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    Machiavelli in Florence

    September 1, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Miles J. Unger: Machiavelli: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011.

    Heinrich Meier: “The Renewal of Philosophy and the Challenge of Revealed Religion: On the Intention of Leo Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli.” In Political Philosophy and Revealed Religion. Robert Berman translation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017.

     

    In February 1513, Florentine authorities arrested Niccolò Machiavelli for plotting to overthrow the new oligarchic Medici regime which, after overthrowing the republic, had dismissed him from his position as Second Chancellor. He survived torture while remaining an atheist. And so his enemies subjected him to a fate worse than death, exile to the countryside, where “few people were as ill suited” as Machiavelli, no Epicurean amenable to a “quiet life” cultivating his garden. As is well known, Machiavelli wrote The Prince as an attempt to ingratiate himself with the Medici. “I love my city more than my own soul,” he averred, and Unger goes along with that, saying that Machiavelli’s patriotism burned brighter than his loyalty to republicanism. As is also well known, “while The Prince failed in its immediate objective to restore him to the good graces of the lords of the city, it has secured him a permanent place in the history of ideas.”

    Born in 1469 to a middle-class family in the minor nobility, his father a respected citizen, an attorney esteemed as a man of learning, Machiavelli grew up in a condition of “insecure respectability,” sufficiently distant from the Florentine grandees to give him a sense of being an outsider, on the margins of the ruling class. The family had shared in the prosperity of the city, which “was becoming a center of trade, manufacturing, and finance,” but the young and ambitious man needed a career, choosing the civil service, a vantage point that “provided vital insight into the cruel economy of power.”

    His ancestors were Guelphs, partisans of the pope, not Ghibellines, partisans of the Holy Roman Emperor. By this time, the Guelphs had triumphed, but “the crumbs of the victory had barely been cleared when they themselves split into rival factions—the Blacks and the Whites—who now went about slaughtering each other with equal gusto.” In this struggle, Machiavelli’s family joined the Blacks, who won, while not-yet-eminent Dante Alighieri “had the bad luck to belong to the Whites.” In the event, The Divine Comedy was the best revenge. For his part, looking back on that time in his Florentine Histories, Machiavelli found such violent factionalism to have been a tonic not a curse. Florence had become greater because of them, and in The Prince he would reverse the teaching of the Bible, saying that there is greater life in cities animated by hatred than those whose rulers attempt to govern by love. In such struggles, men of virtù could rise up and replace complacent ancestral lords. His father chronically in debt, preferring such activities of amateur scholarship as the compilation of an index to Livy, to the son “would fall the honor and the burden of carrying on the family name.”

    “One way the Medici consoled their compatriots for the loss of any real say in their own government was by keeping the city prosperous and splendid.” Wealth and architectural grandeur left Machiavelli unimpressed, but the future philosopher did take interest in the intellectual eminences who gathered “at the home of Florence’s leading citizen, Lorenzo de’ Medici.” These men included Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. “Educated Florentines like Machiavelli found their moral bearings not by emulating the lives of the saints but by studying the deeds and adopting the attitudes of the ancient Greeks and Romans,” in liberal studies “worthy of a free man,” as the scholar Pier Paolo Vergerio wrote. If Florentines no longer really practice civil liberty, they could still think about it. For now, safely ensconced in the civil service, Machiavelli could seek to rise socially and politically through literary achievement. He was handicapped, however, by “his prickly personality” and spent rather too much of his time frequenting brothels and taverns, before and after his marriage. 

    Such a place may well attract religious reformers. In 1498, Machiavelli, now in his late twenties, witnessed a fire and brimstone sermon by the Dominican monk, Girolamo Savonarola. “One would be hard pressed to find two men who embodied such divergent and mutually uncomprehending philosophies,” Unger writes; more, one might say that Savonarola was no philosopher at all but a pious rhetorician of the first rank. In his sermons, Savonarola made bold to excoriate Pope Alexander VI, who did indeed deserve rebuke on Christian terms. The dispute between these men re-factionalized not only Florence by all of Italy, which “descended into chaos” and “put an end to the golden age of the Italian Renaissance.” Crucially, it left Italy open to conquest by the French king, Charles VIII, who swept aside the small Italian city-states, one by one. A few years before Machiavelli heard Savonarola’s sermon, Charles had been unwisely invited to intervene in Italian politics by Ludovico Sforza, the king of Naples, who supposed that Charles would end the internecine wars; he did, but not to the advantage of Naples or any other Italian city. 

    By then, Lorenzo de’ Medici’s haughty, cruel, and incompetent son ruled Florence. Treating with Charles, he sacrificed the Florentine claim to Pisa in exchange for a continuance of himself in power. Enraged Florentines, who had long considered the city a prize they deserved to rule, drove out the Medici. Charles then occupied the city, and Savonarola greeted him warmly as the answer to one of his prophesies, which predicted the coming of a second Cyrus who would purge Italy of its sins. But Charles, too, soon retreated in the face of the Florentines’ rage. After his departure, that rage once again turned inward, with the ottimati or optimates, the oligarchs, fighting the populari or populists. Savonarola now “jump[ed], body and soul, into the political arena,” on the side of the populari, declaring their cause to be in accordance with “the will of God.” Be that as it may have been, his side won and formed a republican regime (modeled on that of Venice) ruled by the Great Council, a body “open to a wide spectrum of Florentine citizens,” eventually some 3,500 strong, including shopkeepers and artisans. Like Venice, the regime was no democratic republic, but it was a broader-based oligarchy than its predecessor. This was the regime Machiavelli joined, serving his entire career in the civil service under a regime which numbered a fervent Catholic preacher as its most eloquent founder. Machiavelli benefited from the republic but found it ill-designed, unable to last because it “did not satisfy all the parties among its citizens.” No regime in that city-state could survive if it “did not take into account the Florentines’ natural love of liberty.” 

    Charles VIII assuaged his disappointment by going on to take Rome, Vatican City, and Naples. But these conquests only served to unite Italians against him in the Holy League, nominally under the rule of Pope Alexander VI. “The only major Italian power that refused to join this sacred cause was Florence, which, under the leadership of Savonarola, had its own ideas where righteousness lay”—hardly with the Pope. Florentines still wanted to reacquire Pisa, which the Pope and his allies were loath to do. In the Battle of Fornovo, “one of the bloodiest battles ever fought on Italian soil,” neither the French forces nor those of the League won a conclusive victory, but Charles’s troops suffered such attrition that he had no choice but to quit Italy, “the land that not many months before had seemed so ripe for the picking.” Now, Savonarola and his Florentines became the objects of the Pope’s rage. The dissident preacher organized not troops but a “bonfire of the vanities,” a city-wide destruction of luxury items intended to appease the God who seemed to him angry at the Florentine sins. Excommunicated by the Church, Savonarola was exposed as having been quite as sinful as his compatriots. As Machiavelli would later remark, “unarmed prophets” do not fare well against those who are armed, whether they claim the gift of prophecy or not.

    A Franciscan priest challenged the Dominican Savanarola to a trial by fire, having long resented Dominican preeminence in the city. Prudently, neither man undertook the trial himself, preferring to hire substitutes. Rains came, forcing the postponement of the blessed event, but by now the people were out of patience with their erstwhile champion. Angry mobs attacked Savonarola’s “most prominent supporters,” and the people wrested Savonarola himself from the high altar of his church where he had gone to pray; they tortured and hanged him, burning his body for good measure. A few months later, Machiavelli was elevated to serve as Second Chancellor of the Republic.

    This was a paid office; such offices were called the utili. The higher offices, the oneri, were reserved for gentlemen who needed no salaries. Machiavelli got the job in part because he was known to be a critic of Savonarola. As Second Chancellor, he managed the republic’s correspondence, heading an office of fifteen notaries and secretaries, “learned men of modest means who had the skill and command of both Latin and the vernacular to convert the often-garbled instructions of their superiors into comprehensible documents crafted in a fine, legible hand.” The republic also sent Machiavelli on occasional diplomatic missions, one involving an unsuccessful negotiation with the Countess of Forli, the lady who makes a memorable appearance in The Prince as its sole example of a woman of virtù.

    Louis XII now occupied the French throne. “More able and less impulsive than his predecessor,” “less prone to chase half-baked dreams of glory,” Louis nonetheless “had no intention of abandoning what he believed were France’s legitimate claims in Italy.” The secular head of the Holy League, Ludovico Sforza of Milan, had alienated the other members with his schemes to boost himself over them. Pope Alexander, who attended no less to the winds of political change than to the Holy Spirit, “reversed his previous antipathy toward the French, concluding he could more easily advance his family’s fortunes”—he was a Medici—by “allying himself with that kingdom.” This left Ludovico isolated, then defeated by the invading French. But that expedition, too, was “doomed from the outset.” France and its ally, Florence, had different war aims, Florence wanting Pisa but France caring only for acquiring Naples. (“The truth was that Florence needed France more than France needed the militarily insignificant republic.”) On their way to Naples, greedy and undisciplined French troops wasted too much time extorting money and provisions from the towns along the way. By the time they did reach the place the Florentines coveted, “the puny city of Pisa” had organized themselves sufficiently to hold them off. This failure “revealed the weakness” of both France and Florence; “with Italy fast becoming the proving ground for the armies of Europe, such an opening could not remain long without someone walking through it.”

    That man was Cesare Borgia, son of reprobate Pope Alexander VI and himself a cardinal in the Church hierarchy. After clearing a principal rival, his brother, out of the way by murdering him, he won the promise of a dukedom from the French king. When Milan fell to the French, leaving the Countess of Forli without her protector, Cesare threw her in prison. The alarmed Florentines sent Machiavelli as part of a two-man team to negotiate a treaty with France, hoping to secure the city’s continued independence against conquest by this formidable new prince. In the negotiations, Machiavelli argued that France was allowing the Papacy to grow to great in the person of the ambitious cardinal. More persuasively still, he offered a bribe, and the king reined in Cesare. “After more than thirty directionless years,” Machiavelli “had found his calling.” In exchange for continued monetary support from the wealthy republic, Louis would protect Florence from the Borgias. Cesare would continue his conquests, albeit at a slower pace, and himself extracted money from Florence, whose rulers believed in hedging their bets.

    Machiavelli’s “calling” entailed much more than diplomacy and public correspondence, as Unger recognizes. He sharpened his observations of politics, too. The courts of Europe “were not places for the faint of heart or the easily deceived,” as “Latin orations modeled on Cicero delivered by ambassadors dressed in cloth of gold and sparkling with pearls” formed a “culture of flattery and obfuscation” disguising “brazen self-interest and naked aggression.” With such teachers, Machiavelli continued his education.

    By the autumn of 1502, Italian military leaders met to plot Cesare’s overthrow. Many were the Cardinal-prince’s own captains, fearful for their own lives under the rule of their mercurial commander. Distrusting both sides, Machiavelli temporized. His experience in Italy and elsewhere taught him to understand political history “not as the unfolding of impersonal forces,” as Hegel and Marx would do, some three centuries later, but as the rivalries of persons. “Politics as the clash of personalities was an approach that came naturally to someone raised in a city where everyone knew everyone else and where one’s political views were shaped by patronage and family rivalries.” In his own political maneuverings, however, Machiavelli “was the least Machiavellian of men,” having little of the deceptive fox about him,” to say nothing of the powerful lion. His “excessive candor” consistently held back his advancement to any greater office. 

    Upon the death of Alexander VI, Giuliano della Rovere took the papal mitre under the name of Julius II. Cesare, ill and inexplicably trusting of his enemies’ diplomatic guarantees, was reduced to “peevish rantings” which Machiavelli found “so distasteful that [he] wanted to flee his presence.” He soon met a still greater man, however: Leonardo da Vinci, who had apprenticed in Florence but removed to Milan after being accused of sodomy. “Both men make a virtue of marginality,” Unger remarks, each “a new kind of man,” one “free to discover new ways of looking at the world” beyond the sight of “men whose only claim to superiority was an accident of birth.” Even as Machiavelli would later advise princes to master Fortuna, so Leonardo worked to master “the forces of nature,” seeking “to harness wind, water, and even sunlight to serve the purposes of mankind.” Machiavelli returned to Florence but did not forget Leonardo. In 1503, returning to Florence after the controversy died down, Leonardo proposed to defeat Pisa and win it back for his city by diverting the Arno River, which would cut off the city’s lifeline to the outside. Initially, the Council rejected the plan as unrealistic, but Machiavelli and his ally Gonfaloniere Piero Solderini, saw promise in it and eventually persuaded the others. In the event, the workers botched the job and the rulers turned against Machiavelli and Solderini. 

