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    Fatherhood and Friendship in the Modern Regime: Jean Dutourd’s “The Springtime of Life”

    April 14, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Jean Dutourd: The Springtime of Life. Denver and Helen Lindley translation. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1974.

    Paper delivered at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 1997

     

    The Springtime of Life is a novel about fatherhood, love, and friendship in a modern political regime—France in the 1930s, during the last years of the Third Republic. Charles de Gaulle, who knew the terrain well, never stopped asking, How can this modern commercial republic defend itself? Given the kind of people who rule in such a regime, how can they, and their fellow citizens, be protected from the consequences of their own worst vices? How can they be encouraged in their virtues? Further, how can those men and women who are by nature not of the commercial republic nonetheless be brought to defend it against the much worse tyrannical regimes which seek to exploit the weaknesses of commercial republics and their citizens?

    De Gaulle caused several writers to think about these questions. The most celebrated of them was André Malraux. Malraux writes in the tradition—the ‘regime,’ the ‘succession,’ in Diogenes Laertius’ sense—of Victor Hugo. A man of very different sensibility, Jean Dutourd writes in the tradition of Flaubert and Proust. This makes him in one sense more interesting than Malraux. A writer in the Hugo tradition might well respond favorably to Gaullist statesmanship, with its themes of la grandeur, la France, Le Tricolore. A writer in the Flaubert tradition will always hesitate before the grand gesture. How grand is it, really? Where does it point? A Flaubertian artist will apply a properly mixed acidic solution to the surface of Gaullism—treat it will a clarifying irony.

    In The Springtime of Life, Dutourd presents Jacques de Boissy, a man in his twenties with two friends: Jean Pousselet, the friend of his childhood, and Captain Lacassagne, a new friend, a few years older.

    Jean is the most intelligent of the three—or, at least, the most ‘intellectual.’ He dislikes his last name, which suggests something like ‘pushiness,’ bourgeois vulgarity. He is ill at ease with his family name, with his father’s name, with ‘his own.’ He believes that he stands in awe of writers, and believes, fashionably, in “the goodness of the world, in justice and loyalty” (13). He gives no thought to the political conditions of writing, to say nothing of the political conditions of goodness and justice. He ‘believes in’ loyalty, but will not practice it, in friendship or in love.

    His mother is a silly, self-pitying war widow—the sort of person who should inspire sympathy, but cannot, leaving her acquaintances a touch irritated and a touch guilty at their irritation. The Great War stripped France of fathers, leaving a generation of ‘feminized,’ that is, submissive sons who imagine that good grace consists of intelligence yielding to stupidity, especially if stupidity is vehement. Living in a “feminine universe,” young men “readily believe in the fragility of women” (33); deference to Mme. Pousselet’s insistent inanities has habituated Jean to a slightly guilty resentment in retreat. By inspiring in her only son “the conviction… that he had been created more to be loved than to love” (43), Mme. Pousselet has left him morally and intellectually flaccid, anerotic. Her idea of motherhood is requiring her little boy to eat all the food on his plate, “hungry or not” (43), substituting annoying, pointless duty for natural desire and pleasure.

    A feminized world (in this sense) is a privatized world. “[F]rom 1920 to 1940, the child was the Frenchmen’s alibi; he made it possible for them to abdicated with untroubled conscience their duties and their rights as citizens, to disregard the future of all under the pretext that they were occupied with the future of one, to think no longer about that pressing matter, demanding such tiresome vigilance, that is called liberty” (44).

    Jean marries badly, of course. His wife is exactly like his mother, only more so, and with less reason. His mother’s founding moral instruction—eat everything on your plate—deprives him of the strength to push away from the table when young Nadine puts herself on his plate, despite Mother’s disapproval of the offering. An only child, habituated only to be loved and not to love, his soul is the prey of the stronger woman, the one who loves him more insistently. His mother had denatured him in order to attach him firmly to herself, not seeing that no firmness of attachment can arise from a soul with no real desires, not firmness to it.

