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    Chinese Appropriations of Schmitt and Strauss

    December 2, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Kai Marchal and Carl K. Y. Shaw, eds.: Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the Chinese-Speaking World. Landham: Lexington Books, 2017.

     

    An ancient people, the Chinese partake of modern statism under two regimes, one oligarchic (previously an especially vicious tyranny), the other republican. They undertake modern scientific research and technological projects, very much intended to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate, and also intended (under the oligarchic regime) to fortify the ruling body and the highly centralized state it wields. The world has seen the Chinese Communist Party tighten its control on computer-based communications networks, which might otherwise support free discourse leading to challenges to the regime, as seen in Hong Kong. On Taiwan, republican Chinese engage in commercial enterprise; by contrast, on the mainland Chinese Communist oligarchs engage in a form of quasi-capitalism in a political economy dominated by state-owned enterprises.

    The Chinese are now ‘moderns.’ Yet their transition to modernity has been more agonizing than other such transitions in Asia, as for example Japan and the Philippines. The Chinese had farther to fall, psychologically; for centuries they had supposed themselves to be, and at times had been, the most powerful and most civilized nation in the world, dominating their neighbors and dismissing Europeans as crude, even barbaric adventurers, hardly worthy of notice. The shock of domination by such riffraff, effected during the nineteenth century, brought on much more than a material or even a political crisis. In his epistolary novel The Temptation of the West, André Malraux gives his Chinese correspondent the name, “Ling,” which means sensibility; Ling’s character stands as the type of the cultivated Chinese person. Despairing, Ling writes to his European counterpart, “How can I express the state of a soul which is breaking apart?” The finest among the Chinese had aspired to become living ideograms. When the symbols—their ‘characters’ in both senses of the word—were confronted with the peoples of the alphabet, peoples of individuality and combinations of individuals, the grammar of their lives shattered.

    The tyrant Mao Zedong responded to this crisis by crushing the shards of traditional Chinese identity underfoot, grinding them to powder, then attempting to re-fuse them into a new type, Communist Man. As in Soviet Russia and elsewhere, this radical recasting of human beings, this hyper-modernity, was imperfectly realized. After Mao’s death, his successors in the Chinese Communist Party altered the regime once again—so far with more success. As Marchal and Shaw report in their introduction, “if current trends continue, the shifting of the economic center of gravity from North America and Europe to other parts of the world (especially East Asia) may result in even more radical social and cultural transformations and possibly lead to a new form of modernity, one that is ‘global’ as well as ‘polycentric.'” In that world “non-liberal political regimes and alternative forms of capitalism and social organization” will enjoy greater geopolitical heft. The self-described ‘People’s Republic’ of China will then have achieved its not-entirely-peaceful ‘rise,’ quite likely extending its ambitions beyond a merely regional hegemony.

    Hence the interest, among Chinese scholars, in two Western critics of liberal politics, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. “Some Chinese scholars are explicitly interested in drawing on these two thinkers from Weimar Germany to shape China’s political culture and influence the direction of Chinese politics.” Schmitt and Strauss also went beyond critiques of liberalism to assessments of the modern project itself, the thing from which the peoples of the West themselves had both profited and suffered. Can the undeniably superior power of Western/modern science be assimilated by the Chinese? If so, how?

    Or should it be? Marchal and Shaw observe that “Many Chinese intellectuals were—and still are—attracted to the notion that modernity in its Western guise has been nothing but a colossal blunder, and that the political and cultural dominance of the United States and Europe needs to be supplanted by a Pax Sinica in the future.” Those so attracted look to “dissenting European thinkers like Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault” for alternatives to liberalism. But all of these thinkers are ‘moderns.’ Schmitt and Strauss are ‘Western’ but “nevertheless highly critical of the very core of Western modernity.” Schmitt himself admired Maoist China, hoping that it might become a vehicle for advancing humanity toward what he called the “planetary era.” Strauss, by contrast, simply noted that he could not master Chinese thought, not being able to read Chinese; “were he alive today, Strauss would probably be amused, but also slightly worried, by the fact that Chinese intellectuals are now turning to his ideas.” This being as it may, “the contributors to this volume are in agreement that the reception of Schmitt and Strauss in the Chinese-speaking world (and especially in the People’s Republic of China) not only says much about how Schmitt and Strauss can be read today, but also provides important clues about the deeper contradictions of Western modernity and the dilemmas of non-liberal societies in our increasingly contentious world.” Because care must be taken both in interpreting Schmitt and Strauss ‘on their own terms,’ but also in the possibility that Chinese circumstances may ‘filter’ those terms in ways intended and not intended by intellectuals, the editors emphasize that the essays here exemplify “theoretical engagements” with the political theories of Schmitt and Strauss,” not only historical accounts of their reception by the Chinese.

    The first pair of essays provides an overview of the critiques of liberalism advanced by Schmitt and Strauss. Harald Bluhm remarks Schmitt’s well-known “concept of the political,” which, as he says, “operates outside liberalism” by defining politics as fundamentally “the antagonism between friend and foe.” Schmitt denies that there can be any genuine ‘rule of law,’ “as liberal thinkers like to claim.” Law is in no way independent of the overall political system—the regime or “total order” of the state. The weakness of the liberal state, its refusal to think of itself as a total order, derives from its false anthropology, which fails to “understand human beings as evil, their nature prone to conflict.” Contra liberalism, the state can never be a neutral power over society, an umpire. It must take sides because like all other human things it has friends, allies, and foes, enemies. For example, any real state must control the terms of civil discourse, the semantics of society, as seen in the United States in disputes over such terms as ‘Negro’/’black’/’African-American’ or ‘homosexual’/’gay’/’LGBTQ’ (to say nothing of intentionally derogatory terms). Any real state must also control technology, as when the Chinese Communist Party takes control of Internet access available to its subjects.

    Bluhm criticizes Schmitt for oversimplifying politics. In South Africa, former enemies reconciled after the Afrikaner regime was replaced by a majority-rule regime. Bluhm rightly notes the attraction of Schmittian ‘conflictualism’ to those on the Left accustomed to the class-conflict theory of Marx and the ideologies of his political disciples, especially Lenin and Mao.

    In Strauss Bluhm finds a thinker who concentrates his attention more fully on political philosophy, one who takes few if any ‘policy positions.’ Strauss “wants to identify strategies that will foster self-obliged moral and social responsible conduct in the philosopher, the politician, and the well-educated.” No less than Schmitt does he understand that the regime determines the laws, not the other way around. Strauss’s critique of modernity generally and of modern liberalism in particular has no affinities with a historicist thinker like Marx, however. Strauss’s “unswerving search for truth  in the context of the highest normative framework” leads him beyond ‘the moderns’ to ‘the ancients,’ especially Plato and “the tradition of Jewish thought.” “What Strauss seeks in philosophy is spiritual orientation and prescription for life conduct, not abstract theory”—in a word, political philosophy. In his own, modern circumstance, this quest leads Strauss to a concern with liberal education. “Strauss, the critic of historicism and relativism, responds to liberal political philosophy with a transhistorical understand of liberalism grounded in his concept of philosophy as a steadfast, zetetic discussion of eternal problems.” For Chinese readers, this looks like an invitation to return to their own scholarly tradition, which centered on Confucianism.

    Both thinkers, then, “provide insights for both critical and affirmative views on the social order in Mainland China.” Neither would excuse “a merely particularistic claim that advances a position of cultural relativism,” whereby Chinese civilization could be treated as offering one way of life among many, with no responsibility to justify itself before a trans-cultural standard of conduct. Bluhm also contends that both “believed that [liberalism] undercut the power of the political,” that “they understood liberalism primarily in a contained legal sense, divesting [that power] of its political and moral ends.” But this is much more true of Schmitt than it is of Strauss, whose critique of liberalism goes much deeper than that, leading to the philosophic conflict of the moderns, following Machiavelli, with the ancients and to the theological conflict of the moderns, again following Machiavelli, with the Bible and indeed with any revealed religion aside from a ruler-made civil religion.

    Karl K. Y. Shaw approaches the critique of liberalism from the other side, from the Chinese side. Chinese interest in Schmitt and Strauss arose with “the rise of Chinese state power and its search for a new mode of legitimacy that diverges from liberal democracy” without necessarily perpetuating Maoist Marxism. The late 1990s saw a  dispute between “Neoliberals,” who advocated privatization of the economy, market reform, and “political reform based on respect for universal human rights and constitutionalism,” and “New Leftists,” who held up “the ideals of socialist equality and mass democracy,” and who condemned Neoliberals as apes of the West. This enabled Wang Hui and other New Leftists to associate socialism with nationalism, and both of these with “the strong state” coupled with “mass democracy.” If this sounds at least as much like fascism as communism, then the interest in the Nazi Schmitt seems quite understandable, although the interest in Strauss needs a very careful explanation, indeed.

    Schmitt’s dismissal of humanitarianism and of universal human rights as epiphenomenal cloaks for real politics obviously fits well with New-Left nationalism and statism. Shaw discusses the radical historicism of Xudong Zhang, who aims at a “universalist Chinese cultural politics” which would challenge Western universalism. Paradoxically, Zhang takes his intellectual bearings not from Chinese thinkers but from the modern Germans: Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Weber, and Schmitt. But this makes sense when one sees that his “core concept” is “the modernity of the late-comers, which is a shared fate of Germany and China in their competition with earlier bearers of modernity like England, France, and the United States.” As late-comers to modernity, Germany and China faced three tasks: “the unification of the state, the construction of nationhood, and the development of capitalism.” “Like Schmitt, Zhang disdains the claim that liberalism has made since the Enlightenment of being a universal value,” insisting “that Chinese cultural identify could not possibly be developed in space delimited by Western universal values such as science, democracy, and liberty.” Zhang “particularizes” universalism by “disclosing the fact that Western modernity is a historical contingency,” not “a discourse of truth.” Zhang then “universalizes” particularism by “reaffirming Chinese subjectivity as a legitimate mode of universalism which is self-sufficient and not delimited by Western modernity.”

    Where, then, does the leftism of the ‘New Left’ come in? Why is it not a form of fascism? Shaw contends that Zhang’s strategy “originates from Marxism,” especially from the “young Marx,” who “highlighted that the bourgeoisie elevates itself as the universal representative of the whole of society”—quite unwarrantedly, of course, since the vast majority of persons living in modern societies were manual workers on farms or (more importantly) in the factories the bourgeoisie owned. “Zhang’s arguments are based on the Marxist dialectics of the universal and particular, though in the postmodernist mode and without the teleology of total redemption.” On that basis, “the Chinese could claim a universality that stands in opposition to Western modernity.” This universality would consist, first, of “the tradition of Chinese history,” its imperialism and highly developed civilization; “the value of mass democracy,” which constitutes “the core content of Chinese modernity”; “the legacy of Marxism,” which Zhang identifies as its “spirit of vitality and fearlessness to assert political autonomy” shared by peoples worldwide; “the Chinese revolutionary tradition and the leadership of the Communist Party,” which “better than any other political forces, represented the interest of the whole nation; and finally “the unitary political will of the nation,” whereby the identity of the national state and the people, the ruler and the ruled, is complete. With Schmitt, he rejects what he takes to be the weaker, liberal institution of representative government or republicanism. The “masses” in “mass democracy” must entirely ‘identify with’ the Communist Party regime and its national state. Shaw calls this “a Marxist appropriation of Schmittian categories”; its main proponent in the West, acknowledged as such by Schmitt himself, was Georg Lukács. Both men understood their debt to Hegelian dialectic, with its valorization of friend-foe conflict in the confrontation of master and slave.

    Shaw chooses Liu Xiofeng and Gan Yang as his representative Chinese Straussians. Whereas the attraction of Schmitt to Chinese Communist state-builders stands out clearly, the interest of some Chinese thinkers in Strauss, Shaw suggests, may have both an exoteric and an esoteric dimension. The contemporary Chinese state, as part of its invocation of nationalist sentiments, has authorized study of the Chinese classics. Strauss’s critique of modern social science and his defense of a liberal education in the classics of Western thought fits this intention, at least on the surface. Meanwhile, under the surface, Strauss also discusses the relation of philosophy to politics with respect to the ways in which philosophers may philosophize under the nose, as it were, of even a decidedly illiberal regime.

    “Liu argues that all Chinese conceptions of Western learning since the nineteenth century were based on the episteme of Western modernity.” But genuinely Chinese, classical learning predates modernity. The Western counterpart to Chinese learning is Western classical learning. “Since modern Western learning is the product of state-building”—Strauss would say the reverse, but leave that aside for the moment—”reformulating Chinese learning within this modern framework is not adequate.” Liu has expended some of his considerable energies toward publishing Chinese-language translations of Western classical books “to counter the hegemony of Western modernity.” Liu writes, “following Strauss frees us from the habit of evaluating the classical Chinese Dao merely by the Dao of Western modernity”; this in turn can free the Chinese from “the political imaginations of the contemporary Western education system,” with their orientation toward liberal democracy. The obvious question is : Will this also free the Chinese from longer-standing aspects of modern political thought, including statism, nationalism, and historicism—and particularly from “modern tyranny” as seen in Lenin, Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler, and (come to think of him) Mao? “Liu is evasive on this crucial issue,” and understandably so, given the character of the PRC regime, but Gan Yang explicitly points his readers to the debate between Strauss and tyranny-defending Alexandre Kojève. Gan sides with Strauss, especially in rejecting Kojève’s praise of the ‘end of history’ as a universal, homogenous state, and in preferring particular, political identities based on the national characteristics of each people.

    However, like the Schmittian  Xudong Zhang, Gan recommends a synthesis of contradictory elements—in his case, Confucian tradition, Maoism, and liberal reforms—for modern China. As Shaw tactfully understates the matter, “The crucial issue to be addressed is whether this enterprise is in tune with Strauss’s line of thought in deploying liberal education to regenerate the Western classical idea of ‘perfect gentlemanship’ in contemporary mass society.” Gan’s project “seems to be a Straussian idea of liberal education, but actually falls back on historicism,” with its claim that ‘History’ can reconcile contradictions by means of its extraordinary ‘synthetic’ powers. Shaw observes, “the three orthodoxies” Gan commends “are of an entirely different order.” For starters, Gan is proposing a synthesis of ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ systems of thought—exactly the sort of effort Strauss denigrates as incoherent, indeed, “a reversal of Strauss’s thinking.” “How exactly could the Maoist ideas of equality and mass participation and Deng’s market-oriented reform be synthesized with the classical tradition?” Maoism and capitalism alike stem from the modern West, whatever their contemporary advocates in China may tell themselves, and the rest of us.

    Shaw concludes, “the Chinese Schmittians and Straussians fail to confront—or perhaps attempt to conceal—the domination of the Marxist-authoritarian state, which, according to Strauss’s depiction, is nothing less than ‘modern tyranny.'” Exactly so.

    The following two sections of the collection consist of five essays on Schmitt’s reception in “the Chinese-speaking world” (that is, in the PRC mainland regime and the Republic of China on Taiwan) and of five essays on Strauss’s reception there. Thomas Frölich recalls that Schmitt “rather unexpectedly became interested in Mao Zedong and China” in the early 1960s, as seen in his book Theory of the Partisan. This interest coincided with the interest in Maoism (in a decidedly sanitized version) seen among some members of the Western New Left during the same decade. In this book Schmitt revised his famous definition of politics as the conflict between friend and enemy, leading not to mutual recognition (as in Hegel) but in the annihilation of the enemy (as in Lenin, Hitler, and Stalin). He modified this formulation by redefining politics as partisanship, as partisan conflict in which the victorious side may permit the other to survive. Concurrently, he transferred his attention from conflicts within the West to the conflict between the West and the ‘Third World,’ the non-West, a conflict in which Mao figured prominently. Schmitt envisioned Maoist partisanship, especially in its anti-colonial phase during the Second World War, as resistance to Western hegemony on the basis not so much of class conflict as on that of “defending a particular territory.” “Schmitt took Mao to embody his own view of the partisan who struggled to fully express and authentic apperception of the political that was free from the delusions of a ‘One World’ ideology,” seen in both the Wilsonian/Rooseveltian framework of worldwide leagues to enforce peace and in the Marxist-Leninist framework of universal communism. Schmitt “portrayed Mao’s China as the last stand of human agents’ open resistance against the de-subjectivizing thrust of modernity.” Schmitt’s Mao planted himself firmly on his native soil, and his 1968 “Cultural Revolution” resembled “original revolutionary Christianity” in its struggle against the universalizing Roman Empire. The Chinese people, like the early Christians, engaged in a “permanent revolution” against the (imperialist) world (if not exactly the flesh and the devil).