    But the Council soon had more serious worries. At the end of 1503, the French army that protected the city lost a battle to a Spanish army under the command of Gonzalvo de Cordoba. The Florentines panicked. Fortunately for them, the Spanish had insufficient troops to venture any farther than Naples and agreed to a three-year truce. Impatient with his city’s military weakness, which made it dependent upon foreign protectors and an admirer of Switzerland’s citizen-soldiers, Machiavelli began to push for a strengthened army, to be composed not of mercenaries but of citizen conscripts. Not only would this “require a reversal of almost two centuries of military policy,” it “would involve a radical shift in the way the citizens viewed their obligations to the state.” Hitherto a commercial people, Florentines “had long since forgotten the discipline of war.” With their “low sense of civic duty…they would howl at any attempt to drag them from their comfortable homes to drill on the parade ground” in preparation to “endanger[ing] life and limb on the field of battle.” For their part, the aristocrats feared arming the populace. Machiavelli eventually was permitted to put together a militia recruited from the neighboring peasantry, not the city-dwellers. The Council appointed Machiavelli himself as chancellor of the body that governed these troops. 

    In the summer of 1509, Florence finally conquered Pisa, partly on the strength of its newly formed militia. Machiavelli rode with the troops as they entered the city in triumph. “He had succeeded where others far better versed in the military arts had failed.” He carefully saw to it that his troops “maintained the discipline that would help reconcile” the Pisans to their new, lowered, status. He assured the Pisans that Florence planned to be clement; “most adjusted to the new state of affairs.” Over time, however, having been neither caressed nor annihilated, the Pisans began to plot their revenge. And Machiavelli’s fellow Florentines, after the first glow of his success had worn off, began to feel what Unger calls “a peculiarity of human nature,” ingratitude. 

    Florentine and Pisa themselves formed part of Italy’s ever-diminishing geopolitical significance. The Mediterranean itself, where Italians had plied their trade for centuries, had begun to lose economic and military importance as Portugal and Spain built armadas venturing out onto the Atlantic Ocean. Even the Mediterranean saw a new naval rival, the Ottoman Turks. Spain and France had become “the two greatest powers on the Italian peninsula,” and the new pope’s attempts to rule it only “seemed likely to unsettle further an already unsettled situation.” France attempted to foment a schism in the Church to weaken Julius, intending to hold a rival Church council in Pisa. Since that city was now under Florentine control, this would have proved embarrassing to the Florentines, who dispatched Machiavelli to the French court. Louis didn’t care, “demanding that the government of Florence offer safe passage” to the handful of cardinals (all of them French) who had the stomach for schism. The pope placed Florence under interdict and ignored the feeble schismatics.

    “Soft power’ having failed, Louis returned to planning a military invasion, which began in the winter of 1512. The French won the Battle of Ravenna that spring but lost their general. Julius had his own problems, as his Holy League army consisted mostly of Swiss and Spanish soldiers, no less foreign to Italy than the French invaders. Still, he succeeded in driving away the French.

    Machiavelli still faulted the Church. It could not unify Italy, even if it could prevent anyone else from unifying it. He predicted another war between France and the pope. Meanwhile, his enemies in Florence sharpened their knives. 

    The crisis came in the form of an alliance between the pope, who wanted to remove the annoying republican regime in Florence, and the Medici brothers, Cardinal Giovanni de’ Medici and his younger brother, Giuliano, who wanted to return their family to power there. “This was the direct thrust at Florence that Machiavelli and his colleagues had long feared and had strained every fiber to avoid,” now forced to match their militia troops against “a professional army bent on their destruction.” The war went well for Florence at first, as the Florentines defeated Spanish troops under the command of the enemy. But Soderini foolishly rejected the Spanish offer to withdraw in exchange for a trivial payment. The Spanish won the next battle, and the Council forced Soderini to resign. The Medici took the city, called a mass meeting of the citizens who, “surrounded by armed men who made the consequences of dissent immediately apparent,” bowed to their conquerors’ intention of putting an end to the republican regime. Machiavelli allowed himself to entertain the hope that he might remain untouched; “there may [have been] an element of wishful thinking here,” Unger drily remarks.

    Unger explains Machiavelli’s vain attempts to ingratiate himself to the Medici as an obtuse overestimation of “people’s capacity to listen to unpleasant truths, which tended to get him into trouble with his colleagues and contributed to his posthumous reputation as the world’s greatest scoundrel.” In fact, Unger claims, he was quite the opposite, a man who made naïve and tactless attempts to instruct the Florentines, assuming that “any opinion honestly given would be welcomed in the spirit in which it was offered,” to paraphrase the epistle dedicatory to The Prince. In this, it is more likely that Unger is the naïve one. As he makes clear, Machiavelli got in trouble with the Medici because he opposed them politically. The spirit with which The Prince is offered is very much open to interpretation; the phrase may have a certain irony loaded into it.

    The Medici removed Machiavelli from office in November 1512, as part of a general purge of populani partisans. After his arrest on suspicion of participating in an assassination plot against Giuliano de’ Medici, he seems to have been nearly as tortured by the sound of prayers offered by persons outside the prison than he was by the physical ordeals he underwent. While jailed, he wrote sonnets which courted no sympathy and expressed no love or hate, instead “depicting their author as a hapless wretch, a figure of fun rather than pity.” He was released in March 1513 and sent into exile.

    Somewhat astonishingly, but in keeping with his portrait of Machiavelli-the-Naïf, Unger asserts that “few works of political philosophy are more sincere than The Prince.” By this, he means that Machiavelli “treat[s] people not as children of God but as independent adults, forced to make choices without guidance from an all-seeing Father and to suffer the consequences of their mistakes,” as he had done. But of course Machiavelli’s atheism, while it can be deduced from his arguments, does not lie on the surface of his writing. He writes sentences that appear to respect God. This being so, sincerity isn’t exactly the word to describe his book.

    As for the philosophers, Machiavelli judged that they had “ignor[ed] the actual conduct of real men and women” in favor of moralizing, offering pictures of imaginary republics, not real ones. Both Aristotle and Christian Aristotelians like Aquinas and Erasmus “predicate their philosophy on the assumption, so deeply held as to remain largely unexamined, that the universe is essentially rational; that it promotes virtue and punishes wickedness; that society yearns to achieve a more perfect union, no matter how far short it falls in practice.” For Machiavelli, by contrast, the world is “governed by caprice,” the caprice of “the trickster goddess” Fortuna. “The very notion of a fixed morality is preposterous in a lawless world,” and the way forward is to “master capricious fortune.” “We would be far better served if instead of building models of perfection we concentrated our efforts on cobbling together a serviceable government for the moment recognizing we must adapt our solutions to evolving circumstances.” Unger relates this teaching to the life Machiavelli experienced in Florence, the commercial republic characterized by economic ups and downs, “boom and bust.” Here, the problem isn’t so much a misunderstanding of Machiavelli as a misunderstanding of Aristotle, who equally insists on adapting conduct to circumstances. What Aristotle would want to know is how one defines “serviceable.” That is Machiavelli’s real departure from ‘the ancients.’

    Unger therefore rightly asks, “What exactly are those ends toward which Machiavelli’s famously unpleasant means are pointing us?” But he evades the question, claiming that The Prince, “like all how-to manuals,” “assumes the ends are self-evident and sets them aside in order to concentrate on demonstrating the best way of achieving them.” Unger somehow divines that Machiavelli regards “right and wrong” to be “determined not in the individual conscience but in society, whose ultimate expression is the state and whose preservation, in peace and security, is necessary to human happiness” because it serves as “the vital bulwark against the forces of chaos,” of Fortuna. Once again, however, Aristotle wants to know what happiness is. If men are beasts, or at best centaurian half-men, half-beasts, their happiness cannot be happiness as understood by Aristotle. Might it not rather be pleasure, whether the libidinous pleasures of the brothel or the pleasures aimed at by the libido dominandi? That is, Machiavelli despises Epicureanism not because it is a materialism aimed at pleasure but because it is insufficiently political, just as its stern critic, Christianity, is held to be. (In this, Machiavelli anticipates Hobbes, whose doctrine has been described as political Epicureanism.) At any rate, what Unger admires as “brutal frankness” may be more rationally disputable than he supposes, and may even be a sort of temptation, not so frank at all, another instance of Machiavelli’s praise of “the strategic uses of cruelty and deceit.” 

    And where does this leave Machiavelli’s supposed patriotism? “He was above all an ardent patriot.” In what sense? In averring that he loved his country more than his soul, what weight does that have for a man who denied the existence of the soul as understood either by previous philosophers or Christians? If “experience is his guide and expedience his god,” then why would he, or his prince, not throw his country to the wolves, if he judged that to be expedient? 

    Unger rightly contrasts Machiavelli with another exiled public figure and political philosopher, Cicero. Cicero prized his banishment because it “allow[ed] him the serenity to turn his mind to timeless truths.” Not so, Machiavelli, who “thought the life of the mind poor compensation for what he had lost,” and rejected the traditional esteem for leisure as necessary “to the cultivation of the public spirit.” He did whatever he could think to do to persuade his enemies to bring him back into government. Even his life in the countryside seemed to him not a platform for leisure but for squabbling with the cheating locals over cards—petty competitions that mirrored the great competitions of lo stato. In this, Unger regards Machiavelli not as a philosopher in the traditional sense at all, not a man who has thought his way out of the ‘cave’ that represents conventional opinion but as “a true child of Florence, product of a merchant culture that valued work and carried in its collective consciousness a memory of the battles required to free itself from the grasp of the feudal aristocracy,” a product specifically “of the Florentine professional class, that pool of educated men dependent on their wealthier patrons for their livelihood.” Not for them, or for him, “a life of pampered indolence.” In Machiavelli, Unger senses “the bourgeois’s fragile vanity, where servility wars with pride and feelings of shame at his neediness are alleviated by a healthy sense of his own abilities.” For all his acknowledgment of Machiavelli’s sharp departures from his religious and philosophic predecessors, Unger finally (mis)understands him in historicist and indeed largely Marxist terms, a man of his time, place, and social class.

    This notwithstanding, in “the fullest account of his political philosophy,” the Discourses, Machiavelli turns out not to have been quite so sincere as he seemed to Unger in The Prince. “Machiavelli was not the first to recognize that it was impossible for a politician to live according to the precepts set down by Jesus and his disciples, but he was the first to openly endorse appearing to live by one set of standards while secretly adopting another.” In openly endorsing prevarication, does Machiavelli not raise the question of how open his openness really is? In any event, he urges “nothing less than a revolution of values to complete the revolution of taste,” the Renaissance love of all things ‘ancient’ and therefore pagan, which had “already occurred.” That is, he intended to extend his contemporaries’ love of ancient art and thought to politics and religion as the ancients really practiced it—not as thought by Plato or Aristotle but as practiced by world-conquering Alexander. But what if Machiavelli intends rather not to raise up the ancients at the expense of the ‘moderns’ or Christians, but to offer a third, different way of life? “Much of the tension and many of the apparent contradictions in both The Discourses and The Prince stem from this clash between the Christian faith in which he was raised, and which provided a conventional moral frame that not even he could escape”—in what sense?—and “the pagan virtues of strength, boldness, and civic-mindedness he admired,” the “unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable, dissonance between morality and utility.” Unger himself involves himself in an irresolvable dissonance. Earlier, he had openly and frankly acknowledged Machiavelli’s atheism, but now he maintains that “while future generations, reading between the lines, have detected in his writings the suggestion that God is indeed dead, Machiavelli himself never went so far”; “he was probably not an atheist.” “Metaphysics simply did not interest him, and he may well have retained some vestige of belief simply because he lacked the passion required to demolish it.” Or simply the caution that steered him away from writing like Voltaire?

