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    Mr. Nice Guy: On the First Book of Montaigne’s Essays

    March 6, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Pierre Villey famously argues that Montaigne ‘evolves’ during the course of the Essays, from Stoicism to Pyrrhonism to ‘prudence’ or hedonism. Book I reflects Montaigne’s ‘Stoic’ stage.

    This is indeed the impression Montaigne gives. In his book Montaigne in effect ‘tries on’ any number of philosophic identities, Stoicism being the foremost of these in Book I. In so doing, Montaigne invites his readers to do the same, to relax their hold on their own identities, including their opinions, deeply ingrained, which help to constitute those identities. The question to which there can never be any dogmatic answer is: Is Montaigne evolving, or is he deliberately bringing us along toward a goal he knows? Montaigne, it might be said, deliberately makes it very difficult to determine what his intentions are, to say for sure who this apparently open and genial man is. Montaigne deliberately wants to make dogmatism of any sort difficult.

    Stoicism? Yes, but…. In Montaigne there is always a ‘Yes, but….’ Consider the very first essay. Montaigne has gone to Italy. He retrieves not Seneca but Machiavelli. There he is, hiding in plain sight, embedded in Montaigne’s account of means and ends. If we have offended someone—surely a serious problem for an essay of heterodox opinions?—shall we throw ourselves on their mercy? Or shall we defy them openly, prepare to fight to the death? There is no dogmatic answer to these questions, Montaigne shows us, as either reaction might work or fail, given circumstances. But if you are a ruler, he more than suggests, the way to end vacillation between cruelty, pity, and admiration for your enemy’s courage is policy: Secretly have your enemies drowned at sea. Or (no dogmatic recommendations for rulers, either) be like Alexander: openly merciless. That is, ‘be’ (that is, use) the fox or the lion. To be able to use the fox or the lion is of course to ‘be’ both, to enlist in the Machiavellian army. Montaigne can ‘be’ lion, fox, Stoic, Epicurean, Pyrrhonist, Socratic, Christian, and—what not?

    Is Montaigne a Machiavellian, then? Not so fast, the charming Mayor of Bordeaux says, ‘Stay. Have some wine. Cheer up. Relax for a while. Virtù? What virtù? I’m really quite harmless. Leave your fortress and come out to parley. I am a man of honor, like the ancients, and besides—I haven’t the energy to be a prince. Are my essays not casual, easy, and written in no order? (Not that I am altogether aimless: “The soul that has no fixed goal loses itself”). But my goal is only pleasure, and what harm can my pleasure be to you? “One is punished for defending a place obstinately and without reason,” so open up a bit and converse with me.

    ‘What shall we talk about?’ you wonder. What not? Sadness, idleness, liars, prognostications, kings, cabbages, fear—the list can go on forever. But centrally, in my First Book, let’s talk about friendship. (Why look at the center in Montaigne’s book? Because he tells us to, at the beginning of his essay on friendship.) I had a true friend once, Montaigne recalls, but now he is dead. Friendship eliminates “separation and distinctions.” I would offer to show you my friend’s uniquely valuable work, “On Voluntary Servitude”—an obligation to top all obligations—but I’ve changed my mind. I forbid you the fruit of his labors, precious and indispensable thought it is, and I substitute for it 29 love sonnets—which, come to think of it, may also disappear from my table before long.’

    When, with Adam-like curiosity, the reader seeks out and tastes friend Etienne de la Boétie’s essay, he finds a protest against having one master or several. Neither monotheism nor polytheism, so to speak, satisfies Montaigne’s best friend. Servitude to the one or the many depends finally upon one thing: our own consent. Our manacles are mind-forged. “There is nothing a human being should hold more dear than the restoration of his own natural right” to be a man and not a “beast of burden.” [1]  The violence of tyrannicide—and of wars of religion, too?—is not absolutely necessary if enough of us simply stop believing. (No wonder Montaigne demurs when it comes to show us this work; neither the Protestant nor the Catholic side would find such a solution to the brutal religious strive of Sixteenth-century Europe very satisfying.) The brotherliness of friendship will always undermine the tyranny of the one or the few. As for the One, the Supreme Tyrant, “it is because he doews not know how to love that he ultimately impoverishes his own spirit and destroys his own empire.” Philia can replace agape as agape destroys its devotees in wars spiritual and corporeal.

