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    De Gaulle According to Faulkner

    January 25, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    William Faulkner: The De Gaulle Story. Volume III of Faulkner: A Comprehensive Guide to the Brodsky Collection. Edited by Louis Daniel Brodsky and Robert W. Hamblin. (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1984).

    Originally published in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy. Volume 17, Number 3, Spring 1990.

     

    In Hollywood, William Faulkner wrote a screenplay about Charles de Gaulle. A surprising nexus: the General can be located plausibly in neither Yoknapatawpha nor Los Angeles County. Nor, in a way, can Faulkner. Yoknapatahpha is the fictional version of Lafayette County, Mississippi, where Faulkner lived among but not with “all my relations and fellow townsmen, including the borrowers and frank spongers,” who “all prophesied I’d never be more than a bum.” (A modern novelist, they might have replied, is still worse.) As for 1940s Hollywood, self-fictionalizing, its citizenry had suspicions, too. The head of Warner Brothers’ steno pool recalled, “We heard that he was coming. When we saw this little man, quiet and grey, who was sweet and kind and soft-spoken, we said, ‘This is a talent?'”

    But some of these appearances deceive. History and culture do bind France with Faulkner’s part of the American South. In 1682, La Salle claimed for France what became Mississippi, and Lafayette County’s name commemorates the French marquis better known to Americans than to the French. By 1817, when Mississippi entered the Union, Southerners already admired the chevaliers of the Middle Ages; such novels as Walter Scott’s Quentin Durward, which appeared five years later, enjoyed considerable popularity there. Gothicism entails a nostalgic defiance of modernity, yielding, among other things, natural and imitation aristocrats who lack the material and technical power to win the wars they courageously fight.

    Edgar Allan Poe, the parodist from Virginia, understood Gothicism as well as did any American. His sardonic aestheticism (Gothicism’s anti-matter) anticipated Baudelaire’s independent reaction by two decades. (“Do you know why I so patiently translated Poe [beginning in 1846]? Because he resembled me.”) The fascination with death; l’art pour l’art; the mockery of heroes—all these went well with defeat, both its anticipation and its aftermath, in the South (1865) and in France (1871). A new generation of British poets tasted the French concoction (at age 25 Swinburne reviewed Les Fleurs du Mal in The Spectator) before decadents of both countries came into vogue at the beginning of the twentieth century among literary American Southerners. Faulkner (born 1897) drank deep. Hugh Kenner locates him precisely; “Faulkner’s miscalled Mississippi Gothic is more nearly a Mississippi estheticism.” One should add only that ironist aesthetes reacted to the straight-faced aesthetic of Gothicism, so their project makes little sense without its rival. Aesthetes consider this cross-fertilization. Others (for example, those who prefer to win wars) might consider it cross-sterilization.

    Mule-stubborn Bill Faulkner came from a prolific line of businessmen, politicians, and drunkards. Drunkenness, predating both Gothicism and aestheticism as a means of escape, of course does not exclude those latter-day strategies; as Faulkner’s biographer Joseph Blotner ruefully jokes, many of the prominent Décadents were alcoholics, and Faulkner rejected neither his familial nor his artistic heritage in this regard. As an escape-method, lying predates even drunkenness, and Faulkner could combine those, as well. (“After a few drinks, he would tell people anything,” his wife noted.) While there may be some truth in wine, there aren’t many facts—and besides, Faulkner drank bourbon. Toward his life’s end, he amiably told undergraduates, “I don’t have much patience with facts, and any writer is a congenital liar to begin with or he wouldn’t take up writing.” He called the people in one of his novels partly real, partly fictional; “thus I improved on God, who, dramatic though He be, has no sense, no feeling, for theatre.”

    This proud theatricality—of history, of culture, and of character—better suited Faulkner to Hollywood, and Hollywood to Faulkner, than either cared to admit. He first worked there in 1932, for MGM, where Irving Thalberg collected literary reputations. For the next thirteen years Faulkner wrote screenplays in Hollywood and novels in Mississippi. The movie work supported him and his family. He did it conscientiously, working on 48 film projects, of which eighteen were produced. At the not-rare times Hollywood began to wear, he would take sick leave and dose himself with Old Grand Dad.