    “Machiavelli is concerned with the practical effects of an idea rather than its abstract or metaphysical qualities.” Very well, then, how does he judge whether a practical effect is good? Can the good be reduced to the desirable, and if so, how? If “the man who uses violence to spoil things, not the man who uses violence to mend them, that is blameworthy,” then why is mending preferable to spoilage? If the republic of virtue, as understood by Plato and Aristotle, must give way to the republic of “interest,” if virtue must give way to virtù defined as prowess in the pursuit of utility in pursuit of individual and political interest, why is ‘must’ really ‘must’? And if necessity is all there is, simply, then how can a prince even partially master Fortuna? Or does Fortuna (to borrow a later philosopher’s formula) force one to be free? Unger now defines Machiavelli’s conception of the course of events as “a Sisyphean exercise in futility,” with “temporary improvement” possible but no permanent human, let alone divine, salvation on the horizon. But such a Sisyphean exercise isn’t really futile, if it causes men to cultivate virtù, generation after generation, strengthening not-so-invisible human hands. To what end, though, if not the satisfaction of the libido dominandi? 

    By 1516, now securely in control of Florence, the ottimati allowed Machiavelli to return to Florence, limiting him to activities within literary circles while keeping him well away from any governmental office. He “reinvented himself” as a playwright, his productions staged by friends for audiences of friends, not in public theaters. That La Mandragola eventually was performed for the pope opens a window into the soul of Leo, who remained more a child of the Medici than a child of God. By the time of his death at the age of forty-five, he “had worn out his welcome and his body through dissipated living” and by “devoting his energies to aggrandizing his family rather than bolstering the moral reputation of the Church or the prosperity of his native city,” leaving the Church vulnerable to Martin Luther’s contemporary thundering and the later subordination of Florence and indeed of all Italy to a foreign ruler, which Leo didn’t live to see.

    In yet another of Fortuna’s whimsies, after Leo’s successor died, Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, a friend of Machiavelli, was elected to the papacy in 1521, reigning under the name Clement VII. He granted Machiavelli and audience a few years later, on which holy occasion he received a copy of The Prince.

    In a way, one wishes the story had ended there. But it turned out that Clement was no more a Machiavellian prince than a genuinely Christian prelate. The Holy Roman Empire had by now defeated France, leaving Italy open to conquest. Machiavelli recommended that the Papal States form a militia, ready themselves to do battle with their own arms. But the key state of Romagna, governed by Machiavelli’s intellectual rival, Guido Guicciardini, balked at the proposal, which Guicciardini deemed impractical; in an ironic twist, he had judged Machiavelli to be a man lacking in political and military realism. Clement vacillated and Machiavelli returned to his farm, expecting the worst. It came, delayed slightly by another war between the Empire and France, now allied with Venice, Florence, Milan, and the papacy. Clement even named Machiavelli secretary of a commission charged with supervising refurbishing the walls around Florence. But all to no real effect, as the imperial troops sacked Rome and captured Leon in the spring of 1527, leaving Machiavelli “an emissary to an army that was now leaderless from a government that no longer existed.” “For someone as politically astute as Machiavelli, it is remarkable how often he seemed to back the losing side,” and puzzlement Unger explains by describing “Machiavelli’s misfortune” as devotion to the state “in an age when the state was dysfunctional,” still vulnerable to Fortuna’s moods. But more tellingly, Unger quotes one of Machiavelli’s contemporaries, who wrote that the people hated Machiavelli “because of The Prince; the rich thought his Prince was a document written to teach the duke how to take away all their property, from the poor all their liberty; the piagnoni [the pious] regarded him as a heretic; the good thought him sinful; the wicked thought him more wicked or more capable than themselves—so they all hated him.” Machiavelli himself teaches that although it is better to be feared than loved, one must avoid being hated. One can avoid that by dissimulating, but Machiavelli, without being sincere, nonetheless made his acts of dissimulation too flimsy to cover his intentions. He died in June 1527 from complications of an emetic he’d given himself, an end which suggests the limits of self-reliance.

    Later that year, Emperor Charles V released Clement from captivity. The two men now had a formidable common enemy—no longer France but Henry VIII of England, who intended to divorce Charles’s aunt, Catherine of Aragon, to marry English Anne Boleyn. Since only the pope could grant the divorce, “the Emperor had a powerful incentive to mend fences with Clement.” Henry went ahead and broke from the Church, establishing his own Anglican Church in its stead and acquiring the bride he wanted. As for Florence, it had briefly restored the republican regime under French protection, but now that France was forced to retreat, the Medici returned with the blessings of the Medici pope and his ally, the Emperor, who ensured that the city henceforth would be “little more than a feudal vassal of the Holy Roman Empire.” 

    Could Machiavelli then be said to have lost? Only if one takes him for a true Florentine and/or Italian patriot. Charles V and Henry VIII, winners of this latest round, strike one simply as bigger fish swallowing the now-little Italians. In Prince-ly principle, could Machiavelli really object? He was more than merely a product of his class, his city, his nation. His teachings, if mistaken, did at least transcend their time and place, and were intended to do so. Henry VIII’s England became an exemplar of a moderated form of Machiavellianism, seen in the writings of Locke, along with those of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, who taught that “selfishness is the strongest bias of men,” but preferred to confine the art of acquisition primarily to the art of commerce, not the art of war. The English brought this sensibility to North America, where the Founders “rehabilitated Machiavelli as a humane philosopher who laid the foundations of the modern state by recognizing that political institutions could be built only on interest rather than virtue.” This ignores the clearly stated purpose of those institutions, however, seen in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the lives not only of a man like Benjamin Franklin but of George Washington, whose Farewell Address repudiates Machiavellianism in morals and whose life partook more of Ciceronian Stoicism than Machiavelli’s less-than-realistic realism.

    Unger writes as a historian. As such, he provides excellent information concerning Machiavelli’s milieu and the actions he took in it. He is less impressive as a reader of Machiavelli. For an appreciation of Machiavelli as a philosopher, one must turn elsewhere—first of all to careful study of his books.

    One such study, Leo Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli, has itself found a commentator in Heinrich Meier, who devotes a substantial chapter to an inquiry into Strauss’s intention. “The only book in which Strauss chooses a title that refers to his own activity,” the Thoughts amounts to “a theological-political treatise” which engages the confrontation between philosophy and revealed religion “in the most detailed way.” 

    Socrates famously brought philosophy down from the heavens, engaging his fellow-citizens of Athens in dialectical conversations rather than attempting to understand nature as a whole directly, as the earlier, stargazing ‘natural philosophers’ had done. Aristotle called this “political philosophy.” Strauss sees in Machiavelli a philosopher, a claim never explicitly stated before by any philosopher. In his Thoughts, then, Strauss addresses two problems: “the problem of Socrates” and “the problem of Machiavelli.” Why did they insist on philosophizing as it were through the lens of politics? 

    On the surface, Strauss criticizes Machiavelli as the founder of modern philosophy, which Strauss seems to consider inferior to the philosophy of ‘the ancients.’ Strauss thus comes across as a traditionalist. But Meier identifies three “innovations” Strauss proposed: “Strauss is the first philosopher to give a coherent presentation of the art of careful writing, which consists of an exoteric teaching and an esoteric (let us call it a) suggestion; “no philosopher before Strauss stressed with similar emphasis that philosophy has to be conceived as a way of life”; and this “concept of the philosophic life stands in the closest connection with the concept of political philosophy,” a concept “Strauss makes into the veritable guiding concept of his oeuvre.” “The highest subject of political philosophy is the philosophic life”; political philosophy both defends and rationally justifies philosophy, “consequently answering the question, Why philosophy?” In the Thoughts, Strauss relates Machiavelli’s writings to these themes. Can he show that Machiavelli addresses them? And if he does, how does he address them?

    Meier’s chapter consists of three numbered sections, in addition to a preface and an epilogue. Although many scholars (see Unger, above) have argued that Machiavelli’s core teaching occurs in The Prince and still more have assigned that status to the Discourses on Livy, Strauss was “the first to offer the argument that Machiavelli asserted in the dedicatory letters of both books that each of them contains everything the author knows.” This “reduces the Florentine to a political partisan or to an ideologue,” a reduction that “blocks access to the philosopher Machiavelli,” who, unlike Machiavelli the citizen, could stand outside the political parties, and outside Florence itself, scrutinizing them.

    Strauss distinguishes between Machiavelli’s teaching, Machiavelli’s enterprise, and Machiavelli’s thought. Machiavelli’s enterprise, according to Strauss, consisted of “a new political founding, of the discovery and implementation of new modes and orders, of a thoroughgoing change of the world,” by “a new kind of philosopher,” a “philosopher-warrior, philosopher prince, philosopher-craftsman,” whom Machiavelli understands himself to be the first but does not want to be the last. To perpetuate his philosophic ‘institution,’ Machiavelli “relies on propaganda as the decisive weapon in the struggle against the power of Christianity and has for its true goal the establishment of stable order on a solid foundation grounded in sober knowledge.” He does this (as Unger sees) by making his enterprise seem to be “ruled by the absolute primacy of practice,” making philosophy into an instrument “for the purpose of the transformation of human living conditions” conforming to “the absolute will to rule.”

    Strauss presents Machiavelli’s enterprise in two ways, “the one striking, the other subtle.” Strikingly, Strauss “makes clear the revolutionary character of Machiavelli’s enterprise as it was never before made clear”; subtly, Strauss “situates Machiavelli within the fundamental continuity that links him to philosophers before and after him.” Machiavelli was a revolutionary political philosopher, but he remained a political philosopher. That is, Strauss’s teaching on Machiavelli, influential among many of his readers, points to Machiavelli as the new Prince, the modern Moses, the Anti-Christ, the founder of the Enlightenment. Machiavelli blasphemes, thereby compelling his reader to think blasphemous thoughts, tempting them. Even and especially by concealing some of his teaching, making them less than explicit, Machiavelli draws the reader into completing the teaching, entangling them still further. Like Socrates, he can be accused of corrupting the young. 

    The subtle Machiavellian thought Strauss thinks concerns “his conception of the good life or the life according to nature as one of alternation between gravity and levity”—the life of “the most excellent man,” the philosopher, perhaps the only kind of “prince” who by his knowledge reaches what Strauss calls “full satisfaction and immunity to the power of chance,” or, as Meier puts it, “a self-sufficiency grounded in knowledge and serenity in harmony with the philosophic tradition.” Shakespeare, too, alternates between gravity and levity, between tragedy and history in some plays, comedy in others, indeed putting comic elements into his tragedies and histories and serious thoughts into his comedies. Strauss associates gravity with knowledge of the truth, the philosopher’s thought, and levity with the way the philosopher communicates that truth, the philosopher’s teaching. The “true addressee” of the political philosopher’s writing will be able to link the levity with the gravity, seeing the gravity in the levity of the mode of communication. That is, the communication is serious, its mode not. Strauss compares the combination or unity of knowledge and its communication to a horseback rider, the “combination of man and horse,” a horse that may seem as comical as Mr. Ed. (Although the comedy of Mr. Ed consisted of the reversal of roles, as the man was clueless, the horse wise.) By inducing “the true philosopher of the future” to “think through the task of his enterprise as a whole,” Machiavelli “ranks among the great renewers of philosophy,” along with Farabi and Plato, whose writings exhibit the ‘twofoldedness’ of irony, both in imitation of the master ironist, Socrates. But what does it mean that Machiavelli presents his figure of wisdom not as a man riding a horse but as a centaur, a creature half-human, half-bestial? For starters, one might answer, the centaurs were warriors, like Machiavelli’s philosopher-princes, themselves new forms of Socrates’ ironically presented philosopher-kings. But that is only for starters, as Meier shows.

