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    Archives for August 2025

    Chateaubriand’s Christian Epic

    August 27, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    François-René vicomte de Chateaubriand: The Martyrs. Chapters 1-12. O.W. Wright translation. New York: Derby and Jackson, 1859. Originally published in 1809.

     

    In his preface, Chateaubriand explains his intention in writing this prose epic. “I advanced, in a former work”— The Genius of Christianity, which had appeared, to considerable applause, seven years earlier—that “Christianity appeared to me more favorable than Paganism for the development of and the play of passions in the epic” and, further, “that the marvelous of this religion might contend for the palm of interest with the marvelous borrowed from mythology.” [1] With The Martyrs he seeks to prove these claims by a kind of thought experiment. To do so, he sets his plot near the end of the third century AD, when Diocletian ruled the Roman Empire and initiated what would later be called the Great Persecution against Christians. This setting enables him to compare and contrast “the predominant features of the two religions: the ethics, the sacrifices, the ceremonies of both systems of worship” and indeed their rival gods, Jupiter and Jehovah. Because the Empire encompassed such vast territory, he can also present the diverse lands of its provinces and the moeurs  of their peoples, many of which he had visited. He exercises his poetic license, putting Augustine and Jerome in this period, making them friends of his hero, Eudorus, as men who converted from paganism to Christianity and took up different vocations within the Church.

    Like all the epic poets, he begins with an invocation of the Celestial Muse, inspirer of Homer and Virgil in “that art pleased with austere thoughts, with grave and sublime meditations” (I.31). But he wants the Muse to teach him “upon the harp of David,” not the lyre of Greece and Rome, and “to give to my eyes a portion of those tears that Jeremiah shed over the miseries of Zion,” so that he may “speak of the sorrows of the persecuted Church” (I.31-32). He issues a poetic version of a hero’s challenge to a rival: “Come, Muse of Falsehood, come struggle with the Muse of Truth” (I.32). Having survived nine persecutions under previous emperors, Christians had enjoyed peace under Diocletian, their numbers growing, “contest[ing] the honors offered on the shrine of idolatry” (I.32). But Satan had other plans.

    Chateaubriand first introduces the elderly widower Demodocus, the last male descendant of Homer, and his daughter, Cymodocée, born in the sacred grove where the interlocutors of Plato’s Laws dialogued. Chateaubriand reminds his readers of the close relation of laws, religion, and epic poetry, observing that “the ancients placed the cradle of Lycurgus near that of Jupiter” on the border of Messenia, where father and daughter live, and Laconia, “to teach us that religion and the laws have one common origin, and that to destroy their mutual union is both impious and unnatural.” (I.39). “The augurs, therefore, declared that the daughter of Demodocus would one day be renowned for her wisdom” (I.33)—very much his father’s daughter, inasmuch as “wisdom had taught” Demodocus “the full knowledge of the human heart” (I.36). Chateaubriand takes care to present the best of the pagans first; he emphasizes the very real virtues seen amongst them. Demodocus serves as the high priest at a temple to Homer, who sang of the “warlike life” and “pastoral moeurs” (I.34). [2]

    Like all fathers, Demodocus wants his daughter to marry well, but she has the misfortune to have attracted the vile Hierocles, “the favorite of Galerius,” an equally vile ambitieux who serves, restively, under Diocletian; worthy suitors have been scared off. The opposite of pious Aeneas, “this impious Roman” disgusts Cymodocée, and Demodocus “could not risk her happiness with a barbarian suspected of many crimes, and who, by his inhuman treatment, had hurried his first spouse to an early tomb” (I.35). To shield her from his attentions, he consecrates her “to the services of the Muses,” making her the pagan equivalent of a cloistered nun. “Familiarized in the learned society of the Muses with all the noble recollections that antiquity inspires, each day Cymodocée unfolded new charms”; at the same time, Demodocus moderated “the effects of this divine education,” which might lead to hubris, “by inspiring in her a taste for simplicity” (I.36). Rather, he tells her, “let us beseech Minerva to grant us Reason for our guide; from her we shall learn that moderation, the sister of Truth, without whose aid our passions will hurry us into every extreme” (I.36). 

    On a journey to attend the festival of Lymnaean Diana, Cymodocée gets separated from her nurse-chaperone, loses her way, and discovers a sleeping youth next to an altar dedicated to the Naiad of a sacred spring. She “really imagined that in this youth she beheld the lover of Diana,” Endymion, who had been cast into sleep by Jupiter because he “had the insolence to solicit Juno” (I.40). She prays to Diana to protect her from the “arrows” of this huntsman (I.40). But upon his awakening, her misrecognition proves even more radical: he rejects her polytheistic beliefs, testifying that “There is but one God, master of the universe; and I am but a mortal, full of weakness and misery” (I.41). Eudore [Eudorus] means “good gift.” In the Iliad, Eudorus is a demigod, an ally of Achilles; in later Greek history, Eudorus of Alexandria was a Neoplatonic monotheist. This Eudore, however, is a Christian, who prays that “heaven guard your virgin honor,” a concern that should be second only to “the fear of God,” the beginning of wisdom (I.41). “The language of this man confounded Cymodocée,” as “the gravity of his language,” his Christian words, coincide with “the grace of his person,” his classical beauty (I.41). “He seemed to belong to a different race of men, more noble and serious than that with which she was acquainted” (I.41). “I am a descendant of Homer, a name immortalized in song,” she tells him, only to be told, “I know a book more valuable than his” (I.41-42). After hearing the story of her wandering, he determines to return her to her father. Along the way, looking up at the night sky, she invokes the stars that are, she believes, gods and goddesses; Eudore “see[s] nothing but the stars, which declare the glory of the Most High,” a claim that “filled the priestess of the Muses with fresh confusion,” raising the possibility that he might be “some impious demon,” or maybe a pirate (I.42). Yet he “bend[s] compassionately over a slave, whom they found helpless and abandoned by the roadside, call[ed] him brother, and threw his mantle over him to cover his nakedness” (I.42). 

    When he returns her to her desperate father, Demodocus asks, tellingly, “what god hath restored thee”? (I.44). He won’t learn that for a long time, but he exhibits the nobility of pagan self-sacrifice, saying that he would have thrown himself at the feet of Hierocles to beg her return at the price of his own life, had she been captured by his “partisans,” as he had feared (I.44). It happens that he knows the family of Eudore, whose father, Lasthenes, is a prominent citizen of Arcadia, “a descendant of a race of heroes and of gods” [3]; Eudore “has borne away laurels of triumph in the field of Mars”—a point of respect, indeed, for a priest of the Homeridae (I.46). He determines to visit the young man, bringing gifts: “O my daughter! May heaven preserve us from the crime of ingratitude!” (I.48). “The gods chose Egypt for their birthplace, because the Egyptians were the most grateful of all mankind” (I.48). [4] Once in Lasthenes’ palace, Demodocus gives Eudore “an urn of inestimable value” (“I will accept your offering,” Eudore replies, “if it has not been used in your sacrifices”) goes so far as to say that he would agree to a marriage between the young man and his daughter, had she not already “been consecrated to the Muses.” (II.53). 

    As the two fathers converse, Demodocus learns that Lasthenes’ servants are not slaves, as “my religion forbids slavery, and I have given them their liberty”; that his religion is Christianity; that his fields and flocks prosper because his family submits “to the will of him, who is the only true God”; that his wife is humble, chaste, and faithful; that “no happiness she can enjoy will equal my wishes”; and that they “have grown old together” (II.54). While Cymodocée “listened and admired”—moeurs “so amiable touched the very soul of the young infidel”—Demodocus wonders: “Your words breathe all the wisdom of ancient times, and yet I have not met with them in Homer,” and if “your sentiments have not the grace of Euripides, they possess the solemnity of Plato” (II.55). He blesses the Christian patriarch. 

    Cyril, Bishop of Lacedaemon, enters as an honored guest of the household. He explains to Demodocus that he is “no king,” carrying a scepter, “but a shepherd,” carrying “a crook with which I conduct my flock,” a worshipper of the God who was “born among shepherds” (II.58). He has come to hear Eudore’s story of penance, his confession, a practice unknown to the pagans. They move outdoors, near the Alpheus River (legendarily re-routed by Hercules in order to cleanse the Augean Stables), where Cyril quietly humbles himself not before a mythical hero but before the divine wisdom that created the river and the mountains surrounding the river valley. Cymodocée sings Homeric hymns while playing the lyre; Cyril hopes that “these ingenious fictions of antiquity” may one day “be considered as fictions only” in the songs of poets,” since “now they obscure the mind, and keep it, even in this life, in a state of slavery that is disgraceful to reason, and after death, they will destroy the soul” (II.62). No hater of music itself (“ours is a religion of harmony and love”), the Bishop asks Eudore to sing while playing not a Greek lyre but a Hebrew kinnor, the instrument associated with the shepherd David (II.64). The young man of course obliges, singing of “the vanity of life” and “the false vanity of the wicked,” reserving a song of praise for “the honest poor and the virtuous woman” and, finally for the praise of God (II.64). “Demodocus and his daughter were too much astonished to give utterance to their emotions,” although Cymodocée “remembers[s] the praise of the virtuous woman and resolved to attempt the song on her own lyre” (II.65). After all retire for the night, Cyril dreams of a young couple, martyred.