    Liu Xiaofeng hedges his bets more carefully than Schmitt. It isn’t that he does not share Schmitt’s glossing-over of Maoist mass-murder; neither of them mentions that. Rather, “he leaves unanswered the question of whether the contemporary reconstruction of a Chinese nomos would entail territorial claims beyond the current borders of the PRC”—in other words, whether contemporary Chinese rulers themselves aspire to the status of Romans in the modern world. Be this as it may (or rather so obviously is), Liu’s territorial or “telluric” outlook “belongs to a Schmittian, neo-Maoist formulation in debates about China’s political options, its role in the world, and its Maoist legacy,” a formulation that “has clearly left its imprint on current Chinese discourse.”

    Mario Wenning, who earned his Ph.D at the New School for Social Research, considers Schmitt from the ‘postmodernist’ orientation that prevails among many members of its Graduate Faculty, as he effectively announces by writing, “deliberate reinterpretations for radically different political and historical agendas dominate the history of political philosophy” (italics added). In addition to Liu Xiaofeng, he adds Gan Yang not as a Straussian but as a Schmittian, an addition that may comport with his own deliberate reinterpretation of these thinkers for his political and historical agenda as a ‘man of the Left.’

    “Schmitt’s analysis of liberalism replacement of the political serves to unmask the hypocritical motivation behind a liberal discourse perceived as the latest expression of a colonization of China through Western powers and ideas.” This sentence itself exemplifies a combination of Marxist, ‘postmodern,’ and Schmittian strategies to turn any invocation of principles (in this case, “universal human rights and values”) into a hypocritical cloak for the will to power. “Schmitt offers the critical tools necessary to expose and correct the consequences of a pernicious Western universalism” (italics added), from “the superstition that Western liberalism, itself closely linked to the Enlightenment legacy, ought to be the only or even major reference point of international politics.” Schmitt “approvingly cites Mao’s dream”—evidently deemed neither hypocritical nor superstitious—”to cut up all under heaven into three slices, one for America, one for Europe, and one for China.” This “‘pluralistic image of a new nomos for of the earth’ would result in world peace.” Webber does not explain why this would be so, even on Schmitt’s terms; it sounds rather more like George Orwell’s satirical ‘image’ of a world ‘cut up’ into spheres of influence, engaging in perpetual war.

    Wenning deploys Schmitt in a more telling manner when he turns to Schmitt’s critique of the replacement of classical understandings of ‘the good’ with the modern concept of ‘values.’ “The concept of value has increasingly replaced references to human dignity as well as to particular virtues.” Following Schmitt, Wenning prefers to denounce value not so much in terms of their subjective and arbitrary character and the attendant claim that all ‘values’ are ‘relative’ to the societies in which they are upheld, but instead as abstractions or universals distinct from “historically embedded goals.” “When one reads the ancient Western or the Confucian, Daoist, or Buddhist classics, one does not encounter the concept of value”—that is, of ethical principles understood as abstract ideas. Nor does one hear see “a theory of distinct Confucian or Chinese values,” as one does in modern Western thought. One instead sees, for example, “the Confucian concept of li,” which “refers to a specific set of inherited rituals, including the ceremonies surrounding ancestor worship, without, however, juxtaposing them to other traditions.” Quite so: but Wenning characterizes li and similar customs or traditions as “concrete historical realizations,” “specific forms of life”—ways of life, as Aristotle would call this aspect of regimes. But the notion of a concrete historical realization is itself an artifact of Western philosophizing—not, to be sure, Western philosophies of natural right but of modern Western doctrines of historicism. For Aristotle, the elements of any regime, including its way of life, stand at the bar of natural right, not of history. The valorization of the Confucian way of life, under the historicist aegis, can only come from the claim that the course of events, now redefined as ‘History,’ tells us something about what is right. But does it? How so?

    Further, why Confucianism? There are several traditions opposed to it within China itself. As Wenning observes, the New Left thinker Wang Hui appropriates Daoism against Confucianism, at least in the sense of ‘Confucian values, but (why not?) against Confucian praxis, as well. Wenning claims that “the alternative to the priority of values and the practices of valorization is an acknowledgment of the irreducible normative complexity of forms of existence,” and acknowledgment that “aim[s] beyond the tyranny of values” and toward “a richer account of possibility and freedom.” Tyranny? Possibility? Freedom? Are these not abstract criteria by which Wenning judges, and invites the rest of us to judge, his own ‘norm-ism’? They do, in any event, prove spurs to partisan warfare, said to be a purely defensive warfare undertaken against invaders, Schmitt’s replacement for the “absolute warfare and its destructive potential” with which Schmitt in old age had become “weary.” This “continuous revolution” proposed as the practice of the weak against the strong, consistent with “the anarchic tradition of Daoist emancipation and resistance movements” stands in contrasts with Mao’s later “repressive and totalitarian turn,” which Wenning, to his great credit, readily acknowledges. It is of course highly unlikely that a more vigorous version of life-by-flash-mob could sustain itself in real politics, Schmittian or Aristotelian. Wenning himself holds out the tantalizing suggestion of “integrating the theory of the partisan within a politics of friendship.” Aristotle discusses friendship in politics, but with no historicist claims.

    Charlotte Kroll identifies “two independent features” of “the Sinophone discussion of Schmitt’s work”: the Chinese response to the “failed democratization from below” seen in the Communist Party’s suppression of the 1989 demonstrations in Tianamen Square; and the increased worldwide academic interest in Schmitt in the 21st century. Post-Tianamen, “scholars were engaged in lively debates on how liberalism should be understood, what its role in Chinese politics might be, and how that, in turn, would define China’s relation to ‘the West.'” Such scholars as Xu Ben and Ji Weidong reject Schmitt’s critique of economic and political liberalism; Wang Hui, by contrast, has integrated Schmitt’s arguments into his own case against both free markets and globalization. On the question of liberalism itself, Kroll regards Gao Quanxi as the most substantial writer.

    “Gao envisions China’s future as that of a strong modern nation-state based on liberal virtues, constitutional order, and the rule of law.” He sees that this won’t be the work of a day. It will require “the political maturation of Chinese liberalism, including a revision of liberalism’s stance on nationalism, a better understanding of the relationship between politics and law, and the reinterpretation of the current state of China’s constitution.” In response to Schmitt’s challenge to liberalism, he counterposes such thinkers as Hume, Montesquieu, Hegel, and even the American liberal, Bruce Ackerman. It must be said that this is a decidedly mixed bag, on the highest level, but the commonality seems to be an insistence on the importance of political institutions to the founding of a liberal regime. Since the mainland “Chinese do not need Schmitt to teach them about authoritarianism,” having experienced no liberal democracy (whether Weimar-weak or America-strong), they need to read Schmitt to see more clearly the kind of liberal ways and institutions to avoid. They can then design a regime that will avoid the traps into which Western liberal regimes have fallen. “Gao’s ultimate aspiration remains the founding of a nation-state along the lines of what he refers to as ‘the Anglo-American, classical, or republican liberal tradition.'” Like Schmitt (and like the American Founders), he insists on the priority of thinking about regimes prior to thinking about laws. Also like the Americans, he lauds political union. He is less convinced than they that republicanism ought to be commercial, and this distinguishes him not only from them but also from the free-market advocates of 1990s China.

    Han Liu takes up a theme familiar to Americans: “the globalization of constitutional law,” which “poses big challenges to the traditional face of a democracy,” which features popular self-government. Today, however, “judges of various national higher courts learn from their foreign colleagues when deciding similar cases,” sometimes even treating majority judicial opinions in foreign cases as authoritative for their countries. This obviously undermines democracy, substituting for it a sort of international aristocracy of judges. Although hardly a democrat, Schmitt would despise this practice, demanding recognition of the (very different) regimes that should produce different sets of laws, not at all easily transferable from one political community to another. Schmitt further rejects social contract theory, countering the liberal intention of taming religious conflict by insisting on the irreconcilability of regimes, which he equates with the irreconcilability of religions. And even a settled constitutional order will require a guardian, a sovereign who can wield emergency powers in crises. “The person in question is either the sovereign or the representative of the sovereign,” empowered to “temporarily suspend the constitution in order to protect the constitution.” Judges who take the role of guardianship typically exploit the political weakness of the country. The fundamental problem, Schmitt thinks, is that “the norm of justice” is “a product of reason,” and thus in principle universal, whereas national identity is “a product of will,” and thus particular. Although judicial reasoning is harmless, indeed good, once the regime has established a constitution for the political community, so long as it stays within the bounds set by that constitution, when it transgresses the nation it purports to serve it resists the nature of political life itself, based as it is, according to Schmitt, on the friend-foe distinction and not on some version of humanitarianism such as (for example) the neo-Kantian universalism of Hans Kelsen, whom Schmitt debated.

    Han Liu identifies the United States as an exception in such matters, “quite unique.” Although its regime takes its bearings from natural rights, which are universal, inherent in human beings as such, “its Supreme Court is the most famous court that resists the use of foreign constitutional law in its decisions.” America’s “national debate over foreign law in recent years” “would be unthinkable in many other liberal democracies.” There is even a touch of Schmittian political theology in America: “Nowhere else in the world do the people take their constitution as the sacred text of the nation”; even the Supreme Court considers its “primary work… to maintain an identity of the political unity that is the United States of America.” “Without such an identity, multiculturalism would split the body politic of the United States.” “Just as the death of God leads to the war of gods and demons rather than the age of science, judicial control of the sovereign can lead to a ceaseless struggle among divergent groups rather than the rule of law. The judicialization of politics turns out to be the politicization of the judiciary.” For the Chinese, the American example should be understood not as a template for its own constitution-framing, but as a reason to “pay attention to its own political culture, however defined, to ground a firm constitutional authority.”

    Finally, Shu-Perng Hwang considers how Schmitt’s thought might effect the one existing Chinese republican regime, Taiwan, and its constitutional law. So far, it hasn’t effected it much: “Schmitt’s constitutional theory remains foreign and irrelevant to the development of Taiwanese constitutional law.” Indeed, the Taiwanese mistakenly take Schmitt to be an advocate of human rights, an error that demonstrates, if nothing else, the power of regime-formed assumptions in (mis)shaping the interpretations of readers. Professor Hwang disputes this illusion, writing that Schmitt materialistic, anti-pluralist, and anti-liberal thought plainly rejects the concept of human rights. But “many Taiwanese discussions” continue to “interpret Schmitt’s argument based simply on” the “imaginations” of the discussants.

    The five essays on Chinese uses and abuses of Strauss begin with the American political philosophy scholar Christopher Nadon’s assessment of the intention of the most prominent Chinese Straussian, Liu Xiaofeng. He reminds readers that Strauss joined Schmitt in rejecting what’s now called liberal internationalism or globalism. He departed from Schmitt’s claim that ‘everything is political,’ that human nature can be understood to be political ‘through and through.’ Considering Sparta as presented by Xenophon, Strauss saw that the Spartans weakened the family to strengthen the polis and encouraged boys to steal to strengthen the desire for acquisition of goods by military action. These customs involved Sparta in a contradiction; Spartans were taught to do both good and harm to human beings. “Unless the city also draws a distinction between how one treats fellow citizens and how one treats foreigners, its own practice calls into question he justice or coherence of the laws upon which it depends.” But even this distinction, central to Schmitt’s understanding of politics as conflict between friends and foes, doesn’t remove the problem. It can as easily lead citizens to view one another with hostility, especially when no foreign war is on. “This insight is fatal to the political community conceived of as the total community inasmuch as it leads citizens to regard each other at best as simply allies, that is, potential enemies, against whom anything is permitted,” a mindset that “necessarily diminishes their devotion” to the polis. Strauss concluded that liberalism may obscure the political, as Schmitt says, but political life itself is “contradictory, irrational, and irredeemably imperfect.” To see the truth about politics, to philosophize about politics, is to put the philosopher at odds with any political community, even if modern liberalism may obscure this fact by attempting to distinguish public from private, thereby giving space for heterodox thoughts and thinkers.

    This is the origin of Strauss’s discovery of exoteric writing, and his apprehension of the need for it, “not just as a means of avoiding persecution, but as a permanent duty.” Reason, the philosopher’s means of reaching the truth, “always poses a danger or threat to political life, yet by understanding that danger it will also always moderate itself. If political life is necessarily imperfect, wisdom cannot be separated from moderation.” In attempting to replace the comprehensive political-thought system of liberalism with his own comprehensive system, Schmitt imitates liberals. But “if the classics as Strauss understands them are correct, and the perfect political community is simply impossible, there can be no perfectly consistent system of political thought.” The task of political philosophy then becomes not political theorizing, system-building but the encouragement of practical reasoning, prudence; “common sense, shrewdness, and a certain moral decency are the intellectual requirements of genuine political success,” and this reasoning should “be fortified by political philosophy,” not denigrated by it. “Strauss thought that the greatest danger came from the dreams of modern political theorists who thought the realization of their ideals was necessary,” dreams that led such thinkers “to overestimate the political power of reason to complete a systematic account of politics and therefore to underestimate the dangers to which decency and humanity will always be exposed.”

    Liu Xiaofeng understands this, Nadon argues. He doesn’t “think that Strauss is useful for the direct guidance of political reforms, but rather as a resource to help restructure the universities and to inform and encourage he development of liberal arts education in China, although he recognizes these tasks as political but in the broader sense of the word.” He criticizes the Western universities, and “the Western intellectual world” generally, for having succumbed to exactly the utopianism Strauss criticizes. “From Rousseau to Derrida, the ruling passion among intellectuals has been ‘to establish on this earth the empire of wisdom, justice and virtue.'” Indeed, “he finds in the fact of this intellectual homogeneity in the West one reason why Strauss is so vilified there, for Strauss alone subjects the various ‘isms’ to questioning and a radical challenge.” “Strauss actually provides what American and European universities claim to value but in fact abhor: genuine diversity in the form of a perspective that provides an alternative to the Enlightenment tradition and offers the possibility of a critique of Western modernity that does not itself rest upon and therefore advance the principles of modernity.” This includes Strauss’s critique of moral or ‘cultural’ relativism. “The kind of moral advice offered by the philosopher should avoid anything that ‘weakens the moral fibers of men and thus [makes] them unable to bring any sacrifice.” In the modern west, the fact/value distinction and the notion of value-neutral social science confuses the souls of “people who have received higher education (professors in particular),” making them, in Liu’s words, “inferior to ordinary people on the moral plane.”

    Liu maintains that it’s not too late for China, that the very interest of Chinese scholars in Strauss’s critique of modern liberalism indicates that ‘we Chinese’ “must take advantage of our situation to promote classical education as quickly as possible.” Moreover, Strauss’s attempt to “understand thinkers as they understood themselves,” rather than trying to plug them into a preconceived thought-system or ‘ism,’ may enable Chinese scholars to recover an understanding of the Chinese classics. “After his encounter with Strauss, Liu sees that philosophy as understood by the classics is the genuine universalism and source of liberation,” a universalism that (crucially) remains zetetic or questioning, and does not aim at rationalism or Enlightenment system-building. Philosophy owes that genuine universalism to the discovery of nature. While philosophy originated in ancient Greece (if it exists, it must have originated somewhere) “its essential core is nevertheless universal and timeless.”