    “At the center of interest of Thoughts on Machiavelli stands the confrontation with revealed religion,” a circumstance that has two dimensions: “the historical answer to the altered political situation that the role of revealed religion created” and “the philosophical answer to the challenge implied by the claim to truth of revealed religion.” Revealed religions challenge the truth claims of philosophy by commanding “faith in an omnipotent God as creator of the world, ruler and judge of human beings.” Strauss understands Machiavelli to regard the claim to truth of revealed religion as “all-important,” “an expression,” Meier notes, “that Strauss does not employ very often.” This associates Machiavelli with Socrates, who also defended the philosophic life against the claims of religion, albeit not a revealed religion like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

    Machiavelli’s response to the two dimensions of the confrontation consists of two responses. In The Prince, he describes the prince as a “founder,” “the bringer of new modes and orders.” He lists Moses as an example, along with Solon and Lycurgus. In the Discourses, by contrast, he discusses not ‘the one’ but ‘the many’—the people “as the maintainer of established modes and orders, or the repository of morality and religion.” The Bible’s truth claim, its account of why the people come to be the repository of morality and religion, rests on “the phenomenon known as the conscience,” which takes the place of the philosopher’s effort to perceive truth noetically through reasoning. Founders of Biblical religion convince the people of the truth of their prophetic speech by appealing to the conscience of each person. “The demands of morality,” registered by the conscience, “presuppose the truth of religion, without whose main concept and center they lose their obligatory character.” How does Machiavelli, as a philosopher, respond to these demands, which include both moral and even what we now call ‘epistemological’ claims?

    In chapter IV of the Thoughts, Strauss begins with the historical circumstance Machiavelli faced. Strauss writes that for Machiavelli “the moderns are primarily the Christians.” As is well known, Machiavelli charges that Christianity has weakened the world by directing their hearts and minds toward Heaven, away from ‘the world,” along with the flesh and the Devil. Machiavelli regards Christians as thereby “unarmed” against its enemies in the world. Strauss understands Machiavelli as contending, “Where men are not soldiers this is due to the fault of the prince.” The prince in question is the Prince of Peace, adjuring His followers to make spiritual warfare against principalities and powers and disastrously neglecting the discipline of physical warfare. The Founder of Christianity commends “humility, abjectness and contempt for things human.” This “consecrat[es] humility and weakness.” Strauss contrasts this with the religion of the ancients, which commended “greatness of mind, strength of the body and all other things which are apt to make men very strong” as the highest good. The gods of the Athenians may have misled the minds of the citizens, but at least they did not weaken, and evidently strengthened, their hearts for battle in this world. “It is not a historical decline in itself, but rather the central place of Christian humilitas…that blocks access to classical magnamitas.” That “good arms,” physical and moral strength in this world, “are the one thing needful” is “the anti-Biblical truth par excellence.”

    Thus, the discussion moves from Machiavelli’s historical circumstance to “the decisive level, when his statements and determinations are applied to philosophy and the life of the philosopher.” In that life, depending upon your own arms means “insight grounded on the free use of one’s own reason,” in contrast with “a life that wants to understand itself on the basis of the obedience of faith.” The philosopher will not live his life “bound in advance to any obedience.” To the religious man, this is pride; to the philosopher it is self-sufficiency.

    Politically, revealed religion has a similar effect, namely, the rule of priests instead of self-government. “The criticism of the rule of priests, who trace their authority to the highest authority of revealed religion, unites Machiavelli with all political philosophers who come after him.” (Not quite all. There is Richard Hooker.) This criticism also unites him with “all political philosophers who came before him,” most notably Plato, whose proposed “rule of philosophers is meant to replace the Egyptian rule of priests.” (Perhaps not quite all, depending upon how one understands Thomas Aquinas.)

    The problem with Machiavelli’s predecessors, in Machiavelli’s view, was that it not only failed to prevent the triumph of Christianity, much to the detriment of the philosophic life, but “without intending to, contributed to it” by giving Christians “the knowledge and education to carry out its mission in all heavenly directions, the arms and the instruments to rule for the next millennia.” In this, philosophy failed to transcend the ancient cave but merely supplemented the arts and sciences of their fellow ‘ancients,’ turned by Christians to their own use with the “pious cruelty” of devotees of the jealous God of the Bible. For Machiavelli, God is a tyrant who “makes thoughts, which cannot be commanded, into a sin, which makes disobedience, which thinking is, into a crime,” thereby criminalizing the philosophic life. Such an assertion of authority will require arms commanded by priests to enforce it and (since it makes free thought “a crime against the holy God,” equally commands an eternity in Hell for those who question.

    Strauss argues that the idea of original sin is self-contradictory and therefore very much open to question, because “a punishment for sin which compels men to sin still more…does not appear to be wise.” (A Christian might reply that it is very wise indeed, if the punishment prepares men to depend not on themselves but on God.) An unwise God is hard to have faith in. By contrast, “Natural Theology” asks the question, “What is a God?”—denoting “an endeavor of reflection and criticism.” Meier takes care to distinguish Natural Theology from Natural Religion, sometime called ‘the religion of the philosophers,’ which provides a teaching or doctrine to non-philosophers, supplying their “need for belief with what reason can give it.” Natural Theology, however, “has its raison d’être in the self-understanding of the philosophers,” that is, lovers of wisdom. As such, philosophers are “not shaken by the whims of fortune”; “thanks to their knowledge of the world, their knowledge of nature, their insight into necessity, they lead their life in an even temper, without hope and without fear o trembling” (as per Kierkegaard). Such men mix gravity with levity, regarding (in Strauss’s words) humanity or generosity, the willingness to share their thoughts with qualified young persons, as “the virtue opposite to pride or arrogance, not humility.”

    Strauss next proceeds to the particular doctrines or teachings of Christianity. The philosopher needs to prepare himself for the kinds of objections religious men will make to his way of life. He begins with the doctrine of conscience because it connects so intimately with the human mind. Will conscience command you to desist from the philosophic life, “counsel[ing] against philosophy as a persistent repetition of the Fall”? Why, if man is compelled to sin, if he has a ‘sin nature,’ should he have a bad conscience in sinning, Strauss asks. This suggests that the promptings of conscience have the same status for a philosopher as conventional opinions have in Plato’s Republic.

    The second religious doctrine Strauss addresses is the providential God, the God Who affects not so much our mind but our actions. This discussion, occurring in the twenty-sixth paragraph of chapter IV of The Prince, “not only brings together Machiavelli and Aristotle but also has the God of the Bible encounter the God of the philosophers”; Meier suggests that this “can be considered with reason as the culmination of Thoughts on Machiavelli.” The problem here is that “there is no evidence supporting the Biblical teaching,” only the assertions of the Bible itself. The Bible speaks truth, unqualifiedly, if it truly is the Word of God. But to assert that it is the Word of God is to assume what needs proving. In moral terms, the requirement that we obey God’s Word requires humility. What will replace humility if, as Machiavelli does, one questions the existence of God? Machiavelli proposes humanity or generosity, but Strauss demurs. Humanity as a principle raises man above humility while failing to point “man beyond himself.” [1] Not humanity but magnanimity is the virtue that beckons the man of moral virtue beyond himself. The portrait of the magnanimous or great-souled man can inspire a morally serious man beyond the cardinal virtues of courage, moderation, justice, and prudence, towards a sort of master virtue which combines all of these virtues in one soul. Here, Strauss argues, Aristotle is superior.

    How about the philosopher, the man preeminently ruled by reason, whose moral virtues come to him not through a teaching but by his own rational powers? It, too, looks ‘up,’ this time at the wisdom the philosopher loves. Aristotle’s supreme god, the Unmoved Mover, issues no commands; it attracts, beckons us beyond ourselves by distilling in its being the most difficult-to-achieve result of reasoning, self-knowledge. This “teaching about God”—and notice it is a teaching, not the thought of the philosopher—does “not conceal philosophy but rather points to the philosophic life.” Such a teaching partakes of a significant strength of religion by being “capable of being handed down to serve the philosopher as a medium of self-reflection, and self-criticism.” What began as a critique of providence, of God’s effect on action, has circled back to a consideration of the human soul and the mind within that soul.

    The first pair of Biblical doctrines, conscience and providence, refer to human thought and human action, respectively. The third Biblical doctrine, the immortality of the soul, returns from the actions of man to the inner man—this time, with emphasis on the soul, not only the mind. Presented as the basis for hope in Heaven and fear of Hell, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul supports the notion of a tyrannical God, enemy of philosophy. The fourth doctrine, creatio ex nihilo, points to another action, even vaster than providence. Meier says nothing much about it, leaving it to the reader to suspect that the philosopher suspects it of self-contradiction, doubting that anything can be made to come into being out of nothing. Aristotle’s God, it will be recalled, is an unmoved mover of a cosmos that already existed, a nature that has always been.

    For all the differences between Machiavelli and Aristotle, then, “in the innermost core of Machiavelli’s thought we encounter Aristotle,” namely, the philosophic life. Contra the Epicureans, both men insisted that philosophy must be political, and especially in the sense of ‘politic’ or prudent. Seeing the challenge to philosophy sharpened by the advent of revealed religion as distinguished from paganism, Machiavelli seeks to regulate that religion, to “transform transpolitical religion into a civil or religion, or to constrain revealed religions by a Natural Religion,” by the laws of nature and of nature’s God. “The intention to help establish the primacy of politics over religion Machiavelli has in common with his successors and his most important predecessors.”

    One might add that there is a sense in which “transpolitical” religions—religions which reach beyond the political limits, the borders of political communities, universal religions—nonetheless feature the central characteristic of politics. Each religion commands a particular regime—a ruler, God; a form or set of ruling offices, the Church or the Ummah; a way of life (‘My way, commands the God of the Bible, not the way of the Amorites, the Jebusites, the Philistines, the Sabaeans); and a purpose, a telos—the salvation of souls. Similarly, the philosophic life consists of a regime, despite its transcendence of the idols of any particular political ‘cave.’ In this sense, political philosophy confronts religion in a way that is politic but more fully political than it seems at first sight.

    Having identified the initial object of philosophic thought, the need not simply to ‘philosophize’ about nature but to take account of the “political or human things,” at least partly in order to defend the philosophic life itself, and having then, centrally, shown “the rational justification of the philosophic life, Strauss moves in the third part of his book to the consideration of all of these matters “as the locus of the philosopher’s self-knowledge,” the philosopher’s imitatio Dei, the closest he will get to pure thought thinking itself.

    Socrates’ political philosophy included a public defense of philosophy; the Platonic dialogue featuring that defense is indeed title The Apologia of Socrates. Strauss summarizes that defense, which consisted of praising the philosophic life as exhibiting “the highest virtue,” a life pleasing to the gods and worthy of reverence among citizens. Machiavelli did much the opposite, seeking “to protect the philosophic life by concealing it as much as possible”—so much so, that few people recognize Machiavelli as a philosopher at all. Insofar as political philosophy surfaced as public philosophy, Machiavelli justified it as socially and politically useful, advice to princes and peoples. With Socrates, Meier writes, the “essentially private” task of philosophy “comes to be a public power”; Machiavelli objects that this has had the unintended consequence of “undermin[ing] political communities” because political communities make only particular claims to rule, claims to rule within their own territorial boundaries, whereas philosophy makes “a universal claim” based on its inquiries into nature, first of all human nature. This finally left philosophers nearly defenseless against the competing universalist claims of revealed religion, as it retreated to monasteries and “assimilated by the teachers of the church to the Christian vita contemplativa,” a move that can and sometimes did confuse philosophy with piety. But Christian life, with its universalist claims and its denigration of the ways of the world, itself suffered from the same political weakness philosophy now suffered.

    Considering this new circumstance, Machiavelli concludes that since philosophers are few and the faithful are many, philosophers now need to come out of the cloister, as it were, clarify their understanding of their task and become political again, this time by adopting the strategy of concealing their thoughts and promoting their actions on grounds the many will understand, namely, service to themselves, utility. This “reestablishment of politics” as apparently in control of philosophy “succeeds only at the price of an obfuscation of philosophy.” By writing in a guarded manner about philosophy, even as he writes openly and even a sort of impious cruelty about politics, Machiavelli deliberately diverts the attention of his readers from the philosophic life. “With the exception of philosophic natures,” who won’t be distracted but will figure him out with only the slightest hints from the new prince of philosophic princes.

