American scholar Harry V. Jaffa called “the miracle of the common noun” consists in the human capacity (in the Bible, given by the God who creates Man out of dust) to see the commonalities amongst many particulars, to see and express the commonality among the many red oaks as the identifiable species, ‘red oak.’ But the language of naming can only go so far, because it cannot incorporate a thing or a being that exceeds the human capacity to describe. And so God’s name is not to be spoken. Similarly, it will take the advent of the Messiah “to remake the very structure of time in such a way as to redeem the past by annihilating the suffering that constituted its moment” (97). The character of the future Zion, the future ‘Heaven on Earth,’ is as ineffable as the character of God. “Profane language cannot speak without having something to speak of. In the speaking of the triumph, the language of history is unfree. The conquest of nature is the preface to redemption, but only the preface, because the second problem is not solved Language must turn to itself through naming in order to be purged of the profane” and thus at least prepare the way for the unpredictable coming of the Messianic event that will issue in the ineffable Zion.

    Such a language cannot be scientific or rationalist. It must be metaphorical, an indirect expression or suggestion of something that cannot yet be humanly defined. “Only the metaphor frees us from identity but roots us in reality” (98). For example, if I say “God is love” I have spoken of God, but I have not defined God, inasmuch as God is not only love. “Jews speak of God and redemption metaphorically. Identity and abstraction are catastrophic to them. So, too, Benjamin and Adorno speak metaphorically. But where the Jewish conception of redemption is a metaphor of a thing unimaginable—redemption—the Frankfurt School’s is a metaphor for a metaphor. They use the Jewish formulation of language to explain their own epistemological dilemma: language is the ground of freedom but simultaneously of imprisonment. Redemption requires the Messiah who would cut the dialectical knot.” (98) For them, the advent of communism is the Messiah-substitute for the Biblical Messiah. “The point of Communism is that it is a radical break with the past—a Messianic break” (99). Benjamin understood that this parallels the Biblical condemnation of idolatry. He “chooses a Jewish metaphor for Communism because his alternative is a Greek image“—one thinks of the picture of communism painted by William Morris in News from Nowhere. “An image is, however, on a continuum with the original and is thus dialectically bound up with it” (99). An image of the future Zion, the world of communism, would amount to an idol, and idolatry anticipates the error of rationalism, especially in its historicist form, the error of demanding lawful predictability from Being, the error of believing that reality is fully ‘enlightenable’ or knowable, humanly controllable.

    As Friedman quietly understates the matter, “The problem is the leap from metaphor to reality” (99). Historical dialectic had been exhausted in bureaucratization; “neither damned nor redeemed, history exhausted itself, suspended between hope and horror” (100). One can only hope for “the Messianic intervention into seamless time,” an intervention “blast[ing] that moment and that time into nonexistence, thereby redeeming its suffering” (99). To prepare for this moment devoutly to be wished, the Schoolmen identified “the political task of Critical Theory [as] establish[ing] the prismatic formula through which the Messianic entity could be invoked and identified” (100). Almost pitiably (I remark), they searched for a “revolutionary subject” outside the course of modern history: these included the peoples of the ‘Third World” (that is, outside the ambit of either the bourgeois West or the communist East), peoples of color living inside the sphere of the liberal West, and even, by the 1960s, the students of the New Left, who had given themselves over to the Dionysian ‘counter-culture’ of sex, drugs, and rock-and-roll—all in conjunction with a politics of communitarianism.

    To their credit, the Schoolmen understood that these reeds were quite likely weak. The odds of finding a Moses in those bulrushes seemed very long to them. In the intellectual dimension of their project, Critical Theory resembled the Midrash: “the profane hermeneutic of the utterly sacred” (101). “Both are the attempt of the unredeemed to glean visions of redemptions from the words that mediate between the sacred and the profane” (101).

    Friedman concludes the section on the ideational origins of the Frankfurt School by clearly distinguishing them from the Old Left of Marxism. “Marx was no solution. Indeed, in many ways, he was the heart of the problem. To industrialism, he could juxtapose only more industry; the reason, only more rationalization.” All of this resulted in “the towering emptiness [the Babylon?] that accompanied Communism” (104-105). The Right, which did oppose modernity without availing itself of modernity’s conceptual tools, also failed because it was ‘reactionary,’ attempting to return to an irrecoverable past. Would the Frankfurt School prove to be “the redeemer or the executioner of the teleological hopes of the Enlightenment” (106-107)? With this, Friedman turns to the second section of his book, in which he examines the Schoolmen’s statement of the problem of modernity in their own terms, not in the terms of the thinkers they drew upon.

    “The centerpiece of modernity faith is its belief in Enlightenment,” in the “demystification” of all remaining mysteries, the dispelling of all shadows of ignorance. The Schoolmen trace the Enlightenment to Homeric Greece, to “the myth of Odysseus,” the man who assumes “that through reason or cunning, the natural can, somehow, be known to man” (111-112). Reason has its place, but only in the form of criticism or negation of the given, never as “positivity” or construction, which only leads to tyranny (113). By denying the rational subject’s power to know the essence of a thing, the ‘thing-in-itself,’ Enlightenment rationalists inclined to denying essence altogether, dismissing it as a pseudo-problem on the shaky assumption that if the rational subject cannot understand the essence of a thing, if Enlightened reason cannot shed its light upon it, essences may as well not exist at all. In the rational attempt to remove all contradictions the Enlighteners dismiss anything that doesn’t fit their ideas: “the idea becom[es] identical with the thing” (116). This leads either the identification of reason with whatever exists—Hegel’s error—or, as seen in the ‘totalitarian’ tyrants, the identification of reason with whatever must be forced to exist, according to the tyrant’s systematic plan. Either way, the result is the denial of critical reason, the denial of the human capacity to negate the fact in favor of the essence. “Reason, under the rule of Positivism, stands in awe of the fact” (118), losing “true subjectivity” (120) or the capacity to judge the fact. Reason comes to “recognize no standard beyond the fact” (121). This illusion perpetuates itself easily because positive, instrumental reason does succeed in delivering economic goods and because it is logically consistent with its own anti-essentialist premises. To “break out of its self-satisfaction,” this form of rationalism “requires an act of self-conscious will rather than dialectical movement” (123), which would only confirm the premises with which it begins. No logical system can overcome the problem of systematization itself. Only critical theory—purposely unsystematic or “prismatic”—can enable philosophy to escape its self-made cage.us

    If Enlightenment yields materialism; materialism yields the criterion of quantifiability as the test of truth; quantifiability characterizes modern science and lends itself to technology; and technology aims at the conquest of nature, overriding the essence of things, then the conquest of nature implies the self-deification of man. Because man is not really a god, this means that the result of Enlightenment ‘demystification’ of the world is a myth, that the “Enlightenment is itself a myth” (130). Like the mythical Odysseus, that “human Prometheus” (130), “with real and imagined suffering and with authentic cunning,” the rational man “roams the world slaying whatever is enchanted, eluding and deluding those magical things that can only be dealt with so” (130-131). Enlightenment “never escapes mythology but recapitulates myth in rationalistic form” (132); like the magicians of antiquity, it fears what it cannot see, namely, the essences of things. Anything that “did not conform [was] ruled out of existence,” and those elements that did conform were integrated into a precreated structure of thought” (133). What began as a critique of mythology and barbarism ends in a new myth and a new barbarism.

    The Enlightenment thus precipitates a crisis of culture. Against rationalism, the Frankfurt School upheld esthetic sensibility; “our tastes determine our experience of the world” (139). Culture “consistently subjects itself to analysis and criticism” precisely because it has this esthetic criterion of judgment. “The critic’s role is pivotal in relation to culture” (139)—never allowing culture to ossify into a supposed ‘end of history.’  “The root of the cultural crisis is the failure of the work of art in this age to take a critical stance. Rather than upholding the beautiful as a historical alternative to the ugly irrationality of the world, the work of art either lapses into historical irrelevance or into a positive affirmation of the world as it is” (141)—useless abstraction or pointless concretion” (143), art-for-art or artful propaganda. Art becomes either a commodity, as under capitalism, or an instrument of political control, as under ‘totalitarianism.’ Against this, the Schoolmen deployed critical textual exegesis in an attempt to “conjure the radical possibilities embedded in the tradition without falling into reaction” (154). Exegesis keeps truth rooted in language, not in the distorting objectivism of Positivism.