    “Liu also claims that there is a profound harmony between Chinese (Confucian and Daoist) and classical Western philosophy in their shared practice of esoteric speech, the discovery of which Strauss thought was crucial to his own recovery of political philosophy in its original sense.” Admittedly, the Chinese classics evidence no discovery of nature. The Chinese classics do, however, cultivate a certain kind of gentlemanliness, if not the same kind as Xenophon intended to cultivate, given the substantial differences between ancient China and ancient Greece. Liu “apparently” sees that philosophy “still needs to be or will be properly introduced” in China. To do this, Liu follows Strauss, as Strauss follows the Western classics, practicing exoteric writing “not only to escape persecution”—no small thing under the PRC regime—”but also to reproduce their distinctive way of life, a way of life which is in conflict not with this or that political regime but with political life in general.” If, as Strauss writes, exoteric writing is necessary to convince “the city” that philosophers “do not desecrate everything sacred to the city,” that “they are not subversives,” then philosophers can philosophize without suffering death (Socrates) or exile (self-imposed, for Aristotle). “For Strauss, true liberalism consists in freedom of the mind”—a way of life, a sort of regime-within-the regime the philosopher happens to live in. “What Strauss thought al-Farabi did for the Islamic world, Maimonides for Judaism, and perhaps Strauss himself for the modern liberal world, Liu might well be undertaking to do for China.”

    Co-editor Kai Marchal doubts this. He agrees with Nadon respecting the lack of philosophy in ancient China. For that matter, also unlike the West, China lacked “the idea of a revealed religion.” Nor did Confucian or Daoist sages present themselves as ‘gadflies,’ awakening sleepy cities from their slumber, whether dogmatic or merely habitual. Therefore (and taking a hint from Strauss) we need “to understand the Chinese Straussians in their own terms.”

    Thus, by “introduc[ing] to his readers Strauss’s deeper anxieties about modernity and his fierce polemic against the phenomena of ‘nihilism’ and ‘historicism,'” Liu Xiaofeng uses Strauss to induce “Chinese intellectuals to overcome their uncritical, submissive attitude toward the West and Western theories,” to “emancipate themselves from the idea that true ‘Enlightenment’ is only possible by means of Western ideas.” Liu’s “creative reading of Strauss” “affirms the idea that classical Chinese civilization represents a valid horizon and does not need to be critically examined from a modern perspective.” That can in turn impel the Chinese to work at recapturing one major part of that civilization, the Chinese empire: “When read in China,” Strauss’s criticism of “the parochial character of the 19th and 20th century outlook” in the West “encourages readers to reject or, at least, bypass Western modernity and to engage in the building of a united and powerful Chinese state that will again dominate Asia and even the world, as it had done for centuries before its fateful encounter with the imperial powers” of the West. Marchal remarks, dryly, “Strauss likely never anticipated such a reception, namely that his original project, the ‘quarrel between the ancient and the moderns,’ would turn into a veritable gigantomachia in the form of a political and ideological struggle between China and the United States.” He might also wonder how a renewed Chinese imperialism could avoid the methods and mindset of the moderns; for its part, the CCP doesn’t seem to be given to such wondering, a reality Strauss surely would not have found difficult to anticipate, had he lived long enough to see the beginnings of the effort.

    Marchal unearths an especially entertaining instance of Liuian legerdemain. If “a contemporary Socrates” were “convicted as a ‘dissident,'” what would he do? Would he flee to the United States or would he stay in the PRC? Why, the Chinese Socrates would stay at home, just as Socrates did, accepting his punishment because “he would not want to live in a country whose ‘gods’ and customs are not his own.” In Liu’s words, “Socrates preferred to sacrifice his life in order to preserve philosophy in Athens rather than to preserve his life in order to introduce philosophy into Crete.” What is more, only under a “despotic regime” like the PRC does such an “existential choice between life and death even arise”; the gods of the liberal-democratic cities have fallen asleep, “citizens can choose rather arbitrarily between all sorts of values” with no criminal consequences, and so “are unable to reach the higher stages of moral being.”

    As Marchal notes, this argument pretends that philosophy needs to be introduced into the United States. One might add that it also ignores the example of Aristotle, who did in fact get out of town, lest the Athenians sin twice against philosophy. Or, as Marchal recalls, Strauss himself did get out of Germany, then France, then England, arriving in America—in a way not to introduce, but to reintroduce natural-rights-based philosophy there.

    Nadon interprets Liu as writing these things as an exoteric defense of the philosophic way of life in China. Marchal points to Liu’s valorization of the death-defying Socrates as not so much a Straussian but a Schmittian trope, with its frisson at existential risk. For his part, Marchal emphasizes Strauss’s interpretation of Xenophon’s dialogue, the Hiero, as a defense of philosophic daring, to be sure, but simultaneously of ‘politic’ philosophic moderation. By contrast, Liu praises the philosopher Xiong Shili’s “decision not to go into exile after the Chinese Communist Party’s successful revolution in 1949” and his subsequent attempts to convince Mao Zedong “of the need of valuing and preserving traditional scholarship (especially Confucianism) in order to create Chinese culture anew”—actions Liu finds reminiscent of Simonides’ dialogue with Hiero. Liu then argues that Xiong considered “the totalitarian rule of the democratic sage is necessary for the foundation of a truly democratic community,” and that Mao was, or could be, such a “sage.”

    Marchal finds “all this” to be “quite perplexing,” in view of the fact that “the ideological foundation of Mao’s communist revolution is of modern origin,” as Liu himself has admitted elsewhere; “the communist notion of equality is a direct result of Westernization, more specifically of the European Enlightenment.” He has also “repeatedly claimed” that Mao’s revolutionary partisanship in the 1930s and 1940s “was very similar” to the sort of thing Schmitt had begun to advocate in the 1920s. Liu’s “attempt to elevate Mao to the status of a ‘beneficent tyrant'” proves “deeply flawed”: Strauss “insists on the eternal tension between the political life and the life devoted to wisdom,” and for that reason such a tyrant will fail; further, there remains “a fundamental difference between the Confucian-Legalist ethos in Imperial China and Mao’s extremely violent and voluntaristic vision of rulership, aiming to push the revolutionary project beyond any limits and restraints,” unifying theory and practice not for the sake of stability but for the sake of permanent revolution. In his dialogue with Kojève on the Hiero, Strauss refuses even to vindicate the rule of Salazar in Portugal, a rule that scarcely approached the tyrannical extremes of Mao.

    It “may be possible,” Marchal grants that other Chinese Straussians such as Li Meng and Ding Yun will “aim at a more balanced understanding of the cultural differences between East and West,” preserving philosophy as “a genuinely critical, zetetic force,” and “think about the question of tyranny more soberly.” And it should not be forgotten that Liu has done substantial work in introducing “the Western canon into China.” This “may positively influence many generations of Chinese in the future,” although, one might remark, Strauss and many other commentators were not unmindful of the high level of civilization achieved by the Germans by the beginning of the calamitous twentieth century.

    The next two essays feature assessments of Strauss as a philosopher by Chinese scholars. Jianghon Chen describes Strauss as a “negative philosopher.”  By this he means that for Strauss “The quest for the nature of things becomes possible only if one is dissatisfied with the common or vulgar understandings of things. In other words, the quest for the nature of things requires a negation of commonly accepted opinions and customs.” Thus political philosophy will challenge commonly accepted opinions and customs concerning politics. “Two facts” necessitate “the quest for the nature of political things”: first, “political life is enveloped by political opinions and social customs”; second, “political life has never reached the state of perfection and hence is in the state of lacking knowledge of political things.” Philosophy achieves at minimum an awareness of this ignorance. “Philosophy is the negation of any actual politics that claims to have achieved perfection in this world.” It is, as Strauss writes “zetetic.”

    These facts being facts, Strauss understands “political philosophy as a politics of philosophy, that is, exotericism.” This practice of exotericism “can be justified in view of the conflict between the quest for knowledge and the satisfaction with opinion,” which satisfaction can lead to lethal dissatisfaction with philosophy and philosophers among the opinionated. Therefore “it is ridiculous to regard Strauss as a conservative thinker,” if ‘conservatism’ means to hold on to one’s received opinions and customs. No genuinely philosophic thinker can be conservative in that way, although he may well appear to be, given his practice of exoteric speech and writing. In prudently rejecting the path of open reform in his public speech, the politics of philosophy may be conservative, but the underlying thought will always be daring. “Political philosophy remains possible in society only if it becomes political philosophy. Strauss is neither a secret Schmittian, a man of the ‘Right,’ nor a follower of Hannah Arendt on the ‘Left.’ Neither is truly politic or truly philosophic in the eyes of Strauss. In the case of Arendt, this may be seen in her refusal to view Plato as an ironist, and her consequent charge that Platonic philosophy, and even philosophy generally, inclines to tyranny. Strauss does not think that Plato’s ‘ideal republic’ is intended as a serious ‘policy proposal,’ as a “blueprint” for human society. The ‘ideal republic’ Socrates and his interlocutors build in the Republic is a city in speech, and only in speech. It will never exist outside of speech; it transcends ordinary, down-to-earth reality, perhaps providing a standard for judging ‘actual’ regimes, but not as a goal to be striven for in action.  Accordingly, Strauss finds philosophy liberal in both senses of the term: a generous giver of noetic insights and an agent of true human freedom from ancient conventions and modern ideologies alike.

    Kuan-Min Huang distinguishes the Chinese practice of attempting to “mirror” Western thought and the strategy of viewing that thought as if through a “prism.” He begins, as Malraux had done, by pointing to “the crisis of meaning” contact with the West produced in China, with the consequent search for a Chinese identity, both national (democratic in Taiwan, “authoritarian” on the mainland) and cultural (traditionalism versus modern ‘progressivism’). “All economic development and democratic organization”—attempted solutions to the national crisis—”cannot hide the deeper crisis of meaning,” the cultural crisis, in part because the solutions on offer, by negating Chinese tradition, only intensify that crisis. “For intellectuals during the modern era, the rupture with the Chinese tradition meant nothing less than the collapse of a whole universe of meaning,” as seen in the poignant statement of Malraux’s Ling.

    An earlier generation of exiled Chinese intellectuals, including Carson Chang, Xie Youwei, Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan, and Tang Junyi, put their hopes “in justifying the possibility of democracy and science in accordance with the Confucian spirit.” “Seen in this context, Leo Strauss’s criticism of modernity could serve as a point of reference in regard to the problem of value.” Professor Huang calls “the method of making use of Straussian arguments to counter Western modernity and to justify the inherent value of the Chinese tradition a form of ‘mirroring.'” In China, this transfers Strauss’s account of the battle of the ancients and the moderns to the Chinese conflict between the Confucian classics and modern Western ideas and ways of life. The problem is that “Strauss precludes any reshaping of tradition.” In Straussian terms, it would be highly unlikely that Confucianism and modernity could mix, any more than Judaism or Platonism could mix with Machiavelli. Politically, too, “if the traditional political regime cannot restore institutional Confucianism (including the traditional family structure and the civil service examination system), appropriating Western values simply will not take China back to the political system of the past; also, it will lead to a political regime rather different from socialist authoritarianism,” itself a product of modern ideas. Neither nationalism nor socialism nor democracy, nor some combination of two or three of those, can comport with Confucianism (or Daoism, or even Legalism, which, of those three, modern thought most nearly resembles).

    Huang suggests approaching Strauss in a different way. Strauss’s critique of Western modernity is ‘prismatic’; that is, he shows that there is no one ‘West,’ that it must be analyzed into its components. The principal components are reason and revelation (“Athens” and “Jerusalem”) and “ancient and modern.” Further, modernity itself comprises several elements. “If Chinese culture or other Asian cultures have been caught by the spell of modernity, it is necessary to understand how this modernity is constituted… in order to see at what level the encounter happens and toward what ends the dialogue can lead.” To Huang, Strauss is “Schmittian” in the sense that he emphasizes the conflict of the several elements of the West, not their reconciliation, harmonization, or synthesis.

    Huang remarks that, for starters, the conflict between reason and revelation does not resonate in China because Chinese religions are not ‘revealed’ religions. Further, “for a Chinese person who is interested in Strauss, one obvious problem is the difficulty of using the Chinese language to talk about philosophy, given that the latter originated in Greece.” “Can philosophy be other than Greek?” If a Confucian scholar were to consider Western philosophy, he might say that “the source of philosophy is moral conscience.” This is the Chinese equivalent of “human nature” in Western philosophy. A non-Confucian scholar might say no, it ‘universal’ isn’t conscience but the Dao, the “Way” or “Origin” or “Principle.” Still another might say that “nothingness” (in Chinese, sunyata) is the universal principle underlying everything. In considering these matters in light of Strauss’s theologico-political problem, Chinese religion makes the conflict of reason and revelation less severe, making Hegelian historicism—with which Strauss sharply disagrees, precisely on the grounds that reason and revelation cannot be made to cohere—a much more plausible solution to the conflict between Chinese tradition and modernity.

    Huang commends the philosopher Tang Junyi, who, Hegel-like, makes the confrontation of Confucianism with modernity into a struggle for recognition. “Tradition is neither an absolute authority nor a divinely revealed source” in Confucianism. “It has great value, but only through rational recognition,” and it “provides a source for human rationality” in the “possibility of self-transcending to affirm the power of adaptation of the Kantian-Hegelian approach to self-consciousness” that Confucianism offers. Thus “the return to tradition does not mean a complete refusal of modernity, as Strauss insists.” Hegelian “immanent transcendence” leaves a place both for religion and reason, with faith “limit[ing] reason’s overestimation of itself” and “offer[ing] a sense of security” to the human soul, and reason, perhaps, limiting religion’s inclination to dogmatism. This Confucian approach to reason and revelation also solves the theologico-political problem because it makes the best regime possible; for Huang, “the best regime is a democratic one complemented by moral cultivation,” centering on (Hegelian) “mutual respect,” which circumscribes “the will to power” by “moral conscience.” And this political solution for China may be extended to international relations, whereby religions can coexist peacefully and build “perpetual peace.” (In China itself, it might be remarked, the often-brutal civil wars have seldom been wars of religion, and the two biggest such wars—the Dungan Revolt (Muslims) and the Taiping Rebellion (Christians) involved adherents to revealed religions. A Chinese intellectual might well associate the immanentism of Chinese religions with relative peace among religionists.) That is, the spectrum revealed by considering Strauss ‘prismatically’ can lead to “a synthesis in the future.” The choice of Hegelian language is of course revealing. Tang Junyi is Kojève with the Schmittism (not to mention the Stalinism) removed.

    It must be said that Strauss resists prismatic reading and therefore the synthetic solutions arising from religious or philosophic immanentism. He would raise a zetetic eyebrow at any such grand conciliation of Confucian classics with modernity, replying also that if Chinese tradition is not based on revealed religion, it might well be based on custom or convention, received opinion (albeit refined). Huang does not notice another of Strauss’s distinctions, the one between nature and convention. Strauss might also doubt that Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism can be made to cohere. He might find the Daoists somewhat reminiscent of the apolitical Epicureans, on the one hand, and the cosmos-centered pre-Socratics, on the other; in contrast, Confucianists’ moral and political concerns more nearly resemble Western political philosophers following the ‘Socratic turn.’ And the Legalists look to be closer to Machiavelli and his followers, despising both Daoists and Confucianists as soft, unrealistic, foolish. Strauss might well hasten to note the roughness of these parallels, even as he maintained that neither ‘East’ and ‘West,’ nor the several elements of Chinese tradition itself, much lend themselves to rational synthesis.