    (As for Montaigne’s twenty-ninth essay, following the one on friendship—by amazing coincidence in a book whose writer professes to proceed in such a desultory fashion, the essay refers us to a collection of exactly twenty-nine sonnets—a glance confirms that love and tyranny go together. The fifteenth or central sonnet of the sequence describes a moment of self-rule or liberty, quickly lost to the power of love’s tyranny. It isn’t easy for a solitary soul to resist tyranny. You need friends, brothers, allies. Montaigne himself gets along without them, now, but not everyone is Montaigne.)

    (Montaigne, through de la Boétie, follows the ‘modern’ strategy: deliberately meld agapic with erotic love, interpret the former as the sublimation of the latter, then dismiss both as ineffectual. The difference between Montaigne and Machiavelli seems to be that Montaigne thinks you will need at least one friend, one unindictable co-conspirator. But perhaps you will be able in large measure to invent that friend, even as you invent your variety of selves.)

    But all of this is buried deep—not merely in the center of Book I but beneath the text altogether. Everywhere else, Montaigne follows the advice of the forty-seventh essay: “It is dangerous to attack a man whom you have deprived of every other means of escape but that of weapons, for necessity is a violent schoolmistress.” Give your enemy many options; his own uncertainty of judgment will do, or undo, the rest. Montaigne is supremely the writer of many options offered. How to condemn a man with no fixed identity? Pascal formulated a way, but long after Montaigne needed to worry about it.

    And so near the end of this remarkable Book I, he writes an essay on prayer that makes one smile, or even laugh. In these essays, he says, he puts forth “formless and unresolved notions” in order to “submit them” to the worthy guardians of “the holy proscriptions of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman church,” guardians who enjoy “absolute power over me.” Thus he will have his liberty and enjoy protection from Church persecution. Lion and fox, but more often fox, living quietly in his burrow in a lion’s den.

    Toward this end, he prudently recommends a means: a division of labor in an age when theologians write too humanly, humanists too theologically. This is the beginning of the ‘secularist’ version of the separation of church and state. In the face of God and His vicegerents, how dangerous can a deferential, self-effacing nice guy like Montaigne possibly be? Pass over him (Montaigne prays), so that he may live into the old age that is the final topic of Book I, and be well on his way to extending his influence everywhere.

     

    Note

    1. Etienne de la Boétie: The Politics of Obedience. Harry Kurtz translation. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975, p. 50.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Lincoln on Culture

    March 5, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Abraham Lincoln: “Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society.” Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 30, 1859. Speeches and Writings 1859-1865. New York: The Library of America, 1989.

     

    The audience at the agricultural fair sponsored by the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society probably did not expect that their invited speaker would address them not only on the cultivation of the soil but the cultivation of the human mind and heart. Readers today might be equally surprised. They know Lincoln’s great themes of political union and human liberty, without suspecting his prowess as what we might now call a ‘culture warrior.’

    He begins not with culture but with institutions. Agricultural fairs “are becoming an institution of the country,” and “useful” ones. The Declaration of Independence identifies governmental institutions as means of securing natural rights. Agricultural fairs are institutions that address the distinction drawn a century later by Carl Schmitt, the distinction between friend and enemy. But while Schmitt valorizes the distinction, making it central to his conception of political life, Lincoln aims to ameliorate it, on the eve of civil war in his country and with an eye toward peace among nations. Agricultural fairs are civil-social institutions that secure natural rights by doing what institutions do for any regime, channeling human thoughts and activities in directions that serve the purposes of the regime—here, a democratic and commercial republic.

    “From the first appearance of man upon the earth, down to very recent times, the words ‘stranger’ and ‘enemy’ were quite or almost, synonymous.” Whether among individuals or nations, “it was deemed no offense, but even meritorious, to rob, and murder, and enslave strangers.” Tamed, the inclination nonetheless persists in the modern world, even among men of “the highest cultivation.” Social and political institutions serve as ‘pathways’ of authority, thoughts, and sentiments in any community; agricultural fairs advance “civilization” in the United States by “mak[ing] more pleasant, and more strong, and more durable, the bond of social and political union among us.” Quoting Alexander Pope, Lincoln identifies happiness as the “end and aim” of human being, human nature. Most immediately, happiness consists of pleasure, the pleasure of “recreation” marked by “virtue and advantage, and free from vice and disadvantage.” In this way they afford fellow-citizens pleasure without pain.