    Can this work? Under contemporary conditions, human beings are entertaining themselves to death; “amusement replaces art as the principle of mass culture” (163), as we doze in a relaxing hot tub of uncritical bliss. “Television takes this [inauthentic or pseudo-art] to radical extremes” (161); by penetrating the home, it makes the rightly private, erotic quest of art into a public spectacle. The entertainment industry “must maintain itself and thereby maintain the system it is a part of” by eschewing the critical function of genuine art. “It does this by abolishing the distinction between the cultural product and life. Life becomes like a movie, and movies tend to recapitulate life” (164). The Schoolmen did not live long enough to view ‘reality television,’ and Friedman published his book decades before its invention, but they would see it as the culmination of the phenomenon they abhor.

    The modern crisis extends, therefore, into the human psyche itself. The abolition of scarcity accomplished by the conquest of nature has not abolished the problem of alienation, as Marx had supposed. “Clearly, something had gone wrong with the consciousness of the masses” (169). As we have seen, the Frankfurt School turned to Freud as the great explorer of the unconscious and the repressive Superego, while rejecting Freud’s naturalism as too conservative, ahistorical. For the Schoolmen, “scarcity is historical and not natural” (172). They also rejected Freud’s theory of the death wish, which tends to deny the possibility of Messianic irruption. “Freud’s pessimism, moderated through Marx, becomes optimism” (179). Having conquered nature, we should now be able to liberate our repressed desires, which had to be repressed while we conquered nature but are no longer repressed for any good reason. “The greater the potential for liberation from material want, the less possible is freedom from psychic distortion” (185). It is easy to see why the comfortable, middle-class university students of the 1960s found all of this so appealing.

    “The overarching crisis” of modernity is a crisis of history, “the failure of history to transcend itself—the freezing of history at an inhuman moment” (186). If “the essence of humanity is in its negativity,” in its capacity to say ‘no’ to the factual conditions in which it finds itself, in “its standing against the affirmations of everyday life, in the rejection of the demand to be a member of the group”—that Freudian Superego—then “the attack on [the] private sphere,” the attack on the human subject, whether by commercial capitalism or ‘totalizing’ modern tyranny, “is the essence of the historical crisis” (188). In the United States, capitalism uses technology to seduce; in Nazi Germany, the regime uses technology to terrorize. The Soviet regime, too, “sprang from the same ground of Enlightenment as the West” (198), so it could never fulfill its self-proclaimed Messianic mission. Like anti-imperialist Third-World guerrillas, the ideational warrior of Critical theory carried on “the warfare of irregular against regularity itself” (203).

    Friedman devotes the third section of his book to elaborating the Frankfurt School’s “search for the solution” (205)—again, never to be an ominous, dehumanizing ‘final’ solution. The Schoolmen proposed three interdependent solutions: exegetical, political, and Messianic.

    The exegetical solution, Critical Theory, arose out of their conviction that Marx was mistaken, or at least no longer correct in his demand that philosophy bend itself to the practical purpose of advancing the proletarian revolution or, to put it more grandly, that theory and practice could achieve unity at the end of History. Bolshevism, Social Democracy, and Fascism had each “given the lie to the promise of philosophy” (208). On the contrary, reality will not come to embody philosophy in any predictable way—that is, as the result of any supposed laws immanent in History itself. For now, philosophy must become contemplative and (especially) critical again. “The opposition between appearance and reality, which was an essential element of ancient philosophy, constitutes the core of Critical Theory” (209). More, Critical Theory returns “to what is both the most concrete and the most metaphysical element of the philosophic: the text,” to language, because “what was true in the universe came to man not directly but rather mediated through the word” (210)—an insight embodied in both the Bible and the Platonic dialogues. Even if the noetic perception of Being is wordless, “prior to all that [is] profane,” we live enmeshed in the profane; we can approach “philosophic and religious truth” “only through the words of those who had captured the truth in the web of language, whether Moses or Plato” (212).

    Critical Theory addresses the condition of human beings as they exist now, offering a critique of that condition and “pointing to” (without attempting foolishly to delineate) “the next moment in time” (213); it does so by “negat[ing] the existent untruth, at least in theory” (214). Philosophy is not ideology, not merely the expression of the interests of a given ruling class; it has a transhistorical element, which enables just this ‘pointing beyond.’ And beyond that, Critical Theory “conjures up images of authentic being that are rooted not in time but in the unrealized possibilities inherent in men” (213). In this form of exegesis, “the text as a whole is not treated as sacred; rather, elements of the text, little chips of the sacred (or more precisely, the prophetic) embedded in a complex of the profane, are conjured from the circumstances that defile them” (216). The significance of Spengler (for example) “was in what he knew and not in who he was or what he accomplished” (215), but the Schoolmen also persisted in identifying his contradictions. That is where reason, and even a sort of Socratism, come in. This philosophic approach follows from the characteristic style of Nietzsche, as opposed to Hegel: the critical insight encapsulated in an aphorism, not as a building block in some grand system. The word “conjures” makes sense, as the critical selection made from any text amounts to a “Messianic mediation” which prepares the actual, unpredictable Messianic moment by making “the sacred sensually real” (219) through metaphoric rather than rational, imagistic, and discursive system-building or “positivity” (219). “The historical can no longer tolerate the burden of being systematized,” inasmuch as “the systematic stance would be to abandon the struggle against the system” (223). Auschwitz was simply too stark and crushing, too much an event of “awesome singularity” (even if, sickeningly, replicated many times in the twentieth century) to be explained away as just another dialectical incident in the march of historical progress. This is true, one surmises, even if, as Hegel had remarked, the dialectical clash of opposites can be described as a slaughter-bench. “History has become such that the particles of experience can no longer be understood if they are forced into the unnatural categories of eternally unchanging systems” (222). Transcendence via contemplation, not immanence via dialectics is the only approach that holds out the promise of breaking free from the stultifying system of the World State. “The ultimate hope is for the transfiguration of being itself into a realm of utter negativity and autonomy” (225).

    The Frankfurt School never loses sight of the political aim of its contemplative and critical approach. “Just as the goal of Critical Theory in dealing with texts had been to transcend the textual material, so the goal of the Critical Theory in dealing with the world was to transcend the practical” (226). This transcendence, again, is not immanent in any historical process but Messianic, to be revealed in a catastrophe of history and not in some mythical historical telos. Here is where the Schoolmen pin their hopes on ‘Third World’ peoples, American blacks, and students, which they take to be “strangely archaic” forces outside of the tentacles of Enlightenment historicist systematizing. “If the Enlightenment turned the world profane, the revolutionary act would make it divine again—more fully than before” (242), as “the revolutionary act puts man in contact once more with the roots of his being and sensibility,” with the sensuously erotic subject rather than the abstractly conceived object (246). But the political revolution is not the Messianic moment itself. That is rather “the transfiguration of Being” (248).

    Like Jews, and even a bit like Marx in his saner moments, (in admitting he could not delineate the exact character of life after the withering-away of the state, life under communism), the Frankfurt School eschews any firm knowledge of the future. Still, some things can be guessed at, negatively. Just as a strict Jew will describe God’s attributes negatively (God is not lacking in loving-kindness, not lacking in justice, and so on), the condition brought about by the Messianic event will betoken the negation of the struggle against nature and the disappearance of the death wish from the psychic landscape. To say any more than that, the Schoolmen had recourse to mythic language. So, for example, Marcuse would replace the figure of Prometheus with those of Orpheus and Narcissus, personifications of “the joy of gratification” and of “self-gratification” (257). “Marcuse rediscovers the individual in the age of the mass in the privacy of the erotic” (261). Consistently enough, the Frankfurt School sympathized with the drug use popularized in the Sixties because “the faculty of fantasy shatters the power of the reality principle,” fantasy being “perpetually indifferent to reason” (264-265). Drugs, dreams, art, and play all can serve to “forge a space between the powers of Positivism and [Heideggerian] existentialism” (266). The man of the Messianic age will be the Last Man, not the aristocratic Superman: but he will spend his time fantasizing and playing, not working as a drone in the industrial beehive.  The whole body will become sexual/erotic, not just a few erogenous zones. Perpetual progress will give way to “perpetual gratification” (276). As Friedman wittily and accurately puts it, this is “the spirit of Nietzsche turned egalitarian” (261). This is a point that cannot be emphasized too much. It is Tocqueville’s soft despotism reconceived not as a place of industrious herds but as self-gratifying individuals. One may well consider it an implausible notion, but many daydreaming university students took it as a realizable vision of Paradise.

