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    What Is the Point of Studying Literature?

    April 3, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    John Guillory: Professing Criticism: Essays on the Organization of Literary Study. Part One: The Formation and Deformation of Literary Study. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022.

     

    A skeptic might wonder if, by “professing criticism,” Professor Guillory means that professing criticism is all English professors really do, without ever getting around to criticism itself. But he doesn’t mean it that way, exactly, and it would be odd if he did, since criticism sometimes seems to be about all many such professors now do, using their authority, such as it is, to issue ‘critiques’ of modern societies, critiques informed by a variety of egalitarian sentiments. 

    Guillory rather intends to consider “an unresolved problem in how literary study understands its purpose.” Should works of literature be studied at university or criticized? Or both? To study, one must first establish a “discipline,” “identify[ing] objects of study by differentiating these objects from others, by specialization”; a discipline is a discipline by virtue of its implied command, ‘Stay in your lane.’ Study requires no university framework, nor indeed an institutional framework of any kind. A student of literature or of physics might even prefer to be a lone wolf. A profession does require such a framework because a profession sets “the requisites and perquisites common to all the disciplines,” with the expectation that all members of that profession will adhere to them. Readers of Plato will understand this as a political-philosophic question, the exigencies of political life (reverence for the gods of the city, deference to the rulers and the laws) versus philosophers’ desire to know and therefore to inquire, to question human rulers, gods, and laws. In modern tyrannies, this tension becomes acute; modern commercial republics have attempted to resolve the matter by establishing liberty of speech and the press, but universities—regimes within the larger regimes—have their own set of rulers and ruling institutions. To “profess” literature, to speak and write within the ruling institutions of a university, may be to collide with the university’s regime, which may want to define scholarship in ways some scholars do not want to follow. 

    To this perennial problem, literary study has added another, a problem of self-definition. Literary study, the discipline, has become a profession, but it didn’t start out that way. In earlier modern centuries, those who studied literature thought of themselves as literary critics. And before that, those who studied literature considered themselves rhetoricians, or philosophers, or sophists. “The discipline’s enthusiastic embrace of professionalism” in the past hundred years or so “betrays an ambivalent relation to its amateur past.” “The essays in this book consider how literary study has been organized, both historically and in the modern era, both before and after its professionalization.” After all, if literary scholars cannot clearly define what they do, how shall they defend their position within the university regime? In the early twentieth century, scholars labeled what they proposed to do in the university with “a surprising array of names: philology, belles lettres, rhetoric, literary history,” before finally settling on “a new name,” “literary criticism,” after the Second World War.

    This is, then, a political question. Guillory addresses it sociologically, however. Sociology focuses on subpolitical categories, while inevitably bringing political considerations in, albeit with insufficient clarity. In this book, one hears about Weber and Veblen, but not Aristotle (except for the Poetics), Tocqueville, or Machiavelli. Tocqueville would be especially helpful, since his analysis of democracy as the ruling condition of civil society remains unsurpassed and supremely relevant to what literary scholars have been doing in modernity. But this caveat should not deter anyone from learning from Guillory’s immense erudition and formidable analytic strength. He knows what he studies and professes, better than just about anyone else. And he does use at least one political term, calling “the perpetual churn in literary study” a “constant revolutionizing of its methods and objects.” Regime change, indeed.

    “Literary study in the past did not take the form of a professional activity at all; for most of its history, literary study was a set of practices with many different sites, both within and outside the university,” ‘professionalizing’ itself only in the late nineteenth century, “and then only fully after the First World War”—that is, with the rise of Progressivism, a movement addressed by and in large measure to, the expanding class of persons who thought of themselves as ‘professionals.’ “The theory and practice of professionalization was a hallmark of the Progressive Era, when the university gathered an extraordinary number of disciplines and professions within its pale, organizing them in the bureaucratic form of the ‘department'”—bureaucracy (somewhat contradictorily) at the service of historical movement toward ever-increasing social egalitarianism being Progressivism’s signature. By professional, Guillory doesn’t mean, merely, someone who gets paid for what he does—a professional wrestler, for example. Earlier specialists in literature “achieved great visibility and influence without depending upon academic credentials”—in England, Carlyle, Arnold, and in America Emerson; “they were in that sense truly amateurs, representatives of the common reader,” possessing “a kind of expertise that was self-authorized,” founded on public recognition. Later scholars and critics committed themselves to “the ideal of professionalism,” that is, recognition within the institutional setting, the regime, of the university, which requires credentials. 

    To be accepted within such a regime, literary criticism needed redefinition. No longer a “practice of judgment”—how shall a bureaucracy assess that?—it became a “method of interpretation” focused on a “proper disciplinary object,” in this case “the verbal work of art.” As a method, it made sense, at least marginally, to the university administrators; interpretation sounded sort of scientific, or at least something that could make a claim to know. Famously, the kind of knowledge claimed by post-World War II literary scholars proved unsatisfactory to administrators after the administrators’ student population deemed it ‘irrelevant’ to the social and political controversies of the late 1960s: sexual liberation, psychedelic drugs, and fear of getting shot in a rice paddy in Southeast Asia (a fear dignified by the term ‘anti-imperialism’). In response, “the discipline and its institutional structures, especially the curriculum, were reimagined as surrogates for the social totality,” an ambitious claim indeed, which Guillory kindly calls “the profession’s overestimation of its aims.” But at this same time, not only the well-calculated irrationalism of the New Left but “the proliferation of new media” has “displaced literature itself from its historical position as the premier medium of entertainment and edification.” Guillory cogently remarks, “It does not matter how politically ambitious the aims of literary study might be if literature itself continues to contract in social importance.” The ‘social-activist’ turn in literary study brings the discipline to the bar of its “real effects in the world,” a “position of justification by faith,” which he doubts to be “either warranted or likely to sustain the discipline in the future.” This may then be what educationists call a ‘teachable moment’ for teachers of literature, and Guillory undertakes “to give an account of the profession’s formation and deformation according to a guiding principle of what the Greeks called parrhesia, or speaking the truth freely.”

    Every regime features a way of life that tends to produce a characteristic human ‘type.’ In Guillory’s preferred sociological terms, “all professional formation is also, by necessity, deformation,” not necessarily in a pejorative sense but indeed as a necessity of mastering the task. The hand of the dyer gets stained; the back of the scholar, leaning over the book on the table, gets hunched. And of course these habitual behaviors form and deform minds at least as much as bodies. This is true of scholarship pursued in solitude or within the university bureaucracy, that “highly organized, even byzantine form of collectivity.” Bureaucracies ‘compartmentalize’ human activities, thoughts, habits; “the fact that the division of knowledge during the nineteenth century into ever more specialized disciplines necessitated the reorganization of university faculty into departments, the most conspicuous feature of our institutional geography.” A type of human being called a ‘clerk,’ closely aligned to ‘clericalism,’ could be described by Nietzsche as zealous, serious, and even furious; this character hasn’t gone away but it has adapted itself to the universities’ turn “away from the church.” “Literary study is not alone among the humanistic disciplines in its struggle to define a social mission that would justify its corporate identity as a profession or to resort to overestimation as compensatory response to uncertainty of aim.” And as Nietzsche well knows, scholars are not philosophers; they are oxen, plodding over the field of knowable things, at best directed by philosophers or, as likely, followed by philosophers who harvest their gleanings. In Nietzsche’s formulation, however, philosophers imitate life itself by partaking of life’s universal will to power, a doctrine that distorts Plato (Guillory cites the superficial Hannah Arendt on this, with altogether too much credence) and deformed Heidegger (fair enough). The problem of deformation, Guillory maintains, in philosophy or in any other discipline, must be “redressed by a better estimation of philosophy, as of any scholarly discipline.” (Yes and no: a better estimation than Nietzsche’s, to be sure, but not an estimation that fails to distinguish philosophers from scholars—in this instance, from professors of philosophy or, to use an older word, philosophes.) 

    Returning to the Progressives and their distinctive kind of bureaucracy, Guillory cites the “new professions [that] both displaced and transformed the system of the three ‘ancient’ (that is, medieval) professions” of law, medicine, and divinity. As Plato almost says of the idols of the cave, “it is difficult to see through the professionalization of literary study to its long prehistory”; “almost” because the Platonic ascent rises to nature, not to history. Guillory presents an “epochal break” whereby “claims to professional identity b a proliferation of new technical and managerial workers effectively entailed a reconceptualization of cognitive labor itself,” a reconceptualization “expressed in a great burst of theorizing that lasted from the later nineteenth century until the Second World War.” That theorizing, it should be seen, consisted precisely of a shift in political thought that mirrored a prior shift in philosophy, the shift called ‘historicism,’ replacing both Biblical commandments and natural right as the source of moral and political principles. Guillory here cites Kenneth Burke, who, although no Edmund Burke, understands clearly enough that “a society’s ways of life affect its modes of thinking, by giving rise to partial perspectives,” which both form and deform citizens. Guillory provides the necessary application: in “much Progressive Era theory, the professional organization serves as a model for society itself.” As both Burkes, Aristotle, Progressive stalwart John Dewey, and many others acknowledge, “all education can be understood as a process of habituation, the embodiment of knowledge,” and “what one learns changes one’s behavior, but it can also induce a maladaptive hardening of behavior over time.” Progressives especially concerned themselves with inculcating expertise, wielded by (in Woodrow Wilson’s phrase) “experts in the relations of things,” prepared to coordinate the relations of those “things,” including persons, in the march toward social justice as they conceived it. “This ideology of professional expertise is in some ways as constitutive of modernity as the rise of the natural sciences,” and indeed conceives the ‘social sciences’ and at times the humanities along the model of experimentalism at the service of the mastery of nature and of ‘fortune.’ Dividing intellectual from manual labor, professionalism animates “a new class” of professional managers, which “arrogates ‘intellectual’ labor to itself,” and thus moral and political authority to itself. Although Guillory finds “the explosion of professions in the Progressive Era” “difficult to explain,” that may be because he considers neither Machiavelli (and following him Bacon), whose prince knows how to “master Fortuna” by the means of the lion and the fox, nor Tocqueville, who traces the longue durée of democratization. If the professions valorized by Progressivism as instruments of historical progress toward egalitarianism have proliferated, this registers the modern philosophic attempt to rule nature combined with the modern philosophic esteem for equality; the ambition to rule according to the dictum, ‘Knowledge is power’ and to ‘democratize’ the ruled, simultaneously, requires the expansion of professionalism to disciplines well beyond the medieval trinity.

    For literary scholars, the problem has been that their discipline “was not an easy fit for the university,” so reorganized. “The establishment of new disciplines in the university system, and their ultimate bureaucratic organization into departments, was premised on a normative conception of knowledge identified with what the age called science.” Science meant not only natural science but “other forms of empirical investigation, such as history and philology,” both of which had to do with the study of literature. As scholarship generally became increasingly institutionalized within universities, “many nonscientific professions came increasingly to imitate the scientific form of knowledge production through disciplinarization, that is, by the strategy of locating the production and reproduction of their expertise in the university,” as universities “brought the professions into permanent fusion with the system of the disciplines, which in turn transformed the university itself.” In the United States, in the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth centuries, colleges had trained clergymen and coated the sons of commercial and industrial entrepreneurs with “the veneer of European civility.” American gentry, so formed, returned to the enterprises of their fathers, or invented new ones, but had no substantial bureaucracy to enter and so needed no education to fit them for it. When philosophic doctrines of historicism, democratized as a reader of Tocqueville might anticipate, turned the universities away from Bible-based theology and natural rights-based civic life, there was no political class to resist them, to guide democracy away from them, as Tocqueville had hoped his own aristocratic class would do. Thus, “in the era of the great university presidents—Charles William Eliot of Harvard, Danield Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins, Andrew Dickson White of Cornell” (one might add Wilson at Princeton)—the “Latin and Greek curriculum was replaced by the system of electives, which permitted specialization directed toward a career” and also permitted professors not only to teach but to do research. “These professors acquired sophisticated new conceptions of research in part as a consequence of study abroad, primarily in the German universities.” The American universities (and, under Dewey’s influence, high schools and elementary schools) taken together amounted to “a new kind of school,” one committed not to transmitting the principles of the existing regime to subsequent generations but to move toward a new regime altogether, one founded upon the new, historicist principles. Under this new dispensation, literary study could thrive in the universities under the rubric of philology, the scientific study of language. “But this was only a temporary rapprochement” between literary study and the ‘harder’ sciences.