    Agricultural fairs have as their “chief use” the improvement of work, not recreation: “the great calling of agriculture.” The pleasant sociality of recreation comes as a side-benefit of the serious sociality of work, “mak[ing] mutual exchange of agricultural discovery, information, and knowledge” general, no longer the preserve of one or few. In doing so, the fairs excite “emulation” not only for material rewards but “the pride and honor of success—of triumph, in some sort.” These institutions redirect ‘thumotic’ passions, especially the love of victory, away from war and toward peace and prosperity. In this, they are the social equivalent of the patent clause of the United States Constitution, which guarantees that the inventors who design the useful implements displayed at such fairs will be secure in their ‘intellectual property.’

    Before elaborating on these themes, Lincoln needs to address the speaker’s perennial problem: Why should you listen to me? Why am I here before you, today? He assures them that he does not come bearing flatterery—something a likely presidential candidate might well be suspected of doing. Farmers “are neither better nor worse than other people,” although in the America of 1859 they are “more numerous than any other class,” and therefore much flattered by vote-seekers. He concedes that the most numerous class justly lays claim to being “the largest interest” of the many interests in the country, “that if there be inevitable conflict between that interest and any other, that other should yield.” The question of majority rule and natural right, the possibility of a tyrannical majority, had formed the centerpiece of Lincoln’s debates with Senator Stephen Douglas, only a year earlier. How will a majority that knows itself to be a majority in a democratic republic bring itself to self-restraint, to that degree of self-government which refrains from trampling the natural rights of minorities? That is as much a task of civilization as the sociality cultivated by agricultural fairs, and requires a similar disinclination to view others as strangers and enemies.

    Lincoln doesn’t flatter himself, either, another thing politicians are wont to do; admittedly, he is “in no sort a farmer.” He will not pose as an expert. He comes as a fellow citizen, inviting farmers to think along with him, not as an authority claiming the right to tell them what to do. Neither ‘the many’ nor ‘the one’ rule without consideration for the other.

    What he can offer, without arrogance or irrelevance on this occasion, in front of this audience, amounts to a general framework of how to think about agriculture. American farmer have a problem. Their acreage now yields much less produce than it did, quite recently. And even at its peak, crop yields were below the land’s potential. Farmers need to know how to reverse this. New techniques of working the soil, analysis of soils themselves, fertilizers, varieties of seed, meteorology: all these need investigation if farmers are to obtain more produce on their acreage. As the population increases, land prices will go up and there will be more mouths to feed. Without discoveries in agronomy, farmer will need to cultivate more land just when land becomes scarcer; moreover, larger farms will increase costs for maintaining property boundaries and for transporting equipment in the race against time that farming entails.

    Only renewed economy of means toward the ends will meet the problem. Improved cultivation of the land thus requires a more “thorough cultivation of the farmer’s own mind” and heart. By doing “what he does well” a man feels proud; failure humiliates. “With the former, his heart in in his work, and he will do twice as much of it with less fatigue,” giving energy to his labor, whereas failure makes him look at his work with “disgust,” “imagin[ing] himself exceedingly tired.” Even as agricultural fairs give happiness in the form of pleasure, work well done gives happiness in the form of “satisfaction.” A satisfied mind and heart benefits the land that has rewarded the farmer’s economy—feeds back into it, as it were—by spurring him to protect and care for his land.

    Agricultural fairs display new inventions. Lincoln invites the farmers to consider the steam-powered plough, which, if feasible, will “afford an advantage over plowing with animals.” Again he claims no expertise in the matter, instead inviting his audience to think with him about the technical problems that need to be overcome, including the size and weight of the machine, its fuel supply, and the supply of water needed to produce steam. He connects investigation into the feasibility of the steam plow to the honors bestowed at agricultural fairs: “Our thanks, and something more substantial than thanks”—namely, profit—”are due to every man engaged in the effort to produce a successful steam plow.” Even those who try and fail “will bring something to light, which, in the hands of others, will contribute to the final success.” Lincoln understands how scientific experimentation and discovery work.