    Jean predictably resents Jacques’s new friend, the “solid, patient, indefatigable, unshakable,” and above all gentlemanly Captain Lacassage. Lacassage hasn’t “read any of the works of André Gide” (22). Surely, had he lived thirty years ago, a soldier like this would have plotted against Dreyfus! Dragooned (so to speak) into an excursion to Les Invalides with Jacques and the Captain, Jean complains about the tedious reminiscences of war veterans, giving thanks that men like Napoleon “are no longer interested in France” (84). Pious about littérateurs, contemptuous of military officers: Sure enough, Jean will enjoy a successful career in journalism.

    By contrast, Jacques de Boissy is no intellectual. He is a young man of not exactly aristocratic pedigree: The ‘de’ was shrewdly joined to the ‘Boissy’ only a century back. But he has some of the cultivation of an aristocrat without having lost the aggressiveness of the bourgeois; the de Boissys are new aristocrats. In childhood he dominated Jean because he has a ready-made attitude “for every circumstance of life” and acts forthrightly thereon (11). When he meets Jean’s unfortunate mother, he acts as a sort of social statesman—taking her as she is, leaving her pleased and perhaps a touch better. (As a reader, she likes a good storyteller. Ah, you must try Les Thibaults. Humor? Do you know that very funny English writer, P. G. Wodehouse?) Jacques has the good breeding to be a hard man to embarrass, and never leaves others embarrassed.

    Above all, Jacques is a man with a father. De Boissy père is “a bit of a shark,” a tough businessman.” From him, Jacques learns—contra Jean’s humanitarian illusions—that society is “not at all benevolent,” and that “it is a good thing to be on one’s guard” (13). He learns to retaliate when insulted, but to take correction from his superiors—and therefore to recognize that superiority really exists.

    M. de Boissy is no bien-pensant, but he has kept his eyes open. After the Great War, he observes, women and horses have disappeared: “When the style of short hair appeared some ten years ago, I had an idea, and it may seem backward to you: I said to myself that we were witnessing Samson’s revenge, that Delilah had gone mad and in cutting off her curls she had given up her powers. A sort of symbolic surrender, if you like. But notice this: my experience has taught me that people do not give up except in the last extremity, when they see that all is lost, that the situation is untenable, that there is no longer any way of holding their ground. This sort of thing must have happened with women. They felt that they had no place in the world as women… that it was necessary to be like men.” (55-56). As for men, according to M. de Boissy, it is really quite simple: Justice consists of helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies (117). As for his son, he says, with irony, “I am  a modern father,” considering it “his duty to help his son’s personality to ‘expand,'” a modern attitude the novelist entertains with some suspicion, and to which M. de Boissy himself sets firm limits (14).

    Unlike Jean, Jacques views literary life with cynicism, Captain Lacassagne with respect. In France, Jacques says, the government no longer governs. The police and the financiers govern, but those who wield “the real power today in a country that is no longer serious, a country that prefers words to events, or, if you like, the newspaper serial to history,” are the women and men of letters (24). They constitute the real French politeuma. Women and men of letters always rule when the government and the military are weak. Proust is “the greatest contemporary novelist” because “he alone has understood this and has made it the essence of his work” (24). Ergo, Jacques announces that he shall use literature as “a means to success”; “in 1935, for Julien Sorel, the red and the black are the colors of ink” (35).

    Jean is shocked. His superficial literary idealism is offended. An idealist on the surface, at core Jean is not so much a cynic (that would take strength) but without character. In Jacques, the cynicism is what is superficial. Jacques reads good books seriously and prefers not to discuss them with unserious people, mentioning the names of Stendhal and Balzac “with a sort of affectionate mockery, emphasizing their eccentricities as though he had known them or as though they were still alive” (48). While reading an author, he becomes the author—a Christian with Bloy, an atheist with Diderot (79). He treats greatness as a living thing, a permanent possibility, without admitting to his friend Jean what Jean will never truly perceive: That greatness is a permanent possibility. In a calculatedly offhand way, he does his best to incorporate greatness in himself. He uses a sinecure at the War Ministry to write his first novel, which would indeed have been a success (his father judges), had he chosen to publish it; it is not long before he begins a serious one, with the support of his father, who senses the change and respects it.

