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    The Presence of the Old ‘New Left’

    June 29, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Angela Y. Davis: The Meaning of Freedom: And Other Difficult Dialogues. San Francisco: City Light Books, 2012. (Hereinafter designated as MF.)

    Angela Y. Davis: Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016. (Hereinafter designated as FICS.)

    Angela Y. Davis, Gina Dent, Erica R. Meiners, and Beth E. Richie: Abolition. Feminism. Now. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2022. (Hereinafter designated as AFN.)

     

    Angela Davis became one of the most prominent participants in the New Left movement of the 1960s, a status for which she was well-prepared. The daughter of Communist Party members, she studied with Herbert Marcuse at Brandeis University and later at the University of California, San Diego. Marcuse arranged for her to study with another celebrated Frankfurt School neo-Marxist, Theodor Adorno, who had returned to Germany from the United States after the Second World War. 

    The ‘neo’ in neo-Marxism derives from its expansion of the field of Marxist dialectic. Marx held that the course of human events proceeds ‘dialectically’—specifically, through the ‘contradiction’ or struggle between a socio-economic ruling class and a rival class which challenges its rule. Social and political phenomena other than class—contradictions between or among ideas, countries, races, and the sexes are driven by the class struggle, which unfolds according to the Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis logic according to rationally (and indeed scientifically) ascertainable laws toward a predictable conclusion: worldwide communism, which issues from a previously triumphant worldwide socialist state. There had been socialists before; Marx’s proudest claim was that he was the first genuinely scientific socialist, no mere sentimental dreamer. 

    A couple of decades into the twentieth century, however, some Marxists began to have doubts. True, the Russian Communist Party had founded a socialist ‘dictatorship of the proletariat,’ but the expected revolution had stalled. The Great War hadn’t sparked the expected revolution in Europe. And in the more thoroughgoingly capitalist major European countries—Great Britain, France, and above all Germany—there were communists, to be sure, but no revolution. The Great Depression seemed to portend the predicted collapse, but despite Stalin’s maneuvers, capitalism rebounded triumphantly in the years following the Second World War, limited not by economic weakness but by the political control of Eastern and Central Europe and China by communist parties. 

    It had become harder to argue that economic struggle understood as ‘dialectical materialism’ adequately explained, let alone predicted, ‘history’ or the course of events. Some of the supposedly derivative ‘cultural’ factors looked as if they had the status of independent or perhaps interdependent variables. How ‘scientific’ Marxism really be? How materialistic should it be? The neo-Marxists began to take ‘culture’ more seriously; Marcuse, for example, added Freudian psychoanalysis to the toolkit. The socialism and the yearning for communism remained, as did the dialectic. The ‘harder’ dimensions of Marxist thought were supplemented. 

    As Davis writes in the 1990s, when socialism again had stalled after the collapse of the Soviet empire, “the crisis has been produced in part by our failure to develop a meaningful and collective historical consciousness”; “transformed circumstances require new theories and practices” (MF 19). To be sure, the new theories and practices must not issue from any one thinker or practitioner. That would only reinforce the grip of capitalism, even if intended to oppose it. “Social meanings are always socially constructed, but we cannot leave it up to the state to produce these meanings, because we are always encouraged to conceptualize change only as it effects individuals,” a tendency “not unrelated to the possessive individualism of capitalism” (MF 132). She might have added that the one undeniably great literary figure ‘produced’ by the centralized state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn—a decidedly great individual, and one decidedly unsympathetic to the state socialism which had ‘produced’ the Gulag Archipelago. She needs a socialism that does not depend upon any state, a socialism that does not need the dialectical clash between the ‘capitalist’ states and the (now failed) ‘socialist’ ones to emerge triumphant, a socialism that emerges from the civil societies framed by modern states and may not go through a ‘statist’ phase at all to reach fruition. Indeed, it may never reach fruition at all, instead resisting long-lasting institutional structures, remaining in a condition of joyful Heraclitean flow—the notion of ‘permanent revolution’ advocated (although she doesn’t mention it) Leon Trotsky, not Lenin, Stalin, or Mao.

    Davis retains Marxist historicism. When Hillary Clinton ran in the Democratic Party primary against Barack Obama in 2008, she reacted to the slogan “Black Lives Matter” by insisting that “all lives matter.” Davis pounces: “Does she not realize the extent to which such universal proclamations have always bolstered racism?” (FICS 87). For example, to say with the American Founders that “all men are created equal” has in practice meant that women, “people of color,” and other groups were regarded as less than fully human. This exemplifies “the tyranny of the universal,” whereby apparently abstract moral claims have “been colored white and gendered male.” Not universal nature but concrete history is the better source of moral and political guidance. As a young student reading Frederick Douglass’s autobiography, “I had not yet learned how to recognize the extent yet which the equivalence of ‘freedom’ and ‘manhood’ meant that women were excluded by definition from enjoying the full benefits of freedom.” Thankfully, “my training in German philosophy” eventually gave her “the conceptual tools that allowed me to analyze the complex trajectories from bondage to freedom (using, for example, Hegel’s approach to the relationship between master and slave in the Phenomenology of Mind)” (MF 194) undermined her esteem for Douglass’s natural-rights convictions, although it took the experience of incarceration and her study of the role of American slave women in their communities which brought a new ‘consciousness’ of the ineluctable historicity of human life. 

    Hence “we” (i.e., Davis and her fellow neo-Marxists) “are interested not in race and gender (and class and sexuality and disability) per se, by themselves, but primarily as they have been acknowledged as conditions for hierarchies of power, so that we can transform them into intertwined vectors of struggle for freedom” (MF 197). Power: The Nietzschean, more than the original Marxist socioeconomic framework, frames neo-Marxist analysis, but of course neo-Marxists seldom openly profess their indebtedness to Nietzsche’s thought, with its hope for a ‘planetary aristocracy.’ It is a quasi-Nietzschean analysis with Marxist characteristics, at the service of a radical egalitarianism. Because “social realities always exceed the categories that attempt to contain them,” “we keep changing our vocabularies” (MF 198). This means that the Marxist claim that ‘history’ marches toward a predetermined ‘end’ disappears; neither state socialism nor the state capitalism that defeated it in the late 1990s is the ‘end of history.’ Francis Fukuyama is as mistaken as Marx. She prefers W. E. B. DuBois in his later, Communist Party, days, whose “theory of history” “relied neither on teleology—the idea that human history would inevitably lead toward social improvement—nor [Heaven forfend!] theology,” divine providence (AFN 56).  Davis remains a steadfast Communist Party operative in at least one way: “Despite its failure to build lasting democratic structures, socialism nevertheless demonstrated its superiority over capitalism on several accounts: the ability to provide free education, low-cost housing, jobs, free childcare, free health care, etc.” (MF 33). That this is nonsense, a reprise of Soviet propaganda, does not faze her.

    This air of unreality is in a way principled. Having rejected the historicist rationalism of Hegel and the historicist scientistic materialism of Marx, Davis needs some other intellectual guidepost for her own non-teleological historicism. She finds it in imagination. “A necessary step to winning greater freedom and greater justice is to image the world as we want it to be,” to “imagine a world without war,” without prisons and police, and without social, economic, and political hierarchies of any kind (MF 132-133). In this, she is very much a child of the Sixties, replacing Lenin with Lennon, scientific socialism with Beatlemania socialism. We must “transcend the limits of nationalist patriotism in order to imagine ourselves as citizens of the globe,” a globe apparently to be devoid of national states or even a world state (MF 149).

    This leads to some fascinating historical imaginings. We should “use our imaginations to try to come up with versions of democracy in which, for example, the practice of Islam does not serve as a pretext for incarceration in an immigration detention facility or in a military prison” (MF 149). Since the practice of Islam isn’t the reason for such incarceration—suspicion of links to Islamic terrorist organizations is—it doesn’t take much imagination to conceive of due process of law, which has proved rather more difficult to obtain under socialist regimes than under democratic-capitalist ones. Imagination can also lead one to fanciful conclusions in historical research, as when the Marxist historian Orlando Patterson, cited approvingly by Davis, claims that “the very concept of freedom must have been first imagined by slaves” (FICS 67). 

    Whereas Marx and his followers scorned utopian socialism, the valorization of imagination enables Davis to exult in it. “We ardently embrace” the “utopian dimension” of the movement to abolish prisons, for example (AFN 15). But this dreaming is doable. “Far from utopian, this world is ready at hand, already underway” in the practice of neo-Marxian socialists, who continue to develop, dialectically, “political methods and practices” fitted “for these times” (AFN 1-2). These new and ever-renewing practices recognize, uncover, and forge “interconnections of race, class, gender, sexuality” against “racism, sexism, and imperialism” (FICS 18). There have been “those of us who by virtue of our experience, not so much by virtue of academic analyses, recognized that we had to figure out a way to bring these issues together” (FICS 19). Since there is “no finish line, no firm resolute end” to these interconnections and these struggles against power hierarchies, “we are our road map” (AFN 166). Admittedly, “the dominant power structures will attempt—often successfully—to absorb our labor and demands” with tactics of co-optation, “yet we still forge new language and practices, and we work, anyway,” inviting others to “write and to organize,” as “freedom is a constant struggle” (AFN 172-173). The eschaton of the ‘Left’ historicism is at once imagined and fully immanent. 

    This gives Davis plenty of room to say more or less anything she wants. She may well like it that way. Although she associated herself with the New Left, she maintained her ties with the Old Left, running as the vice-presidential candidate of CPUSA on two occasions and happily receiving the Lenin Peace Prize from the Soviet Union in 19XX. As Soviet propagandists would say, that was no accident. And she remains unapologetic. “During the McCarthy era, communism was established as the enemy of the nation and came to be represented as the enemy of the ‘free world'” (MF 41). One must pause to admire the tactical use of the passive voice and of scare quotes in that sentence. But to continue: “Because of the moral panic that proclaimed communists to be enemies of the state, countless numbers of institutions were purged of communists, their allies, and people who simply believed in democracy” (MF 75). The fact that the genocidal tyrant Josef Stalin remained at the head of the Soviet Union during the “McCarthy era” remains absent from the Davis radar screen, decades after even the few remaining Old Leftists have admitted his crimes. 

    Later, during the civil rights movement, “many of us thought we were changing the world,” “joining the revolutionary impulse that was happening around the world” in Cuba and in “the liberation movements in Africa and Latin America” (MF 131). That is, by “revolutionary impulse” Davis means Castroite tyranny and the tyrannies desired by other Soviet-backed “liberation movements.” 

    Later, “the U.S. war in Vietnam lasted as long as it did because it was fueled by a public fear of communism,” a fear stoked by “the government and the media,” entities that “led the public to believe that that the Vietnamese were their enemy,” that “defeat of the racialized communist enemy in Vietnam would ameliorate U.S. people’s lives and make them feel better about themselves” (MF 42). Communism, you see, was really the friend of the American people; to think otherwise was to become a dupe of capitalist propaganda. (“Karl Marx revealed the manipulations underlying the equation of capitalism and democracy in chapter 6 of Volume I of Capital“) (MF 102). When South Vietnamese people took to seas to escape the Communist takeover, Davis must have been distracted by some more pressing issue. 

    This means that interpreting Davis’s writings requires a dual task. One must attend to the arguments she actually makes and respond to them in the terms she makes them—a duty owed to any writer. One must also keep in mind the distinct possibility that this is only her latest ‘line,’ a rhetorical adaptation to current circumstances.

    One of those circumstances is “the rise of global capitalism and related ideologies associated with neoliberalism” (FICS 1). In Marx’s time, and even in Davis’s earlier career, most capitalist corporations did the bulk of their business within the borders of their home country; even the major corporations were limited in their scope to ‘the capitalist world,’ largely excluded from ‘the socialist world.’ Now, the operations of those corporations are much more thoroughly worldwide in scope. At the same time, the corporations continue to promote “capitalist individualism”—holding up an Elon Musk, a Steve Jobs, for public honor, as an estimable human ‘type,’ a model of what a person should be. This also permits capitalists to perpetuate its system of law enforcement and punishment of those ‘criminalized’ by it. For example, campaigns “to convict individual police of white supremacist, misogynist, and transphobic ‘bad act’ have not resulted in contracting the power of policing or rendering it less repressive” (AFN 153). Only a mindset free of individualism will bring the downfall of capitalism and its ideology.

    “This insidious promotion of capitalist individualism” presents “dangers” to the human race. Because “U.S. corporations have economically undermined local economies through ‘free trade’ agreements, structural adjustment, and the influence of such international financial institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,” tens of thousands of displaced persons leave their homelands, “often travel[ing] along the same routes that have been carved out by migrating corporations,” “simply retrac[ing]” those routes “in reverse,” only to be faced with criminal charges when they attempt to enter the United States (MF 47, 64). “It is the homelessness of global capital that is responsible for so many of the problems people are experiencing throughout the world,” as the corporations “evade prohibitions against cruel, dehumanizing, and exploitative labor practices”—a “freedom to do virtually anything in the name of maximizing profits” (MF 64). [1] That is, what parades as individualism lurks as corporatism.