    The topic of thoughtful work provides Lincoln with an opening for addressing the fundamental moral and political issue facing Americans in 1859: free labor versus slavery. If farmers constitute the majority interest in the country, they will need to be persuaded that free labor is better than slave labor, that the kind of labor Wisconsin farmers do and use makes better sense than the kind of labor seen in, for example, South Carolina. “The world is now agreed that labor is the source from which human wants are mainly supplied,” not climate or soil. But what kind of labor? Some assume that capital is prior to labor, “that nobody labors, unless somebody else, owning capital, somehow, by the use of that capital, induces him to do it.” The only question then becomes, Which kind of labor is better, that provided by hired men who “work by their own consent,” or that provided by slaves, who work because compelled? Such thinkers also assume that once a laborer, always a laborer; that such a man’s condition “is as bad as, or worse than that of a slave.” Not only will the poor always be with us, but the same people will be poor, all of their lives. Named by South Carolina Senator James Henry Hammond only a year earlier, this “‘mud-sill’ theory” of free labor conceived as wage slavery was held by both Southern plantation owners and and in a different way by Karl Marx, all contemporaries of Lincoln and his audience. Whether consisting of chattel slaves or wage slaves, for the plantation owners the “mud-sill” serves as the indispensable foundation of every social ‘house,’ and the house will be fatally ‘divided’ if that foundation crumbles. Marx thinks so, too, but looks forward to that crumbling, envisioning a new, egalitarian society in which there will be no such miserable foundation.

    Others take the opposing view. Following John Locke, they hold labor as “prior to, and independent of, capital,” that “capital is the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed.” (Marx takes up this ‘labor theory of value,’ which is why he expects the oppressed working-class foundation of modern societies to hold firm while the oppressive social and economic structure above it collapses.) These thinkers point to the fact that most laborers are neither hire laborers nor hire themselves out. “Even in our slave States, except South Carolina, a majority of the whole people of all colors, are neither slaves nor masters” but men who work the land with their families. Lincoln does something both subtle and indispensable here; he associates white and black men as members of the majority, the rulers of the democratic republic. He well knows how virulently prejudiced many whites are, when it comes to blacks; Stephen Douglas had exploited these prejudices in their debates, race-baiting Lincoln’s supporters as “black Republicans,” to which taunt they raged back in self-defense, “White! White!” Just as Lincoln asked the majority class of farmers to think along with him to discover the first principles of agriculture, so he suggests that they and black farmers are together in the same class of industrious American workers.

    The “mud-sill” theorists also err in assuming that hired laborers constitute a permanent class. On the contrary, “the prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him.” Prudence and labor overcome poverty, so long as “the just and generous, and prosperous system” of liberty can defend itself against the unjust, ungenerous and impoverishing system of slave labor ruled by ‘the few.’

    Here is where education returns, education reconceived for the new regime of democratic republicanism. Under the old oligarchic regimes, called aristocracies, educated persons “did not perform manual labor.” So long as education remained the province of the very few, this regime could survive, even prosper, at least for the benefit of the few. But Wisconsin numbers among the states arising from the old Northwest Territory. The Northwest Ordinance establishing that territory also established a system of public schools. Today, “especially in these free States, nearly all are educated.” This being so, the educated must work; if education were seen as part of an ‘aristocratic’ title to live off the work of others, the educated nation will starve. “Otherwise, education itself would become a positive and intolerable evil.”

    How, then, “can labor and education be the most satisfactorily combined?” The “mud-sill” theory cannot help us, here, separating as it does the head form the hands. The free labor theory distinguishes the head from the hand, but notices that “the Author of man makes every individual with one head and one pair of hands, it was probably intended that heads and hands should cooperate as friends; and that that particular head, should direct and control that particular pair of hands,” directing them to feed the “particular mouth” in that particular head. To better effect this elementary, indeed alimentary, form of self-government, the head will need an education that “add[s] to its capacity for performing its charge”—the “universal education” provided in the Northwest Ordinance. Such education is the “natural companion” of free labor.

    Having brought agriculture to intellectual and moral culture, Lincoln brings culture back to agriculture, observing that “no other human occupation opens so wide a field for the profitable and agreeable combination of labor with cultivated thought.” A mind “already trained to thought, in the country school, or higher school,” will find in agriculture “an exhaustless source of profitable enjoyment,” with “every blade of grass… a study” in botany, chemistry, and physics.

    The thoroughness of “cultivated thought” directed at cultivating the soil and every useful species on it meets the needs of the regime of commercial republicanism. The more commercial republics there are (America’s old enemy, Great Britain, was transforming itself into one, during and after Lincoln’s lifetime), the less the world will be “inclined to wars,” and the “more devoted to the arts of peace, than heretofore.” This means that the world’s human population will “increase rapidly.” With population increase comes the need for better cultivation of the soil, inasmuch as land for agriculture may decrease as the human population increases, and must in any event produce more food. A prosperous nation in which free farmers remain the majority will never “be the victim of oppression in any of its forms”—”alike independent of crowned-kings, money-kings [the financial oligarchs of banks and stock exchanges], and land-kings [the plantation oligarchs of the South].” Such a nation will preserve the moral and political habits needed to sustain a democratic and commercial republic.

