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    The Religious Statecraft of Pius X

    September 13, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Pius X: The Complete Collected Encyclicals of Pius X. Privately published, 2023.

     

    Born in 1835 in the Kingdom of Lombardy, Giuseppe Melchiorre Sarto attended the Seminary of Padua, where he studied the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and canon law before being ordained as a priest in 1858. He rose in rank within the Church, serving as spiritual director and later professor at the seminary in the Diocese of Treviso, then as Bishop of Mantua, beginning in 1884. Nine years later, Pope Leo XIII appointed him to the Sacred College of Cardinals, and he succeeded Leo in the papacy in 1903. Notable as a critic of “modernism” in the Church, he died in August 1914, on the eve of the war that has sometimes been described as the debacle of European modernity. The Church canonized him in 1952. 

    In his first message as pope, Pius professed himself “disturbed” at having succeeded such an eminent pastor as Leo but “terrified beyond all else by the disastrous state of human society today.” “For who can fail to see that society is at the present time, more than in any past age, suffering from a terrible and deep-rooted malady which, developing every day and eating into its inmost being, is dragging it to destruction?” Against this, citing Ephesians i.10,”We have no other program in the Supreme Pontificate but that of ‘restoring all things in Christ'” amidst a society in which “every effort and every artifice is used to destroy utterly the memory and the knowledge of God,” for Whom “all respect” has been “extinguished among the majority of men.” In modernity, “man has with infinite temerity put himself in the place of God,” making “of the universe a temple wherein he himself is to be adored.” The result has been a Hobbesian world, in which “the greater part of mankind [are] fighting among themselves so savagely as to make it seem as though strife were universal.” While many cry for peace, “to want peace without God is an absurdity, seeing that where God is absent thence too justice flies, and when justice is taken away it is vain to cherish the hope of peace.” He therefore calls upon his Church brethren to “lead mankind back to the dominion of Christ” as a spiritual necessity, “a natural duty,” and in “our common interest” as human beings.

    The path to Christ “is the Church.” Once the Church has refuted the pretension of human self-deification, it must continue on “to restore to their ancient place of honor the most holy laws and counsels of the gospel; to proclaim aloud the truths taught by the Church, and her teachings on the sanctity of marriage, on the education and discipline of youth, on the possession and use of property, the duties that men owe to those who rule the State; and lastly to restore equilibrium between the different classes of society according to Christian precept and custom.” Central to these tasks will be the reform and reinvigoration of Catholic education: “How many there are who mock Christ and abhor the Church and the Gospel more through ignorance than through badness of mind.” “Progress of knowledge” need not extinguish faith; it is ignorance that does so. “The more ignorance prevails the greater is the havoc wrought by incredulity.” In the parishes, however, the most effective way to teach is by example, as “luminous examples given by the great army of soldiers of Christ will be of much greater avail in moving and drawing men than words and sublime dissertations.” [1]

    His first specific step to realize this reformation was a letter on Church music, crucial to satisfying the need to establish “the decorum of the House of God in which the august mysteries of religion are celebrated” with “sacred chant and music.” There has been “a general tendency to deviate from the right rule,” which is “to clothe with suitable melody the liturgical text proposed for the understanding of the faithful…in order that through it the faithful may be more easily moved to devotion and better disposed for the reception of the fruits of grace belonging to the celebration of the most holy mysteries.” Although “every nation is permitted to admit into its ecclesiastical compositions those special forms which may be said to constitute its native music,” those forms “must be subordinated in such a manner to the general characteristics of sacred music,” the supreme model of which is the Gregorian Chant. The congregants should themselves participate in the Chant, so that they “may again take a more active part in the ecclesiastical offices, as was the case in ancient times.” The human voice should predominate over organ music.  Modern music “in the theatrical style” (“which was in the greatest vogue, especially in Italy, during the last century”) should be avoided in worship services, for “its very nature is diametrically opposed to Gregorian Chant and classic polyphony, and therefore to the most important law of all good sacred music.” But even the best music should be kept in strict subordination to the liturgy; “it must be considered a very grave abuse when the liturgy in ecclesiastical function is made to appear secondary to and in a manner at the service of the music, for the music is merely a part of the liturgy and its humble handmaid.” As Plato’s Socrates knew, music tunes souls, readying them for reason or for unreason and in a Christian church it should be such as prepares them for receiving the Holy Spirit by word, the Gospel, and in action, by the sacraments.

    If Logos means God’s Word, and His Word is reasonable, then the Church should follow the Fourth Council of the Lateran, which in 1215 made sacramental confession and Holy Communion mandatory only after a child “had attained the age of reason.” By the age of reason, the Church Fathers did not mean the age where formal instruction in logic might be undertaken but simply the time when the child “knows the difference between the Eucharistic Bread and ordinary, material bread, and can therefore approach the altar with proper devotion.” For this “full use of reason is not required, for a certain beginning of the use of reason, that is, some use of reason suffices.” Thought governed by the principle on non-contradiction enables the mind to make distinctions between one thing and another, a capacity that small children have attained.

    Beyond this elementary instruction, further knowledge of God begins with this natural capacity of the intellect. But if the intellect lacks “its companion light,” the light of the Gospel, it remains unable to see its way “to the paths of justice.” “Christian teaching reveals God and His infinite perfection with far greater clarity than is possible by the human faculties alone.” Mere “knowledge of religion” can coincide with “a perverse will and unbridled conduct.” Christian education therefore requires not only faith, “which is of the mind,” but hope, “which is of the will,” and love, “which is of the heart.” Christian education addresses “the whole man” as “the son of the heavenly Father, in Whose image he is formed, and with Whom he is destined to live in eternal happiness,” as is revealed “only by the doctrine of Jesus Christ.” Outward actions, such as baptism and giving alms, are thus less important than teaching. This is why the Council of Trent decreed that the “first and most important work” of pastors is to educate the faithful, carefully distinguishing the “milk” of catechetical instruction from the solid “bread” of the Gospel. The catechist will “take up one or other of the truths of faith or Christian morality and then explain it in all its parts,” comparing God’s command to “what is our actual conduct,” using “examples appropriately taken from the Holy Scriptures, Church history and the lives of the saints” applying them to his hearers’ own lives, showing them “how they are to regulate their own conduct” and “exhort[ing] all present to dread and avoid vice and to practice virtue.” Without this fundamental instruction—aimed, like the liturgy, including music, at preparing the soul for attention to the things of God—the more advanced instruction in the Gospel will prove little more than puffery.

    Citing the intention to restore “all things in Christ” enunciated in his first Encyclical letter, Pius reaffirms the substance of the Gospel doctrine on the miracle of the Immaculate Conception, a doctrine which had been reaffirmed fifty years earlier by Pope Pius IX. “For can anyone fail to see that there is no surer or more direct road than by Mary for uniting all mankind in Christ and obtaining through Him the perfect adoption of sons, that we may be holy and immaculate in the sight of God.” That is, it is in a sense no less miraculous that decidedly unholy human beings may be ‘born again,’ becoming sons and daughters not only of their own parents but of God, than it was for God to be born of a woman. Both the ‘reconception’ Christians experience and the Conception of God in Mary are ‘immaculate’ or untainted by sin. Upon Mary, “as upon a foundation, the noblest after Christ, rises the edifice of the faith of all centuries.” Since faith is a thing of the mind, and education guides the mind, Mary is indispensable to Christian education.  “With her alone of all others Jesus was for thirty years united”; as a result, “Who could better than His Mother have an open knowledge of the admirable mysteries of the birth and childhood of Christ, and above all of the mystery of the Incarnation, which is the beginning and the foundation of faith?” In “sharing as she did the thoughts and the secret wishes of Christ she may be said to have lived the very life of her Son,” and “nobody can ever be more competent as a guide and teacher of the knowledge of Christ.” Devotion to Mary also remedies the defects of the will and the heart, since in seeking “to gain the heart of Mary,” in courting her favor, one must “correct his vicious habits and to subdue the passions which incite him to evil.” Mary educates the whole man, and does so by her nature, having been exempted from “all stain of original sin” by God. This must be so, because the Son of God took not only his human nature from her but something of her own nature. By affirming the truth of the Immaculate Conception precisely as a miracle, Christians reject rationalism and materialism. Mary “has exterminated all heresies in the world” not by preaching but by her life, crushing the head of the serpent and his ‘worldly wisdom’ with “Christian wisdom,” the purpose of Christian education in full.

    Such heresies have entered the Church itself. “An air of independence which is fatal for souls is widely diffused in the world, and has found its way even within the sanctuary, show[ing] itself not only in relation to authority but also in regard to doctrine.” He tells an assemblage of bishops that “some of our young clerics, animated by that spirit of unbridled criticism which holds sway at the present day, have come to lose all respect for the learning which comes from our great teachers, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, the interpreters of revealed doctrine”—foremost among them, Thomas Aquinas, with whose Summa the mind of Pius himself had been fortified. “If ever you have in your seminary one of those new-style savants, get rid of him without delay…. You will always regret having ordained even one such person; never will you regret having excluded him.” Since “a poisonous atmosphere corrupts men’s minds to a great extent today,” bishops should proceed deliberately with ordination. “Your priests will be as you have trained them,” and you are the ones who must train them, rather than releasing them into the secular universities without “very good reasons” for doing so and after “necessary precautions have been taken.” Seminarians are not to “take part in external activities,” to read newspapers and periodicals except “those with solid principles and which the Bishop deems suitable for their study.” Bishops should appoint a spiritual director for each seminary, a man with the innocence of doves and the prudence of serpents, ready “to train the young men in solid piety, the primary foundation of the spiritual life.”

    So reformed, so re-centered on Christ, the Church can then resume what Pius regards as its rightful task not only as “the guardian and protector of Christian society” but as the “solid foundation for civil legislation. In the past, proper relations between Church and State require “the public recognition of the authority of the Church in those matters which touched upon conscience in any manner” and “the subordination of all the laws of the State to the Divine laws of the Gospel,” ensuring that “the harmony of the two powers in securing the temporal welfare of the people in such a way that their eternal welfare did not suffer.” In modern life, religious toleration prevails, offering “indiscriminately to all the right to influence public opinion.” Very well then, Catholics “can certainly use this to their advantage.” To do so, they must “prove themselves as capable as others (in fact, more capable than others) by cooperating in the material and civil welfare of the people,” to “acquire that authority and prestige which will make them capable of defending and promoting a higher good, namely, that of the soul.” In regimes of liberal democracy, the Church can no longer wield political power directly but it can reestablish itself among in the minds and hearts of the sovereign people without formal Church establishment. 