    Friedman offers his own criticisms of Critical Theory in his concluding chapter. The Frankfurt School’s (and most especially Marcuse’s) vision of a world o erotic gratification runs into two problems: administration and death. However eroticized human life may become, we will all still die. In such an intensely pleasurable life, “death comes not as a relief but as a tragedy” (281). Death’s prospect “will sour such a life, every time the individual thinks of it. Nietzsche answered the problem of death by calling a good death “the consummation of life, the greatest and deepest act of will,” but Marcus cannot do that. “To see virtue in the negation of Eros is to see virtue in the negation of gratification,” to tear Orpheus to pieces (283). “Marcuse founders on the heart of his problem: joy cannot have eternity” (283). Adorno tries to solve the problem by waving it away, by claiming that fear of death is bourgeois, all-too-bourgeois. The problem, he declares, is “null and void” (286). Brave words from the brave new worldist, but how plausible? Not to Friedman: “The Frankfurt School’s love of life makes it impotent against life’s universal and inevitable negation” (286-287). To negate that negation, you need the God of the Bible, a genuinely divide intervention. “What Adorno never answers is how satiety in socialist society would be less boring and troublesome” than it is in bourgeois society (289). He recapitulates the very problem he sees in the administrative state organized by the social democrats. Yes, work will be abolished, but why will a life of perpetual play satisfy human beings? His “radically childlike” vision of life would freeze men and women in a condition of perpetual infantilism. “In a way, the Frankfurt School attempted to do metaphysically what Trotsky and Mao attempted politically: to institutionalize revolution by making it permanent” (296). In this, they partook of the modernity they opposed, inasmuch as “modernity has always tried to abolish the distance between being and becoming by somehow rooting being in the practice of becoming”—quite unlike the erotic quest seen in Plato’s Republic, or the God-fearing, prophetic quest of the Biblical prophets. Recall that it was Machiavelli who condemned “imaginary republics.” “The Frankfurt School is, in the end, most praiseworthy for he thing that they failed to accomplish, for by failing, they demonstrated the bankruptcy of modernity” (301).

    The Frankfurt School thus offers us an astounding mixture of insight and bosh.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Muslims and the Modern State

    September 30, 2016 by Will Morrisey

    Pierre Manent: Beyond Radical Secularism: How France and the Christian West Should Respond to the Islamic Challenge. Ralph Hancock translation with an introduction by Daniel J. Mahoney. South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2016.

     

    After the founding of the American federal state, with its democratic and commercial republican regime, George Washington did not need to address Muslim-American citizens, as there were none. The more immediate question for Americans was whether the several denominations of Christians could live together. And could any of them live with Jews?

    Before the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of religion, President Washington answered this question in letters he wrote to each of the major religious congregations in the United States. In his First Inaugural Address he had already reminded Americans that the peaceful ratification of the Constitution owed something to God’s providence, that their self-government was not (to use a word not in his vocabulary) a matter of `autonomy’ but of staying within the limits set by the laws of nature and of nature’s God. To the United Baptist Churches in Virginia, the Presbyterian Churches, the Roman Catholics in America, the Annual Meeting of Quakers, and, perhaps most significantly, to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, Washington enunciated the American view of peaceful religious practice as a right not a privilege. “It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights, for, happily, the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no factions, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection to demean themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their effectual support.” It is noteworthy that Washington in settling the question of religious liberty Washington addressed religious believers not primarily as rights-bearing individuals but as members of congregations, as voluntary associations within American civil society.

    Knowingly or not, in this letter to his countrymen, the French political philosopher Pierre Manent follows Washington’s example. He addresses the French first of all as fellow citizens, not as human beings abstracted from the political circumstance in which they now find themselves. The book consists of a preface followed by 20 succinct chapters. These are structured in a series of three six-chapter waves, cresting in the sixth, twelfth, and eighteenth chapters, followed by two chapters of summary, conclusion, and exhortation. In his fine introduction, Daniel J. Mahoney provides a clear overview of Manent’s argument; here I will follow that argument as it unfolds.

    He begins with one the most familiar and perhaps distinctive features of modern politics: the state and civil society. While modern, centralized states are “large, over-burdened,” and “slow-moving,” the citizens in the societies governed by them “work, reflect, decide, invest, whether in their families, their associations or their enterprises” (3). Despite these energies, citizens seldom “manage perceptibly to modify the course or the physiognomy of the big animal,” except in times of crisis (3). “In fear or in hope, each person is now confronted with what is held in common and what war threatens to ruin or revolution to overturn” (3). The thoughts and actions of hitherto ‘individualistic’ or narrowly ‘groupish’ semi-citizens widen, as “each in deciding for himself decides for the whole, and in deciding for the whole decides for himself” (3). For France, the most recent such moment was June 1940, when the Nazis attacked and conquered. “The defeat was the extrinsic accident that revealed the sickness of the nation’s soul”—a disease Charles de Gaulle diagnosed as the renunciation of moral and political responsibility of the French for France. De Gaulle’s founding of a new republic aimed above all at restoring civic responsibility to the French, but the New-Left uprising of May 1968 shook that regime. Without overthrowing the Fifth Republic, the French Left wounded it; their cherished communitarian illusions defeated, the Left whipsawed from activism to comfortable career advancement within the apparatus of the state that had sought to overthrow: “The citizen of action was followed by the individual of enjoyment” (5). This happened not only in France but throughout the Western republics. But (as usual?) the French took this one step farther. “What is specific to France is the political victory of an essentially apolitical movement” (5), by which Manent means that the utopianism of the Sixties Left and the careerism of French leftists ever since both stemmed from a rejection of the Gaullist call to responsibility, to politics.

    This apolitical utopianism found both its expression and its camouflage in the project of European integration. De Gaulle too wanted a European federation—even to the point of saying to the astonished Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin, “Come, let us build Europe together.” But de Gaulle’s Europe was “L’Europe des patries,” the Europe of the Fatherlands: a federation in which each nation and its state remained self-governing, responsible. But in the Europeanist project that actually developed, “the people, unhappy with government, and the government, unhappy with the people, both turned their faces towards the promised land of Europe where each would finally be rid of the other” (6). Manent remarks, “These sweet hopes are no longer with us” (6), as neither states nor peoples can consummate the grand divorce settlement for which they had hoped in pursuing the European Union.

    This failure has had a serious consequence. “Neither the institutions of Europe, nor the government of the nation, nor what is called civil society [for if apolitical, how civil can it be?] have enough strength or credibility to claim the attention or fix the hopes of citizens. As rich as we still are in material and intellectual resources, we are politically without strength” (6). And those without political strength leave themselves vulnerable to those who are: when Muslims in France “take up arms against us in such a brazen and implacable way, this means that, not only our state, our government, our political body, but we ourselves have lost the capacity to gather and direct our powers, to give our common life form and force” (6-7). The failure of moral responsibility has resulted in intellectual confusion and conflicted feelings, as “our irritated and vacant souls” revolve on themselves, incapable of understanding what is happening to us because we no longer understand ourselves (7). Manent seeks to bring his reader a measure of self-knowledge—”to know better his own soul as a citizen” (7).