    Fortunately for the status of literary studies in the university, not science itself but professionalism became the authoritative criterion for inclusion in the new regime. “Social authority” “came to be based on the very institutional and cultural forms science had helped to establish: the professional association, the academic discipline, the department, professional and graduate schools, the higher degree”; “in the end, professionalism triumphed even over science.” “Knowledge workers” have become “a new ruling class,” and as that class invents more new technologies that enhance their rule, more wealth, prestige, and political power accrues to them. All regimes have rulers; all rulers make claims to rule, upholding some idea of justice and maintaining that they know how to obtain it. Rule by experts maintains its authority by defining professionalism in terms of cognitive or abstract work, by asserting a specialized knowledge that excludes non-experts from the work of rule, by organizing ruling institutions, including publishing enterprises that make their principles and practices known to one another and to the general public, along with professional organizations and educational institutions, by establishing bureaucracy as a main arm not only of government conventionally defined but in education and in ‘private enterprise’ (the business corporation), and finally by “ideologies of social presentation or legitimation” such as “public service” (a nod to democracy by the undemocratic) or, even more pointedly, by means of such locutions of ‘being on the right side of history’ and indeed on the ‘cutting edge of history,’ and the now-familiar ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’—all within the bureaucratic institutional framework peopled by the new ruling class. Commerce and industry can thus be brought to heel—more readily than one might suppose, thanks to their own bureaucratic structures peopled by university graduates saturated by historicist ideologies.

    Within those universities, given the material difference between “a new and potentially lucrative discovery in chemistry” and “a new reading of Joyce’s Ulysses,” “much depends on the maintenance of professional identity” among those who produce the latter sort of thing. Such professionalization “insulates some kinds of knowledge work to a certain extent from the volatility of the market,” seldom kind to new readings of Joyce’s Ulysses. To keep literary studies in the same institutional setting as chemistry, physics, and biology requires not only a claim to professionalism, however, but an additional claim not to commercial or industrial benefit, which would be supremely implausible, but to social benefit. And this, too, is only somewhat less tenuous. To the rescue comes the ‘market’ within the universities themselves, where the humanities have competed fairly well with natural and social sciences in terms of ‘customers’ and ‘products’ —the “number of students taught or books published and, ultimately, to a measurable index of institutional reputation.” Three consequences follow from these circumstances: “standardized, universalized, ritualized, and above all compulsory” professional standards such as academic degrees, attendance at academic conventions and conferences, and publications; the attempt to innovate (fitting well with Progressivism); and the “professional profile,” most notably “the ability to analyze or make complex arguments, in spoken or written form.” For professors of literature, this has issued in “desires to effect change directly through the critique expressed in literary criticism.” And this leads back to the problem of “overestimation” of the value of literary studies and criticism, or what an advertising man would call ‘puffing.’ Among academics, however, puffing is very close to professing, and may often be done with considerable sincerity, if not naivete. This can be a problem, since literary study now calls itself literary criticism, and “no other discipline” than literary criticism “incorporates the concept of criticism into its name.” Puffing and criticism rest uneasily together, given the inclination of the criticized to answer with critiques of their own, and given the occasional inclination of critics to criticize themselves. “If criticism is a kind of Archimedean lever by which literary critics hope to move the world, it must be a wonderful device indeed, wherever one stands in order to push down on this lever.”

    Where, then, shall the literary critic stand? What is “the particular field of professional expertise” where he “plants his flag”? After all, the professional training of literary scholars “by no means confers upon literary scholars the authority to speak on social and political matters in public venues,” a point about which no less an eminence than Joseph Schumpeter groused about back in 1942, calling literary criticism the “profession of the unprofessional”—a palpable hit, indeed, if one makes much of one’s professionalism, as literary scholars and social scientists like Schumpeter must alike do, if they profess within a modern university.

    Criticism came to sight in the late seventeenth century as “the name of a genre of writing” in which writers judged plays and poems, usually in prose but occasionally in poetry, as Alexander Pope did. As the eighteenth century saw Enlightenment philosophes coming to the fore, and as the nineteenth century saw the acceleration of the movement toward ‘democracy’ or social equality, criticism ranged afield, eventually to critiques of “society itself.” This attracted no stern objections until literary criticism “competed for territory among the academic disciplines,” as it was compelled to do in the decades before Schumpeter published his riposte. Guillory hastens to say, “I do not believe the criticism of society is the province of any particular discipline, much less that it can be institutionalized in departments of literature”; “criticism is the privilege of no one discipline and the obligation of all.” Other university denizens are less ‘inclusive.’ Yet criticism implies a criterion or set of criteria for judgment. What will that be, for literary scholars?

    At the time literary criticism had established itself outside the universities, formidable Samuel Johnson had defined its task as “to establish principles,” thereby “improv[ing] opinion into knowledge” with his essays in The Gentleman’s Magazine. Although Guillory does not mention it, Johnson was speaking in Platonic terms, the ascent from opinion to knowledge of nature being the philosophic ascent, the ascent from the Cave. A ‘discipline’ indeed, as Plato himself makes plain in his Letters. [1] In a sense, the ‘caves’ of Europe had multiplied by Johnson’s time, as many clergy and statesmen alike had separated their regimes from the Catholic Church, causing Bibles to be translated into vernaculars; literary critics, for their part, wrote in the vernacular on literary works written in the vernacular. The reign of Latin had weakened and would weaken still more. 

    Johnson’s life ended shortly after the United States of America gained independence from his sovereign. As in England and in Europe generally, American literary critics operated outside of academia for the next century, but when the study of literature gained entrance into the universities, “the classically trained teaching corps of the university system had to be recommissioned for the new vernacular curriculum.” Between the world wars, universities welcomed many of the literary critics to their faculties, “whatever their credentials.” This meant that literary criticism “became an academic profession before it became a discipline.” The critics professionalized themselves by formulating a method of interpretation, the most successful being the New Criticism of John Crowe Ransom at Vanderbilt, later at Kenyon. Ransom “made the stakes of the procedure explicit: ‘Rather than occasional criticism by amateurs, I should think the whole enterprise might be seriously taken in hand by professionals.'” This amounted to a challenge to the scholars, by now primarily literary historians; the New Criticism insisted that a literary work be interpreted within the framework of the text itself, not as a token of the ‘time’ in which it was written. Although Guillory describes the literary historians as positivists, one might more cogently describe them as historicists, meaning historical relativists—having derived their intellectual assumptions from the several neo-Hegelian doctrines then taught in the graduate schools, the philosophic framework of Progressivism. Ransom and his allies often resisted Progressivism not only in literary study but also in politics, as seen in their collection of essays on social and economic topics, I’ll Take My Stand.

    By the years subsequent to World War II, literary and social critics independent of the universities had dwindled in number, the “New York Intellectuals” being the most conspicuous holdouts. Historians and textualists papered over their differences and proceeded to school the Baby Boomers. But “the postwar settlement was fragile: the merger of criticism and scholarship drove the criticism of society underground, as the cost of compromise.” Pressured by the New Left, and at the same time getting a bit bored with what they were doing (“endlessly repeated celebrations of great literature”), the literary professoriate welcomed “the reassertion of criticism,” and indeed of criticism of topics well beyond literary forms. If neo-Hegelianism galvanized the professors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, neo-Marxism or ‘cultural Marxism’ galvanized the younger scholars in the universities, soon joined by the New Leftists who had escaped conscription by going to graduate school. (New Leftists began as critics of academic professionalism, as seen in Tom Hayden’s 1962 Port Huron Statement, but quickly adapted to university forms upon getting gainful employment—tenured employment, at that.) New methods were needed to maintain this professional status, and there was no shortage of those, thanks to prior efforts by European leftists, among whom Jacques Derrida, armed with ‘deconstructionism,’ was perhaps the most popular initially, although feminism to some extent eclipsed it. “At present, theory is disseminated largely by means of anthologies that offer theoretical approaches to interpretation, like choices on a menu (I invoke the banal simile to underscore my point).” As a result, in literature departments today, “criticism is what we really profess,” “claim[ing] to wield an Archimedean lever,” “want[ing] to rule the world.”

    As Guillory satirically puts it, this combination of university requirements and perquisites—a quasi-aristocratic status—and taking one’s stand on the Left, for ‘democracy,’ means that “the professional career of the scholarly critic today functions simultaneously as a covert prophetic career.” Guillory hastens to remark that this is indeed literary criticism is “a spurious form of prophecy, the religious trope by which Weber grasps the politicization of the lecture hall and of scholarship,” warning, as Weber put it, that “the prophet and the demagogue have no place at the lectern,” that they belong out on the street, haranguing passersby. In Weber’s Germany, things of that sort would get noticeably worse before they got better, a point one may take when considering the universities today, although for the moment Guillory considers academic prophets to be animated by “the scholarly imaginary.” Taken by themselves, yes, but when backed by the administrators, they influence the people who go on to find jobs in the ruling professions, do they not? Yes, he soon observes: “It seems reasonable to suppose…that teaching in humanities disciplines has had a significant impact on political attitudes in the demographic of the ‘college-educated.'” But this doesn’t “mean that the college-educated fully understand the structural bases of social injustice or see clearly what must be done politically to transform these structures.” In fact, your reviewer has encountered distinguished professional political scientists who have never read Aristotle’s Politics. 

    What is more, lit-crit attempts to address politics via such subpolitical, social and economic categories as “black, Chicano, or female studies,” or such polemicized political categories as “Revolutionary Literature,” “Imperialism,” or “The Antislavery Struggle” have achieved results less than satisfactory to the ideologues who teach in accordance with them. This brings “renewed uncertainty about the justification of the discipline,” as well it might. In today’s academe, “the system of rewards encourages us to imagine that we are being rewarded for the criticism of society. I think we might expect such rewards in heaven.” (Or not. Heaven reportedly declines to reward hubris.) “The absurdity of the situation should be evident to all of us: as literary study wanes in public importance, as literature departments shrink in size, as majors in literature decline in numbers, the claims for the criticism of society are ever more overstated.”

    With its excess of “rebarbative” jargon and its failure to identify a “proper clientele” for the multisyllabic and bloodless words it has on offer, academic literary critics have ignored “readers of literature.” “To name our clientele as the readers of literature argues rather for…the reestimation of aim, a better understanding of how literary works are read, both in the schools and without, and what literary study might do to improve the reading of literature, even reading as such.” As implied by the adjective itself, “amateur readers” “love what they read” (or sometimes hate it—are engaged by it, at any rate). “I would like to believe that the value of criticism inheres in its discovery of a truth in literary or other cultural works, whatever feelings of affection or disaffection the critical reader might have about a given work.” Dr. Johnson and his guide, Aristotle, were right: Man does indeed want to know.

    The regime of the university, with its departments of literary study, thus need a new purpose. “The criticism of the text can also be the criticism of society,” but this criticism needs “to move beyond the phase of manifesto.” “Long ago, literary education was the chief requisite for a voice in the public sphere; that day is over.” Get over it and move on. One way to do so (if I may so bold as to suggest) would be to assume that the ‘canonical’ authors are often smarter than the professors and students who study them, then take things from there, both in class and in the journals.

    Note

    1. See Ariel Helfer, ed.: Plato’s Letters: The Political Challenges of the Philosophic Life. For commentary, see “Plato’s Politic Practice” and “What Is Politic About Political Philosophy?” on this website under the category, “Philosophers.”