    It also parades as democracy. “Our system of capitalism eschews economic democracy even as it proclaims itself to be the vanguard of democracy around the world” (MF 102). By economic democracy Davis means the provision of ‘free’ education and health care, “services we all should be able to claim by virtue of our humanity” (MF 102). To be sure, publicly funded education already exists in the United States and Europe, but “a juggernaut of privatization of public services” in the Southern Hemisphere threatens them there, and even in the United States rumblings about privatizing Social Security may be heard. “As crucial as voting rights may be”—that “may” in tantalizing—we “have long recognized that the right to vote by itself does not guarantee democracy,” “since elections can be subordinated to the power of money” (MF 90). Such are the ways of “bourgeois democracy” (AFN 46).

    All this was understood by W. E. B. DuBois (again, in his later, Marxist phase), as seen in his 1935 book, Black Reconstruction in America. As Davis summarizes his argument, when the postwar Reconstruction of the political regime of the former slave states was terminated in 1877, “the crushing force of the property-holding elites” quickly prevailed in the American South in the form of laws enforcing racial segregation in a way that subordinated the ex-slaves. (AFN 54). DuBois saw that “capitalism cannot be understood outside of a relationship of power and race” (AFN 55). True revolutionaries must understand that “it is inevitable that mainstream political responses to [social-justice] movements will attempt to reject radical understandings of social problems such as he the prison crisis and the gender violence pandemic” (AFN164). The existing regime of worldwide capitalist oligarchy must be replaced, not reformed.

    Appeals to nationalism will fuel the capitalists’ resistance, although they themselves have not a patriotic bone in their bodies. According to Davis, the Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’ was racist, having nothing to do with Muslim fanaticism (MF 75-76). Oh, “how quickly so many people who considered themselves to be progressive and radical took refuge in this idea that we as Americans had to consolidate ourselves as a militarized nation, which inevitably meant excluding all of those who were not Americans” (MF 112)—although in fact immigration continued under tighter restrictions.  But don’t interfere when Davis is on a roll: We should have “reflect[ed] on community formations that extend beyond the borders of the nation” (MF (73), “imagining ourselves as citizens of the planet” (MF 98). If one were to answer that American policymakers did in fact do as Davis recommends, “reach out and create community with people in other regions of the world” against the terrorists (MF 73), well, that was the wrong kind of networking, networking among capitalist regimes. Against “the circuits of capital” we need “other kinds of globalities,” globalities “disentangled from the agendas of global capitalism” (MF 98). Such “new social relations are possible,” linking “human beings around the planet not by the commodities some produce and others consume, but rather by equality and solidarity and cooperation and respect,” relations defined by “a radical multiculturalism” (MF 102). Why are they possible? She does not say. It is a matter of the imagination, again.

    Racism is the enemy of radical-socialist multiculturalism. While legal racial segregation no longer exists in the United States, “deep structural and institutional” racism remains (MF 129). Her main evidence of this is the differences among incarceration rates among the black, Hispanic, and white populations. According to a 1991 study, 5.1% of all U.S. citizens would be imprisoned at some point in their lives, if current rates of incarceration held—9% of all men, 1.1% of all women. (Davis doesn’t hold this up as evidence of bias against men, for some reason.) Of the men 16.2% were black, 9.4% were Hispanic, 2.5% were white. One problem with using statistics this way is that things may change; they did. And not the way Davis wanted her readers to believe. “If trends continue,” she wrote, “50 percent of young black men could be behind bars in ten years’ time,” and “in another twenty-five years it might be as much as 75%” (MF 29). She is counting on readers not knowing that simply extending a line on a statistical chart often does not result in an accurate prediction of future events. It didn’t.  Between 2006 and 2020, incarceration rates fell in all racial categories, 34% among blacks, 26% among Hispanics, 17% among whites. Blacks still go to prison more often than Hispanics or whites, but that may be a measure of crime, not of racism. The same 1991 study also anticipated that five out of six Americans would be victims of violent crime at some point in their lives, so the desire of the general population to lock violent criminals away may well register an interest in self-defense rather than prejudice. Don’t think that way; not when Davis stands by to assert, “Prisons are racism incarnate” (FICS 107). 

    No such thoughts enter Davis’s mind. According to her, resistance to crime has “already become so implicitly racialized that it is no longer necessary to use racial markers” when talking in favor of it (MF 27). President Bill Clinton, for example, “is lauded as the quintessential warrior against crime, with his shrewdly racist policies divested of all explicit racial content,” policies concealed by “a rhetoric that focuses on victims of crime” (MF 24). Clinton used the murder of a “white girlchild” by a white man as his example of the kind of violent crime he intended to fight, but no matter: “there is enough socially constructed fear of crime entangled in the national imagination with the fear of black men” that the murderer was “perceived as one white face representing a sea of black men who, in the collective mind’s eye, comprise the criminal element” (MF 24). Hence “law-and-order discourse is racist” MF 30). No one can accuse Davis of being unclever, although one must note that in this instance she presents “imagination” as malign. Orthodox Marxism reigned in imaginings of all sorts by its (attempted) rationalism, its claims about the iron laws of history, its dialectics. The only discipline imagination finds in Davis’s thought is the rhetorical exigencies of the moment.

    Such imagining may be seen in her racialized account of the Union victory in the Civil War. Following W. E. B. Du Bois’s argument, she claims that “it was the decision on the part of slaves to emancipate themselves and to join the Union Army—both women and men—that was primarily responsible for the victory over slavery” (FICS 36, italics added). This, Du Bois and Davis claim was a successful “general strike”—an anticipation of workers of the world uniting—which transferred the slave’s labor “from the Confederate planter to the Northern invader” and “won the war” (FICS 70). This rather minimizes the role of the white Union troops, who did most of the dying and, even more pertinently, most of the killing of Confederate soldiers in that war.

    No matter to Davis, she’s on to a larger point. “Black struggle in the US serves as an emblem of the struggle for freedom” in all areas—not only race but struggles over class and gender (FICS 39). “Black history, whether here in North America, or in Africa, or in Europe, has always been infused with a spirit of resistance, an activist spirit of protest and transformation” (FISC 112). [2] Indeed, “people all over the world have been inspired by the Black freedom movement to forge activist movements addressing oppressive conditions in their own countries,” whether in South Africa, in India, or in Palestine (FICS 114). In turn, the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King “was inspired by Gandhi” (FISC 114). This is the new Internationale Davis would oppose to the international capitalist networks. Those networks in the United States do not merely incarcerate. They kill, massively. We know this because in 1951Communist Party attorney William L. Patterson and Communist Party member Paul Robeson submitted a petition, “signed by luminaries such as W. E. B. Du Bois,” “charging genocide with respect to Black people in the US” (FICS 132). The petition received backing from the Soviet Union and its satellites, then commanded by Comrade Stalin, criticism of whom for actual commissions of genocide was, she has assured us, little more than McCarthyite capitalist propaganda.

    When it comes to ‘gender,’ Davis admits that she and her fellow Communists were a bit late to the game. “There was some measure of resistance from women of color, and also poor and working-class white women, to identify with the emergent feminist movement,” which initially seemed “too white and especially too middle class, too bourgeois” (FICS 95). But eventually her native ingenuity didn’t fail her. “Anticapitalist, antiracist internationalism” could be brought to drive feminism in resistance to “heteropatriarchy” (AFN 91, 95). Yes, “the more closely we examine it, the more we discover that [gender] is embedded in a range of social, political, cultural, and ideological formations” (FICS 101), “so much more than gender equality” but “involv[ing] a consciousness of capitalism, and racism, and colonialism and postcolonialities, and ability, and more genders than we can even imagine, and more sexualities than we ever thought we could name” (FICS 104). This is the new way to understand “the old feminist adage that ‘the personal is the political,'” a new pathway toward “recraft[ing] ourselves” (FICS 105). The effort at conquering nature, especially human nature, based not only on class struggle but on denying the primacy of male-female sexuality is “a Marxist-inflected feminist insight,” after all, with a dash of Foucault’s critique of the “carceral state” (FICS 106). What this new, anti-bourgeois feminism must resist is the tendency to desire the incarceration of “those who engage in gender violence” (i.e., rapists); such feminists only “do the work of the state”—the capitalist state (FICS 138). 

    What is needed, Davis contends, is “abolition feminism,” by which she means a feminism that aims at ending the prison system of the capitalist state; “gender justice will not be realized without the incorporation of abolition praxis” (AFN 82). “Women have always been the major supporters of those in prison not only as organizers, but also as anchors of families and kinship networks deeply affected by incarceration practices. This is especially true of women of color.” (AFN 45). Prison abolition forms the centerpiece of Davis’s project of neo-Marxist regime change.

    Why prisons? Because a critique of prisons “can help promote an anticapitalist critique and movements toward socialism,” a “society in which people’s needs, not profits, constitute the driving force” (FICS 6-7). Imprisonment, you see, is a strategy of “bourgeois democracy” (AFN 46) to deflect attention away from the “underlying social problems” of “racism, poverty, unemployment, lack of education” (FICS 6). Once again, Du Bois saw it. “His analysis” in Black Reconstruction in America “offers a challenge both to historians of the period and for the present in which he wrote” (AFN 55). He “call[ed] for dismantling institutions that are overtly causing social and civil death” by “broadening the liberatory agenda to include apparatuses of oppression beyond those specifically understood to be carceral” but at the same time “linking contemporary abolition praxis—or theory plus action and reflection—to questions of racial capitalism,” all seen “with an internationalist lens” and “always hinged to challenging capitalism” (AFN 55). [3]

    Why capitalism, specifically? Because the “conception of justice” seen in “bourgeois democracy” “assumes that justice is retributive,” that “punishment is the very essence of justice,” a “proportional punishment” intended to rebalance “the aftermath of harm” (AFN 47). But this isn’t justice; it is only vengeance. And it is capitalistic vengeance because it is “individualistic,” focused on the criminal and his victim “in isolation from larger social contexts” in which alleged crimes are committed (AFN 47). We Marxists must “convinc[e] enough people that crime [is] not the unqualified cause of punishment” and (linking this now also to feminism) “central to this process of rearticulation [is] the recognition that race, gender, class, and sexuality were more important determinants of who goes to prison than simply the commission of a crime”; “this is especially true of women, both cisgender and trans[-gendered]” (AFN 47). This, Davis avers, is so much so that people in prison should be called “criminalized,” not “criminal” (AFN 48). How, indeed, could it be otherwise, if the economic, social, and political rulers and their institutions themselves are the real criminals? The regime of bourgeois democracy, the public order of capitalist statism, and the international network of capitalist corporations define criminality in terms of laws that bourgeois democrats make, laws that reinforce and both literally and figurative legitimize that regime, that order, and that network. In the new, socialist international and regime order, crime will be entirely redefined, even abolished along with the prisons built to enforce those laws. 

    As “a tradition, a philosophy, and a theory of change,” prison abolition dates back to the early 1970s (AFN 50)—perhaps uncoincidentally, when the Nixon Administration’s abolition of conscription took the wind out of the anti-Vietnam War protests, which had been the centerpiece of New Left agitation in the years immediately prior. The movement drifted but then revived in the late 1990s linking prison abolition with increased funding for education. This was a shrewd move, as it forged an alliance with the now-powerful teachers’ unions which had supplanted the ‘proletarian’ industrial unions as the best-organized and most active labor organizations in the United States. Part of the proletarians’ weakness derived from “the deindustrialization of the US economy, which led to the elimination of vast numbers of jobs,” throwing many black men out of work (AFN 41). Although the jobless men, some now in prison, might have seemed the likely target for socialist organizers, Davis and her allies focused on the “decarceration” of women, especially those ‘criminalized’ for such nonviolent actions as prostitution and shoplifting, quite likely because their release from prisons would be a less intimidating prospect than the release of men.

    But this is only a start, a relatively minor reform, the thin end of the proverbial wedge. One must never forget “the root causes of injustice and the impact of other systems of oppression, including, in the first place, global capitalism” and its attendant “racist and heteropatriarchal structures” (AFN 58-59). 

    In the meantime, the decarceration of women should be supplemented by the abolition of the death penalty, which “remains a central issue” because “it incorporates historical memories of slavery,” memories of slaves being hanged for “very minor offenses” (FICS 30, MF 116). More, American bourgeois democracy “relies fundamentally” upon it, along with prisons (MF 56). “Today,” she writes in 1991, “there are more than 3,500 people on death row in the United States” (MF 57); this miniscule number of Americans, (admittedly, most of them white men) drawn from a population of more than 300 million, all convicted not of minor crimes but of murder, remains central to Davis’s polemic because guidelines for the application of the death penalty now “reflect the abstract individualism associated with liberalism and especially neoliberalism” (MF 107). Individualism, you will recall, serves as the ideological mask for corporate-capitalist class domination. And you will also recall that oppression in the form of punishment of white men stands merely as a signifier of punishment of black men, in the imaginative mind of Angela Davis. Even violent crimes committed by black men on other black men and on women must be explained as results of the racist order (MF 30). In this way, “institution of punishment have served as receptacles for structures and ideologies of enslavement” and racism, long after the abolition of chattel slavery itself (MF 140). 