    Manent’s book appeared in France in 2015, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks by Muslim Frenchmen. In his first chapter he identifies these attacks not as crimes but as “acts of war” (8). This identification (which would have been obvious to such early modern philosophers as Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu) had become difficult for the French of Manent’s time; “we do not know what to think because we do not know how to think” (8), and we do not know how to think because we no longer think of religion “as a social or political fact, as a collective reality, as a human association” (9). Manent assures his readers that he isn’t about to urge them into the confessional but to urge them to think, and to think politically. The liberal regime of the modern French state inclines citizens to regard “public institutions [as] responsible for guaranteeing the rights of the individual,” including the right to one’s opinion on religion (9). More, the education established by that state “discourages all effort to take religion at least a little seriously as a social and political fact” because that education propounds a notion of historical progress which consigns religiosity to the past. Supposedly, “Humanity his irresistibly carried along by the movement of modernization,, and modern humanity, humanity understood as having finally reached adulthood [as per Immanuel Kant’s formulation], is a humanity that has left religion behind” (10). But, as Gilles Kepel argued more than two decades ago in his book The Revenge of God, no one told this to God. The complacent assumption that Muslims would `progress’ towards secularism has proven false. Both Arab nationalism and Arab socialism have staggered and fallen, beginning with the 1979 collapse of the Shah’s regime in Iran—”the beginning of an unseen detour from the great narrative shared by liberals and socialists” (10). Manent eschews the grander debate over whether the great modernist story will resume, although he evidently doubts that the supposed historical laws of historical progress are really laws at all; “it would be better to try to focus on the present, and to take up the task of seeing more clearly what it is we see” (12).

    What we see at present is a “disagreement between the average Western and the average Muslim views” respecting the right “way of life”—the right moeurs. For the West, “society is first of all the organization and the guarantee of individual rights,” whereas for Islam society “is first of all the whole set of morals and customs that provides the concrete rule of a good life” (13). The modern, liberal state that so organizes and so guarantees individual rights failed in both its imperial form with the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and then with the several secular nation-states that succeeded it, including those founded by Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, Gamal Nasser in Egypt, and the Pahlavi family in Iran. Crucially, even as in the West the state has strengthened while moeurs have weakened, in the Muslim East states have weakened as moeurs have strengthened. “While we for our part strive to live with no law and no moral rule other than the validation of the validation of the ever-expanding rights of the individual, they hope to find in divine law a just order that political law has too rarely or too sparingly provided” (14). In the West, we see “social dissolution and the loss of the common good” even as “still more rights” proliferate; in the Muslim East, even “those who are offended by the brutality and sometimes the cruelty of Islamism already share the rule of life which the Islamists would like also to make the exclusive political law” (15). In view of this, how could `moderate’ Muslims “oppose very vigorously the imposition of a law whose fundamental goodness they accept? (15). They are more or less in the same moral position as the left wing of the American New Dealers of the 1930s, who jocularly called the Communists “New Dealers in a hurry.” Manent observes that both of these assumptions disregard the “political approach to common life” (16), by which he means what Aristotle means, namely, the practice of ruling and being ruled, shared rule, reciprocity, the way of life that practices reasonable discussion in common of the common good. “Both sides are committed to a process of depoliticization” (16). In France, where both the West meets the Muslim East in the schools and on the sidewalks, there is little foundation for any such shared rule, because neither side understands or wants it and because they would not know how to begin practicing it if they did.

    Concretely (as the Marxists used to say), the French and the West generally face the problem of “how to accept the Muslim way of life as the way of our Muslim fellow citizens, and yet avoid this way finally being confused with the law or taking the place of the law” (17)—precisely the aspiration of so many Muslims. The fact that Muslims freely adhere to Islam does not commit them to the way of life of civil liberty any more than the free adherence of some on the Left to the Communist Party committed Communists to civil liberty. In so arguing, Manent disputes the claim of Western secularists, who suppose that any way of life that does not limit the ways of life of other citizens can find safety within the modern state. He begins by distinguishing between “secularity” and “secularism.” Secularity means what the  George Washington and the other American founders meant by the separation of church and state, whereby government guarantees freedom of worship so long as the practices of a given religion do not impair the natural and civil rights of other citizens. But secularism means something else; it means the attempt by the state to promote religious indifference within civil society. Secularism extends secularity’s religious neutrality of the state to the society the state governs. As Hancock and Mahoney remind us in a footnote, the 1905 French law establishing laïcité resulted in closing Catholic schools and religious orders, a move halted only by the need for national unity during the First World War. Since then, however, secularism has moved less forcefully but more effectively. However, Manent insists, this increased secularism or social areligiosity has actually resulted in a sort of “interpenetration between secular State and a Christian society profoundly marked by Catholicism” (20)—not quite what contemporary Voltaireans have in mind. Instead of a thoroughly secularized state and society, France sees “the neutral or `secular’ state, a morally Christian society, and the sacred nation” (20)—the latter raised up by the French revolutionaries of 1789, reinvigorated in the union sacrée of the First World War, and revived once again by de Gaulle in the aftermath of the Second World War.

    Yet many French persist in envisioning “an imaginary city,” the “secular Republic” wherein historical `progress’ has brought them far beyond religiosity as a matter of civic concern. In religion-free utopia, the current troubles with Islam can be overcome as readily as Catholicism supposedly was. “Yet, in the real Republic, which has been declared henceforth altogether secular, we find nothing to suggest the slightest perceptible progress on this path that we imagine we will follow tomorrow at a vigorous pace” (23). This “secular faith” depends upon an exalted notion of “the State”—a notion some readers may recognize as Hegelian in origin and aspiration. The State has indeed been, “for four centuries, the great instrument of modern politics” (24). But how has it actually worked in France? Has it produced the secular society its proponents long for?

    In actuality, the French state “is much weaker than would be necessary for event slight success in this task” (25)—weaker, indeed, than the state at the disposal of the Third Republic, which itself reached only a compromise (though a beneficial one) with the Church and the nation. “The big difference is that the State of the Third Republic had authority. It represented a nation that all held sacred,” a nation committed to the modern project of social democratization, as Tocqueville had described it. Animated by the philosophic principles of Kant and Comte, the Third Republic had confidence in historical progress and, toward this end, unhesitatingly conscripted young men into military service and, above all, “laid down the content of education very precisely, putting the French language and French history at its center” (25). The state fostered democratic nationalism within the framework of an ideology that combined German idealism with  French positivism. If the idealism gave it moral elevation, the positivism gave it at least the sense, the hope, of hard-headed practicality. Today, however, “our life is much more pleasant” than it was at the turn of the last century but “our State is much weaker” (25). It has “abandoned its representative ambition and pride, thus losing a good part of its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens” as the indeterminate internationalism of pan-Europeanism has partially replaced democratic nationalism (25). A de-nationalized citizenry cannot sustain any real citizenship, so the nation’s ability to `push back’ against the weakened French state languishes. It no longer dares to conscript its citizens and it no longer cares to educate them civically, to provide them with “a truly common education designed to produce a common mind” (26). Even the secularism that remains amounts to little more than moral and cultural relativism: “Under the name of secularism we dream of a teaching without content that would effectively prepare children to be members of a formless society in which religions would be dissolved along with everything else” (27). The strong and decisive modern state has become an imbecile, having “gradually but methodically stripped itself of the resources that once made it the characteristic instrument of modern politics” (27). This is what the much-touted ‘post-modernism’ of French intellectuals has produced. Although utopians dream of ‘globalization,’ in reality the weak state leaves itself vulnerable to another form of internationalism, the Muslim ummah. “How would such a weak State suddenly find the strength to give the law to religion”—as the Third Republic did—”especially when the religion in question has no doubt concerning the legitimacy of its collective rule and when its believers have no particular reason to respect the State in question?” (28).

    But in fact, and quite apart from the grand compromise of the union sacrée, even the French state under the Third Republic experienced “an enormous political and spiritual failure,” “a religious obstacle that no one had anticipated” (28). This was the Dreyfus Affair, which highlighted the dilemma of the place of Jews in the democratic-nationalist French state. If the Third Republic collapsed in 1940 because factions had weakened it far too much to withstand the Nazi attack, and if these political divisions were symptoms of as well as aggravations of moral irresponsibility (as de Gaulle argued, with Manent concurring), the rise of anti-Semitism in the period between the middle of the nineteenth century and the Second World War “signals the first great failure of the liberal State” (29)—specifically, the failure of that state to protect Jews in the society governed by that state. The state’s failure in this task—a task that George Washington saw as indispensable to a regime of civil liberty—its failure to convince its own citizens why Jewish citizens must be respected by their fellow citizens, enabled enemies of the liberal state in France and elsewhere in Europe to use an ever-strengthening anti-Semitism as a weapon against the regime of liberal and democratic republicanism. Monarchists and fascists alike, in opposition but also in symbiosis with the communists (who were not anti-Semitic but who of course detested liberal and democratic republicanism), fatally weakened the Third Republic and the network of republics throughout the Continent.