    The final essay on Schmitt discusses Schmitt in relation to Taiwan. Similarly, the final essay on Strauss discusses Strauss in relation to Taiwan. Chuang-Wei Hu cites Wan Dan, a political activist, and Pai Hsien-yung, a novelist, Taiwanese intellectuals who seek a “cultural renaissance” in their country. Dr. Hu suggests that Strauss’s writings on liberal education might be useful in such a renaissance. As Strauss argues, a “cultured” person may be formed by reading the “great books.” From them, he will learn what human excellence is, and what the best regime is, both for individuals and political communities. Strauss emphasizes “that the meaning of philosophy is to love wisdom but not to have wisdom,” that turning one’s soul “toward the good” does not make the soul perfect, but does make it better and, in some cases, makes it either great—magnanimous—or even (in rare instances) philosophic. The cultured soul may not achieve philosophic status, but ‘intellectuals’ can at least learn to respect philosophers, learn a thing or two from them. In studying philosophers, “the reader cannot expect a set of instructions”; he must try to think along, and finally to judge the merit, of what he’s reading. The philosophers do not “only speak for their own time; they did in fact think about perennial questions.” “Ancient” liberalism means freeing the mind to think rationally about those questions.

    Strauss writes, “Liberal education is the necessary endeavor to found an aristocracy within democratic mass society.” If ancient democracies expected “all citizens” to “be wise and virtuous,” they at least could be said to aim high. “Modern democracy, in contrast, does not focus on virtues or [what Strauss calls] ‘the contemplation of the eternal,’ but rather pays attention to the political rights of everyone.” The necessity of liberal education in regimes of modern democracy must therefore be seen in the need to maintain at least a core of citizens who continue to see the need for virtue in maintaining their political regime, and the need for virtue in leading a good life within that regime. If modern democracy, as Strauss understands it, isn’t so much the rule of the masses, since modern societies are too large to be ruled directly by the people as a whole, then modern democracy really consists of a “mass culture,” a culture, as Strauss unsparingly puts it, “which can be appropriated by the meanest capacities, without any intellectual and moral effort whatsoever and at a very low monetary price.” The cultural “aristocracy” within this mass culture will consist of those citizens who acquire a liberal education. By becoming teachers they will resist mass culture, possibly elevating not only the culture but the politics of their countries, even if only to a modest degree.

    Because they recognize the fact of “natural inequality or social inequality in a democracy more than other thinkers,” Strauss and Straussians “have been denounced” severely by real and pretended democrats (rival elites, in other words) within the democratic regimes. Dr. Hu writes, “I deeply believe that everyone can achieve excellence in one particular area of life,” not necessarily in politics but in “parenting, driving, cooking, etc.” To achieve the excellence appropriate to each soul is to achieve happiness for that soul, and each of us “is worthy of seeking their own happiness.” This is a kind thought, although Strauss would qualify it by noting that one soul’s excellence might be philosophy, another politics, another cooking, and still another pickpocketing. That is, he would insist that there remains a hierarchy of excellences, a hierarchy established by considering what human nature is.

    Returning to liberal education in Taiwan, Dr. Hu notices that Strauss leaves open the possibility that great minds and great books may well be found in such countries as China and India. “We do not understand their languages,” Strauss writes, “and we cannot learn all languages.” Dr. Hu confirms that great minds and books to indeed exist in the East, and that “Taiwanese students should read Confucius’ Analects or the classical novel Dream of the Red Chamber, because they do know the language.” And Taiwanese students can read the Western ‘greats,’ too, “most of the time with the help of translations.” In Taiwanese mass culture as elsewhere, “people tend to read by their passions, and not by reasonable thinking.” They will need “to choose between the values of Eastern and Western cultures, which often conflict with one another.” “Reading the ‘great books’ can help the Taiwanese people to know themselves better.” In so choosing and coming to know, Dr. Hu draws attention to Strauss’s emphasis on “the importance of political moderation.” As Strauss writes, “Moderation will protect us against the twin dangers of visionary expectations from politics and unmanly contempt for politics.” On that, Dr. Hu and Strauss are, as a Chinese thinker might say, in harmony.

    Marchal and Shaw have put together a highly instructive collection of essays. The essays demonstrate the possibilities, both promising and dangerous, which the introduction of the writings of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss have opened for Chinese peoples and their regimes. Judging from these essays, Strauss seems a more beneficial influence than Schmitt, who does not necessarily appeal to the better angels of our nature. It must be observed that the policies of the PRC regime today comport far more with Schmitt’s notions than they do with anything Strauss teaches.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Solzhenitsyn in the Seventies: Prospects for Russia and the West

    September 25, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Igor Shafarevich, eds.: . From Under the Rubble. Translations under the direction of Michael Scammell. Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1981 [1974].

    Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Warning to the West. Harris L. Coulter and Nataly Martin translation. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1976.

     

    To understand the political atmosphere contributing to these volumes, it’s almost necessary to have lived through the lugubrious mid-seventies, when they were published. Those too young to have experienced the American Congress’s abandonment of South Vietnam to the Communist regime in Hanoi, the implementation of the policy of ‘détente’ with the Soviet Union, the hapless Ford Administration, Soviet advances in Africa, and indeed the vacuous pop music and hideous clothes of the period may rightly count themselves fortunate to have missed witnessing how the Sixties went to seed. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s pessimism may seem odd to those who know that the Soviet regime he loathed was only some fifteen years away from implosion—not America, not the West—but it seemed, and in many ways was, quite reasonable at the time.

    As that distinguished translator of Russian texts, Max Hayward, remarks in his introduction, the authors of the essays in Under the Rubble look back collections published before and after the Russian and Bolshevik revolutions: Landmarks, which appeared in 1909, and De Profundis, in 1918, featured writers criticizing the uncritical adoption of nineteenth-century European philosophic doctrines by the Russian intelligentsia; of these writers, the best known in the West today is Nicholas Berdyaev, the brilliant Russian Orthodox essayist who, with his collaborators, defended the spiritual and intellectual legacy of Christianity against the secularists, provoking the wrath of no less (and no better) the polemicist, then tyrant, Vladimir Lenin, who somewhat comically fulminated at the authors’ “apostasy.” Presumably a deviation from the teachings of the Church of Dialectical Materialism.

    Co-editor and main contributor to Under the Rubble Alesksandr Solzhenitsyn does indeed reject Marxist-Leninist dogma, insisting that “History is us”; consequently, “there is no alternative but to shoulder the burden of what we so passionately desire and bear it out of the depths,” de profundis. In the penultimate essay, he recurs to Landmarks, listing the faults of Russia’s pre-revolutionary secularists as identified by the contributors: a clannish, unnatural disengagement from the life of the nation; intense opposition to the Czarist regime as a matter of principle; moral cowardice in the face of “public opinion” (largely as they imagined it, given their isolation from the public); centrally, dogmatic egalitarianism; ideological intolerance; fanaticism and conceit; atheism. Although these “smatterers” did continue the Russian intelligentsia’s tradition of moral seriousness (secularists, yes; Voltaireans, no), they displayed “a fanatical willingness” to sacrifice themselves that harder souls like Lenin would readily satisfy, once their usefulness faded. They shared with the Bolsheviks an “expectation of a social miracle” and “a religion of self-deification,” both following from an ideology of “religionless” humanism. By 1917, “the intelligentsia had succeeded in rocking Russia with a cosmic explosion, but was unable to handle the debris.” Despite their belated to conversion to regnant Marxist-Leninist ‘line,’ the new regime discarded them, preferring a scientistic/technocratic and bureaucratic ‘intelligentsia’ to the old gaggle of dreamers.” “Communism was its own offspring,” but Communism had decidedly Oedipal inclinations toward its fathers.

    In the 1970s, the ‘intellectual’ who combined the scientism of the regime’s intelligentsia with the vacuous optimism of the pre-revolutionary humanist was Andrei Sakharov. Solzhenitsyn replies to the argument Sakharov advanced in his 1968 tract, Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom, wherein he predicted a “convergence” of the Soviet and American regimes. Sakharov predicted (or rather hoped) that the Soviets would democratize its political institutions and the Americans would ‘democratize’ their political economy by adopting socialism. With the two (then) major world powers comfortably in the camp of social democracy, peace would rule the planet.

    Solzhenitsyn neither wanted nor expected any such Aquarian thing. For Russians, “the way back” from Communism will “prove difficult and slow,” “just as painful” as the transition from the relative freedom of czarism to Communism had proved; a “gulf of utter incomprehension… will suddenly yawn between fellow-countrymen” because under tyranny no one dared to speak frankly with anyone else. Russians “lost touch with each other, never learned to know each other, ceased to check and correct each other”—lost the habits of mind and heart that any genuine politics, any life of ruling and being ruled, reciprocally, instills. While praising Sakharov for his courage in publishing his argument, for having “broken out of the deep, untroubled, cozy torpor in which Soviet scientists get on with their scientific work, are rewarded with a life of plenty and pay for it by keeping their thoughts on the level of their test tubes,” Solzhenitsyn finds that he has left the conditions prevailing under the Soviet regime “dangerously underlit.” While condemning fascism, racism, militarism, Stalinism, and Maoism, Sakharov gives Marxism-Leninism a pass. Similarly, in his “Secret Speech” of 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev had condemned Stalinism; yet Stalinism only differed from Leninism in Stalin’s purges of the Communist Party. The condemnation of Stalinism amounts to an attempt to shift the blame for the mass murder perpetrated by the Communist Party regime onto a particular ruler, rather than admitting the regime itself, and the ideology underpinning it, inherently push rulers to mass murder.

    Therefore, when Sakharov calls “the high ideals of socialism” and the “ethical character of the socialist path” he has described nothing; he has only expressed a “pious wish.” “Nowhere on earth have we been shown ethical socialism in being.” “But in the great expanses of our collectivized countryside, where people always and only lived by labor and had no other interest in life but labor, it is only under ‘socialism’ that labor has become an accursed burden from which men flee.” (It might be added that the usual good regime cited as the model of ‘democratic socialism’—Sweden—has never been socialist at all; it has been at most a capitalist country offering substantial ‘welfare benefits,’ with a social-democratic party enjoying a parliamentary majority, as it was in Solzhenitsyn’s time under the premiership of Olaf Palme).

    Similarly, Sakharov’s condemnation of ‘nationalism’ fails to see what Nietzsche saw, decades earlier, and what de Gaulle had insisted on, in Sakharov’s generation: that nationalism has been “a tough nut… for the millstones of internationalism to crack.” “In spite of Marxism, the twentieth century has revealed to us the inexhaustible strength and vitality of national feelings,” requiring any honest person to “think more deeply about this riddle: why is the nation a no less sharply defined and irreducible human entity than the individual?” Just as socialism break on the rock of human personality, human individuality, the human soul, so does internationalism, whether ‘liberal’ or socialist, break on the rock of the nation. Solzhenitsyn rejects Sakharov’s claim that historical “progress” will overcome individuality or nationhood, pointing to Sakharov’s hope for the “creation of an artificial superbrain” which could “control and direct all vital processes at the level of the individual organism” and “of society as a whole” (“including psychological processes and heredity”) as prospects that “come close to our idea of hell on earth.”

    “In all the history of science, has scientific foresight ever saved us from anything?” Not yet. Sakharov’s “convergence” hypothesis being a case in point: Why would a historicist synthesis of Communist tyranny and commercial republicanism or democratic capitalism necessarily combine the best of both regimes, instead of the worst? Or some mediocre combination of the elements? What Sakharov really wants is world government (assisted or even ruled by the artificial superbrain), not the intellectual freedom he lauds in the title of his book.

    Solzhenitsyn also gazes critically at Western freedoms. Intellectual and other freedoms, legally protected, are often “very desirable,” but only if understood as means to a worthy end, some “higher goal” than the freedoms themselves. A “multiparty parliamentary system” amounts only to “yet another idol” if “no extraparty or strictly nonparty paths of national development” exist within the regime of free political-party competition. For Russia, Solzhenitsyn is thinking primarily of a revivified Russian Orthodox Church, and also, on the material level, an esteem for and protection of landed property for peasants, a right peasants often had under the czarist regime. In the United States, thriving churches and farms also underpinned a republican regime dedicated to securing the natural rights of human persons in accordance with the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God; for Solzhenitsyn, this would be the American parallel to what he wants for Russia, but not the model for Russia, which has its own national character and needs its own civil and political institutions. Having abandoned many of their founding principles, “the Western democracies today are in a state of political crisis and spiritual confusion.” It therefore “ill becomes us to see our country’s only what out in the Western parliamentary system”—a system recently rejected by that staunch republican, Charles de Gaulle. This is “especially” true, “since Russia’s readiness for such a system, which was very doubtful in 1917, can only have declined still further in the half century since.”

    Under the “authoritarian” regimes of previous centuries, Russia “existed for many centuries,” “preserv[ing] itself and its health,” avoiding such “episodes of self-destruction” as were visited upon it by Lenin and Stalin. “Authoritarian regimes as such are not frightening—only those which are answerable to no one and nothing,” to “God and their own consciences.” “The state structure is of secondary importance.” Therefore, “the absolutely essential task is not political liberation, but the liberation of our souls from participation in the lie forced upon us,” a liberation that each individual Russian can undertake here and now, despite the vile regime of Communism. “If mud and dung cling to any of us it is of his own free will, and no man’s mind is made any the less black by the mud of his neighbors.”

    Demonstrating that rigorous and exact intellectual training does not necessarily lend itself to Sakharov-like optimism for the prospect of the worldwide rule of a socialist superbrain, Solzhenitsyn’s next two essayists turn out to be a mathematician and a cyberneticist, respectively. Igor Shafarevich asks the scientific (and also the Socratic) question, What is socialism? He classifies modern socialism as “not just an economic system, as is capitalism, but also—and perhaps above all—as an ideology.” This ideology typically yields “hatred of religion in socialist states,” being itself a substitute for religion. Marx, for example, “regards socialism as the highest level of atheism,” affirming the centrality of man, not God, in the universe. The abolition of private property, the destruction of religion, the destruction of the family—all indispensable elements of Marxism and of the regimes animated by Marxism—deny human personality or soulfulness in the service of impersonality, of ‘scientific’ socialism. Ancient and medieval communalisms were not impersonal (the Cathars were hardly ‘scientific’ socialists) and, although corrosive of families and of property, they never extended over large territories or populations. It was only in modernity that socialism “threw off its mystical and religious form and based itself on a materialistic and rationalist view of the world.”

    Modern socialism, Shafarevich sees, rests on a fundamental demand, “the demand for equality,” not in the sense of equal natural rights but as the demand for “the destruction of the hierarchy into which society has arranged itself,” the “negation of the existence of any genuine differences between individuals.” In this “‘equality’ has turned into ‘equivalence.'” Whereas “the idea of equality is also fundamental to religion,” there “it is achieved in contact with God, that is, in the highest sphere of human existence.” Modern socialism denies any such contact, in principle. “Such a revolution would amount to the destruction of Man,” not his apotheosis, as seen when indigenous peoples who lose the “way of life” which had been “arranged to give meaning to their existence.” In contact not with God, or even with ‘the gods,’ but rather in contact with foreign men, they lose “their will to live.” “It seems obvious that a way of life which fully embodies socialist ideals must have the same result,” as indeed it had, in listless, alcoholic Russia. Freud was right about one thing, at least: human nature carries within it a death-wish. Socialism plays to the human “urge to self-destruction, the human death instinct.”

    Cyberneticist Mikhail Agursky points to an underlying similarity of capitalism and socialism of the 1970s, industrialism. The vast production industrialism makes possible concurrently requires the stimulation of demand in order to induce people to consume the vast quantities of stuff. Advertising and ‘fashion’ stimulate the natural desire to acquire to new intensity. This is why both capitalism and socialism “are rapacious plunderers” of “natural resources.” Both also tend toward political instability—in capitalist countries, economic boom and bust destabilize governments, while in socialist countries the quest for ‘raw materials’ tempts stronger states to invade and loot smaller ones. Further, capitalists in republics do not want trade disrupted, and so push politicians to appease the tyrannies that aim at destroying both republicanism and capitalism. “These were the roots of the Munich agreement in 1938,” and of détente with Communist regimes now. While “democracy’s faults pale into insignificance beside the enormities of totalitarianism, such as the deaths of tens of millions of people in Soviet and German death camps and prisons,” these lesser faults make that regime vulnerable to those regimes. “The only reason, indeed, why democratic societies still exist is that their populations have not yet altogether lost their self-control,” the moral foundation of political self-government. Merely to make socialism democratic won’t solve that problem.