    Cyril, who had already offered to lead Demodocus to the knowledge of God, “if you wish”—the God who demands only the sacrificial “offering of your heart” (II.58)—delivers a sermon on the next day. Tacitly contrasting the City of God with the Roman Empire (“Away, monuments of earth! ye compare not with the monuments of the Holy City” [III.67]), he contrasts earthly happiness with the true happiness of the Christian. Christian happiness in no way denies “the delightful condition of a mortal who has just done a virtuous or heroic action, of a sublime genius who gives birth to a great thought, of a man who feels the transports of lawful love or of friendship long tried by misfortune”; “noble passions are not extinguished but only purified in the hearts of the just,” with human loves and friendships now “concentrated in the bosom of the Divinity itself, imbib[ing] something of the grandeur and eternity of God” (III.69-70). It is especially the eternity of Christian happiness that Cyril praises, an eternity often vindicated by the Mother of God, the “Queen of Mercy,” who intervenes on behalf of suffering human beings with her Son, their Savior. Nonetheless, there are times when God the Father decrees martyrdom, not earthly prosperity, for His people. Now, in Diocletian’s time, “the Christians, unconquerable by the fire and sword” of earlier persecutions, “have grown enervated amid the delights of peace” (III.74). “To try them better, providence suffered them to know riches and honors; they have been unable to resist the persecution of prosperity” (III. 74). And so, they have angered God, who will purify them with suffering, unchaining Satan to afflict them. Cyril’s dream was prophetic: chief among the martyrs will be Eudore and Cymodocée, although Cyril does not know that they will be the young couple he dreamed of. It will be a long time before Cymodocée converts to Christianity.

    It is only after delivering what amounts to a theological introduction that Cyril urges Eudore to begin to tell the story of his struggles. A descendant of Philopoemen, whose descendants were punished by the Romans for resisting Rome’s conquest of Greece, Eudore had reported to Rome at age sixteen, as per the ancient peace treaty, which stipulated that elder sons of Greek families be held in Rome for a time as hostage-guarantors against any future Greek rebellion. His family “was the first in Greece to embrace the law of Jesus Christ” and he had passed his childhood learning “the hard lessons of adversity” in accordance with “the simplicity of Arcadian moeurs“; this enhanced and prolonged the natural “innocence of childhood” (IV.84) He saw the difference between his own upbringing and that of the other young conscripts on the way to Rome. As they passed the Greek cities, “once so flourishing, now present[ing] nothing to the eye but heaps of ruins,” “skeletons of their former magnificence,” he considers how “personal evils,” such as conscription, “sink into insignificance when compared with those calamities that strike whole nations” (IV.86). The others were “quite insensible” to this reflection, and the difference “rose from our religion”: “paganism develops the passions too prematurely, and thus retards the progress of reason,” whereas Christianity, “while it prolongs the infancy of the heart, accelerates the manhood of the mind,” teaching it to “respect the dignity of man” (IV.86). “My young companions had heard nothing but of the metamorphoses of Jupiter,” manifestations of the god’s erotic adventurism, while “I had already been seated with the prophets on the ruins of desolate cities, and had learnt from Babylon what judgment to form of Corinth.” (IV.86-97). And he too felt the pull of pagan lightness, a festive procession traveling from Athens to Delos, the celebrants chanting “verses from Pindar and Simonides”; “my imagination was enchanted by this spectacle”—the “first time that I witnessed a pagan ceremony without horror” (IV.87). And the seductive beauty of Greece soon gave way to the seductive grandeur of Rome, where everything “bears the mark of dominion and duration”—the ‘Eternal City’ vying with the invisible City of God (IV.89. 

    He began classes taught by a former student of Quintilian, where he met Augustine, Jerome, and Prince Constantine, son of then-caesar, future emperor Constantius, under the Emperor Diocletian. One of Constantius’ three fellow-caesars was Galerian, hater of Christians, and Galerius’ “favorite,” Hierocles, a student of the sophists and currently governor of Achaia. Glancing at the Enlightenment philosophes of France, Chateaubriand has Eudore describe the sophists as “disciples of a vain philosophy” who “attack the Christians” and sponge off the rich while praising moderation; among them, there are those who “advocate a republic in the bosom of monarchy,” “pretend[ing] that it is necessary to overturn society in order to remodel it on a new plan” (IV.95). “Inflated with vanity, persuaded of the sublimity of their own genius, and boldly superior to vulgar doctrines, there is no folly, however contemptible, of which these sophists are not guilty, no system, however monstrous, which they do not bring forward and support” (IV.95). “The words liberty, virtue, science, the progress of intelligence, the good of mankind, are perpetually in Hierocles’ mouth; but this Brutus is a mercenary courtier; this Cato the slave of passions the most shameful; this apostle of toleration is the most intolerant of men, and this worshipper of humanity the most bloody minded of persecutors” (IV.96). Hierocles “is corrupting, under the name of enlightenment, a man who reigns over mankind” (IV.96). “Such is the deformity of man, when left alone with his body, after renouncing his soul” (IV.96). With his sophistical revolutionism and false enlightenment, Hierocles embodies not only decadent imperial Rome but the Jacobins of Chateaubriand’s youth.

    When visiting Christians in Rome, Eudore saw, “in the midst of this evangelical poverty,” the civility, “cheerfulness tempered with gravity,” simplicity and dignified language, “good taste and solid judgment” that recalled “the best days of Augustus and Maecenas (IV.98). “It seemed as if this obscure retreat had been destined by heaven to prove the cradle of another Rome, and the last asylum of arts, of letters, and of civilization” (IV.98). This notwithstanding, he confesses to his listeners, in Rome “the illusions of my youth took from me the love of truth” (IV.98). The Christian pontiff Marcellinus attempted “to bring me back to God,” failed, and excommunicated him as one “who violates by his corrupt moeurs the purity of the Christian name” (IV.98-99). “I now believed my return to Christianity impossible, and abandoned myself to my pleasures with thoughtless indifference” (V.102). 

    His companions were only slightly more serious—Jerome preoccupied with natural philosophy, Augustine with the poetry of Virgil, Constantine with Roman history—Constantine being Eudore’s best friend among the three, a travel companion, fellow dreamer of amours, and drinking buddy. But, Eudore advises his listeners, “think not that we were happy in the midst” of their “deceitful pleasures”: “an inquietude, which I have no words to define, incessantly tormented us” (V.108). [5] “In vain we expected to find constancy and truth” in love; “we met with nothing but deceit, tears, jealousies and indifference”; “betraying or betrayed, our affections were ever varying” (V.108). “We had abandoned those virtuous thoughts which are the true food of the soul, and had lost all relish for that celestial beauty which alone can fill the immensity of our desires” (V.108).

    Jerome was the first to voice frustration with their life. In front of the tomb of courageous Scipio Africanus, said to have spent his latter days at a rural villa, far from the ingratitude of the Rome he had defended as a general, Jerome asked, “Does not the whole life of Scipio condemn our conduct?” (V.109-110). He and Augustine concurred: only Christianity offers the hope of a soul at peace with itself. The Church has no gladiatorial combats, no spectacles of human beings thrown to their death in the jaws of wild animals, no “blood of victims,” no “orgies,” only vigils and prayers (V.112-113). Eudore wasn’t quite ready to return to what Jerome calls “the religion of my infancy” (V.110), but he did listen to a Christian hermit who overheard their conversation, who recalled his own “wild and dissipated” youth and the way its pleasures eventually palled. He had been a celebrated rhetorician, as they aspired to be, but now he asks (rhetorically),”What is this literary fame, which is disputed during life, uncertain after death, and often the portion of mediocrity and of vice?” (V.112). Eudore considers him no longer a rhetorician but a “Christian philosopher” (V.114). “My young friends, it is a great evil for a man to attain prematurely the summit of his desires; and to pass, in a few years, through the illusions of a long life” (V.112). One might suspect that the celebrated author of Atala and René speaks through the mouth of old Thraseus. [6]

    The friends part and Eudore returns to Rome, where he wandered into the Catacombs, seeing the Empress Priscia and her daughter, Valeria, at prayer, accompanied by Sebastian, soon to be martyred, and Dorotheus, whose name means ‘God’s gift.’ “A mingled sensation of shame, repentance, and rapture filled my soul” (V.119). “Oh, the power of that religion which could induce the spouse of a Roman emperor to steal like an adulteress from the imperial couch to visit the rendezvous of the unfortunate, to seek Jesus Christ at the altar of an obscure martyr, in the midst of tombs, and among men the objects of contempt and proscription!” (V.119). God rebuked Eudore for his apostasy by allowing him to be falsely accused by Christians and Romans alike. Knowing of his excommunication, the Christians suspected him of being a Roman spy, while Hierocles, who had himself sent spies into the Catacombs, invented the story that Eudore had guided the imperial wife and daughter to that place. Hierocles then brought his lie to Galerius, who informed Diocletian, accusing Hierocles’ rival of treason. Eudore escaped punishment only because Constantine intervened in his defense before the emperor. Exiled, he joined the army of Caesar Constantius, then stationed along the Rhine, fighting the rebellious Franks, that “restless nation” which “is always harassing the frontiers of the empire” (V.124). “From the bosom of luxury, and of polished society, I passed to a hard and perilous life, in the midst of a barbarous people”—the “most fierce” of all the barbarians, their weapons “always in their hands,” regarding “a life of peace as a life of the most grievous servitude” (V.124). All of this “awakened a new train of ideas” in him (V.126): “I was here fighting the battles of barbarians, the tyrants of Greece,” his native land, “against other barbarians from whom I had never received an injury”—not unlike the conscript foreign soldiers who fought alongside the French in the Napoleonic Wars (V.127). “The love of my country revived with ardor in my bosom, and Arcadia arose to my view arrayed in all her charms” (V.127). Before his love of God returns, his love of country does; Chateaubriand considers the one love as precedent to the other.