    Faulkner came to work for Warner Brothers after the attack on Pearl Harbor, his attempts to enlist in the Air Force and the Navy politely turned aside. Hollywood too was war duty. Jack Warner placed his studio at the service of his friend, President Roosevelt. (“I virtually commuted to the White House,” Warner recalled. “Court jester I was, and proud of it….”) Roosevelt wanted, and Warner ordered, a movie dramatizing General Charles de Gaulle, exiled in London since June 1940 when he became the only member of the French cabinet to publicly oppose the armistice with Nazi Germany.

    De Gaulle interested Faulkner, who read the early biography done by Philippe Barrès. “This man bore none of the marks of our epoch,” Barrès wrote after his first interview with the General. “There is something elemental which gave him force, the expression of a soldier and a peasant.” De Gaulle was a pre-décadence Frenchman, a sort of virtuous Southerner, if you will. He was also an unusually realistic one, no Gothicist. Unlike Heidegger, who fetched his nostalgia from even farther back in history than Gothicists did, imagining the “inner truth and greatness” of Nazism to inhere in an anti-technological vision, as early as 1934 de Gaulle saw Hitler’s massive arsenal of tanks and airplanes and supposed they were meant for use. In his first radio speech to the French after arriving in London, de Gaulle said, “Crushed today by a mechanical force, we can vanquish in the future by a superior mechanical force. The future of the world is there.” De Gaulle partook of classical virtue while appreciating the power of modernity; this tension defined his life. As one brought up on stories of Souther chivalrists defeated by Yankee materièl—one, moreover, who invented stories of aristocratic Sartorises retreating before the vulgar tribe of Snopes—Faulkner surely saw some of this.

    He gave “The De Gaulle Story” two foci. One was de Gaulle himself, the other a pair of fictional brothers, Georges and Jean. Faulkner explained that Georges “represents the French individual as de Gaulle represents the abstract idea of Free France.” Georges possesses “all the French middle-class virtues,” especially patriotism and humaneness. Although the bourgeoisie is “that class which by tradition is democratic, which is the backbone of any democracy,” Faulkner also included other “representative individuals”—a peasant, a priest, a music teacher, a factory worker—enough to symbolize “all France.”

    Home on leave during the days before the Nazi blitzkrieg, Georges plans to marry the daughter of the village mayor. The young man’s spiritedness leads to acrimonious debate with his future father-in-law concerning the utility of the Maginot Line. Colonel de Gaulle, commander of the tank school where Georges trained, wrote a book (Vers l’armée de métier, 1934) advocating mechanized counteroffensive as the indispensable complement to fortification. The mayor dismisses Georges’ Gaullist criticisms of French strategy as impudent subversion, and temporarily cancels the wedding. Faulkner cannot resist contriving a messenger to interrupt their second argument with news of the Nazi invasion of Holland—the beginning of the flanking maneuver which rendered the Maginot Line useless.

    The real statesman in the village is not the mayor but the priest. Faulkner introduces him at church, delivering a sermon with the tantalizing first line, “In the beginning was the earth.” Omitting such phrases as “God created” and “the heavens” gives the sentence a decidedly secular tone; while this very republican cleric does go on to deplore the blessing of guns “in the name of ultimate peace,” and attributes this sacrilege to the fact that “We have deposed Him,” he concludes with an appeal to French patriotism. Later, after Georges kills a Nazi officer, the priest counsels him to seek absolution “where all Frenchmen must, and find it where all Frenchmen will: in the freeing of France.”