    A critique of socialism is never hard to make, partly because socialism is an ideology, well-defined and therefore readily examined. Nationality, even when made into an ideology, nationalism, needs more analytical work, as nationalities number in the hundreds, even the thousands, whereas political economies fall into only a few recognizable ‘types.’ In the first of several essays on this topic, Shefarevich returns to consider the nationalities question in Soviet Russia. “Whenever great empires have crumbled” (as the Russian empire did, during the First World War, and as the Soviet Union would do, in the opinion of the writers here), “national consciousness has always sharpened in the separate nations composing them and ethnic groups have separated out and aspired to independent status.” One danger in this is the combination of national sentiments with socialism, yielding “an intolerant, radical nationalism”; this can also occur when a proud nation experiences conquest, as Germany did in that same war. In Russia, however, “all the problems of the non-Russian peoples are due in the long run to Russian oppression and the drive for Russification,” which leads the peoples in those territories to desire “to rid themselves of Russian colonial domination.” At the same time, the socialist ideology in the name of which that domination was re-imposed has suppressed Russian national culture, as well. “This ideology is the enemy of every nation, just as it is hostile to individual human personality,” and “the Russians no less than others are its victims; indeed, they were the first to come under fire.”

    To borrow a Leninist phrase, what is to be done? Solzhenitsyn proposes a solution simple to state, hard to practice. A nation by definition ‘sees’ differences between itself and other nations, between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ citizens (or even subjects) and foreigners. Individual persons and individual families experience the same self-defining idea, and indeed social reality, feeling the sentiments that go with it. This being so, can we not limit our (equally human) libido dominandi to ourselves, to those ‘units’ of human life—individual, family, nation—which make sense as ‘objects’ of self-government? This will require “not the embittered strife of parties or nations, not the struggle to win some delusive victory” over persons, families or clans, and nations that will ceaselessly try to get out from under our oppression, but “simply repentance and the search for our own errors and sins. We must stop blaming everybody else” put “that first firm ground underfoot.”

    Individuals can of course repent. What about nations? Solzhenitsyn thinks so. Nations resemble individuals in one way, what he calls the “mystical nature of their ‘givenness,'” their sense of intergenerational connectedness. The individual is never simply an individual; he knows himself as a being with parents, brothers and sisters, ‘relatives’ of all sorts. The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, along with their blessings, and each human person needs to come to terms with those inheritances. Although a nation obviously lacks the biological integrity of a single person, the persons who comprise it nonetheless inherit both the good and the evil deeds of the previous generations. If neither an individual nor a nation can repent from the misdeeds of their ancestors in the simple and direct way they can repent from their own, they can surely repent in a secondary way, to understand their responsibility for acknowledging and correcting the effects of those misdeeds. “The nation is mystically welded together in a community of guilt, and its inescapable destiny is common repentance.” Rather grand language, that, but Solzhenitsyn likely means “mystical” in the Orthodox Christian sense, that of a spiritual and intellectual noesis. For the Orthodox there is nothing misty about mysticism, even if one instance of it, the acknowledgment of God, requires the intervention of the Holy Spirit.

    “Patriotism,” Solzhenitsyn writes, “means unqualified and unwavering love for the nation which implies not uncritical eagerness to serve, not support for unjust claims, but frank assessment of its vices and sins, and penitence for them.” This closely resembles the agapic love of Christianity, although one needn’t necessarily be a Christian to feel it. It does require of a nation “the level of its inner development” needed to perceive its own failures and its own evil actions, an “unarmed moral steadfastness” seen in 1968 when the Czechs and Slovaks confronted Russian tanks, “troubling [Europe’s] conscience”—”briefly.” Such repentance can lead a nation to the renunciation of force in any but defensive wars (and not to confuse self-defense with a strong ‘offense’).

    Solzhenitsyn understands the difficulties. “Self-limitation on the part of individuals has often been observed and described, and is well known to us all,” but “as far as I know, no state has ever carried through a deliberate policy of self-limitation or set itself such a task in general form.” For this to take hold generally, it would signal “a great turning point in the history of mankind, comparable to the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance,” a series of “moral revolutions, requiring both courage and sacrifice, though not cruelty.” Solzhenitsyn in effect challenges Russians to abandon its failing attempt to embody the ‘cutting edge’ of ‘historical dialectic’—of the Absolute Spirit’s progressive march, to put it in Hegelian terms, or the iron laws of History, as Marxists say—and to use both its more than harsh national experience of modern tyranny and its geopolitical circumstance of having no serious enemies on its borders—to turn inward, to recover its moral, spiritual, and even its physical strength. “A family which has suffered a great misfortune or disgrace tries to withdraw into itself for a time to get over its grief by itself. This is what the Russian people must do.” In so doing, it will need to re-create its “whole public educational system,” spending the billions of rubles it now wastes in “vainglorious and unnecessary foreign expenditure” on its children. To obtain the revenues needed for such an enterprise, Russians should “turn our national and political zeal toward the untamed expanses of the Northeast,” toward Siberia, a land rich in natural resources and challenging in the rigors of its climate. This, not incidentally, would turn Russia away from threatening Europe and toward defending a vulnerable border against China (or, as Solzhenitsyn more discreetly puts it, toward the development of a region “whose emptiness is becoming intolerable to our neighbors now that life on earth is so tightly packed.” “Our ocean is the Arctic, not the Indian Ocean,” not the Mediterranean nor Africa” (“we have no business there!”). Repentance isn’t only a matter of spiritual renewal but also a matter of giving oneself something to do. Siberia offers “us plenty of room in which to correct all our idiocies in building town, industrial enterprises, power stations and roads,” and, more importantly, “signify that Russia has resolutely opted for self-limitation, for turning inward rather than outward.” Especially, one might add, if Russians do not accompany such settlement with offensive weapons systems.

    Historian Vadim Borisov contributes one of the collection’s best essays, also on this topic of nationality. Today, “the ideological monolith that has weighed for long years on Russian life and thought has done its work: Russian consciousness is scrambling out from under it toward an unknown future which is fragmented as never before,” as the “unresolved dilemmas” of 1917 resurface, now “intensified, complicated, and distorted” by more than fifty years of tyranny. In the years before the revolutions of 1917, Russia’s secularist intelligentsia had failed to distinguish ‘national’ from ‘nationalist.’ This mistake flowed from the historicist/progressive inclination to think of “the freedom of individuals and their unification in mankind” as “the alpha and omega” of philosophy—a philosophy that overlooks political philosophy, dismissing the nation, and therefore politics, the activity of a political community (as distinguished from nations, families, and mankind) in its characteristic modern form, the nation. Without an appreciation of politics, of the human capacity for ruling and being ruled, of ‘talking things over,’ a philosopher will mis-answer the central question of human society, What is justice? We may assert human rights, natural justice, social contract, but our supposedly rational assertion will have no discernable rational basis. “The American Founding Fathers who many years ago first propounded the “eternal rights of man and the citizen” [here he confuses a phrase from the French Revolution with the “unalienable rights” of the Declaration of Independence, but in this case the error is merely verbal] postulated that every human being bears the form and likeness of God; he therefore has an absolute value, and consequently also the right to be respected by his fellows.” But rationalism (in the sense of atheism), positivism, and materialism “successively destroyed the memory of this absolute source of human rights. The unconditional equality of persons before God was replaced by the conditional equality of human individuals before the law.” This leads to arbitrary government, the government of fallible human beings ruling without any standard beyond their own wills. But “if the human personality is not absolute but conditional, then the call to respect it is only a pious wish, which we may obey or disregard.”

    Modern tyranny is ‘totalitarian’ because it is atheistic, denying the existence of God as the standard-setter for nature, and, not incidentally, denying that nature itself has any purposes beyond those human beings impose on it. “Rhinocerouslike,” ‘totalistic’ modern tyranny is “humanism put into practice,” having “forgotten what the human personality is.” Christianity “gave birth to the very concept of the human personality.” [1]

    But does Christianity not also obviate nationality, contending that in the eyes of God there is neither Jew nor Greek, but only saved and unsaved? Yes, in that critical sense, but not in all respects. After all, the same Jesus also tells his fellow Jews to continue obeying the Law, without telling the Apostles to bring to the Gentiles anything more than the Spirit of that Law. Go and teach all nations,” He tells them. The universal Kingdom awaits its Founder, and He won’t be a successor of  V. I. Lenin. Meanwhile, we have individuals as God created them: with one nature but many personalities, just as God has one “nature” but three Persons “or personalities,” and as mankind consists of one entity featuring many nations. The Christian Church itself “was born not in a single world language but in the different tongues of the apostles, reaffirming the plurality of national paths to a single goal.”

    History didn’t make nations; God did. “The nation’s personality realizes itself through [its] history or, to put it another way, the people in their history fulfill God’s design for them.” This givenness, and this purpose, distinguish a nation from “the empirical people.” Even in empirical terms, a human being has a biological heritage, a genetically given structure; beyond this biological code, however, the human being also is born into a family and a nation, into a qualitative identity in addition to his biological identity. This fact “does not violate or diminish the gift of human freedom” because one can “evade the fulfillment of his personal destiny,” “reject God’s design for him,” “forget the roots of his being.” But those roots cannot be destroyed by that man. Christianity teaches each man to become a new man, teaches humanity to “transform itself entirely,” to become Christlike, through the given national ways of life each person has, by birth if not by biology. The new man does not replace the old one, but perfects him, always with the indispensable help of the Holy Spirit, without Whom he would never answer the call to Christlikeness in the first place.

    “The beginning of the collapse of Russia’s integral, Christian national awareness was unusually stormy, thanks to the brutal reforms of Peter the Great.” Subsequent Russian ‘Enlighteners’ “substituted the social image of the people for the face of the people, since the people as a whole cannot be comprehended rationalistically and materialistically,” and so do not ‘register’ in the calculations of modern rationalists. When the people (mostly God-fearing peasants) rejected their formulas, the intelligentsia deemed them a ‘reactionary mass’—’unpersons,’ as the later Stalinists would menacingly label them. “Since man appears to have reached the ultimate in bestiality this century, we must ask the question: what is it that is developing progressively? It should be formulated as a question about human nature, about the instinct of evil in man and the conditions in which it comes to the surface,” but for the most part it hasn’t been so formulated, for a very long time. Instead, the supposed pragmatism of the intelligentsia works toward an “impersonal, unstructured, formless existence”—precisely for the impractical, indeed the utopian. In the modern context, ‘nihilism’ means the negation of the personal, the structured, the formal, the negation of what human beings, in their nature and in their personalities, are. Secularist suppose that ‘History’ will cause that nature to be utterly transformed, but it never quite does so, except for the worse. “The fulfillment of this utopia does not raise the standard of existence, as its adherents believe, but lowers it, bringing disintegration and finally destruction.”

    As distinguished from nationality, nationalism is “above all an ideology,” based upon “the concept of the exclusive value of the tribal characteristics of a given race, and the doctrine of its superiority to all others.” Like the alleged ‘laws of History’ endorsed by the ‘historical science’ of historicists, nationalism distorts a given reality with racism or racial naturalism, biological pseudo-laws (often resembling the ‘laws’ posited by historicists in being evolutionary, a matter of the survival and indeed the triumph of the biologically ‘fit’). “Nationalism confuses the concepts of personality and nature, ascribing to nature the attributes of personality. As a result, the absoluteness of national personalities is transmogrified into the absoluteness of national nature,” much to the detriment of those national personalities that believe such rubbish, and of those which collide with nations under such delusions. Such a nation cannot do what Borisov and Solzhenitsyn alike commend; it cannot set limits to itself, but rather will have limits set for it, whether by internal collapse or defeat in war.

    Both nationalism and (as remarked by previous essayists) socialist internationalism have recourse to the modern state. Alternatively, one might suspect that the modern state has recourse to ideologies of nationalism and socialism to dragoon the peoples it rules into its ‘projects.’ Be that as it may, or be it some malign interdependence between statism and ideology, the whole effort amounts to nihilism, to self-destruction.

    It is in the volume’s sixth, central essay that Solzhenitsyn elaborates an alternative path. “The path of reason and cognition, based on the gradual exercise of thought and the accumulation of judgments logically arrived at”—the rationalism of modern science, misapplied as the means toward a full understanding of political life—”is not the only one possible either for society or for the individual, and it is not the most important.” “There is also the path of lived spiritual experience, the path of integral intuitive perception.” It is well to recall that Orthodox Christianity integrates Platonism or perhaps more accurately Neo-Platonism into Christianity; its ‘mystic’ insight, mentioned previously, is really a noetic perception of the teachings of all three Persons of God brought by the Holy Spirit.

    The perception of God, and of God’s teachings, have always occurred to certain persons, within a certain nation, at certain times, all of them chosen by God. To be so chosen, those persons must have opened their souls to God, must have readied themselves to listen to Him. Solzhenitsyn proposes that just as his own soul had been opened to God’s teachings by the apparently calamitous experiences of imprisonment in the Gulag and confinement to a cancer ward, so Russians as a nation “have experiences such utter exhaustion of human resources [italics added] that we have learned to see the ‘one essential’ that cannot be taken from man, and have learned not to look to human resources for succor.” Christianity as a regime, as “a way of life,” now makes sense to Russians in a way it did not to Russian intelligentsia of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in a way it still does not to such intellectuals as Sakharov and Roy Medvedev (author of a tome titled, typically, Let History Judge). If ‘History’ (as distinguished from history) is an illusion, an excrescence of an ideology, and if human nature is tainted by sin, then Christianity beckons us to a liberation from ideology and from our own natural deformities, aiming at the perfection of human nature by the only realistic means possible, God’s grace. Nothing less will do. Let God judge, and let God redeem.

    Since persons in the West also now sense that progressivism and democracy don’t quite fulfill the claims made on their behalf, a more intelligent ‘convergence’ hypothesis than that offered by Sakharov might become possible. “Perhaps if we can assimilate our experience and somehow put it to use, it may serve to complement Europe’s experience.” Each ‘side’ in the Cold War might learn something from the other. The story goes that de Gaulle sent a message to the Soviet Union’s then-premier, Aleksei Kosygin: “Come, let us build Europe together.” The startled aging Bolshevik preferred to cling to his illusions. But if Russians now abandon those illusions, they may yet prove a nation carrying a prophecy, a ‘new Rome.’