    A homely young woman falls in love with Jacques, who does his best to repel her, once he realizes that she does (thanks to another young woman, who tells him). But Anne-Marie is a woman who senses how to make the conquest, despite her disadvantage. She is not the least literary, or intellectual. She scarcely understands the manuscript he reads to her. But what she does understand, well before Jacques understands, is the significance of the fact that he is reading it, to her. So she praises his work and (she really does love him) learns how to type. Like men in love with literature, women in love with men are chameleons, “instantly assum[ing] the color of the man at whom they have taken aim” (161-162; compare Jacques, 79). They become exactly like military men in war; love brings out their intelligence. They discard pettiness—in Anne-Marie’s case, her fashionable bohemianism. A real woman is very much like a real aristocrat, the representative man “of the ancient regime,” tough, ardent, and discriminating, kindly conscious of his superiority (162). Anne-Marie, “ugly at twenty-six, would be beautiful at fifty,” thanks to the transformation, the crystallization, of soul that her love will effect. Eventually, and to his credit, “Jacques vaguely fores[ees] this distant metamorphosis,” and will marry her (175).

    Captain Lacassagne tactfully gives Jacques the political education he needs to go with the sentimental education he has been receiving. First lesson: France, and the modern world generally, though automated, unhorsed, are not ‘automatic.’ They need tending. without tending, they will perish. The Great War very nearly saw the destruction of France. Its aftermath—fatherless sons and daughters—threatens France still.

    Second lesson: Modern France is bourgeois, but bourgeois souls can’t defend it. Going along and getting along, while profitable, won’t work for a country located next to Germany. France won the Battle of the Marne because General Joffre “did not have the soul  of one vanquished”; he “made a stand” (96), showed the courage of an aristocrat, thereby making a modern army of barbers and shopkeepers not aristocratic, of course, but stubborn enough to win, to defend that piece of soil that is France. Without soil, where will the soldier, the barber, the shopkeeper—the writer—stand and work? Without France, the French language will become as extinct as Latin—living on as no more than a component of foreign languages. A writer must write in a language, usually his own. Lacassagne shows a young novelist why ‘his own’ matters to him, how literary life depends upon your own country, your own family, your own friends.

    Third lesson: France should be fighting in Spain, on the republican side with the Communists, against Franco and his fascist allies. This has nothing to do with ideology. Lacassagne has met lieutenant colonel Charles de Gaulle, who observed that Soviet Russia is far away, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on France’s border. A Francoist Spain would mean “France encircled” (204); that concrete geopolitical circumstance means more than the ideology du jour. That a Popular Front government, of all things, could not see this represents the triumph of pacifism over proletarianism—a silly idea trumped by a sillier. Go to Spain, de Gaulle told Lacassagne; “reconnoiter the future enemy” (206). (Jacques offers to go with him, but although Dutourd is a Gaullist he is no Malraux: The man of letters belongs at his desk, not on the battlefield (207). It is enough that he respect those who go to the battlefield.)

    Fourth lesson: There really are superior men, by nature and not only by social convention. Lacassagne admits that he had allowed himself to become a bourgeoisified  soldier, a bureaucratic functionary in the War Ministry, “someone who was accommodating himself without reflection to the cowardly mediocrity into which the country had fallen” (200). De Gaulle made him recollect; he re-minded Lacassagne. De Gaulle caused Lacassagne to reflect upon what the French army is for, what France is for, why “there was every reason to die” for France (198). Lacassagne wants Jacques to be the kind of man who writes, lives on French soil, who makes that soil worth defending. He wants him to be part of the succession of French writers.

    Lacassagne’s attempt at political education succeeds. He changes neither Jacques’s ideas nor his passions, but “taught him that there is a certain noble and romantic though realistic way of looking at the world” (211). The reconciliation of nobility and realism is the alliance of the spirited part of the soul with practical reason. In Greek terms, it is the alliance of thumos and phronēsis. In Dutourd’s terms, it is “heart.” In his book on Stendhal, The Man of Sensibility, Dutourd defines “heart” as “not only courage” but also “a desire to try one’s strength, a nobility of character, a horror of what is base or vulgar, espagnolisme, a passion for honor—in short, soul. And soul precisely as Alain defines it. Heart is what refuses the body.” [1]  Intellect should ally itself with soul: “How many cowards there are for one Socrates who dies a hero, and how often our intellectual masters give us opportunities to despise them in their lives! One sees every day that it is easier to have intellect, with and philosophy than heart, or, if you prefer it soul. Wars have at least this much good, that they permit us to see the souls of those we admire. Danger brings out the soul as rain brings out snails.” [2]  This alliance constitutes the character of the statesman. To enter into the succession of French writers, a writer needs to understand this alliance, to think about how it might be perpetuated in new circumstances.