    Wounded in battle, Eudore was rescued by a Christian priest who had exchanged himself for a Christian captured by the Franks and is now a slave, evangelizing among them. Harold, “his name among the Franks,” returned accompanied by Clothilde, the wife of his master, Pharamond, who had interceded on Eudore’s behalf with her husband (VII.146). “I doubt not that you will prove an obedient slave, and repay her kindness by your fidelity and gratitude” (VII.146). [7] Harold descended from the Roman patriot, Cassius (his given name is Zacharius); his ancestors were “banished from Rome for having arisen in defense of liberty,” then converted to Christianity, “the only asylum of true independence”—still another association of patriotism and Christianity (VII.149). He asks Eudore, “Will you be less sensible than [the] Franks to the charms of the Gospel?” only to be told, “I am of the same religion as yourself”; “I am a Christian” (VII.153-154). He does not admit his excommunication, however. A day later, Clothilde joins them, praying to God and converting. “Thus I beheld the origin of Christianity among the Franks” (VII.154).

    His enforced residence among the Franks enabled Eudore to describe their political institutions and moeurs to his listeners. They live under a monarchic regime; although they divide rule among several kings, they unite behind one when in danger. This is Pharamond, chief of the Salian tribe. The Franks assemble once a year to bring their complaints to their king, who “renders justice with impartiality” (VII.156). They hold property in common, assigning plots to families that cultivate them for one year, returning it to the tribe after the harvest. “The same simplicity marks the rest of their character,” each wearing the same types of clothing, inhabiting the same types of huts, sleeping on the same beds of animal skins as the warrior-kings. According to one chieftain, Chloderic, “We forbid our children to read or write; we wish them not to learn the arts of servitude: we wish nothing but the sword, battle, and blood” (VII.162). [8]

    Eudore won his freedom after he saved his master’s son’s life from a wolf. The Franks tasked him with bringing a peace overture to the Romans. “It is my hope that this rude season of my life, thus passed in the family of a barbarous master, will render me one day like this lily in the eyes of God: in order to develop all its powers, the soul requires to be buried for a season under the rigors of adversity” (VII.164). [9]

    Having spoken for nine hours, Eudore paused his narration. Bishop Cyril “admired this picture of the church in its first progress through the world” while reflecting on the perfidy of Hierocles, knowing that a new persecution was then being plotted by that man and his superior, Galerius, at court in Rome (VIII.165). Eudore himself “was far from feeling tranquil,” troubled by his passion for Cymodocée, whose “mild and timid looks” were “incessantly fixed upon him” during his narrative (VIII.166). As for the priestess of Homer, “the ignorance of her mind vanished before the light of Christianity” even as “the ignorance of her heart [vanished] before that of the passions,” feeling, “at the same moment, the anxieties of love and the delights of wisdom” (VIII.166). “It was thus that heaven first united two hearts, that were to add fresh triumphs to the cross” (VIII. 167).

    Satan hoped otherwise, “groan[ing] at the loss of his power” during this time of Christianity’s advance but “resolv[ing] at least not to yield the victory without a struggle” (VIII.167). Having determined to punish the complacent Christians under hitherto tolerant Diocletian, God “left him free to accomplish his dark designs” (VIII.167). Chateaubriand has given himself the opportunity to depict the caesars of Hell, whom Satan convened for a parley, rather as the rebellious Franks do, when under assault from Rome. The demon Homicide argued for the extermination of all Christians. The demon False Wisdom, with his “deadly hatred of true reason,” the “father of Atheism, an execrable phantom whom Satan himself did not father,” who “became enamored with Death as soon as she appeared in hell” and “proud of his enlightenment” [!], spoke up as the pacifist of the lot, deploring violence and insisting that “we shall only obtain the victory by reasoning, gentleness, and persuasion” (VIII.174).  Let us disseminate among the Roman sophists and “among the Christians themselves” the “principles that dissolve the bonds of society and undermine the foundations of empires,” deploying Hierocles as our point man (VIII.175). But with “her mild glances” and “the charms of her voice and smile,” concealing her “perfidy and venom,” the demon Voluptuousness intervened with still another plan: “To conquer the disciples of an austere law, neither violence nor wisdom is needed,” only “the tender passions,” which are sure to soften “these austere servants of a chaste God” (VIII.176). She reminded her colleagues that Hierocles is not only a sophist but a spurned lover of Cymodocée. “I know how to continue my work, excite rivalries, overturn the world with the greatest ease, and bring men, through delight, to partake of your misery” here in Hell (VIII.177). Ever the conciliator among his caesars, Satan assured them that all these strategies can be used, along with those of the demons Idolatry and Pride, with Ambition to beckon “the soul of Galerius” and Superstition “the heart of Diocletian” (VIII.177). “With all these evils combined, let us stir up against the Christians a terrible persecution” (VIII.177). All of this reminds readers of the Jacobin persecution of Christians.

    Continuing his account, Eudore recounted his embassy to Rome, where he found the emperor senile, Galerius primed to replace him, with Hierocles his confidant. The truce was established, and he visited the Gauls before returning to Arcadia. “Never did any country present such a diversity of manners and religions, such a mixture of civilization and barbarity” (IX.183), Eudore observes, as Chateaubriand glances at the France of his own time (IX.183). He witnessed a Druid ceremony presided over by a mysterious woman who goads her listeners to rebel against the Romans. Velleda “was truly a remarkable woman,” her character “a strange mixture of dignity and of wildness, of innocence and of art” (X.195). “Pride was her ruling passion, and the elevation of her sentiments often bordered on extravagance”—traits not unknown in modern society ladies (X.195-196). Against her claims of supernatural powers, Eudore soberly protested, “I am unacquainted with any such power,” sensibly asking, “How can you reasonably believe yourself possessed of a power that you have never exercised?” (X.196). “I could but pity the lovely maniac,” but that pity, and perhaps her loveliness, proved his undoing, given the “lukewarmness” of his Christian faith at the time—a condition that “deserved to meet its punishment” (X.197). Having developed a passion for him, Velleda eventually breached his none-too-formidable defenses, leading him to conclude, “I am not strong enough to be a Christian” (X.207)—true, because no one is, without the grace of God. After falling at her feet, “I felt myself stamped with the seal of divine reprobation” and “doubted the possibility of my salvation, and the omnipotence of the mercy of God” (X.207). But Velleda committed suicide after her father was killed in a skirmish with the Romans. A Christian priest, Clair (i.e., “Light,” genuine Enlightenment) hears Eudore’s “full confession of all the inequities of my past life” (XI.211). Eudore resolved “to abandon the army and the world,” writing to Constantius and asking to be decommissioned (XI.211).

    Heading to Diocletian’s court, temporarily in Africa, he visited the library at Alexandria, “this depository of the bane and the antidote of the soul,” evil and good books (XI.216). The city is shaped in the form of a Macedonian cuirass, perhaps as a way “to perpetuate the memory of its founder”: “the spear of Alexander could bid cities spring up amidst the desert, as the lance of Minerva called for the olive from the bosom of the earth” (XI.217). (In all the lands Napoleon had conquered, in how many did he establish a library?) The Egyptians themselves have lost their learning, as the successors of priests once “renowned for their knowledge of the wonders of the sky, and the records of the earth,” were now only “impostors, who enveloped truth as they did their mummies, in a thousand strange and fantastic folding,” no longer understanding the hieroglyphics their ancestors etched in their obelisks (XI.218). Recognizing Eudore’s services to Rome and perhaps also those to his son, the emperor granted his request to return, remarking that “you will be the first of your family that ever returned to the roof of his fathers, without leaving a son as a hostage to the Roman nation” (XI.219).

    He then visited a grotto once occupied by Paul the Apostle. The anchorite, a hermit, told him, “Your faults have been great; but there is no stain that the tears of penitence cannot efface” and, moreover, “it is not without some design that providence has made you a witness of the introduction of Christianity into every land”: “Soldier of Jesus Christ, you are destined to fight and to conquer for the faith” (XI.224). In their long conversation, the anchorite said, “Behold this eastern clime, where all the religions, and all the revolutions of the earth, have had their origin,” including the “elegant divinities” worshipped in Eudore’s Greece, the “monstrous and misshapen gods” of Egypt, Jesus Christ himself, and (he prophesied) “a descendant of Ishmael,” Muhammad, who “shall reestablish error beneath the Arab’s tent” (XI.226). “It is worthy of your attention, that the people of the East, as if in punishment for some great rebellion of their forefathers, have almost always been under the dominion of tyrants; thus, a kind of miraculous counterpoise, morality and religion have sprung up in the same land that gave birth to slavery and misfortune” (XI.226). In “future ages” Egypt will see armies as huge as those of Sesostris, Cambyses, Alexander, and Caesar; Chateaubriand is thinking of Caesar and Napoleon, but had he been gifted with prophecy, he might have added Rommel and Montgomery, even Moshe Dayan. “All the great and daring efforts of the human species have either had their origin here, or have come hither to exhaust their force,” as “a supernatural energy has ever been preserved in these regions wherein the first man received life; something miraculous seems still attached to the cradle of creation and the source of light and knowledge” (XI.226). And even now, the desert saints of the Thebaid preserve Christianity against “luxury and effeminacy” (XI.227). Egypt remains a land of spiritual warfare, of Christian saints struggling against “the ancient worship of Osiris,” a false deity they will someday conquer, since “the Lord gathers about him Egypt, as a shepherd fathers round him his mantle” (XI.227). In parting, the anchorite adjured Eudore to stand fast in “the ranks of the soldiers of Jesus Christ,” who will conquer not only Egypt but Rome itself, “this mighty empire, so long the terror and the destroyer of the human race” (XI.228). Eudorus returned to his father while Demodocus urged his daughter to “imitate Eudorus,” for whom “adversity has but augmented [his] virtues” (XI.232). The priest of Homer commends the virtues of the young Christian.