    The pseudonymous contributor “F. Korsakov” recalls the prediction of Russian Orthodox priest Pavel Florensky, victim of Lenin’s labor camps, who wrote (with sharp irony, appropriating the language of his jailers), “As the end of History draws nearer, the domes of the Holy Church begin to reflect the new, almost imperceptible, rosy light of the approaching Undying Day.” The subsequent crimes committed by ideologically-motivated tyrants and their collaborators have subjected Russians to the trials of Job, imposed not by God directly but by those tyrants and collaborators. They may yet turn out to have been instruments of God, returning the Job-nation to God. And the historian Evgeny Barabanov adds, “The problem lies in how we define our attitude to this bondage, how we manage to accommodate both it and the triumphant paschal strength and joy.” Insofar as the Orthodox East profited from its contact with the learning, the law, and “the concept of the state” developed by the Roman Catholic and Protestant West, it did so “in Christianity,” not outside it. Insofar as the Orthodox East has appropriated the later secularism and rationalism of the West, it has done anything but profit. Even before that, “in Byzantium and Russia ideas about the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar too often merged and became interchangeable,” with Church too often subjected to State. In the eyes of the monarchs, “it has always been desirable to have a ‘tame Orthodoxy’ which would serve the ends of autocratic power.” But at least those emperors “regarded themselves as the instruments of God’s will,” even as they foolishly and wrongly made a prophetic religion into a civil religion by subordinating God’s Church to themselves. This has made the Russian Church in one sense too ‘worldly,’ too sycophantic, but in another sense to ‘otherworldly,’ too willing to give up the attempt to evangelize, the put Russians more firmly on the Christian path, to rule themselves according to the Christian regime or way of life and thereby to liberate themselves from the pseudo-religious pretensions of statists. God’s Kingdom is not of this world, but it is most assuredly in this world, and the task of God’s people is to advance that Kingdom without demolishing the still-needed fabric of ordinary political rule, in some decent regime whether republican, kingly, aristocratic, or ‘mixed.’ The task of God’s people is not to indulge themselves in Christian Platonism wrongly understood, Christian Platonism that attempts “to fix life in lasting forms.” Plato’s Socrates never supposes that life itself can be so fixed; hence his famous irony, so annoying to rulers who want to conserve what cannot and should not necessarily be conserved. Today, in Russia, it has been Christianity that has stagnated, losing its life, forgetting that the Holy Spirit “goeth where He listeth” and not always where political rulers want it to go. “We must speak,” Borisov urges, “beyond modernism and conservatism alike, of what is eternally living and absolute in this world of the relative, of what is simultaneously both eternally old and eternally young. Our historicism must be metahistorical, it must mean not only a breakthrough into eternity but the presence of eternity in our own time, metahistory in history,” in each of our own unique individual, familial, and national personalities. Under current conditions in what he rightly takes to be the waning years of the Soviet regime, this will mean sacrifice. But without it, without having “your education and life… disrupted,” “damage to the soul and corruption of the soul” will inevitably follow—sacrifices “far more irreparable” than even the consequences of a sentence in the Soviet Gulag.

    Solzhenitsyn gives the final essay to Sheparevich. Against the claim of the secular intellectual, Andrei Amalrik—whose pessimism counterbalanced Sakharov’s optimism—that Russia had no future, Sheparevich joins Solzhenitsyn in affirming that it can have one. To see a Russian future, intellectuals will need to sacrifice their dearest idol, secular ideology, whether Marxist, nationalist, or liberal-progressive. The iron laws of history aren’t really made of iron. “Even in quantum mechanics it is considered theoretically impossible to eliminate the influence of the observer on what is observed.” Testimony for personality, indeed! “History’s laws must… take account for a fundamental element—the influence of human beings and their free will.” In this taking of accounts, regimes count: “The hierarchy of human society reflect that society’s outlook on life. The people most skilled in the activities that are highly regarded by society possess the greatest authority.” Christianity proposed a new regime, one unknown in antiquity, with saints replacing heroes, freedom under God replacing mythological nature-deities. When Russians followed Nietzsche’s (and Europe’s?) proclamation, “God is dead,” they committed not deicide (which is after all impossible) but suicide. As one of Malraux’s characters observes, “Man is dead, following God, and you are struggling with the consequences of this strange inheritance.”

    What Russians have done, a new generation of Russians cannot so much undo as respond to, work against, in a sense redeem in much the way a human person, having experienced evil inside and outside his soul, can turn away from it and turn toward something, Someone, better. “One reason why the revolution in our country succeeded was undoubtedly the fact that only in revolutionary activity could the intelligentsia find an outlet for their yearning for great deeds and sacrifice.” Such sacrifice, and not a grasping toward power for the sake of the all-too-human ambition to rule for the sake of the pleasure of commanding and enforcing those commands in accordance to one’s own will, remains the only true way of ruling, as Jesus showed on the Cross, sacrificing His human life but winning the minds and hearts of those He freed. “This is now,” in the 1970s, “Russia’s position. She has passed through death and may”—may—”hear the voice of God.” “Or, of course, we may not hear it.”

    Turning Westward

    Soon after publishing this book for Russians, Solzhenitsyn published one for Western democrats, primarily Americans, in whose country he had then settled. He collected five lectures, three delivered to American, two to British audiences. He found his most receptive listeners among the workers, members of the AFL-CIO, not among capitalists either corporate or ‘small-town.’ “Workers of the world, unite!” he exclaimed, doubtless relishing the thought that real workers in a free country preferred to hear him than any commissar or Marxist professor.

    Solzhenitsyn denied that the Bolsheviks ever really wanted the workers of the world to unite. The only “genuine worker” among the top Bolsheviks, Alexander Shliapnikov, “disappeared from sight” in 1921, after “charg[ing] that the Communist leadership had betrayed the interests of the workers” by “crushing and oppressing the proletariat” and “degenerat[ing] into a bureaucracy.” “Since the Revolution, there has never been such a thing as a free trade union” in the Soviet Union; it was left to the American labor movement to publish a map of the concentration camps, the Gulag Archipelago, in 1947—rather to the discomfiture not only of American communists but also of some American capitalists, who had been financing Soviet industry and trading with the regime for decades.

    During its (then) nearly six decades in power, the Soviet regime had achieved several noteworthy ‘firsts’: “the first concentration camps in the world”; the first to exterminate all rival political parties; the first to undertake genocide of the peasantry (murdering some fifteen million); the first to reintroduce serfdom after its abolition under the monarchy; the first to induce a famine (six million died in Ukraine in the years 1932-1933). But Solzhenitsyn’s theme isn’t so much a citation of Soviet crimes as a critique of and warning to the Western republics.

    Some of his criticisms are too severe, or at least open to question. “World democracy could have defeated one totalitarian regime after another, the German, then the Soviet. Instead, it strengthened Soviet totalitarianism, consented to the birth of a third totalitarianism, that of China, and all this finally precipitated the present world situation.” While it might have been physically possible for American and allied armies to roll back the Red Army after defeating the Nazis (General Patton wanted to), it would have been hard for Allied statesmen to justify this, given the ongoing war with the Empire of Japan and the fact that the Soviet Union hadn’t attacked the Allied countries. The Allies had futilely attempted to crush Bolshevism in the aftermath of the First World War, and were reluctant to try again.

    Solzhenitsyn is on much firmer ground in excoriating the Allies willingness to return Soviet expatriates in territories controlled by the Allies, after the war. While it is true that some of these persons had fought with the fascists, most had not; all faced death or long-term imprisonment upon their return to the Soviet Union. [2] Solzhenitsyn was correct in predicting the murder of America’s allies in South Vietnam, now that the country had been ceded to the Communists.

    As for the policy of détente, initiated by the Nixon Administration and continued under President Gerald Ford, Solzhenitsyn rightly insists that true détente would require another revolution in Russia, with the installation of a liberal, if not necessarily republican, regime there. Contrary to many American politicians and pundits, the Soviets have not given up Marxist-Leninist ideology, nor has the Politburo split into rival factions of ‘Left’ and ‘Right.’ The regime still intends to destroy commercial republicanism, to do what it can to hasten that destruction. For the Soviets, détente is only a cloak for pursuing geopolitical advantages elsewhere, establishing ‘friendly’ regimes that will afford access to natural resources and to strategically-placed military bases.  “The Communist leaders respect only firmness and have contempt for persons who continually give in to them.”

    More profoundly, Solzhenitsyn criticizes the West for abandoning the moral language, the moral ideas, that would strengthen souls to resist Soviet encroachment. “In the twentieth century it is almost a joke in the Western world to use words like ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ They have become old-fashioned concepts, yet they are very real and genuine.” And the evil forces now father strength: “We must recognize that a concentration of evil and a tremendous force of hatred is spreading in the world.” Russians know this firsthand, and there “a liberation of the human spirit is occurring.” But will the West respond? The Westphalian principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries should no longer hold. “On our crowded planet there are no longer any ‘internal affairs.'” Russian dissidents need Western support. “The Communist leaders say, ‘Don’t interfere in our internal affairs. Let us strangle our citizens in peace and quiet.’ But I tell you: Interfere more and more. Interfere as much as you can. We beg you to come and interfere.”

    It isn’t as if Communists have not announced their intentions. But “Communism has been writing about itself in the most open way, in black and white, for 125 years, and even more openly, more openly, in the beginning,” with the Communist Manifesto. While it is “hard to believe that people could actually plan such things”—destruction of the family, merciless class warfare, forced confiscation of private property, the dictatorship of the proletariat ‘led’ by a party ‘vanguard’—”and carry them out,” they could and they have. Elsewhere, Marx and Engels wrote, “Democracy is more to be feared than monarchy and aristocracy,” that “political liberty is false liberty, worse than the most abject slavery,” and that terror would be “necessary” year after year after the Communist Party took power. As for Lenin, in his book The Lessons of the Paris Commune, he concluded that “the Commune had not shot, had not killed, enough of its enemies,” that “it was necessary to kill entire classes and groups,” which indeed he did, upon taking power in Russia. “Communism has never concealed the fact that it rejects all absolute concepts of morality,” Solzhenitsyn tells the American workers. It lauds and denounces thoughts and actions only insofar as they conform to, or deviate from, the Party’s judgment of what will advance the Party’s claim to rule and to expand its rule.

    Solzhenitsyn also remarks, tellingly, that the contemporary admiration for Mao Zedong, and for China as “a sort of purified, puritanical type of Communism, one which has not degenerated,” is equally absurd as the claim that the Soviet regime had become amenable to peaceful coexistence with the West. “China is simply a delayed phase of that so-called War Communism established by Lenin in Russia but which remained in force only until 1921.” When socialism sputtered, Lenin then shifted to the New Economic Policy, whereby he invited capitalists to invest in the country, under highly controlled conditions. China, in the mid-seventies, hadn’t felt the economic pinch of socialist economic incompetence—or, what is more likely, Mao didn’t care. After Mao’s death, the Chinese Communist Party did indeed go to their own equivalent of the NEP, which it has attempted to continue by the time of this writing.

    As for the Soviets, American invention of the atomic bomb turned their attention to the manipulation of ‘peace’ sentiments in the West. “But the goal, the ideology, remained the same: to destroy your system, to destroy the way of life known in the West” by indirect means, including terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and support for allies overt and covert. The goal “has never changed; only the methods have changed a little.” Solzhenitsyn told a British interviewer, “the most important aspect of détente today is that there is no ideological détente.” To Bertrand Russell’s infamous line, “Better Red than dead,” Solzhenitsyn replied, “Better to be dead than a scoundrel.”

    “The principal argument of the advocates of détente is well known: all of this must be done to avoid a nuclear war.” Solzhenitsyn rightly dismisses the prospect. “There will not be any nuclear war. What for? Why should there be a nuclear war if for the last thirty years they have been breaking off as much of the West as they wanted—piece by piece, country after country, and the process keeps going on.” While “the American heartland is healthy, strong, and broad in its outlook,” the men who run American foreign policy on the East Coast are none of those things, and neither is the milieu in which they live. Solzhenitsyn calls upon them to cut off economic support from the Soviet regime. They need America more than America needs them. As we now know, the economic squeeze placed on that regime by the Reagan Administration would indeed induce the collapse of the Soviet empire (along with an unanswerable military buildup; moreover, the only time nuclear was seriously discussed by the Politburo was when the Party ‘vanguard’ saw what Reagan was doing, and nearly panicked.

    Finally, the West has “become hopelessly enmeshed in our way of slavish worship of all that is pleasant, all that is material,” worshipping “things” and “products.” The effect of this materialism has been to weaken our souls. Whether in these essays, speeches, and interviews, or in his monumental histories, historical novels, and memoirs, Solzhenitsyn unfailingly attempted to strengthen the souls of his countrymen first of all, and of those who might more consistently oppose the enemies of his countrymen, the tyrants and oligarchs who arise wherever Marxist-Leninist ideology takes hold.

     

    Notes

    1. Borisov is incorrect. Like Christians, such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle clearly point to a nature shared in common by all individuals along with differentiations among individual souls. It is hard to suppose that the observer of Socrates could not tell that he had a ‘personality’ or individual character.
    2.  For a concise discussion of the repatriation controversy, see Mark Elliott: “The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 1944-47,” Political Science Quarterly, Volume 88, Number 2 (June 1973), 253-275. On the basis of primary source documents then available, Elliott accounts for the policy of forced repatriation on two main grounds: American and British negotiators were concerned about the return of their own citizens (Elliott calls this “the overriding motive behind the  West’s signing the repatriation agreement”); and “the climate of opinion prevailing in the West in 1944-45,” propagated by the overselling of the ties between the republics of the West and the Soviet tyranny and by “the nagging fear of a future German renaissance,” such as had occurred in the 1930s. “In reality the Grand Alliance of Britain, America, and Russia was a tenuous marriage of convenience united only by opposition to Hitler, the West heralded it as a harbinger of the millennium,” Elliott writes. Further, “the United States was more susceptible to this myth than Britain,” since “President Roosevelt helped create it.” This soon changed, as Americans reawakened, or in some cases awakened, to the malign character of the Soviet regime in the months following the war; by 1947 the United States refused “the use of force in repatriation under any circumstances and in all cases.” But by that time much of the damage had been done.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Can Democracy Work?

    July 30, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    James Miller: Can Democracy Work? A Short History of a Radical Idea, from Ancient Athens to Our World. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.

     

    From his early writings on Rousseau and on America’s ‘New Left’ of the 1960s to his brilliant study of Michel Foucault [1], James Miller’s scholarship has had two characteristic features. One is ‘methodological.’  He seeks to understand political thinkers by combining textual exegesis with biographical research, titling his first book (for example) Rousseau, Dreamer of Democracy, not Rousseau’s Political Philosophy. He never reduces the thinker to the work or the work to the thinker, but presents both in one coherent picture. In this, he resembles Diogenes Laertius, whose Lives of the Eminent Philosophers he has indeed brought out in a beautiful new edition, complete with extensive notes and illustrations. Second, in terms of the substance or guiding principle of his work, he displays a commitment to justice understood ‘democratically,’ as equality. This centers his thought on democracy—both as a regime (as it has been understood by most writers) and as a social condition existing in the confines of the modern state. Democracy has remained ‘his’ theme, throughout his life in thought.

    But can democracy work? And what exactly is it? Something called democracy has proven persistent, if only “as an article of faith or a figment of modern ideology.” Indeed, “virtually every existing political regime today claims to embody some form of democracy”—from Putin’s Russia to Kim’s North Korea to our United States of America, whose current chief executive rode to victory on a wave of sentiment often described as populist.

    Given this wild diversity of opinions and definitions, Miller proceeds with a sort of Socratic combination of caution and daring, gathering the several most influential definitions of democracy and bringing them into dialectical confrontation with one another. Not for him are the illusions of historical dialectic, which bring scholars to imagine a gradual worldwide evolution of humanity toward democracy. To think of democracy that way is to succumb to moral complacency and intellectual laziness, expecting ‘history’ to do the work for you.

    With Aristotle, Miller identifies the underlying principle of democracy as equality, which may or may not associate itself with liberty. This begs the question of what equality is, or what kind of equality ‘democrats’ want. The natural equality of all human beings to certain unalienable rights? The economic equality of a communal life animated by the principle, ‘From each according to his ability to each according to his need? The social equality of a community in which there is no ‘ruling class’? The political equality of one citizen, one vote on public policies? Some combination of these? Consistent with his question concerning the practicability of democracy, Miller answers these questions not by theorizing but by consulting the historical practices of those who have called themselves democrats. “Democracy before the French Revolution was generally held to be a fool’s paradise, or worse.” It was the Jacobins, borrowing their theories from Rousseau, who implemented the first modern democracy in the form of “direct democracy in local assemblies, now and then augmented through armed insurrections.” The movement then split into what would turn out to be the two characteristic, rival variations on the democratic theme: representative democracy, roughly modeled on examples in the American states; and democratic dictatorship—purportedly temporary—intended “to preserve the possibility of building a more enduring form of representative democracy once the revolution was complete and law and order were restored.”