    Such an alliance is not ‘modern.’ Lacassagne leads Jacques to consider that the modern world is not mere uprootedness, as Barrès had said and Weil would say, but a systematized uprootedness—cars in place of horses, short-haired, streamlined women in place of long-haired, alluring ones. Politically, the modern world consists of “dictatorships by blackguards” and “republics of the petits bourgeois and the workers,” not constitutional monarchies or republics of citizen-soldiers (213). The Lacassagnian, or Gaullist, political education gives Jacques precisely what a writer needs; a theme worthy not only of his talent, but of his character, his sensibility, a theme that will strengthen and refine that character and sensibility. Dutourd’s reply to Malraux is: A political novel should not be directly political. A novel of manners is the novelistic way of writing about politics, because politics—the answer to the question, Who rules?—shapes manners, giving friendships and love affairs tensions unknown in other regimes. (Malraux’s response: Don’t write a novel, write an epic in prose. And in reply to Proust: Don’t write a novel, write an anti-memoir.)

    Jean resents Jacques’s new novel. “Up to that time, Jacques and he had been equals”; Jacques’s superior wealth and family connections could be dismissed as mere accidents” (231). Jean, the bourgeois democrat, confronts the dilemma bourgeois democracy poses for its representative man. In the old regime, Jean would have been shielded from resentment by the realities of class. Not for a bourgeois Pousselot to concern himself with the accomplishments of a de Boissy! But now, “the unhappy fellow lied in miniature the drama of democracies where social life is insupportable because it is founded on merit, that is to say, you are exposed constantly to seeing someone who was your equal become your superior, and where consequently friendship is no longer possible” (231). Such weak social bonds make a bourgeois democracy susceptible to faction despite nominal equality, and therefore more likely to be heedless to foreign threats to the regime of democratic republicanism and to the lives of its citizens.

    And so Jean fumes. He tries to discourage Jacques, scribbles a thousand corrections on the margins of the novel manuscript. How can a novelist be so insensitive? he complains. How can a novelist fail to wring his hands, feel somehow guilty about the suffering masses, Nazism, Communism, “the war in S[pain, the lack of paid vacations, the housing problem, the armaments race” (239)? Jacques ignores the corrections. When Jean sees the uncorrected published version, the friendship is irretrievable.

    Jacques’s father dies not long before the French prime minister Daladier announces the supposed settlement of the crisis in Czechoslovakia. Jacques realizes that Lacassagne is now his best friend, and therefore “suffered less from his father’s death together with the feeling of not being unfaithful to his father” (282). the Springtime of Life is a story about finding a friend worthy of your father. You will need one. The modern regime needs some men and women of the ancien regime within it, braver than the demi-men and demi-women of the modern regime, and also sufficiently gracious not to resent their marginal status in a regime nominally ruled by the persons—hardly to be called citizens—such a regime produces.

    Jean was mistaken when he claimed that France no longer interested in men like Napoleon. In Dutourd’s view, one such man remained, Charles de Gaulle. Franklin Roosevelt suspected de Gaulle of Bonapartism in the worst sense, claiming to worry that de Gaulle would destroy French republicanism if given the chance. In the event, he saved it, twice, and left it on a firmer foundation than he had found it. But is not regime politics that Dutourd thinks of when he thinks of Napoleon. He thinks instead of greatness of soul.