    Since the twelfth century, the Catholic Church had formalized its relations with civil governments by signing concordats—effectively, treaties whereby a given state would agree to a set of licit practices within it by a ‘foreign power,’ the Church. The Church never committed itself to treating with any one regime type. So long as the Church could freely perform its duties to God and to men, it was ecumenical with respect to rulers and ruling institutions. What Pius deplores in modern times is ‘laicization’ of civil society, particularly as seen in the French Law of Separation the Churches and State, enacted in 1905. Although the Concordat of 1801 had re-established the Catholic Church in France after its disestablishment and the dispossession of Church properties under the First Republic, secularization had resumed, gradually, in the 1880s within the education system. In 1904, the Third Republic had severed diplomatic with the Holy See. The new law completed the task, permitting divorce, replacing nuns with laywomen as hospital nurses, ending exemption from military conscription for priests, transferring Church property to the national and municipal governments, banning public prayers at the beginning of parliamentary sessions, and eliminating religious references from oaths taken in courtrooms as well as any religious symbols in the courtrooms. Pius deems this violation of the Concordat to be “as disastrous for society as it is for religion,” an act of “injustice to God,” inasmuch as “the Creator of man is also the Founder of human societies, and preserves their existence as He preserves our own,” incurring an obligation to “a public and social worship to honor Him,” not merely a guarantee of Christian worship conceived as “a private cult.” The purpose of the God-ordained political community isn’t “the pursuit of public prosperity during this life only”—a “proximate” aim—but of “man’s eternal happiness after this short life shall have run its course.” Under the Law, however, the Church in France survives “under the domination of the civil power,” having taken over education and other important functions of Christian charity and having revoked the government subsidies Napoleon had instituted as compensation for the despoiling of Church properties during the Revolution. The framers of the Law admit that they intend to “de-Catholicize” France, even to the extent of severing religious institutions from the Church hierarchy by making them “judicially answerable to the civil authority.” Pius adjures French Catholics to defend the Church by “model[ing] all your actions and your entire lives” so that they “may do honor to the faith you profess” and then unite with “your priests, your bishops, and above all with this Apostolic see,” going forth fearlessly and prayerfully to resist these statist depredations, “employ[ing] all means which the law recognizes as within the rights of all citizens to arrange for and organize religious worship.” In so doing, French Catholics must anticipate that their adversaries will falsely claim that “the form of the Republic in France is hateful to Us,” that the Pope intends “to overthrow it.” They will pretend that the Church seeks “to arouse religious war in France,” but on the contrary, “the whole world now knows that if peace of conscience is broken in France, that is not the work of the Church but of her enemies.” [2]

    Some of Pius’s suspicions were directed at would-be ‘helpers’ of the Church. In 1894, a French lay Catholic named Marc Sangnier founded Le Sillon (“The Path”). Responding to Leo XIII’s call for increased civil-social engagement by Church members, Sangnier hoped generally to reconcile Catholicism with the democratic-republican regime in general and with the French labor movement in particular. Membership grew to 500,000—predominantly laypersons and the younger clergy. The Sillon arrayed itself against the resolutely monarchist enemy of the Third Republic, Charles Maurras’s Action Française. [3]

    Initially hopeful, by 1910 Pius became skeptical of the Sillon. Admittedly, “the Sillon did raise among the workers the standard of Jesus Christ, the symbol of salvation for peoples and nations,” inculcating “a respect for religion upon the least willing groups, accustoming the ignorant and the impious to hearing the Word of God,” “proudly proclaiming their faith in the face of a hostile audience,” often consisting of urban workers more accustomed to hearing secular-republican and Marxist doctrines from union organizers. Unfortunately, the leaders of the Sillon “were not adequately equipped with historical knowledge, sound philosophy, and solid theology to tackle without danger the difficult social problems in which their work and their inclinations were involving them.” They incautiously allowed “the penetration of liberal and Protestant concepts” into their talks, adapting Catholicism as much to laïcité as they adapted laïcité to Catholicism. In so doing, “the Sillonists are deceiving themselves when they believe that they are working in a field that lies outside the limits of Church authority and of its doctrinal and directive power,” a misconception Pius was not slow to correct.

    In calling for Catholic civic engagement, Leo XIII rejected radical egalitarianism or social leveling, affirming rather that Christian Democracy “must preserve the diversity of classes which is assuredly the attribute of a soundly constituted state.” Neither popular sovereignty nor social egalitarianism met with Leo’s approval, yet these are the doctrines the Sillon promotes. Pius firmly replies: “In these times of social and intellectual anarchy when everyone takes it upon himself to teach as a teacher and lawmaker—the City cannot be built otherwise than as God has built it; society cannot be set up unless the Church lays the foundations and supervises the work; no, civilization is not something yet to be found, nor is the New City to be built on hazy nations; it has been in existence and still is: it is Christian civilization, it is the Catholic City. It has only to be set up and restored continually against the unremitting attacks of insane dreamers, rebels and miscreants.” 

    Pius regards the Sillon’s regard for human dignity as praiseworthy, but its conception of human dignity is mistaken, taken from philosophers “of whom the Church does not at all feel proud,” the ‘philosophers of freedom’ who define liberty as autonomy. [4] From the principle of autonomy they derive the principles of economic, political, and intellectual emancipation from bosses, from all regimes other than democracy, and from the Church hierarchy, respectively. “The leveling down of differences from this threefold point of view will bring about equality among men, and such equality is viewed as true human justice.” Without the traditional hierarchies ordained by God, the bonds of society will consist of “love or one’s occupation and for the welfare of the community.” Thus, fraternity will give shape and cohesion to the society of equality and liberty. None of this comports with Leo’s intention, which had been consistent with “the sentiments of Catholics who hold that the right of government derives from God as its natural and necessary principle.” Sillonists have committed “the error of philosophism,” embracing doctrines propounded by the philosophes who endowed the Jacobins with what little intellectual heft they had. In a word, the Sillon resembles a salon. By making authority “a shadow, a myth,” Sillonists establish a principle whereby there can be “no more law properly so-called, no more obedience” to rulers secular or religious. “Even the priest, on entering [The Sillon], lowers the eminent dignity of his priesthood and, by a strange reversal of roles, becomes a student, placing himself on a level with his young friends, and is no more than a comrade.” The philosophy of freedom inclines toward anarchism. But in fact, as Leo himself had declared, the people are entitled “to choose for themselves the form of government which best corresponds with their character or with the institutions and customs handed down by their forefathers.” Following Aquinas, who follows Aristotle, the Church has long considered kingship, aristocracy, and mixed regimes as licit forms of government, since “justice is compatible with any of them.” “Democracy does not enjoy a special privilege.” In embracing it, and rejecting all other regimes, the Sillon “subjects its religion to a political party,” when the Church “has always left to the nations the care of giving themselves the form of government which they think most suited to their needs.”

    Nor does the Church endorse the secularist notion of fraternity. “Love of our neighbor flows from our love for God,” and “any other kind of love is sheer illusion sterile and fleeting,” inasmuch as “pagan and secular societies of ages past…show that concern for common interests or affinities of nature weigh very little against the passions and wild desires of the heart.” Catholicism means universalism, but it is far from an indiscriminate universalism. Indeed, “by separating fraternity from Christian charity thus understood, democracy, far from being a progress, would mean a disastrous step backwards for civilization,” especially since their version of fraternity tolerates false ideas, errors, and vices—interdenominationalism and indeed “promiscuity” of association. Similarly, secularist notions of human dignity only exalt “human pride.” The Sillonists are therefore utopians: “Unless human nature can be changed, which is not within the power of the Sillonists,” their envisioned society will never arrive. Real fraternity will occur only when “all minds” are “united in the knowledge of Truth, all wills united in morality, and all hearts in the love of God and His Son Jesus Christ,” which only the Catholic Church affords. “Vague idealism and civic virtues” will not do. And “worse is to come,” as “the end result of this developing promiscuousness, the beneficiary of this cosmopolitan social action, can only be a Democracy which will be neither Catholic, nor Protestant, nor Jewish” but an egalitarian ‘Religion of Humanity.’ [5] Sillonists have been “carried away towards another Gospel which they thought was the true Gospel of Our Savior,” but which “put[s] aside the divinity of Jesus Christ, and then to mention only His unlimited clemency.” But the real Jesus “has laid down with supreme authority the condition that we must belong to His Flock, that we must accept His doctrine, that we must practice virtue and that we must accept the teaching and guidance of Peter and his successors.” Yes, Jesus loves sinners, but He also teaches them “in order to convert and save them.” “He was as strong as he was gentle,” teaching “that fear [of God] is the beginning of wisdom, and that it is sometimes proper for a man to cut off an offending limb to save his body.” Such teachings “show in Our Lord Jesus Christ something quite different from an inconsistent and impotent humanitarianism.” Cutting off the offending limb was exactly what Pius then proceeded to do, telling the leaders of the Sillon to turn their leadership over to the French bishops, whom he charged with superintending the civil-social work of the rank-and-file members. 

    Pius outlined his own understanding of the Church’s role in a democratic republic and in regard to labor organizations in his Encyclical, Singular Quadam, published in 1912. There is to be no revival of religious warfare. “We desire and intend that the faithful live with their non-Catholic fellow citizens in that peace without which neither the order of human society nor the welfare of the State can endure.” But spiritual warfare is another matter. A Christian “cannot ignore the supernatural good,” but “must order all things to the ultimate end, namely, the Highest Good,” subjecting all his actions “to the judgment and judicial office of the Church.” This goes for labor organizations, which ought to be “established chiefly on the foundation of the Catholic religion and openly follow the directive of the Church.” Associations composed of Catholics and non-Catholics are forbidden to Catholics, given the “serious dangers to the integrity of their faith and the due obedience to the commandments and precepts of the Catholic Church” such organizations entail. “Provided they exercise due caution,” Catholic labor organizations may “collaborate with non-Catholics for the common good” as “cartels”—associations, that is, which imitate the already existing cartels among capitalist firms, cartels involving labor instead of goods. It is entirely possible that Pius may have noted the resemblance of existing cartels to medieval guilds, organizations the Church had dealt with, and among, for centuries.

    Beyond Europe, Pius intervened on behalf of South American Indians, consistent with a longstanding Church policy of defending them against European colonizers. [6] Quoting Pope Benedict XIV’s 1741 Encyclical, Immensa Pastorum, Pius recalled the rebuke of nominal Catholic Spaniards who acted “as if they had utterly forgotten all sense of the charity poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,” reducing the Indians to slavery, selling some into slavery, and “treating them with such inhumanity that they were thus greatly hindered from embracing the Christian faith”—example being more persuasive than precept. Although slavery has since been abolished, in some instances Indians are still scourged and branded, “often for most trivial causes, often for a mere lust of cruelty”; whole villages and districts have seen the people slaughtered, with the extinction of some tribes. Surviving women and children are sold acts in which the rulers “have surpassed the worst examples of pagan iniquity.” Pius calls on European Catholic bishops to sponsor missions in America and to denounce “these base deeds,” which do “dishonor to the Christian name.”