    In his exordium, Lincoln good-humoredly remarks that his audience may be eager to stop listening to Lincoln and listen instead to the award of prizes. He parts with advice on how to think about this new, more peaceful form of competition, the competition in producing things useful to the American regime. Winners should reflect that they may be losers next year, if they “relax in [their] exertion”; meanwhile, “the vanquished this year, may be victor the next, in spite of all competition.” The old maxim, “true and appropriate in all times and situations”—”And this, too, shall pass away“—chastens us “in the hour of pride” and “consol[es] in the depths of affliction.” It is a maxim good for  a way of life animated by liberty, economic and political. What need not pass away is the progress of “individual, social, and political prosperity and happiness” sustained “by the best cultivation of the physical world, beneath and around us,” and “the intellectual and moral world within us.” Like the Founders, Lincoln wants progress without being a ‘progressive.’ Progress will come not from some necessary unfolding of an Absolute Spirit, biological evolution, or class conflict, not from a supposed law of ‘History,’ but from the free, undetermined and intelligent labor of human beings living in regimes of liberty.

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Seneca: The Governance of Anger

    March 5, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Seneca: Moral Essays. John W. Basore translation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.

     

    The Senecan essays on providence, firmness, anger, and mercy might educate some prince who aspired to a philosophic life. Perhaps the young Nero raised such hopes in old Seneca? It would not be the first time or the last time a tyrannical soul inspired unwarranted philosophic dreams.

    Anger is the passion of the political man, unless it is libido dominandi. How often does the rage for justice stand revealed as the rage to rule? In the Republic Socrates seeks to cure this passion. In his judgment, prudence is the crowning virtue of the political man, the one that needs to be made to guide spiritedness, to divert ardent young men from tyranny. Seneca’s essays are more accessible to those who actually may become political men.

    If anger animates the desire to repay suffering, as Aristotle teaches (II. i. 115), then the justification of the ways of God to man becomes a prime theological end. God metes out suffering in mysterious ways. Why me? the sufferer asks. Why not that wastrel over there? Why do good men suffer while the bad prosper? To ask these questions insistently betrays a mindset of dependency; rebellion against God only reinforces resentment of and groveling before God—the sort of thing Rousseau satirizes in his pages on “the great conspiracy” against him, at the end of the Confessions.

    Anti-theological ire poisons the soul, the potentially philosophic soul above all. Seneca advises a courageous acceptance of the will of God that will weaken superstitious worries about the gods. God makes you suffer because he wants you stronger, not softer. The worst sufferings may injure the individual but benefit onlookers who take heart at courage. Suffering aids philosophy: “To be always happy and to pass through life without a mental pang is to be ignorant of one half of nature,” the philosopher’s object of study (I. i. 25). Suffering brings you back to nature by illustrating the emptiness of things most people regard as desirable or fearful (I. i. 33). the good, man, by contrast, “despises externals” (I. i. 43). Finally, (and here Seneca appeals to the most spirited souls) suffering well is glorious. “In this you outstrip God; he is exempt from enduring evil, while you are superior to it” (I. i. 45). (Hence the theological need for Christ.) Resentment of God or nature (insofar as these can be genuinely distinguished in the thinking of any philosopher) can lead to no good. Indeed, it led to Machiavelli.

    “On Firmness” centers not on the sufferings inflicted by God but on those inflicted by men, particularly the mental sufferings caused by insult. Once again, Seneca seeks to liberate the mind of his reader from dependence upon externals. “The wise man can receive neither injury nor insult” (II. i. 49), as “no baneful force can extend its power all the way to him” (II. i. 57). In retaliating against his would-be injurer, he moves not in anger but in benevolence, correcting the vice(s) that impelled his enemy to attack. The wise man “can lose nothing,” having “everything invested in himself” and “trust[ing] nothing to fortune” (II. i. 61). Fortune rules gross externals. Made of finer matter, autarchia or self-sufficiency, self-rule, eludes Fortune’s ham hands.