    As the priest is a statesman, so de Gaulle’s statesmanship is a priesthood. Faulkner shows de Gaulle urging the last cabinet of the Third Republic to resist Nazi tyranny, then welcoming the first Free French recruits in the name of liberty. As he review his troops, we hear that the name “De Gaulle” does better than raise the dead in France; “it raises the living.” Later, a soldier who heeded a Vichyite’s appeal to return to France comes back to de Gaulle; we are given to understand that a politically dead man has returned to life. De Gaulle’s final speech in the screenplay predicts the liberation of the French from “the enemies of France.” Faulkner’s de Gaulle, is prophet, priest, and “Chief of all Frenchmen who want to be free.” Political salvation is Faulkner’s theme. It also would be one of de Gaulle’s themes in his Mémoires de guerre, whose third volume is titled Le Salut.

    De Gaulle himself disappears almost entirely in the screenplay’s second half, as French salvation requires that Gaullist spirit animate the French. We see this in the conversion of Georges’ older brother, Jean, a navy officer who begins by collaborating with the Nazis, in a limited way, out of fidelity to the military command structure. Jean finally aids the Resistants after he sees their martyrs’ courage; one of them saves Jean’s life before sacrificing his own. Jean “save[s] his soul,” as one Resistant says, by as it were becoming Georges; he substitutes himself for his brother (now a confidant of de Gaulle and key man in the Underground) in a Nazi jail cell. One might say that the re-founding of the city, France, requires both an Abel who resists and a Cain who sacrifices himself.

    Returned to his village, Georges needs one more act of charity to complete his physical salvation. The priest ships him out in a coffin, enabling Georges’ later resurrection. The Nazis expose the priest, murdering him after he spits in one of their faces—a gesture disregarding traditional pieties about turning the other cheek. Having metamorphosed the Old Testament story of Cain and Able, Faulkner metamorphoses the New Testament story of Jesus and Lazarus.

    In the screenplay’s penultimate scene, Georges hears the good news that his wife has borne their child. The priest had insisted on Georges’ marriage during the war, in order to moderate his spiritedness—to make him serve life, not merely risk it. The birth demonstrates the priest’s posthumous success. Faulkner himself would arrange a wartime union or marriage between statesmanship and Christianity. In his final scene he shows the Resistants setting fires all across France, lighting the way for Allied bombers. The Christian imagery of an obscure childbirth thus anticipates the Christian imagery of apocalypse. The coming and second coming of a savior are clearly indicated.

    Warner Brothers never produced “The De Gaulle Story.” Editors Brodsky and Hamblin, following Joseph Blotner, propose several reasons: De Gaulle quarreled with Churchill, whose “attitudes were communicated to Roosevelt,” who communicated them to Warner, who canceled the project; producer Robert Buckner despaired of finding an actor to play de Gaulle; Fighting France representatives in the U. S. criticized the script; another script, “Mission to Moscow,” received higher priority.

    Roosevelt’s apparent veto must have decided the matter. FDR hardly needed Churchill to make him distrust de Gaulle. Churchill more or less kept faith with the French from the beginning to the end of the war. But Roosevelt and his State Department quickly turned away, preferring to deal with Vichy and a series of dubious pretenders. In November of 1943, when Faulkner’s work was halted, the Allies invaded North Africa; de Gaulle was excluded from the operation at Roosevelt’s insistence, over Churchill’s cautious objections. De Gaulle had anticipated this. In October he wrote an eloquent letter to Roosevelt, warning that “If France, when liberated by the victory of the democracies, will drive her to submitting to other influences. You know which ones.” Roosevelt never replied. Neither he nor the State Department personnel who read the letter worried much about postwar Communism.

    The film Mission to Moscow confirms this. In his memoirs, Jack Warner extends warm self-congratulations on his studio’s wartime efforts. “We had taken on Hitler, Mussolini, Hirohito, Tojo, and the rest of the totalitarian mob in one gutty picture after another.” Unfortunately, there was more than one totalitarian mob in those days, as Brodksy and Hamblin observe: “Ostensibly a documentary based on [Joseph E.] Davies experiences in Russia in 1936, Mission to Moscow was designed by Davies and Warner Brothers, with the encouragement and full support of President Roosevelt and the Office of War Information, to sell the American public on the idea that Joseph Stalin would be an acceptable ally in the struggle against Adolf Hitler. To accomplish this purpose, however, the makers of the film played fast and loose with important historical facts, most notably by justifying both the Soviet purge trials of the 1930s and the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1941 as appropriate and necessary responses to the threat of Nazism. Judging by Stalin’s willingness to allow Mission to Moscow to be shown in the Soviet Union, the film apparently succeeded….” Whether or not Moscow actually displaced “De Gaulle” at Warner Brothers, film history does parallel diplomatic history, here.