    Pius X’s Encyclicals clearly evidence the work of a pastor-statesman, one who undertook the reforming the regime he served in light of new circumstances, implementing a comprehensive policy consisting of recurrence to the regime’s first principles, attention to its ruling persons and institutions (especially its educational institutions, under assault from several quarters), and formulation of what might be described as a foreign policy regarding friends and enemies alike. He upholds the regime’s way of life and the end or purpose of that way of life, both as set down by its Founder. The besetting vice of the statesman might well be pride; this is even more likely in a monarchic regime, wherein the ruler has no equals, and so no one likely to rebuke his errors. To avoid this, to humble himself, Pius looks first to the King of kings and of popes. But to do that isn’t necessarily to see how a non-divine being might rule in the office he has inherited. He therefore looks to the examples set by one of his most distinguished predecessors in the Holy See, St. Gregory the Great, the great missionary and defender of the Church against monarchic interference St. Anselm of Acosta, Archbishop of Canterbury, and also St. Charles Borromeo, reformer of both the Catholic Church in Milan and the city itself and, like Pius, a strong advocate of sound education for the clergy. 

    Pius celebrated the thirteenth centenarian of Gregory, “that great and incomparable man,” that “most prudent father of the family of Christ,” in 1904. In praising Gregory for his prudence, Pius follows both the teaching of Christ, who advises His disciples to be as innocent as doves and as prudent as serpents, but also Aristotle, who regards prudence as the preeminent virtue for the ruler. The parallel between the circumstances of the sixth century and the twentieth are clear: “When Gregory assumed the Supreme Pontificate the disorder in public affairs had reached its climax; the ancient civilization had all but disappeared and barbarism was spreading throughout the dominions of the crumbling Roman Empire.” Although the barbarism Gregory faced down was violent—Italy “had been left a prey of the still unsettled Lombards who roamed up and down the whole country laying waste everywhere”—Pius foresees a similar condition of anarchy in then-peaceful contemporary Europe, if the forces of modernity remain unchecked. More than only a defender of the Faith, Gregory sent to missions to England, adding that country to the realm of the Church while stipulating that it was Christ, not his own human wisdom, Who must be credited with that success. His “profound humility” led him never to “put himself forward as one invested with the might and power of the great ones of the earth,” calling himself rather “the Servant of the Servants of God.” Not despite because of this humility, carried on by his successors, the Church remains, even as the powerful men who rose up against her have disappeared and “philosophical systems without number” have been forgotten, confirming Jesus’ prophecy, “Heaven and earth shall pass, but my words shall not pass.” For this reason, the Church today can “calmly wait until all the voices be scattered to the winds that now shout around Us proclaiming that the Church has gone beyond her time, that her doctrines are passed away forever, that the day is at hand when she will be condemned either to accept the tenets of a godless science and civilization or to depart from human society.”

    In the coming struggle, the “unshakeable firmness” of Gregory in understanding the necessity of “a perfect harmony between the two powers, ecclesiastical and civil,” stands as an example for this pope and for all the clergy. Brought to understand that the Church does no injury to “the common weal” and may not abandon its own rights, vis-à-vis the state, “the world regained true salvation, and put itself on the path of a civilization which was noble and fruitful in blessings in proportion as it was founded on the incontrovertible dictates of reason and moral discipline, and derived its force from truth divinely revealed and from the maxims of the Gospel.” The Church today in one sense finds itself in the opposite condition. Christendom has been built, yet the world “seems as though it were tired of that life which has been and still is the chief and often the sole font of so many blessings—and not merely past but present blessings.” This exhaustion derives from the denial of the “supernatural order” and, “as a consequence, the divine intervention in the order of creation and in the government of the world and in the possibility of miracles.” “Men even go so far as to impugn the arguments for the existence of God.” Contemporary “historical criticism” of Scripture ignores the intention of the Scriptural authors, instead “forcing them to say what [the critics] wish them to say.” With the truth of Scripture effectively so erased, men “take away the principle that there is anything divine outside this visible world”; that in turn “take[s] away all check upon the unbridled passions even of the lowest and most shameful kind,” enslaving the mind, the seat of reason, to those passions and thereby negating “the morals of individuals and of civil society.” Absent moral authority, “the only check” on lawlessness governments retain is force. The rule of force causes men to “become discontented with everything,” to “proclaim the right to act as they please,” to “stir up rebellions” and “provoke revolutions, often of extreme violence,” which end in “overthrow[ing] all rights human and divine.” “The very liberty that belongs to the law of nature is trodden underfoot; and men go so far as to destroy the very structure of the family, which is the first and firmest foundation of the social structure.” With the rejection of Christ, the corner stone, the architecture of Church and state must collapse. 

    Hence what began as a circumstance opposite to that seen by Gregory threatens to become something nearly identical to that circumstance. Catholics “must, above all else, have recourse to prayer, both public and private, to implore the mercies of the Lord and His powerful assistance.” But prayer is “not enough.” Gregory rebuked a bishop who had retreated to a life of solitary prayer, a man who “fail[ed] to go out into the battlefield to combat strenuously for the cause of the Lord.” Even a bishop cannot set an example if no one sees him—out of sight, out of mind. Catholic clergy must engage the errors of their time, preaching the truth of Church doctrine, especially Christian moral principles, and more “to show charity towards all, to  temper with Christian love the bitterness of social inequalities, to detach the heart from the goods of the world, to live contented with the state in which Providence has placed us, while striving to better it by the fulfillment of our duties” and “to thirst after the future life in the hope of eternal reward.” Only then, if God so wills, can “these principles be instilled and made to penetrate into the heart, so that true and solid piety may strike root there.” There is prudence and then there is prudence; not all forms of prudence are genuinely prudent at all. To concede anything to modern “science falsely so-called” bespeaks a “prudence of the flesh” and to fail to preach, teach, and fully to practice the Gospel is a failure of prudence, not the exercise of it. Gregory’s “spirit of energetic action” caused “the whole medieval period” to bear “what may be called the Gregorian imprint,” seen in “the rule of ecclesiastical government, the manifold phases of charity and philanthropy in its social institutions, the principles of the most perfect Christian asceticism and of monastic life, the arrangement of the liturgy and the art of sacred music.” Christendom proceeded to see “the ever more perfect observance of the natural law inscribed in our hearts,” as “the ferocity of the barbarians was…transformed to gentleness, woman was freed from subjection, slavery was repressed, order was restored in the due and reciprocal independence upon one another of the various classes of society, justice was recognized, the true liberty of souls was proclaimed, and social and domestic peace assured.”

    Pius finds his second example of Christian statesmanship in St. Anselm of Canterbury, who served as archbishop from 1093 until his death in 1109—that is, beginning three decades after the Norman Conquest. Anselm did not confront barbarism but state oppression of the Church, the problem Pius has seen in contemporary France and Portugal. Anselm won freedom from the monarchic domination of Kings William II and Henry I, signing a concordat in which Henry renounced his claimed power to invest bishops. 

    Anselm was capable of accomplishing this and other statesmanlike tasks because his soul consisted of “a wonderful harmony between qualities which the world falsely judges to be irreconcilable and contradictory: simplicity and greatness, humility and magnanimity, strength and gentleness, knowledge and piety, so that both in the beginning and throughout the whole course of his religious life” he was could “calm the angry passions of his enemies and win the heart of those who were enraged against him,” who ended by “prais[ing] him because he was good.” [7] He did this not by hedging on Church rights, “as though any compromise were possible between light and darkness, between Christ and Belial,” but by firmly asserting them. Nor did he restrict his resistance to the political realm, joining the intellectual battle against “the quarrelsome and the sophistical, ‘the heretical dialecticians’ of his time, as he rightly calls them, in whom reason was the slave of the imagination and of vanity,” even as imagination and vanity had prevailed in the minds of heretics in Pius’ day. Anselm described the heretics he saw as souls in whom “reason which should be the king and the guide of all that is in man is so mixed up with corporal imaginations that it is impossible to disentangle it from these, nor is itself able to distinguish them from things that it alone and pure should contemplate.” Such men are false philosophers who, as Anselm wrote, “because they are not able to understand what they believe dispute the truth of the faith itself, confirmed by the Holy Fathers, just as if bats and owls who see heaven only by night were to dispute concerning the rays of the sun at noon, against eagles who gaze at the sun unblinkingly.” With such men, “it must be shown to them reasonably how unreasonable is their contempt of us,” to show “the reasonableness of our faith.”

    St. Charles Borromeo is Pius’ third Christian statesman. As Archbishop of Milan and a member of the Sacred College of Cardinals, Borromeo reformed both the Church and the city of Milan in the sixteenth century. More broadly, he proved a staunch defender of the Church during the Counter-Reformation. “In those days,” like today, “passions ran riot and knowledge of the truth was almost completely twisted and confused.” Calling “perversion of faith and morals a reformation,” “in reality” the Protestants” “were corrupters” who “undermin[ed] the strength of Europe through wars and dissensions,” thereby “pav[ing] the way for those modern rebellions and apostasy” Pius opposes today. To counter Protestant doctrines, Borromeo emphasized the need for “Christian instruction”—even as Pius has condemned the “public schools, lacking all religion, where everything holy is ridiculed and scorned,” “stronghold[s] of the powers of darkness” which traduce “the rights of religion and the family.” Pius thus distinguishes “between true and false reform.” False reform, “imitating the fickleness of the foolish, generally rush to extremes: exalting faith while neglecting good works or, contrarily, overlooking faith and God’s grace by “canoniz[ing] nature” in the form of human virtue, making it seem as if human beings can become self-sufficient. Such reformers never achieve reform because their extremism undermines the discipline upon which any reform depends. [8] Borromeo, his example now followed by Pius, undertook true reform, founding schools and colleges and promoting the example of Mary. “The Catholics of our days, together with their leaders, the Bishops, will deserve the same praise and gratitude as Charles as long as they are faithful to their duties of good citizenship,” obeying even evil rulers “when their commands are just” while resisting commands that are unjust,” avoiding the “impious rebellion” of seditionists as well as “the subservience of those who accept as sacred the obviously wicked laws of perverse men” who “uproot everything in the name of a deceitful liberty and then oppress their subjects with the most abject tyranny.” In Borromeo’s words, “It is a certain, well-established fact that no other crime so seriously offends God and provokes His greatest wrath as the vice of heresy.” But the warfare touched off by today’s heresies are “far more dangerous than those former conflicts which crowned Borromeo with such glory.” The religion of humanity is worse than Protestantism.

    Writing of Borromeo, but likely thinking of himself, as well, Pius cites “the divine word saying that men will remember the just man forever, for even though he is dead, he yet speaks.” This is possible because the Roman Catholic Church “alone conceives, nourishes, and educates the noble family of the just.”