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    What Is Politic About Platonic Political Philosophy? Plato’s “Letters,” V-XIII

    March 27, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    Ariel Helfer, ed.: Plato’s Letters: The Political Challenges of the Philosophic Life. Translated, with introduction, notes and interpretive essay by Ariel Helfer. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023. Letters V-XIII.

     

    Having shown how the tyrant, Dionysius the Younger, and the aspiring philosopher-king, Dion, failed as philosophers but especially as rulers, Plato turns in Letters Five and Six to corresponding with two more sober men, the young Perdiccas III of Macedon, then under the regency of his brother-in-law, and Hermias of Atarneus, a former student of Plato and friend of Aristotle, who is said to have arranged Aristotle’s marriage to his daughter. In some respects, Perdiccas serves as a parallel life to that of Dionysius, both of them young men, Hermias to that of Dion, both of them mature men. 

    To Perdiccas, Plato offers counsel on the customs of guest-friendship and of sacred counsel. Plato has sent one of his students to him, as he had done for Dionysius. According to one account, the student, Euphraeus, inspired a love of philosophy in the young king, and Perdiccas reciprocated by raising Euphraeus to a position of honor in his court. A guest-friend, indeed. As to sacred counsel, Plato advises Perdiccas on the nature of political regimes—that is, on ruling, the divine action par excellence. Political life is ‘polytheistic’ in the sense that each regime has “a certain voice,” even as certain animals have distinctive calls (321d). But whereas animals call to other animals, regimes call to other rational beings. Yet only “a very few” observers understand what democracies, oligarchies, and monarchies are saying as they speak to gods and human beings, with actions that “follow” their voices (321e). When regimes follow their voices they flourish, but if they imitate the voices of other regimes they are ruined. Euphraeus can help you to find the right voice for your regime, “the speeches befitting monarchy” (322a).

    “But if someone, having heard these things, should say, ‘Plato, it seems, pretends to know what things are advantageous to a democracy, but when it was possible to speak to the demos and to counsel the things best for it, he never went up to utter a sound,'” how to reply (322a)? True enough, but the Athens of Plato’s own time (having already executed Socrates, among other actions) saw “a demos already elderly and habituated by those who came before to do many things unlike to his own counsel”; the philosopher would have been foolish to attempt to advise it, “taking risks in vain and doing nothing more” in a regime that had descended into “an incurable state” (322b). “Political wisdom is likely to be as much an object of suspicion in a democracy as in a monarchy,” Helfer rightly observes. Plato makes no mention of philosophy itself in this letter, content to recommend his philosophically-minded student, with good effect. Perdiccas ruled for five years, killed in a disastrous military expedition against Illyria, which had seized upper Macedonia. It would be helpful to know what we do not know—what Euphraeus advised in regard to the venture—but it is at least clear that this was no imperialist lunge, rather an attempt to counter an act of imperialism. 

    Plato sends students to Hermias, introducing them as persons likely to benefit the tyrant and likely to benefit from him in turn. His letter is addressed to all three men. “Friends who are steadfast who have healthy character” are more valuable than a multitude of horses or an additional military alliance or additional gold (322d). Young Erastus and Coriscus will prove to be such friends to Hermias, as Plato has tested them and found them of moderate and trustworthy character. For his part, Hermias can protect them, as “they are inexperienced on account of having been occupied with us…for a long part of their life” (322e). It will be recalled that Plato had regarded his time spent in Syracuse with Dionysius a waste of his time and Dionysius regarded the beginnings of a liberal education at the feet of Plato a waste of his time; as a ruler, Hermias spends his time deliberating and acting, not philosophizing, whereas the young philosophers have spent their time becoming liberally educated, not in ruling. As Helfer suggests, “the study of philosophy in Plato’s Academy has rendered them perfectly upright but desperately vulnerable; by attending for so long to the attainment of ‘true wisdom,’ they have failed sufficiently to acquire ‘the human and compulsory’ wisdom that would allow them to fend off the ‘wicked and unjust.'” This being so, these two human types should “hold fast” to one another, “arriv[ing] at a single braid of friendship” (323b).

    If, however, one of you becomes disgruntled with this bond and you “resolve to dissolve it,” write a letter of accusation to me, and I will attempt to reconcile you (323b). If you do this, “unless the dissolution happens to have been great,” our joint philosophizing should succeed better “than any incantation whatsoever,” any pious utterance, to “naturally implant and bind you together again” in “friendship and community” (323b-c). Plato playfully calls this “a good prophecy,” claiming “that we will do all these good things, if a god should be willing” (323c). More seriously, he calls this “a compact and sovereign law” among the four of them,” as “playfulness…is a sister of seriousness, and swearing by the god who is leader of all things”—perhaps the “first by nature,” mentioned in his letter to Dionysius?—both “the things that are and the things that will be,” can be known to us, provided “we really philosophize,” as “clearly as is within the power of happy human beings” to know that god (323d). If the tyrant consents, he will be less a tyrant, having submitted to a form of the rule of law.

    Helfer contrasts the real Platonists with Dion. “Dion did not really understand what philosophy means for Plato.” Erastus and Coriscus do, but as a result of their ardent and laborious studies they are helpless in any polis, needing the political protection of one such as Hermias. Philosophy alone is not a solution to politics, although Euphraeus’ Platonic political science can be helpful to a young ruler like Perdiccas. Letter Six “is a bridge between [the] drastically truncated presentation of philosophy” moralizing Dion embodied “and the correction of that distortion.” Letter Six both “upholds the notion of philosophy as the basis of trustworthy friendship” and acknowledges philosophy’s “essentially dynamic and transpolitical character.” While insisting on the pious character of philosophy, Plato takes care to propose the covenantal law as a hedge against “the danger of human inconstancy.” After all, will Hermias, with his “limited capacity for philosophy,” sustain the friendship? The young philosophers will be loyal, but how useful can they be to this ruler, beyond their trustworthy friendship? After all, “the philosopher does not wish to spend time in, or even think about, the practical requirements of political activity,” even if he comes to be capable of doing so, in time. And indeed “the real lesson of the letter…is the demonstration of the practical infeasibility of this ideal arrangement,” “the regime” within the regime in Atareneus “that [Plato] has founded.” While he has written “a critical safeguard” into the sovereign covenant—the three philosophers outnumber the lone non-philosopher—the unphilosophic ruler will retain all the physical power, leaving “the philosopher at the mercy of the ruler,” should the tyrant turn especially tyrannical. “Plato cannot rule by means of fear because he can muster no threat of force against the powerful Hermias”; persuasion is his only available means of rule. Worse, this “solution to the philosopher’s need for protection is inappropriate in any real circumstances, since the philosophers must always constitute a tiny minority of the political community.” Letter Six serves as “an introduction to the central political challenge of Plato’s political-philosophic writings.” The “doctrine of philosophic rule is necessarily mythical.” Letter Seven will address this matter, showing much more elaborately “how Plato calls into question the political efficacy of philosophy.”

    Plato addresses the seventh letter to “intimates and comrades of Dion,” who by now had been assassinated (323e). These men carry on a civil war against the rule of the assassins. Letter Seven is the central letter in the book, and also the longest. 

    Plato recalls that Dion “supposed that the Syracusans should be free, dwelling under the best laws” (324b). His opinion originated from his association with Plato, who explains his own political career. Even before reaching the age of full citizenship, Athenian Plato expected to engage in “the common affairs of the city” (324c). But the regime of the Thirty Tyrants, effectively installed by the Spartans after their defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, with some “intimates and acquaintances of mine” among its number, did not “manage the city by leading it from a certain unjust life to a just way,” as Plato had hoped, but instead imposed a violent purge of those Athenians who had opposed the surrender (324d). The leader of the Thirty, Critias, had been a student of “my friend, the elderly Socrates, whom I would scarcely be ashamed to say was the most just of those in that time” (324e). That is, the worry that the conduct of Dionysius, Plato’s student-tyrant, might reflect badly upon his teacher was a possibility Plato had seen in Athens, decades earlier. This, despite the fact that when the regime commanded Socrates to “carry off one of the citizens by force to be put to death in order that he should participate in their affairs whether he should wish to or not,” Socrates courageously refused the command, “risked suffering everything rather than become a partner in their impious deeds” (324e-325a). As for Plato, “I was disgusted and I withdrew myself from the evils of that time” (325a). The subsequent democratic regime that replaced the brief rule of the Thirty Tyrants was even worse, at least regarding to philosophy, killing Socrates “on grounds of a lack of pious veneration” (325c). As Helfer remarks, Plato passes over in silence the second charge against Socrates, that of corrupting the young. One reason for that may be that the addressees of the Seventh Letter are young men. 

    Upon reflection, and with further observation of politics in Athens and elsewhere, Socrates came to understand how hard it is “to manage the political things correctly” (325d). This is because it is hard to find “men who are friends and faithful comrades,” without whom one can do nothing politically, as the reign of Dionysius, that man alone, confirmed (325d). The corruption of existing regimes, with their “written laws and customs,” makes this nearly impossible, inasmuch as bad regimes foster bad character in rulers and ruled alike (325d). Being a philosopher, Plato continued to consider how regimes might be improved, but “with respect to acting I was always waiting for propitious moments” (326a). They never came. I “ended up thinking, concerning all the cities now, that all of them are being governed badly—for what is of their laws in in a nearly incurable state without some amazing artifice [or preparation] together with fortune” (326a). Echoing the words of the Republic 473c, Plato then concluded that “the human tribes will not cease from evils until either the tribe of those philosophizing (correctly and truly, that is) should come into the positions of political rule, or that of those who are in power in the cities should, by some divine fate, really philosophize” (326b). Plato tacitly invites the late Dion’s allies, and perhaps especially those reading his book, to measure the odds of either eventuality.

    Journeying to Italy and Sicily for the first time, he found that “the life that is there called happy” consists of eating and copulating, habits that prevent the young from “becoming practically wise,” men of phronēsis (326b), or indeed to cultivate any other virtue. Here is where Dion came in. His association with Plato, his attempt to philosophize, was the “beginning” of “the problems that have now come to be concerning Dion and of those concerning the Syracusans”—namely, civil war—and, “it is to be dreaded, of still more, unless you would now obey my counsel, given now for the second time” (326e). For when Plato revealed to Dion “through speeches the things that seemed to me to be best for human beings and counseling him to do them, I was ignorant that I, without noticing myself, was in a certain way contriving what would come to be a dissolution of a tyranny” (327a). Dion “hearkened keenly and intently such as none of the young I have ever met,” choosing to “over the rest of his life in a manner differing from that of the many Italiotes and Siceliotes,” “cherish[ing] virtue more than pleasure and the rest of luxury” (327a). This annoyed “those living according to what is lawful convention in a tyranny” (327b). 

    Had Dion left it there, had he simply lived a virtuous private life, he might have been written off as a peculiar character but deserving of no more than contempt. But Dion “apprehended” that his way of life was being emulated in others, if not in many (327c). More, he “held” (note well, not apprehending) that even the ruler, “even Dionysius could perhaps become one of these with the assistance of gods,” and if so, “both his life and that of other Syracusans would turn out to become one of indomitable bliss” (327c). And he further “supposed” that his good old teacher, Plato, might be brought in “as a partner in these things,” turn Dionysius toward philosophy and thus to found, “without slaughters, deaths, and the evils that have come to be, a happy and true life throughout the land,” a regime ruled by the philosopher-king in practice, not merely in theory, as in the Republic (327d). Does this not substitute Plato for the gods, or does it merely assume that Plato’s arrival has become possible thanks to a divinely arranged, rare circumstance? In the event, it was not a god who called Plato but Dionysius, having been persuaded by Dion to do so. Plato was rightly cautious about Dion’s bright hopes, but he eventually decided to journey to Syracuse, thinking that “if ever someone was to undertake to bring these intentions concerning both laws and regime to completion, it must be attempted also now” (328c). To that dubious hope, Plato added the worry that he might be “in danger of betraying, in the first place, the guest-friendship and comradeship of Dion, who had really come to be in no small dangers” (328d). More, what if Plato did not come and Dion were exiled, arriving in Athens (under the terms of guest-friendship) to rebuke Plato but even more philosophy itself for having betrayed him and having betrayed this unique opportunity to put philosophic theory into practice? In the words Plato puts into the mouth of Dion in this fictional scenario, “will you ever escape a reputation for vice? Far from it.” (329a). There would be no answer to this accusation against himself and philosophy, Plato claims.