    “The phrase ‘great soul’ turns up over and over again in Stendhal’s life of Napoleon,” he writes in his 1957 book The Taxis of the Marne. [3]  “What historian other than Stendhal has perceived the greatness of Napoleon’s soul? Yet there lies the whole key to his character.” [4]  Stendhal writes, “This man’s whole life is a paean of praise of greatness of soul,” by which he means something like what the American Founders meant by fame, joined by courage and firmness of judgment, and exhibited in Napoleon’s calmness in exile. [5]  Napoleon was a natural aristocrat formed by an aristocratic civilization. He never understood representative government, and so his soul struggled between “the genius of tyranny and the profound reasoning powers which had made a great man of him.” [6]

    De Gaulle too was “a great soul,” one which languished in the last, mediocre decades of the Third Republic, “tied down in the promotion roster of the army,” “condemned to vegetate in garrison towns, with an occasional minor command to relieve the boredom. It needed nothing less than the disintegration of the nation to liberate this great soul from his bonds.” [7]  In his Conversation with De Gaulle, Dutourd admits that he had often worried that de Gaulle might turn tyrant. What he found was that de Gaulle reminded him of Flaubert even more than he resembled Napoleon—an even more surprising comparison. Like Flaubert, de Gaulle was a great anti-bourgeois, understanding France not as “a house of commerce” but as “a work of art, a cathedral upon which one has worked for a thousand years.” [8]  France had been feminized—its government in the Fourth Republic an indulgent mother, its people “one gigantic Madame Bovary, an enormous ninny in the arms of Bohemia.” [9] A bohemianized bourgeoisie will no longer have the discipline to maintain something so modest as prosperity; what had hitherto been supposed to be the ‘low but solid ground’ will turn muddy. France needed fatherliness in order to save its republicanism. It found de Gaulle, and de Gaulle re-founded it.

    For de Gaulle (Dutourd learned in conversing with him), France “had a character and a destiny, like a living creature, which one did not model at will.” [10]  This seems flatly to contradict the image of France as a work of art, a cathedral, until one reflects on the way Jacques de Boissy reads the literary artists of the past, treating them as living presences. De Gaulle was more than such a reader, he was such a ‘writer.’ Like Flaubert, in “his Herculean efforts to make one sentence with the balance of those of Montesquieu, de Gaulle strove to perfect a living work of art, France. Thus the “strange kinship” of de Gaulle and Flaubert: “their pride of solitaries, their austere love of glory, their disdain for honors and money,” their “humble placing of themselves in a French line” of succession—for Flaubert, the succession of masters of the French language, for de Gaulle, the succession of those who made France “the most astonishing nation in History.” [11]  “Politics and literature proceeded from an identical patriotism.” [12]  The patriotism of literature and the patriotism of politics proceed from a certain nature, from greatness of soul, from the soul-forming love and friendship that the great-souled have for one another. In a commercial republic, or worse, a bohemianized democracy, greatness of soul will find its rightful place not in the tyranny of Napoleon and not exactly in Napoleon’s grace in exile, but in the political man’s patient vigilance and preparedness, in the literary man’s readiness to recognize and honor such a man when, if he sees him.

     

    Notes

    1. Jean Dutourd: The Man of Sensibility. Robin Chancellor translation. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961, 218.
    2. Ibid. 219.
    3. Jean Dutourd: The Taxis of the Marne. Harold King translation. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957, 17.
    4. Ibid. 17.
    5. Stendhal: A Life of Napoleon. Roland Gant translation. London: The Rodale Press, 1956, 28, 184.
    6. Ibid. 181-182.
    7. Jean Dutourd: Conversation avec le général. Paris: Flammarion, 1990. 18.
    8. Ibid. 31.
    9. The Taxis of the Marne, op. cit., 241.
    10. Conversation avec le général, op. cit., 40.
    11. Ibid. 40.
    12. Ibid. 40-41.
    13. Ibid. 41.

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    Michel Foucault v. Nancy Fraser: Dueling Aphorisms

    April 13, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Paul Rabinow: The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. 

    Nancy Fraser: “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions.” Praxis International. Volume 1 (1981).

     

    Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Bernstein, and Nancy Fraser criticize Foucault for excessive ‘negativity,’ for failing to provide some criterion for his critique of modernity. I shall consider Fraser’s objections—aphorizing my way along, lest some Foucaultian accuse me of concocting a totalizing discourse.