    Here, at the midpoint of his epic, Chateaubriand undertakes a new beginning. He turns from depicting Christian heroism overcoming personal sins and errors to depicting martyrdom, Christian triumph in sacrifice. For the depiction of heroism he had invoked the Celestial Muse, the muse of poetry, of beauty. For the depiction of martyrdom, he invokes the Holy Spirit, the God of sublimity: “I have need of thy aid” (XII.233). “Thou regardest the perpetual commotion of the things of earth, this human society in which everything, even to principle, is subject to change, in which evil becomes good and good becomes evil,” looking “with pity on the dignities that inflate our hearts and the vain honors that corrupt them,” menacing injustice and consoling “the calamity purchased by virtue” (XII.233). More than the Celestial Muse, the spirit of poien, of making, You are the “Creative Spirit,” Maker of something out of nothing, life out of death (XII.233). 

    The first element of martyrdom arose in the demons’ conspiracy against the Church. While Diocletian “was a prince blessed with wisdom and moderation,” to “clemency in favor of his people,” in his advancing senility superstition and avarice overcame him (XII.234). Urged on by Galerius, “he suffered himself to be seduced by the hope of extorting treasures from the Christians” (XII.234). A demonically inspired pagan soothsayer told him that Christians seek to overthrow him because they are “the enemies of our gods” (XII.236). As with so many false prophecies, the soothsayer mixed his lie with truth: the Christians were indeed the enemies of the Romans’ gods but have no intention to overthrow any earthly kingdom. Fulfilling his part of the demons’ plan, Hierocles set off for Greece and Cymodocée. While he was motivated by the demon Voluptuousness, Eudore was inspired not by eros but by agape, by “the angel of holy love” for Cymodocée. “For the first time, Eudore felt his bosom glow with the flames of genuine love” (XII.239). He hopes to convert her to Christianity, “at once throw[ing] open to her the portals of heaven and those of the nuptial chamber”: “What a happiness for a Christian!” (XII.239). From this collision of false and true doctrines, false and true fears, false and true loves will come the triumph of the martyrs.

     

    Notes

    1. For an account of Chateaubriand’s discussion of Christian poetry in The Genius of Christianity, see “The Poetic of Christianity” on this website under Bible Notes. For further accounts of the book, see “Chateaubriand’s Defense of Christianity,” “Christianity and the Liberal Arts,” and “Christian Forms of Worship,” also on this website.
    2. Chateaubriand takes Demodocus’ name from a poet in the court of that “mighty man,” Alcinous, in Homer’s Odyssey. Demodocus’ song of the Trojan War causes Odysseus to weep. Cymodocea, whose name means “wave gatherer,” appears in Greek mythology as a Nereid, a sea-nymph; Chateaubriand’s Cymodocée will traverse the Mediterranean from Greece to Rome to Jerusalem, then back to Rome.
    3. Chateaubriand borrows Lasthenes’ name from that of a liberty-loving first-century AD Cretan general, who led a rebellion against the Roman Empire.
    4. The ancient Egyptian religion centered on ma’at, which means harmony—the order of the universe including the family and the political community. Ingratitude, and especially ingratitude to the gods, is the first sin because it disrupts that order, which was given and is maintained by the gods; conversely, gratitude faithfully affirms the divinely ordained cosmic order. 
    5. Readers of Tocqueville will recognize this sentiment, shared by both men, although Tocqueville attributes its prevalence in modern times to civil-social democracy, whose constant turmoil prevents the mind from resting.
    6. Thraseus was the name of a Roman senator, a member of the “Stoic Opposition” to the tyrannical Emperor Nero; another Thraseus was a Christian martyr who died in the second century AD. Chateaubriand’s opposition to Napoleon is the likely political parallel; this book, on Christian martyrdom, is the religious parallel.
    7. Thanks to her association with Harold, “the natural violence and cruelty of her disposition have become softened into gentleness and compassion,” although she was not yet a Christian (VII.152). In history and legend, Saint Clothilde was the wife of Clovis I, the first king of the Franks, who led her husband to God. Pharamond was a later Frankish king. Like his hagiographic sources, Chateaubriand does not hesitate to mix names and dates in poetic invocation of Christian figures.
    8. The historical Chloderic murdered his father at the instigation of Clovis (before his conversion to Christianity, one hastens to add), then was killed by Clovis’ men. Clovis then incorporated Chloderic’s tribe into his own alliance, becoming the king of the Franks.
    9. Chateaubriand thus combines Christ’s parable of the lily of the field, which does not toil or spin, flourishing without effort, with His parable of the seed which must die, like Christ Himself and the martyrs who would follow Him, in order to germinate.

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Is Modernity Finished?

    August 20, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Romano Guardini: The End of the Modern World. Wilmington: ISI Books, 1998.

     

    This volume consists of two books: The End of the Modern World, published in the original German in 1950, and Power and Responsibility, in which Guardini elaborates on his earlier work.

     

    Guardini begins with the ancients. “Classical man had no desire to transcend his world.” He “lived within his cosmos.” Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus distinguished nature from convention but “knew nothing of a being existing beyond the world.” Politically, this preference for the limited, the humanly scaled, registered in the classics’ preference for the small polis over the contemporary empires; Alexander was a Macedonian, not a Greek. And even the nation-state was outside their range, a fact Guardini ascribes to “political blindness,” although that may not quite be so. [1]

    By contrast, “medieval man centered his faith in Revelation as it had been enshrined in Scripture,” which “affirmed the existence of a God Who holds His Being separate and beyond the world” as its sovereign. There was something, indeed Someone, far transcending the limits of nature, One who had indeed created nature from nothing. “Irreducibly personal,” the Christian God “can never be merged with any universe,” loving the world but not depending upon it, “need[ing] no world in order that He might be.” The world He created out of nothing “is found only in the Bible.” This being so, “man must turn toward the Lord as toward his final end,” not (or not crucially) to the fulfillment of his nature by right participation in the natural order. 

    Although born in Italy, Guardini spent almost all of his life in Germany. He applauds “the influx of the German spirit” into Christianity, with its “restlessness” and “armed marches,” signs of a “mobile and nervous soul [that] worked itself into the Christian affirmation” and “produced that immense medieval drive which aimed at cracking the boundaries of the world.” 

    But just as one suspects Guardini of offering a sort of Christian Hegelianism, he demurs. “Medieval anthropology, in both principle and application, is superior to its modern counterpart,” and “medieval life had a firmer yet richer hold on reality than is possible for modern man,” making “possible a fuller perfecting of human nature.” It is true that “medieval man neither wished to explore the mysteries of the world empirically nor did he want to illuminate them by a rational methodology,” but that enabled “a life and a sense of being integrally religious in nature,” one in which the division of God from nature and the analogous division between Church and Empire at once prevented ‘totalitarianism’ and elevated the souls of men, inviting them to live by a standard set above them, not by them. “Church and State were united only through the fact that both derived their power and their office from the high authority of God Himself”; “human life in the total sweep of its existence and in all its works must be founded upon and ordered by the transcendent sublimity of the Lord,” as seen in Dante’s Commedia, “perhaps the most powerful embodiment of this medieval sense of the unity of all things in being.” 

    Intellectually, medieval man respected the authority of the Scripture and the Church in divine matters, the authority of the ancient philosophers in understanding nature. He did not inquire into nature by means of experimentation, Bacon’s method of ‘torturing nature to compel her to reveal her secrets.’ This, it might be noticed, did not preclude revision of previous insights; just as Aristotle respectfully disputed with Plato, Hugh of St. Victor respectfully disputed with Boethius and Cassiodorus. Indeed, disputation itself was a feature of medieval university education. Still, to relinquish authority altogether “always breeds its burlesque—force,” as seen in Machiavelli, “the first to express” a morality severed from the transcendent God “in the political realm,” followed by Hobbes, who “built his theory of the state upon the assertion that it should be absolute master and judge of human life.” At the same time (perhaps most clearly in the thought of Montaigne), “man began to find his own individuality an absorbing object for study, for introspection and psychological analysis.” The division between Church and Empire, both under God, was replaced by the division between State and Self, ‘under’ no one. While “medieval tensions were resolved as the soul achieved an ever new and greater transcendence,” modern anxiety “arises form man’s deep-seated consciousness that he lacks either a ‘real’ or a symbolic place in reality.” At best, modern man looked to nature as its standard, as seen “in the honnête homme of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the ‘natural’ man of Rousseau, in the rationalism of the Enlightenment, in the ‘natural’ beauty invoked by neoclassicism”—notably by Goethe. This resembled the classical view but only resembled it, since “the modern world affirmed neither nature nor classicism as the Middle Ages had done.” Medieval man saw in nature “the creation of God” and “a foreshadowing of Revelation.” Modern man saw nature as severed from Revelation, which he supposed “empty of meaning and hostile to life.” At the same time, and unlike the classics, moderns denied that nature had a telos. This left men free to undertake the project of dominating nature for their own purposes. What Machiavelli called the mastery of Fortune, what Bacon called the conquest of Nature, led to a “concept unique with modern man, the concept of ‘Culture,'” of human work as ‘creation.’ Culture “took its stance opposite God and His Revelation.” “Although the scientific picture of the world has become increasingly exact, man no longer finds a home in it.” Instead of looking ‘above,’ towards the transcendent God, modern man “sought for answers within his own soul.” This included even the remaining Christians: Calvin, Pascal. 