    “I went, in accordance with reason and in justice as much as can be for a human being,” who lacks godlike foresight (329b). “I left behind my occupations, which were not indecorous”—as we know, his teaching in the Academy he had founded—in order to live “under a tyranny that didn’t seem to be fitting with respect to my things or to me” (329b). This nonetheless acquitted him “in relation to Zeus Xenios,” that is, the god of gods in his aspect of guardian of guest-friendship, while “rendering the philosopher’s part impeachable” (329b). That is, by showing himself both pious and philosophic, he defended himself and philosophy against one of the charges the Athenian demos had leveled against Socrates.

    Upon arrival in Syracuse, however, he found not philosophic or friendly speech but “everything around Dionysius full of strife and slanders about Dion in relation to the tyranny” (329c). His concerns about Dion’s safety confirmed, he defended him “to the extent I was capable,” which wasn’t very far; Dionysius soon accused Dion of “plotting against the tyranny”—of a form of thought animated by philosophic principles, if not by the virtue of prudence (329c). In exiling Dion, Dionysius begged, or rather insisted, that Plato stay behind. Did he find something of value in the philosopher, or was he simply ensuring that his putative regime enemies could not reunite and continue their supposed conspiring against him? “While he did grow ever fonder of me as time went on during his intercourse with my way and character, he also wished for me to praise him more than Dion and to hold him to be more especially a friend than him,” spurred on by the “amazing love of victory” typical of a thumotic soul (330a). In this, Dionysius never came to pursue the regime, the way of life, of philosophy; worse, “he shrank from it, fearing, on account of the slanderers’ speeches, lest he should become ensnared in some way and Dion come to accomplish everything for himself” (330b). Plato persevered in his efforts but Dionysius, “resisting, won out,” not in persuading Plato to prefer him to Dion but in resisting philosophy (330b). 

    Should Plato have persevered instead of getting out of town? No: “One who is counseling a sick man adhering to a regimen that is depraved with respect to health ought first to change his life into something else, and if he is willing to obey, at that point to suggest other things too; but if he is not willing, I would hold one who flees from counseling such a one to be both a man and a doctor, and one who remains to be the opposite: unmanly and artless. It is indeed the same with respect to a city as well, whether it has one sovereign authority or more.” (330c-d). With a slave, it is another matter; in that case, one can use force. But there is no sense in “mak[ing] myself hateful by admonishing in vain” or in flattering them either (331c). Yet isn’t that what Dion did, in Syracuse? Making himself hateful by admonishing in vain? His followers should take note. One should speak to one’s city “if it does not appear to him to be nobly governed, if he is neither going to be talking in vain nor to be put to death for speaking; but he should not bring force against a fatherland to produce a change of regime when it is not possible for it to come to be the vest without exile and slaughter of men; rather, he should keep quiet and pray for the good things for both himself and the city” (331d). Plato makes it explicit: “In this same way, indeed, I would counsel you,” and this is how Dion and I counseled Dionysius; govern yourself, first, then “acquire faithful friends and comrades” attracted to you by your virtue before attempting to reform Syracuse or to recolonize Sicilian cities misruled by barbarians, the latter task undertaken but never achieved by his father (331d-e).

    But neither did the virtuous Dion succeed in founding a good regime in Syracuse after returning to the city and expelling the tyrant. Dion’s virtue attracted friends, to be sure. In this enterprise, he brought with him two brothers from Athens who had “come to be [his friends] not from philosophy but from the promiscuous comradeship belonging to most friends, which they work out through hosting someone as a guest-friend or through initiation into the lesser and greater mysteries” (333e). Once victorious in Syracuse, they betrayed Dion, participating in his assassination. This was a “shameful and impious thing” to do, but it must be noticed that although Plato makes much of the congruence of traditional customs, piety, and philosophy, rational inquiry shows that such customs and piety do not guard a man from false friends as well as philosophy—in particular political philosophy, which ought to alert its students to the importance of prudence. Plato immediately displays such prudence, observing that just because the two men in question were Athenians they did not necessarily represent the ethos of that city. I, Plato, am also an Athenian, but never betrayed him, even when tempted by the blandishments of the Syracusan tyrants. Plato “had become a friend to Dion not through vulgar friendship, but through partnership in liberal education” (334b). As for Syracuse, and your continued attempt to rule it in line with Dion’s intentions, but not with his folly, his wish “to make use of justice” without considering the ethos of Syracusans (335c). “Let not Sicily, nor any other city, be enslaved to human masters, but as my speech [logos] has it at least, to laws; for otherwise it is better neither for the enslavers nor the enslaved,” nor for their descendants (334c-d). And, now recurring to a pious thought, “one really ought to be persuaded by the ancient and sacred speeches, which indeed reveal to us that the soul is deathless, and it has judges, and that it suffers the greatest penalties whenever it is rid of its bodies; wherefore ought one to believe that it is a smaller evil to suffer even the great sins and injustices than to do them” (335a). 

    How, then, to rule Syracuse? Imitate Dion’s personal moderation, be alert to those among you who are “not capable of living in the Dorian way” (336d), do not seek vengeance against your defeated enemies but make them, “by a pair of compulsions, awe and fear,” and make yourselves too, in your prudence, “slaves of the laws” (337a). Select fifty elders and offer them “the greatest possible honors” in framing good laws (337c)—in marked contrast to the Spartans’ imposition of the Thirty Tyrants on conquered Athens. “The laws having been given, everything comes down to this: if those who have won victory should render themselves, more than the vanquished, subservient to the laws, everything will be full of salvation and happiness and there will be refuge from all evils; but if they do not, neither call upon me nor upon another partner for help against whoever is unpersuaded by the letter that has now been sent to you” (336e-337a).

    All very good, sage philosopher, but if you had taken Dionysius’ measure in your second visit to Syracuse, why did you return yet again? And if the only reliable friends are the philosophic ones, and philosophic souls are so rare, why would you risk falling into the clutches of this tyrant a second time, inasmuch as he had not heeded the advice of you and your friend Dion the previous time? It isn’t hard to see that Dionysius might invite him back; as a point of honor, he did not want people to think he’d learned nothing from Plato—or so Plato surmises. But why would you accept his invitation?

    We have reached what Helfer identifies as the midway point of Letter Seven, “which is to say the midway point of the entire Letters.” As Fortune or some other god or gods would have it, another philosopher, and indeed a philosopher-king of sorts, the mathematician Archytas of Tarentum, had spent time with Dionysius, writing to assure Plato that the young tyrant “had advanced in philosophy” (339b). For his part, Dionysius wrote, too, promising Plato to follow Plato’s wishes regarding Dion. Once again, Plato chose to put the thing to the test, for “if things really be as had been said, in no way [would he] betray this very thing,” philosophy, and thereby put himself under “so great a reproach” (439e). And although fearful and “divining not very nobly,” he set out; once again, his increasingly wan hopes were disappointed, but at least Dionysius, “next after a god,” did prevent “many who wished to destroy me” from doing so, perhaps out of a certain “awe” or shame (340a). Helfer observes that at least Plato had come to the assistance of Archytas and the other Pythagorean philosophers at Syracuse by appeasing Dionysius’ request; “it was to avoid jeopardizing them and their work that Plato once more ‘veiled himself.” But why was Archytas fired with false hopes for the tyrant? Here Plato unfolds the difficulties of the philosophic life, perhaps the main reason so few continue in it.

    Students need to understand “what sort of thing the whole problem is and through how many problems and how much toil it lies” for those who undertake to solve it (340c). To “really be a philosopher, being both intimate with and worthy of the divine problem” one must “strain to follow” the path toward it (340c). Such persons, and such persons alone, consider “that life would not be worth living for one who would do otherwise,” and “will not let up until he should either bring everything to completion or obtain such a power that, separately from the one who has shown him, he is incapable of being a guide himself” (340c). On the other hand, “those who are not really philosophers, but have been tinctured by opinions just as those whose bodies have been burnt by the sun, once they have seen how many are the subjects of learning, and the extent of the toil, and the ordered daily regimen that befits the problem, hold it to be hard and impossible for themselves” (340d). Even worse are those “who persuade themselves that they have heard the whole sufficiently and have no further need of any problems” (341a). Such a one was Dionysius, who “pretended both to know and sufficiently to have a hold on many, even the greatest, things because of hearsay from other,” even to the point of writing “about the things he had heard, composing as though it were his own treatise,” although Plato himself professes to “know nothing of these writings” (341b). Even I, Plato, who have written extensively on Socratic and other efforts of philosophic inquiry, have written nothing about the divine problem, for “it is no way speakable as are the other subjects of learning, but rather, from the coming to be of much intercourse concerning the problem itself, and living together, suddenly, as from a jumping fire a light is kindled, and having come to be in the soul, it straightaway nourishes itself” (341c-d). Genuine philosophizing about the divine problem, if writable and speakable “to the many,” would be of the greatest benefit to them, as it would “lead nature forth into the light for all” (341d-e). But “I do not hold [that] to be good for human beings unless for some few—however many are themselves capable of finding them out through a small indication” (341e). Others will view such discoveries either with “incorrect disdain” or worse, “a lofty and empty hope as though they had learned some august things” (341-342a). 

    Why so? Plato lists five levels of knowing. The first is naming, the first sort of knowledge children learn, once they begin to understand words: for example, ‘this is a circle.’ The second is definition; rationally explaining the thing named in verbal terms: a circle is “that which is everywhere equally distant from the extremes to the middle”—an account, however, which remains ambiguous, inasmuch as it could refer as easily to something called a ‘ring’ (342b). For more precision, one needs an image, “what is drawn and erased, and what is turned on a lathe and destroyed” (342c). Scientific knowledge comes after that, when “all this [is] set down in turn as one, being not in sounds, nor in shapes and of bodies, but within souls” as “the nature of the circle,” its species (342c). And there is still a fifth level, knowledge of “the very thing that is knowable and is truly a being” (342b). The need for this level, as Helfer remarks, is that it “makes it possible to say that the objects of our experience belong objectively and really to species or classes.” Overall, “this amounts to a far-reaching critique of any thoroughgoing materialism” and, one might add, any ‘subjectivism.’ [1]

    It is easy to see the daunting features of this path of philosophic ascent. One needs to be “good-natured” to gain the “scientific knowledge of the good-natured” (344e). Aptness to learn and a good memory will not suffice to gain such knowledge. This suggests that the divine problem has to do with “the good,” which Plato’s Socrates mentions as somehow both the origin and ‘end’ or purpose of all natural phenomena. This may be why Plato now emphasizes in his account of inquiring into the nature of the whole the task of “learn[ing] the truth about virtue to the extent possible,” and of vice (344b). “It is necessary to learn them simultaneously, and also the false and true of the whole being simultaneously, with total occupation and a great deal of time” (344b). The difficulty comes with the necessary task of “rubbing against one another: the names, definitions, sights, and perceptions,” the dialectic that process with “kindly refutations,” “making use of questions and answers being without envy,” whereby, when considering what is good and what bad, “practical wisdom shines forth, as well as mind, straining to the utmost extent of human power” (344b-c). This is why a serious man considering “the serious beings” will not write about them, “cast them down amid the envy and perplexity of human beings” who, for the most part, will sneer, snicker, or become enraged at whatever has been discovered in the inquiry, and inquiry for the rigors of which they have neither taste, nor time, nor patience, nor the courage to persevere in (344c). Things that are written down—laws, to give the politically important example—are “not the most serious things” to the lawgiver, “if indeed he himself was serious,” philosophic (344c). For his part, Dionysius wrote about the divine problem “for love of honor” (344e). He was not a serious man, although he was a dangerous one, to others and to himself. 