    “So how does one persuade people to think differently? That’s a question of organizing.” (FICS 22). As Foucault remarks, prisons as ‘penitentiaries’ arose with the criminal justice reform movement spearheaded by the Quakers, “around the same time as the idea of a society in which citizens are defined as rights-bearing subjects” (MF 59); prison “is the quintessential democratic institution, because it provides you with the negation of that upon which the whole concept of bourgeois democracy has been developed,” namely, the right to personal liberty (MF 143). Instead of killing or wounding the bodies of the ‘criminalized’ with torture, those bodies would be deprived of liberty, a “conception of punishment…only possible in a society that recognized its citizens as rights-bearing subjects” (MF 59). Imprisonment “was thought to be humane and democratic, especially because it replaced corporal and capital punishment” (MF 59). A humanly-designed and implemented criminal justice system that was once reformed, even revolutionized, can be revolutionized once again, even abolished altogether. It is only a matter of persuasion. 

    “When you look at the population of death row prisoners, you see that almost every single person there is poor,” whether white or black (MF 63). Prisons “thrive on class inequalities,” “racial inequalities,” and “gender inequalities” (MF 142). (If women are oppressed, however, why are there not many more women in jail?) For this reason, “the hidden danger of relying on incarceration as the major solution to behaviors that are often the by-products of poverty is that the solution reproduces the very problem it purports to solve” (MF 142). In this way, Davis can steer the argument back towards the more fundamental orthodox Marxist insistence on class conflict as the driver of ‘history.’ After all, the “carceral machinery” emerged not only around the time of bourgeois democracy but, perhaps more significantly, “around the time of industrial capitalism, and it continues to have a particular affinity with capitalism” (MF 82).

    How so? Because prisons are increasingly being ‘privatized’ at least in the sense that private corporations build and profit from them. The “prison-industrial complex,” feeding off the “structural racism” of American bourgeois democracy (MF 84), “has become so big and powerful that it works to perpetuate itself,” devouring “immigrant youth and youth of color throughout the world” (MF 148). That is, “prisons catch the chaos that is intensified by de-industrialization,” as capitalists build more prisons and incarcerate more people, “thus creating the momentum for further expansion and larger incarcerated populations” in the “so-called free world,” which thereby retains “obvious vestiges of enslavement” (MF 49, 51, 52).  

    The prisons will be replaced by “educational institutions,” institutions which, as one anticipates, will be animated by a new, socialist spirit. For example, Davis recounts her pedagogic technique in a class she ran at the San Francisco County jail. Although her students from her class at San Francisco State University were expected to help her teach the prisoners, but when they arrived, Davis “position[ed] the prisoners as teachers”—a “reversal of assumed hierarchies of knowledge [which] created a radical and exciting learning environment” (MF 53).

    Such a reversal must finally be “systemic,” not piecemeal (FISC 32). Not only prisons but police should be abolished. The first step will be “community control of the police,” by which Davis doesn’t mean bourgeois control but “community bodies that have the power to actually control and dictate the actions of the police”—a new sort of dictatorship of the proletariat, if you will (FICS 32). Since, “at this moment in the history of the US, I don’t think that there can be policing without racism,” (FISC 48), the communities in question will be populated by persons of color. According to Davis (and she is lying), police today “are encouraged to use violence as a first resort” (FISC 32), as “police are trained to use force rather than to prevent or address root causes of violence” (AFN 116). As a matter of fact, police are trained to de-escalate potentially violent situations whenever possible, but the interesting phrase here is “root causes of violence.” Davis seems to be suggesting that a new form of non-police policing will enforce “community” efforts to outlaw racism, sexism, classism, and, above all, capitalism. The slogan is “Care not cops” (AFN 66). This may be understood as yet another instance of ‘dialectic.’

    Divide and unite: Davis shares the old hope of establishing ‘one big Left,’ a notion at least as old as the Popular Front of the 1930s. “We’d better figure out how to build a resistance movement together” (MF 26), since “in today’s era of global capitalism, resistance to racism can only be effective if it is anchored in global communities of struggle” (MF 80). this means organizing racial, sexual, and class communities around political goals (MF 118-119). “Internationalist engagements are imperative to illustrate the continuing and global repercussions of colonialism and imperialism embedded in police and carceral institution” (AFN 22-23). 

    This can be accomplished by establishing “accessible, free, and horizontal political education” (AFN 144) by the relevant groups, an education—suspicious minds might take it for propaganda—that contests “the public-private dichotomy” of the capitalism state (MF 33). The heuristic technique deployed in this task will be what the “critical race theorist” Mari Matsudi calls “ask the other question” (AFN). For example, “When I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘Where is the patriarchy in this?’ When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, ‘Where is the heterosexism in this?’ When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, ‘Where are the class interests in this?'” (AFN 3). This aids coalition work; one big Left requires one comprehensive account of all grievances, giving the one big Left one big, if multifarious, target for its dialectical struggle. 

    Davis laments the fact that “despite years of relentless work, by the 1990s the gulf between [prison] abolitionist perspectives and gender work was widening, and many survivors were falling into the dangerous space between two movement” (AFN 103). “Issues of racial injustice, sexual exploitation, pernicious state violence, and the analysis of linked forms of oppression became incompatible with an emerging conceptualization of gender violence that relied exclusively on gender essentialism,” by which Davis means the dichotomy of male and female and its attendant impulse to lock up male rapists (AFN 103). The Clinton Administration-backed Violence Against Women Act put this “essentialism” into law, thereby using the capitalist state to divide one oppressed class (women) against another (black men). One purpose of LGBTQ+ agitation on the Left is to break down a dichotomy that divides the Left, a ‘dialectic’ that works against it, and to replace that ‘dialectic’ with one that unites the Left against the enemies of socialism. “Key to this abolition feminist ecosystem are networks, organizations, and collectives. This work is never a solo project. Individuals tire, fade. Movements deepen and continue.” (AFN 13).

    Or so “movement” operatives like to think. As a matter of fact, movements also tire and fade. For now, deprived of an appealing socialist state to rally around, Davis and her allies direct their efforts at civil-social organizing aimed at undermining the formidable institutions they decry. They may hope to skip the Marxist ‘stage’ of state socialism altogether and instead proceed directly to the communist stage directly, once global capitalism collapses. Davis’s own unstinting celebration of state socialism throughout the years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet empire makes one wonder at her bona fides. Such wonder is longstanding. In his speech before the AFL-CIO in July 1975, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn offered a ‘critique’ of his own—a critique of Marxism. Rightly describing Marxism as a pseudo-science, he observed that regimes animated by Marxism rule not by some scientific method but by abolishing political and economic freedom and state-sponsored terror, very much including a massive network of prisons. He told the story of how Davis, after her release from prison in America, toured the Soviet Union and rested in its resorts. When Czech dissidents appealed to her, asking her to back the release of prisoners held in the prisons of the communist regime in their country, Davis said, “They deserve what they get. Let them remain in prison.” In a later speech at East Stroudsberg University, Davis denied the story.

    Assume that Davis is telling the truth, that Solzhenitsyn believed a false claim. Nonetheless, Davis never once condemned the prison systems of the Soviet bloc or of China. She has had plenty of time to do so. She has instead proved a faithful daughter of her Communist parents. Prisons deserved no condemnation when Communist regimes maintained them. They deserved condemnation only when instituted by ‘bourgeois democracies’—the regime the Communist Manifesto denounces as the most dangerous threat to the socialist regime of proletarian dictatorship. Solzhenitsyn’s theme in 1975 was that Communist tactics change but Communist ideology remains steady at its core, through its various Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, Maoist, even Brezhnevian permutations. “The Communist ideology is to destroy your society. This has been their aim for 125 years and has never changed; only the methods of changed a little.”

     

    Notes

    1. This sort of ‘critique’ has its limits. According to Davis (following longstanding Marxist polemics), capitalism causes war. “Why, in the aftermath” of al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, “have we allowed our government to pursue unilateral policies and practices of global war?” she asks, rhetorically. You will understand this if you take President George W. Bush’s “recent speeches” and “systematically replac[e] the words ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ with the word ‘capitalism'” (MF 89). This proves that if you change the words in a sentence, you will change its meaning—supposedly revealing its true meaning thereby. A certain circularity of logic prevails in this move, but that’s ‘deconstructionism’ for you.
    2. Carried along by her rhetorical momentum, Davis does not pause to consider that postcolonial “African” politics has been as much about war and tyranny as resistance.
    3. The definition of Marxist “praxis” as theory plus action plus reflection is orthodox Marxism. If, as Marx claimed, an idea isn’t a passion of the head, a longing for noetic apprehension of the whole, but the head of a passion, a mere instantiation of some underlying material self-interest, then theory has no intellectually independent status. Instead, there is a ‘unity of theory and practice,’ as one commentator called it—a materialist version of Hegelian immanence which denies that the separation of ideas from ordinary reality is possible. The only rationalism remaining must keep theory and practice united but with theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning (“reflection”) overcoming self-interest. In orthodox Marxism, this process will be hastened by the ‘consciousness-raising’ vanguard of the proletariat, those who understand the historical dialectic and can point the workers in the correct direction; in the neo-Marxist formulation, feminism, antiracism, and, in Davis’s case, prison abolition are added to the dialectical mix.

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Ciceronian Ethics

    June 23, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Cicero: On Obligations. P.G. Walsh translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

     

    Cicero writes to his son, Marcus, whom he sent to Athens to study with Cratippus, an Aristotelian Cicero calls “the outstanding philosopher of our day” (I.2). By philosophy Cicero means the study of both theoretical principles and practical precepts—Aristotle’s division of rational thought into theoria, the understanding of which is sophia and praxis, the understanding of which is phronēsis. As a guide to theory, one needs a teacher; as a guide to practice, one needs a city, a political community, a re publica or public thing. Each is the “supreme authority” in one area: the teacher for knowledge, the city for examples. Pay attention, then, not only to Cratippus but to Athens, which provides examples of the most eminent philosophers, beginning with Socrates. Of course, Cicero knows that philosophy cannot be authoritative in any straightforward sense; Socrates knows that he doesn’t know, or at least doesn’t know anything. But Marcus is a young man, not a philosopher, and the De officiis presents him with clear doctrines more than it engages him in dialectic.

    The Latin officium translates the Greek kathekon, which (as Walsh explains in his introduction) means a service or friendly and helpful act. Cicero emphasizes service to the re publica, intent as always to turn his reader away from an exclusively private life, whether philosophic or not. He calls attention to the need to pay attention to translation, urging Marcus to study not only Greek but his native Latin and, by implication, not only Athens but his native Rome. To make progress in dicendum, learning, and judicandum, judiciousness, you need both languages. It is noteworthy that Cicero chooses judiciousness to denote practical wisdom or prudence; he will go on to speak of argumentation in law courts—a public forum for Roman citizens, and a place where one can indeed provide ‘good offices’ or friendly service to fellow citizens. And again to this purpose, he tells his son, you might read not only Aristotle but your own father’s books, while “exercis[ing] your own judgment on the content without pressure from me” while perfecting your mastery of your own language—a language for which his own writings serve as a model, Cicero rightly implies (I.2). While “I yield to many in knowledge and the practice of philosophy,” I really am a good orator (I.2), exhibiting propriety, clarity, and elegance of thought and expression. “While [my] orations exhibit a more forceful style, the equable and temperate style of my philosophic discussion is also worth imitating” (I.3). None of the major Greek philosophers and orators excelled in both genres.

    Cicero’s own immediate good office or service to Marcus consists of his gift of this book. “I intend to begin with the subject most suited to both your years and my paternal authority,” the topic of officium itself. (I.4). This part of philosophy has the widest practical application, as “there is no aspect of life public or private, civic or domestic, which can be without its officium” (I.4). “Honorable conduct lies entirely in the performance of such obligations, base conduct in neglecting them” (I.5). Honestum not only contrasts with turpitudo but is also distinct from what is utile, useful. A substantial part of De Officiis consists of a defense of the claim that honorable conduct comports better with utility than base conduct does. And it is this point that Machiavelli will contest the moral ground with his great rival, centuries later. [1]

    Cicero warns his son that some philosophic schools “undermine obligation in general by their theories of the supreme good and the supreme evil” (I.5). How a philosopher understands nature, what is theory of ‘the whole’ is, had considerable bearing upon his practical, ethical, teaching. For example, if a philosopher thinks that the summum bonum or supreme good “has no connection with virtue, and measures [that good] by his own interests rather than by what is honorable,” he “cannot cultivate friendship, justice, or liberality so long as he remains consistent in his views, and is not prevailed upon by his own better nature” (I.5). He will be a Cynic, an apologist for the base, one who sees no real possibility of honorable conduct in himself or in anyone else. Or a philosopher might be an Epicurean, holding pain to be “the greatest evil”; such a man “cannot possibly be brave, and he that accounts pleasure the summum bonum cannot be temperate” (I.5).