    French republicanism hadn’t started out that way. In the formulation of a prominent liberal aristocrat, the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre—like so many of his political friends, a victim of the extremist Jacobins a few years after he made his speech in December 1789—the Republic intended “to refuse everything to Jews as a nation, and to grant everything to Jews as individuals” (quoted p. 29). The problem with this, as Washington implicitly saw when he wrote to a Jewish-American congregation, is that Jews are both individuals and a nation, in fact a nation with a unique mission and regime or way of life. In the years subsequent to the First and then the Second Republics, and especially in the Third Republic, “the European liberal State… failed to bring about the transformation of the Jewish way of life into the guarantee of rights to Jewish individuals as citizens” (30). This failure had two opposing consequences: the Holocaust or Shoah and the subsequent founding of the state of Israel as a homeland and refuge for the Jewish nation which had been persecuted and left to die by the European liberal state. At the same time, Manent observes, the founding of Israel does not solve the so-called Jewish problem not only because that state has no shortage of virulent enemies but because the Jewish nation has a meaning for humanity beyond the borders of any state, whether that state is secure or threatened.

    Given these facts, what now is the status of Jews in France, in the wake of terrorist attacks by Muslims in France? The formulation of Clermont-Tonnerre no longer suffices. One suspects that the nineteenth conflation of the notion of nation with the biological notion of race—seen in the very word ‘anti-Semitism‘ as distinguished from anti-Judaism—inclined Europeans (who supposed ‘race science’ actually to be scientific, a thing on the very cutting edge of scientific progress) to deny the natural-rights individualism that allowed men like Washington to uphold the rights of human groups who had covenanted with themselves or even with God to pursue aims consistent with the laws of nature and of nature’s God, the Creator Who endowed human beings with rights as individuals, including the liberty to enter contracts and covenants. Be this as it may, the regime of the Third Republic, animated by the principles of Kantian idealism and Comtean positivism which had replaced unstably the more coherent natural-rights principles of the First Republic, never adequately addressed the question of Jews’ status in French society, and today’s much-weakened French republican state has failed to protect not so much their civil status as their natural right to life itself. This failure has yet to approach the failure of the last years of the Third Republic, leading to the crisis of 1940, but it “manages less and less to give meaning to the association” of “force and justice” upon which the legitimacy of any decent modern state must rest (31).

    This requires both Jewish French citizens and non-Jewish French citizens to “outline the contours of a new association that will no longer be simply contained in the political regime [of republicanism], indispensable as that regime remains” (32). French citizens of Christian inflection (including those who have abandoned Christian theology and Church membership) are “heirs of Israel” (32) by way of Jesus’s Judaic witness, His insistence on the validity of the Law of God. “If the Jews were set apart from the ‘nations,’ this was to reveal God as a friend to mankind among the nations, and to make Him present among them”; the Jewish nation, the light unto those nations, has thus “assur[ed] the mediation between God and humanity,” whether in the original Israelite regime or in the renewed spiritual regime that centers on the worship of Jesus as Christ  (32). In Europe, “this mediating role was appropriated and claimed by the Catholic church, reducing the Jews to the role of passive witnesses who transmitting the Books without understanding them”—a nation supposedly superseded by the Church (32).

    The searing memory of the Shoah remains one side of Europeans’ horribly late recognition that the doctrine of supersession cannot withstand rational scrutiny. But more is needed. The term ‘anti-Semitism,’ with its overtones of race theory, made sense in the intellectual atmosphere of the Dreyfus Affair, but it only obscures the circumstances France and the West generally face today. Islamists target not some supposed ‘race’ but religions and their adherents, including but by no means limited to Judaism and Jews. “The word that fits the new reality is the word war” (33). This war targets Jews, Christians, blasphemers, Muslim ‘apostates,’ and also “the authorities and institutions of Western nations” (33). For non-Islamists, this war is a “defensive war” (34), but a war it is. And in fighting it, every Western nation-state will need to find “the contours of a new friendship for which the political means are not available” (34), given the morally and intellectually disoriented character of the modern state (34). “Within this friendship”—which can only begin in civil society, not the state—”Jews as Jews and as a people are an essential element. The part they will now play in the world will demand of them a mediating role that might be said to correspond to the deepest vocation of Judaism” (34). For France this would mean a reconstituted and improved union sacrée. What the French state of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics all failed to solve ‘from above,’ the French themselves must move decisively to solve ‘from below.’ If they can do so, ‘2015’ will prove to have been another ‘1940,’ another ‘1871,’ another ‘1789.’

    Thus the first ‘wave’ of Manent’s essay begins with a consideration of modern political regimes and the modern state, especially as seen in France. It culminates in a consideration of the failure of that state fully to solve the religio-political question with regard to the Jewish citizens of France and a call for a renewed effort to re-found the liberal state through a civil-social coming-together of all French citizens threatened by Islamist violence in the service of a profoundly illiberal projected regime. The next ‘wave,’ which gathers strength in chapters 7 through 11 and crests in chapter 12, addresses the question of Islam in the civil society that must take over the task the State has failed to perform.

    Insofar as the modern republican state weakens, “we return to the pre-modern situation”—feudalism—but without the now-vanished features of the original feudal societies in Europe (35). The Catholic Church remains, but in much-chastened form, while the aristocrats and dynasts have disappeared almost entirely. Nonetheless, like feudalism, the post-modern, post-statist Europe features societies without clear borders, wherein ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ mingle transnationally. Globalization is the new feudalism. “What is often neglected… is that this effacing of political borders leaves religious or more generally spiritual borders largely intact”; their borders “tend to become the main borders” (36). These too are somewhat porous, at least in Europe, given the influx of Muslim immigrants. Europe’s problems “will prove insoluble if we do not succeed in developing a coherent and stable disposition that defines our relation to Islam as such socially, politically and spiritually” (37). Republicanism in France aims at the common good, at “civic friendship” (38). How shall the French establish such friendship with Muslims, admitting the failure of secularism to transform Islam or to transform a critical mass of Muslims? The fact is that “Islam fulfills and brings together the three dimensions of human time, giving stability, compactness and completion to the umma” (39); Islam gives its adherence a purpose secularism simply cannot offer. Why would Muslims, especially young Muslims, abandon the one for the other? “Thus the world in which we must live and act is a world marked by the effort, the movement, the forward thrust of Islam”(39) even as “Europe is disarming itself in its core” (40) precisely by eschewing common goals and common efforts in the name of individualism in the Tocquevillian sense of a refusal of political activity, of political and civil-social organization, in favor of an ever-narrowing circle of friends and family—all valorized in the name of ‘rights.’

    Islam “advance[es] into Europe” by immigration, by investment, and by the use of terror (41). Although these three means of advancement (or to put it more dramatically than Manent does, conquest) are analytically separable, they are related in practice. Immigration provides a demographic base; money provides mosques and publishing houses. As for terrorism, it “would not be what it is, it would not have the same reach nor the same significance, if the terrorists did not belong to this population and were not our fellow citizens” (42). In view of this, the “coherent and stable disposition” the French must develop “must be essentially defensive” (43); emotionally satisfying as it may be to (as Americans say) ‘go on offense,’ that will not work as a means of achieving a peaceful conclusion to this war.