    With this, Plato brings matters down to earth. What the tyrant also wanted, aside from honor, was property, including Dion’s property. He also wanted power, and suspected, as already recounted, that Dion was plotting against him. Dionysius proposed an arrangement whereby Dion would profit from his property in Syracuse but could not withdraw the ‘principle,’ as we now would call it, without Plato’s approval, as the right to withdraw that property would give Dion revenues sufficient to fund a military campaign to overthrow Dionysius. Plato disgustedly saw through that ploy, counter-offering to stay in Syracuse but only if Dionysius put his offer in writing. Dionysius wanted nothing to do with that sort of writing—permanence of obligation being less appealing to the tyrannical soul than permanence of a reputation for wisdom concerning the highest things, however spurious that wisdom might be. In the event, Dionysius simply sold Dion’s property, not surprising Plato when he did it. Plato’s recalcitrance regarding the initial scheme proved “a persuasive argument for enmity against me” (349c), as Dionysius now charged that Plato had sided with Dion. Happily, the philosopher-king Archytas rescued the philosopher he’d persuaded to return to Syracuse.

    Dionysius’ machinations brought on his ruin. Dion would not have marched against him, had Dionysius given him his money back or had reconciled with him. “But as it is they, having set out against one another, have had their fill of every evil” (350e). For his part, Plato declined Dion’s invitation to join him in the expedition to overthrow Dionysius, and Plato concludes his letter to Dion’s admiring followers with a measured eulogy. Their mutual friend nobly “preferred the suffering of impious deeds above the doing of them, yet being very careful not to suffer them; nevertheless he stumbled, having come to the peak of his overcoming of his enemies” (351c). Such a pious, moderate, sensible human being “would never be wholly deceived concerning the souls of such as they,” but although “a coming storm would not altogether escape his notice…the extraordinary and unexpected magnitude of a storm could escape his notice, and having escaped it, inundate him by force” (351d). A basically good but not prudent man, he did not understand the height of their “ignorance, depravity, and gluttony” (351e). He had not rubbed good and bad together long enough, as a genuine philosopher would do.

    As Helfer observes, “there is no denying that the whole undertaking in Syracuse appears to have been a debacle.” Making a philosopher-king out of Dionysius was Plan A; Helfer likens this to Socrates’ proposal in the Republic. Had it succeeded, Platonic political philosophy would have been vindicated in the most spectacular way. Putting Dion in as king, with the best laws, was Plan B; Helfer likens this to the plan of the Laws. “Had Dion succeeded in giving good laws to the Syracusans his reputation of being associated with philosophy, more than any ability to govern wisely himself, would have benefited the reputation of philosophy in turn,” although in truth Dion was no philosopher but rather a gentlemanly admirer of it. He was “wrong ever to believe that Plato’s description of philosophic rule in the Republic was a blueprint for political action,” since philosopher have no “wish to rule” and the people have no wish “to be ruled by philosophers.” Plato more reservedly, more prudently, praised philosophy by saying that “human beings would not be free from evils until philosophy and political power should coincide,” but although he was cautiously ready to test the possibility he never wholeheartedly believed in it. Did Plato derive what political prudence he had from his philosophy as such? Helfer doubts it, since philosophy seeks to know the nature of things, and indeed the nature of the divine things, the rigorous inquiry into which more readily brings souls into the condition of Erastus and Coriscus. 

    Yet, what of Plato himself? He has inquired into both the divine and the human, political things, not without result. With Erastus and Coriscus, might he be holding out the likelihood of the harmlessness of philosophy and of philosophers and their trustworthiness, while concealing their political knowledge—the result of their philosophic inquiry into the human nature that finds a home in nature as a whole? For one thing, as Helfer does not hesitate to cite, “the key failing of Dion’s political thought” is precisely his insufficient “attention to the difficult problem of political foundings.” He expects—and to Dion’s friends and admirers, Plato praises him for it—a bloodless founding, “recoil[ing] instinctively from the ugly business of ‘laying down the law’ for a new regime,” something the Athenian Stranger in the Laws most emphatically does not overlook. At the same time, Plato is no Machiavellian, one who rather takes delight in such ugly business. For one thing, “Plato is much less willing than Machiavelli to encourage the prospective founder to discard his belief in divine providence as a determining factor in human affairs.” Plato would set natural-right limits on founders, while recognizing that “political affairs belong too much to the realm of flux and chance to be mastered,” Machiavelli-like, “that great political undertakings require more good fortune than one can reasonably hope for.” 

    In Letter Eight, Plato again addresses Dion’s “intimates and comrades,” but much more briefly. With Dionysius’ tyranny removed and Dion assassinated, Syracuse now roils with a regime dispute between those who want a new tyranny and those who want to “escape from tyranny” (352c). The short Dionysian dynasty had first been installed because the city had needed a defender against powerful Carthage, and it found one in the capable Dionysius the Elder, but once the emergency had passed the tyrants did what tyrants often do: turn their untender attentions upon their own people. Plato writes, “My speech urges to everyone: it urges those aiming at tyranny to turn away in flight and flee the purported happiness of insatiably hungry and mindless human beings, and to attempt to change into the form of a king, and to be slaves to kingly laws, having acquired the greatest honors both from human beings voluntarily and from the laws; and those pursuing free ways and fleeing the slavish yoke as being bad, I would counsel to beware lest they should ever fall into the disease of the ancestors out of insatiability for a certain unpropitious freedom, which disease they then suffered because of the excessive anarchy, making use of an unmeasured, passionate love of freedom” (354c-d). Sounding rather like his student, Aristotle, he denigrates the extremes of slavery and freedom, although “if each is in measure” (as in slavery to good laws and freedom understood as the rule of reason over the appetites), they are “altogether good” (354e). 

    What would Dion say, were he still living? Plato imagines a speech by Dion, for the benefit of his intimates and comrades. Dion would say that there are three things to consider: soul, body, and money. All are good, so long as care for them is sought in that order, in a regime whose laws buttress that proper hierarchy. Syracusan freedom-lovers should accept “freedom under kingly rule” while would-be tyrants should enjoy “kingly rule for which they are accountable, with laws as masters both of the other citizens and of the kings themselves in case they should do anything illegal” (356c). This can be done if the founders of the new regime establish the kind of ruling institutions that will perpetuate the rule of laws—specifically, three kings, vested with military power and religious authority, thereby made capable of defending the city from foreign attack, along with a set of law guardians who would oversee the kings, with the power to block them from violating the law. Plato also recommends a policy: Syracuse should recolonize Sicily, expelling the barbarians. This effort seems directed at uniting the city, now at war with itself, by giving all citizens a noble, common purpose. “These things I intended to come to be for you while I lived,” Plato’s Dion says, “and I intend them now” (357d). Helfer points to the fact that Plato considers this speech a kind of prayer to hint that it may not prove to be practical. It is evident, for example, that enslaving oneself to the laws, which are written and therefore stable but rigid, does not meet the bar of prudential rule, which requires adjustment to ever-changing circumstances. And what “if there is a conflict between the law of the city” which here is obviously human, “and what the gods demand, such as we know from, for example, Sophocles’ Antigone?” In Letter Two, Plato himself “claims that he is ‘great’ because he makes himself ‘a follower’ not of the law, nor indeed of pleasure, but of his ‘own reason.'” Citizen-bodies can’t do that, being non-philosophers. 

    Letter Nine goes to someone who may be more amenable to reasoned self-rule, the mathematician-ruler of Tarentum, Archytas, whom Helfer identifies as “the closest thing we find in the Letters to a philosopher-ruler.” This is the man who had entertained such hopes for Dionysius. Here, Plato mentions one of the difficulties of philosopher-kingship, citing a report that “you are restless because you are not capable of being released from the lack of leisure connected with the common things” (357e). After all, “the most pleasant thing in life is to do one’s own thing, especially if someone should choose to do things of such a sort as you too have chosen” (357e-358a). This notwithstanding, Plato counsels moderation. “You need to take the following to heart as well: that it is not only for oneself that each of us has been born, but one’s fatherland gets a certain portion of our birth, one’s parents another, and the rest of one’s friends another, and many things are given also to the propitious moment that overtake our life” (358a). In the philosophic life, lest we become defenseless Erastuses and Coriscuses, the virtue of moderation requires us to balance philosophizing with considerations that can, if well managed, protect the philosophic way of life within the regime of the city, the order of the family, and the network of friends, all of which can threaten that way of life, as seen throughout, but all of which can also support it, if philosophers take care to allocate their time prudently. “This theme quietly pervades the Letters from its very first words,” as Helfer recalls, when Plato complained to Dionysius about all the time he’d devoted to him.

    Plato addresses the very short Letter Ten to Aristodorus, whom Dion (who was still alive at this point—the letters in the Letters are not chronologically arranged) has described as “a special comrade of his” (358c). Special because he understands philosophy in the Dionian way, “exhibiting a character that is the wisest one with a view to philosophy; for it is steadfast, and faithful, and healthy,” a view that Plato assures him is his own view of what “true philosophy” is (358c). But as we know, and as Helfer emphasizes, philosophy is much more than this, being the love of wisdom and the ardent pursuit of it an inquiry that yields ambiguous results. “Be strong and remain in the very character traits in which you now remain,” Plato writes in his best avuncular manner (358c). Decent readers who don’t read very carefully will come away with the impression that this Plato, and philosophers who follow him, are trustworthy fellows, no threat to the city and even commendable citizens.

    The philosophers must not be seen as impious, then. This defense is the burden of Letter Eleven, addressed to the otherwise unknown Laodamas, a Greek colonist who is thinking of founding a new regime. Plato here insists, as he has done previously, that a founding consists in more than lawgiving. A city cannot be “well established without the existence of some authority caring for the daily regimen of both slaves and free in the city, so that it might be both moderate and manly” (359a). If the city already has good men in its politeuma, its ruling body, very well, but “if there is a need of someone to educate them,” who will do it? (359b). “What remains is for you to pray to the gods” (359b). Alternatively, and perhaps marginally more realistically, you will need a founder, “a man both noble and good” who also enjoys “great power” (359b). “Good luck,” indeed (359b).

    Letter Twelve is Plato’s final letter to his own philosophic comrade, Archytas. He praises some memoranda Archytas has sent to him, memoranda quite possibly written by Archytas himself. Plato doesn’t mention the topics of the memoranda, which might range from comments on Dionysius the Younger to philosophic considerations. The author reminds Plato of the writer’s “ancient ancestors,” “good men” expelled from Troy by the tyrannical Laomedon, father of Priam (359d). Plato might be alluding to the exiles from Syracuse in the present day. He also mentions some memoranda of his own, which Archytas was waiting for; they are not yet ready, Plato tells him, but he has sent them, anyway, with the proviso that they be guarded from eyes unworthy to see them, reiterating the theme of caution with respect to anything written down, a caution Plato is confident his philosophic confidant shares.

    The thirteenth and final letter begins jarringly: “It is denied that this is by Plato” (359e). Helfer draws a parallel between Plato’s disavowal of the full seriousness of his corpus of writings in Letter Two, and also to Plato’s final paragraphs in that letter, where he moves from “lofty philosophic subjects to a hodgepodge of quotidian matters.” Letter Thirteen, the last one to Dionysius, also contrasts sharply with the earlier letters, especially Letter One, “which of course was marked by strident denunciation of tyranny in general and Dionysius’ tyranny in particular.” What’s going on? 