     

    Note

    1. In his letter, “For the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Immaculate Conception”—i.e., of the reaffirmation of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception by Pope Pius IX—Pius X elaborates: “If we know how to make ourselves the light of the world by our teaching, and the salt of the earth by our example; to put it in a word, if we employ the resources of virtue and doctrine that Paul enjoined on his own disciples, Titus and Timothy, namely sanctity and perfection of life, strength in teaching the spirit of sacrifice and self-denial, active and enlightened zeal, charity that is at once strong and gentle, then we will win the love and veneration of the good, yea and the esteem and respect even of our enemies.”
    2. See also the Iam Dudum of May 1911, in which Pius condemns a similar law of separation in Portugal, also by a secularizing republican regime, which “proclaims and enacts that the Republic shall have no religion, as if men individually and any association or nation did not depend upon Him who is the Maker and Preserve of all things.” In Portugal, “the harshest and gravest stroke of all” against “the domain of the authority of the Church” was aimed at “the formation and training of young ecclesiastics,” who must now “pursue their scientific and literary studies which precede theology in the public lycées where, by reason of a spirit of hostility to God and the Church, the integrity of their faith plainly is exposed to the greatest peril”; what is more, “the Republic even interferes in the domestic life and discipline of the Seminaries, and arrogates the right of appointing the professors, of approving of the textbooks and of regulating the sacred studies of the Clerics”—in all, an attempt “to deprave the morals of the clergy and to provoke them to abandon their superiors.”
    3. See Charles Maurras: The Future of the Intelligentsia & For a French Reawakening, edited and translated by Alexander Jacob. London: Arktos Press, 2016. See also “The Monarchist Kulturkampf of Charles Maurras,” on this website.
    4. See Waller R. Newell: Tyranny and Revolution: Rousseau to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. See also “The Effects of the Philosophy of Freedom on Modern Tyranny” and “The Critique of Rationalism in the Philosophy of Freedom,” on this website.
    5. See Pierre Manent: The Religion of Humanity: The Illusion of Our Times. Edited and translated by Paul Seaton. South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2022. See also “Manent on ‘The Religion of Humanity,” on this website.
    6. See Tzetan Todorov: The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. Richard Howard translation. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999 [1982]. See also “Spanish Conquistadors Through a ‘Postmodernist’ Lens,” on this website.
    7. For a summary of the Thomistic argument reconciling humility with magnanimity, see David Bobb: Humility: An Unlikely Biography of America’s Greatest Virtue (Nashville: Nelson Books, 2013.)
    8. For example, Pius condemned the “Mariavitas,” a group of young Polish priests who had “turned aside from the right road and from the obedience they owe the Bishops” by proclaiming “a certain woman,” a Franciscan nun named Maria Franciszka Kozlowska who claimed to have experienced mystic visions, “to be most holy, marvelously endowed with heavenly gifts, divinely enlightened about many things, and providentially given for the salvation of a world about to parish,” consequently “entrusting] themselves [to her] without reserve and to obey her every wish.” (Tritus Circiter, April 5, 1906.) The priests seemed to be putting Maria Franciszka on a par with Mary—an instance of extremism, indeed. As a good Thomist, Pius could be depended upon to view such mysticism with suspicion.

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    When the Business of America Was Business: The National Wrestling Alliance

    September 6, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Tim Hornbaker: National Wrestling Alliance: The Untold Story of the Monopoly That Strangled Pro Wrestling. Toronto: ECW Press, 2007.

     

    Professional wrestling in the United States began in the circuses and traveling carnivals of the nineteenth century, with who knows what mixture of competition and hoax. In Germany, staged matches were firmly in place by the 1880s, so it is unlikely that Europe’s American cousins trailed less than a generation behind, if that. Whatever its provenance, the early pros had to know how to wrestle for real, not only how to put on a show. If your opponent decided to ‘shoot,’ try to beat you when he was supposed to lose, you needed to be able to defend yourself and your reputation. For this reason, the best-trained performers learned ‘hooks’—potentially crippling, always painful holds that could save them if, well, a situation arose. 

    Along with boxers, wrestlers became sports celebrities late in the century—John L. Sullivan the boxing champ in the 1880s, Martin “Farmer” Burns the wrestling champ in the 1890s. Burns trained Frank Gotch, the first American claimant to a pro wrestling ‘world’ championship in 1905. Gotch reportedly enjoyed inflicting pain on his opponents, whether the match was a contest or a show. By the time of the Great War, the top promoter in the United States was Jack Curley, a.k.a. Jacques Armand Schmuel, headquartered in New York City and allied with Midwest promoters Billy Sandow and Tony Stecher in the wrestling “Trust.”  Such a dangerous business cried out for reform, which began in the Progressive era in the person of Ed “Strangler” Lewis.

    Robert Herman Julius Friedrich took his ring name from a famous wrestler of the previous generation, Evan “Strangler” Lewis. The new Strangler was managed by Billy Sandow, a.k.a. Wilhelm Baumann, trained by Joe “Toots” Mondt. A finer group of German-American lads could scarcely have been assembled, and, whether intentionally or not, they broke from Curley’s Trust and followed their countrymen’s tradition by gathering “a stable of grapplers who followed [Sandow’s] orders.” Those who chose not to conform were quickly schooled to the contrary by the ‘policeman,’ John Pesek, “a shooter beyond compare,” who “simply could not be beaten.” In the first half of the 1920s, the “Gold Dust Trio,” as the sports journalists of the day named them, dominated the industry with short, fast-paced matches that kept the marks coming back for more. In the Strangler, pro wrestling had found its Babe Ruth, its Jack Dempsey, as sports became part of the entertainment and mass media industry of that decade.

    Alas, the boys outsmarted themselves. A popular University of Nebraska football star, Wayne Munn, looked like money to the boys. They arranged for him to win a spectacular upset match against the Strangler in 1925, planning to promote a return match that would make all parties to the deal a boatload of money. The deal went down in Kansas City, with Munn next undertaking a national tour of championship bouts while, for his part, the Strangler kept on the heat by refusing to relinquish his diamond-studded championship belt, prompting a sham court case, well publicized by the cooperative journalists of the day. The flaw in the plan was Munn’s lack of shoot-wrestling experience. One of his opponents on the tour was Stanislaus Zbyszko, a veteran wrestler who had taken a fall for Munn in the past. But in April, Zbyszko crushed the hapless footballer in Philadelphia, and it transpired that Jack Curley was behind the double-cross.

    In an attempt to bring a touch of order and (it was fondly hoped) respectability to the game, the National Boxing Association established the National Wrestling Association in 1930, headquartered in New Orleans. This organization competed with the American Wrestling Association, which had been founded a couple of years earlier by Boston promoter Paul Bowser. Curley allied with Lewis and eventually formed a new version of the Trust in 1933. A year later, he installed the photogenic Jim Londos as champ. Lewis, half-blind from trachoma, did the job, although even then he could have mauled the diminutive Greek hero. 

    After Curley died, in 1937, promotional wars continued, with more double-crosses and title changes. By 1940, the dominant promoters were Tom Packs of St. Louis, head of the National Wrestling Association, whose ‘world champion’ was Bill Longson, and Bowser, who installed Frank Sexton as his champ. Bowser was the more influential of the two because he had connections with more state athletic commissions, which had designated the ‘world’s champion’ since 1930. Annoyed at the National Wrestling Association’s secondary status, other Midwestern promoters, notably Sandow and Maxwell Baumann, broke with the Association and founded the first entity called the National Wrestling Alliance in 1941, putting their headquarters in Wichita, Kansas and naming Roy Dunn, a legit amateur wrestler (a former Olympian, in fact) as their champion. A couple of years later, Des Moines promoter Paul “Pinkie” George appropriated the National Wrestling Alliance name for his own promotion, naming his own champion. Partnering with Wichita promoter and wrestler Orville Brown, he expanded the new Alliance to Minneapolis and Omaha. By 1944, Brown himself was the Alliance champion. As Hornbaker duly notes, a champion was whomever a promoter or consortium of promoters called a champion.

    After the war, back in St. Louis, a former sportswriter named Sam Muchnick began a promotion in competition with Packs, with support from Stecher and Sandow. He was successful, and in July 1948 Muchnick, Stecher, Sandow, Brown, and Chicago promoter Fred Kohler met in Waterloo, Iowa, founding a third entity called the National Wrestling Alliance; the Pinkie George organization remained intact but allied with the larger organization. Brown was its first champion, thus giving some continuity to two of the “Alliances.” By the end of 1948, the Alliance had members in twenty states, including Ohio (Al Haft in Columbus) and Michigan (Harry Light in Detroit) to its membership, thus forming a strong Midwest, though as yet hardly ‘National,’ organization in rivalry with the National Wrestling Association. Muchnick was elected president in September 1950, a position he held for more than two decades. Muchnick was that rarity, an honest and trustworthy promoter, proving once again that in the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed man is king.

    The National Wrestling Alliance compact stipulated that each promoter would, in the words of the by-laws, “run his existing territory as he sees fit without the interference of any other member.” The promoters agreed to mutual aid in terms of sharing talent, including the recognition of one heavyweight champion and one junior heavyweight champion, whose appearances would be distributed “so that each member receive[s] equal benefit in showing said champions” in his territory. The Alliance members would “act as their own commission to police wrestling,” whereby a wrestler suspended in one territory would be suspended in all territories. Each territory had several promoters, with only the top promoter as a member of the Alliance; he was also the ‘booker,’ that is, the person who sent wrestlers under contract to ‘his’ promoters for their local shows.

    Less materially but far more entertainingly, the incorporation documents also included among its purposes the intention “to enlighten and direct public opinion with regard to the relation between professional wrestling and public welfare”—as if there could ever had been so much as a tincture of doubt—and to “promote good will between members of this association with state athletic commissions”—a mission rapidly accomplished, inasmuch as money talks—and “to promote fair play, sportsmanship, and a high standard of competition and interest in the wrestling profession.”

    Meanwhile, Packs sold his promotion to wrestlers Lou Thesz and Bill Longson (both of whom had worked as champs for him), who were backed by Canadian promoters Frank Tunney (Toronto) and Eddie Quinn (Montreal), rivaling Muchnick in St. Louis. An initial meeting between the two groups ended in stalemate, but in July 1949 Thesz gave in, joining the NWA and quickly becoming its heavyweight ‘world champion,’ since Brown had been seriously injured in an automobile accident. Tunney and Quinn joined soon afterward, as did promoters in Los Angeles (Johnny Doyle, who gave the world Gorgeous George), San Francisco (Joe Malcewicz), and Honolulu (Al Karasick). Billy Wolfe, who controlled the principal stable of women wrestlers, also joined. The organization gained an important inroad in the northeastern U. S. when Toots Mondt of Pittsburgh joined; Mondt had the contract with Antonino Rocca, the star of Madison Square Garden shows since the late 1940s, a venue Mondt had booked since the beginning of that decade. Rocca exemplified a new sort of pro wrestler. He couldn’t wrestle much, for real, but within a well-disciplined promotion, that didn’t matter, since no one would shoot on him. (Although in one match Thesz disgustedly dropped him on his head, just to send a message.) This enabled Rocca to enliven the sport with spectacular but utterly ineffectual maneuvers like dropkicks, which his opponents ‘sold’ to the audience as devastating aerial strikes.