    Thus, the underlying question is nature, human nature. These schools of philosophy can “say nothing about obligation,” as “no firm, stable precepts inherent in nature can be posited except by those who claim that honorable maxims are to be enacted solely or chiefly for their own sake” (I.6). The schools that do make that claim are the Stoics, Academics (Platonists), and Peripatetics (Aristotelians). Cicero tells Marcus that he shall “draw upon their wells as much as, and in whatever way, my judgment and inclination dictate” (I.6), although he shall “follow the Stoics chiefly,” perhaps in order to lean against any cynical and/or epicurean inclinations the young man might develop during his stay in Athens.

    What is obligation—its end or aim—and what guidance does it give us in shaping our lives from day to day? Obligation can be either absolute—the right, simply—or measured, a matter of shaping means to an end. In considering a course of action, one should first think of whether that course is right, honorable, or whether it is reprehensible, base; second, one should think of whether it is useful, likely to enhance their wealth or power; one should also think of whether a useful course of action contradicts the right. And when choosing between courses of action, one must distinguish between an honorable course and one still more honorable, and between a useful course and one still more useful.

    Cicero begins with the right, the honorable. What is right for any species of thing is the fulfillment of its nature. Man differs from beasts in his capacity to reason, which enables him to identify the causes of things and the likely consequences of the actions of things. “Without effort [Man] visualizes the course of his whole life and prepares the necessities to live it out” (I.11) In their families and cities, in which men share “a common language and life,” reason enables them to find the best way, to choose the right course of action. But “primary for man is the inquiry and investigation into the truth”; “what is true, simple, and genuine is what is most suited to man’s nature” (I.13). Bringing this desire for knowledge together with family and political life, men by nature consent to be governed only by those who issue “just and lawful commands for our benefit” (I.13). “From this attitude comes greatness of soul and contempt for merely human ways” (I.13). 

    With such rational apprehension of natural right, “man alone of all animals” apprehends “the nature of order and propriety and due measure in deeds and words” (I.14). In so apprehending the natural order, Man “transfer[s] this by analogy” from “eyes to mind,” and plans his course of action as a similarly “harmonious structure” (I.14). He wants to do nothing “unsightly or degenerate,” or to contemplate anything irrational in thought or action (I.14). “These are the qualities that kindle and fashion honorable conduct,” whether or not that conduct wins praise (I.14).

    The honorable has four sources: the perception and intelligent awareness of what is true (wisdom); safeguarding the community by assigning to each individual his due and by guaranteeing fidelity to contracts (justice); the greatness and strength of a loft and unconquered spirit (courage); and modestia and temperantia (moderation). Readers will recognize the four principal virtues enumerated by Plato’s Socrates in the Republic. Cicero devotes the remainder of Book I to discussing each of them.

    Wisdom or “knowledge of the truth comes closest to the essentials of human nature, for” as Aristotle asserts at the beginning of the Metaphysics, “we are all impelled and attracted towards a desire for discovery and knowledge” (I.18). “In this natural and honorable activity there are two faults which we must avoid,” namely, to take unknown things as known, giving “rash credence to them,” and to waste energy and effort on “unnecessary” matters (I.18-19). On this latter point, Cicero warns against shirking one’s obligations by becoming “diverted from public service by enthusiasm for research” (I.19). Here, he has in mind some of the more recent Stoics, such as Sallust, satirized by the young man in Cicero’s De Republica who is preoccupied with trying to figure out an optical illusion caused by a meteorological phenomenon that makes it appear as if there are two suns in the sky. It is true that theoretical wisdom (sophia in Greek, sapientia in Latin) is “chief of all virtues,” differing from practical wisdom (phronēsis, prudentia), the “knowledge of things to be sought and things to be avoided” (I.153). But since theoretical wisdom “embraces the sense of community between gods and man, and the relationship between man and man,” it would be enfeebled and unfulfilled “if no practical action were to flow from it” (I.153). And how could practical action be sound if it were not informed knowledge of what human beings are and “concerned with the fellowship of the human race” (I.153)?

    Justice, “the brightest adornment of virtue,” ensures, first “that no one harms his neighbor unless he has himself been unjustly attacked” and, second, “communal property should serve communal interests, and private property private interests” (I.20). Nature doesn’t endow private property; one comes by it either by longstanding occupancy of empty land, victory in war, law, bargain, contract, or lot. For another person or persons to seize property so acquired is to “transgress the law of the community” (I.21). Communal or public property is also legitimate, since “our country claims a share in our origin, and our friends likewise,” doing so by nature, human beings being social and political animals. Public property betokens these claims, “binding the community and its individuals closely together by our skills, our efforts, and our talents” (I.22). Justice rests on “good faith,” that is, “truthfully abiding by our words and agreements,” by our fides making our promises fiat (I.23). 

    Injustice, by contrast, usually stems from fear, greed, and/or the desire for glory. Cicero cites “the shameless conduct of Gaius Caesar” as a recent illustration: “He undermined all laws, divine and human, in order to establish that dominance which his erroneous belief had targeted for himself” in his pursuit of power and glory (I.26). Most regrettably, such ambition “is usually nursed by men of the greatest and most outstanding talent” (I.26). They often possess the abilities needed to achieve their unjust ends.

    Cicero takes care to distinguish between injustice committed under sudden impulse or stress from premeditated injustice. There is also a certain moral laziness that can set in, whereby men “allow persons whom they should protect to go without their support” (I.28). And injustice can occur through sheer distraction, as we concentrate on our “personal pursuits or activities” (I.28). Cicero singles out philosophers as especially prone to this last cause of injustice. In this, he disagrees with Plato’s remark in the Theaetetus to the effect that philosophers are just because they search for the truth, eschewing more ordinary ambition. They do indeed refrain from acts of justice committed out of fear, greed, or the desire for glory, Cicero concedes—they are not Caesars—but the very often neglect acts of justice because they are distracted by philosophizing itself. Still others commit injustice because they pursue family interests too ardently, in the manner of today’s soccer moms, or they harbor “some repugnance for the human race,” cloaking their misanthropy with the claim that “they are minding their own business” (I.29). Such persons are “deserters from the life of the community” (I.29).

    Having defined the two types of injustice and identified their causes, and having shown the ways by which justice is maintained, “now we shall be able readily to assess what our obligation is at any particular juncture, unless our self-absorption becomes excessive” (I.29), letting no person suffer harm and remaining mindful of the public good. This settles the question of justice within the political community, but what about justice between and among political communities?

    “Rights in warfare must be scrupulously observed” (I.34). Some military disputes are settled by negotiations, others by force. “Since the first is characteristic of human beings and the second of beasts, we must have recourse to the second only if we cannot exploit the first” (I.34-35). (Machiavelli famously subverts this formula in The Prince.) As in Aristotle, “wars should be undertaken for the one purpose of living peaceably without suffering injustice; and once victory is won, those who have not indulged in cruel monstrosities in the war should be spared” (I.35). We Romans have done just that, indeed conferring citizenship upon many former enemies even as we “utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia,” whose armies committed such monstrous acts against Romans. Not just any peace should be accepted, only those which do not “contain the seeds of future treachery” (I.35). [2]

    There is also the question of civil war, usually waged when two or more factions arise within a political community which do not agree upon what the community’s regime should be. To prevent this, we should observe justice even with respect “to the lowliest of society,” the slaves (I.41). “That we treat them as hired hands is reasonable enough: make them work, but give them what is their due” (I.41).

    More generally, Cicero identifies “two ways of inflicting injustice, by force or by deceit. Deceit is the way of the humble fox, force that of the lion. Both are utterly alien to human beings, but deceit is the more odious; of all kinds of injustice none is more pernicious than that shown by people who pose as good men at the moment of greatest perfidy.” (I.41). Machiavelli’s adjuration to “use” both the fox and the lion is another instance of his subversion of classical morality as seen in one of its most admired Roman exponents. Although Machiavelli is usually understood to be an enemy of Christianity, this animosity is often supposed to be part of a defense of ‘the ancients.’ Not so: Machiavelli is out to ruin both moral codes and to substitute his own for them.

    Related to justice with respect to the distribution of property are beneficence and liberality. Cicero recommends that these subsidiary virtues be ruled by reason in the form of practical wisdom. Assess the character of your potential beneficiary, his affection for you, the type of association you have with him, and any obligations he may have “undertaken in [your] interest” (I.45). At the same time, since “our lives…are spent not with men who are perfect and manifestly wise, but with people who at best embody some pale reflection of virtue,” liberality should extend to anyone “as long as some glimpse of virtue is perceptible in him” (I.46). This requires you to rank your fellow human beings in terms of your obligations to them. Whether good or not so good, one should extend liberality to those “endowed with the milder virtues of moderation, self-rule, and justice”; this is prudent, since those of less mild disposition, the high-spirited ones, often become perfervid,” more likely to abuse your open-handedness (I.46). 

    You should also rank possible recipients of beneficence and liberality with respect to their relation to you. The most general relationship is our shared human nature, “the fellowship of the whole human race” (I.50). As mentioned earlier, what unites human beings is reason and speech, “which more than anything separates us from the nature of the beasts” and binds us “in a kind of natural alliance” (I.50). True, some animals may be said to have courage, but not justice, equity, or goodness in the sense of being fully cognizant of the rational order of nature. Within this bond, there is also “the common ownership of all things which nature has brought forth for men’s joint use”—air and water, for example (I.51). These “must be preserved” with the help of laws governing private and public property (I.51). Other levels of human relationship include nationality (including race and language), the political community, close friends, kin, and marriage. Following Aristotle, when it comes to friendship, no friendship “is more pre-eminent of enduring than the friendship forged between good men of like character” (I.55). 

    How to rank these relationships? Here, Cicero provides a challenging contrast to the rank order ‘we moderns’ incline to make. “None of these affinities has more weight and induces more affection than the allegiance which we each have to the re publica” (I.57). True, “our parents are dear to us, and so are our children and relatives and friends; but our native land alone subsumes all the affections which we entertain” (I.57). But since we feel the competing attractions of all these relations, Cicero ranks country and parents first, since “the debts we owe to the benefits which they bestow are the greatest” (I.58). Next come children and the rest of the household, “for we are their sole resource, and they can have no other refuge”; following them come “those relatives whom we find congenial and with whom our future prospects also are often shared” (I.58). Nonetheless, in terms of our life within the re publica and outside of our families, all persons “flourish best in friendships; and the most satisfying friendship is that cemented by similarity of moral outlook” and character (I.58).

    Aristotle identifies magnanimity or greatness of soul as the compendium of all the virtues, rightly ordered. It is especially associated with the spirited element of the soul, the part which takes risks, regrets that it has but one life to give for its country. If a spirited soul lacks any of the virtues it can become dangerous to itself and to others. Lacking justice, it will fight “not for the safety of all but for personal interests,” descending from civility to barbarism (I.62). True courage defends the right. Similarly, an intelligent and knowledgeable soul “divorced from justice [is] to be called cunning,” not wise (I.63). Spirited souls lacking one or more of the virtues become tyrannical. “Such men do not allow themselves to be overruled by argument”—reason”—or by any political or lawful sanction”—by civility (I.64). Demagogues who rely “on the false assumptions of the ignorant mob” cannot be classified among the men of magnanimity, either (I.65). “The loftier a man’s spirit, the more easily in his desire for fame he is drawn to unjust deeds; this is a slippery slope on which he is poised” (I.65). The desire for wealth is equally deleterious, “for we must consider it characteristic of the brave and noble spirit to think little of the things which most men reckon special and glorious, and to despise them with the steady and unflinching eye of reason”; “it is the mark of the mature spirit and the great resolution it shows to endure [the numerous and varied occasions which affect the human condition throughout life] in such a way as not to abandon either the life of nature or the dignity of the philosopher” (I.67).

    The mention of philosophers spurs Cicero to relent a bit on his previous strictures regarding their inclination to the private life. Some of these are “austere and serious men unable to stomach the conduct of the people or its leaders”—Stoics, not Epicureans (I.69). Let us “perhaps allow abstention from public affairs both to individuals of outstanding talent who have devoted themselves to learning, and to men hindered by ill-health or some other cogent reason who have renounced politics and yielded to others the power and praise for administering the re publica” (I.71). But if a man’s only excuse is that he “despise[s] the military and civil offices which most men admire,” this is not to be condoned, given our obligations to the re publica as our protector (I.71). Men “whom nature has endowed with the resources for conducting public business should renounce all hesitation, seek entry to public office, and administer the re publica,” as “in no other way can it be governed, or greatness of soul be made manifest” (I.72). Both statesmen and philosophers should cultivate such greatness of soul, and philosophers will find this easier to do, as they are less vulnerable to reversals of fortune, need fewer material resources, and endure less humiliation in reversals of fortune than the public men do. 

    The political man therefore needs a different kind of preparation than a philosopher does. He should consider not only the honor political work brings but whether he has the capacity to perform it. “Careful preparation must be made” (I.73). Many politically ambitious men take military achievement as crucial to such preparation. Cicero demurs. In truth, “there have been many civic issues of greater importance and renown than operations in war” (I.74). Let arms, then yield to the toga. Although war should not be avoided by inventing ‘rationalizations’ for evading it, “establishing the rationale for making war is more desirable than courage in battle” (I.80). A war should be undertaken for some purpose that justly serves the re publica, not as an opportunity to win glory.