    Buckner exclaimed of the character de Gaulle in “De Gaulle,” “What a casting problem!” True enough: Claude Rains, though good at imitating Frenchmen, would not suffice, although Buckner did suggest making de Gaulle an invisible man in the film (“Why show de Gaulle? Why not just talk about him?”). The French questioned de Gaulle’s role in another way: Faulkner had made it too small to justify the use of the General’s name in the title. However trivial and contradictory, these objections to suggest that, somehow, Faulkner’s characterization of de Gaulle is the central problem with “The De Gaulle Story.” The fault is simple and fundamental. Faulkner’s conception of statesmanship cannot quite account for de Gaulle. De Gaulle must disappear from the film, given this conception.

    One Resistant has a speech on the subject: “All [the Nazis] have to threaten us with is death. And little people are not afraid to die. The little people, and the very great. Because there is something of the little people in the very great: as if all the little people who had been trodden and crushed had condensed into one great one who knew and remembered all their suffering.” After enduring too many French criticisms of his work, Faulkner wrote to Buckner, “Let’s dispense with General de Gaulle as a living character in the story,” thus ridding Warner Brothers of the need for the Gaullists’ imprimatur. “Any historical hero, angel or villain, is no more than the figurehead of his time. He is only the sum of his acts, only the sum of the little people whom he slew or raised, enslaved or made free.” One should note that Faulkner’s democratic/historicist assessment of “historical” heroes did not apply to artists. His daughter, whom he cherished, once tried to talk him out of starting a drinking bout. “Think of me,” she pleaded (he usually could be depended upon to do so). Faulkner was still sober enough, and perhaps just drunk enough, to deliver an unanswerable reply: “Nobody remembers Shakespeare’s children.”

    Although a statesman likely takes popular opinion more seriously than an artist must, de Gaulle exceeded “his time,” the sum of “the people.” Faulkner saw materials testifying to that. Barrès recalls, “I left General de Gaulle, not carried away—he’s too cold to produce that impression—but convinced that I had just seen a man.” The coldness of de Gaulle’s manliness suggests something more than spiritedness in his soul. It suggests moderation and prudence. In Barrès’ best chapter, de Gaulle gives a concise, masterly overview of wartime geopolitics. Speaking in November of 1940, de Gaulle tells Barrès that Hitler “knows perfectly well the war he has unleashed is a world war and that it can end only in a total victory for him, [or] for us.” Hitler also knows “it is the United States which holds the balance of power.” Hitler’s designs on Africa thus aim at South and Central America. With the Panama Canal closed by Axis troops, the United States could not quickly transfer ships between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans; German and Japanese forces then would bring a devastating two-front war to North America. “This war is a struggle for strategic bases,” de Gaulle concluded. Barrès adds that “the democracies, governed by untrained masses and by rather shortsighted businessmen and politicians, have been incapable of comprehending the fantastic breadth of view and the cynical ambition of the group of ruthless men who govern totalitarian Germany.” Many of de Gaulle’s contemporary speeches sound the same themes.

    Given these sources, Faulkner should have appreciated the statesman’s capacity to comprehend the tyrant’s comprehension. Faulkner did not. He therefore could not assume the statesmanlike artist’s responsibility to present both comprehensions. Faulkner’s mind did not calculate efficiently (he once enrolled in a college math course as an antidote to fuzzy thinking, but quickly dropped out). He knew petty calculators—Snopes—well enough. But great calculators were beyond him.

