David E. Sanger: New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West. New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2024.
His troops massed along the Ukrainian border, Russian president Vladimir Putin flew to Beijing, where he met with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping, showing “the world that he and his fellow autocrat could combine their power and influence” for “one common purpose: to stand up to the United States, frustrate its ambitions, and speed along what they viewed as its inevitable decline.” Against political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s claim, made in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, that “western liberal democracy” stood “as the final form of human government,” abetted by worldwide commerce and Internet conversation, the allied despots essayed to prove that monarchy, abetted by disciplined state elites and supported by populations unified by nationalist fervor and fear of the regime, would overbear the democratic republics by using commerce as a weapon and controlling computer linkages within their territories, while building up their military power and testing the nerve of complacent republican politicians, who had shown themselves incapable of guarding their countries’ borders even against peaceful (if often illegal) immigrants.
New York Times journalist David E. Sanger regards this as “a more complex and dangerous era than we have faced in nearly a century,” with two major powers aligned against the United States and its allies, with dangerous regional threats from Iran and North Korea, and with the ever-present undercurrent of Islamist terrorism. “We all have a lot to lose.”
Although the 2002 meeting between Vladimir Putin and U.S. president George Bush fostered “the storyline…that the Cold War was over, never to return,” that Russia would join the World Trade Organization and possibly the European Union (with NATO membership to follow?), the fundamental problem was that the Cold War hadn’t ended the same way as World War II: Germany, Japan, and Italy had had their regimes changed from tyrannies to republics, but Russia was no republic and the Communist Chinese regime went through it all untouched. True, Putin could join the Americans in a campaign against terrorism, but “it soon became clear that everyone had a different definition of who was a terrorist and what to do about them”—an unsurprising point to anyone who understands that different and indeed fundamentally opposed regimes are likely to define things differently. “It was Putin’s bet that if he joined with the Americans’ antiterrorism efforts, the West would look the other way on some of Russia’s human rights issues.” In this, he had the support of the new generation of Russian intelligence operatives and military officers, who despised their elders for having ‘lost’ the Cold War. Putin shared this sentiment: “By allowing the Soviet republics to flourish, each with its own distinctive culture, he argued, [the Soviet rulers] sowed the seeds of splitting away from Moscow.” Marxism-Leninism had been too optimistically internationalist. And so, Putin “didn’t keep a bust of Lenin in his office; he kept one of Peter the Great,” Russia’s modernizing czar. The extension of NATO to the Central and East European countries liberated by the disintegration of Soviet power proved a unifying threat to Putin’s Russians—a threat that would have been no threat at all, had the Russian elites intended to move toward a republican regime. They didn’t. As President Bush ruefully confided to his aides and allied foreign heads of state, “I think Putin is not a democrat anymore,” still nursing the assumption that he ever was one.
When it came to cultural independence, Ukraine irked Putin more than any other neighbor. “Ukraine is not even a state!” he is said to have said, and has obviously proven that he believes, by his actions. He had already launched cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, successfully invaded Georgia in 2008, paying “almost no price” for these adventures. Indeed, the subsequent Obama Administration embarrassingly proposed a “reset” of relations with Putin’s Russia, only to be rewarded by the conquest of Crimea in 2013. President Obama sighed “that Russia would always care more about the Ukrainians than Americans would,” and that, in his words, “this is not another Cold War” since “unlike the Soviet Union, Russia leads no bloc of nations, no global ideology”—a point that proves not that it wasn’t another Cold War but that it wasn’t the same kind of cold war. “The United States failed to update its own perception about who Putin was and where he was headed.” Throughout, “the United States was consistently underreacting to Putin’s escalating gambits,” thanks to progressivist-historicist assumptions shared by Republican and Democratic administrations alike. Bush’s former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice put it most exquisitely, telling Sanger, “Fighting for territory, thinking in ethnic terms, using resources to wage war. I thought we had moved beyond that. This wasn’t supposed to happen. We thought the linearity of human progress should have left all of this behind.” But “should” isn’t “would.” And when it comes to geopolitics, regimes count more than “human progress.” On into the Obama Administration, “the United States failed to update its own perception about who Putin was and where he was headed.” Even Obama’s last year in office, the administration was divided on that point, with Secretary of State John Kerry assuring himself that Russia was no more than “a declining competitor” and the Pentagon regarding it an “increasingly potent threat,” citing Putin’s own statements, the modernization of his country’s nuclear arsenal, along with the invasion of Crimea. As for the Trump Administration, the president persisted in ignoring the evidence, preferring to worry about Islamist terrorism. His second National Security Director, H.R. McMaster, did his best to alert him to the danger and was out of office in a year. Trump apparently accepted Russian claims that Ukraine was rightfully an integral part of Russia, suspecting its government of having interfered in the 2016 election on Biden’s side.