    With forty members leasing ruling territories from New York to Honolulu, the NWA now had some real nationwide heft. Competitors were, of course, unwelcome. “Controlling the best talent in the business was the key in shutting down independents. Members used contracts to tie up wrestlers and the threat of suspension by state athletic commissions to keep their athletes in check,” and the athletic commissions, seldom offended by offers of cash, “limited the number of licenses issued to prospective bookers or promoters” and reserved the best arenas for NWA members. Even so, a stubborn challenger could still be countered. In such cases, “members united and sent their top grapplers to the [NWA] promoter engaged in the conflict,” and President Muchnick made sure that the champ would visit the territory for more than his usual allotment of dates. As supplementary measures, “verbal and physical threats were not unheard of.” 

    All of this coincided with the rise of television. The small, black-and-white screens conveyed boxing and wrestling better than they did the more complicated team sports. Fred Kohler had put a weekly show on a local station, debuting in July 1946, proving that a TV show could be used to promote shows in the big arenas. With NWA backing, he built an empire within the empire, taking his shows national in 1949 by distributing them on the Dumont Network. Although he used Thesz, he also established his own champion, crowning the current NWA junior heavyweight champion Verne Gagne as the “United States Heavyweight Champion,” a title Kohler invented. He soon allied with Mondt and Madison Square Garden promoter Charley Johnston, never stepping outside the limits of the NWA but prospering beyond any others within it, until he lost his arrangement with Dumont in 1955 and his contract with its local affiliate, two years later.

    Thesz proved a highly successful champion for the NWA. He had been trained in his native St. Louis by a shooter named George Tragos, then further by Strangler Lewis, so he could actually wrestle, lending credibility to the exhibitions and guarding the title against any wrestler bold enough to try to grab the title for himself. (Once established, he had the NWA hire Lewis as his traveling manager, exhibiting a sentiment, gratitude, that seemed a bit eccentric to his colleagues. Lewis was good for business, too, having mastered the art of publicity during the Roaring Twenties.) The very size of the NWA brought a new challenge, however. The bigger it was, the fewer times the champ could tour any one territory, and the more exhausting his schedule became. As usual, arrangements were made. In 1955, Thesz and San Francisco favorite Leo Nomellini staged a match with an intentionally ambiguous finish, thus enabling Nomellini to be billed as world champ in that city, Thesz everywhere else. Injured in 1956, he lost to Tunney’s Toronto hero, Whipper Billy Watson, another relatively trustworthy soul, who readily lost a return match once Thesz had recovered. In 1957, he lost a match by disqualification to Eddie Flynn’s top draw, “The Flying Frenchman,” Edouard Carpentier (a.k.a. Weczerkiewicz)—yet another dodge to split the title, since Thesz could claim that a DQ loss was no ticket to the championship and Flynn could bill his local boy as the ‘real’ champ. Thesz relinquished his title to one of the few wrestlers he respected, Dick Hutton, a former NCAA champion. Verne Gagne’s U.S. title had rubbed Thesz the wrong way, and the other major star of the period, Buddy Rogers, had not only jumped from Thesz’s St. Louis promotion to the fledgling NWA before Thesz did but had the temerity to joke about Ed Lewis in front of Thesz, a few years later. Thesz blocked both of them from becoming the NWA champ.

    All of this might strike the casual observer as monopolistic, in light of the venerable Sherman Antitrust Act. “Although the monopolistic practices of the NWA were not yet on the radar of government officials, it was just a matter of time.” Corruption of state athletic commissions had been routine for decades, but corruption coming from a traceable, centralized source eventually raised some eyebrows. By the mid-1950s, there had developed a sufficiency of disgruntled promoters and wrestlers to enable U.S. Department of Justice investigator Stanley Disney to begin building a case, starting with L.A.’s Doyle, who had quit the organization in 1954. That old trouble-maker, Stanislaus Zbyszko, also got in touch with the Antitrust division; “his disdain for the Alliance’s methods were well known,” and he went to the extreme of writing an article exposing the theatrical character of the genre, although the limited circulation of The Man’s Magazine, where the article appeared, made the publication in itself unthreatening to the industry. But by June of 1955, Muchnick was interrogated by Disney on NWA business practices. “One thing Muchnick sought to avoid was a public proclamation, either by the Department of Justice or in a federal courtroom, that wrestling was a scripted sport,” which might “demoralize the fans,” “sinking the industry.” That never happened, but Disney did issue a memorandum recommending a grand jury investigation, “elaborat[ing] on a conspiracy of 38 bookers in controlling specific territories, browbeating promoters into dealing with Alliance associates, the sale of towns, discrimination, price fixing, and systematic blacklisting.” He additionally recommended a civil case, resulting in United States of America v. National Wrestling Alliance, which resulted in a consent decree ordering the NWA to “cease illegal practices.” For his part, President Muchnick generously admitted that some members of the organization had, well, “deviated from the true purposes of the organization, and that some corrections should be made.” This enabled him to admit no wrongdoing while agreeing to reform. In an especially fine turn, he named Doyle as one of the delinquents. Congressman Mel Price of East St. Louis, a Muchnick ally, may have been influential in limiting the Justice Department to the consent decree, and Hornbaker also suspects United States Senators Everett Dirksen of Fred Kohler’s Illinois and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee of intervening. (Upon the occasion of Dirksen’s death, many years later, the conservative writer William F. Buckley, Jr., claimed that the only thing the senator really cared about was getting the marigold designated as the national flower—a manifest calumny, as this shows.)

    The real effect of the investigations was that a reformed NWA was no longer an especially effective NWA. Its members had less incentive to stay in it and independents were less intimidated by it. The most significant secessionists were Verne Gagne, who formed the American Wrestling Alliance, centered in Minneapolis—a lucrative promotion that endured for three decades—and (as it turned out, much more significantly), Vincent McMahon.

    McMahon’s family had been involved in sports promotion since the early years of the century. Brothers Edward and Roderick “Jess” McMahon promoted baseball and boxing after graduating from Manhattan College, with Jess promoting the Jack Dempsey-Jack Sharkey fight in Madison Square Garden, one of the major sports events of 1927. He also promoted wrestling in the New York City area. Son Vincent, born in 1914, moved to Washington, D.C., after serving in the Coast Guard during World War II, managing the Turner Arena, the main wrestling venue in the city. He bought the territory from NWA affiliate Joe Menendez in 1952 and began producing TV shows on the local Dumont Network affiliate, four years later. The matches were syndicated to the Dumont affiliate in New York, and “Wrestling from Capitol Arena” (as McMahon renamed Turner Arena) became a popular weekly feature on Channel 5 until the mid-Sixties. Philadelphia-based promoter Ray Fabiani ran opposition shows at the Uline Arena, featuring Buddy Rogers, the top ‘heel’ performer in the business, but McMahon won the ‘war’ and the two promoters became allies. Rogers would prove instrumental to McMahon’s eventual plans.

    The main attraction in the New York-Philadelphia-D.C. area was Antonino Rocca. Allying with Toots Mondt, who had Rocca signed to a contract, “McMahon devised a strategy to rule wrestling in the Northeast, partnering with Charles Johnston, his nephew Walter Smallshaw, and matchmaker Kola Kwariani, who controlled Madison Square Garden and other smaller venues in city.” McMahon and Mondt supplied the wrestlers, and with both Rocca and now Rogers in the stable, the New Yorkers had little choice but to play. The first McMahon-Mondt card in the Garden, in February 1957, drew the biggest crowd for any sports event in 25 years—without Thesz in the main event, it might be noted. This earned Mondt status as co-promoter with Johnston, and McMahon replaced Kwariani as matchmaker. Rocca, who was in the main event, was “the biggest wrestling attraction in New York since Jim Londos,” headlining every card there until January 1961. That the fans were suitably engaged may be seen not only in the attendance figures, but in the riot that occurred at the November show in 1957, when Dick the Bruiser and Dr. Jerry Graham committed acts of manifest felony against Rocca and his tag team partner, Edouard Carpentier, leaving the crowd no righteous choice but to engage in prompt citizen action. Rocca next teamed with the young Miguel Perez, the first Puerto Rican star in the territory, to defeat ‘brothers’ Eddie and ‘Dr.’ Jerry Graham in another record-setting show held in January 1959. (Jerry explained his doctorate by claiming alternatively, a B.S. in psychology from Arizona State or, only a bit less impressively, by saying “I’m a tree surgeon.”)

    With a second weekly television show, beginning in February 1959, McMahon could reach fans from Canada to Virginia, giving him “unparalleled leverage” in the industry, with a roster of some fifty wrestlers remitting booking fees to Capitol Wrestling. The organization earned as much as fifty percent of the gross in the shows its wrestlers worked. McMahon used his influence to have Buddy Rogers obtain the NWA championship in 1961, and since he’d had Rogers under contract since the previous year, he made sure the champ headlined his own shows on a regular basis. This displeased the other Alliance members, and when they moved to take the belt from Rogers (Thesz was tapped, for the sixth time), McMahon simply dropped out of the Alliance, forming the World-Wide Wrestling Federation in 1963 and ignoring the title transfer. The story line had Rogers winning an “international tournament” in Rio de Janeiro, a city Rogers in fact never saw in his life. McMahon also co-founded a Cleveland-based promotion, unknown to WWWF fans, wherein Rogers passed his title to Dory Dixon. McMahon took care not to break relations with his former colleagues entirely, continuing business dealings with many of the NWA promoters.

    In his main territory, he had plans that didn’t include a major role for Dixon. Rogers suffered from a heart condition; although he was one of the top attractions in the country, he would have to be replaced. Rogers’ health condition was carefully concealed, not only from the fans but from the several state athletic commissions, which would have barred him from appearing if they had known about it. It is not inconceivable that money changed hands. Be that as it may have been, necessity led to the decision that would make the WWWF the most successful company in the industry: on April 17, 1963, “The Italian Strongman,” Bruno Sammartino, defeated Rogers in Madison Square Garden, a match that lasted only 47 seconds. (Incensed at having been passed over, Rocca started his own promotion, using workers from promoter Jim Crocker’s Charlotte-based territory, but the enterprise went bust in a year or so.) The difference between Cleveland and the Connecticut-to-DC corridor was simple: Cleveland’s fan base consisted of a high percentage of African Americans, who would buy tickets to see the Jamaican-born “Calypso Kid,” Dory Dixon. On the East Coast, however, the fan base consisted of a high percentage of Italian Americans, who had supported the now aging (and alcoholic) Rocca (and, indeed, the lumbering ex-boxer Primo Carnera before him); they now exulted in the triumph of their new hero over the detested heel, Rogers. Sammartino went on to become the biggest box-office attraction in wrestling, until Hulk Hogan came along, under much-changed promotional circumstances, twenty years later. By then, McMahon the Elder and his partners had sold their stock to McMahon the Younger, Vincent K. McMahon, the first promoter to establish wrestling as ‘sports entertainment,’ abandoning the claim that it was a competitive sport. It was a bold and potentially risky move at the time, but the revenues almost immediately spoke for themselves.

    As for the NWA, it has never regained its dominance, although for a time the billionaire showman Ted Turner owned it and offered some competition to McMahon. Many people don’t know that it still exists, after many permutations. McMahon the Elder himself rejoined it in 1971, although his son jettisoned the partnership for good, twenty-two years later. 