    One doubly regrets this because “The De Gaulle Story” remains a brilliant screenplay, reflecting the remarkable specimen of human nature who wrote it. Like so many drunks, Southerners, and Frenchmen, Faulkner combined sentimentality with cynicism, orotundity with debunking wit. But Faulkner also had a strength of character that bent in the wind but never broke in a gale. When his firstborn daughter died in infancy, when his young brother died in an airplane crash, Faulkner did what needed doing, without bourbon. He could endure major comic adversities, too—staying sober at his second daughter’s wedding, a dispiriting event in the life of any man. And on public matters, in his last ten years he said things worth heeding about Americans and our relations with the Soviet Union, criticizing his countrymen from the perspective of a moral strength that had nothing to do with moralism. [1]

    Gothicism, the romance of ruined Christianity, and Decadence, the romance of ruined Satanism, provoked the literary ‘modernists’ (we need a better word) to “make it new,” to rebuild or rediscover the foundations of human life. The question of the extent to which this enterprise requires a builder’s ingenuity or a discoverer’s intelligence, is a question familiar to careful students of politics. But not one of the English-speaking ‘modernists’ succeeded politically. Not one adequately integrated politics into his recreation or imitation of the world. None of them got far enough beyond the Gothic and Décadent denigration of politics. This denigration went with the denigration of prudence.

    As he grew older, Faulkner may have glimpsed this. He envisioned another life for himself: “I’d want to come back a buzzard. Nothing hates him or envies him or wants him or needs him. He is never bothered or in danger, and he can eat anything.” The sharp-eyed buzzard, unblinking toward death, who both rises to an overview and descends to the particulars, who excites little comment in either Mississippi or California, and who doesn’t work hard for a living—he, more than the dog, is the philosophic animal. Faulkner was on to something, there. He needed only a more calculating mind to realize it.

     

    NOTE

    1. After some West Point cadets were expelled for cheating, Faulkner said, “They are victims of that whole generation of their fathers, teachers, governors, who promulgated and put on public record the postulate of national fear of our national character: that Americans as individuals or in the mass are incapable of independence, courage, endurance, sacrifice; that in time of trouble we will not hold together since our character is not in the brain nor in the heart, but in the appetites, the entrails; incapable of independence, so we have made charity a national institution; incapable of decision and discipline and government, so we have transferred control of the individual’s slightest action into federal bureaus….” Faulkner declined a State Department request to tour the Soviet Union on the grounds that the Russia which produced Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Gogol… is no longer there.” “If I who have had freedom all my life in which to write truth exactly as I saw it, visited Russia, the fact of even the outward appearance of condoning the condition in which the present Russian government has established, would be a betrayal, not of the giants: nothing can harm them, but of their spiritual heirs who rik their lives with every page they write; and a lie in that it would condone the shame of them who might have been their heirs who have lost more than life: who have had their souls destroyed for the privilege of writing in public.” In a fittingly less lofty tone, he replied to Khruschev’s prediction, “We will bury you”: “That funeral will occur about ten minutes after the police bury gambling.”

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Plato’s “Protagoras”

    January 25, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Patrick J. Coby: Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato’s Protagoras. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1987.

    Originally published in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy. Volume 17, Number 2, Winter 1989-90. Republished with permission.

     

    Intellectuals: What to do with them? With one foot in the cave, one foot out, they urge the citizens within to chain-breaking liberation, charge philosophers beyond with uncaring detachment. Neither fully underground nor above, they would rather lead than think, and thus risk a trampling—voilà, historicism.

    In ‘synthesizing’ politics and philosophy, historicism denies that philosophers see beyond their time and place, even as it holds out the prospect of revelations ‘progress’ will bring. Patrick J. Coby demonstrates the falsehood of this denial, showing that Socrates conceived something very like one of the lower versions of modern utilitarianism, commending it lukewarmly to a sophist it might have tamed. Coby thus uses history to refute historicism, showing that Plato’s Socrates both formulated and implicitly criticized a well-known philosophic doctrine, more than two millennia before ‘its time.’