    1. Fraser summarizes Foucault’s description of the modern ‘power/knowledge regime’: local, continuous, productive, “capillary,” exhaustive. The modern regime is godlike but fully human, the mighty Leviathan without the monarch. Everything in it has been ‘leviathanized’ or politicized, made into a ruly practice.

    2. “The liberal framework understands power as emanating from the sovereign and imposing itself upon the subjects. It tries to define a power-free zone of rights, the penetration of which is illegitimate” (Fraser, 26). Yes, with the following refinement: liberalism sees as clearly as Foucault that power can be socially persuasive. Popular sovereignty undergirds modern liberalism but, as Foucault sees (along with John Marshall, Tocqueville, many others) popular sovereignty can be tyrannical. Pre-historicist liberals solve this problem by pointing to natural rights, which then receive legal protection from, and political support from, popular sovereignty. hence the care liberals take in defining limits even to “capillary” power; Leviathan’s blood must be judiciously channeled—confined to the right capillaries.

    3. Historicist thought denies natural right. ‘Natural right,’ according to historicists, is an historical construct like any other belief. Foucault is in the line of thinkers who want to look at what happens when you jettison the God of the Bible and the god of the philosophers.

    4. Fraser describes Foucault as “normatively confused” (Fraser, 31). Foucault fails to differentiate clearly among different kinds of power (cf. Derrida, “Force of Law,” 7). Why is ‘domination’—capillary or other—bad? With no moral theory, with no way to distinguish good and bad regimes, good from bad policies, Foucault cannot tell the difference between a Salvadorean torture cell and a bureaucratic welfare state. (Similarly, Heidegger could not distinguish between the Soviet Union and the United States.) Foucault fails to relieve the potential nihilism—or, at best, the final silence—of Heidegger’s radical historicism.

    5. Foucault might reply: Even as Nietzsche whispers to conservatives that their task is impossible because  historical flux permits no lasting conservation, so I, Foucault, whisper to progressives: There is no norm to get confused about. The moment you erect one, genealogy will demolish it. Otherwise, you will totalize human life, whether gently like liberals and social democrats or ham-handedly like Leninists. History is war. It has no meaning. Dare to fight!

    6. Why do I resist such totalization? (Foucault continues). Because my fatum is freedom. The slogan of the modernity, of the Enlightenment, is ‘Dare to know!’ Modernity is “the will to ‘heroize’ the present” (Foucault 40) by transforming it via the most rigorous rationalism, opposed to slack superstition. In philosophy this leads to the full-blown rationalist historicism of Hegel and his followers. In practice it yields the thousand tyrannizing microtechnologies of modern rationalism. “How can the growth of capabilities”—individual and collective—”be disconnected from the identification of power relations?” (Foucault 48). He answers, ‘By opposing sacrifice to the axis of knowledge, parody to the axis of power, and dissociation to the axis of association. Marx wanted to ‘concretize’ Hegel, but was insufficiently radical: still too ‘dialectical,’ too ‘scientific,’ too rationalistic. A true praxis-critique of modernity will unleash Dionysus, engage in creative destruction, that joyful evidence of the irrepressible power of human beings who oppose life-energy to the dead hand of structure. The philosophers of the future will heed the Nietzschean command not to know yourself but to be yourself.

    7. To which Fraser might reply: But Monsieur Foucault, you charming and vigorous bounder, you tell me ‘how.’ You even tell me ‘Why not.’ But you still do not tell me ‘Why.’

    8. Why? Because the world is motley, like Nietzsche’s fool. The stable identities of the Enlightenment are impossible to sustain. Human beings are radically formless, pure energy; they will not, ‘finally,’ conform to even the most cleverly-designed structures because they cannot. “It can never be inherent in the structure of things to guarantee the exercise of freedom. The guarantee of freedom is freedom…. Liberty is a practice.” (Foucault 285). To say so is neither to be ‘for’ or ‘against’ Enlightenment. To say so is rather to find the only genuine enactment of the modern heroizing impulse. Freedom is the only non-totalizing universal, precisely because it is always heroic, always empty of structuralizing-tyrannizing-bourgeoisifying content—unlike equality and fraternity, to take two notable examples.