    Professional wrestlers are the true American gymnosophists. When called upon, they could speak with words and not merely bodies, deploying a variant of the ‘carny’ code they called ‘kayfabe’—which means ‘be fake’ in carny. But as Hornbaker’s well-researched book shows, they had nothing on their employers when it came to the arts of legerdemain.

     

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Political Theory for a Postmodernist ‘Left’

    August 23, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Chapter 3: “Beyond the Positivity of the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony”; Chapter 4: “Hegemony and Radical Democracy.” London: Verso, 2014 (second edition).

     

    In their first two chapters, Laclau and Mouffe traced the course of the “Crisis of Marxism,” the embarrassing failure of ‘scientific socialism’ to deliver on its prediction, namely, the proletarian revolution. Increasingly, Marxian thinkers saw the need to make political strategy and choice, even free will, central to socialist politics, to give politics its independence back, refusing to claim that political life merely ‘reflects’ underlying social and economic forces. This led Antonio Gramsci to hold up “hegemony” or ruling as indispensable to socialist politics, just as it has been to political life from the beginning. 

    “We now have to construct theoretically the concept of hegemony.” The authors thus follow in the line of modern epistemology, which inclines to make knowledge a matter not so much of perceiving as of making. Leo Strauss (a thinker the authors do not consult) remarks that Machiavelli shoulders aside the metaphor of knowledge as seeing (offered by Plato and the other philosophers of classical antiquity) and the metaphor of knowledge as hearing (as prophecy, hearkening to the voice of God) in favor of the metaphor of knowledge as touching, ‘grasping.’ Unlike seeing and hearing, touching perceives by means of direct contact with the object perceived; simultaneously, it affects that object, lays it open to grasping, shaping, making. Modern theory is no longer ‘merely theoretical.’ Modern, Machiavellian, philosophy thinks of thinking as intervention, construing—not quite the creatio ex nihilo of the Biblical God, who fully knows what he has fully brought into being, but somewhat in the imitation of, and sometimes as a rival to, Him.

    As historicists, the authors understand their effort not as a dialectical ascent from the ‘cave’ of convention, lit by fires ‘built’ by its rulers, to sunlit nature, but as a “strategic movement requiring negotiation among mutually contradictory discursive surfaces” (emphasis added). This isn’t quite Socrates’ political philosophy, which does indeed require dialogue, strategically inflected, with fellow citizens inside the political ‘cave,’ because Socrates aims at an ascent to a nature that the authors deprecate. They would stay within the cave, while rearranging and indeed reconstructing the fires and idols within it. The objects within the cave are the only things there are, at least for political purposes. Political life requires speech or articulation, implying “some form of separate presence of the elements which that practice articulates or recomposes.” Those elements, they maintain, “were originally specified as fragments of a lost structural or organic totality.” By “originally,” they mean in the thought of the late eighteenth century, the thought of German Romanticism. The Enlightenment thinkers of the generations immediately preceding them had dismantled, at least to their own satisfaction, the cosmos of Christendom and of the classical philosophers who preceded it, ‘disenchanting’ the world. The Romantics undertook “an eager search” for “a new synthesis,” a reintegration of body and soul, reason and feeling, thought and the senses. Politically, they sought a modern equivalent of the ancient polis in the face of the modern state, with its complex civil societies of many ‘classes,’ increasingly bound together by impersonal, scientistic bureaucracies—a disenchantment, indeed. But any synthesis must be, well, synthetic—artificial, therefore unlike “the natural organic unity peculiar to Greek culture,” as they conceived it. [1] 

    As the poet-philosopher Friedrich Hölderlin explained it, Romanticism upheld “two ideals”: reducing human needs to their “natural simplicity” while aspiring to “the highest cultivation” through “the organization which we are able to give ourselves.” Laclau calls the first ideal “articulation,” the second, “mediation.” They describe the distinction as “a nebulous area of ambiguities,” not nearly so clear as the Romantics wanted it to be. Enter Hegel, whose work “is at once the highest moment of German Romanticism” and the first fully post-Enlightenment “reflection on society.” Hegel takes the fragments of the modern world and reunites them in a grand synthesis by means of his historical dialectic—history conceived as the rationally understandable unfolding of the Absolute Spirit. The “cunning of reason…leads separation back to unity,” in “the highest movement of rationalism,” “the moment when it attempts to embrace within the field of reason, without dualisms, the totality of the universe of differences.” Unfortunately, “this synthesis contains all the seeds of its dissolution” because “the rationality of history can be affirmed only at the price of introducing contradiction into the field of reason.” By this, the authors evidently mean that the principle of contradiction, first articulated by Plato’s Socrates in the Republic, states simply that the same thing will not do, or suffer having done to it, opposites, in the same part, at the same time, in relation to the same thing. (So, for example, to say that a child’s top both stands still and moves isn’t a contradiction, since it stays still with respect to its axis while moving with respect to its circumference.) Socrates leaves it at that; if two opinions contradict one another, one or both must be false, insofar as they are contradictory. Hegel would like to treat opinions and indeed everything else as if they were paints of opposite colors; when mixed together, they form a new color. This is “introducing contradiction into the field of reason,” thereby undermining the principle of reasoning itself. [2] In making Hegelian dialectic a supposed science explaining the dialectical unfolding of economic-material relations in society, Marx and his followers imported such “ambiguities and imprecisions” into socialist theory.

    Thus, “this area of ambiguity constituted by the discursive uses of ‘dialectics’ is the first that has to be dissolved.” The authors undertake to do so by denying that ‘society’ is a coherent totality, rationally understandable because governed by laws of dialectical development, its elements ultimately to be harmonized as if it were a Hegelian syllogism, the grand concluding synthesis of a set of theses and antitheses. The elements of ‘society’ are “diverse” and “precarious,” contingent on one another, ever-shifting—more Heraclitean than Hegelian. “The social itself has no essence.” Human beings determine the ‘nature’ of these contingent relations. More, they determine the identities of the elements themselves—nowadays, for example, as ‘L,’ ‘G,’ ‘B,’ ‘T,’ ‘Q,’ and on, perhaps, to infinity.  That is, social relations and identities are not “merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘contemplative’ but instead defined by “an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations.” Today’s complex “industrial societies” see “a growing proliferation” of such relations and identities. Analyzing “articulation” will “give us our starting point for the elaboration of the concept of hegemony.” This requires establishing “the possibility of specifying the elements which enter into the articulatory relation” and then determining the relations among them. 

    Before doing so, they offer a critique of some “theoretical discourses” which move in the direction they seek but remain “inhibited by the basic categories of an essentialist discourse”—essentialism being the claim they are most eager to refute because they regard it as limiting egalitarianism, and thereby preventing a radical democratic politics. They begin with the then-famous French Algerian Marxist, Louis Althusser. Althusser rejected both Stalinism and the fashionable ‘Marxist humanism,” which described Marxism as a benign extension of Enlightenment thought. His own “structural Marxism”—holding, against Lenin, that the modern state is not the instrument of the bourgeois class but a framework ensuring the viability of capitalist enterprise—diverged from the current line of the erratic French Communist Party leader, Roger Garaudy, who was promoting ‘socialism with a human face,’ at the moment. For the authors, Althusser’s analysis exhibited an unrealized potential. Althusser demystified the modern state by denying Hegelian immanence; the state isn’t really the instantiation of ‘God,’ that is, the Absolute Spirit. Such concepts as state and society have symbolic meaning but they are not to be taken literally as coherent causes, as drivers of ‘History.’ “Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a certain order.” But Althusser failed to take this idea far enough. He retained an ‘essentialist’ notion of economic life, thereby “laps[ing] into the very defect he criticizes.” He sees that the state, society, and even individuals are not essences, but he takes the economy as “an abstract universal object…which produces concrete effects,” determining the character of society. What Althusser implied but did not realize was a “critique of every type of fixity, through an affirmation of the incomplete, open and politically negotiable character of every identity.” The presence of other identities prevents the “suturing” of my own identity. That is why the working class has not been and can never be what Marx said it would be: the unified and decisive driver of the last stage of history. 

    Having established that point, the authors can now offer four definitions of the terms that serves as touchstones for their theory. They define “articulation” as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identify is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.” A “discourse” is “the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice.” A “moment” is a position differentiated by an articulation with a discourse. An “element” is “any difference that is not discursively articulated.” That is, talking about something or someone changes the thing or person talked about. If I say I’m an angel and you say I’m a rotter, both of those claims alter what and who I was before the claims were made. It is not merely an exaggeration to regard this as a theory which gives some credence to the belief that saying something make it so—although only some credence, as the authors will soon explain.

    Given these definitions, one must pay careful attention to “the characteristic coherence of the discursive formation” one is examining, the “dimensions and extensions of the discursive,” and the “openness or closure exhibited by” that discursive formation. The coherence one perceives in a discursive formation owes its existence not to “the expression of any underlying principle external to itself,” such as a law of history. ‘Values’ are relative to each other. They “depend closely upon one another.” They can be seen to cohere only in the sense that they coalesce, for a time, a “moment,” in a regular “system of structural positions.”

    One must also reject “the distinctive between discursive and non-discursive practices” because “every object is constituted as an object of discourse.” The dichotomy between “the linguistic and behavioral aspects of a social practice” is a false dichotomy. For example, while it is true that an earthquake “is an event that certainly exists,” independently from what anyone wills, the question of whether we think of the earthquake as a natural phenomenon or an act of God “depends on the structuring of a discursive field.” It is in that sense that saying something about an event ‘makes it so.’ Discursive structures, furthermore, are not mental but material structures; speech is an act. Articulation is “a discursive practice [emphasis added] which does not have a plane of constitution prior to, or outside, the dispersion of the articulated elements,” whether that plane is mental or material. “The main consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the thought/ reality opposition, and hence a major enlargement of the field of those categories which can account for social relations.” Metaphor, for example, no longer takes second place “to a primary, constitutive literality of social relations.” Laclau and Mouffe to this extent may be said to ‘poeticize’ political thought.

    They are careful not to take such “moments” too far. They are limited, if not ‘essentially’ defined by exterior factors. Positing something doesn’t entirely make it so. “The transition from the ‘elements,'” the differences not discursively articulated, “to the ‘moments'” in which they are, “is never fully realized”; “there is no identity that can be fully constituted.” “Here we arrive at a decisive point in our argument”: ‘society’ is not “a sutured and self-defined totality.” It has “no single underlying principle fixing—and hence constituting—the whole field of differences.” Identities are never fully fixed within it. “Neither absolute fixity nor absolute nonfixity is possible.” In this, they partake of the ‘postmodernism’ of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Derrida, with their insistence “on the impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings.” There are, however, “partial fixations”; if there were not, “the very flow of differences would be impossible,” and a night in which all cows are black would descend upon us. The authors call these (temporarily) “privileged discursive points of this partial fixation” “nodal points.” Identities float, but they are identities. “The practice,” the act, “of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity.”