    Guardini summarizes the modern world as consisting of “three ideals: a Nature subsisting in itself; an autonomous personality of the human subject; a culture self-created out of norms intrinsic to its own essence,” with the “constant creation and perfection of this ‘culture’ constitut[ing] the final goal of history.” He adds, “This was all a mistake.” Modernity’s “technological mind” sees nature as “a mere ‘given,'” an “object of utility.” It begins to extend that sensibility to human “personality,” as well, with the “Mass Man…absorbed by technology and rational abstraction.” (Guardini is thinking of machine production; he was innocent of the cell phone.) In this culture, ‘leadership’ replaces statesmanship, the leader being “nothing but the complement of the many,” no authority but rather “another in essence with the many.” “It is taken increasingly for granted that man ought to be treated as an object,” losing what remains of his liberty “both for free decision and for open growth as a person.” In truth, however, “man is a person called by God,” a being “capable of answering for his own actions,” responsible to God and neighbor. “To assert and cherish the incommunicability of each and every man is not to advance self-interest or privilege; it is to pledge that loyalty, that fundamental duty, which is one with being a man.” 

    This raises the Tocqueville problem, the problem of democracy, of social egalitarianism. “Does the leveling which flows from the dominance of the many cause the loss of personality or does it cause the loss of the person himself?” A genuine person orients himself toward the supreme Person, thereby being “robed with duties no other can assume.” Under democratic conditions, the human person “is destined to stand forth with a spiritual resoluteness never demanded of man before,” a challenge that “demands an inner freedom and strength of character, a strengthening of character which we can scarcely conceive.” This strength of character cannot stand alone, however. It requires “comradeship in the work of facing future danger and menace.” But Guardini doubts that this will suffice. The “not-human man” of modernity and the “not-natural nature” modernity conceives “promise to be the foundation upon which the world of the future will be erected,” a world in which man “will be free to further his lordship of creation, carrying it even to its last consequences.” But “a cultural order which does away with God cannot prevail—simply because God exists.”

    To Guardini, and not only to Guardini, the “modern faith in progress” looks increasingly wan. As the wars and tyrannies of the first half of the twentieth century demonstrated, evil is still possible. “We recognize with increasing clarity that the modern world deceived itself.” Human power has increased dramatically but increase in power does not denote human progress. “The modern world forgot the fact of ‘demons,”” having “blinded itself by its revolutionary faith in autonomy.” But, as so many modern revolutionaries and tyrants have shown, “demons may take possession of the faculties of man if he does not answer for them with his conscience,” as they “rule him through his apparently natural but really contradictory instincts, through his apparently logical but in truth easily influenced reason.” Insofar as human beings conquer nature, nature “becomes involved with, even partakes of, human freedom.” This enhances its “potential for evil as well as good.” “Could the events of the last decades have happened at the peak of a really true culture of Europe?” The question nearly answers itself. “What can guarantee man’s proper use of his power in the realm of freedom? Nothing.”

    Modern man “has not developed thoughtfully that ethic which would be effective for controlling the use of power” and indeed lacks any “proper training ground…for such an ethic, either with the elite or among the masses.” For that, modern man will need a courage beyond even what he “needs to face either atom bombs or bacteriological warfare, because it must restrain the chaos rising out of the very works of man.” Personality “can be affirmed only under the guidance of Revelation, which related man to a living, personal God, which makes him a son of Gpd. which teaches the ordering of His Providence.” Humanism can preserve “an awareness of the individual as a rounded, dignified and creative human being” but without awareness “of the real person who is the absolute ground of each man, an absolute ground superior to every psychological or cultural advantage or achievement.” Without that awareness, moral principles and relations “begin to disappear.” “The last decades”—i.e., 1900 to 1950—have “suggested what life without Christ really is. The last decades were only the beginning.”

    This is because modern ‘paganism’ differs radically from the ancient kind. It is no longer so innocent of the real nature of human beings. And it responds accordingly, as seen already in Machiavelli and his innumerable epigoni, who have increased the earthly sway of demonic powers. If so, for the remaining Christians “the Old Testament will take on a new significance” because it “reveals the Living God Who smashes the mythical bonds of the earth,” who “casts down the powers and the pagan rulers of life” while “show[ing] us the man of faith who is obedient to the acts of God according to the terms of the Covenant.” The stronger the powers of evil, the stronger the powers of freedom and faith will need to be. “Loneliness in faith will be terrible. Love will disappear from the face of the public world.” 

    In The End of the Modern World, Guardini propounds a Personalism without the socialist optimism of Mounier. [1] The Essence of Power cautiously advances some ways in which Christians might counteract the worst effects of modernity. He begins by recalling the themes of the previous book. “What determines [the] sense of existence” of modernity “is power over nature.” The modern age has ended because “we no longer believe that increase of power is necessarily the same thing as increase of value.” The question now is how to curb power, how “to integrate power into life in such a way that man can employ power without forfeiting his humanity.” This will require man “to match the greatness of his power with the strength of his humanity.” This is possible, though far from sure, because power, “the ability to move reality,” requires energy and awareness, both of which require spirit, “that reality in man which renders him capable of extricating himself from the immediate context of nature in order to direct in freedom.” “Power awaits direction,” the free choice spirit makes possible. And choice implies responsibility; “there is no such thing as power that is not answered for,” even if “the person responsible rejects responsibility.” In rejecting responsibility (as Tocqueville sees), human beings get the impression that “there is no one at all who acts, only a dumb, intangible, invisible, indefinable something which derides questioning,” a “pseudo-mystery” that replaces the divine mystery—a Satanic mystery. [2] Guardini refuses to reduce Satan to a force, to ‘the demonic.’ Satan is a person, as much as God is.

    There can be no evading the necessity of power. “Every act, every condition, indeed, even the simple fact of existing is directly or indirectly linked to the conscious exercise and enjoyment of power.” What men overlook, what Satan the deceiver wants them to overlook, is that human power derives from man’s creation in God’s image, with “a whiff of the spirit-breath of God.” It is that spirit which enables man to govern nature and himself. When modern men exercise power, however, they mask it “behind aspects of ‘utility,’ ‘welfare,’ ‘progress,’ and so forth,” thereby ruling “without developing a corresponding ethos of government.” On the contrary, “sovereignty is to be exercised with respect to the truth of things,” and the truth is that “power is not man’s right, autonomously,” but given “only as a loan, in fief.” “Man is lord by the grace of God” and he is “answerable for it to him who is Lord by essence.” This is how “sovereignty becomes obedience, service”—to neighbors (‘public service’) and to God. Man’s God-given right to rule, “in fief,” over the rest of God’s creation warrants no radical attempt at re-creating God’s work but rather his “acceptance of each thing’s being what it is—an “acceptance symbolized in the ‘name’ by which he tries to express its essential quality,” the task God assigns to Adam in Eden. That is how sovereignty can operate “as part of God’s creation,” not “to establish an independent world of man, but to complete the world of God as a free, human world in accordance with God’s will.”

    Eden saw God test Man. God authorizes Man to rule over “all natural things,” which requires that he “know them.” But to remain lord of the earth, Man must remain “an image of God” and not his rival. This is Satan’s temptation or test. Satan baits Woman with the promise of becoming like God, and Man goes in with that. “To say God knows that man can become like him by doing the act he has forbidden is to imply that God is afraid, that he feels his divinity threatened by man, that his relation to man is that of a mythical divinity,” the insecure ‘gods’ of paganism. “Satan tempts man by distorting the genuine God-man relation, placing it in a mythical twilight which falsifies it.” But of course Man’s “disobedience brings, not knowledge that makes man a god, but the deadly experience of ‘nakedness'” in shame, naturalness seen as guilt because “man’s fundamental relation to existence is destroyed.” To restore it, first the divine Law brought by Moses and the salvific work of Jesus are both necessary. 

    “No mere improvement of the condition of being,” salvation is “a new beginning”—not exactly a creation ‘from nothing’ (it “takes place within the reality of people and things”), but a renewal and redemption of the “old,” “fallen” man. While it is true that not only the ancient Greeks and Romans but “the sages of all great cultures” opposed the excesses of power with “moderation and justice,” such virtues are not salvation, as they do not “embrace existence as a whole,” existence including the personal and providential God. Indeed, as seen in the measure of classical architecture, “ancient man’s manner of interpreting nature, of reacting to it, utilizing and developing it” betokened “his rational, instinctive, and creative aspects” in just harmony with one another. But modern ‘paganism’ does more than that. Following the ‘lead’ of the Bible, man began to eschew comprehension of nature “with his senses” but to “disintegrate nature both experimentally and theoretically” in order not merely to regain some of the mastery over it that he lost when expelled from Eden but to imitate God’s power instead of following His spirit. To follow God’s spirit, however, man must become not only moderate and justice but humble. The Old Testament describes Moses as the preeminent man of anav, of humility before God, the one worthy of bringing His Commandments to the Israelites. But the ultimate Person of anav is God Himself. In Paul’s words, Christ “emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit formed of as a man”; “He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death even to the death of the cross.” His motive was not glory but agape, divine love, which animates the spirit that God breathed into Man in the first place. That is, the New Testament differs from the Old Testament because in the New Testament God humbles Himself, and by that act reveals His love for man, reveals Himself, his ‘nature,’ more completely than ever before. In Jesus, “what you see over and over again is supreme power converted into humility” because humility in love is nearer to the character of God as Person than His power is. He takes on “the lowliness of a slave,” even as He rules all of His creation, which was created to be loved.