In these years, Chinese rulers were touting the ‘peaceful rise’ of their country. A straightforward analysis of the Chinese regime would have shown that the rise of China, peaceful or otherwise, portended badly for the rest of the world, but the same ‘progressive’ or ‘evolutionary’ hopes prevailed. In 1997, President Clinton’s Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin negotiated a trade agreement with Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, who seemed to want to move toward a free market in his country. “The belief underpinning these visits—and virtually every element of American policy toward China—was that it would be economic and diplomatic malpractice not to entice the country toward the West,” since (it was hoped) “increased exposure to Western norms and legal systems would seep into Chinese society,” thereby “embolden[ing] China’s population to seek more capitalist reforms and, ultimately, political reforms,” setting “China on a slow train to freer expression and some form of democracy.” Meanwhile, “the more deeply that China and the West became intertwined, the less chance there would be for conflict because both sides would have too much to lose.” That two-way street proved to carry heavier traffic in one direction than in the other. But those governing the great commercial republic “assumed China’s economic interests would overwhelm its other national objective,” seeing every bit of counterevidence as “a brief deviation from Beijing’s inevitable destiny, “ignor[ing] what was occurring in plain sight.” The Communists’ crackdown on Hong Kong, that hub of capitalism, their claims of “exclusive rights to vast parts of the South China Sea” with a naval buildup to match, their bullying of foreign investors, their technology thefts, eventually disabused many if not all Americans of their illusions, a quarter of a century or so later.
Xi Jinping became CCP General Secretary in 2012. Although he made his intentions plain to the Party cadres, those speeches were not widely known in the West for decades. [1] His “agenda remained a mystery” to U.S. intelligence agencies; it was still “easy to make the mistake of presuming that because Xi seemed fascinated by America, he was gradually becoming Americanized.” But fascination is not admiration. “What increasingly attracted the attention of the CIA, the NSA, and the FBI…was what Chinese operatives were doing in the United States,” such as offering “remarkably cheap bids to build the 3G and 4G networks of rural telecom carriers located around the country’s nuclear missile silos.” Hmmm. And then there was the theft of digital security files of 22 million U.S. government employees and their families, “Part of a broader [!] campaign by China to understand every detail and vulnerability of the American elite.” No worries, Xi told President Obama, he would cooperate in “hunting down cyber threats” and would never militarize those islands in the South China Sea.
This is not to say that regime change did not come to China. It just wasn’t the regime change anticipated by the dupes. Mao’s tyranny had been replaced by a Party oligarchy, as had occurred in post-Stalinist Russia, decades earlier. But Xi set about “concentrat[ing] power in the hands of one leader,” himself. Viewed with maximum benevolence, or perhaps naivete, it may have been that the oligarchs had become “convinced that the only way for the country to survive in a world of chaos and upheaval [was] to centralize power again, even at the cost of the openings that made China rich.” Rush Doshi, President Biden’s director for the China-Taiwan division of the National Security Council, rather suspected that this was part of “a grand strategy to displace American order, first at the regional and now at the global level.” This suspicion had been shared by Trump’s third National Security Director, John Bolton, but the president, thinking like the businessman he was, preoccupied himself with trade negotiations, gave no serious thought to China’s military and political ambitions. This is not to say that commercial relations between the United States and China were not a major element in America’s dilemma: “Americans might tell pollsters that they viewed Beijing as their country’s number one threat, but they weren’t going to give up their shopping habits,” which largely consisted of purchasing Chinese-made products at Walmart.