    Where does this leave the human individual, the “subject”? Laclau and Mouffe stand with Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger in denying the accounts of both rationalism and empiricism, which view the subject “as an agent both rational and transparent to itself,” unified and homogeneous, and as the “origin and basis of social relations,” as in social contract theory. They regard the critique of rationalism as definitive, although of course, given their own anti-essentialism, this amounts to a tacit admission that the critiques themselves might be redefined. To the authors, subjects are really “subject positions,’ identities that exist in relation to other identities, in many ways unfixed. This is why they reject ‘humanist’ Marxism. “What is important is to try to show how ‘Man’ has been produced in modern times, how the ‘human’ subject—that is, the bearer of a human identity without distinctions—appears in certain religious discourse’s, is embodied in juridical practices and is diversely constructed in other spheres.” ‘Man,’ as produced or constructed, is indeed “a fundamental nodal point from which it has been possible to proceed, since the eighteenth century, to the ‘humanization’ of a number of social practices,” but today it must be understood as only a nodal point, lest a presumption of fixity interfere with the project of radical democracy. The same goes for feminism. It, too, must avoid a rigid dichotomy of feminine and masculine, both ‘essentialized’ and thus distorted. And, obviously, the familiar Marxist dichotomy of capitalists and proletarians brings distortions in its wake, which is why Marx’s supposedly scientific predictions never came true. Nodal positions are established politically, not by the immanent nature or historicity of subjects. “Neither the political identity nor the economic identity of the agents crystallizes as differential moment of unified discourse, and…the relation between them is the precarious unity of a tension.” Human subjects do not give meaning to themselves or anything else, since “the subjectivity of the agent is penetrated by the same precariousness and absence of suture apparent at any other point of the discursive totality of which it is part.” Articulation is hegemonic, a political act of agents interacting with one another. 

    Social antagonisms are not the same as physical collisions, although they can lead to physical collisions. And social antagonisms are not, strictly speaking, contradictions, which in logic amount to the juxtaposition of two entirely opposite ideas, as in the impossibility, ‘blackwhite.’ A social antagonism arises when “the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself.” For example, “it is because a peasant cannot be a peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his land.” This renders the peasant’s ‘being a peasant’ precarious, partial, so long as the landowner can kick him out. Thus, “antagonism, far from being an objective relation,” like a physical collision or a logical contradiction, “is a relation where in the limits of every objectivity are shown.” The landowner may be able to dispossess the peasant, and indeed the peasant, or more likely a group of peasants, might be able to dispossess the landowner. “The limit of the social must be given within the social itself as something subverting it, destroying its ambition to constitute a full presence.” The social is no more fully constituted than the persons who interact within it. At the same time, antagonism also has its limits in the continued existence of the antagonists. The dispossessed peasant or landlord need not be destroyed; new social relations may coalesce. 

    Considered politically, antagonism takes place not so much among individuals as among social groups. The authors give the example of the antagonism between peasant culture and urban culture. As “not one but two societies” within a political community, a “millenarian rebellion” may occur—a “fierce, total and indiscriminate” assault on the city. “The only alternative is massive emigration towards another region in order to set up the City of God, totally isolated from the corruption of the world.” On the more mundane level, Benjamin Disrael considered the “two nations” in England, the poor and the wealthy; another example is the Continental antagonism between the old, throne-and-altar monarchies and the regimes of popular sovereignty. As a statesman, Disraeli sought to unite the two nations into one, avoiding revolution, by extending voting rights to the working classes and meeting some of the social demands of the workers. Laclau and Mouffe call this policy of expanding and ‘complexifying’ the political sphere the “logic of difference.” As complexity increases, the demands of one group antagonistic to the existing regime might not collaborate with another group just as antagonistic, but on different grounds. For example, feminists might not collaborate with racial minorities. Such struggles are democratic but they are not “popular” in the sense that they consist of ‘the people, united.’ 

    How, then, to achieve democratic “hegemony” or rule? The Marxist claim that a socioeconomic class could be the agent to achieve this has failed, thanks to “the generalized crisis of social identities” that democratic social complexity itself has caused. But if “nodal points” are possible to establish, then Gramsci’s notion of social antagonism as a “war of position” becomes salient, if imperfect. He is right to think that a popular identity needs to be constructed, cannot be assumed to exist as a precondition of antagonism. He is wrong to think that there is one main antagonism, the working class against the capitalists. “We will therefore speak of democratic struggles,” not the grand “popular” one, a plurality of struggles. As the authors put it in their somewhat tiresome jargon, “The hegemonic dimension of politics only expands as the open, non-sutured character of the social increases.” In a complex, modern society, “there can be a variety of hegemonic nodal points,” not just one (e.g., ‘capitalism’). “Insofar as the social is an infinitude not reducible to any underlying unitary principle, the mere idea of a center of the social has no meaning at all.” This plurality must become “the starting point” of social-democratic analysis. This disposes of ‘totalitarian’ forms of Marxism. The Soviet or Chinese Communist attempts to harmonize the entirety of a modern society into one coherent thing is impossible. Instead, the various social groups, understanding their own precariousness in relation to all the others, will need at times to cooperate and resist all the others, with no supreme Leader or Party to ‘guide’ them. “No hegemonic logic can account for the totality of the social and constitute its center, for in that case a new suture would have been produced and the very concept of hegemony would have eliminated itself.” To rule means to rule over someone or some thing, but ‘totalitarianism’ absorbs all into one, an impossibility. However, “it would be equally wrong to propose as an alternative, either pluralism or the total diffusion of power within the social, as this would blind the analysis to the presence of nodal points and to the partial concentrations of power existing in every concrete social formation.” No one “logic” can account for such complexity. This means that “a ‘scientific’ approach attempting to determine the ‘essence’ of the social would, in actual fact, be the height of utopianism.” Marx and his followers have decried the folly of ‘utopian socialism,’ but they have fallen into it from another angle.

    Democracy arose in the first half of the nineteenth century, socialism in the second half. As a result, a unified popular pole, “far from becoming more simple” to obtain, as Marx predicted, “grew increasingly difficult” to obtain “as the growing complexity and institutionalization of capitalist society” led to “the corporatization and separation of those sectors which should ideally have been united as ‘the people.'” Politics saw “the very identity of the forces in struggle” subjected to “constant shifts,” calling for “an incessant process of redefinition.” Mere economic-class antagonism “is incapable of dividing the totality of the social body into two antagonistic camps, of reproducing itself automatically as a line of demarcation in the political sphere.” For “radical democracy” to form, a “radically libertarian and more ambitious” politics will be needed. 

    Even granting this, why is radical democracy good? In search of an answer, one must turn to the authors’ discussion of “the democratic revolution.”

    On the grounds (as it were) from their rejection of anti-essentialism, they rule out not only history but nature as a source of right. Admittedly, with “the anthropological assumption of a ‘human nature’ and of a unified subject,” one can reject at least some forms of subordination, namely, those that stunt human nature itself. In rejecting “this essentialist perspective,” they need another approach. They begin by distinguishing subordination from oppression, and both of these from domination. A relation of subordination is one in which one “agent is subjected to the decisions of another”—an employee to an employer, a child to a parent. A relation of oppression is one in which subordination has sparked antagonism. A relation of domination is one in which subordination is “considered as illegitimate from the perspective, or in the judgment, of a social agent external to” the subordinate and his subordinator. So, for example, Mary Wollstonecraft vindicated the rights of women by transferring the more generally accepted principle of “political equality between citizens”—a social agent external to men and women as such—to “the field of equality between the sexes.” Citing Tocqueville, Laclau and Mouffe take his democratic revolution, “the end of a society of a hierarchic and inegalitarians type, ruled by a theological-political logic in which the social order had its foundation in divine will,” society’s replacement of that with the “affirmation of the absolute power of its people,” as morally dispositive. The argument of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, an argument from natural right, derives its authority not from the substance of its claims but from its “establishment of a new legitimacy,” the “invention of democratic culture,” by means of “provid[ing] the discursive conditions which made it possible to propose the different forms of inequality as illegitimate and anti-natural, and thus mak[ing] them equivalent as forms of oppression” (emphasis added). That is, saying it made it so, once French society assented. 

    This democratizing tendency in modern societies, beginning in the political realm, argued in the realm of male-female relations by Wollstonecraft, eventually influenced discourses on economic inequality, with socialists “putting in question” the “forms of subordination” seen in the workplace and “demanding new rights” for the workers. This is as Tocqueville predicted, when he wrote, “It is impossible to believe that equality will not finally penetrate as much into the political world as into other domains. It is not possible to conceive of men as eternally unequal among themselves on one point, and equal on others; at a certain moment, they will come to be equal on all points.” Tocqueville worried about that, not because he sought to defend the privileges of the titled ‘aristocracy’ to which he belonged but because the effort to achieve thoroughgoing equality in all spheres of human life might well put an end to liberty, the precondition of moral conduct, either under a Napoleonic despotism or under a softer, bureaucratic despotism. To their credit, Laclau and Mouffe share some of his caution, humanity having seen tyrannies far worse than anything Napoleon attempted, and bureaucracies at least as stultifying as those Tocqueville envisioned. Nevertheless, as socialists, they remain fixated on ‘capitalist’ oppression. Indeed, “a good proportion of the new political subjects have been constituted through their antagonistic relationship to recent forms of subordination, derived from the implanting and expansion of capitalist relations of production and the growing intervention of the State.” These include “the waste of natural resources, the pollution and destruction of the environment,” the ills of urbanization, and even the attempts to meliorate social equality by means of “the Keynesian Welfare State,” which “has been accompanied by a growing bureaucratization” of State practices, which is “one of the fundamental sources of inequalities and conflicts.” Indeed, “expansion of capitalist relations of production and of the new bureaucratic-state forms” have proven “mutually reinforcing” in many instances. “Given the bureaucratic character of State intervention, this creation of ‘public spaces’ is carried out not in the form of a true democratization, but through the imposition of new forms of subordination,” resulting in “numerous struggles…against bureaucratic forms of State power.” By this (and again consistent with their socialism) the authors mean not the resistance of small businesses against public and corporate bureaucracies but rather such phenomena as the “Welfare Rights Movement” in the United States, whereby clients of the Welfare State demand more benefits, more transfers of wealth from the upper and middle classes to themselves, in the name of social equality. Once again, “the categories of ‘justice,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘equality’ have been redefined and liberal-democratic discourse has been profoundly modified by this broadening of the sphere of rights.” 

    On the level of ‘culture,’ the “new mass culture” has “profoundly shake[en] traditional identities,” as it “contains powerful elements for the subversion of inequalities.” In particular, the young “constitute a new axis for the emergence of antagonisms,” since the they are simultaneously advertised to, treated as consumers, and thereby enticed to spend money they don’t have, “stimulat[ing] them to seek a financial autonomy that society is in no condition to give them.” This generates antagonism, antagonism further exacerbated by the erosion of family bonds, and especially parental authority, which grates against egalitarian sentiment. Liberty, now reconceived as ‘diversity,’ not only disoriented parents and the bourgeoisie but the left, especially the ‘Old Left’ of Marxism, ill-disposed to an emerging “radical and plural democracy.” “Pluralism is radical only to the extent that each term of this plurality of identities finds within itself the principle of its own validity, without this having to be sought in a transcendent of underlying positive ground for the hierarchy of meaning of them all and the source and guarantee of their legitimacy.” Radical pluralism is democratic insofar as its self-constituting, self-validating character has been universalized; everyone gets to do it. At the same time, radical democracy, precisely because it has no foundation below it, no essence within it, and no standard above it, teeters on precarity, even more than previous societies have done.