    In considering civil rule, a man should follow two precepts articulated in the Platonic dialogues: to “protect the interests of the citizens in such a way that all they do should be directed towards that end without thought of personal advantage” and that “the whole rei publicae be their concern, so that they do not protect one section at the expense of the rest” (I.85). Otherwise, he will only exacerbate factionalism, that is to say, contradiction or disharmony in the city, which is unreasonable and immoral, as seen in the political histories of both Athens and Rome. One should not engage in “scrambling for offices,” either—an “utterly wretched business” (I.86). Nor should we “lend an ear to those who will have it that we should show bitter anger towards adversaries”; rather, “nothing is more praiseworthy or more worthy of a noble an exemplary man than to be conciliatory and forgiving,” as “those of us who live with free peoples in communities where there is equality before the law should make a habit of affability and reserve,” not allowing ourselves to become irritated by demanding and annoying requests (I.88). At the same time, “such gentleness and magnanimity are praiseworthy only if we are stern when the state demands it, for otherwise the civitas cannot be well administered” (I.88). Be governed by the laws, “which when imposing punishment are guided by fairness and not by anger” (I.89). 

    The virtue of moderation comports with the honorable because what is truly honorable precedes from what is well-measured, fitting. ‘Fittingness’ or decorum applies to all the virtues. In exercising practical wisdom, for example, one should fit words to the circumstances and “recognize and maintain the truth in all matters”—true statements being words that fit the nature of the matter considered (I.95). With courage, “what is performed in a manly and lofty spirit is seen to be worthy of a man and to be fitting, whereas the opposite is unfitting and because it is despicable” (I.95) In general, the fitting is whatever action is reasonable in a given circumstance; “the fitting is what is consistent with man’s excellence in the respect in which his nature differs from all other living creatures” (I.96). Nature is ‘what is’; decorum is consistent with nature, does not contradict it, and indeed burnishes it.

    Many poets understand this, but apply it more broadly, showing us what is fitting in a villain as well as what is fitting in a hero. “But nature has endowed us with the role of constancy, moderation, self-government, and consideration of others” (I.98). Poets show us what is fitting to human nature and what is fitting to men who have ruined their nature. They know the difference, and so do we, since “just as physical beauty attracts the eye because of the apt harmony of the bodily parts, and our pleasure lies in the fact that all those parts are as one in sharing a native grace, so this notion of the fitting, of decorum, which shines in our lives, wins the applause of our contemporary through the order, moderation, and constancy reflected in every word and action” (I.98). “The obligation which stems from this advances first on the path which leads to harmony with nature and to the preservation of its law. If we take nature as our guide, we shall never go astray”; just as “we win approval by our physical movements which accord with nature,” so much more do we win it “with the movements of the soul which are likewise consonant with nature” (I.100).

    By nature, the soul’s appetites should obey the commands of the soul’s reasoning capacity. “Nature has not fashioned us to behave as if we have been generated for play and jest” but for “more serious and important pursuits” (I.103). Play and jest should be treated as we treat sleep and relaxation generally, as restoratives after “we have done justice to serious and weighty business” (I.103). As for play itself, it can be “ill-bred, rude, scandalous, indecent” or “refine, urbane, clever, and witty,” as seen in the plays of Plautus and “the books of Socratic philosophy” (I.104). Cicero commends the second form, preferring that his son not turn into a frat boy.

    Cicero understands that individuals have different natures within the overall framework of human nature. He does not, impossibly, expect everyone to be the same. “We should each of us hold resolutely to the characteristics peculiar to us as long as they are not flawed,” following “our natural bent insofar as it befits the law of nature” (I.110). Nothing is fitting if it flies in the face of Minerva, of reason, and that includes never aiming at “something we cannot achieve” (I.110). The boy puts aside his dreams of athletic ‘stardom’ when he learns that he can’t hit a curveball. Instead, “work hardest at the things for which we are best suited,” unless circumstances require otherwise (I.114). But above all, Marcus, “we must establish what kind of person we wish to be, and what way of life we wish to follow” (I.117). This is the hardest decision to make, and we make it when we are young, “at a time when our powers of deliberation are at their weakest,” when we are more likely to follow our desires than our reason (I.117). “The person who has harmonized his entire plan of life with the sort of nature which is free of faults should hold a steadfast course, for this is supremely fitting, unless perhaps he realizes that he has made a mistake in his choice of a way of life,” in which case he should never be so vain as to fail to change course (I.120). Many times, the example of a father is helpful in such deliberations, provided one doesn’t imitate his vices.

    Decorum should be observed also in relation to one’s age—a young man should concentrate especially on developing habits of moderation, an old man on avoiding laziness and shameless luxury—and to one’s role in relation to the political community—a magistrate is not an ordinary citizen and neither is the same as a resident foreigner. Decorum also manifests itself in personal conduct: modesty regarding the body, never “fall[ing] into a habit of listless sauntering in our gait” or of “hurrying too fast” (I.131). Decorum of soul consists of “keeping our mental operations in harmony with nature,” never succumbing against perturbation or depression” (I.131). Our appetites should obey reason whether we are intent upon discovering the truth or in determining a course of action. Decorum of speech, whether in an oration or in ordinary conversation, requires a similar reasoned measure. 

    “In all of life,” then, “the right precept is to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and untempered by reason” (I.136). Even in rebuking someone, “show clearly that event that very harshness which goes with our reproof is designed for the good of the person reproved” (I.137). 

    Turning from speech to action, Cicero identifies three principles to be followed. “First, impulse should obey reason”; “second, we should assess the importance of a project we seek to achieve, to ensure that neither more nor less attention and labor is expended than the case justifies”; “third, we must take pains to safeguard all that pertains to the dignity and moderation of a gentleman” (I.141). The political community’s civil institutions will serve as guides for many actions, whatever criticisms may have been leveled against them by philosophers. With respect to foreigners, “in sum, not to go into details, we should respect, defend, and preserve the common bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all humanity” (I.149).

    A gentleman will select a fitting means of livelihood, excluding tax gathering, usury, manual labor, wholesale merchandizing, mechanical trades (“for no workshop can have anything liberal about it”), and all trades which “serve sensual pleasures,” such food preparation, and entertainment (I.150). Honorable trades require “more prudence” than these, and include medicine, architecture, and “teaching honorable things” (I.151). “But of all profit-making activities none is better, more fruitful, more delightful, more worthy of a free man than agriculture” (I.151). Such Virginia gentlemen as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison took due note.

    Having established that “obligations derive from what is honorable, and from each type of virtue” (II.1), in Book II Cicero addresses the second main element of ethics, utility, which involves “the kinds of obligation which impinge upon our mode of living, and on the availability of the things which men put to use, their wealth and their resources” (II.1). However high-minded he may be, a gentleman still must attend to ‘low’ necessities.

    There have been some who have charged Cicero with failing to observe this obvious point. He offers an apologia. “From time to time I fear that mention of philosophy is abhorrent to men of integrity, and that they are surprised that I devote so much time to it” (II.2). But he does so only because public life is no longer possible in Rome, now that Rome is “wholly in thrall to one man,” Julius Caesar (II.2). Had the re publica remained a mixed-regime republic, had its regime not changed, I no longer had any public role to maintain. Here, Cicero illustrates an earlier teaching: That moral conduct or obligation changes with circumstances. “Should anyone pour scorn on such study” as philosophy, “I cannot possibly imagine what such a person thinks worth praising” (II.5). 

    Others criticize not his philosophizing but his way of philosophizing, charging that he contradicts himself when “I maintain that we can grasp nothing for certain” while “pursuing the rules for obligation” (II.7). But I have never claimed that there are some things certain, other things uncertain, only that “some things are probable and others improbable” (II.7). Ethical reasoning depends not upon certainty but upon convictions tested by logic, by dialectic, “the clash of arguments from the two sides” (II.8). Such rational testing, whereby one can identify and discard improbabilities, suffices for firm moral conduct. Cicero proceeds to do just that with respect to utility and possible conflicts between it and the honorable.

    “Nothing more destructive can be imposed on human life” than the claim that “the honorable is detached from the useful” (II.9). And both the honorable and the useful should be related to justice. “Those who fail to see this are people who often venerate only tricksters and mistake perversity for wisdom” (I.10).

    There are several kinds of useful things: inanimate (gold, silver), animate but non-rational (farm animals), and animate and rational (the gods, other men). Of the last group, “the gods are not thought to inflict harm” but men often do, presenting “the greatest stumbling-block to their fellow-men” (II.12). Inanimate and animate but non-rational things require human labor or at least rule to be useful. As for human beings, they can scarcely be useful to one another if they do not live in political communities, preferably ones with sound regimes. As a result of political life, “men developed a peaceable outlook and a sense of restraint; human life thus became more secure, and by giving and receiving, by interchange and application of talents we came to want for nothing” (II.15). Conversely, “there is likewise no plague so abominable that it is not visited by one man on another” (II.16). Cicero agrees with the opinion of Dicaearchus, who wrote that “many more men…have been wiped out by attacks of other men in wars or civil commotions than by all other disasters” (II.16).

    Given this crucial dichotomy, “I regard it as the peculiar function of virtue to win over men’s minds, and to harness them to its purposes” (II.17). In this way, morality is supremely useful as well as good ‘in principle.’ All virtue centers on three things: “in detecting what is true and genuine in any instance, what is consistent with it, and what are its consequences, origins and causes”; in restraining “those mental disturbances which the Greeks call pathe (’emotions’)” and “subject[ing] impulses (the Greek for which is hormai) to the control of reason”; and, finally, in “treat[ing] our associates in a restrained and expert way, so that with their support we may have our natual needs supplied in full and abundant measure” while “wreak[ing] vengeance on those who have sought to harm us, and inflict[ing] such punishment as justice and decency allow” (II.18).

    In diametric opposition to Machiavelli, Cicero argues that “of all these possibilities none is more calculated to secure and retain influence than winning affection, and none is more repugnant than being feared,” which leads to being hated (II.23). Tyrants like Julius Caesar are killed for this reason, as “no amount of influence”—meaning bribes—can “withstand the hatred of the many” (II.23). Even if the laws have been trashed by such a man, and “even if liberty has been intimidated,” eventually the laws will surface again, ready to prescribe just punishment (II.24). More, “liberty which has been suppressed has a fiercer bite than when it has been maintained” (II.24). Those who rule by fear often die in fear. The same goes for factitious men who foment civil wars. As a result of such men, “we have lost our republic” (II.29). “We have plunged into this disaster through choosing to be feared rather than to be cherished as the object of affection” (II.29).

    Glory, which military commanders seek, works the same way, depending upon the affection and trust of the people and their opinion that a man is worthy of admiration and honor. These sentiments in turn depend upon the intent to serve the people and, better still, success in doing so, actions which manifest the virtues of “liberality, beneficence, justice, good faith, and all the virtues associated with civilized and affable manners” (II.32). It is human nature itself which induces us to “feel affection for those in whom we think these virtues reside” (II.32). Beyond affection, we also trust those whom we think have practical wisdom conjoined with justice, the ability to foresee events and to prepare for emergencies when they arise. Justice inspires trust still more because we place more trust in a just man with lesser prudence than a prudent man with little justice. “Justice without prudence will be able to do much; prudence without justice will have little effect at all” (II.34). In the philosophic sense, prudence with little or no justice is mere craftiness, not true prudence, but Cicero stipulates that he here describes the sentiments of ‘the many’ on these matters, not a precise moral teaching. 

    Along with beneficence and the combination of prudence and justice, the man who wins glory enjoys the admiration and honor of his fellow-citizens. A man known for self-indulgence, unscrupulousness, backbiting, and baseness generally will be viewed with contempt, whereas the one who maintain their self-possession regardless of circumstances, good or bad, earn respect.

    Above all, “justice fulfills all three prerequisites for gaining glory: benevolence, because it seeks to benefit the greatest number; trust for the same reason; and admiration because it despises those things which fire most men with greed, and possesses them” (II.38). A reputation for justice is necessary to gain the help of others, but “if people imagine that they can obtain glory by deceit and empty show and hypocrisy, in word and look”—the mere appearance of justice—they “very much mistaken” (II.43). Even thieves need to practice justice among themselves. Therefore, “justice must be cultivated and maintained by every means, both for its own sake (otherwise it would not be justice) and to enhance our honor and glory” (II.42). “We should be as we wish to be regarded” (II.43). To win this worthy reputation, one may conduct oneself well in war, exhibit modesty, devotion to parents and household, associate with men with the reputation for wisdom and justice, and demonstrate the ability to speak well, in friendly and affable conversation but also in public oratory, especially in courtrooms and especially as a defender of the accused, not their prosecutor. To defend the accused, especially those accused by government officers, can put a just limit on rule by fear even as it wins the esteem of the people, who are often the victims of such unjust intimidation. Cicero refers his son to an oration of this sort that he made when he was a young man. It is reasonable to consider the De Officiis not only as an example of a father’s advice to his son, not only as a model of advice fathers generally should give to their sons, but as his own version of Plato’s Apology of Socrates, that is, the speech of a man punished unjustly for living a just life—in his case, however, a life devoted mostly to civic activity, less to the more exclusively philosophic way of life defended by Socrates.