    Plato reminds Dionysius that the tyrant had once said he’d benefited from Plato. He sends some Pythagorean writings along, a further benefit, and announces that he is also sending Helicon, a student of the mathematician Eudoxus. He is someone Archytas might wish to converse with—another example of Plato’s interest in placing philosophically minded persons under the patronage of a ruler who might yet be brought to “honor Platonic philosophy,” as Helfer puts it. Plato judiciously includes some material gifts—a statue of Apollo for Dionysius and some jars of honey for his children. Helfer suggests that this contrasts with the conduct of imprudent Dion, who relied on appeals to moral rectitude alone in his dealings with men.

    Plato then gets down to brass tacks: “I will be frank with you concerning money” (362c). He once again adjures the tyrant—who, we recall, has not dealt honestly with Dion’s property—to make sure that his “expenses be correctly spent and correctly returned,” lest he (the honor-lover) be impugned as a man “hard to do business with” (362d). Hard not only for Dion, but just as hard for Plato, it transpires, inasmuch as the wealthy Dion had been donating funds that Plato uses for wholesome “civic and familial duties” in Athens, to say nothing for the expenses Plato incurs in running his Academy. “It was the life of the Academy,” Helfer sees, “the support for his philosophic friends’ ability to live the philosophic life, that put Plato in the position of needing to raise funds in places like Syracuse.” A college president is a college president, then and forever after. Dion, his chief donor, is too high-minded to notice the material needs of philosophers; Dionysius, Plato’s chief worry, is perhaps too honor-minded to appreciate such a purpose. Put another way, Plato has indeed founded a regime, a regime ruled by a philosopher-king who rules within the larger Athenian city, which has seen more than one regime. Although the purpose or telos of Plato’s regime differs substantially from the purposes of any of the regimes of the city, it shares the characteristics of regimes generally: a ruler, a ruling way of life, a ruling purpose, and ruling institutions. The regime also needs a foreign policy, a way of dealing with other regimes in other cities, including a philosophic regime-within-a-regime in Syracuse. All regimes need revenues, philosophic regimes not excepted.

    Helfer concludes: “the Letters is Plato’s attempt to clarify the meaning of his lifelong project of promoting and defending the reputation of philosophy, of seeking to make philosophy ‘honored even among the multitude.'” He does so in the course of narrating and commenting on a cautionary tale on the difficulties of philosophizing itself and of philosophizing in a politic manner.

     

    Note

    1. In the spirit of Socratic inquiry, Helfer cites serious problems with Plato’s account of the levels of knowledge in the Letters. First, Plato does not explain how the changing, perceptible things known at the first three levels relate to the imperceptible but knowable fifth level. Elsewhere, Plato unfolds a theory of “participation” in the forms/Ideas. But “Plato’s own work does not consistently stress this solution,” which he presents as an unquestioned doctrine only in the Phaedo. Although the Parmenides has the young Socrates presenting that theory, “Parmenides there advances a number of trenchant critiques that Plato never attempts to refute in any of his writings.” Second, in the Seventh Letter, the emphasis isn’t on participation of perceptible things in “the fifth” but on the participant. ‘Subjectively,’ Plato elsewhere (e.g., in the Phaedrus) links perceptibles to imperceptibles with his theory of “recollection,” but not here. Finally, the relationship between the fourth and fifth levels isn’t clear. If knowledge of the fourth level is prerequisite to “scientific knowledge of the fifth,” why is this “anything but the incoherent or circular claim that attainment of some scientific knowledge is a prerequisite to attainment of that same scientific knowledge”? What is needed is “an understanding of the nature of mind,” but the mind is hard to understand, a thing that “cannot be known in the same manner as the other beings of which scientific knowledge is possible.” This leads to the question of the question of the existence of “a cosmic mind or deity, knowledge of which is made out to be the goal of philosophy in Letters Two and Six,” but unmentioned here. In the Seventh Letter, then, Plato does not answer “the great questions” of mind so much as he “indicates the basic features—and some of their implications—of our intuitive belief that we know, or can come to know through sense perception together with mind, about the beings that make up the whole”; “some further metaphysical apparatus would be needed to make up a complete explanatory picture.” He has certainly “indicated no avenue along which we might still hope to find access to the ‘what’ of the beings, to any direct grasp of ‘the fifth’ itself.” Is there any divine or cosmic support, then, for justice and the other virtues? There are limits to human knowledge, which makes writing down claims about “the fifth” a misguided enterprise for the philosopher, as only a certain, rare, kind of human soul can live with the knowledge of those limits. “There is doubt or ‘perplexity’ (aporia) involved in philosophy that is generally ill suited to the human constitution.” This doubt opens the possibility that “true knowledge of the divine…is not necessarily compatible with the stories of Homer and Hesiod,” and therefore that true piety, which Plato identifies with true philosophy, may lead in a direction the vast majority of people don’t want to hear. In this, respectable Dion is farther from philosophizing than tyrannical, sneering Dionysius.  

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Plato’s Politic Practice: Plato’s Letters, I-IV

    March 20, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    Ariel Helfer, ed.: Plato’s Letters: The Political Challenges of the Philosophic Life. Letters I-IV. Translated with introduction and interpretive essay by Ariel Helfer. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023.

     

    In his introduction to Plato’s Letters, Ariel Helfer recounts Plato’s three visits to Syracuse. In 387 B.C., when that city-state was ruled by Dionysius the Elder, Plato met the tyrant’s brother-in-law, Dion, whom he converted to philosophy or, perhaps, merely convinced of philosophy’s worth. “Converted” translates the word Socrates uses as he converses with Plato’s brother, Glaucon, in the Republic. Socrates describes the way in which a human soul, chained in place by the rulers, can be “turned around,” away from the idols’ shadows on the walls of the cave. The cave represents the confines of the polis, the idols being the artifacts designed by the rulers to keep the people, shackled in place, in their thrall, taking the shadows of those idols, the opinions given them by the ruler/priests, as truths. The opinions derive from the various stories describing the founding of the polis (often said to have been blessed by the gods) and the alleged heroic actions of its subsequent rulers. Philosophy breaks the shackles and reorients the soul toward the light, nature, outside the cave ruled by conventions. 

    Twenty years later, Dionysius having died, and his son having taken the throne, Dion asked Plato to return, reporting that Dionysius the Younger might also be converted to philosophy if Plato tutored him in it while advising him on politics. Rivals of Dion raised suspicions that he and Plato were conspiring against the twenty-year-old ruler; Dionysius believed them, exiled Dion and eventually acceded to allowing Plato to return to Athens. But in 362 B.C., Plato returned, having been told that Dionysius might indeed be brought to philosophize under his guidance. This effort was no more successful than the first. Plato escaped, and Dion returned to Syracuse, fought a civil war, and deposed the tyrant, only to be assassinated by his own false friends. 

    The thirteen letters in which Plato describes these events, explaining and defending his motives for acting as he did, may or may not be genuine in whole or in part. Helfer argues not only that they are genuine but that they form a unified whole, a book—indeed, the first known epistolary novel. As such, they give students of Plato a unique “glimpse of Plato in action,” addressing “a distinctive and essential feature of Plato’s political philosophy that, at its peak,” has as its theme “the relationship between philosophy and politics as such.” Whereas the Republic addresses this theme in theory, the Letters addresses it in practice, and, as the proverb goes, actions speak louder than words. This “literary unity thesis” was advanced in 1934 by Franz Dornseiff, a German classicist who held that the letters constitute a fictional or semi-fictional book, its elements “carefully arranged, not in chronological order or by addressee, but in accordance with a more complex plan whereby themes, motifs and lessons are developed or juxtaposed to suit the author’s various intentions.” 

    Your reviewer can claim none of the qualifications that would be needed to weigh in on the facts of the matter in any sensible way. He is happy to go along with the Dornseiff/Helfer thesis, however, because it makes the Letters so much more interesting.

    Helfer observes that the Letters is the one work in which Plato writes in his own voice, albeit a voice that shifts its tone depending upon whom he addresses. He presents himself as a man who has failed; Dionysius did not convert to philosophy. He acted as he did “to serve the cause of philosophy in Sicily,” but in so doing hardly mentions Socrates, his own philosophic mentor, the central figure in his dialogues; and even then, he describes Socrates not as a philosopher but as an elderly friend, a man of justice and piety, simply. “If not by the light of Socratic wisdom, how did Plato think it best to approach and to manage practical and political affairs?” This turns out not to be an easy question to answer. Though brief, the Letters is complex, indeed as convoluted as a Platonic dialogue. Helfer excellently clarifies the intention behind Plato’s “confusing and paradoxical” manner of writing by dividing his inquiry into three parts: Plato’s political counsel; his “defense and promotion of philosophy”; and the causes and implications of “the disaster that unfolded for Plato in Sicily.” The central inquiry turns up Plato’s “two distinct ways of presenting or discussing philosophy in the Letters, namely, as the need for “a regime of philosophic rulers,” which “Plato presents as the key to humanity’s political salvation,” and, less but in a sense more ambitiously, “the activity of philosophy as a quest for clarity and understanding, and thus for individual fulfillment, without reference to its political utility.” These two ways of thinking about philosophy “roughly correspond to Plato’s relationships with Dion and Dionysius, respectively. To understand “these two different—sometimes even incompatible—portraits” of philosophy, Helfer points especially to the five letters in which philosophy is explicitly discussed: letters Two, Six, Seven, and Ten. He keeps his eyes on the overarching questions: Why did Plato journey to Syracuse, and not only once but three times? How did these journeys, one of which Plato compares to the Odysseus’ dangerous voyage between Scylla and Charybdis, benefit philosophy, the way of life chosen once one’s soul has turned around?

    Helfer’s brilliant and, as far as I can see, accurate interpretation leaves his reader with one important task: to put his insights back into Plato’s letters as they unfold within the book, beginning with Letter One, “a portrait of Plato slamming the door shut behind him on his way out of Syracuse,” or, more precisely, from the safety of Athens upon his return. Plato begins the letter to Dionysius with his characteristic citation, “Do well!”—itself a formula worth inquiring into. Is it encouraging or admonitory? What is “well”? And what is the relation of doing to wellness, whatever wellness might be? Plato has already set himself a task.

    Whatever wellness is, Plato rebukes Dionysius for failing to do it, in fact for wasting the philosopher’s time, and “such a long time,” at that (309a). Although Plato “had become most trusted of all in managing your rule, you were receiving the benefits while I was enduring the slanders” concocted by envious courtiers (309a). “Brutal things” were done in your regime, and Plato had not “gone along with them” (309b). But even so, “I was sent away more dishonorably than would be proper if you were dispatching a vagrant and directing him to sail away after having been occupied for so long a time with you” (309b). Dionysius’ parting bestowal of a gold coin upon his philosophic guest only added insult to injustice, as it didn’t even cover travel his travel expenses and, besides, gold isn’t as valuable as “the intellect of good, like-minded men” (310a). In parting, Plato offers some stern free advice: “Be strong, and recognize how greatly you have erred with us, so that you may bear yourself better toward others” (310a). To do well, one first needs strength of soul, not the tyrant’s command of physical force.

    Well. What are to make of this “sententious reprimand,” as Helfer calls it? Plato has introduced several of the most important topics he will address in the book. The relation between doing and thinking (both the practical thinking a political man needs to undertake and the theoretical thinking of philosophers); the question of how to spend both time and money (that is, the question of one’s way of life); the question of honor, reputation, among both political and philosophic men; the question of how to discern truth, first of all in the political realm, where conspiracies real and imagined (imagined sincerely or cunningly) abound; the question of right or just conduct: none of these matters will be neglected in the letters to come.