    “It is humanly impossible to judge Revelation. All we can do is to recognize it as a fact, and accept it, and judge the world and man from its standpoint.” We can nonetheless make sense of some of the things Jesus does. He never joins “any of the ruling groups,” any of the regimes on earth, selecting His disciples from ordinary men, none of them “personally extraordinary or particularly capable.” He obeys His Father, not in weakness but in strength. His prayer at Gethsemane ends with setting His face like adamant, toward Jerusalem and crucifixion. Human beings can imitate Him, in their own much limited way, when they choose to obey “a power that knows no outer bounds, only those self-imposed from within: the bounds of the Father’s will accepted freely and so completely accepted at every moment, in every situation, deep into the heart’s initial impulse, that will’s demands are effective.” In lordship “giving itself to slavery,” the Gospels attest to a “power so perfectly controlled that it is capable of renouncing itself utterly—in a loneliness as boundless as its dominion.” Monotheism, indeed. To disobey God is to risk “losing the measure of things and lapsing into the arbitrary exercise of authority”; “to forestall this danger, Christ sets up humility, the liberator which breaks asunder the spell of power” without denying its reality, its necessity. Christ’s experience “is not simply the isolated experience and victory of one individual…but rather an attitude in which all who will may share.” For their part, the ancients countered power’s tendency to corrupt “the lofty qualities of the soul” by moderation, the maintenance of “spiritual balance.” “Little by little, modernity has lost this knowledge.”

    Guardini cautions against any Christian nostalgia for the Middle Ages, for pre-modernist Christendom, which incorporated classical with Christian virtue. No Romanticist kitsch about crusading knights in shining armor need intrude. More seriously, he acknowledges that any “direct application of the truths of Revelation to world problems also has its dark side”—religious persecution and religious warfare being two notable examples. “Christian truths are by no means self-evident,” as the Christians of Christendom sometimes supposed. One cannot only be as innocent as a dove; Jesus commends the wisdom, the prudence of the serpent, as well. The “correct interpretation” and “practical application” of Christian truths “presuppose a constant metanoia or conversion.” As for the modern world, it too suffers a sort of crisis of conscience, on its own less impressive terms, in which technique supplants what was supposed to have been the rule of reason. The techniques of the modern administrative state “tend to treat people much as the machine treats the raw materials fed into it.” “Organization does not create an ethic.” This leads Guardini to go a bit too far, claiming that the modern nations’ “political structure and methods of operation are largely interchangeable” from one country to the next. The remainder of his century would suggest otherwise, as the nations under the rule of Soviet Russia saw so clearly. Organization doesn’t create an ethic, but it does reinforce one ethic or another, and Pope John Paul II, a reader and admirer of Guardini, well understood that regime differences remained meaningful, even if bureaucracy had become common to all.

    With Guardini, John Paul II understood the danger of replacing the course of events understood as providential with the course of events understood as what Guardini calls “a mere string of empirical processes,” the danger of replacing a state that exists by the grace of God with a state that exists by “grace of the people” yet operating on them as if its control of empirical processes in accordance with psychological and sociological ‘laws’ entitled administrators to rule. “The real drives behind” bureaucratic planning “are spiritual rather than practical,” culminating as they do “in an attitude which feels it to be its right and duty to impose its own goal upon mankind” for “the realization of its earthly ‘kingdom.'” That pope and his immediate successor also understood that bureaucracy in the hands of tyrants differs from bureaucracy in the hands of individuals still answerable, still responsible, to the people they rule, if not so much as they ought to be.

    In considering actions that might begin to counteract modernity’s effects, Guardini returns to that upon which “everything depends, namely, “the personal responsibility of free men.” This may yet be recovered because “the feeling that is beginning to permeate our own age is that the world is something shaped, hence limited.” The seductive apparent—but only apparent—boundlessness of the modern project no longer quite convinces. “We have today an ever deeper realization that all existence rests on certain basic forms, and that the individual form is part of a whole, which in turn is affected by the individual.” Politically, “we are approaching a state in which the economic, social national conditions in one country have repercussions all over the world.” Regimes matter to other regimes; here, Guardini qualifies his claim that political structures have become “interchangeable,” worldwide. Machiavelli counted on the limitlessness of human ambition, but limits to ambition are tightening. “The future will depend on those who know and are ready to accept the all-decisive fact that man himself is responsible for the turn history will take and for whatever becomes of the world and of human existence,” that he has “power not only over nature, but also over his own powers,” knowing how to rule and also how to be ruled—Aristotle’s definition of politics, jettisoned by the moderns. As for the Christian element, “ultimately, one can command only from God, obey only in Him.”

    Thus, Guardini has no recourse to historical or metaphysical necessity. He is no Hegelian, investing his hopes in “the Spirit of the Age.” Nor does he appeal to nature, to a First Cause that will work its way toward the good; “the evil in nature must be resisted, and this resistance is asceticism—not, to be sure, “a new version of Sparta” but a “realistic piety” which looks not only inward but outward. “History does not run on its own; it is run. It can also be run badly,” as it has been for some time. On the classical side, this means that “the concept of rule, like so many other vitally important ones, has been spoiled.” What it should mean is “a human, ethical-spiritual attitude that is, above all, deeply conscious of how the nascent world is conditioned and how every person, each in his or her place, may help to shape it.” Morally, this means that ruling “requires prudence” and the moderation that enables men to think prudently. Not the Absolute Spirit but spirituality is needed, initially by “try[ing] to rediscover something of what is called the contemplative attitude” in a world too inclined to thoughtless activity. “Before all else, man’s depths must be reawakened” by “step[ping] aside from the general hustle and bustle.” Open your “mind and heart wide to some word of piety or wisdom or ethical honor,” whether from Scripture or Plato, from Goethe or Jeremias Gotthelf.” [3] In so doing, “we must return to the essence of being,” asking such fundamental questions as the relation of a man’s work to his life, what standards are worthy of living by, and “what do health, sickness, death really signify?” Against Machiavelli’s valorization of grasping, he praises a certain asceticism, letting go of things, an open hand. “Man is not so constructed as to be complete in himself and, in addition, capable of entering into relations with God or not as he sees fit; his very essence consists in his relation to God,” on Whom “all other realities, including the human, are founded.” “When existence fails to give Him His due, existence sickens.” 

     

     

    Notes

    1. See “Personalism,” a review of Emmanuel Mounier: Personalism (1952) on this website under “Bible Notes.”
    2. See Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America XXX
    3. Jeremias Gotthelf was the pen name of Albert Bitzius, a nineteenth-century Swiss pastor and novelist whose best-known work, The Black Spider, depicts the malign effects of dealing with the Devil—Guardini’s theme here.

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Personalism

    August 6, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Emmanuel Mounier: Personalism. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952.

     

    “A philosophy but not a system,” Personalism refuses to trap human beings into any comprehensive determinism, whether natural, historical, or religious. “The existence of free and creative persons” is “its central affirmation,” but neither is it Nietzschean. Although versions of Personalism may include agnosticism, Mounier affirms Christian Personalism. Morally and politically, Christian Personalism beckons men to “the adventure of responsible liberty.” It posits a paradox that needs resolution: that “the personal is the mode of existence proper to man” but it “has ceaselessly to be attained.” It participates in “the human struggle to humanize humanity” against those who would dehumanize it, as the scientific manipulators of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World attempt to do. Personalism comports with the Bible’s personal God, not the ‘god of the philosophers,’ whether Aristotelian or Spinozist. It is not alien to some of the philosophers, however, as Socrates’ “‘Know thyself’ is the first great personalist revolution of which we know” and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics follows in the wake of that adjuration.

    Still, “it is Christianity that, first of all, imports into these gropings a decisive notion of the person.” God “through love brings [persons] into existence,” creating the world ex nihilo and peopling it with individuals, each of whom has an “eternal destiny.” He unifies the world, makes it a cosmos, not “through the abstraction of an idea but by an infinite capacity for the individual multiplication of these separate acts of love.” This metaphysic so scandalized the world that Averroës attempted to return to generality, to abstraction, to depersonalization—to the notion of “one common soul for the whole human race.” But “the individual soul is not a crossroads where several participations in general realities meet (matter, ideas, etc.) but an indissoluble whole, in which the unity is prior to the multiplicity because it is rooted in the absolute,” by which Mounier means the God of the Bible and (emphatically) not Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. (Indeed, “Hegel remains the imposing and monstrous architect of all the imperialism of the impersonal idea,” an empire that demands that we “believe in complete subservience of the individual to the State.”)  No “abstract tyranny of a Destiny,” no Platonic or neo-Platonic “heaven of ideas,” no “Impersonal Though indifferent” to individuals and their “destinies”: the personal God “grant[s] man a freedom analogous to his own, by his readiness to be generous to the generous,” to be gracious.

    God’s grace forces no one. Rather, “the profound purpose of human existence is not to assimilate itself to the abstract generality of Nature or of the Ideas, but to change  “the heart of its heart,” to convert, to undertake a ‘turning around’ of the soul, a “personal choice” made in “the inviolable domain which no one can judge and of which nobody knows, not even the angels, but God alone,” a transformation to which “man is freely called,” given that “liberty is constitutive of his existence as a creature.” Human liberty entails the freedom to sin, as well, the freedom of a man to “refuse his destiny”; otherwise, the choice wouldn’t be real. 