    Tocqueville famously registered this schism in the democratic movement in arguing that democracy—which he defined not as a regime so much as a social condition of equality (by which he meant a society without a ruling class)—could have one of two regimes—republicanism or despotism. Tocqueville saw American democracy as a political regime only in the small setting of the New England town meeting, within a large modern state but never its ruling form. This divergence between society and state, civil-social ‘regime’ and political regime, is the source of Miller’s question, Can democracy work, “especially in complex modern societies?” Today, although what’s been called ‘liberalism’ finds many challengers in and outside the commercial republics, “democracy as furious dissent flourishes as rarely before, in vivid and vehement outbursts of anger at remote elites and shadowy enemies.” Just about everyone this side of the Iranian mullahs “now claim to represent the will of a sovereign people” as the morally legitimizing principle of their claim to political authority.

    Miller very sensibly distinguishes democracy from liberalism, observing that “democracy, when it first appeared in Greece, had nothing to do, either in theory or in practice, with any such modern conception as liberalism.” Athenian democracy killed Socrates—the sort of thing liberalism was formulated to prevent. In addition to decriminalizing philosophy, modern liberalism inclined to locate the final moral-political authority in natural law and natural right; a liberal wants a political regime that secures the natural right to liberty, among other natural rights. But modern democracy pointed instead either to “Rousseau’s concept of the general will,” which “has no necessary connection to liberalism,” or, earlier, to sixteenth-century Protestant notions of popular sovereignty, based squarely on doctrines of right religion, not on religious toleration. “A majority of voters in a modern representative democracy may very well support policies that are explicitly illiberal, as some Americans fear had happened after the election in 2016 of Donald J. Trump as the forty-fifth president of the United States—and, it might be added, as some Americans fear when university administrators quail before the demands of the Leftist agitators who call Trump and his supporters fascists, a rhetorical move not unknown to both the Old and the New Left.

    Given these broils, Miller remarks, “I probably feel more proud of the American accomplishment in this context than I did as a young man” because “I have lived long enough to appreciate the fragility of political institutions that are responsible to citizens, however limited that responsiveness may currently be.” Representative or republican government instead of direct democracy; organized political parties; “the polyglot expansion of our citizenry as a whole”: All these features of the American regime make the United States “the world’s most striking ongoing experiment in cosmopolitan self-government.” There is something to the claim of ‘American exceptionalism,’ yet. Miller will not cede that claim to the ‘Right.’

    He devotes his next three chapters to three case studies, as it were, in democratic politics: ancient Athens, modern France, and the United States. Ruling a small place about the size of Rhode Island with a resident population of about 300,000, of which ten percent were citizens sharing rule (the politeuma, as Aristotle would say), ancient Athenian democracy saw direct and active participation on rule. Adult male citizens held forty Assembly meetings annually and all political offices were held by those citizens, selected not by voting but by lot—the most democratic means of election. What is more, the regime lasted for about a century, with one important interruption by the Thirty Tyrants; not internal faction (admittedly serious) but foreign conquest by Macedonia put the ax to it, and even then the name if not the practice of democracy survived well into the Hellenistic period. Miller suggests that it wasn’t democracy itself that weakened Athens sufficiently to leave it vulnerable to the Macedonians but a narrowing of the criteria for citizenship, which stoked factionalism.

    What were the features of this regime? Its founder, Cleisthenes, opened membership in the Ekklesia or Assembly to all “free-born males over the age of twenty-one, with a native Athenian father, no matter how poor.” Cleisthenes also took advantage of the modest size of Athens. He centralized political authority, weakened the “few wealthy families who worshiped a divine ancestor and controlled the relevant priestly offices,” and designed a set of ten civic units he called tribes. He gave each tribe a new divine hero to worship and drew the members of each tribe from the several geographical regions of Attica. Infantry troops were also organized according to these newly formed tribes, and all freeborn Athenian men were required to serve before they could take their place in the Assembly. As a check on popular-majoritarian passions, Cleisthenes instituted the Council of 500, in which all tribes were equally represented, which prepared the Assembly’s agenda and audited all city officials, awarded contracts for public works, and supervised Athenian finances, military forces, welfare system, coinage, weights and measures, capital criminal cases (tried by citizen-jurors unencumbered by debt), and foreign policy. Yet it too was elected by lot, and so remained democratic. “By the time that Pericles emerged as the city’s undisputed leader [in the mid-fifth century BC], Athens had amassed the eastern Mediterranean’s most feared military machine, an armada of battleships backed up by a large infantry.”

    This was anything but a regime dedicated to the protection of individual liberty. Miller quotes the noted historian M. I. Finley: “Freedom meant the rule of law and participation in the decision-making process, not the possession of inalienable rights.” Such critics as Plato and Thucydides charged that democracy in Athens consisted of “a collective tyranny of the majority”—a majority, moreover, swayed by flattering demagogues and swaggering military chieftains who captured the imagination and fired the indignation of the citizenry. Although “the rise of democracy in Athens coincided with the birth of philosophy as a distinctive way of life,” that same democracy threatened philosophers with exile or death if they offended the politeuma. With its carefully managed civil religion and resultant homonomia or like-mindedness, ‘the many’ were entirely capable of moving against such an odd fellow as Socrates. The gods of the city were not to be mocked, and neither were the gods’ human devotees. “Aristotle’s famous assertion that man is a political animal certainly applied to the citizens of fourth-century Athens.”

    As a member of the Students for Democratic Society in the 1960s, Miller found in “this active and direct form of democracy” an inspiring alternative to American representative government, especially as then weighed down by bureaucracies military and civil. “A wish for a more perfect democracy was part of what first inspired my interest in both radical activism and political philosophy.” He continues to esteem the importance of citizen participation in government as a means of “forg[ing] a shared civic culture,” but he also now recognizes that such a culture in no way precludes stasis—conflicts yielding”faction, sedition, even civil war.” A politeuma consisting of ex-soldiers may result in “a certain fear of non-conformity” and in foreign war and imperial ambition. There’s a thing or two to be said in favor of James Madison and the republican regime he helped to design.

    Democracy as a political regime can survive and even thrive for a fairly long time in a small political community, a polis or ‘city-state.’ There, centralization of political authority need not lead to a substantial bureaucracy, an oligarchy claiming to rule on the basis of its status as a sort of aristocracy or ‘meritocracy.’ In the much larger modern state, centralization exerts pressure to bureaucratize authority, and thus to compromise democracy. And of course a truly democratic (as distinct from republican/representative) ‘national’ assembly becomes physically impossible in a large place; even today, a ‘virtual’ assembly, constructed on the Internet, might raise many reasonable suspicions, and in any case could hardly capture the personal, ‘face-to-face’ ethos of democracy in Athens, where even philosophers were known by name, for better or for worse. Here the French experience proves (as any child of the American ‘Sixties might say) relevant.

    In politics, spontaneity is a scarce commodity, and democratic politics are no exception. ‘Flash mobs’ don’t happen in a flash. Despite the claim of the marvelous Romantic Jules Michelet in his buoyant mid-nineteenth-century History of the French Revolution, the Paris insurrection of August 1792 was openly and indeed carefully prepared. A network of self-organized neighborhood assemblies, verbally whipped into action by militants invoking the very reasonable fear of an invasion by Prussian troops commanded by the Holy Roman Emperor, in collusion with Louis XVI himself. The newly-redesigned constitutional monarchy—really a republic with an elected Legislative Assembly “represent[ing] the people as a whole”—had been structured to limit democratic neighborhood assemblies to control of municipal affairs, only. Those assemblies fit Aristotle’s precise definition of democracy as rule by the many who are poor. To the radical democrats, the national regime was republican, all-too-republican, and therefore insufficiently democratic—especially given its monarchic executive. The Communards, as the municipal rulers were called, insisted that “Popular sovereignty was ‘an indefeasible right, an inalienable right, a right that cannot be delegated'” to king or even to representatives. “Out of this explosive melee of political passions and interests there appeared a critical mass of people fiercely devoted to forging a radically egalitarian new form of self-government,” for “the first time since ancient Athens.” No ‘mixed regime’ could satisfy the democrats of Paris; They took their bearings not from Aristotle or Cicero, not from Machiavelli or even the American Founders, but from Rousseau, who had “redefined sovereignty in terms of democracy” in the form of the “general will,” defined as only those “wants and interests that all individuals in a group happen to share.” According to Rousseau, the general will, if enacted, maximizes liberty and equality at the same time. Rousseau’s fellow-citizens in republican Geneva considered such a notion “destructive of society and of all government, and very dangerous for our Constitution.” The Parisian democrats, however, proclaimed them as rights of men (human beings as such) and citizens (members of this particular civil society). Calling themselves the Jacobins, after the Jacobin monastery where they met, the biggest of the democratic political clubs organized affiliates throughout the country. “The views of the club’s dominant members grew fiercer and its national appeal narrowed, even as its political power in Paris slowly expanded.” That proved sufficient to topple the regime because France, as a centralized modern state, could be revolutionized and ruled by anyone who controlled the capital city. That is, a modern state can be democratized, after a fashion, if democrats rule its central nervous system, although those same democrats might amount to a rather small minority of the national citizenry.

    The impassioned fears and ambitions in this face-to-face regime turned toward phantasmagoria. “The most radically democratic phase of the French Revolution began with a carnival of atrocities.” Indeed, “the threat of violence gave ordinary citizens an unfamiliar, and therefore intoxicating, power to challenge constituted authority”; it’s a mistake to assume that “the ardent desire of ordinary people for public freedom can be separated, in fact, from their willingness to use force in its pursuit.” Democracy not fails to offer any guarantees against fanaticism but may well gin it up. Although Robespierre wanted to rid France of the Legislative Assembly altogether, most Jacobins preferred to call a constitutional convention “tasked with creating a new, truly democratic constitution, to replace the mixed, but still monarchic, constitution of 1791.” Such a constitution of course “would have to square a circle, somehow reconciling the demands of the sectional assemblies for a direct expression of popular sovereignty with the needs of governing a large nation”—that is, a modern state—”that consisted of citizens holding diverse—and even divergent—views about what a good society should look like.” How could a large modern state, with a population consisting mostly of more or less pious Roman Catholic peasants, rule itself as if it were a giant Paris commune? The Convention’s drafting committee made a brave try.

    The proposed constitution eliminated the monarchy and established a unicameral legislature consisting of ‘instructed’ delegates—persons entitled only to vote for policies approved in advance by their constituents. Thus they could be said to embody the General Will, somewhat redefined by mathematics-mad drafting committee member Nicolas de Condorcet as what’s left over when you remove contradictory opinions from the sum of all opinions. Meanwhile, the decidedly contradictory head of Louis XVI was subtracted from his body in January 1793.

    The efforts of Condorcet and his colleagues went for nothing, as the radical democrats from Paris saw the proposed constitution as an attempt to bridle the power of the Paris communes. The Convention itself now became “the scene of a pitched power struggle between rival factions,” with “the constitution itself [as] a bone of contention.” Robespierre’s rhetoric eventually carried the day. Arguing from his central claim, that “the interest of the office holder” always remains private but “the interest of the people is the public good,” Robespierre sought to overcome the basic institutional dilemma, that a modern state is much bigger than an ancient polis, by declaiming his way out of it. “While it was obviously impossible for the people of France to assemble as a whole, as the people of Athens had assemble, Robespierre proposed, as an approximation to the ideal, that the republic build ‘a vast and majestic edifice, open to twelve thousand spectators,” who in this way would monitor meetings of the National Assembly.” No corruption, intrigue or perfidy would “dare show itself,” he claimed, and “the general will alone shall be consulted, the voice of reason and the public interests shall alone be heard.”

    All of this turned out not to matter, as the Jacobin constitution, though ratified, was “set aside indefinitely on October 10, 1793, when a ‘Revolutionary Government,’ endowed with extraordinary powers to repress ‘counterrevolutionaries,’ was declared, thus beginning the Reign of Terror. France had become “a kind of dictatorship.” The consequent bloodshed sobered even Citizen Robespierre, who came to see the virtue of representative government, albeit atop of a democratic electorate, a national government not dominated by Parisian activists. For his heresy he was executed. “The French Revolution had produced a new understanding of democracy—and a hecatomb on a grand scale.”

    By contrast, the Americans chose representative government from the start. Miller quotes Benjamin Rush: “All power is derived from the people,” but “they possess it only on the days of their elections. After this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can [the people] exercise or resume it, unless it is abused.” Government by consent of the governed in this sense “didn’t exist in the classical world” because it didn’t need to; the democratic poleis were not big enough to have a state-civil society dichotomy. As in those poleis, the rule of the many didn’t mean the rule of the majority; as in Athens, women and slaves could not vote. This notwithstanding, the American republic had established ruling institutions that induced ambitious men to reach out to “ordinary people to settle disputes among rival elite factions”—with the elites themselves, it might be added, hardly qualifying as elites at all in the eyes of the dynasts and aristocrats of Europe. To Europeans, all Americans were commoners.

    Out of such a motley crew, new oligarchs might arise, particularly in the financial sector of the American economy. In the next generation, Andrew Jackson took due advantage of such men, riling democratic sentiments against the Monster Bank and swamping his opponents at the polls. Greatly aided by his ally, the organizational genius Martin Van Buren, Jackson organized the first recognizably ‘modern’ political party in America and found his own way to bridge the state-civil society divide by appointing his key party organizers to positions in his administration. Tocqueville identified the ideational limit on this kind of popular sovereignty: the principles of the Declaration of Independence, which he heard recited at a Fourth of July celebration in Albany in 1831, entwined with a “Christianity that [as Tocqueville wrote] can best be described as democratic and republican.” “According to Tocqueville, democracy denoted not merely a form of government but, in addition, and more important still, a new kind of society, in which the principle of equality was pushed to its limits”—those limits being demarcated by the laws of nature and of nature’s God, in principle, but also by the aberrant phenomenon of slavery, in practice, as well as by property qualifications that disqualified the landless poor from voting. Dorr’s Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842 aimed at expanding the suffrage, but balked at any restriction of the Atlantic slave trade, and also at the possibility of extending the franchise to black men. The rebellion failed after its leader, Thomas Dorr, led a “botched assault” on the Rhode Island state armory. He triumphed post mortem; as decades passed, the franchise was indeed extended, not only in Rhode Island but throughout the country.

    As a noted historian of rock-and-roll, Miller doesn’t neglect the effects of democratic civil society on what we have come to call, democratically enough, ‘popular culture.’ Ralph Waldo Emerson “became the architect of a popular philosophy for the new nation by lecturing on the Lyceum circuit of organizations that sponsored public events meant to promote ‘the universal diffusion of knowledge’ to the general public.” The content of this ‘philosophy’ was the notion of self-reliance, which Miller rightly considers a forerunner of Nietzscheism. (Nietzsche himself sighed, “In Emerson, we lost a philosopher,” meaning that Emerson might have attained Nietzsche’s own intellectual heights had he only undergone a really rigorous education at a European university). Also rightly, Miller remarks that such “a quasi-religious sanction for the American cult of individualism” tended more to civil disobedience (as in Emerson’s friend, Thoreau) than to serious political construction or reconstruction. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s coruscantly popular novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, inspired ardent sentiments against slavery, but little in the way of suggestions as to what American might do to re-found the regimes of Southern states, were slavery to be abolished. In music, Stephen Foster became “the first popular musician to achieve global fame, through the international sale of sheet music”—it was a commercial as well as a democratic republic, after all—and the minstrel shows for which he wrote eventually produced the musical foundation “for almost all subsequent forms of African American musical entertainment, from ragtime to blues to jazz.” Miller points out that the earliest minstrel shows consisted of white performers in blackface, acting out an American form of bohemianism last exemplified by Al Jolson; at the same time, black entertainers did their own minstrel shows, transforming the music from sweet, nostalgic Foster tunes to the harder-edged ‘urban’ sounds and lyrics of the twentieth century. One might conclude that democracy meets with its greatest success on the civil-social level of the modern state—that is, on the most democratic level of that state.