    Beneficence or kindness—seen in what we now call charitable giving but even more charitable work—and liberality (the mean between the extremes of extravagance and miserliness) will earn you many friends. Direct your acts of beneficence toward men of integrity, lest your efforts be wasted; this keeps your efforts within the limits of justice. Some such acts should be directed to individuals, others to the re publica. Care must be taken to give moderately because gifts of money erode the wealth that makes such gifts possible; it can also corrupt the recipients. Cicero censure the practice of providing not so much bread as ‘circuses’—civic feasts, gladiatorial shows, public games, and “wild-beast chases” in the arenas (II.55). Liberality hits the middle between extravagance and miserliness. 

    Beneficence is for men in their private capacity. As public officials, their “chief preoccupation…must be to ensure that the individual keeps what is his; there should be no public confiscation of the possessions of private persons” (II.73). Sulla began, and Julius Caesar expanded, the policy of proscribing their enemies and then giving their property to others; such largesse with others’ possessions is an instrument of tyranny. Similarly, Marcius Philippus’ “agrarian law,” whereby property would be transferred from the wealthy few to the many poor, aimed at “the equalization of property; what could be more baneful than that?” (II.73). “The chief motivation behind the establishment of res publicae civitatesque was to ensure the maintenance of private property; for although nature guided men to form communities, it was in the hope of guarding their possessions that they sought protection in cities” (II.73). Cicero singles out the property tax as particularly unjust for that reason; needed revenues may be supplied by tariffs. In all, “there is no vice more squalid than greed” (II.77), whether it is seen in private or public men, leading as it does to injustice and thus to factionalism. Rather, “the supreme demonstration of reason and wisdom as manifested by a good citizen, not dividing the interests of the citizens but uniting all on the basis of equity” (II.83).

    At the same time, and as a corollary to property rights, rulers must take care that the many who are poor do not fall into debt. This only leads to resentment when the few who are rich attempt to collect what they’ve lent. To guard private property, prevent exploitation of the poor by the rich and rebellion by the poor against the rich; to “employ all possible means both in war and at home to enhance the power, territories, and revenues of the re publica while observing justice: “these are the tasks for great men,” tasks “regularly achieved in the days of our forebears” and still achievable today “for those who will carry them through,” thereby winning glory for themselves and proving useful to the re publica.

    Book III continues the theme of usefulness, now with respect to describing and ranking the several kinds of useful things and actions. Cicero begins by contrasting his own enforced leisure, with the overthrow of the republican regime and the rule of Mark Antony, with that of Publius Scipio, whose intentionally extracted his moments of leisure from a life of military and political activity. Scipio said that “he was never less at leisure than in his leisure-time, and was never less lonely than when he was on his own,” thinking of public business or communing with himself (III.1). Leisure and solitude lend themselves to sloth in others; they stimulated the soul of Scipio. As for himself, Cicero wishes he could say the same, as “my leisure has been imposed on me from want of public business rather than through desire for rest” (III.2). But he can imitate Scipio as best he can, if imperfectly. Scipio’s leisure and solitude were superior to my own because he, like Socrates, wrote nothing while at leisure, concentrating his mind entirely upon political and philosophic meditations undiluted by the act of writing. Lacking “the strength of mind” that enabled Scipio to ignore his solitude, Cicero writes, an act of sociality—in this instance, one directed toward the care of his son. Cicero is ‘making himself useful,’ as our phrase puts it.

    This returns Cicero’s thoughts to the relationship between the honorable and the useful. “Socrates used to pronounce a curse upon those who first separated these two things which are inseparable by nature” (III.11). In this, the Stoics concurred, arguing that nothing truly useful can be dishonorable and that the honorable is always useful—in sharp contrast to those who claim that what is honorable should serve the useful. Things said to be useful very often conflict with the useful.

    Cicero cautions that for the Stoics the identity of the honorable and the useful can only coincide perfectly among the wise. Most of us are not wise. We esteem as honorable what is not truly honorable and esteem as useful what is not truly useful. We are human but imperfectly so; we strive to fulfill our true nature but have yet to do so. For us, what the Stoics call “the honorable at a secondary level” must suffice (III.16), cultivating and admiring the virtues as imperfectly understood—thinking of justice simply as repaying debts and refraining from lying or cheating, for example. Such virtue is not to be discouraged. It readily distinguishes between the honorable as conceived imperfectly from, for example, greed for financial gain. But it does lead to doubts in the moral realm, a realm where we typically seek certitude. For example, murder is rightly deemed evil, murdering a friend especially heinous. “But if a man murders a tyrant even if he is a friend, has he thereby implicated himself in a criminal act? the Roman people in fact do not think so, for they regard this as the most noble of illustrious deeds. So in this instance has the useful prevailed over the honorable? On the contrary, the honorable has allied with the useful.” (III.19). The criterion for judging these moral dilemmas we unwise folk must consider is human nature, which is social and political. Ordinarily, murder and theft and other acts of injustice undermine the natural sociability of human beings, although in the exception given such an act might affirm that sociality by killing an enemy of that very humanity. Thus, “though nature does not object to our opting to obtain for ourselves individually rather than for another what is need for life’s necessities, she does not permit us to increase our own resources, wealth, and possessions by plundering those of other people” (III.22). The “aim and purpose of laws [is] too keep intact the unifying bonds between citizens” (III.23). This goes not only for those who live as fellow-citizens but for nations as they deal with other nations.

    As he had discussed in the Laws, nature as a whole holds together, consists of a unity of many forces and things, a harmony. There is a law of nature; nature isn’t chaotic. So too with the human soul, which is part of nature: “a lofty and noble spirit, and attitudes of courtesy, justice, and generosity, are much more in harmony with nature than are pleasure, mere life, and riches.” [3] “It is the mark of that noble and lofty spirit to despise these last, and to account them as nothing compared with the common good,” the good of the re publica (III.24). For ‘we unwise,’ we imperfect human beings, to emulate Hercules, who undertook “the greatest toils and privations so as to save or aid each and every nation, rather than to live apart from men, enjoying not only freedom from all troubles but also the greatest pleasures,” as Epicureans recommend (III.25). In engaging in military and especially political life, however, the one who “conforms with nature can inflict no harm on his fellow-man,” although he will unhesitatingly inflict harm on men who act as if they were beasts (III.25). “We do not share fellowship with tyrants” (III.32). In this sense “we must all adhere to the principle that what is useful to the individual is identical with what is useful to the community” (III.25). As Aristotle argues, we must attend to the circumstances, adjusting our conduct to them in order to achieve the honorable with the useful.

    “What is good is certainly useful, and so whatever is honorable”—by definition good—is “useful” (III.35). The circumstances which “perplex our minds” occur because some things appear to be useful when they are not (III.40). So, for example, “the good man will never promote a friend’s interests to the detriment of the re publica or in defiance of his oath or pledged word, even if he is sitting in court over him, for he then quits the role of friends to undertake that of judge” (III.44). It might seem useful to promote your friends interests in expectation of some quid pro quo down the line, but this would injure the bonds of the re publica within which your friendship is framed. On the contrary, “the good man is one who benefits all those whom he can, and who harms none unless he has been the victim of injustice” (III.76). “Is it not shameful for philosophers to have doubts about this, when even plain country folk would have no doubts?” (III.77). Even if the prize is consulship, even if the intended end is, Caesar-like, lordship “of all the world,” it remains “a monstrous error” to perform what seem to be useful but unjust acts, to “lose the luster and repute of a good man” (III.83). “Nothing is more useless to the man who has gained that eminence unjustly,” as he “fears by day and night” for his own safety, knowing that the victims of his crimes seek just revenge, and will not stop until they have it (III.84).

    In contrast to the likes of Julius Caesar and Mark Antony, Cicero holds up the example of Marcus Atilius Regulus, a consul captured by during a war with Carthage. The Carthaginian monarch sent Regulus back to the Roman senate to ask for the return of some prisoners of war; Regulus swore an oath that if the senate refused to release them he would return to Carthage to face death by torture. Instead, Regulus recommended a supremely un-useful course for himself and his family, recommending to the senators that they not release the prisoners and then returning to Carthage to face execution. In doing so, Regulus “maintain[ed] the dignity of his consular standing,” exhibited “greatness of soul and courage,” serving the re publica instead of himself (III.99). How did this serve Rome? Regulus was old, “spent with age,” whereas the Carthaginian prisoners were young, brave officers; it was more useful to Rome for Regulus to sacrifice himself than to have such men released (III.100). Cicero’s title, De Officiis, suggests the intimate relation between the ‘good offices’ of the individual man and the political office he holds. Ciceronian ethics are political to the core, yet with no suggestion of modern ‘totalitarian’ servility towards ‘the state’ or ‘the party.’

    “When men detach the useful from the honorable, they undermine the very foundations of nature” (III.101), which support the harmony of all elements not their contradiction and consequent destruction. “Nothing is useful which is not also honorable; and it is not honorable because it is useful, but useful because it is honorable” (III.110). That is, one must always ask, ‘Useful for what?’ To join pleasure with the honorable, for example, “is like mating an animal with a human” (III.118). It is Machiavelli who will commend the Centaur as a model for the prince.

     

     

     

    Notes

    1. As Walsh mildly puts it, “Machiavelli in his celebrated Il Principe (1513) diverges from the Ciceronian tradition.”
    2. Walsh suggests that Cicero alludes to the Great Civil War of 49 BC, when Julius Caesar was allowed to retain the means by which he could violate the peace agreement he had reached with the Senate.
    3. Hobbes and other materialists often put self-preservation, the maintenance of mere life on whatever terms, at the head of moral aims. Cicero is thinking more of such pleasure-seeking philosophers as the Epicureans, who argue “that all good lies in pleasure, and have maintained that virtue is praiseworthy merely because it is productive of pleasure” (III.116). This notion is “at war with the honorable,” contradicting the principal virtues of practical wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice—all now reduced to the status of instruments of pleasure (III.117).

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Theology as Inquiry

    June 14, 2022 by Will Morrisey

    Michael Bauman: Pilgrim Theology: Taking the Path of Theological Discovery. Manitou Springs: Summit Ministries, 2007.

     

    By “pilgrim theology,” the late Michael Bauman doesn’t mean the theology of the Pilgrims. He has a different journey in mind, a pilgrimage of the soul for Christian theologians. “Christian theology is an activity for those en route, and it should be conducted so as to aid those who study it and practice it to travel more efficiently and effectively toward truth. Theology ought to be, in other words, both a statement of present belief and an explorer’s compass for further intellectual navigation.” Regrettably, too many prefer “fortress theology,” system-building, structures whose inhabitants seek to guard themselves against enemy assault, expending their energies in elaborating their defenses instead of ranging out for new discoveries, “open[ing] the door to truth, to beauty, and to goodness.” By contrast, the theological pilgrim achieves not certitude—sure feeling about his convictions—but certainty—reasoned confidence in the steadfastness of the Person in whom we trust and in the convictions we have arrived at, concerning Him.

    Our confidence should be reasoned because reason corrects mistakes, which human beings are prone to make. “We have a very good excuse for our distorted perceptions: we ourselves are distorted.” As Jonathan Swift had occasion to observe, human beings are only capable of reason, not entirely, or even very, rational. For this reason, when reading God’s revealed Word, we should try to follow its meaning, not attempt to fit it into a theological system we’ve thought up for ourselves, as if each insight were a stag’s head placed neatly on an inner wall of the castle. In that “fortress” approach, “rather than the theologian having a theology, the theology has him.” “We must not allow our theology to be turned into a hermeneutic,” a system for reading that will likely ignore God’s indications of His intent which do not fit into one’s ‘method.’ Readers should open themselves to words, not pull up the drawbridge of a structure that, however impressive, remains human, all-too-human.

    Thus Bauman reprises a contrast seen in the practice of philosophy, the contrast between system-builders and Socratics. He favors the Socratics. As for philosophy itself, “I want simultaneously to endorse [it] and to identify its danger.” As a means of “skeptical debunking” in light of the principle of non-contradiction, “philosophy can disabuse us and our opponents of intellectual hubris and baseless self-assurance because it can strip away error.” In so doing, however, it cannot “supply us with much of the raw data we need for proper theologizing”; philosophy, too, must be undertaken with humility. Its zetetic or skeptical character should not be allowed to shade over into sheer denial, which is no more rational than unthinking affirmation. “Methodological skepticism must be informed by, and tempered by, objectivism, the common sense belief and practice that the working relationship between mind and senses is fundamentally valid and reliable”; “the basic dependability of mind and senses (when the function normally) cannot be denied without self-contradiction and epistemological collapse.” “Objects are what they are quite independent of anything we might say about them.”