    To so redefine what is ‘one’s own’ is to politicize philosophy even as Stoicism seems to depoliticize it. Stoicism depoliticizes philosophy ‘externally’—not for it the careful Aristotelian classification and weighing of regimes—but politicizes it ‘internally.’ When considering Aristotelian ethics, Seneca combines the great-souled man with the philosopher. For Aristotle’s philosopher, the love of one’s own is unphilosophic, as the philosopher directs his gaze at nature, ‘inner’ and ‘outer.’ For Seneca’s philosopher, and for his wise man, love of one’s own means love of one’s own soul, whose finest element is identical to the finest element of the cosmos, the natural law. Accordingly, the Senecan conquest of Fortune (II. I. 93) is exactly the opposite of Machiavelli’s conquest of Fortune. Aristotle—ever the moderate—lands in-between, albeit closer to Seneca.

    Human nature is social, not punitive; reason cannot listen to others when anger towards others—gods or men—blinds it. Do not écrasez l’infame; learn from it, then correct it. Seneca can propose this dispassionate view in part because he does not regard reason or passions as essences. “[P]assion and reason are only the transformation of the soul toward the better or the worse” (III. i. 127). Unlike Plato’s Socrates, unlike Aristotle, who enlist the thumotic ‘part’ of the soul in alliance with reason against the appetitive ‘part,’ Seneca can make reason entirely self-sufficient. This is how he can conflate the philosopher and the great-souled man. His great-souled man is less thumotic than Aristotle’s, and so reconcilable to philosophy. (At the same time, as noted above, his philosopher and his wise man are more assiduous than Aristotle in loving ‘their own’ to the exclusion of political life, and thus more animated by what Plato and Aristotle call thumotic desire.)

    Following Socrates, Seneca ascribes evil to error. Why get angry at a mistaken man? (This is not to be confused with sentimental compassion: “Sometimes the truest form of pity is to kill” (III. i. 147), a remark Rousseau endorses when he writes, “such pity is a great cruelty toward men.”) To give scope to anger is dangerous because anger will rule or ruin, being “enraged against truth itself if this is shown to be contrary to its desire” (III. i. 157). Indeed, as imperial Rome and modern America so amply confirm, “What vice, pray, has ever lacked its defender” (III. I. 195)? Worse still anger is the only vice that can seize the public as a whole” (III. i. 157). Seneca may have somewhat underestimated greed. (Living in a regime with a substantial aristocracy, the mistake is understandable, but here attention to Aristotle’s fully-developed regime theory would have prevented the error.)

    Seneca recommends six techniques in avoiding error. Arraign and convict it in your own heart—presumably with such arguments as Seneca provides. Consider that the highest heaven is unperturbed by storms. Attempt neither too little nor too much, thus avoiding restlessness and frustration. Live with a calm and good-natured person, rather than, say, Xanthippe. Soothe yourself with music and poetry (Seneca was of course innocent of the likes of Beethoven). Know your own weaknesses, so as to avoid being injured and thereby angered; this is another way in which wisdom or self-knowledge encourages the tranquillitas ordinis of the soul. If angry already, do nothing; “fight against yourself,” not the other (III. ii. 287); and think of mitigating circumstances.

    This sequence of essays culminates in an essay on mercy, dedicated to Nero. Seneca commends mercy to Nero as one of the virtues of the great-souled man. Appropriately enough, the essay is incomplete. Its conclusion may have remained unwritten, or severed.

    Seneca contends that cut-off lives (unlike cut-off essays) can be said to have been full, if well-lived. Virtue “is her own reward,” meaning, there is nothing higher than “a mind made perfect” (“On the Happy Life,” i. 123). Euthymia or good-spiritedness makes the present perfect; the rest is only multiplication of that perfection (“On the Tranquilllity of the Soul,” ii). “[L]ife, if you know how to use it, is long” (“On the Shortness of Life,” ii. 289). “He who bestows all of his time on his own needs, who plans out every day as if it were his last, neither longs for nor fears the morrow” (Ibid. 308). A short life, which may linger chronologically, consists in having the fears of mortals and the desires of immortals (Ibid. 295). “Who of these would not rather have the state disordered than his hair” (Ibid. 323)?

    And so the philosopher “argue[s] with Socrates, doubt[s] with Carneades, find[s] peace with Epicurus, overcome[s] human nature with the Stoics, exceed[s] it with the Cynics” (Ibid. 335). The philosophers of the past are added to his life, and his to theirs—”the only way of prolonging mortality, nay, of turning it into immortality” (Ibid. 339).

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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