    Manent regards French and indeed Western disorientation in the face of the “forward thrust of Islam” as entirely understandable: “This is the first time for quite a long time that something new in the West did not come from within Western life, from the internal development of Western society and politics” (44). So much so that the West even generated an ideology, historicist progressivism, to valorize and to explain this development. In formulating a strategy of self-defense, such complacency will only continue us in our illusions. Given the demographic and spiritual strength of Islam in Europe, Manent calls for intellectual and spiritual regrouping; “our regime must concede, and frankly accept their ways, since the Muslims are our fellow citizens. We did not impose conditions upon their settling here”—why would we, if we believed in the inevitability of historical progress toward secularism?—”and so they have not violated them” (45). Even the new, nationalist French Right of Le Pen père and Le Pen fille will find, if they eventually win office, that control of a vitiated State will not enable them to do the things they want to do. A defensive strategy will begin with French self-knowledge—a consciousness resulting from the forced acknowledgment of the differences between ‘Frenchness’ and Islam brought on by the Muslims’ advances—a knowledge of the “great moral and spiritual resources that can be renewed, activated, and mobilized in order to contain this inevitable change within certain limits, and to preserve a country whose physiognomy remains recognizable” (46). The French must therefore, first, accept Muslims “as they are,” “renounc[ing] the vain and somewhat condescending idea of an authoritarian ‘modernizing’ of their way of life,” and, second, “preserve and defend, as an inviolable sanctuary, certain fundamental features of our regime and certain aspects of France’s physiognomy” (46-47).

    Specifically, with regard to prudent renunciations by the French, Manent finds requirements that public schools serve uniform menus (including pork) to all students a policy of “meanness”, and the refusal to allow different swimming pool hours for girls and boys an instance of civil discourtesy that deserves prudent abandonment (48). But Manent devotes much more attention to the features in need of defense, perhaps because the French are so confused about them.  As the fundamental unit of political life, the one in which children first learn what political relations are by observing the reciprocal rule of husband and wife, the family is another matter; “it is our right to prohibit polygamy and this we do, [he adds with Gallic irony] at least in principle” (49). In the public square, moreover, “the burqa is inadmissible,” inasmuch as the social “physiognomy” of the West cannot survive the concealment of the human face (49); “it is by the face that each of us reveals himself or herself at once as a human being and as this particular human being”—a “mutual awareness that is prior to and conditions any declaration of rights” (49).

    Beyond the family and civil society, the political realm too has elements deserving “intransigent preservation” (49). Principal among these are “complete freedom of thought and expression” (51) and the French “way of life” (55). With regard to civil liberty, the French should reject the use of the term ‘Islamophobia’ to repress any and all critical discussion of Islam, thereby preserving “the capacity to treat Islam in the same way all political, philosophic, and religious elements of our society have been treated for at least two centuries” (51). To (as it were) privilege Islam would amount to “the worst service we could render to Islam at a time when demands for its reform are heard on all hands,” first and foremost Islamic hands (51). While respecting Islamic persons (and perhaps because we respect them as persons, as human beings), the French must reserve the right to combine that respect with “vigorous criticism of opinions that seem to be false” (52). At the moment, we in the West live more and more in a society in which any opinion is tolerated but persons are routinely subject to vituperation and contempt. We would do better to reverse that practice, and better still to meet the opinions with reasoned argumentation. On this point Manent takes gentle issue with Pope Francis, whom he catches equating respect for one’s mother with respect for one’s religion. The figure of the Mother Church notwithstanding, my mother is mine in a way my religion is not, inasmuch as Christians are adjured to share their religion but not their mothers with the rest of the world, and are additionally commanded to turn the other cheek in response to insults to their persons and opinions but not necessarily to insults to their mothers. “Precisely because the freedom to judge, and thus to criticize, has such a strong tendency to provoke passions… it is so important to obey the law that commands us to respond to critical speech, if one is to respond to it, only by critical speech” (53). Bombing the office of a vulgar and irreligious publication will not do. Why so? Because criticism of opinion “demands reasons” and reasoning is the distinctive characteristic of the political relationship, the reciprocal rule of one another by discussion and compromise (54).  Today, our postmodern, post-rationalist (and therefore post-Western) attitude causes us to demand “a freedom without reason, a freedom that does not need to give reasons since it always has a ‘right’ or a ‘value’ at its disposal; so marvelous are these claims that they are established just by being stated” (54). But even Nietzsche—especially and above all Nietzsche—would scorn this democratizing, leveling assumption that Everyman can be his own Superman. Such democratized and therefore individualized or privatized self-assertion feels like strength but ends in weakness, as it spoils our ability to organize ourselves into groups strong enough to offer prudent resistance to groups that organize themselves spiritedly around spiritual claims.

    The twelfth and culminating chapter in this second ‘wave’ of Manent’s essay considers the European way of life in its relation to the self-confident Muslim way of life. Although in Aristotle a ‘way of life’ referred to one dimension of the regime of the polis or self-ruling city, the spread of religions—themselves requiring adherence to God’s way for His creatures—gives a regime-like dimension to populations that cut across many sovereign states. Europe, once the heart of Christendom, has a “physiognomy,” too. In Europe, the way of life shared by citizens has an internal or regime dimension strictly speaking (limited to one’s country) along with an external or civilizational dimension that extends across the continent, reaching its limits on the borders with Russia and the Balkans. “Islam presents a question to each nation, and at the same time to our civilization, or to European history” (57). Unlike Europe, “Islam was never able to abandon the imperial form that Christianity was never lastingly to assume” (58).

    By “political form” Manent means something different from “regime.” Aristotle classifies political communities in terms of regime, with their four dimensions: quantitative (a community is ruled by one, a few, or many); qualitative (those rulers are good or bad); teleological (the purposes or aims of the community); and finally the Bios ti or way of life, what Tocqueville later calls the habits of mind and heart. Another way of classifying political communities (and Aristotle knew this, too, although he doesn’t dwell on it) is in terms of their geographical and demographic size on the one hand and their degree of political centralization on the other. Manent contrasts the city (‘city-state,’ as it is usually called)—small and centralized—with the sprawling and perforce less centralized empire. In the city we find “the purest political form” (59), the community in which who rules, what their purposes are, and the way of life they foster matter a lot to every resident; in such a small place, rulers can really rule. “The city has no other raison d’être than to produce the association, or the community, whose material and moral resources are sufficient to allow citizens to lead the ‘good life'” (59) But “the moral character of the empire is more uncertain, even suspect, insofar as the pride of domination flourishes there in an expansive movement that has no natural limits”; even if “very well and very humanely governed,” the empire “is subject to a principle of boundlessness that prevents or hinders the mind’s self-reflection” (59). And in more gritty terms, the empire often simply lacks the means effectively to control its own periphery; its boundlessness thus may lead from rapid expansion to sudden shrinkage, as seen in the Soviet Empire in the past century, and as seen throughout the long history of China. Ancient Israel managed to be universalist in its mission, the light unto the nations, while (usually) preserving “its knowledge of the meaning of humanity” by resisting imperial boundlessness (59).

    By contrast, the Muslim prophet Muhammad founded an empire, thus subjecting Islam to “what might be called the curse of extension, which brings about the fragmentation of imperial territory and often the tendency towards independence of distant provinces, which do not, however, really achieve a true independence that would remove them from the imperial form of Islam” (60). Imperialist expansions and contraction have plagued it, as the contemporary example of the ‘Islamic State’ demonstrates for our generation.

    What made Western Europe differ from the equally Christian but perennially imperial Eastern-European ‘Byzantium’? What made it, if not a realm of city-states, a realm of nation-states? Manent doubts the argument that the Catholic (and later partly Protestant) civilization of Western Europe took Jesus command to separate the things of God from the things of Caesar more seriously than the Orthodox world did. The early Church did not emphasize this distinction. What is more, the distinction between Church and State, which made so much of Jesus’s aphorism, “was in fact clearly set forth only after Europeans had re-founded their political order by entirely emancipating their political principles from all dependence in relation to the Christian proposition, and even from any direct connection with it” (61). The notion that there is an entity called ‘the State’ that can be considered entirely apart from the individuals who compose ‘civil society,’ and that moreover those individuals have rights the State should secure, but quite independently of whether the State actually does what it should do: that notion does not suggest the existing of a dispute between the claims of rulers (God and Caesar). Further, “what the declarations of the rights of man say of humanity and to humanity has nothing to do with what Christian preaching says of and to humanity”; to say that man is “born free and that he can and must govern himself according to his freedom” differs sharply from “tell[ing] him that he is born a slave of sin and that he can only be freed by the grace of Christ” (61-62).