    Letter Two, the first to discuss philosophy explicitly, also addresses Dionysius. The young tyrant evidently has replied to Plato’s adjuration with one of his own, demanding that Plato restrain his “associates”—evidently, Dion and his friends—from “doing or saying anything nasty” to or about Dionysius. Regime change is afoot, he suspects, not without reason. Plato denies that he rules his associates and, it must be noted, Dionysius, an erstwhile associate, had decided against Plato as an adviser and ruler. “For if I were thus ruling the others, and you, and Dion, then would there be more good things for us and all the other Greeks,” as “I myself am great by rendering myself a follower of my own reason,” rather than the whisperings of the slanderers you consulted before exiling me (310c-d). “In the future,” you ought to test your advisers, especially those ‘conspiracy theorists,’ by checking with me, first. “Send me a note to ask,” for “I shall neither shrink from, nor be ashamed of, speaking the truth” (310d). Speech and reason, the modes of philosophy par excellence, have their limits as means of rule; qua philosopher, one cannot be a king, since not all of one’s subjects will be ruled by you by their consent.

    “By nature,” thus beyond but also within the walls of the cave, “practical wisdom and great power come together in the same place, and they always pursue and seek each other and come to be together” (310c). Those who rule need practical wisdom, phronēsis, at a minimum to sustain themselves in rule. And “human beings” as such, not only rulers, “enjoy both conversing about these themselves and hearing others do so, both in private intercourse and in poems” (310c-d). Plato recalls four such instances of partnerships known from histories between the wise and the powerful: Hiero and Pausanias, both of whom conversed with the poet Simonides; Periander of Corinth and Thales the Milesian philosopher; the Athenian Pericles and the philosopher Anaxagoras. Wise Croesus, Solon, and Cyrus, however, are distinctive, in Helfer’s words, because they were lawgivers, “more self-sufficient” than those who needed the wise counsel of others; they combined wisdom and power in one person. Plato also recalls stories of poets concerning Creon and the blind prophet Tiresias, Polyidus and the lawgiver, Minos, Agamenon and wise Nestor, Odysseus and Palamedes, and finally, “as it seems to me,” Prometheus and Zeus (311b). “There is a critical shift in the meaning of phronēsis when we cross over to the poets’ presentations,” Helfer observes; the wise men the poets portray “possess their wisdom through divine revelation or the at of divination,” a wisdom “compatible with, because it is dictated by, their piety; and their usefulness as political advisers lies in their ability to communicate what the gods want or intend.” This raises “a great and abiding question of political philosophy: Is the highest wisdom, and therefore the ultimate guide for human action, accessible to reason and the senses unaided by revelation, or is divine revelation necessary for the most prudent human life and therefore for the best possible regime and laws (cf. Meno 99b1-d5)”?

    Whether philosophic or divinely inspired, some of these wise men came “into conflict with one another” (most spectacularly, Prometheus and Zeus), some became “friends,” others “like-minded about some things and conflicting about others” (311c). Given the lasting fame of such stories—fame brought about by nature, by the human nature of rulers, of the wise, and indeed of everyone–you and I, Dionysius, are likely to be remembered in speeches, long after we are dead. Men such as ourselves should “care about the time to come” and the speeches about us that will be made about us; unlike the propensity for listening to such speeches, care about them is not human, by nature, but in accordance with “a certain nature,” the nature of “decent” men as contrasted with the nature of “the most servile” men (311c). They want to “hear well of themselves,” not only now but in the future; Plato even professes that he “make[s] this out to be evidence that those who have died have some perception of things here; for the best souls divine that these things are so, while the most depraved ones don’t say so, but the divinations of the most divine men are more authoritative than those of the men who aren’t” (311d). If Dionysius will not be ruled by the speech of a philosopher, perhaps he might be ruled by the speeches of prophets, by divinely-inspired poets, having something of a longing for immortality in his soul? As for Plato, “I myself say that opinion and speech about the true philosophy will be better if we are decent, but if we are petty, the opposite”; he hastens to add that “we could act no more piously than to take care, nor more impiously than to be careless” (311e). Unlike Anaxagoras, the pre-Socratic materialist philosopher who advised Pericles, adding to the suspicions among Athenian citizens that philosophers are dangerous atheists—very much including Socrates, whose teachings were confusedly associated with materialism by one of his accusers at trial—Plato will not suffer philosophy to be tarred with the atheist brush.

    That is, Plato evidently has concluded that if the tyrant will not or cannot philosophize, remaining immune to appeals to the rational part of his soul, then he might respond more favorably to the call to honor, an appeal to the thumotic, the spirited, part of his soul. If Dionysius does not philosophize, might he join Plato in building a good reputation for those who do? “I myself came to Sicily with a reputation of being quite distinguished among those in philosophy; and I wished, by coming to Syracuse, to get you as a fellow-witness in order that, through me, philosophy would be honored even among the multitude” (311e-312a). Plato evidently sees a political alliance between ‘the one’ in Syracuse, its tyrant, and ‘the many,’ the people, an alliance typically made against ‘the few,’ rich and often high-born. But the tyrant’s distrust prevailed, largely because “many” were “making noise” about the philosopher, even as they did in Athens, regarding Socrates (312b). Despite his previous reprimand, he offers Dionysius another chance: “If you have come to disdain philosophy altogether, bid it farewell,” but “if the things from us are agreeable to you, then I also should be honored most” (312b-c). This will “honor philosophy” but also, Plato claims, bring “good repute” to you, “in the view of many,” who will consider you “a real philosopher” for having compared and contrasted the distinguished Plato with unnamed others, even as Socratic philosophers compare and contrast opinions, dialectically (312c). Plato takes care to bring honor under the rule of justice: If you honor me, I will honor you; if you don’t honor me, “I will keep quiet”; “but if I honor you without you giving honor, I will seem to admire and pursue riches, and we know that this, among everyone has no beautiful name” (312c), as it is what the greedy, logic-chopping Sophists do, not the philosophers. Honor begets honor; if you give it, “it is an adornment to us both,” a reciprocally beneficial thing, but if I give it without reciprocity (in Aristotle, the specifically political, non-tyrannical relationship), then “it is a reproach to us both” (312d). Tyrants rule unreasonably and dishonorably; Plato invites this tyrant to elevate his rule, if not to reason then at least to lasting good repute. If he does not, so much the worse for him, and as for Plato and philosophy, they have their own defenders, Plato first among them. As Helfer remarks, “it is not enough for Plato to cut ties and wash his hands of the whole Sicilian affair; he must attend to the rippling effects upon his reputation of having involved himself so openly in an ordeal that is becoming increasingly messy.”

    But Plato is not done with holding out the attractions of philosophy to Dionysius. He changes the subject, abruptly, addressing a question Dionysius had raised. “The little sphere is not in the correct condition,” Plato writes (312d). “This is the first indication in the Letters of what Plato’s education of the tyrant Dionysius may have contained,” Helfer remarks, and this is “the only passage in the Platonic corpus in which Plato himself explicitly undertakes to teach someone the highest principles of his philosophy.” But what is the “little sphere”? Helfer suggests that it is an orrery, a model of the cosmos used to teach astronomy and the geometry that underlies it, pursuant to “an education in the mathematical necessities underlying reality as we know it, which has the power of liberating the student from superstition by suggesting the possibility of a comprehensive causal account of the cosmos that is naturalistic or does not have recourse to supranational divinities or other supernatural elements.” More, and more cryptically, Plato mentions “the nature of the first”—the first cause, the archē of the cosmos?—the “king of all things” around whom all things orbit and move “for the sake of him” (312d). Plato links “the first” ruler of all to nobility; he is “responsible for all the noble things” (312d). Helfer cautions that “Platonic interpreters over the millennia have espoused such a great variety of unprovable hypotheses regarding the identity of Plato’s ‘king of all things’ as should make us wary of offering yet another attempt at deciphering the enigmas.” Plato complicates rather than clarifying the enigma by mentioning “second things” that “are around a second” and “third things around a third” (312e). The enigma, Helfer prudently observes, may be the point; these truths, if they are truths, are far from self-evident. “The human soul reaches out to learn about them, what sort of things they are, looking to the things akin to itself, of which none is in sufficient condition” (313a). Mystery induces wonder, and wonder induces a certain kind of erotic longing, a longing not for bodies or even for souls but for the truth about the whole; here philosophy or the love of wisdom begins, whether or not fear of God or gods is where wisdom begins. But human souls do not begin as beings capable of approaching these mysterious things, and many will never be capable. Still, the soul asks, “What sort of thing” is the cosmos, with its first, second, and third orbits and causes? Just as Dionysius was ’caused’ by his parents, born of his mother, Doris, in pain, so one result of the erotic longing of philosophy produces “labor pains” not in the body but in the soul (313a). These labor pains are “responsible for all evils,” and “until one is relieved of them, one never really hits upon the truth” (313a). All evils? This might mean that the strife of politics, caused not only by eros misdirected towards physical pleasure, not only by eros misdirected towards false honor, towards ‘lording it over’ other human beings, can also derive from wrongful understanding of the divine and of nature, misunderstandings concerning “the nature of the first.” 

    Plato tells Dionysius that these considerations indicate “how we need to be disposed to one another” (313c). He does not propose a return to Syracuse. The philosopher and the tyrant should instead communicate through an intermediary, Archedemus, with Dionysius continuing to ask such questions, and any other “perplexities” that may “seize you” (313d). “And if you do this two or three times, and sufficiently test the things sent from me,” in the Platonic-Socratic way, “I would be amazed if the things that are presently perplexing will not come to be very different for you than they are now. Take heart, therefore, and do thus; for never did you dispatch, nor will Archedemus ever transport, a thing nobler and dearer to the gods than this cargo.” (313e-314a). Helfer writes, “If this letter should inspire Dionysius to believe that Plato can help him resolve his philosophic problem”—a decidedly big “if,” Helfer ventures to observe—than “Plato will be in a better position to dictate the future terms of their relationship and thereby to manage the problems he identified in the letter’s first half.” Given the pains one must endure in philosophizing, and given Plato’s rather forbidding remark that some of his students have taken “no fewer than thirty years” to experience what Helfer calls “the shift in perspective Plato unrealistically proposes.” Dionysius “may remain in a kind of intellectual limbo of partial understanding for the rest of his life.”

    Plato ends his second letter to Dionysius with a warning about their means of reciprocation, their means of long-distance philosophic dialogue through an intermediary. “Beware lest these things ever be exposed to uneducated human beings” (314a). While “many” might conceivably learn to respect philosophy, that will never happen if they learn the thoughts generated by philosophizing, which seem “ridiculous” to them (314a). And even those of “good natures” may distort them, making them seem “inspired” instead of rationally achieved in a laborious process Plato likens to the purification of gold (314a). Again, beware: “Beware in examining these things lest you come someday to regret their having been unworthily exposed now,” an evil that can be avoided if you learn them “by heart” instead of writing them down (314c). Despite all Plato has written in all of his complex, often aporetic, sometimes lengthy dialogues, “I have never written anything at all about these things,” nor shall I (314c). My Socratic dialogues do not portray the elderly Socrates, who was my friend, but “a Socrates become beautiful and strong” (314c), as it were a mythological Socrates, one who, he hints, is no “mouthpiece for Plato himself,” as Helfer puts it. Do not rely on my writings for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, you jurors who read this letter. Instead, he writes to the tyrant, “read this letter many times,” committing it to memory, putting it into your soul, then “burn it up” (314c). 

    Helfer raises a skeptical eyebrow. Dionysius evidently did not burn the letter. Perhaps he did not want ardent but arduous philosophy to get too far into his heart. Nor did Plato necessarily expect him to burn it, or to burn with curiosity about the nature of the first, or at least to burn long enough to raise his mind to it. Readers of Plato’s writings will not find truths laid out for them; his writings, are dialogic and fictionalized, dramas of philosophic dialectic (itself a sort of drama), whose golden words must be purified by persistently inquiring minds. “It is only in Letter Two that Plato provides an honest acknowledgment of the ‘labor pains’ brought about by the deepest philosophic questioning,” the “psychological obstacles to the pursuit of Platonic philosophy” as distinguished from the logical challenges addressed in the famous Letter Seven. These psychological obstacles include the human-all-too human inclination to reason only a bit, only until it becomes painful—too difficult, too challenging to one’s own prior attachments.