    Coby fits his commentary to the order of the dialogue, beginning at the beginning and working his way through. The dialogue itself fits its topic—Protagoras, or the nature of sophistry—in being “a war of words.” Perhaps alone among commentators, Coby emphasizes the importance of one silent auditor of the conversation—Alcibiades, here a combative young man attracted by Socrates’ combativeness, in whom Socrates may wish to awaken an erotic attraction to wisdom. A combative soul will want to know how to conquer; it may not know, but merely presume, the worth of conquest. “The difference between knowing [a] doctrine and knowing its worth is the difference between —technē [artistry] and sophia [wisdom],” the wisdom Socrates may want Alcibiades to love. The sophist, preeminent vendor of technē, might easily seduce a spirited young man. Socrates would convince Alcibiades that sophistic technique cannot withstand the manly assaults of philosophy, which enables those possessed by it to wield certain superior techniques along with their superior understanding.

    Despite his apparent spiritedness, Protagoras lacks the true conqueror’s soul; he seeks pleasant safety. “Protagoras is both safe and famous”—or so he believes. “It will be Socrates’ purpose in the dialogue to show him why safety and fame are mostly incompatible.” Socrates does this initially by exposing the contradiction between the sophist’s praise for democracy and the undemocratic character of sophistry itself, which offers a technique for ruling the many, a technique that finally consists more of coercion than of persuasion. The ‘virtue’ Protagoras professes to ‘teach’ amounts to a technique of political control.

    “Justice to Protagoras is what human beings declare it to be.” Socrates undertakes to pull Protagoras away from his conventionalism and toward a low-level appreciation of nature, specifically of pleasure. In doing so, Socrates must centrally prove—not by words but by action—that he can walk away from his audience. That is, he shows his independence from his listeners’ desires, even as Protagoras, despite his boasts of control-techniques, betrays his own subservience. Socrates forces Protagoras to accept short speeches, dialectic, and to eschew rhetorical declamation.

    Protagoras accepts the philosophic form of speech, but tries to escape into the thickets of literary criticism—a move that should amuse readers today who’ve seen much the same strategy at work on college campuses. In fairness, the sophistic, posturing Protagoras does have rather more nobility in him than our ‘deconstructionists’; he at least vaguely senses the appeal of tragedy, of heroic struggle. Socrates responds by citing the example of the Lacedaemonians, an example not likely to move many academics today, but effective in ancient Greece. (Historical relativism does apply to rhetorical appeals, shaped as they are to the character of the audience. Does historicism’s desire to lead, which necessitates the conflation of logic and rhetoric, ‘naturally’ incline its devotees to relativism? That is, does not historicism result ‘logically’ from the intellectual’s libido dominandi?) Socrates claims that those admirable citizens the Lacedaemonians secretly partake of philosophy; “what seems to the world like courage is in fact wisdom.” An esotericism so effective none but Socrates ever suspected it: This “elaborate jest” forms one part of Socrates’ thoroughgoing effort to “intellectualize” the virtues. In its most extreme formulation, this means that virtue is knowledge (easy to practice once you know what it is), vice ignorance. This resembles Protagoras’ notions, with a significant exception: Protagoras only knows his techniques, not nature. Perhaps this accounts for the deficiencies of Protagorean technique; a tool designed for the rule of human beings will fail in the hands of one who does not understand human being. Poetry, being imaginative, more easily lends itself to manipulation by clever technicians than does the logical apprehension of nature.

    Protagoras misunderstands human nature not only in the abstract but in the particular. He will teach, or claim to teach, anyone who pays, regardless of the student’s nature. Socrates would redirect Protagoras’ attention to an art whose primary purpose is perception, not manipulation: “The art of measurement,” better known to readers now as the utilitarian calculus of pleasures and pains. The knowledge this art brings does not reach the heights (or the depths) of human nature; intellectuals, in their ‘middling’ circumstance of soul, cannot stretch so far. But the art does induce them to measure man instead of unwarrantedly supposing man the measure. Knowledge, however narrow, and pleasures, however unrefined, will replace the will to power, and the susceptibility to worship power, so noticeable in sophists generally—a will and a susceptibility that finally issued in historicism.