    This inviolability, this “absoluteness of the person” does not isolate him from the world or from other persons. The Trinity itself, the very structure of God (as it were) suggests “an intimate dialogue between persons, and is of its very essence the negation of solitude.” Since “every human being is created in the image of God, every person is called to the formation of one immense Body, mystical and physical, in the charity of Christ.” That is the commonality underlying human individuality, the commonality that makes human beings persons, not atoms. Mystical and physical: Mounier rejects Christian neo-Platonism of the Middle Ages, which in his estimation “hampered full reaffirmation, by the Albertino-Thomist realism, of the dignity of matter and the unity of the human being” as a being created in God’s image and thereby as a person. Glimmers of Personalism, proto-personalism, may be seen in various ways in Occam, Luther, Descartes, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Rousseau in their several critiques of “scholastic decadence,” although Descartes also “bequeaths to us, in his Cogito, the germs of the idealism and metaphysical solipsism,” while Pascal and Kierkegaard succumb to a “lofty and solitary religion” that isolates them from human beings. As a result, “what one might call the Socratic revolution of the XIXth century, the fight against all those modern forces that tend to depersonalize man,” seen in Kierkegaard’ spirituality and Marx’s dialectical materialism—each a rebellion against Hegel but also a failure truly to overcome him—has led to a sharp duality between spirit and matter which Christian Personalism seeks to restore to the harmony God intends. [1]

    Not dualism but “the indissoluble union of the soul and the body is the pivot of Christian thinking.” Christianity teaches that thought, soul, the divinely granted breath of life “fuse[s] with the body in existence.” When soul and body strive wrongly, in “the direction opposed to the supernatural vocation of man,” the “destiny” of man, Christianity calls that ‘the flesh’ (not to mention the world and the Devil). The flesh causes a “downward drag” of both body and soul, but when this unity, this person, “collaborate[s]” with the power of the Holy Spirit, it reaches out to “the substantial kingdom of God,” not “some ethereal realm of spirit.” That is, the Kingdom of God will see us not only in renewed souls but in new bodies. “The Christian who speaks of the body or of matter with contempt does so against his own most central tradition,” partaking not of the Gospel but of “the Greek contempt for the material,” transmitted us “under false Christian credentials.” Man is indeed incarnate, but he was so before the Fall, not only after it. His incarnation “is an abiding occasion of perversity,” not perversity per se. (While Marxism correctly regards material poverty as “an aberration,” one that needs correction of “the development of humanity,” that correction will not end all other kinds of aberration, “even upon the natural plane.” Marxism “is a kind of secularization of the central value that the Christian tradition claims for work.”) To exist subjectively and to exist bodily “are one and the same experience,” inasmuch as “I cannot think without being and I cannot be without my body.”

    “If we are to render an account of humanity, we must grasp the living reality of man in his total activity.” Unlike other animals, man knows the cosmos and transforms it and, moreover, is capable of loving his neighbor and of loving cooperation with God, understanding both neighbor and God as persons. He can do this not only because he has a soul but because his body itself “takes me constantly outside of myself into the problems of the world and the struggles of mankind,” “pushes me out into space”; my body ages, thus “acquaint[ing] me with duration,” and, because it dies, “confront[ing] me with eternity.” “We bear the weight of [the body’s] bondage,” but we must never ignore that “it is also the basis of all consciousness and of all spiritual life, the omnipresent mediator of the life of the spirit.” This constrained liberty, this liberty limited by an incomplete bondage, perfects itself in struggle. “The right road for man is in this tragic optimism, where he finds his true destiny in a goal of greatness through unending struggle,” with no ‘end of history’ to be delivered by impersonal forces of nature or of history.

    Mounier carefully distinguishes personalism from individualism, “the ideology and the prevailing structure of Western bourgeois society in the 18th and 19th centuries,” which conceives of “Man in the abstract, unattached to any natural community, the sovereign lord of a liberty unlimited and undirected; turning towards others with a primary mistrust, calculation and self-vindication; institutions restricted to the assurance that these egoisms should not encroach upon one another, or to their betterment as a purely profitmaking association.” So defined, individualism “is the very antithesis of personalism, and its dearest enemy” because it denies that “the fundamental nature of the person is not originality nor self-knowledge nor individual affirmation.” Personalism affirms not “separation but communication” whereby the individual “make[s] himself available…and thereby more transparent both to himself and to others,” more gracious. Far from limiting the person, as ‘individualists’ suppose, other persons enable each person “to be and to grow.” Borrowing Martin Buber’s language, Mounier affirms that “the thou, which implies the we, is prior to the I—or at least accompanies it.” Failure of communication diminishes me. To avoid such failure, including the corruption of communication seen in lying, sophistry, and rhetorical domination, one must stand ready to go outside of oneself; to see others from their point of view; to share in their destinies, joys, and sorrows, to be liberal in the original sense of the word, generous (“an economics of donation, not of compensation nor of calculation”); and to be faithful in “devotion to the person” in “love and friendship.” “Love is the surest certainty that man knows; the one irrefutable, existential cogito (I love, therefore I am); therefore being is, and life has value (is worth the pain of living).” What “shakes me out of my self-assurance, my habits, my egocentric torpor” is what “most surely reveals me to myself.”

    That is, love as agape dislocates as it rewards. Communication is difficult. Misunderstandings happen. Even when they don’t, “there is something in us that deeply opposes every movement toward reciprocity, the kind of fundamental ill-will that we have already mentioned.” Other persons aren’t easy to understand, given the “irreducible opacity about our very manner of existing.” Forming a community—whether a family, a nation, or a religious community—tempts us into “a new egocentricity of its own,” a collective selfishness and shutting-out. While the person “cannot be duplicated or repeated,” he also cannot fully realize his personhood without “the world of persons,” and that goes for communities, too. This means that “there must be some common factor,” some “abiding human nature,” a point that “contemporary thought” inclines to reject in favor of existentialism, historicism, conventionalism, or some other such claim. Contemporary thought “rejects the conception of ‘human nature’ as a prejudice that would limit” the possibilities of human achievement, typically claim that “every man is nothing but what he makes himself.” But personalism, whether Christian or agnostic, affirms “the unity of mankind, both in space and time.” It opposes “the totalitarians’ denigration of political adversaries” because “any man, however different, or even degraded, remains a man.” “This sense of humanity as one and indivisible is strictly implicit in the modern notion of equality,” although many egalitarians don’t recognize that. 

    That includes egalitarian ‘idealists,’ who would abolish property. “Man must on no account play at being pure spirit,” however. He needs property, “a certain range of objects, with which [he] can form relations of intimacy somewhat like those that it seeks with other persons, relations of frequency and of long duration.” ‘To be’ and ‘to have’ are not mutually exclusive but “opposites between which our embodied existence is held in tension.” Embodied existence makes it impossible “to be without having”; it also requires a man “to give up [his] isolation, to ‘bear with’ something. The tension comes when he refuses to act generously with what he has, but to do so he must have things in the first place. “Moral idealism is not uncommonly the quest for an existence freed at last from any burden whatever: an aspiration opposed to nature which can end only in ruin, or in anti-humanity.” Rather, “concentrating in order to find oneself; then going forth to enrich and to find oneself again concentrating oneself anew through dispossession; such is the systole and the diastole of the personal life, an everlasting quest for a unity foretold and longed for but never realized.” And while “mystics of personality” forget that their persons are embodied “in the world,” “politicians of the person” incline to think of themselves beings in need of defensive walls against all others. Neither can be a hero, who risks himself in battle, or “a lover giving himself for love,” or a saint “inspired by love for his God.” They are too focused on their own interiority for any of that. 

    A true person must ready himself for struggle. “To be a presence in the world is not easy! I am lost if I flee from it, I am also lost if I give myself up to it,” failing sometimes “to say no, to protest, to break away.” “Experience demonstrates that there is no value that is not born of conflict or established without struggle, from the political order to social justice, from sexual love to human unity, or, for Christians, to the Kingdom of God.” Mounier’s person strikes a balance, recognizing that “the machines, the masses, the ruling powers, administration, the universe itself and its forces present themselves to him increasingly as a general menace,” inviting him to succumb to “a kind of social paranoia,” while also recognizing that “love is a struggle,” life ” struggle against death,” spiritual life “a struggle against the inertia of matter and the sloth of the body”—a call for engagement in that very modern world. Christians call for the virtue of fortitude, whose “great aim” is to “overcome the fear of bodily evil,” the “fear of being hit,” still another manifestation of individualism or perhaps merely selfishness equally opposed to liberality and magnanimity. “In modern conditions of comfort and of indulgent care for the feelings, we have long cultivated, under the cover of philosophies of love and of peace, the most monstrous misunderstandings of these elementary truths,” which incline to deny not the wrong use of force but the use of any force at all. On the contrary, “rights themselves are an always precarious effort to rationalize force and incline it towards the rule of love.” Immoral violence must be confronted by violence, Mounier writes, a few years after the Second World War, an event which brought that point to one’s attention. “To try to eradicate aggressiveness altogether from education, or too early to swamp the virile energies of youth in idealistic hopes—this is less likely to realize any ideal than to spoil the fighters for it.” Education entails cultivation, and “to cultivate means to sacrifice”—to weed out, to prune. “Every organization, every technique, every doctrine which tends to deny or diminish this fundamental vocation of the person to exercise responsible choice, whatever advantages it may offer, is a poison more dangerous than despair”; “the most solemn declarations of Rights are speedily transgressed in a state that contains too few men of indomitable character to confirm them, or social structures too weak to guarantee their realization.”

    This emphasis on the wholeness of human life, the integration of all its elements into the person, precludes any strict dualism. “As soon as one isolates freedom from the whole structure of the person, it tends toward some aberration.” And while it is true that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, “the indeterminism of modern physics,” refutes materialist determinism, “it does no more” than that. “If freedom were merely an irregularity in the working of the universe, who could prove that it was not reducible to a defect in our perception, or even to some systematic distortion in nature or in man?” Human freedom “is the freedom of a person, moreover of this person,” a naturally constituted and therefore limit being, “situated in the world and in the presence of definite values.” “To be free is, in the first place, to accept this position and base oneself upon it,” exercising choice and accepting the sacrifices choice requires, given our ‘givens’ of body, space, time. “He who is blind to his servitude is the only real slave, even if he is a happy one.” By “values” Mounier means not the arbitrary and/or conventional claims people make when they say that they, or ‘society,’ ‘places a value’ on some thing or some act. Real liberty means “liberation to choose the good,” to be a “responsible man.” Freedom is “the mode and manner in which the person is everything that it is”—its fully developed nature. In this, Christian personalism shows its affinities to Christian Aristotelianism.