    As for Strauss, his own “enterprise of renewal…takes into account the effects and consequences of both traditions,” the Socratic and the Machiavellian. Like Socrates, he “moves the philosophic life into the center,” giving “the philosopher a new visibility by making the concept once more into a concept of distinction and by helping to provide it with concrete clarify through exemplary confrontation,” seen in his writings on Socrates as presented by Plato and Xenophon and on Machiavelli. Strauss shows that philosophers need “awareness of the repercussions that every public presentation has on philosophy”; it might be added that, as a refugee from Nazi Germany and a witness (thankfully from afar) of Soviet Russia under Lenin and Stalin, Strauss had occasion to think about such repercussions. A philosopher who achieves this awareness, it might be added, will gain in the self-knowledge that he seeks as a high good.

    More specifically, Strauss employs a “double strategy” in response to this “double tradition” of political philosophy. He contrasts ‘ancient’ or classical political philosophy with modern, Machiavellian political philosophy, very much to the advantage of the classics. He also examines Machiavelli’s political philosophy with great, indeed book-length, care, “bring[ing] to light what he has in common with the philosophers of the Middle Ages and antiquity,” namely, the philosophic life itself. Philosophy stood in need of renewal, given the threats posed to it by modern tyrannies and its academic institutionalization in liberal regimes, which tends to petrify philosophizing into a set of techniques.

    “For the philosopher, everything depends” upon the fact that “there is no mean between the obedience and disobedience of thought.” If thought is held to obedience to received doctrine, it can no longer philosophize. In Strauss’s time, certain philosophic teachings, especially those that derive from the claim that ‘History’ encompasses and determines all thought—a sort of ‘totalitarianism’ that lends itself to the characteristic political tyranny of Strauss’s time—must be opposed by a political philosophy that is genuinely political, not tyrannical, a political philosophy that leaves philosophers free to pursue their way of life, so long as they practice some degree of prudence in living that life, some consideration of the dangers of philosophizing in an unphilosophic ‘city.’

    “The command of prudence has for [men of the highest excellence] compulsory power.” They aim at the wisest goal “possible under the prevailing circumstances,” correctly judging “what necessity allows in the best case and demands in the given case.” This requires knowledge of both necessities—insight “into the necessity that underlies all knowing” and “insight into one’s own nature.” Contra advocates of divine and natural law, and contra Kantianism, “there is no Pure Ought or Universal Law.” This virtue is “a gift of nature” which differentiates “great men” from ordinary ones. “The particular nature of a man, far from being determined by his choice or free will, determines this man, his choice or his ‘free will.'” Such a man may be honorable/moral or wise/philosophic, but the wise man is the more excellent, since honor-lovers depend to some extent on the opinions of others, as seen in the young Abraham Lincoln, whose announcement that he was running for public office described him as one who desired the esteem of his fellow citizens. But the virtue of the honorable man, the “republican virtue,” mixes with “collective self-interest.” The common good may very well not include the good of the uncommon. The “glorious patriot Cato,” the republican honor-lover, may be less favorable to the philosophic life than the emperor Marcus Aurelius, “a prince who might have understanding, greatness of mind, strength of will at his disposal.” The Roman Empire, where the monarch tended to “matters of state,” while poets like Ovid but also, in a different way, philosophers tended to intensely private “matters of love,” “corresponds to the difference between gravity and levity, mentioned earlier. In the circumstance given him in the modern world, the Machiavellian political philosopher unites these, knowing that there is nothing more ‘in common’ than the truth philosophers seek in private.

    The great man’s given nature may be modified by habituation, but not fundamentally changed. The greatness, the wisdom of founders derives from this natural gift. One is reminded of Nietzsche, who writes that deep down in every person lies a core of fatum. He is what he is, ineluctably.

    In response to his own inner necessity and the outer necessities imposed by circumstances, the Machiavellian political philosopher does to the few, now the priests, what would-be monarchs in Rome did to the few, the patricians, in the older times: win over the minds and hearts of the people. This “democratic turn of philosophic politics” hides the essentially ‘aristocratic’ character of the philosopher, denying at least outwardly “the radical distinction between philosophers and nonphilosophers.” In taking over the function of serving the people, the philosophers assume the role that priests had taken, in this case by saving bodies if not souls by their scientific inventions.

    What if those inventions, instruments of the conquest of nature, in turn threaten humanity’s survival? Eventually, some ‘telluric disaster,’ some worldwide catastrophe occurs, wiping out technological advances and forcing the survivors to begin anew. It is not inconceivable that such a disaster could be a result of technology itself, since a thoroughgoing conquest of nature, a denaturing of nature, might not go well.

    “Strauss takes account of a threefold movement: The ascent from an opinion about the world to the inner necessity of philosophy; the renewal of a traditional teaching by recourse to the genuine philosophic activity that precedes every teaching; and, uniting all three movements in one, the turn from the historical experiences that separate the philosophers to the fundamental experiences they have in common: the liberating force of knowledge, the eros of thought, the deepening of reflection, the happiness of understanding.” The philosophic life “according to their nature finds its eloquent expression in the art of writing,” and art that leads “kindred spirits to the philosophic life.” This contrasts with the life of the Sophists, who “believed or tended to believe in the omnipotence of speech.” With this allusion of the doctrine of John the Apostle, Meier concludes his book.

    Unger’s biography provides impressive detail regarding the nonphilosophic element of Machiavelli’s life. On the real character of that life, Meier is the better one to consult.

     

    Note

    1. Machiavelli substitutes Fortuna for divine providence. He urges the Prince to master Fortuna, or chance, which is what he thinks providence really is. This project, the distinctively Machiavellian project later made the foundation of modern science as the conquest of nature, propounded by Bacon, a project that has proceeded relentlessly to our own time, makes humanity an end in itself, assumes that man fundamentally has nothing to aspire to, beyond the satisfaction of his own desires for security and comfort, for which reasoning now serves as an instrument.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Seneca on Anger: A Second Look

    August 16, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Seneca: “To Novatus on Anger.” In Moral and Political Essays. John M. Cooper and J.F. Procopé, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

     

    Seneca’s older brother has asked “how anger can be alleviated,” and Seneca agrees that it should be, as anger is “the most hideous and frenzied of all emotions,” indeed “utterly inhuman” (I.i.1). Anger “most resembles those ruins which crash into pieces over what they have crushed” (I.i.2). “No plague has cost the human race more,” having emptied cities of human life.” (I.ii.1). “Look upon gathered throngs put to the sword, on the military sent in to butcher the populace en masse, on whole peoples condemned to death in an indiscriminate devastation” (I.ii.1). Thus, Seneca’s first way of alleviating anger is to remind his brother how ugly and destructive its results can be.

    Anger is a distinctively human passion. Human beings become angry because, as Aristotle observes, want to “pay back pain” (I.ii.3). “Wild animals,” Seneca observes, “are angered without being provoked by wrong and without aiming to inflict punishment or pain on others”; they may be frenzied, ferocious, and aggressive, but never angry, strictly speaking (I.iii.3). Only human beings become morally enraged because only human beings reason. “Anger may be the enemy of reason. It cannot, at the same time, come into being except where there is a place for reason.” (I.iii.3). Reason discovers ‘should’ and ‘should not,’ and indeed makes them thinkable. Animals never get that far.

    Does anger accord with nature? No: “What is milder than man, when he is in his right mind? But what is crueler than anger?” (I.v.2). “Human life rests upon kindnesses and concord; bound together, not by terror but by love reciprocated, it becomes a bond of mutual assistance”; anger, however, is “greedy for punishment” (I.v.3). True, punishment is “sometimes necessary,” but it should be inflicted “without anger” and aided by reason (I.vi.1). (Centuries later, John Locke would advise fathers to spank their sons, but calmly. In this, Locke followed Seneca.) Even capital punishment need not be done in anger, as “no one should be put to death save he whose death will benefit even himself” (I.vi.3). Punish not because you enjoy punishing; punish to make the miscreant “an example to all” (I.vi.4). “At least by their death they can serve the public good!” (I.vi.4).

    Seneca criticizes Aristotle’s treatment of anger in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle would “moderate anger, not remove it,” on the grounds that moderate anger “rouses and spurs the mind,” inspiring the soul with courage (I.vii.1). Seneca will have none of that. Anger isn’t natural at all, he argues; it is a deformation of reason. Aristotle proposes something that’s dangerously difficult: “It is easier to admit the forces of ruin than to govern them” (I.vii.2). Further, reason rules only “so long as it remains isolated from the affections,” not “mixed and contaminated with them” (I.vii.3). The passions or affections may be controlled when they first arise, but soon “they sweep us on with a force of their own and allow no turning back,” turning reason into their servant—the guide and scout of the passions, as Hobbes puts it (I.vii.4). Better to practice ‘forward defense,’ stopping the enemy at the frontier. If anger grows strong, reason cannot limit it; if, on the contrary, anger is weaker than reason, then “reason can do without it,” being “sufficient by itself for getting things done,” with “no need for a weaker ally” to screw its courage to the sticking post (I.viii.5). “Virtue needs no vice to assist it; it suffices for itself” (I.ix.1). Aristotle is wrong, by definition: If anger “listens to reason and follows where led, it is no longer anger, the hallmark of which is willful disobedience” to reason, a going-beyond of what reason justly prescribes (I.ix.2). Anger is “as useless a subordinate in the soul as a soldier who ignores the signal for retreat” (I.ix.2). Moderate passion “means simply moderate evil” (I.x.4).

    What, then, does courage consist of, if not of moderated anger? “The surest courage is to look around long and hard, to govern oneself, to move slowly and deliberately forward” (I.xi.8). Courage is a form of self-rule; in a human being, self-rule is the rule of reason, pure and simple. “The good man will do his duty, undismayed and undaunted, and he will do what is worthy of a good man without doing anything unworthy of a man” (I.xii.2). Anything less signifies “a weak mind, not a devoted one,” and indeed to be too eager to punish means you are unfit to punish—little better, maybe worse, than the one you want to punish (I.xii.5). “Reason itself is enough not merely for foresight but for action” (I.xvii.2).

    Why would a good man become angry with wrongdoers? They did wrong out of error, and don’t we all? “How much more humane to show a mild, paternal spirit, not harrying those who do wrong, but calling them back” (I.xiv.3). Chastisement, yes; anger, no. It should be remarked that Seneca mixes no tenderness with his justice, given that tenderness, too, is a passion. One may well need to amputate a limb; what one doesn’t need, what would be irrational to feel, is hating the limb as you amputate it. “We put down mad dogs; we kill the wild, untamed ox; we use the knife on sick sheep to stop their inflecting the flock; we destroy abnormal offspring at birth; children, too, if they are born weak or deformed, we drown. Yet this is not the work of anger, but of reason—to separate the sound from the worthless” (I.xv.2). And in fact we should amputate or kill anger in our souls, as it is “a misdemeanor of the soul” (I.xvi.1). “Killing is sometimes the best form of compassion,” if compassion is understood less as a passion, more as rational mercy (I.xvi.4).

    Passions waver, waxing and waning. Reason hold steady, so long as it makes no concession to passion. “Having judged that something should be done, it sticks to its judgment” because “it will find nothing better than itself into which it might change” (I.xvii.3). Like all the passions, anger is strong while it lasts, but it lacks “staying-power” (I.xvii.4). Because it can’t hold steady, anger rushes to judgment; because it does hold steady, reason takes its time. Like a wise judge, it takes the time to hear both sides of the case, “then demands a further adjournment to give itself room to tease out the truth” (I.xviii.1). While anger flames up at “irrelevant trifles,” reason “considers nothing save the matter at issue” (I.xviii.2). “Even if the truth is put before its eyes,” anger “fondly defends its error” (I.xviii.2); “it rages at truth itself, if truth appears to conflict with its wishes” (Ixix.1). 

    “Reason does none of this. Silently and serenely, if the need arises, it obliterates entire households; families that are a plague to the commonwealth it destroys, wives, children, and all; it tears down their roofs and levels them to the ground; the very names of foes to liberty it extirpates”—all “without gnashing its teeth or shaking its head or acting in any way improperly for a judge whose countenance should be at its calmest and most composed as he pronounces on matters of importance” (I.xix.2). Since Rousseau, such calmness in severity has been judged inhuman; since Christianity, it has been judged to be reserved only for God, since Christianity holds the passions always too powerful for reason to master. None of ‘the ancients’ better shows the distance between himself and ‘the moderns’ as Seneca.