    In addition to this historical critique of the ‘God-and-Caesar’ origin story of Europe’s civilizational distinctiveness, Manent offers a political one. In order to separate Church and State, citizens need to think and act as citizens capable (by the fact of their citizenship or membership the ruling body of the regime) to do any such thing. This includes Christians, citizens of both this ‘city’ and God’s ‘city.’ What caused this unity of purpose in Europe? Europeans “strove to bring this collaboration [of their religious and their political purposes] to fruition in a new political form, a political form ignored by the ancients,” a form combining “the pride of the citizen, or more generally of the acting human being, and the humility of the Christian” by leaving to the Church the spiritual formation of citizens while reserving self-governing political action to the State (64-65). This meant that Christians, their souls decisively inflected by the Holy Spirit, would take actions consensually guided by Church teachings but not directed by Church officials. “The object of Europe’s ceaseless quest can be defined, in theological terms, as the common action of grace and of freedom and, in political terms, as the covenant between communion and freedom” (65). This in turn enabled Christians to participate as citizens of the city of God, in a catholic or universal religion, while simultaneously exercising citizenship in particular, limited human communities. Europe became a community of spiritual education that wove together self-government and a relation to the Christian proposition, a two-fold intention that opens a plural and indefinite history, the history of the European nations” (66). In Western Europe, the Catholic Church remained Roman—a body that recalled, even in its centuries of empire, the political and republican origins of that empire: “There was always the city as a living, even if almost smothered, principle; beneath the princeps or imperator, there was the populus romanus” (65).

    Once the unity of purpose that separated Church and State disappeared into the mono-atheism of secularism, once the union beneath the division was removed, Europe lost any coherent purpose. It became spiritually and morally weak, therefore politically weak because lacking a way of life that inspires the moral strength needed to defend itself against devotees of Islam, who are not at all lacking in purpose, and in the strength that goes with it.

    In the third wave of his argument, Manent returns to France  without forgetting Europe. He begins by considering the way Muslim citizens of France should be addressed by the non-Muslim majority. The argument culminates in an appeal for a special role for the French Catholic Church in this civil-social crisis. He first clears away the ideological debris blocking the initiation of such discussion. If French secularism precludes religion from discussion in the public square, why does this apply to Christians and Jews but not to Muslims? That is, if critiques of Muslims by non-Muslims deserve to be dismissed as ‘Islamophobic,’ why are Muslim (and secularist) critiques of Christians not condemned as ‘Christophobic,’ and critiques of Jews condemned as ‘Judeophobic’? If secularism requires us to ignore religions as associations or communities and make moral and political judgments solely on the basis of individual rights abstracted from their sociopolitical context, does not the “unhindered presence of Islam” mark a not only a “spiritual evisceration” of Christianity and Judaism not required of Muslims, but also a denial of the obvious reality of religions as social entities? “If have one ambition, it is that the analysis I propose of the European experience might be adequate to allow us to see Islam as an objective reality, instead of its remaining in the reflection of our self-misunderstanding” (69). This self-misunderstanding stems from Europeans’ loss of “faith in the primacy of the Good” (69), a faith powerfully reinforced by religion but not necessarily requiring religiosity in every citizen. Because “every action, and especially civic or political action, is carried out in view of some good, especially in view of the common good” (70), loss of faith in the Good paralyzes both thought and action. In Christianity and Judaism, faith in the primacy of the Good rested on faith in the God Who is the ultimate Good, and Who works through His Providence to coordinate events so as to serve His purposes. For seventy years, the Shoah has been deployed as evidence against Providence. “The Judge seems to be under judgment: Where was He?” (70). But to judge God not only entangles us in arguments answered impressively in the Book of Job; it also forces us into either Epicureanism, the so-called religion of the philosophers, or to a sort of Manichean or at least pagan claim that God or the gods must be evil. Avoiding theological disputation, Manent simply observes that neither Epicureanism nor a theology of despair can possibly support “the desire to govern ourselves and the confidence in or own powers that alone can nourish this desire”(70)—precisely what a firm defense of abstract human rights requires. Our semi-politicized Epicureanism actually replaces divine Providence with the Invisible Hand of the marketplace; “we have constructed a system of action that can best be described as an artificial Providence” (71). The marketplace valorizes in the material realm what individualized, depoliticized human rights valorize ideologically: satisfaction for everyone. But this valorization undermines the civil framework within which markets can be protected and human rights can be secured.

    Islam can enter and remain in Europe only if Europeans move from ‘rights talk’ to purposeful action. “Islam can only be received within a community of action that engages it and essentially obliges it to participate what is common,” a shared understanding of the Good (73). As a civilization, Europe forms the geographical and moral ground for that understanding, but politically this can be done only through self-governing nations and not through that combination of market and bureaucratic forces that ‘Europe’ consists of. Here the governments of those nations have failed, preferring obfuscation to real discussion by refusing to acknowledge Christianity, Judaism, and Islam as social realities and condemning those who dare to discuss Muslims as Muslims. European governments command their nations to close their eyes in the hope that this will make the world go away. “By their determination to lay down the law concerning social perceptions and the words that translate them, our governments are increasingly abandoning the domain of actual political action” (75). In the name of human rights defined as equality, governments turn out the lights in the hope that all cows will become black.

    This being so, “What does equality mean for the Muslim citizens of France?” (78). At present, “we have only a very vague and incomplete knowledge of the extent of their claims” because they do not elaborate them (78). And even if they did articulate their claims more fully, the current French tendency to filter all claims through the sieve of individual rights may distort them. If these circumstances persist, Muslims “will tend more and more to be a distinctly solid and compact element, while neither they nor their fellow citizens will be capable of giving meaning to a coexistence between heterogeneous ways of life” (80). Each side will stay in its own box, hermetically sealed, breached only by explosions. This results from separating “the rights of man… from man” (81)—that is, from the social and political nature of man; “the rights of man have been separated radically from the rights of the citizen” (85). This cannot actually happen, if only because it would require Muslims to stop being Muslims and to become beings attentive only to human rights as defined by non-Muslims. But any transformation of Muslims (or any other group) can only come in a social and political setting—in France, and in the rest of Europe country by country.

    To bring Muslims more fully into the French republic no such a priori transformation is feasible. This is especially true, given that “the political and spiritual weakening of the nation in Europe is doubtless the major fact of our time” (82) and that there has been no corresponding political or spiritual strengthening of Europe to compensate for this weakness. “If Islam spreads and consolidates in a space deprived of a political form, or in which all forms of common life are delivered over to gnawing criticism from the standpoint of individual rights, now the source of all legitimacy, then there hardly remains any future for Europe but that of an Islamization by default” (82). Why would Muslims feel the slightest need to adapt, particularly in light of the global reach and imperialist bent of their religion? Since the modern state “tends to deny the relevance or importance of the question of the regime or political form because, by guaranteeing members of society the enjoyment of their rights, it seems to dispense them from having governed themselves” (86), why would a religiously serious people view such tame but undisciplined persons with anything other than distaste and contempt? And why would a religiously serious people regard persons in the thrall of secularism as anything better than fools, if not scoundrels? In contemporary Europe what is called ‘governance’ “is really only government by the State alone“—government by administration (87). But government by administration (as Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America) amounts to soft despotism over human beings reduced to the status of timid and industrious herd animals. Despite its net of rules and regulations, the administrative state really wants to issue only one core requirement for its subjects to obey: “to relax” (96).

    Returning to the topics of regime and religion, Manent defends republicanism or representative government, beginning with the observation that representation “presupposes a people to represent” but Europeans are not one people but many. Therefore, they must turn to their own countries if republicanism will survive; at most, a European parliament could only represent the constituent nation-states in a federal structure. If the people are to govern themselves, they must do it at home. In so doing, they can discover if Muslims in France and elsewhere really want to participate in a republican government with their fellow citizens or instead “see themselves as on the margins and so to speak in secession” (89). More than this (and here Manent shows a citizen’s toughness) the French must test French Muslims by “commanding [them] to establish the independence from the various Muslim countries that send out imams, and that finance and sometimes administer or guide the mosques” (89). “The point is for each party to the debate to show that it is serious and to this end to take certain actions that cost something and that show a commitment” (89). The imperial ambition blurs the distinction between internal and external, citizen and foreigner; ruling many from afar, it prefers an attenuation of self-government. Manent demurs. In this defensive war, France’s republic must determine whose side each citizen is on. If it refuses this elementary responsibility, the French will see “whether we still have a government” (92) at all. Forced to show their hand, to decide, French Muslims will relinquish their passivity: no more deceptive waiting game. In return, they would be afforded their own “place in the French public square,” liberated from “all slavish dependence on the powers that dominate the rest of the Muslim world” (93). “If we fail, that will mean both that our regime has entirely lost the representative virtue that had defined and animated it since it founding, and that France’s Muslims are incapable of moving beyond the immobility of their moral practices in order to nourish a political desire, that is, in order to experience effectual freedom as Muslims” (94).