    Socratic philosophers investigate nature, beyond the cave of opinions, of conventions. Theologians investigate God, who, “unlike nature,” is “not merely passive to our investigations.” “The process of theological knowing entails both the work of the mind, on the one hand, and God’s active desire to be known, on the other.” God intentionally reveals Himself, through His Word. A theologian should respond with “a skeptical and tolerant biblicism”—the skepticism aimed at our own thoughts and those of others, the tolerance offered to those who disagree with us, the biblicism intended as the most reliable window into God’s revelation to us, affording the best view of what He wants us to know about Him. Theologians who refuse to do think this way “have never learned to distinguish between good thoughts and their own thoughts.” They often seek disciples, not students, having stopped learning themselves. “Professors and theologians” like that “have transformed institutions of higher learning into institutions of higher indoctrination,” and not always all that high, either. “Academic freedom has its dangers,” but “no ne loom so large as its abandonment.”

    Bauman accordingly recommends three rules for Pilgrim Theologians: “statements of faith should be used as a base from which to explore,” not as a wall against contradictory claims; courage and candor rule out ad hominem attacks and require careful consideration of opposing views (“he who knows only his own side of the case probably knows little even of that”); “the only choice a scholar has is between truth and rest,” as “you cannot have both.” This means that a Christian theologian not only shouldn’t confine his thoughts to the creed of his sect but that he shouldn’t confine his thoughts to Christianity. That is, while remaining a Christian, he should not overlook interpretations of Christianity advanced by non-Christians. It can be illuminating to see oneself, and one’s opinions, as others see us, and them. Otherwise, he is “transform[ing] personal salvation into a way of knowing,” assuming “that one can move only from faith to understanding, but never from understanding to faith.” But “neither faith nor ecclesiastical commitment are a means of knowing” because “the proper functioning of the human mind when it does theology is not fundamentally different from its proper functioning when it does political theory or medical ethics,” for example. 

    The Bible is authoritative for Christians. “I am not challenging the accuracy or authority of Scripture, which is inviolable, but rather, I am questioning our methods of defending and propagating it, which are not.” “We evangelicals” make several “tactical errors” in that regard. For example, some evangelicals argue that since God inspired the Bible and God does not lie, the Bible must be without error. But “other beings than God have had their way in the matter.” Some evangelicals also say that if you admit that one element of Scripture is wrong, you must throw it all into question, a practice no one follows in considering any other document. Instead of arguments founded upon theological deduction, evangelicals should focus “on the accuracy and reliability of the Biblical data,” the only kind of arguments that non-Christians are likely to “listen to patiently.” After all, “if we counsel our opponents to be open-minded, teachable, objective, and patient scholars of good will, scholars who can feel the weight of the other side’s case, then I believe we ought to insist upon the same qualities in ourselves and our colleagues.”

    What, then, does Pilgrim Theology look like, in practice? Bauman shows us by doing some, beginning with the Person of Christ, necessarily the center of any doctrine called ‘Christianity.’ Human beings need to understand God in order to understand themselves. Unlike all other creatures, made “according to their kind,” human beings we “were made ‘in the image and likeness of God,'” which establishes “a reciprocity and kinship” between God and Man “not found anywhere else.” As “living pictures and partners of God,” human beings should not dismiss God as “irrelevant and insignificant in our quest for self-knowledge,” since “to know who we are is first to know who He is.” 

    The God we therefore want to know is not simply an ‘I’ but an ‘us.” “Let us make man in our image,” He says. He ‘talks to Himself,’ engages Himself in what “we learn later” to be a Trinity consisting of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He does this as He makes, “mak[ing] worlds with words.” So do we, when we make, especially when we make families, tribes, and political communities. We, too are “communal and communicative”; “togetherness, not aloneness, is our natural condition,” and God makes Woman as Man’s companion in accordance with His own Personhood. This notwithstanding, to be like God, to be made in His image, is not to be God or even to be His equal, as Man and Woman quickly learn when they make their attempt to know something God doesn’t want them to know. In disobeying His authority, we defied our just subordination, inasmuch as “we come from the will, and mind, and Word of God,” not the other way around. At the same time, insofar as we are like God, insofar as we are persons, we are responsible for our choices and actions. He gave us “dominion” over the earth but we disobediently gave that rulership away, allowing ourselves to be overthrown by ‘the Satan,’ that is, the enemy of ourselves and of God.

    We retain, however, some of the power of speech and of reason with which God endowed us. “God created us not only by his Word, but for his Word,” rightful recipients of that Word. “We were intended for dialogue with God,” and with one another, male and female. “When we fulfill our duty, we are doing what we were made for, doing what leads to our blessing and fulfillment,” whereas “in rejecting or neglecting our duty, we are turning from God and from our soul’s health.” If “we live lawfully with Him,” we fulfill our own purpose. We also fulfill our own need, especially now that “we are fallen and need everything.” “God is to us what water is for fish, what air is for birds, and what earth is for animals—He is our proper environment, our natural habitat,” although to say it in those words is to translate it into un-Biblical, or at least un-Genesislike, language, which does not speak of environment and nature. 

    As the “Second Adam,” the second sinless man, Jesus Christ shows Christians “both what we are now”—inferior to what we were intended to be—and “what we shall become”—not only forgiven for our sin but cleansed of it. The New Testament promises that “we shall see Christ as he is, for we shall be like Him,” “partakers of the divine nature,” as the Apostle Peter puts it. As a student of theology, “if you ask what is God like, the answer is that he is not like anything. But, if you ask who is God like, the answer is he is like Jesus.” Therefore, “to know God is to know Christ.” To know Christ is also to know ourselves, as “without Christ, we don’t understand rightly the horrifying depth and breadth of our depravity.” We have divine assistance in this task of self-knowledge, still another Person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit. 

    Christians who define themselves in opposition to the world, the flesh, and the Devil do themselves a disservice. They have inflated the importance of those things and that person instead of looking to the real standard, Christ. “The negation of a snapshot of the Devil is not a portrait of Christ” and “being out of step with the Pharisees is not the same as being in step with God.” “Christ is the center and standard of Christian existence,” not the apostles, not any segment of the Christian ecclesia, nor the ecclesia taken as a whole. It is important to know ‘about’ God, to gain some of the theologians’ knowledge, but this should not be confused with knowing God as a person. I might be able to know a lot about you, know your height, weight, form, genetic composition, mannerisms. That isn’t knowing you. Knowing God as Jesus Christ is to see how He was indeed innocent as a dove, prudent as a serpent, whether it came to carpentry or verbal combat. Everyone notices his agapic love, but this “shows up in the form of his diligent perceptivity, his resolute teachability, and his train-stopping shrewdness.” As for ourselves, opening ourselves to the guidance of the Holy Spirit, we “must learn to grow as he grew before we can hope to do as He did and be as He was.” Mere admiration is not enough.

    In reading the Gospels we are reading stories. They are the ‘data,’ the ‘evidence’ Christian theologians begin with. But “theologians must always bear in mind that the highest and clearest revelation God ever gave us of himself was as a Person, not as either a proposition of a story.” Persons are never as ‘parsable’ as propositions or stories. Martin Luther was right to say that “God hides not only in his revelation but behind it as well.” This being so, theologians need to approach their task with humility, “not contentiousness and bickering about such unknown, and unknowable, things as the functional relationship either between the divine ousia and the divine energies, on the one hand, or that between deity and humanity in the hypostatic union, on the other.” Such matters are beyond our intellectual pay grade. “Because persons are not reducible to propositions, no man, much less a God-man, can be fully or exactly captured in words or ideas, even inspired words or ideas.” For example, the Christian Fathers attempted to press Jesus into a “family of Greek concepts.” This “yield[ed] great insight,” up to a point. But “no theological road goes on forever.” 

    So, for example, the Christian fathers ruled out the claim of the monothelites, “who said that the will native to the divine nature and the will native to the human nature coalesced into one will.” This cannot have been so, given Christ’s prayer to His Father at Gethsemane, in which He begs to be relieved of physical and spiritual torture on the Cross. But in claiming that Christ “had two natures and hence two wills,” while remaining “only one person,” they implied “that natures will, not persons, and that willing pertains not to persons but to natures, as if a human will and a human nature ever existed without a human persons and as if human nature and human person are (and ought to be considered) a distinct in extra-mental reality as they are in some people’s thought.” In willing, human nature must (as it were) go through human personhood, as human nature can manifest itself only in a person, even as it is recognizable in all human persons. 

    Beginning with the historical record in the Bible, the Christian theologian should take care not to become a “historicist,” by which Bauman means a historian only. Similarly, he “must be rational, but not a rationalist”; Christ’s prudence is practical reasoning, not a form of theoretical system-building. In examining the Biblical text, we should follow Alexander Pope’s advice: “to read every work of wit in the same spirit as its author writ.” Again, objectivity: After all, is “meaning is the prerogative of the reader and not the author, no professor can properly prevent any student from giving the professor’s course syllabus, the professor’s lectures, the professor’s assignments, or the professor’s test questions whatever meaning the student sees fit.” ‘Deconstruction,’ indeed. We should not “confuse the role of the interpreter with that of the author.” 

    Some theologians attempt to bend Christianity into a rationalist system with political intent. One such attempt is ‘liberation theology,’ which puts Christianity into a Marxist or neo-Marxist framework. Bauman is well aware of the defects of Marxist ‘critique’ itself; he knows that free markets outperform command economies, the colonialism didn’t cause Third-World poverty. “Democratic capitalism succeeds where other systems fail because it is more firmly rooted in the inescapable facts of economic scarcity, of incomplete knowledge, and of human imperfectability”—all observation one easily gathered from the Bible as well as from experience. However, it is Marxism’s incompatibility with the Bible that he calls upon his fellow theologians to attend.

    Considered Biblically, Marxists commit five “cognitive failures.” First, they do not see that human institutions cannot fundamentally change human nature, that “notoriously intractable” thing. As the prophet Jeremiah and the Apostle Paul both affirm, the human heart is desperately wicked. “Marxism cannot succeed because it has no way to harness human depravity for the service of others,” supposing instead that a radical revision of human institutions will eliminate human depravity. Marxism also assumes that economic conditions “shape everything and everyone.” But in fact “public policy and political theory are enacted only by real and identifiable human beings, not by any alleged impersonal forces of change set loose in the world at large.” By overlooking individuals and seeing only aggregates—imperialists and revolutionaries, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—Marxists “applaud or condemn millions of individuals for no other reason than that those individuals happen to fall into one or the other artificial category. For such ‘offenses’ millions of people, quite literally, have died.”

    Third, Marxists entertain a faulty view of justice, making it “synonymous with equality.” The Bible never claims that socioeconomic equality is possible on earth, or even desirable there. Hence charity as manifested in uncoerced redistribution of wealth. “Christ indicates that God’s just judgment of human beings is based upon their wise stewardship of the varied gifts (financial and otherwise) that he has entrusted to them., not upon either the allegedly egalitarian initial allocation of those gifts or upon their egalitarian final disbursement.” Additionally, Marxists take a mistaken view of private property. “By abolishing private property rights, Marxism has cut economic rewards loose from risk taking, from effort, and from saving.” But the New Testament shows that when early Christians attempted to hold goods in common, the experiment failed, leading to “complaints and to divisions among believers (Acts 6:1).” “Socialism is a system that not even the apostles themselves could make work.” Moreover, human beings do not belong to themselves, either individually (as libertarians claim) or collectively (as per Marxism). We belong to God. This being so, human beings cannot claim the right to dispose of their property, including themselves, in any manner they please. This is what rules out suicide and abortion. My right to ‘control my own body,’ to swing my own fist, ends not only at or near the point of your nose but at the destruction of my life or of any life that has done no harm to me or to my family or country.

    Finally, Marxism misunderstands the nature of wealth, neglecting the conditions of production and the human capacity for inventiveness in its transfixion on redistributing the products we generate. Capitalism or private ownership of the means of production does indeed recognize human selfishness, which is ineradicable with or without capitalism. But it also requires consideration of others. “If you neglect your neighbor’s needs; if you reuse to put your time, talent, and treasure to work providing for his convenience; your enterprise comes to nothing,” whereas “if you carefully consider and then appropriately satisfy your neighbor’s need you will enjoy the fruit of your labors.” In this way, “the marketplace is a school for virtue” in a way that the strictures of socialism can never be.

    Marx’s atheist materialism alone makes it hard to combine with Christianity. But what about Christian leftism—seen, for example, in the writings of Jacques Ellul? Ellul is a Christian anarchist who claims that the Old and New Testaments are anti-political. “As is almost embarrassingly obvious, the Old Testament never impugns ‘political power in itself’ among Gentile nations”—as Ellul asserts—it rather “excoriates the abuses those powers sometimes perpetrate.” Nor does it “challenge Gentile regimes” in terms of their legitimacy or in terms of the regimes themselves; God vigorously condemns their idolatry, but not their origin or their regime form. As for Israel, the Book of Deuteronomy specifies an elaborate legal code and, as far back as Genesis 9, God prescribes and delegates capital punishment as a power to be enacted by human beings “at their discretion.” With respect to I Samuel 8, where the Israelites call for a human king, their fault lies in their rejection of divine rule, not “because political power is always and everywhere inescapably evil, or because monarchy is inherently vile.” Nor does Jesus reject political rule. On the contrary, he considers the rule of Pilate to be divinely ordained (John 19:11).