    The authors identify the main threat to a democratic outcome as “neo-liberalism,” initiated by Friedrich von Hayek’s “violent attack on the interventionist State and the various forms of economic planning that were being implemented” in the mid-1940s, when he published The Road to Serfdom. Although Hayek argues that the Welfare State will cause “the power of the law” to decline, the power of bureaucracy to increase, Laclau and Mouffe are having none of that. “In reality”—that is to say, in terms of their own agenda within agon of the Left in the precarious democratic world—the issue “is the very articulation between liberalism and democracy which was performed during the course of the nineteenth century,” the extension of asserted democratic rights from the political to the economic sphere. Hayek’s “central political objective,” individual liberty, ought to outweigh egalitarianism. “All State intervention” in the name of “social or redistributive justice,” “except in connection with matters that cannot be regulated through the market, is considered as an attack on individual liberty.” Oddly, they associate Hayek with Zbigniew Brzezinski, who aimed to “remove public decisions more and more from political control and to make them the exclusive responsibility of experts”—a bureaucratizing move Hayek would have detested. Hayek criticized democratic political control of the economy, but had no objection to political engagement in any decent regime, so long as it permitted individual liberty, very much including property ownership. This (very likely deliberate) confusion enables the authors to claim that neoliberals propose “a new definition of democracy which in fact would serve to legitimize a regime in which political participation might be virtually non-existent.”

    They are surely right to contend that “the form in which liberty, equality, democracy and justice are defined at the level of political philosophy may have important consequences at a variety of other levels of discourse, and contribute decisively to shaping the common sense of the masses” in “the constitution of a hegemonic left alternative” to neo-liberalism. At this point, they admit that the plausibility of neo-liberal ideas in contemporary politics owes much “to the growing bureaucratization of social relations.” To refute it, one must challenge “possessive individualism,” the claim that “the rights of individuals,” including property rights, exist “before society, and often in opposition to it.” However, to defend pre-social, pre-political individual rights, neo-liberals understand what Locke, the American Founders, and many other earlier thinkers and statesmen now called ‘liberals’ understood: that government is necessary to secure those rights. Since they reject scientistic-bureaucratic government, the authors argue, neo-liberals recur to “a set of themes from conservative philosophy,” particularly conservatism’s “profoundly anti-egalitarian cultural and social traditionalism.” This is the real agenda; neo-liberals fly “under the cover” of liberty, but in fact only intend to “legitimate inequalities and restore the hierarchical relations which the struggles of previous decades had destroyed.” They offer no proof of this charge; given the intended audience of their book, they don’t need one.

    In face of this threat, acknowledging the precarity of all hegemonic arrangements in democracies, Laclau and Mouffe declare that “the task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology,” as Marxists do, “but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy.” As they have previously (and indeed repeatedly) remarked, there are no natural rights inherent in individuals because “the meaning of the liberal discourse on individual rights is not definitely fixed.” “The radical changes which are necessary in the political imaginary of the Left, if it wishes to succeed in [ahem!] founding a political practice fully located in the field of the democratic revolution and conscious of the depth and variety of the hegemonic articulations which the present conjuncture requires” must begin with overcoming “the fundamental obstacle” to that revolution, namely, any “essentialist apriorism” that “sutures” the social. From there, the Left will need to reject its own inclination to establish “privileged points”; for Marxism, this was the claim that socioeconomic classes drive ‘history.’ This error has led to the political ruinous claim that “the expansion of the role of the State is the panacea for all problems,” and that a technocratic economism will serve as the basis for State action against capitalist inequality. More, the “classic concept of ‘revolution'” as propounded and practiced by the Jacobins, animated by essentialist apriorism and instantiated in statism, must also be abandoned. This concept “implied the foundational character of the revolutionary act,” but this perspective “is incompatible with the plurality and the opening which a radical democracy requires.” Revolution should be reconceived as process. The Left should encourage more autonomous “spheres of struggle and the multiplication of political spaces,” against the “concentration of power and knowledge that classic Jacobinism and its different social variants imply.” In this effort, socialism will become not the but “one of the components of a project for radical democracy.” Socialism is indeed “necessary to put an end to capitalist relations of production, which are at the root of numerous relations of subordination,” but it is no more than that. Socialists need to understand that, accept it, and act accordingly.

    To say this, however, raises “a whole set of new problems.” Where and in what form shall Leftists determine the antagonisms they wish to foster in the ever-shifting terrain of social and political activity? To what extent can pluralism comport with the commonalities of “equivalences” among the many social actors? Can this neo-Heraclitean conception of human life really lend itself to “define a hegemonic project,” or is it a mere recipe for anarchism?

    In terms of “equivalences,” Leftists should regard them as “family resemblances” (a phrase borrowed from Wittgenstein), not entities lending themselves to systematic unity. For example, feminists should think of the State as “an important means for effecting an advance, frequently against civil society in legislation which combats sexism”—the supposed ‘patriarchy’ of the family, pay differentials, and so on. Fortunately, the vast modern State itself “is not a homogeneous medium…but an uneven set of branches and functions,” whose internal conflicts may be turned toward egalitarianism in civil society. “Neither the State nor civil society is the surface of emergence of democratic antagonisms.” The same goes for political parties and (although they do not yet see it) business corporations, which can also be induced to deploy power in the service of egalitarian claims. “What we are witnessing is a politicization far more radical than any we have known in the past, because it tends to dissolve the distinction between the public and the private, not in terms of the encroachment on the private by a unified public space, but in terms of a proliferation of radically new and different political spaces.” This thoroughgoing politicization will, the authors hope, prevent anarchy, since disputes will center on ruling, albeit in the fluid manner they envision, not on not-ruling.

    This is where Laclau and Mouffe define the newest ‘New Left’ project, which is in some respects a reprise of the Popular Front strategy of the 1930s, without the ‘essentialist’ Marxist assumptions that made the Communist Party such an untrustworthy partner in that movement. The Left must expand the “chains of equivalence” to include “anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-capitalism.” Notice that these will indeed be “chains” of equivalence, “symbols of a unique and indivisible struggle.” Yet, somehow, “each of these struggles retains its differential specificity with respect to the others.” There is no contradiction, they claim, so long as no one group on the Left seeks preeminence over the others—the working class over feminists and civil rights advocates, as seen in the past. No one group serves as the foundation of the struggle; instead, each mixes its efforts with the others, limiting the others while strengthening the Left as a whole against the Right. “From this we can deduce a basic precondition for a radically libertarian conception of politics: the refusal to dominate—intellectually or politically—every presumed ‘ultimate foundation’ of the social.” If the Left fails in this, the familiar “Rousseauian paradox”—that “men should be obliged to be free”—must triumph, and they are back to some new version of Bolshevism. Here, a Marxian phrase actually helps: “The free development of each should be the condition for the free development of all.” Marx is referring not to socialism but to the end of history, to communism. Laclau and Mouffe want communism without state socialism, without the dictatorship of the proletariat or of anyone else.

    Admittedly, “this total equivalence never exists,” given the precariousness and “unevenness” of the social. Equivalence, “the demand for equality,” ought always to be “balanced by the demand for liberty”—a “radical and plural democracy.” This tension need not descend into contradiction because reality, including human individuals, is fluid. The appropriate defense against bureaucratic excesses on the Left is not “to return purely and simply to the defense of ‘bourgeois’ individualism,” as neo-liberals want to do. Rather, we need “the production of another individual, an individual who is no longer constructed out of the matrix of possessive individualism” along the lines of “‘natural’ rights prior to society.” Such natural rights conduce to claims of private rights. Instead, individual rights ought to be defined “only in the context of social relations which determine subject positions,” rights “which involve other subjects who participate in the same social elation,” rights which “can only be exercised collectively,” in accordance with a “social theory [that] defends the right of the social agent to equality and to participation as a producer and not only as a citizen.”

    But what about the chain of democratic equivalences”? The authors recognize a threat in it. “Paradoxically,” this “very logic of openness and of the democratic subversion of differences” brings with it “the possibility of a closure far more radical than in the past.” Once all “traditional systems” are broken, now that “indeterminacy and ambiguity turn more elements of society into ‘floating signifiers,’ the possibility arises of attempting to institute a center which radically eliminates the logic of autonomy and reconstitutes around itself the totality of the social body.” That is, if there are no standards exterior to society to which citizens can appeal—no divine or natural laws, not even the supposed laws of history—then “the logic of totalitarianism” might recur, “an attempt to re-establish the unity which democracy has shattered between the loci of power, law and knowledge.” To avoid this, and to avoid the opposite pole of anarchy, “an implosion of the social and an absence of any common point of reference,” the “experience of democracy should consist of the recognition of the multiplicity of social logics along with the necessity of their articulation,” an articulation “constantly recreated and renegotiated,” with “no final point at which a balance will be definitively achieved.” Partial social stability can prevail by undertaking “the search for a point of equilibrium between a maximum advance for the democratic revolution in a broad range of spheres, and the capacity for the hegemonic direction and positive reconstruction of these spheres on the part of subordinated groups.” Leftist utopianism remains where it should be, in the quite different minds of those who seek the elimination of their own subordinate positions in society, but at the same time think seriously about what the conditions of the equality they aspire to should be. These many utopias should never be allowed to coalesce into one, as that would result in a reprise of totalitarianism. This limited utopianism will avoid the other danger, the mere pragmatism of “reformers without a project.”

    Thus, for the newest New Left, “the epistemological niche from which ‘universal’ classes and subjects spoke has been eradicated, and it has been replaced by a polyphony of voices, each of which constructs its own irreducible discursive identity.” An egalitarian Heracliteanism reigns over all, preventing any one ruler from destroying either equality or liberty. Latterly, their attempt has been encapsulated in the slogan, ‘Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion’—a reformulation of the now somewhat long-in-the-tooth New Left ambition to maximize incommensurables. In abandoning the modernist epistemology of ‘grasping,’ they recur to the Biblical epistemology of hearing—their “polyphony of voices”—replacing the God of the Bible with the lesser god of Vox Populi.

     

    Notes

    1. That Greek philosophers themselves did not understand the polis to be simply natural or “organic” may be seen in the Platonic-Socratic metaphor of the cave and throughout Aristotle’s Politics.
    2. The authors identify the philosopher who formulated this critique of Hegel as the German Aristotelian, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg in his 1840 book, Logische Untersuchungen. It is fair to say that they do not follow Trendelenburg into Aristotelian ethics or politics.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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