    Nonetheless, Senecan justice never precludes mercy. The man of reason “often releases a miscreant of proven guilt, if the man’s repentance gives good grounds for hope” (I.xix.5). After all, criminal action stems from error; correct the error and you are no longer criminal. For this reason, the man of reason might punish “a major crime less severely than a minor one, if the one is merely a lapse and not an expression of ingrained cruelty, while the other conceals a secret, hidden and hardened craftiness” (I.xix.6). In this, as Seneca himself remarks, Seneca follows Plato.

    Angry persons intend to terrorize. Don’t be impressed. “Their noise is great and threatening, the mind within terror-struck” (I.xx.5). That is, the angry are the ones gripped by fear, which their anger serves to conceal. They use their anger when they should be using their reason to rule their fear. If you respond as they expect, you will only initiate the same cycle of weakness in your own soul. Anger thus does not enhance but prevents magnanimity or greatness of soul.

    In sum, “there is nothing about anger, not even in the apparent extravagance of its disdain for gods and men, that is great or noble” (I.xxi.1). Achilles is weak, not strong; Homer is right to compare him to raging rivers and wild boars. One might as well call self-indulgent extravagance ‘magnificence’; avarice the token of “a great mind”; lust wide-ranging as it “castrates whole flocks of boys and braves the husband’s sword in contempt of death”; ambition grand when it demands the highest offices for itself alone (I.xxi.1-3). “Virtue alone is exalted and lofty. Nor is anything great which is not at the same time calm.” (I.xxi.4).

    Is Seneca’s critique of Aristotle fair? He overlooks or excludes some features of Aristotle’s treatment of anger. Famously, Aristotle defines each virtue as a mean between two extremes. He, too, considers gentleness a virtue, “a mean with respect to anger” (Nicomachean Ethics 1125b26)—specifically, the mean between irascibility and inirascibility or poor-spiritedness. Mindful of the kind of critique Seneca will advance, centuries later, he also considers the mean difficult to ‘hit,’ to achieve. And of course he lauds the rule of reason in the human soul. “The gentle person wishes to be calm and not led by his passion, but rather as reason may command, and to be harsh regarding the things he ought and for the requisite time” (1126a). He remarks a phenomenon Seneca overlooks, except perhaps when he mentions the calculating criminal: anger doesn’t always flare up and out. There are “bitter” people who sustain their anger for a long time “because they restrain their spirit [thumos],” in effect using reason to maintain a standing reserve of animosity against some real or imagined offense. This abuse of man’s rational capacity accounts for the irascible character.

    That is, to some extent the dispute between Aristotle and Seneca is merely verbal. Aristotle maintains that anger should be governed by reason; Seneca maintains that anger governed by reason is no longer anger. More than that, however, Seneca wants reason to purge the soul of anger altogether, a task Aristotle would likely consider impossible. For his part, Seneca replies that what Aristotle proposes is also impossible or at least extraordinarily difficult because anger so readily overpowers reason. “The downward path to vice is easy” (II.i.1). 

    What makes Seneca’s rationalist absolutism possible, livable? Given his distinction between anger and bestial ferocity, he (like Aristotle) observes that anger starts with a decision, not an impulse. True, “anger is undoubtedly set in motion by an impression received of a wrong” (II.i.3). But that impression as it were filters through the mind of the one who receives the impression. Anger “undertakes nothing on its own, but only with the mind’s approval” (II.4); “it is a voluntary fault of the mind” (II.ii.2). Our indignation may result immediately from some injury, such as physical pain or the experience of of injustice. But anger “is an emotion, which outleaps reason and drags it along” (II.iii.4). He identifies three movements of the soul, respecting anger. “The first is “involuntary, a preparation…for emotion, a kind of threat”; the second movement is “voluntary but not insistent,” a judgment that the injury inflicted upon me is morally unjustified; anger is the final stage, when the emotion ranges “out of control, wanting retribution not just ‘if it is right’ but at all costs” (II.iv.1). The first movement “is a mental jolt which we cannot escape through reason,” an ‘autonomic’ response, as modern psychologists would say. The second movement requires reasoning, a comparison of the injurious act with a standard of justice. It is the third movement that subordinates reasoning to passion, producing the emotion of anger. Emotions jumble themselves with reason, malignantly. Concurring now with Aristotle, Seneca adds that some men become “habitually ferocious,” “rejoic[ing] in human blood” (II.v.1)—irascible.

    By this definition, anger is never righteous but “sordid and narrow-minded” (II.vi.1); “at every moment” the irascible man “will see something to disapprove of” (II.vii.2). This is especially true of the wise man who succumbs to anger; his superior perception will find injustice everywhere, leaving in a perpetual condition of indignation. This is the wrong way to live. “Rejoicing and joy are the natural property of virtue” (II.vi.2) or, as Aristotle maintains, happiness is the telos of human life. “You will do better to hold, instead, that no one should be angry with error” (II.x.1).

    After all, “no one is angry with children who are too young to know the difference between things” (II.x.2). Simply “being human is more of an excuse, and a juster excuse, than being a child” since we humans are “animals prone to ailments of the mind no less than of the body, not exactly stupid or slow, but given to misusing our shrewdness, each an example of vice to the others” (II.x.3). One sees this when people gather in crowds, at the forum or the marketplace: “A gathering of wild animals is what you have here, were it not that animals are calm among themselves and refrain from biting their own kind” (III.viii.3). The wise man rids himself of anger by considering “the sheer multitude of wrongdoers” (II.x.4). Whereas the wise Heraclitus wept over humanity, failing to see that “he himself was among those to be lamented,” wise but more virtuous Democritus “was never seen in public without a smile on his face, so utterly unserious did anything that was taken seriously seem to him” (II.x.5). A wise man should recognize the rarity of men who are wise. Otherwise, melancholy and even misanthropy will be his lot. He should rather view mankind “with the kindly gaze of a doctor viewing the sick” (II.x.7).

    To those who claim that anger is useful because it “enables you to escape contempt and it frightens the wicked,” Seneca replies that a man who can back up his anger with credible threats will inspire “not only fear but hatred” (II.xi.1). That makes it “more dangerous to be feared than [to be] despised” (II.xi.1). And, of course, if you can’t back up your threats you will be despised even more. What is more, to inspire fear has no moral benefit in itself, since physical disease is also feared and has nothing good about it. Fear “impresses little minds,” men of micropsychia (II.xi.5). 

    Because there is always a point when reason can either take or lose control of the passions, it must be that none of them “are so fierce and self-willed that they cannot be tamed by training,” by habituation (II.xii.3). “Anything that the mind commands it can do,” especially if the reward is great (II.xii.3). And it is: “the unshaken calm of a happy mind” (II.xii.6).

    And such self-habituation isn’t even as difficult as it seems. “The way to blessedness is easy,” he tells his brother; “just embark on it with good auspices and with the good offices of the gods themselves” (II.xiii.2). It is instead “doing what you do,” seething with anger, that “is much more difficult”; “nothing is more toilsome than anger” and “nothing more occupied than cruelty” (II.xiii.2). “Every virtue…is easy to guard, whereas vice costs a lot to cultivate”—specifically, an endless cycle of turmoil and crime whereby the wicked are never reformed (II.xiv.3). Admittedly, “sometimes it is necessary to strike into those on whom reason has no effect,” but to do so angrily only repeats the fear-anger-fear-anger dynamic (II.xiv.1). We see this in “all those nations that are free because ferocious,” like “lions and wolves”; “they cannot obey, but neither can they command,” as “no one can govern if he cannot be governed (II.xv.4). Our exemplars shouldn’t be the supposedly ‘noble’ animal species, but the “divine cosmos, which man alone of all animals”—because he “has reason in place of impulse”—can “understand in order alone to imitate it” (II.xvi.1-2).

    And here Seneca himself imitates not only the cosmos, in good Stoic fashion, but Aristotle. “The wise an ought to strike a mean, approaching whatever calls for firm action, not with anger, but strength” (II.xviii.2).

    The remedies for anger fall into two categories. One should avoid falling into it in the first place or, failing that, refraining from doing wrong when in a state of anger. The first defense against anger is education, “to give children from the start a sound upbringing” (II.xxi.1). In early childhood, illness, physical injury, or fatigue can initiate an angry disposition, but “the most powerful factor is habit,” which “feeds the failing” (II.xx.2). Seneca recognizes that “it is hard to change a person’s nature,” since “once the elements have been mixed at birth, to alter them is out of the question” (II.xx.2). Nonetheless, a naturally hot-tempered, choleric child can be given exercise to burn off the steam (“without actually tiring themselves,” which would make them cranky); “games, too, will help,” as “pleasure in moderation relaxes and balances the mind” (II.xx.3). A phlegmatic child, who will tend not to anger but to fear (“nervousness, intractability, hopelessness, suspicion”) doesn’t need anger to rouse him but joyous activities that lift his spirits (II.xx.4). In each case, parents should take care not to tyrannize their children: “The spirit grows through freedom to act, subjection crushes it” (II.xxi.3). And they should avoid too much praise, which “generate[s] arrogance and irascibility” of spirit (II.xxi.3). “Our pupil has to be guided between the two extremes, sometimes reined in, sometimes spurred on,” never made to “undergo anything demeaning or servile” (II.xxi.4). Humility doesn’t develop through humiliation. Reward him, but only “for merit, for past achievement or future promise” (II.xxi.4). And in those games he plays, encourage him to make friends with the opponents he usually faces, “so as to give him the habit, in a contest, of wanting not to hurt, but to win” (II.xxi.5).

    Another means of preventing the development of habitual anger in your son is to “keep him far from any contact with luxury” (II.xxi.6). “Nothing does more to make people bad-tempered than a soft, comfortable education,” which disarms the soul when confronted with “the shocks of life” (II.xxi.6). “They should have their parents’ wealth before their eyes, but not at their disposal” (II.xxi.8). This goes for psychic as well as physical luxury. “If he has never been denied anything, if he always had an anxious other to wipe his tears away, if he has always been backed up against his tutor,” he will expect more from life than he deserves and, upon failing to get what he expects, will rage at the violation of his mistaken opinion of justice (II.xxi.6). He is on the way to tyranny or servility. A genuinely civil social education is indispensable. “Above all, the boy’s diet should be simple, his clothing inexpensive, his style of life like that of his peers. He will not be angry to have someone compared with him, if from the start you have put him on the same level as a lot of people.” (II.xxi.10). Such a child will be on his way to citizenship, to ruling and being ruled in turn rather than to play the master to a world of slaves.

    After childhood, habituation against anger is more difficult. Seneca recurs to his fundamental point: “The cause of bad temper is the opinion that we have been wronged”; that being so, this opinion “should not readily be trusted” by an adult (II.xxii.2). “The greatest harm comes from readiness to believe things” (II.xxiv.1)—malicious gossip or the latest conspiracy theory. Train your soul not to be “irritated by vulgar trivialities”; re-mind yourself by holding your soul above them (II.xxv.1). Since “nothing fosters bad temper more than immoderate, impatient self-indulgence,” avoid the luxury your parents should have shielded you against (II.xxv.4). Don’t become angry at inanimate things, animals, or the gods; things and animals are amoral and, as to the gods, they “neither wish to cause trouble, nor can they,” as “their nature is gentle and kindly, as averse to wronging others as to wronging themselves” (II.xxvii.1). Don’t be foolish: “We are not the world’s reason for bringing back winter and summer” (II.xxvii.2). Natural events “follow laws of their own” and they “govern things divine” (II.xxvii.2). 

    As for our fellow humans, “good magistrates, parents, teachers and judges” have “no wish to harm us” (II.xxvii.3). If they punish us, or even if we encounter bad persons who exercise authority over us, “we should think not only of what we are suffering, but of what we have done, taking our whole life into consideration” (II.xxviii.4). If we do so, we will soon understand “that no one of us is faultless” (II.xxviii.1), a thought that “should make us more reasonable towards wrongdoers, ready to accept reproach, free of anger, at any rate, towards good men” and “above all towards the gods” (II.xxviii.4). The cosmos is not against you. You are the real problem, not it.