    Oddly, Miller misses the point of Tocqueville’s famous critique of democracy gone wrong in the second volume of Democracy in America. Tocqueville’s dystopian vision of a no-longer-civil society consisting of “an innumerable multitude of men, alike and equal, circling around in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls” in “orderly, gentle, peaceful slavery,” does not indicate that he regarded American culture as likely to “prove more significant than its political institutions for determining the future of democracy in America.” Tocqueville rather fears that a democratic society might readily come to accept a bureaucratic elite which keeps it safe and stupefied at the cost of popular withdrawal from the sterner tasks of self-government. This would be one way in which a democracy (that is, an egalitarian civil society) might succumb not only to a Napoleonic or czarist despotism but to oligarchy, even as it might also succumb to an oligarchy founded on industrial capitalism. That is, Tocqueville foresaw both the bugbear of twentieth-century Left and the bugbear of the twentieth-century Right in America. Very often, each faction ignores the oligarchy that’s on its side, but Tocqueville worked under no such partisan illusions.

    Miller next discusses four democratizing movements in Europe during the century following the American and French revolutions: Chartism, Marxist socialism, Mazzini’s republicanism, and the Paris Commune. In England, the Chartists sought to accelerate the widening of the franchise initiated by the Reform Act of 1832. Hoping for improved wages and working conditions, urban factory workers organized the General Convention of the Industrious Classes at the end of the decade, aiming not only at the enfranchisement of all male adults but at a secret ballot (to prevent employers from intimidating voters) and at coupling elimination of property qualifications for those who served in Parliament  with salaries for MPs, which would allow citizens of low income to take seats there. Perhaps unfortunately, Chartists “treat[ed] the Jacobin constitution of 1793 as sacred scripture” and “idolized Robespierre”; this could only make their fellow-Brits a bit nervous. Sure enough, the Chartists split over the question of using physical force to advance their cause, “promis[ing] a restoration of harmonious social relations” while “simultaneously rais[ing] the prospect of a civil war.”

    By the 1840s, London provided a home for radicals exiled from several continental countries. Among these, Karl Marx would have the most lasting effect on European and indeed world politics. Miller provides an excellent, succinct summary of Marx’s theory, observing that he took Hegel’s historicist doctrine of dialectical struggle among persons, ideas, and nations and pared it down to a materialist dialectic centered on struggle between socioeconomic classes. Far from peaceful, this struggle had been and would continue to be violent: “Marx represented the laboring class as a historical agent seething with violence,” spoiling for battle against the bourgeoisie and its capitalist system. A final “collective act” of what Marx himself called “overthrow and dissolution” would wipe out the bourgeois state and clear the way, first for a socialist state and then (in Lenin’s famous phrase), the withering away of that state, as well, leaving only peaceful, egalitarian, and communal civil societies, worldwide.

    This is indeed a democratic telos, but, as Miller tellingly observes, “Fraternity was hard to sustain among the revolutionary sects vying for preeminence in the late 1840s” and, as he knows, would continue to be hard to establish, much less sustain, at any subsequent time or in any other place. Marxian socialism has never quite worked its way out of the ‘dialectical’ phase of ‘History.’ The Communist Manifesto “predicted an end to all social divisions but clinched the argument with a barrage of insults aimed at rival groups,” a habit that has persisted ever since. Part of the problem may be the underlying notion of historical progress itself. If ‘History’ proceeds dialectically toward the telos, communism, then claims to rule made by men and women before the ‘end time’ will derive from their self-asserted position on the ‘cutting edge’ of that historical progress. ‘Top-down’ elitism may disappear, at least in theory, only to be replaced by a ‘horizontal’ elitism; ‘statesmanship’ may go away, swapped out for ‘leadership.’ And of course the would-be leaders will fight among themselves. Marx and his followers assumed that all this would sort itself out in the end, but that’s all they had: a wishful thought wrapped in a rhetoric of scientism.

    A Christian democrat from Genoa, Giuseppe Mazzini presents a more appealing face for egalitarianism than Marx ever did. Animated by “a redemptive new social gospel,” in 1831 he founded “Young Italy,” a secret society dedicated to the founding of a unified, democratic nation-state. He returned to Italy from his London exile in the annus-not-quite-mirabilis 1848, exhilarated by the newly-formed, but also short-lived, Roman republic. It soon became “clear that most people didn’t yearn for democracy, as Mazzini did, as a sacred end in itself,” and that, even more disappointingly, Italian democracy found no favor with God, at least in terms of some such earthly reward as longevity. Providence as interpreted by Mazzini proved no more reliable than History as interpreted by Marx. (It might be recalled that the God of the Bible acts on His own timetable, not ours.) “Mazzini, in defeat more famous than ever, returned to London,” where he exchanged rhetorical barbs with the Marxists over questions of idealism versus realism, Christianity versus atheism, nationalism versus internationalism, the modern state versus communism.

    The Paris Commune of 1871 renewed democratic hopes once more, and ended in similar disappointment. Once again, the city’s democrats manned the barricades, attempting “simultaneously to form a new municipal government, draft new policies to regulate the economy and society, and raise an armed force able to wage and win a civil war with a hostile but duly elected provisional government,” which had taken hold after Emperor Napoleon III had proven himself less-than-imperial in his war with Prussia. The Commune ended quickly and violently, but not without winning the accolades of Marx, who saw in it a “working class government,” the “political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor”—a brief glimpse, if a failed experiment, in the egalitarian communalism the iron laws of History were sure to deliver, someday. Rosa Luxemburg put the very best face on things when she asked, rhetorically, “Where would we be today without those ‘defeats,’ from which we draw historical experience, understanding, power and idealism?” ‘Another day older and deeper in debt,’ a less enthusiastic observer might reply, but Marxian socialists soldiered on, millennial hopes undimmed. Miller astringently remarks, “Such a veneration was jarringly at odds with the realism and other tough-minded radical democrats championed in other contexts,” and indeed, such “quixotic myth-mongering also encouraged zealots to use self-defeating tactics in quest of unworkable goals, and this would become a defining feature of many modern experiments in radical democracy.”

    What such uprisings did accomplish was to strike a sort of salutary fear into monarchist and aristocratic elements, who began to cooperate with middle-class reformers to extend the franchise to workers (if not yet to women) and to tolerate “a new kind of political pluralism in Europe”—an ideological version of the religious pluralism liberalism had established. Europeans began to imitate none other than Andrew Jackson, at least respecting his interest in establishing popularly based political parties, competing more or less peacefully for votes registering the consent of the governed. This modus vivendi remained uneasy, however, with Marxists themselves splitting into the parliament-oriented Social Democrats and the harsher elements who insisted on retaining the option of bullets as well as ballots. In Russia, the latter form of soi-disant democracy prevailed, with consequences that would remain bloody long after the revolution itself was over.

    Such discouraging results may have led the sociologist Robert Michels to formulate what he called “the iron law of oligarchy,” holding that “a tiny minority of business and political leaders wield power regardless of a state’s ostensibly democratic political practices.” What Tocqueville saw at its beginning Michels and his contemporary Max Weber saw in its better-elaborated form, some seventy years later. The two scholars disagreed only on Michels’s residual Rousseauian longings, which Weber dismissed as utopian. Democracy remained for Michels “not a fiction but an inviolable matter of faith, precisely in Martin Luther’s sense (‘Here I stand, I can do no other.’)” Weber conceded to democracy only the possibility of a kind of benign demagoguery, which might “harness productively the otherwise dangerous passions of unruly and uninformed citizens” while the oligarchs ruled quietly behind their backs.

    Michels enjoyed no such luck. He lived long enough to see the rise of Mussolini, whom he mistook as the charismatic ‘leader’ Weber had described. He hoped (again remaining more utopian than his friend) that “a charismatic leader like Il Duce could help counteract the bureaucratic inertia of normal politics.” And moreover, Michels imagined, Mussolini could overcome that inertia in a democratic direction, as averred by the ‘philosopher of Fascism’ Giovanni Gentile, who proclaimed the Fascist State “a people’s state, and, as such, the democratic state par excellence,” a state in which the relation between state and citizen becomes “so intimate that the State exists only as, and in so far as, the citizen causes it to exist.” Under Gentile’s spell, one expects a modern state to mimic an ancient polis—somehow. To his credit, Michels remained a bit more sober, concluding that democracy and oligarchy will struggle to the end of time, and that ‘History’ goes nowhere, except in circles.

    A similar dynamic may be seen in the major ‘Left’ alternatives to fascism: progressivism and communism. Woodrow Wilson advanced the ‘leadership principle,’ making him seem to Miller closer to John Adams’s “natural aristocracy” than to Jackson’s “plebeian democracy.” However, it should be noted, Wilson’s aristoi think not in terms of natural virtues and talents but in terms of historical consciousness. This enabled Wilson to make his leadership principle consistent with his early work on the administrative state; no feature of progressivist historicism seeks to fulfill human nature so much as to master it, to conquer nature in the name of freedom. To Wilson, democracy inheres in a people made progressively more equal among themselves, not a people untutored by leaders and administrators. It is, as Miller observes reminiscent of Weber’s Führerdemokratie.

    Lenin took historicist Führerdemokratie in a more violent and tyrannical direction, undertaking to “smash” (as he put it) not only the bureaucratic-military machine of Czarism but also the bourgeois class, worldwide. ‘The few,’ strictly subordinate to ‘the one,’ both intending to level the social and economic conditions of ‘the many,’ formed a party that seized control of the existing state, transforming it after its own image under the slogan of “democratic centralism.” Where Wilson relied upon administrators, Lenin relied upon party militants. It might be added that Wilson also depended upon elections, assumed generally to register the ever-advancing leadership of ‘progressives,’ whereas Lenin felt no need for such things.

    Miller accordingly examines Walter Lippmann’s work on public opinion with some care, inasmuch as the progressive Lippmann came to doubt “the capacity not just of ordinary citizens but also of their elected leaders to meet the challenges of governing a complex society.” As a journalist, Lippmann knew already what men like Donald Trump thunder about: the citizenry have come to need news media to provide information about such a society, to organize the information, to highlight what’s important, what deserves citizens’ attention. Yet the minds of journalists think as wishfully and fearfully as everyone else’s minds do. ‘Fake news’ may be deliberately crafted, but it also can be the result of ordinary moral failings leading to intellectual failings, to failings of both perception and of judgment. To this, the people add their own passions, stereotypes, and misconceptions. Whereas “a simple, self-contained community”—a polis—might be understandable to its citizenry, more often than not, a modern state is too big and complicated for such comprehension, especially given its situation among many other modern states, equally complex and working at cross-purposes. Lippmann concluded that the common interests of democratic citizens must be, as he put it “managed” by a “specialized class” consisting of well-trained administrators and wise-man commentators such as himself. A few decades later, the Washington Post journalist and ‘insider’ Douglas Cater would publish a book describing elite journalists as “the fourth branch of government.” [2]

    In this sense, today “democracy as a form of government in most actually existing regimes is more or less a sham”—a fake regime in which fake news has taken its rightful place, so to speak. Yet paradoxically, in the twenty-first century “very few regimes, unlike most of those that existed in the early eighteenth century”—that is, before the American and French revolutions—”can rule over a subject population with impunity.” Rulers still need to account for the passions of voters, and indeed for the passions of non-voters in the more oppressive regimes. The many may not rule, but they set limits on the rule of the few.

    Miller concludes with a discussion of democratic prospects. Citing the later works of Samuel P. Huntington– particularly his The Clash of Civilizations (1996) and Who Are We? (2004)—he appreciates the sobriety of a thinker who puts the basic issue of social and political order—”Does anyone govern?”—prior to the question of the regime itself. “For the many peoples around the world in the last century who have had to endure massacres and famines in failed states, these are not academic questions”; while it is true that the worst tyrannical regimes have massacred and starved millions (causing even more deaths than wars, themselves often initiated by such regimes), even despots and imperialists sometimes prevent inter-communal slaughter.

    Miller also acknowledges Huntington’s recommendation to accept the diversity in a multicivilizational world: “A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empire is impossible.” Expectations of inevitable historical progress towards ‘one world’ have been greatly exaggerated, although they’ve not necessarily abated, however, as both Chinese and Islamist ambitieux will tell you.

    If so, Americans will continue to need to define themselves clearly. Huntington posits “four main components of American identity”: race, and specifically white supremacy (“the first and most important”); ethnicity (Anglo-Saxons as distinguished from other ‘whites’); religiosity, particularly Protestantism; and “ideology” (the “American Creed” expressed in the Declaration of Independence). There are some serious problems with this formulation. By putting race, ethnicity, and religiosity before the “Creed,” Huntington centers his analysis on conflict. But given the endurance of the American political union for nearly 250 years, this makes little sense. Something must be holding the country together; if Huntington means to say that our social bonds have consisted of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant domination, one must be at a loss to explain the Declaration of Independence itself, the United States Constitution, and the Union victory in the Civil War. The conflicts in all of those instances involved white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants struggling with other white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants over the questions concerning not only the regime, not only the conditions of civil peace, but the definition of what it means to be human, and not only over what it means to be ‘white,’ Anglo-American, or Christian. Huntington’s formula additionally fails to register a principal (and principled) conflict of the past century or so: the challenge American Progressives mounted to the moral foundation of the ‘old’ republic. To locate right in ‘History’ is to break radically with a regime that had located right in the laws of nature and of nature’s God. If right is said to change in the course of time, then no right can be unalienable. Rulers are no longer adjured to secure rights but to invent them. Government powers no longer need to be limited by and enumerated in a written constitution; they need to be expanded, elaborated, on no foundation in nature but on a purportedly progressive economic, social, and political evolution defined by the ‘leaders’ and administrators who run the new and far more ‘statist’ regime. Miller’s sensible question—”Why should Americans assume that their version of democratic idealism would prove any more resilient” than the regime of the late and unlamented Soviet Union “if put to the test by white nativism?”—becomes harder to answer if one defines America in Huntington’s ‘cultural’ terms, or the Progressives’ historicist ones.

    Looking back on his own instructive political experience, Miller sees in the recent “Occupy Wall Street” movement an echo of “my own experiments in radical democracy,” which also “quickly fell apart.” Both efforts collided with two problems: “the incompatibility of rule by consensus with accountable, responsible, government in a large organization” and with factions within small groups of person “with divergent interests and a limited patience for endless meetings.” Max Weber, meet Oscar Wilde. At the same time, Miller insists that “the search for a democracy of individual participation” lastingly changes one’s “sense of what politics can mean.” Yes: recovering some sense of the experience of the ancient polis—however attenuated that experience will be, given ‘modern’ (and indeed supposedly ‘postmodern’) assumptions and habits—cannot but give a thoughtful participant in such a recovery a more lucid perspective on political life itself.

    Miller thus looks with strengthened appreciation at the achievement of the American Founders, who combined democracy understood as popular sovereignty with the regime of republicanism and a federal state. This may be the best practical answer to those who wonder how some vestiges of small-scale local self-government can survive in the modern world of large, centralized states—states designed to crush small city-states and loosely-organized feudal states. Among his contemporaries, he admires Václav Havel, who carried many of these institutional structures into his Czechoslovakia, newly liberated from oligarchy and empire. To appreciate the achievement of the Americans and the Czechs can initiate consideration of the moral foundations of their regimes, neither of which make sense as ‘ideologies’ animated by the valorization of historical change for the sake of some imagined paradise-on-earth.

     

    Notes

    1. James Miller: The Passion of Michel Foucault. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
    2. Douglass Cater: The Fourth Branch of Government. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959.

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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