    Socrates prefers a different solution to the problems of political life and heterodox thought present to each other. By exoteric speech, the philosopher “endeavors to protect the body politic rom indiscriminate rationalism while at the same time making it tolerant of philosophy.” Socrates can indeed befriend political men—at one extreme, the flamboyant Alcibiades, on the other, Crito—and they him. Unfortunately, citizens may mistake the philosopher for a sophist and make him poison himself. The prospect of this inconvenience requires the philosopher to “confront his fellow intellectuals,” to help them deplore the closing of the Athenian mind in some way suited to their own capacities and defects.

    Socrates may harbor some sympathy for the sophistic intellectual, in one sense. The sophist, caught between cave and sunlit fields, in his own way imitates human being, with its “in-between, daemonic nature,” bestial and godlike. Like Nietzsche, Socrates sees the difficulty in tightrope-walking; unlike Nietzsche, Socrates foresees no godlike overcoming of this activity, at least not for any other than the rarest of humans. (Too, Socrates conceives of no creativity in godliness, the creativity that intensifies Nietzsche’s ambition.) Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment presents or suggests these issues with a sober, thoughtful precision that enables readers to think more clearly about the problem of thinking in regimes in which popular opinion rises to dominance.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Socrates in the City

    January 8, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Mary P. Nichols: Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.

    Originally published in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy. Vol.ume 17, Number 2, Winter 1989-90.

     

    If the name ‘Socrates’ means ‘rule of wisdom,’ small wonder Athenians finally put him to death. That he survived so long attests to his failure to put anything in writing. That his memory survives, however, attests to the writing of others, who portrayed him as the archetypal philosopher, the one whose way of life raised the question of philosophy’s relation to the polis. Theories may or may not directly affect political life, but theorizing does. If you make people think, they will not act while they are thinking; after they finish (if they do) they may act differently than before. Good citizens have known to find this infuriating.

    Nichols’ book has three main parts: on Aristophanes’ Clouds, on Plato’s Republic, and on the second book of Aristotle’s Politics. Although many might believe these books thoroughly discussed by others, Nichols has other ideas. Fortunately, she is right, and the conflicts between some of her interpretations and those of Allan Bloom, Leo Strauss, and Paul Friedlander may do her readers the favor of returning them to the original text with renewed eyes.

    Nichols’ careful reading of the Clouds does not entirely diverge from Strauss’ account in Socrates and Aristophanes. Their emphases differ. She is more down-to-earth about clouds: “Whereas Strauss’ Aristophanes considers “the old-fashioned… no less laughable, no less unreasonable, than the newfangled,” Nichols more measuredly calls Aristophanes “a conservative who sees the limitations of what he is trying to conserve.” She never suggests that Aristophanes wants to be a god. She regards the Just Speech hypocritical but not mistaken in his words. Rather, she describes the Unjust Speech, Socrates, and Phidippides (Strepsiades’ son)as erroneously imagining nature to be “composed of absolutes, unrelated to [other] things in nature, and uninfluenced by time.” The attempt to bring convention into line with this misconceived nature yields young men fit for no action except father-beating. Nor are they fit for thought, and here she comes close to Strauss:

    “Seeking the universal or the unlimited [she writes], Socrates turns to nonhuman nature and to man only insofar as he resembles nonhuman nature. Socrates loses sight of the human, aware only of the movements of matter…. Socrates, seeking freedom in universality, discovers only that man is a slave to his own body. Caught in contradiction, Socrates is laughable.”

    Nichols finds Aristophanes convincing up to a point, but she sees the limitations of his conservatism. A clever defense of ordinary life, of normalcy, cannot account for the fact that “it is in ordinary life that the desire for completeness,” including philosophic eros, “arises.” “How long can laughter check desire and prevent tears?” With this question she turns to the Republic.