    In this, philosophizing shares something in common with tyrannizing, although not in Nietzsche’s sense of being the most spiritual manifestation of the will to power, or in Augustine’s related sense of the libido dominandi. Socrates was charged not only with impiety, with claiming that the earth is nothing but a stone, with nothing divine about it, but with corrupting the young, making them into immoralists. In a sense, philosophizing does indeed ‘corrupt’ the young in the estimation of the rulers of the polis, insofar as it makes them deviate from unquestioning belief in the nobility and veracity of the idols of the cave. Tyrants also challenge convention; in antiquity, a tyrant was often defined as a monarch who came into power without the blessing of law. But to found any regime, to change the existing regime, requires tyranny so defined, such lawbreaking, as Helfer sees. And would not Plato’s efforts to reform the tyrant, to turn his soul to philosophy, if seriously intended, not change the regime of Syracuse, at very least making Dionysius a just if not legitimate ruler, or, if the turn is complete, leading him away from ruling the polis altogether, preparing the way for Dion’s planned revolution? At the end of the letter, after his instruction to burn it, Plato (Helfer notices) advises Dionysius on “more mundane” matters than the nature of the first. It transpires that Plato and Dionysius have been engaged in a sort of commerce in human beings, as Plato sends some of his philosophic companions to Dionysius’ court, where they enjoy the same dangerous patronage he had enjoyed, for a while. Why send philosophic youths to the tyrant? As Helfer remarks, democratic Athens was not necessarily safer for philosophers than tyrannized Syracuse. And it was Dionysius, not respectable Dion nor the Athenian polloi, who did engage in philosophy “somewhat seriously for some period of time.” 

    By the time of Plato’s third consecutive letter to Dionysius, circumstances have changed. Plato signals this immediately, shifting from his characteristic salutation, “Do well!” to “Rejoice!” That sounds quite buoyant, until one learns that Plato has heard that Dionysius has written to the Delphic oracle, “Rejoice and preserve a tyrant’s life of pleasure” (315b-c). That is no way to address a god. “I, on the other hand, would not, in a call to a human being—let alone a god—encourage anyone to do this: to a god, because I would be commanding against nature, for the divine lies far away from pleasure and pain; to a human being, because pleasure and pain engender much harm, the pair of them begetting badness at learning, forgetfulness, imprudence, and hubris in the soul” (313c). For Plato, a god is limited to his nature; the Delphic god, Apollo, in particular, has a rational nature. To ascribe a life of pleasure to a god, and especially that god, is to contradict, to misunderstand, his nature and indeed the natural order, the cosmos itself, and perhaps “the nature of the first,” whatever that might be. In Helfer’s words, “according to Plato, gods are constrained by nature; knowledge of nature can indicate to us such limitations as may exist on the power of the gods.” It is also to misunderstand philosophy and to ignore the natural limits of human beings. Readiness to learn, memory, prudence, and the intention to follow a rational inquiry wherever it leads, without preening oneself on one’s intelligence or on what one has learned so far are all indispensable to philosophy as a way of life, as a sort of regime. As Helfer remarks, “pleasure is not simply the good, nor is pain simply the bad (though it is bad). Each must be evaluated according to its utility in fostering intellectual virtue, and both pleasure and pain are found to be positively harmful when measured by this standard.” Plato’s salutation is therefore ironic, biting; if Dionysius knew himself, knew his own nature as a human being, he would neither address a god as if a god were a pleasure-seeking tyrant nor expect any god to bless him for being one.

    Helfer associates Plato’s salutation and admonition with his concern for the reputation of philosophy, since “Dionysius’ attitude toward the gods might well be thought to be a reflection of the education he received from Plato,” including Plato’s teaching on the nature of the first. Dionysius’ greeting to Apollo “is driven by the tyrant’s regrettable lack of prudence or practical wisdom”—characteristic of the hubristic soul. And there is more, an indication that Plato has the prudence Dionysius lacks. Since, as we know, Plato expects anything written down to circulate beyond its immediate readership, this defense of philosophy will convince more of its future readers than Socrates’ public apologia. “A man who publicly defends himself in writing against slander and rumor will be suspected of distorting the facts in his own favor,” so “he stands a better chance of winning the trust and favor of his judges if his private correspondence concerning the very matters in which he requires a defense appears to exonerate him.” Dionysius may never achieve such prudence, which is indispensable to any ruler. He will fail not only at philosophizing but at ruling. His incapacity to “do well” as a ruler, his rejoicing in pleasure, confuses him with respect to the nature of the ‘final’ rulers, the gods; his character prevents him from thinking, from living, from ruling well.

    Pleasure knows no limits; tyrannical love of pleasure comports with rule without limit, over one’s own people and over others. Tyranny is imperialistic. Plato rebukes Dionysius for telling some ambassadors that he, Plato, had “prevented” him from liberating Greek city-states in Syracuse from barbarian rule and from “replacing the rule of tyranny with kingship” in Syracuse and had later urged Dion to overthrow his rule (315d). On the contrary, as “you yourself know,” while in Syracuse “I was taking seriously, in a measured way”—a non-tyrannical way—some “other, minor things and the preludes to the laws” (316a)—an introductory explanation, as Americans would place a preamble to their constitution. Measure and law characterize kingship, not tyranny; Dionysius has slandered Plato in an attempt to deflect blame for his own bad acts of omission and commission. So, let’s set the record straight. “I came to Syracuse, having been called by both you and Dion” (316c). Plato had known Dion, his guest-friend and a mature man; Dionysius was then young, inexperienced, and “very unknown to me” (316d). Once you had exiled Dion, “the sensible partner,” I was stuck with you (316d). There being no genuine reciprocity, no political relations, with a tyrant, “by necessity” I could only “bid farewell to the political things for the remainder of the time” I spent in Syracuse, prudently “bewar[ing] the slanders of the envious” and continuing to serve as a friend to you “as much as possible” (316e). When Dionysius undertook a war, Plato finally negotiated his release; Plato does not associate himself or philosophy with physical warfare. Thus ended his first expedition to Syracuse.

    Once peace returned, Dionysius repeatedly wrote to Plato, urging him to return and promising to bring Dion back, too. Dion himself wanted Plato to accede to these requests, “to sail and not become soft” (317c). But by now (some two decades on), Plato could make the excuse of advanced age and also point to the continued slanders of himself and of Dion by those Syracusans who wanted none of their own pleasures, gratified by the “riches and the power of the rest of excessive property,” the licentiousness, of the Syracusan way of life, reflecting as it did the character of the tyrant (317d). Part of the property in question belonged to Dion, and there were those who had their eyes on it. Plato finally yielded, as “there was need that no one of my friends ever accuse me on the grounds that, because of my faintness of heart, all that was his”—Dion’s—though “it might not have been lost, was utterly destroyed” (317e). Upon arriving, I requested that you “reconcile with Dion and recall him,” and “had you then obeyed me,” things might have turned out better “for you, and for the Syracusans, and for the other Greeks” (317e). But as it happened, you allowed others to appropriate his property, bringing on Dion’s military invasion and the ongoing civil war. For his part, you, Dionysius, accused Plato of being Dion’s ally against him, and in your clouded vision as a “doer of injustice,” acting “for the sake of money,” this is true; I would not be “persuaded by the greatness of your rule to betray an old friend and guest-friend who was doing badly because of you—someone in no way worse than you, if I may so so—and choose you,” doing “everything in whatever way you commanded” in “your wolf-friendship” (318d-e). Dionysius took the occasion to scorn Plato and his teaching, saying, cuttingly, “So it’s once I had been educated, to do geometry? Or what?” (319c). So much for the utility of a liberal education. In his hubris, the tyrant remains tyrannical. What is the point of continuing to advise him?

    Plato’s friend, Dion, is morally better than Dionysius, but is he better for philosophy? In Letter Four, Plato writes to Dion, following his exchange with Dionysius, and after the tyrant’s overthrow, regarding Dion’s exile, his property, and especially his intention to found a new, more just regime of Syracuse. Plato describes himself as having been “very serious” about seeking a resolution to their affairs in Syracuse and with its ruler, “for the sake of love of honor for the noble things more than anything else,” as “I believe it to be just that those who are in truth decent and who do such things hit upon the proper reputation” (320a-b). While the virtue of courage, and the physical attributes of speed and strength “would seem to belong also to certain others,” truthfulness, justice, magnificence, and decorum concerning truth, justice, and magnificence should be honored even more (320b-c). Honor, good repute, should be Dion’s concern, inasmuch as “you are watched by all” (320d). “Be prepared to show up Lycurgus himself as outdated, as well as Cyrus, and anyone else who ever seemed to be distinguished for his character and regime” (320d-e). But, Plato warns, foreign onlookers have also seen that the very love of honor among eminent Syracusans, including those who have been your allies in the civil war, now threatens Dion’s enterprise with factionalism. Consider that “you seem to some to be rather lacking in the proper courtesy. Let it not escape your notice that it is through being agreeable to human beings that it is possible to act, but stubbornness dwells in loneliness. Good luck.” (321b-c). Dion has his own problem with hubris, and that hubris has made him as much a ‘man alone’ as Dionysius was. As Helfer puts it, “Dion never understood or cared about the animosity he aroused in Syracuse with his rigid, moralistic preaching about philosophy.” This must have been especially irksome to Syracusans, and especially dangerous to Dion and his effort at political founding, given the pleasure-loving ethos of the previous regime, long ingrained in both ‘the few’ and ‘the many’ there. It was a more successful founder, Solon, who conceded that he had given Athenians not the best laws but such laws as they could bear. In his entrancement with the idea of the Platonic philosopher-king, in his hubristic supposition that he could become such a one, Dion may be setting himself up for political failure. And for Plato, he is also discrediting philosophy, albeit in the opposite way Dionysius had done. Whereas Dionysius’ friendship with Plato could be slandered as the corruption of a once-noble youth, a reprise of Anaxagoras’ corruption of Pericles, a case of philosophy inducing a good boy to go bad, Dion’s friendship with Plato could be slandered as the inculcation of priggishness, a case of philosophy making our ruler insufferable. Either way, “the reputation of philosophy” takes a hit; after all, Helfer writes, “the whole doctrine of philosopher-kingship, and in this sense the whole Republic, were conceived out of a necessity Plato felt to praise philosophy in light of his observations of political life,” an attempt “to bolster the public image of philosophy,” especially in view of the dialogic character of Socratic-Platonic philosophy. To engage in dialogue, one needs other people; to perpetuate the philosophic enterprise, the way of life or regime of philosophy, one needs to locate philosophers within political regimes. But if the figure of the philosopher-king is mistaken for a tyrant or as a pest of a priest, philosophers and the philosophy they practice will remain at peril. “In Dion’s zealous love of Platonic philosophy as the truest foundation of justice and virtue, we see something of what Plato hoped people would think and say about philosophy on the basis of his work.” Those hopes are now dimming, now that the not-really-philosophic moralist, also a moralist who lacks one needful virtue, prudence, has managed to boost himself into a position of rule. Helfer calls Letter Four the equivalent of the comic satyr play that traditionally followed the presentation of a series of three tragedies in the Greek theater. While Dionysius’ failure to become a philosopher ended in tragedy, Dion’s impending failure to become a “founding lawgiver” for Syracuse evokes the “poignant humor of this letter.” It, too, will end in the death of the protagonist, but it may be that some deaths are tragic, some comic. Might Dionysius’ story be tragic because in him Plato lost a potential philosopher (as Nietzsche said of Emerson)—eros misdirected is still eros, after all—while more thoroughly tested Dion could never have been a real philosopher?

    Machiavelli lauds his prince as a man alone. Plato shows why the sort of thing is not to be praised. An isolato will not do well, by Platonic or even Machiavellian standards, although he may at times rejoice.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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