    When it comes to politics, Jesus offers no counsels of perfection. Christian political theory instead “seeks that form of government that is attended with the fewest and most pardonable shortcomings, and it knows that anarchism is not that form which it seeks,” inasmuch as “Christian political theory deals with possibilities, not with unreachable goals.” In this, Ellul falls into self-contradiction, failing to understand that “the abolition of power can be accomplished, imposed, and maintained only by means of power,” inasmuch as “it takes a power to check a power.” “Without political power,” freedom is impossible, which is why the ‘ancients’ understood liberty to mean civic participation and why (some of) the ‘modern’ demand representative government and federalism in the modern state. Otherwise, “freedom without law endures as long as a lamb among hungry wolves.” To defend freedom, one needs not the absence of power but a right way of wielding it. Hence the importance of regimes and also of citizen virtue. “The various coercive powers of family, of church, of state, and of school are not inimical to virtue; rather, they help secure it and make it possible.” 

    Ellul presents the unusual spectacle of a thinker who accepts the Marxist critique of modern society and the Marxist expectation that the modern state can, should, and will ‘wither away,’ while refusing to accept the socioeconomic and political means by which Marxists intend to get from here to there. He decries human alienation, capitalism, money; he embraces determinism (although he prefers neo-Marxist cultural determinism to the economic determinism of Marx and Engels), dialectics, and revolution. Perhaps because he is a cultural determinist, not an economic determinist, a materialist, he supposes that cultural revision can replace coercion.

    An even more extreme form of ‘cultural’ politics may be seen in contemporary feminism, which weaponizes words. For his part, Bauman “will defy all those who insist on taking the language and the literature of Western tradition to the verbal veterinarian in order to have them neutered.” In theology, feminists attempt to substitute God, Jesus, and the Spirit for Father, Son and Holy Ghost, “as if the Son were not God, as if the revelation in Scripture could be altered at will, and as if heresy were a trifle.” Jesus almost always spoke of God as Father, “not merely continu[ing] the patriarchal theology of the Old Testament” but intensifying it, inasmuch as God is rarely described as “Father” in the Old Testament. “The feminists, in other words, are fighting with Christ, and they must be made to realize this,” if they do not already. Jesus insists that “no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the Son reveals Him, and the Son has revealed Him to us as Father. If you reject that revelation, then, in some profound fashion, you can not know God.”

    Another way feminists describe the Trinity is as Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer. This replaces the personhood of God with a set of functions—a variation of the Sabellian heresy, “modalism,” which “denied that God is authoritatively revealed to us as three Persons, but which affirmed instead that God merely fulfills three functions and plays three roles.” To this, feminists add a second well-known heresy, the one advanced by Marcion, who “rejected the authoritative witness of the Hebrew Scriptures,” denigrating the God revealed in them. In their version of Marcionism, “feminists reject the God of the Jews because they think He is merely the culture-bound product of a political an sexist agenda. I reject the God of the feminists for precisely the same reason.”

    That agenda includes legalized abortion, again by an act of “linguistic sleight of hand.” To call the murder of babies the ‘abortion’ of a ‘fetus,’ feminist words hide “the real nature (murder) of their action and the real identity (baby) of their victim”; some even go further, calling this the ‘termination of a pregnancy,’ which artfully re-centers the question on the condition of the woman, not the life of her child. This act is done on the basis of the claim that a woman has the right to control her own body. Indeed she does, “but that is not the issue here.” “It is not her body, after all, that is being murdered; it is someone else’s,” and the body of a human being at that—having “twenty-three sets of paired chromosomes,” a set different from her own. “It is not something she may do with as she pleases.” “I do believe in abortion rights. I believe that it is the right of every human being not to be murdered by abortion.”

    More controversially, in turning to the foundations of ethical thought, Bauman argues that no firm morality can be sustained without fidelity to God. His target appears to be a form of Aristotelianism that attempts to incorporate modern evolutionary theory into its teleological account of nature. This neo-Aristotelianism holds that human nature has a purpose and that ethical conduct consists in habituating the soul in ways that conduce to fulfilling that purpose. [1] On the contrary, Bauman writes, “one must not contend that human nature and human flourishing yield moral absolutes, properly so-called, because such a theory fails to account for (1) the origin of human nature, (2) changes in human nature, and (3) the selection of ‘flourishing’ as a category of moral discernment.” 

    With respect to human origins, “if nature arose as the chance result of mindless evolutionary process, a process behind which exists no divine mind and no divine plan, then moral absolutes disappear” because right and wrong themselves must be “accidents, not moral absolutes.” That is, such a theory runs squarely into Hume’s ‘is/ought’ problem. It amounts to “a system of biological relativism.”

    Similarly, if changes in human nature occur as the result either of evolutionary theory’s natural selection or of humanly-designed transformation (for example, manipulation of the human genome to get rid of, say, aggression), then that “is the death knell of any and all moral absolutes supposedly rooted in human nature.” What will be produced will no longer be “fully human”; the means will have destroyed the end. Further, as such changes occur, over time, “which version of human nature supersedes the other and is to be considered the fountain from which all right and wrong arise?” We will then present ourselves with “the logical contradiction of having a number of competing sets of moral absolutes.” 

    Finally, “why flourishing (and not something else) should be the measure of virtue, cannot be proven.” “Flourishing” is a squishy category; Bauman charges that it leaves us with the chaos of personal preferences, whereby there is no real way to choose between the morality of Jesus of Nazareth and the morality of the Marquis de Sade. In arguing as C. S. Lewis does in The Abolition of Man, that there exists among the nations “substantial agreement…about the rules of right and wrong,” and that “therefore these rules of right and wrong are moral absolutes,” makes consensus the “measure of morality.” But “‘majority’ is no synonym for ‘morality.'”

    Given these observations, Bauman concludes that “virtue is not known by reason alone, but by revelation and by Providence.” “If there is no God, there is no good.” 

    The conclusion doesn’t quite follow from the premises, however. The logical contradiction of having a number of competing sets of moral absolutes occurs as well among sets of religious persons as it does among atheists. Substitute ‘piety’ for ‘flourishing’ in the formulation above and you see what I mean. Indeed, Christian moralists are among the first to charge that a man like de Sade has made a (false) god out of his pleasure, especially in the satisfaction of his libido dominandi. And rightly so, one might well argue, but that doesn’t remove the problem of moral pluralism until you can show the falsity of all gods but God. And if one says that reason can’t show that but revelation can, that to know God is to know Him as a Person, noetically by means of His Holy Spirit, not logically as the conclusion of a proof, that still doesn’t show that an atheist can’t sustain a theory of virtue.

    Why not? Because a proponent of virtue as flourishing can reply, ‘I base my ethics on a meaning of ‘good’ that differs from yours. There are at least two ways of calling someone or something good. One is on the basis of the judgment of some superior being; I say, “good dog” or “bad dog” depending upon whether the dog obeys me, as its master. The other is on the basis of whether the dog fulfills its nature, instances the characteristic qualities of its species and breed. A good human might well be good (or as good as humans get) in the eyes of God; a good human might also be good according to the standard of human nature. This might include not only bodily health but a rightly-ordered soul, a soul that exhibits the distinctively human characteristics of speech and reason. 

    Having disposed to his satisfaction of nature as a source of morality, Bauman turns to another putative source of morality, history. He views it favorably, not as a source of morality (in the manner of ‘historicists,’ who tend to claim that the course of events points not only onward but finally upward) but as a source of vicarious experience, from which one’s native prudence may be enhanced. “The history of mankind is a narrative of frauds and deceits,” the storybook of evildoing and evil-saying. “An acquaintance with the ways of evil…engenders for us a protection”; “we need not fall prey to the same old ploys our fathers did.” History provides us with “a treasure trove of wisdom, gleaned from thousands of years of experience and thoughtful reflection.” History also “enables us to make informed predictions about the likely outcome of various possible courses of action.” One comes to beware those who tell us (for example) that the dictatorship of the proletarian vanguard may be harsh but it will yield sweet fruit. Still another benefit of historical study is the study of human reasoning. As Bauman has himself demonstrated, “most current philosophical and theological disagreements stem from presuppositions that reach far back into the history of ideas.” Listening to the latest ‘opinion maker’ or ‘thought leader,’ one almost always finds unoriginality. Intellectual shock tactics become less shocking if you know where the argument is going because you know where it’s been taken before. And the study of history itself delights, “afford[ing] both the excitement of discover and the satisfaction of acquired mastery.”

    Still another source of morality is quite familiar to any theologian, pilgrim or otherwise. It is eschatology, a form of prophecy that can be much abused. In keeping with his personalism, Bauman turns away from “macro-eschatology” or “God’s plan for the nations and the world” toward “micro-eschatology” or “God’s plan for individual people.” The latter is “more suitable for a theological pilgrimage,” as Scripture “is more clear and accessible” in this realm than in the Book of Revelation (to take the most striking example). The Bible’s vision for individual Christians is that “they shall be like Christ,” and Christ is the embodiment of a telos on a human, not a ‘world-historical’ scale. As what the world Christians will live in with Jesus will be like, “I don’t know.” He will surprise us.

    The final source of moral authority in the modern world Bauman addresses is science, which claims not to prophesy but to predict, with ever-increasing rigor, because it can make its predictions come true, with ever-increasing power. He considers scientists to be more like theologians than scientists care to admit, at least in terms of their cosmological theories, although the theories themselves vary more than Christian theological orthodoxy does. That may be because God assists theologians in their quest to understand him more than nature assists scientists in their quest to understand it: “unlike nature, God wills to be understood and actively reveals Himself to us,” given Christian revelation a finality not seen in scientific theologizing. At the same time, scientists “tend to resist the overthrow of their cherished beliefs” as much as anyone else, they can be as stubborn as theologians in resisting such challenges, albeit with less warrant, since they make so much of experimentation and revision of opinion.

    Their claims to empiricism are also misplaced. “Many of the issues of science are neither purely scientific nor genuinely empirical,” inasmuch as scientific presuppositions and procedures are inescapably philosophical and, indeed, empiricism itself rests of philosophic grounds. “If, as some scientists insist, real science is truly empirical and reduces only to empirical methods and to the conclusions reached by using them, then there is no real science, because the theory-independent observation, analysis, and conclusions needed to establish such empirical premises are simply not possible.” “Physics always has its metaphysics.” On the basis of science so conceived, scientists can’t say why science is good.

    Nor can it say what it is. To ask, ‘What is science?’ begs a philosophic, not an empirical answer “because the question itself presupposes and requires a vantage point from outside science.” 

    What has this to do with Christ, as distinguished from philosophy? Science is procedurally a-theist, non-theistic. It implicitly “denies that Christ is Lord of the universe, an inescapably theological denial.” “Because Christ is foundational to the universe, He is foundational to science,” providing the rational ground upon which the sciences stand. By claiming “that only those things that are testable under controlled laboratory conditions qualify as hard knowledge,” that “all else is merely opinion,” scientists assume an empiricism that cannot confirm its own validity. In the moral and political realms, preeminently realms of opinion, this leaves only force, that empirical thing, as the only arbiter. 

    To make a Person, Christ, the foundation of the universe, indeed its Creator, does not, however, require one to accept Bauman’s own radical personalism. He regards all taxonomies as artificial, even if “helpful and serviceable.” “While the beings that populate those categories most emphatically do exist, the families, orders, classes and phyla into which we have pigeon-holed them do not.” Such categories “do not exist outside the taxonomists mind.” This nominalism is little more than empiricism in disguise. It is also un-Biblical, given Adam’s God-given task of naming the plants and animals in the Garden according to their kind. The many nouns Bauman uses in the course of his book and the logical arguments he makes neither help nor serve any person (except by accident) if they exist only in his own head. Such wise sentences as “Because human nature is what it is, without great volumes of enforceable, law, freedom is impossible” fall into the void.

    Bauman ends with a vigorous polemic against the mentality of the New Left of the 1960s, which he once admired. “Those who loved the sixties own today,” having occupied authoritative institutions in the universities, the media, and governmental bureaucracies. But this pilgrim has moved on. “My desire for you is that you throw off the vestiges of leftist cultural subversion” and “become the faithful and ardent friend of God.” That is the true liberation, which the liberationists of the Sixties had not achieved because they could not achieve it on the road they chose to take.

    When he wrote this book, Michael Bauman had left that road, although he may have left a shoe behind on it, never having re-shod his thinking with a realism that recognizes not only persons and things as real but kinds as real, too. He was a colleague of mine for fifteen years, and it is one of my regrets that I didn’t read his book until after he had died. I wish I had given myself the chance to talk to him about it.

     

    Note

    1. An example of this claim may be found in Larry Arhhart: Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.)

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

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