    To avoid anger, “the greatest enemy is delay” (II.xxix.29), the proverbial counting to ten. If someone tells you an injury has been done to you by a good man, don’t believe it; if by a bad man, don’t be surprised. “Reckon on everything, expect every thing!” (II.xxxi.4). Even good natures have their rough edges, and “there will always be something to annoy you” (II.xxxi.5). “Each of us has within himself the mentality of a monarch; he would like carte blanche for himself, but not for any opposition” (II.xxxi.3). Work on turning the monarch within into a person truly royal. “The mark of a great mind is to look down on injuries received,” exhibiting megalopsychia not micropsychia. “A great and noble person, like a great beast of the wild, calmly hears out the yapping of tiny dogs” (II.xxxii.3). And if the powerful abuse you, those you cannot dismiss, “it is better to dissimulate than to seek retribution,” putting on “a cheerful look,” not expecting them to reform themselves and knowing you are powerless to do so (II.xxxiii.1). Such men “hate those whom they have harmed”; provoke them no further (II.xxxiii.1). A man who had “achieved that rarest of distinctions at [the royal] court, old age,” explained this anomaly by saying he had adopted a policy of saying ‘Thank you’ to those who wronged him (II.xxxiii.2).

    If, despite your best efforts, you succumb to anger, what can a man do to alleviate it? First, recognize its power. Anger doesn’t creep up on you; “it begins at full strength” (III.i.3). Other passions draw you away from reason but anger rips you away from sanity itself. “Not even failure can weary it,” and “if the adversary has the luck to escape, it turns its teeth on itself” (III.i.5). As suggested earlier, other passions confine themselves to individuals but “anger is the one emotion that is sometimes caught by a whole community” (III.ii.2), which is why “barbarians rush haphazardly into war” (III.ii.6). Seneca repeats his criticism of Aristotle for giving anger a degree of ethical ‘standing,’ again because Aristotle underestimates its power, perhaps especially in politics.

    This is why Seneca recurs to urging Novatus to avoid anger in the first place. Consider its consequences, all of them bad, and bad because unnatural. “Nature exhorts us to love, anger to hatred; nature tells us to help anger to harm” (III.v.7). “While its indignation comes from undue self-regard, which gives it a look of spiritedness, anger is petty and mean, since no one can help being inferior to the man who he feels has despised him.,” whereas the magnanimous soul, “with its true self-awareness will not avenge, since it has not noticed the wrong done to it” (III.v.7). “There is no surer proof of greatness than to be unprovoked by anything that can possibly happen,” as tranquil as “the higher and better ordered part of the world, the part nearer the stars” (III.vi.1). 

    Still, what should you do if angered? Stop it when it first appears; make a joke of the situation; postpone any action while in its grip; exert your mind to suppress it. “If you wish to avoid bad temper, mind your own business” (III.xi.1). Tell yourself, truly, that “reason forbids it, and I have entrusted my life to reason’s governance” (III.xxv.4). It is “more satisfactory to heal a wrong than to exact retribution for it” (III.xxvii.1), as “gentleness is the only treatment for the ungentle” (III.xxvii.3). 

    The recognition of anger’s malignancy should prompt our reason to oppose rational habit to irrational habit. “All our senses in fact, must be trained to endure” frustration; “they are naturally capable of endurance, once the mind stops corrupting them” (III.xxxvi.1). The mind ceases to corrupt the senses when the rational part of the mind summons the mind “each day to give account of itself” (III.xxxvi.1); “your anger will cease or moderate itself, if it knows that each day it must come before a judge” in a case at your “own court” (III.xxxvi.2). In the end, however, “nothing will help more than a meditation on our mortality” (III.xl.2). Life is too short for bringing “turbulent confusion” upon ourselves (III.xl.4). “Fate looms above our heads, chalking up the days as they go to waste, approaching nearer and nearer” (III.xl.4). “Death is on its way, to make you all equal” (III.xliii.1).

    It’s worth knowing that Seneca’s advice may have had a salutary effect. Later on, as a provincial governor, Novatus successfully negotiated a dispute between the rabbis of Corinth and the Apostle Paul.

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Vico’s Periods of History

    July 25, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Giambattista Vico: Principles of the New Science of Giambattista Vico Concerning the Common Nature of Nations. Books III, IV, V. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch translation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

     

    Vico titles the third, central, book of The New Science “The Discovery of the True Homer.” Why is the true Homer so important?

    He has already demonstrated to his satisfaction that “poetic wisdom was the vulgar wisdom of the peoples of Greece, who were first theological and later heroic poets” (III.780). But Plato “left firmly fixed the opinion that Homer was endowed with sublime esoteric wisdom,” and “all the other philosophers have followed in his train” (III.780). But was “Homer ever a philosopher?” (III.780). If not, Vico’s central book consists of a refutation of all previous philosophers on the status of philosophy itself, which, Vico has already asserted, developed much later than the savagery of the early centuries of human history. “Such crude, course, wild, savage, volatile, unreasonable or unreasonably obstinate, frivolous, and foolish customs” as then prevailed “can pertain only to men who are like children in the weakness of their minds, like women in the vigor of their imaginations, and like violent youths in the turbulence of the passions; whence we must deny to Homer any kind of esoteric wisdom” (III.787). For example, King Agamemnon sacrifices two lambs to consecrate the Greeks’ declaration of war against Priam and Troy, “an idea we would now associate with a butcher!” (III.801). This leaves readers to wonder what Vico thinks of similar acts of the Jewish Patriarchs, whose laws Vico has associated with the true God.

    Homer’s poetic characters are conceived not in terms of rational ideas, as Plato would do, but in terms of “imaginative universals” (III.809). So, for example, the character of Achilles embodies “all the properties of heroic valor, and all the feelings and customs arising from these natural properties, such as those of quick temper, punctiliousness, wrathfulness, implacability, violence, the arrogation of all right to might” (III.809). For his part, Ulysses embodies “all the feelings and customs of heroic wisdom; that is, those of wariness, patience, dissimulation, duplicity, deceit, always preserving propriety of speech and indifference of action, so that others may of themselves fall into error and may be the causes of their own deception” (III.808). That is, these characters didn’t spring full-blown out of the mind of Homer, who was only “a binder or compiler of fables” (III.852). They were “created by an entire nation” in accordance with their “common sense” and “powerful imaginations” (III.809). Vico observes that “poetic sublimity is inseparable from popularity,” and that nations who imagine such characters then take judge their customs by the example of the heroes they themselves have drawn out of their “common sense”—that is, the sense of reality they hold in common (III.809). No esoteric, philosophic wisdom inheres in these poems. In imagining that it does, the philosophers have been as fanciful, indeed more fanciful, than the old poets. 

    Homer himself probably didn’t exist but was rather another imagined universal or “idea,” rather like ‘his’ characters (III.873). If Vico’s critique or ‘deconstruction’ of Homer resembles later Higher Criticism of the Bible, this may be, as Strauss remarks in his 1953 class, owing to the fact that both Vico and the Higher Critics took their cue from Spinoza. [1] However that may be, “the philosophers did not discover their philosophies in the Homeric fables but rather inserted them therein” (III.901).  This does not mean, however, that Homer has no value for philosophers. On the contrary, “it was poetic wisdom itself whose fables provided occasions for the philosophers to meditate their lofty truths, and supplied them also with means for expounding them” (III.901). Theological and heroic poetry keeps philosophers, beginning with Plato’s Socrates, grounded in political reality. It suggests to them the central importance of political philosophy to all philosophizing.

    Vico additionally redirects political philosophy. Rather than attempting the Socratic ascent from the cave of opinion and convention, Vico uses the poets as guides to seeing the nature philosophers seek in the opinions and conventions recorded in poetry, poetry understood as a window into not only ancient beliefs and practices but into the nature those beliefs and practices reflect and refract. This means that he integrates both the poets and the historians into philosophy much more tightly than philosophers had done hitherto. The results may be seen in Book IV, “The Course the Nations Run”—that is, the pattern of events poets and historians record.

    The course nations run consists of three stages: human beings who conceive themselves as gods, or as consorting with gods; human beings conceiving themselves (or some among themselves) as heroes or demigods; human beings who understand themselves as men, simply. There are eleven triadic unities that track these stages, three kinds of natures, customs, natural laws, civil states, languages, (centrally) characters—i.e., symbols or letters—jurisprudences, authorities, reasons, judgments, and sects. All of these were “embraced by one general unity,” namely, “the religion of a providential divinity” (IV.915). Whether the religion of a providential unity rightly understands the nature of providential divinity as divine has already been cast into doubt earlier in The New Science, but readers should follow this theme here, as well.

    The three kinds of natures—all of them natures of human beings or proto-humans—are poetic/creative, heroic, and human. Poetic humanity or pre-humanity sees beings ruled by a powerful imagination; reason is weak. “Creative” means “divine”; these proto-men are fierce and cruel but also fearful (if indeed fearful of only animistic ‘gods’ formed by their own imagination), and hence susceptible to a higher order of religion, which teaches that the fear of the divine is the beginning of wisdom. Heroic semi-humans have emerged from this nature; they are no longer bestial, having gradually been tamed by their fear of the gods (IV.916). Finally, human nature is intelligent, modest, benign, and reasonable—genuinely human. Similarly, the three kinds of customs seen in these eras are religious and pious, choleric and punctilious (cf. Achilles), dutiful and civil. Fully human beings have become the political animals described by Aristotle.

    The first of the three kinds of natural law is the divine law, law supposed to have been given by the gods or by a god. The fact that Vico classifies “divine” law under natural law indicates his judgment regarding that supposition. Heroic law is the law of force. “This law of force is the law of Achilles”; one sees here the likely source of Simone Weil’s famous essay (IV.923). Human law embodies “fully developed human reason,” now possible in the era in which reason has established some control over imagination and passion (IV.924).

    As to civil states or government, “divine” government is theocratic. “Men believed that everything was commanded by the gods,” ordained by oracles (IV.925). Heroic government was aristocratic, rule by “armed priests in public assembly,” that is, by a regularized rule of persons claiming authority derived from the gods, backing their claims with force (IV.926). In these regimes, civil rights were “confined to the ruling orders of the heroes themselves” (IV.926). Plebeians, typically enslaved under the protectorate of an aristocratic master, had no rights not revocable by the master. Human governments, by contrast, derive authority and rights “in virtue of the intelligent nature which is the proper nature of man,” and “all are accounted equal under the laws” (IV.927). This form of rule may be popular or monarchic, inasmuch as both republics and monarchies aim at such civic equality, albeit quite differently.

    Each stage has its own form of language. The poetic/creative beings express a “divine mental language” in the form of mute religious acts, ceremonies (IV.938). This language “concerns [religions] more to be reverenced than to be reasoned” (IV.929). Heroic language consists of blazonings, coats of arms “in which arms are made to speak,” consistent with the rule of authoritative force (IV.930). Finally, articulate speech betokens fully-formed or true humanity, consistent with political life, ruling and being ruled primarily by speech, only secondarily by force.

    Characters comprise the central triad—central because characters are as it were the elements of the languages philologists study. The first kind of characters, characteristic of the poetic/creative era, are hieroglyphs, symbols that register the “imaginative universals” discernible in the documents that have come down to us from that time (IV.933). Hieroglyphics are “dictated naturally by the human mind’s innate property of delighting in the uniform,” but since the proto-humans’ power of reasoning was weak, they “could not achieve this by logical abstraction” but instead had recourse to the “imaginative representation” seen in pictographic writing (IV.933). The “heroic” characters “were also imaginative universals,” but now in speech, not in pictures (IV.934). The epic poets sang the fables they had heard and assembled. The singers sang of the heroic demigods who embodied the most admired qualities of the several nations, as mentioned before. The last historical era has seen “vulgar” characters, words written down by the commoners in the form of letters (IV.935). And indeed the materials thereby conveyed are themselves ‘literal’; instead of saying “the blood boils in my heart,” a man in the “human” era will say, simply, “I am angry” (IV.935). “Such languages and letter were under the sovereignty of the vulgar of the various peoples, whence both are called vulgar. In virtue of this sovereignty over languages and letters, the free peoples must also be masters of their laws, for they impose on the laws the senses in which they constrain the powerful to observe them, even against their will…. This sovereignty over vulgar letters and languages implies that, in the order of civil nature, the free popular commonwealths preceded the monarchies” (IV.936).