    And this is a Christian Aristotelianism. It is not mere vitalism, inasmuch as “the life-force never prompts us to anything other than itself,” tempting us to refuse “to accept suffering and death” because animated by “the passion for life at any price.” Not so: as the Personalist Gabriel Marcel writes, “I am more than my life,” more than my biological existence. That is the Christlike stance, but also the stance of the self-described ‘anti-Christ,’ Friedrich Nietzsche. The difference is that, like Christ, and unlike Nietzsche with his amor fati, Personalists “cannot willingly surrender the person to anything impersonal,” instead “deduc[ing] all values from the unique appeal of the one supreme Person.” To those who demand proof “of the transcendent,” Mounier replies, simply that “the transcendent, being inherent in the universe of freedom, is not susceptible of proof,” which requires firm predictability; its only verification “is manifested in the fullness of the personal life.” A person isn’t “tied to a given position like a horse hobbled to a post” but one who can “survey the universe from the angle of his own position, and indefinitely to lengthen to the bonds by which he is attached to it.” The “values” or principles by which he governs his conduct are independent of “the peculiarities of a given subject”—not ‘subjective’ in the sense moral subjectivists propound—but “they are subjective in the sense that they exist only in relation to subjects, that they have to be reborn through persons, yet without being bound to any one of them, mediating between all, drawing them out of their isolation and relating them to the universal”—ultimately, the supreme Person. It is true that “God remains silent; all that is of value in the world is steeped in silence.” What is ruinous is steeped in noise and distraction: “the modern techniques of degradation—financial trickery, bourgeois complaisance and political intimidation”—all “more deadly than weapons of war.” [2]

    The Personalist theory of knowledge is rational without being rationalist, not an attempt to find a purely objective truth reducible to logical syllogisms. Spinoza, Adam Smith, and other modern philosophers aspire to a universality that “is not that of a world of persons,” either by attempting to “eliminate the spectator,” the one looking at the world, “in order to uphold the preeminence of the idea” or by positing “an ‘objective’ spectator, one who explains all things, understands all things, and admits everything.” Mounier calls this “the internal weakness in liberalism,” one that Nietzsche saw; “the knowing spirit is not a neutral mirror” but one “linked with a body and a history, called to a destiny, and involved in the situation by all its actions, including its acts of knowledge.”. But this is not to concur with Nietzsche’s attack on objectivity itself and his consequent valorization of the will-to-power. Science has its place, so long as one understands what it can and cannot do. “There is no valid reflection which does not give full weight to scientific knowledge,” but science cannot tell us anything about God, except the impersonal ‘god of the philosophers.’ A person who seeks truth must do what Plato’s Socrates (no mean logician) demands in his allegory of the cave: a conversion, a turning-around of the soul. To link oneself to transcendence and to communication with others requires “the recognition of objectivity,” the fact that there are other persons ‘out there,’ along with the impersonal objects of nature and art. Engagement is no solipsism. “A complete logic needs to formulated upon this basis”; Mounier refers his readers to his Treatise on Character for the beginnings of such a logic. Such a conversion is as necessary in morality as in epistemology. “The moral ‘cogito’ develops through suffering,” through engagement not only with one’s own faults but with other faulty persons. 

    More generally, the whole field of action or engagement “presupposes freedom.” Action has four “dimensions”: poesis or making, behavior, “contemplative action,” and “collective action.” Making aims at “dominat[ing] and organiz[ing] external matter.” It requires ‘economy,’ that is, industriousness and efficiency. “But man has no satisfaction in fabrication and organization unless he finds in them his own dignity, the fraternity of his fellow-workers, and some fulfilment above that of utility.” That is, economy requires “the guidance of politics, which relates” its problems “to ethics.” “It is at the level of politics that an economy becomes personalized and its personnel institutionalized.” Behavior or ethical action thus requires a politics that treats human persons as persons, not as instruments. (In this, Mounier taps into not only Existentialist ‘authenticity’ but Kant’s refusal to treat human beings as means to an end rather than as ends in themselves, although as a Christian he insists that treating human beings only as ends in themselves is an attempt to bypass God.) “Contemplative action” means an action not of the mind alone but of the whole person, the Socratic and Christian conversion just mentioned, aiming at “perfection and universality, but by way of finite works and particular actions.” Far from denigrating theory in the attempt to exalt praxis, Mounier observes that “the highest mathematical speculations, the least directly useful…have found the most fruitful applications, and at the same time the most unforeseen.” The same is true of “the two centuries of theological controversy which established the full significance of the Incarnation of Christ,” speculations that “also founded the only fully activist and industrial civilizations.” Further, contemplation may more directly disrupt “existing practice” by action “of the type that we call prophetic,” by “affirm[ing] the absolute in all its trenchancy, by speech, writing or behavior, when its meaning has been blunted by compromises.” Finally, collective action affirming “the community of labor, a common destiny or spiritual community” must never “confuse engagement with regimentation,” as seen in fascism and communism, with their “systems and dogmatisms.” In all of its dimensions, action as personal engagement meets the scorn of fanatics, who despise its hesitation to act without thinking and of politicians who “reproach it as intractable because it never forgets claims that are absolute.” “But courage lies in acceptance of these inconvenient conditions.” 

    Mounier criticizes modern education as “the worst possible preparation” for a culture of Personalism. “The universities distribute formal knowledge which predisposes men to ideological dogmatism or, by reaction, to sterile irony” and “spiritual educators” often “base moral edification upon scrupulousness and moral casuistry instead of the cultivation of decision,” of responsible choice in the real world. “The whole climate of education needs to be changed if we no longer want to see, on the plane of action, intellectuals who set an example of blindness and men of conscience who inculcate cowardice.”

    “European nihilism,” impelled by the critiques of modern rationalism as seen in the way of life of “the bourgeois world” delivered by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, all deniers of Hegel’s claim to have constructed a philosophic system that marks the end of history because it marks “the end of philosophy,” of philosophizing, of the love of wisdom, the ever-renewed reasoned quest for the truth, “is spreading and organizing its forces in every field left vacant by the retreat of those substantial beliefs which kept our fathers in heart—the Christian faith, the culture of science, of reason and of duty.” Mounier identifies “the great question of the twentieth century” as whether the century “can avoid that dictation by the technocrats, either from the right or the left, which loses sight of man in the organizing of his activities.” Mounier knows what he doesn’t want: “the proletarian condition,” the “anarchic economy of property,” “state monopoly,” and paternalism. He wants “the priority of labor over capital,” abolition of “class distinctions founded upon the division of labor or of wealth,” and “an economy directed to the fulfilment of the totality of personal needs.” He is less sure of how to achieve these ends. Precisely as a Personalist, he must leave such things open to choices made in the future.

    He does offer some preliminary reflections. “Politics is not an end in itself, overruling all other aims,” since “the State is meant for man, not man for the State.” Nevertheless, “if politics is not everything, it enters into everything.” Anarchists are mistaken to think that “power wielded by man over man” cannot be reconciled with “the interpersonal relation,” and this is the core of Mounier’s complaint about liberalism, as well; it is too antipolitical. “Anarchism and liberalism forget that since man’s personality is deeply rooted in the natural world it is impossible to exercise power over things without exercising some constraint over man.” But fascism and other forms of absolutism (he pointedly overlooks communism) ham-handedly reject “authority,” by which he means “the final destiny of the person, which power ought to respect and promote.” To do that, power must be used to protect the person “against abuses of power” with a constitution that limits the powers of the State including its police powers, institutes federalism, permits citizens to appeal decisions of the State, establishes an independence of the judiciary, and asserts the right of habeas corpus. Calls for “democracy” must define that term. Mounier defines it as “a form of government erected upon the spontaneity of the masses in order to ensure their participation as subjects in the objective structure of powers”—Aristotle calls that “ruling and being ruled in turn”—a form that prevents “the ‘mob-rule’ at one extreme”—the excesses of the French Revolution seldom drift far from the minds of French political writers—or “the irremovable one-party State at the other”—both “but different forms of irresponsible tyranny.” The “spontaneity of the masses” can be registered through representative government, itself informed by “political education,” typically undertaken by the political parties. With the parliamentary regime of the Fourth Republic now established, Mounier is predictably dissatisfied with the current parties. “Political democracy needs to be wholly reorganized in relation to an effectual economic democracy adapted to the contemporary systems of production.” And although “the Marxist criticism of formal democracy is on the whole unanswerable,” as a Christian Mounier also tacitly rejects real, existing Communism, with its “divinized” Leader and Party. In modern life, “all the regulative ideals that are set forth in the ‘phenomenology’ of religion come back again in novel cults and in generally debased forms, decidedly retrograde in comparison with those of Christianity, precisely because the personal universe and its requirements are eliminated.” 

    Mounier hopes that someday “there will no longer be any need to direct attention” to the personal character of human beings and of God, a time when this “will have become the common and accepted knowledge of the situation of mankind.” The Christianity of the Bible prophesies that this will only occur with divine intervention at the end of days. Mounier’s ‘Left’ Catholicism inclines to forget that, although it nobly offers resources with which Christians might endure the interim.

     

    Note

    1. Leo Strauss regards this dualism as inherent in modern philosophy itself, seen first in Machiavelli’s invitation to the prince to master Fortuna, and in Bacon’s analogous invitation to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate.
    2. It is noteworthy that Mounier’s journal, Esprit, became the voice of an anti-American, ‘Left’ Catholicism after World War II. That is, he clearly regarded liberalism as a more insidious threat to France and to humanity generally than Marxism, although that did not commit himself to adherence regimes of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat.’ See Seth D. Armus: “The Eternal Enemy: Emmanuel Mounier’s Esprit and Franch Anti-Americanism.” (French Historical Studies, Volume 24, Number 2, Spring 2001, pp.271-304.)

     

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