    9. But does this gallant invitation to sip wine with Sartre at a sidewalk café really get us beyond the humanist horizon? (Fraser asks). Does not the critique of domination depend, for its effect, indeed its power, upon the reader’s modernist sensibility—her care for human rights, compassion for the unfortunate, the whole Enlightenment pantheon of virtues?

    10. Yes, but only initially. I am out to transform the reader. To do so, I must start with what the reader is: a modern. I will appeal to ‘human rights’ to bringer her in, but soon I shall use the Enlightenment against itself by my genealogical demonstration of the microcruelties of the compassion industry. The modern world has no moral excuse for itself, yet. “How can the modern world, in which ethics is divorced from religion, acquire an ethical status?” (Foucault 343)  Not by returning to religion. Not by returning to pre-modern rationalism. Not by following Kant, either. Kant had reintroduced ethics as an applied form of procedural normativity, as “the universal subject” guided by the categorical imperative. He tried to formalize, to legalize freedom. Ruly-all-too-ruly.

    Instead, can we develop a sensual Kantianism, an “ethics of acts and their pleasures which would be able to take account of the pleasure of the other? Is the pleasure of the other something which can be integrated in our pleasure, without reference either to law, to marriage…?” (Foucault 346)  Finding limits here involves physical transgression, experimentation with science, living on the margins of pain and pleasure, death and life; finally, it involves dying in bliss, the reward of pure negativity-of-the-body.

    11. But, Fraser objects, what is this ‘body-talk’? If the body talks, what can it say? Is this not simply “bizarre” and “jejune”? (Fraser 62-63). It may make sense (at least in California) to pay someone to be a “Professor of the History of Consciousness,” but what would anyone pay for an unconscious professor? The “muckraking, Socratic Foucault” (65) has been fruitful, but can one really be the Socratic midwife via Dionysus, via Nietzsche, that resolute anti-Socratic? If you say that Nietzsche is to Hegel as Plato should  have been to Socrates—that Diogenes the Cynic, that “Socrates gone mad,” is the superior philosopher—will masturbating in the marketplace really revolutionize the marketplace? Or will it merely become another freak show for the consumers to gawk at? Granted, the attempt to absolutize equality risks tyranny. But does the attempt to absolutize freedom not merely end in some new fatality? Can there be an unruly practice? (Even, maybe especially, of the body—which, even if thoroughly engraveable, is far from infinitely malleable.)

    12. Foucault could only reply, “Amor fati.” Could not Fraser then ask, once more, ‘Why?’ She is right: this lovers’ quarrel can never end in pleasure for both dialogic partners. Foucault can defend himself, but only at the cost of failing in his effort at seduction.

    13. Further, Fraser might say (pressing her advantage), how can there be a Nietzschean democrat? Why will the will to power not result in a strict order of rank, some new version of the Laws of Manu imposed by the philosophers of the future?

    14. Because Nietzsche is dead, along with God and man, in one respect. As I, Foucault, learned to my embarrassment with the Maoists and the ayatollites, the megacruelties of strong men now only vulgarize, destroy without creating, reduce men to last men as surely as liberal microtechnologies do. A renewed will to power must truly pervade everyone, but in resistance to the current power-grid.

    15. A war of all against all? What is this preoccupation with ‘power’? Genealogical research will locate this term in Hobbes, that disciple of Bacon, the technosystematizer of Machiavelli. Where is the freedom?

    16. Once again, I use the term ‘power’ to bring the moderns in. They will come out postmoderns, having a revised sense of power. The new power will resist  on the ‘micro’ level—the only level at which we can defeat liberalism’s confinement. Tocqueville of boudoir and bathhouse, I, Foucault, want to defeat liberalism’s confinement because I seek power not in some magnificent new tyranny but in the only way it can be had in democratic modernity: not in decadent liberalism, not in bourgeois libertarianism, but in radical libertinism. If, as Aristotle says, the principles of democracy are equality and liberty, then Taylor and Rawls can pick up the egalitarian strand whereas I pick up the libertarian, but really libertine strand (cf. Aristotle, Politics V. ix. 1310a1). Comprehensively, though never systematically, I negate the ‘positive,’ all-pervading spirit of egalitarian self-tyrannizing.