    This interpretation forms the bulk and the core of the book. Here Nichols takes issue with Strauss and especially with Bloom on the significance of the philosopher-kings. She argues that they represent the culmination of a profoundly un-Socratic argument led by Socrates but energized by Glaucon’s desire for perfection,” a desire that is not so much erotic as spirited. Whereas Bloom contends that the spirited man endangers himself and others because his love of his own closes his mind to reason, Nichols contends that both love of one’s own and philosophy can bring the illusion of independence from the city, if they are ill-mixed. The philosopher-kings exemplify this. They are finally creatures of the city—orthodox, un-Socratic, unquestioning. They attract Glaucon, who “does not pursue knowledge so much as the certainty knowledge affords.” “Ultimately, the city offers knowledge of simple and eternal ideas as a substitute for the uncertain understanding necessary in a world of complex and changing objects.” Philosophy does not lead men to the unnatural unity of communism; politics does, in its anti-erotic quest for changeless order and control. Reason is reduced to a merely disciplinary force that serves the ‘ideally’ self-sufficient ‘manly’ man. Instead of “Socratic political philosophers,” the city in speech is ruled by a “mathematical philosophy” that prepares the brightest youths “for tyranny over the city,” an enforced homogeneity within each of the three classes.

    “In contrast to these philosophers, for whom the city is a cave they escape, Socrates gains clarity within the city…transcend[ing] his own political community in ways the philosophers of the cave image do not.” The erotic Socrates does not need to be dragged from the cave. Nor does he need to be dragged back to it. “What is needed is not the ridicule of philosophy that Aristophanes offers but a philosophic understanding of the city’s legitimate needs, as well as of its dangerous tendencies. Philosophy must be political in order to avoid being politicized.” The truly just man is “the lover of learning” who lives in the “dialogic community.”

    Socrates’ regime typology is not the kernel of a political science, as Bloom contends; there is no room for choice, deliberation—for statesmanship. Regimes decline inevitably, here. “Plato describes no decent politics in the Republic to which men can give their attention and loyalty…. Because the Republic offers knowledge of the perils of political action rather than knowledge useful in guiding politics, Aristophanes would find it unsatisfactory. As long as knowledge yields no more fruit than this”—the knowledge that one does not know and a consequent moderation in all things, including politics—”he might ask, why is knowledge better for men than the forgetting that comedy is intended to encourage?” Nichols now turns not, as one might expect, to Plato’s trilogy on knowledge and statesmanship, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman, nor to the other philosopher who wrote Socratic dialogues, Xenophon, but to Aristotle. This surprising turn more than suggests that Nichols has intends her book not merely as a scholarly investigation but a philosophic one.

    “Whereas Socrates founded political philosophy by undertaking a philosophic examination of human affairs, Aristotle founded political science by directing philosophy to political action”—”constitut[ing] an implicit defense of philosophy against Aristophanes’ criticism and of politics against Plato’s.” Against Aristophanes, Aristotle teaches that politics can and must “incorporate diversity.” Thus “thought and action correct each other,” with statesmen, and particularly lawgivers, providing “the bridge between thought and actual regimes.” Unlike Socrates, Aristotle does not direct his political teachings to the young. He is “the philosophic teacher of statesmen.” “Far from constituting a threat to the city’s unity, the philosopher can share in political life.” For Aristotle, politics is not based on a lie.

    There may be some problems with Nichols’ discussion of the philosopher-kings. For one thing, Socrates says so little about them as philosophers. their mathematical education does not make them un-Platonic (as distinguished from un-Socratic); the Academy itself is said to have warned away unmathematical souls. Moreover, Nichols believes that Socrates’ account of love as indiscriminate is obviously and deliberately wrong: A wine-lover does not love every kind of wine, as Socrates claims, as no one loves a bad wine. “The city’s communism could be successful, only if Socrates’ account of love were true: only if the guardians love all the members of a class” and therefore no individuals within it. But Nichols confuses kinds with intensity, here. A true wine lover loves all kinds of wine, but not poor specimens of those kinds; nor need he love all kinds equally. Socrates may be more kingly than Nichols says. Plato also teaches that a tyrannical soul may have been a potentially philosophic soul, now spoiled; tyrants and philosophers are opposites, but in another sense twins.

    The extent to which such reservations refute Nichols’ overall argument may be questioned. Only an exceptionally dogmatic soul could fail to learn from her book, and such souls are not the intended readership.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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