    Mystic theology heroic wisdom, and human practical wisdom comprise the three kinds of jurisprudence. Mystic theology is “the science of divine speech” or ‘divining’; it aims at interpreting the gods immanent in nature, gods who command the proto-human giants (IV.938). Heroic jurisprudence may be seen in “the wisdom of Ulysses,” who “obtains the advantages he seeks while always observing the propriety of his words” (IV.939). Ulysses negotiates with gods and his fellow heroes. Human jurisprudence “looks to the truth of the facts themselves and benignly bends the rule of law to all the requirements of the equity of the causes”; this form of jurisprudence is possible only in “enlightened” nations” (IV.941).

    The three kinds of authority correspondent to the three stages of human development are divine, heroic, and human. In the first stage, “everything belonged to the gods” (IV.944). In the second stage, authority rested in the senate and the laws enacted by the senators. In the third stage, authority depends upon trust in persons of experience, persons who exhibit in practical matters and “sublime wisdom” in intellectual matters (IV.942). This is true whether the regime is a republic or a monarchy; in the latter, the wise are the monarch’s counselors.

    Reason appears in three kinds. Lacking any strong form of reason in the proto-human stage, the giants “know of it only what has been revealed to them” (IV.948). “In God who is all reason, reason and authority are the same thing; whence in good theology divine authority holds the same place as reason” (IV.948). Unlike Augustine, who regards messages taken from auspices as likely demonic, the proto-humans listened to the auspices believing them to be from god. Heroic reason no longer depended upon the gods. It consisted of raison d’état and was known only to “the few experts in government,” the aristocrats. In aristocratic states, “the heroes each possessed privately a large share of the public utility in the form of the family monarchies preserved for them by the fatherland; and in view of this great particular interest preserved for them by the commonwealth, thy naturally subordinated their minor private interests,” magnanimously defending “the public good, which was that of the state” (IV.950). Vico here shows why the giants, “the cyclopean fathers,” were “induced to abandon their savage life” in the wilderness “and cultivate civility”: as aristocratic landowners and patriarchs, they maintained the authority they had enjoyed in the wilderness, but as beings honored by all, their “great private interest identified with the public interest” (IV.950). It was a rational choice.

    Reason in “human times,” when “citizens have command of public wealth,” inclines to the detailed and utilitarian, aiming at equality of these “private utilities” (IV.951). This “natural reason,” the “only reason of which the multitude are capable,” attends not to large ‘reasons of state’ but to calculations about whether you are getting more than I am (IV.951). When such polities have monarchic regimes, the counselors who do think of the public good are few, leaving the many to their petty devices. Monarchy alone, however, can “make the powerful and the weak equal before the law,” inasmuch as both aristocracy and democracy are factional, securing the good of the few or of the many, but never of both (IV.953). 

    With respect to judgments, in the proto-human era the patriarchs could only complain to the gods, there being no civil authorities to appeal to. “The rights secured by these divine judgments were themselves gods, for in those times the gentiles imagined that all institutions were gods” (IV.955). In practical terms, such judgments came about by dueling or by revenge for an alleged wrong effected by the injured party. In the heroic stage, judgments were for aristocrats only and consisted of conforming to rigorous legalist punctilio, as seen in the saying, “He who drops a comma loses his case” (IV.965). That is, the formula was sacred, as it is in a religious rite, where every detail must be performed if the sacrifice is to be acknowledged. This was a way of moderating men such as Achilles, who inclined to “measure all right by force” (IV.966). Finally, in the third stage, “human” judgments prevail, meaning “the governing consideration is the truth of the facts” (IV.974). 

    The eleventh and final triad consists of “sects” or ways of life of three “times”: first, the religious times, then the punctilious times, and finally “the civil or modest times”—the habits and practices that prevail at a given stage of human development (IV.9976-978). “The customs of the age are the school of princes.” (IV. 979). Radicalized, such periodicity would yield historical relativism, and although Vico stays within the framework of nature, the later historicist philosophers would claim him as an ancestor, even as the heroes and humans must own the giants as proto-men. He identifies three sets of customs: those of “religious times” (the superstitious giants), those of “punctilious times” (the rule of the heroic aristocrats), and those of “civil or modest times” (which see both regimes of “popular liberty” and monarchic regimes) (IV.976-977). One reason for the transition from aristocrats to the popularly-based regimes, whether democratic or monarchic, was that the many plebeians destabilized the regimes of the few but strengthened the regimes of the many and of the one. The people often have found an ally against the aristocrats in the monarch “because monarchs desire all their subjects to be made equal by their laws,” lest the grandees wax too grand (IV.1023). There was no lack of what we now call propaganda along these lines, as well; Vico cites the example of Augustus, who artfully declared himself “the protector of the Roman people” (IV.996). (In this sense, one may contend that monarchies are “popularly governed,” dependent upon the opinions and sentiments of the many) (IV.1008). In terms of legitimacy, “the natural law which had previously been called that of the gentes or noble houses…was now called the natural law of nations after the rise of the popular commonwealths (in which the entire nations are masters of the imperium) and later of the monarchies (in which the monarchs represent the entire nations subject to them)” (IV.998). More specifically, “the natural royal law” consists of “eternal utility,” that is, the need for a strong and decisive leader in times of crisis (IV.1008). In fine, “the brooding suspicions of aristocracies,” with the plots and counterplots amongst the ruling class families, “through the turbulence of popular commonwealths, nations come at last to rest under monarchies” (IV.1025). What began with patriarchal monarchies within the families of the giants ends with civil monarchies in fatherlands.

    The Romans governed these regime changes with considerable skill, Vico maintains. “The praetors and jurisconsults put forth every effort to ensure that the words of the Law of the Twelve Tables should be shifted from their original and proper meanings as little and as slowly as possible”—a practice that may explain why “the Roman Empire grew so great and endured so long” (IV.1003). Although Polybius attributes Roman greatness to the religion of the nobles, Machiavelli to “the magnanimity of the plebs,” envious Plutarch to mere “good fortune,” Vico credits prudence among those who tended to the fundamental laws of the regime (IV.1003). 

    Like all ancient law, Roman law was “poetic,” by which Vico means that legal rights were “invented by imagination” (IV.1036). “It rested its entire reputation on inventing such fables as might preserve the gravity of the laws and do justice to the facts,” putting “truths under masks” (IV.1036); “thus all ancient Roman law was a serious poem, represented by the Romans in the forum, and ancient jurisprudence was severe poetry” (IV.1037). Philology as it were unmasks the fables, enabling scholars to understand the truth beneath the surface.

    After they came to rule, after the “human times” began, the plebeians brought “common rational utility” to lawmaking, de-fabulizing it, making it more prosaic (IV.1038). “The ratio, or reason, of the law is a conformity of the law to the fact”; the plebs made the law more ‘down to earth’ (IV.1039).

    Despite the substantial changes wrought by the Gentiles in the various stages of human development, Vico insists that time itself neither creates nor destroys a right. Rights are eternal; ergo, they must come from God. All the various rights honored among peoples are “diverse modifications of the power of the first man,” who owned all the earth (IV.1039). By Socrates’ time, popular rule had established “an idea of an equal utility common to all [Athenians] severally” (IV.1040). In undertaking the task of political philosophy, Socrates “began to adumbrate intelligible genera or abstract universals by induction” (IV.1040). Such genera or universals are suggested by the legal criterion of equal utility, inasmuch as they result from abstraction of commonalities from particulars. The “human” or “common” way of life makes philosophic abstraction possible. “We conclude that [the] principles of metaphysics, logic, and morals issued from the marketplace of Athens,” as philosophy emerged from the laws governing that marketplace and the laws emerged from the “popular commonwealths” which put a premium on the prosaic task of buying and selling (IV.1043). “This may serve as a specimen of the history of philosophy told philosophically” (IV.1043).

    In the fifth, final, and shortest Book, Vico turns to the question of nations “when they rise again.” His example, remarkably, is Christendom—not the first collectivity that comes to mind when thinking of nations in the ordinary sense of the word. In this case, by the Christian nation he evidently means the Christian regime, the Christian ecclesia. “When working in superhuman ways, God has revealed and confirmed the truth of the Christian religion by opposing the virtue of the martyrs to the power of Rome, and the teaching of the [Church] Fathers, together with miracles, to the vain wisdom of Greece, and when armed nations were about to arise on every hand destined to combat the true divinity of its Founder, he permitted a new order of humanity to be born among the nations in order that [the true religion] might be firmly established according to the natural course of human institutions themselves” (V.1047). That is, Vico considers the rise of Christianity a return to heroic times, the return of a severe, forceful aristocracy which, among other things, imposed slavery on Muslims captured in war. These, then, were “the new divine times,” when the barbarian who had sacked Rome and brought on the Dark Ages, were, like the cyclopean giants of the wilderness, driven to the “comparatively humane” Christian priests—that is, the new aristocracy (V.1056). Thus, Christian history recapitulates the Gentiles’ history everywhere else, in a prior time.

    Eventually, in feudal times, many members of this Christian aristocracy served not only in the monasteries and churches but in ‘the world,’ ruling fiefdoms. This branch of the aristocracy had recourse to many aspects of the Roman law, emphasizing the right of rule by arms, not by utility. But as before, this too has changed, as the commoners rose up and shouldered the aristocrats aside, only to find that they need to call for a king to guard them against the vengeful, still-ambitious, aristocrats. “In proportion as the optimates lose their grip the strength of the people increases until they become free; and in proportion as the free people relax their hold the kings gain in strength until they become monarchs” (V.1084). Now, “just as the natural law of the philosophers (or moral theologians) is that of reason, so this natural law of the gentes is that of utility and of force” (V.1084).

    Today’s Europe sees “only five aristocracies,” namely, Venice, Genoa, Lucca in Italy, Ragusa in Dalmatia, and Nuremberg in Germany—and mostly small places, at that (V.1094). “But Christian Europe is everywhere radiant with such humanity that it abounds in all the good things that make for the happiness of human life, ministering to the comforts of the body as well as to the pleasures of mind and spirit” (V.1094). “Even for human ends, the Christian religion is the best in the world,” uniting “a wisdom of [revealed] authority with that of reason, basing the latter on the choicest doctrine of the philosophers and the most cultivated erudition of”—yes, indeed—the “philologists” (V.1094).

    But philosophers and philologists alike should take care. “Without order (which is to say without God) human society cannot stand for a moment” (Conclusion, 1100). Epicurus, Machiavelli, and Hobbes believe that chance rules the world; Zeno and Spinoza say it’s fate that does. But the true “political philosophers,” “whose prince is the divine Plato,” maintain that “providence directs human institutions” (C.1109). What providence provides is religion, the only thing that can draw proto-humans and barbarians out of savagery and keep them out of it. The Roman jurisconsults and Cicero followed in the Platonic line, knowing that “if religion is lost among the peoples, they have nothing left to enable them to live in society: no shield of defense, nor means of counsel, nor basis of support, nor even a form by which they may exist in the world at all” (C.1109).

    Enlightenment philosophes like Bayle do not recognize the feebleness of their “reasoned maxims” (C.1110). Many religions have served the salutary purpose of maintaining political communities, but only Christianity is true, the others false. The divine grace enjoyed by Christians “causes virtuous action for the sake of an eternal and infinite good” by “moving the senses to virtuous actions” (C.1110). One may say that Vico ends his symphony on the “new science” with a note of piety.

     

    Note

    1. In his class on Vico, Leo Strauss makes the important suggestion that Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are stand-ins for the Old and New Testaments, respectively. For example, Vico calls Homer the “father” of a nation, but no one before him had done so, whereas many commentators had referred to Moses as the father of is nation. It is easy to see parallels between the warlike characters of the Iliad and those of the Old Testament, but what parallel can be drawn between the wily Odysseus and Jesus and His apostles? If one prefers to avoid blasphemous comparisons, one might point to Jesus’ admonition to the disciples: Be you harmless as doves, prudent as serpents.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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