    17. Nietzsche with the superman subtracted? (Fraser muses). I am reminded of a Nietzschean critique: “One no longer becomes poor or rich; both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion.” Have you not produced a photographic negative of the Last Man, Michel?

    18. I’m sure I have, but only because the shameless toad who has written this dialogue gives you all the best lines, and makes me a mere shadow of my former self!

    19. Now, now, in a Nietzschean, ressentiment is not becoming. Amor fati!

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Hitler’s Architect, Albert Speer: A Note

    April 13, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Albert Speer: Inside the Third Reich. Richard and Clara Winston translation. New York: Macmillan, 1970. Reissued by Simon and Schuster, 1997.

     

    No founder of the American republic would not instantly have recognized Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler as loathsome tyrants. Albert Speer was less discerning. Speer could tell himself, and his prosecutors, that he did not know about Nazi death camps because he so much did not want to know that his knowledge stayed penumbric, a whiff of ash from distant crematorium. “Would you help me become a different man?” Speer asked the priest, not without reason but rather too late.

    The Americans had been bred to politics, a politics of self-government jealous of encroachments, alert to the designs of despots. Speer grew up among a sort of gentry rendered useless by modern life. An apolitical youth left him susceptible to an all-consuming politics in maturity—precisely because he’d never matured at all. Had he been fortunate, he might have found his ‘missing’ father in God, but such wholesome devotion was less likely in the new Europe, the Europe of the Church Militant of Modern Ideology. Father Hitler—who so cared for, so loved, German youth, who had such power, omniscience, and glory—fulfilled Speer’s longings. Chesterton (whose record on these matters was far from spotless) writes that when men stop believing in God they don’t start believing in nothing; they believe in anything. Or (more relevantly here) anyone—even the implausible little Austrian with a suggestion of syphilis in his eyes. Hitler won Eva Brann too, that Gretchen with her sense of danger pithed, vulnerable to Mephistophelian seduction, and therefore not sufficiently good to save her Faustian friend, Speer. Speer’s real father sensed the evil on contact. Like most German liberals of the time, like the Weimar Republic itself, he shuddered and withdrew.

    “All I wanted was for this great man to dominate the globe.” With so many good works behind him—the resurrection of German pride, a reinvigorated economy, a rebuilt military—and surely so many more ahead of him, to culminate in the reunification of the Germanic peoples at the geopolitical center of the World Island–only a fool or a coward would demur, yes? For who would oppose him? The decadent French? The slavish Slavs? The Bolsheviks? The nation of shopkeepers?

    As for doubts, Hitler himself made “an absolute refusal to listen to bad news.” Neither does “the authoritarian state” itself seek to hear criticism. Nor do its subjects. Even the very minimally realistic Speer—who wondered, in 1943, whether it might be better to put the German economy on a war footing—could make little headway. (Fortunately so. Their mindset kept Hitler and his I-venture-to-say eccentric band well away from the potential applications of Einstein’s ‘Jewish physics.’) As for the Germans, “If we couldn’t believe in Hitler, what was there for us?” a woman asked, I suppose rhetorically.

    He left the Germans behind, Speer among them. The Prince of War attaches his followers to himself by implicating them in the crimes that underlie his new modes and orders. When that regime crumbles and the Prince dies, so much of the worse—if, ultimately, much better—for the survivors. What there was for the Germans after Hitler was the potential to recover the self, in pain, or to find some new formula for self-deception. They did both. Speer did both. Thanks to the common sense of their conquerors from the west, they did so in the stable and decent regime of the German Federal Republic. From the east, conquerors came who were not so sensible.

    Are we all Albert Speer? We all tend to believe what we want to believe, and to disbelieve things that reflect poorly on ‘our own.’ A main justification for the commercial republican regime is to make it harder for its citizens to do that, by making them know that they will do it, and by checking them from acting too comprehensively when they do. So we all are, and are not, Albert Speer. We share his inclinations but are less likely to act upon them so unimpededly.

    Filed Under: Nations

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