    Manent brings these currents together in chapter 18, the third crest of the three waves of his argument. Today, “when we are asked to adhere to the values of the Republic, nothing is asked of us” (96) as rational and civil beings. “The new citizenship consists in demobilizing the affects of citizenship”; the so-called identity politics of human-rights assertion looks to the state and not to civic friendship for validation (96). “The ‘I’ imagines that it can identify itself with all things as it pleases, and identify all things with itself” (96), unconcerned about ‘otherness’ because ‘difference’ can be dismissed in a cloud of verbiage. Against this, Manent calls upon French Muslims “to become truly citizens” as Muslims. “If the nation in a certain sense detaches them from their religion, since they share it with non-Muslims, it immediately gives it back to them, and they receive it now in a way from the nation in which they have finally found, not only a place, but their place”(97). No secularism, and no sectarian enclaves governed by religious law instead of French law: “It is up to Muslims to find a place in a place in a Christian country, or a country of a Christian mark” (99). This is no dhimmitude in reverse, no subservience to Christianity. “Christians, or particularly Catholics, do not rule in France” (101) because of course Catholic made exactly the same transition, balancing citizenship in their native city as well as in the Kingdom of God, in the past century. To demand this adaptation by Muslims will have the salutary effect of reminding French Catholics that they are the Catholics of France. Recalling that Manent had remarked the Catholic-Christian assertion of supersession regarding Judaism, Manent effectually recommends that French Catholics now live up to that claim. Given that the West now features “five great spiritual masses”—Judaism, Islam, Evangelical Protestantism the Catholic Church, and human-rights secularism—”what characterizes and distinguishes the Catholic Church within this configuration is, if I may say, its calmness and equilibrium” (103). The other groups “wish to know only their own rights and their own reasons,” but the Catholic Church, having undergone a true crisis of conscience in reaction to the Shoah and in response to “its responsibility for anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism” seen in the Dreyfus Affair at the beginning of the century and the anti-republican Vichyism of substantial elements of its clergy at mid-century (103), now reaches out to “each of the other great spiritual forces” (105). “Alone capable of nourishing a meaningful and substantial relationship with all the other spiritual forces,” “at the center or the pivot of a configuration in which we have to lie and the think,” the Church can become “the mediator par excellence” (105)—exactly the role Manent earlier ascribed to ancient Israel. Roman Catholics have long claimed that Christianity has superseded Judaism; now we will see if they really can do so. France needs it to do so, and maybe other countries also do. After all, France and the Church themselves have exemplified the genuinely political relationship of ruling and being ruled: “If the Church has played an axial role in the history of France, France has often played a determining role in the history of the Church” (106). Pope Francis, do not forget Cardinal Richelieu.

    In his parting words to Catholics, who have often felt ‘marginalized’ in contemporary France, Manent wonders, “How can one leave this quasi-clandestine state without joining the prideful competition of claims and counter-claims that is the scourge of our whining age?” (107). He addresses this question in his two final chapters, widening it to Muslims, as well. On the periphery of today’s “public life,” Catholics remain at the spiritual center of the West; they will return to the center of the public domain if, imitating the traditional role of Jews but now in the modern world, undertake “the task of holding together the configuration that joins her with Judaism, Islam, evangelical Protestantism, and the doctrine of human rights” (108). For their part, Muslims must answer the Catholic and simply French invitation (if it comes) and assume the role “not simply… as rights-bearing citizens, accepting other bearers of the same rights, but as an association marked by Christianity granting a place with which it has never before mixed on an equal footing” (108). It is further “necessary that they accept this nation as the site of their civic activity, and more generally of their education”—not, to be sure, to accept a secularism as repellant to them as it is to Catholics, observant Jews, and evangelical Protestants—but to ensure their status as “a distinct community in a nation in which they are citizens like others (109). That nation will remain “a nation of a Christian mark in which Jews play an eminent role” (109). Can this aspiration be realized? “While our failure would signify the dislocation of the nation and the inglorious end of an enduring hope, success would resonate well beyond the narrow limits of our country, since the man spiritual forces of the Atlantic and Mediterranean worlds would be concerned” (110). I am reminded of President Charles de Gaulle’s invocations of “Latinity”—Roman republicanism with a Christian mark—an appeal to both moderation and grandeur with France as its originator in the modern world, but with all nations with the heritage of Rome as its audience. “This should motivate our desire for glory, if we have any left” (110); de Gaulle might nod in approval.

    Each in its own way, Europe and Islam have denigrated the measured limits of political life. Europe has done so in the name of markets, “the free movement of capital, of goods, of services, of people, just as no law must circumscribe the unlimited right of individual particularity” (111). Islam has done so in a religio-imperial attempt to win the world for the rule of the laws of Allah. Whereas Europe has abandoned politics, Islam has never found it. When well understood and powerfully felt, Christianity (with Islam?) rejects immanence, the notion that ‘god’ is in everything, the Hegelian claim that ‘god’ is the Absolute Spirit instead of the Holy Spirit. Holiness means separation; the God of the Bible creates the world out of nothing; He does not extrude a part of himself (dialectically or otherwise) to make the world. The God of the Bible is the God of Providence, not of ‘History.’ “The collapse into violent immanence that characterized the twentieth century”—seen in such historicist movements as communism and fascism, less malignly in progressivism—”derived from the weakening of Christian mediation” (112). The God of the Bible sets loving limits on human action; historicism does not, cannot. But historicism does not even explain the history it claims to know. “The history of Europe… is unintelligible if one does not take into account a very different notion a notion elaborated by ancient Israel, reconfigured by Christianity and lost when the European arc was broken” (113). European history only becomes intelligible if understood as Christians understand Christianity, and this holds true whether one is himself a Christian or not.

    The holiness of God, His separation from man, finds its political bridge in the Covenant. With that, God permitted freedom to man while setting humanly knowable limits to that freedom. Man can ‘talk back’ to God, and God might even change His mind, depending upon what the man has to say. “As great as man is in his pride as a free agent, his action is inscribed in an order of the good that he does not produce an order of grace upon which he ultimately depends” (114). Manent acknowledges that “an important part of contemporary Judaism” no longer trusts the Covenant, asking, Where was God during the Shoah? “This is a natural and so to speak irresistible movement of the soul” (114), but to give in to it entirely would be to fail to recognize the limits of even the several vast genocides of the last century. One of those limits was the Muslim world (despite, one should never forget, the sympathy Hitler found in some elements of it, most infamously exemplified by the Mufti of Jerusalem). “Islam, for its part, does not know how to enter into a moral world that makes no sense to it for two reasons: on the one hand, its relation to God, consisting wholly in obedience, ignores the Covenant; on the other, having nothing to do with the destruction of European Jews, Muslims are hardly able to be sensitive to the infinitely poignant drama playing out between Europe and the Jewish people” (114). Even so, is it not possible that Muslims, also children of Abraham, begin to consider the Covenant he accepted, the relationship to God that the Covenant embodies, if Christians renew “the meaning and credibility of the human association that bore the Covenant until the European arc as broken, that is, the nation” (114-115)? Christians will lose, and Muslims will never gain, the civic life that the God of the Book of Genesis wanted for them unless they act together to rebuild the nation, which is the only viable form for a life of ruling and being ruled within the modern human condition.

    The question then must be: Do Muslims as Muslims want a civil life? Does the Allah-imposed shari’a brought by Muhammad preclude in principle any genuinely political life, any rule by consent? If the right human relationship to God is God-determined obedience to God’s will, with no rational element in it, then Muslims will reject the offer of a common civil life within the nation with repugnance. Manent seems to say: Let us find out. We are at war. We should offer terms for a peace, which may or may not be rejected. And then we will know.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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