It fell to Democratic foreign policy advisers Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan, their expectations of positions in a Hillary Clinton administration resoundingly denied, to use their unexpected idle time to write an article in Foreign Affairs outlining the several “camps” among “the Washington establishment” regarding China. Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Sandy Berger and for most of his career, Joe Biden advocated “engagement” with the Communists, still expecting that the Communists might reform themselves; Cambell himself had advocated an “allies first” policy, whereby the United States would strengthen its relations with “allies surrounding China” such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam; the hardline skeptics of Communist intentions advocated preparation for possible armed conflict; others (taking a position that Washington establishmentarians typically call ‘nuanced’) advocated a piecemeal approach, dealing with each regional issue as it arises, sometimes working with China, sometimes against; finally, the ever-sanguine ‘globalists’ advocated working with China on such international matters as climate change and pandemic protection. The article’s authors admitted that some of these policies could be mixed and matched.
Meanwhile, the Central Intelligence Agency was “grappl[ing] with the paradoxes of Xi himself,” a man who had placed “the security of the state…ahead of economic growth,” invoking some of the phrases of no less Marxist-Leninist a tyrant as Mao Zedong. But, but, the analysts supposed, “China’s new contest with the West wasn’t about ideology; it was chiefly a technological battle for supremacy and for global influence that comes with spreading Chinese telecommunications networks and aid around the world.” At the time, Xi’s speeches were not available in the West, speeches in which he insisted repeatedly that he was indeed a Marxist and the Communist Party, animated by “Marxism with Chinese characteristics,” must remain the sole ruler of China, with Xi as Party Chairman. To anyone familiar with Marxism in theory or with Communist practice, there is no contradiction whatever between Marxist “ideology” and the ambition to win technological supremacy over ‘capitalism’ and to spread “influence” “around the world.” Indeed, Marxist historicism fuses theory and practice, making any such rigid distinction misleading in attempting to analyze Communist policies. There was no “paradox.”
As for poor Biden, his warnings to Putin, consisting of a list of “red lines” that he must not cross, with no stated penalties for crossing them, was no more effective than his policy in Afghanistan, which culminated in the Taliban’s return to power, for which “the White House was quick to blame everyone but itself.” Sanger regards the American military withdrawal as strategically correct but botched in the execution, something of a reprise of the fall of Saigon in 1975. This “reminded the world that superpowers have limits,” although evidently China hasn’t gotten the message, and it’s not clear that Russia is on board, yet, either. “The mullahs in Tehran, the Chinese generals fulfilling Xi’s orders to prepare for a conflict in Taiwan, and Putin’s apparatchiks, all had good reason to believe that Biden and the United States, with its famously short attention span had no stomach for the kind of international entanglements that had dominated the American Century,” now more than twenty years in the past. As an example, Sanger recalls China’s successful test of a hypersonic missile, a technology Americans had yet to master, along with its nuclear missile buildup and he development of a robotic satellite arm that could disable U.S. satellites. All of this threatened to neutralize American antimissile defenses. “It was complicated enough during the Cold War era to defend against one major nuclear power”; “for the first time in its history,” American strategists “would have to think about defending in the future against two major nuclear powers with arsenals roughly the size of Wahington’s—and be prepared for the possibility that they might decide to work together.”
Putin took the opportunity to invade Ukraine, alleging not only that it was rightly an appendage of Russia but that it was currently ruled by “Nazis.” Of course, as he tenderly put it, “what Ukraine will be—it is up to its citizens to decide,” although it must be remarked that the decision would be made under duress. In this case, “nothing the Biden administration did…would keep Putin from invading Ukraine,” especially given Europeans’ absurd confidence that he would never do such a thing. In February 2022, Putin undertook the aforementioned trip to Beijing, after which he and his fellow despot issued a statement announcing that “friendship between the two States has no limits,” although their “bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.” Given Putin’s claim that Ukraine has no real status as a sovereign country, this didn’t contradict his intention to invade.
As we now know, this turned out to be a “short invasion, long war.” The Ukrainians didn’t think of themselves as Russians, after all. By March, Putin admitted, “this will probably be much more difficult than we thought.” On the other hand, “the war is on their territory, not ours,” and “we are a big country, and we have patience.” They would need it, since they “failed at what they thought they were best at, what the U.S. military calls ‘combined arms operations,’ the ability to integrate land, sea, and air power together in precisely coordinated battlefield operations.” One retired Russian general observed, “there is no doubt that Russia will be added to the category of countries that pose a threat to peace and international security, subjected to the most severe sanctions, transformed into a pariah in the eyes of the international community and probably lose the status of an independent state.” But although the first two predictions have proved accurate, the third is only partly true (Russia is no pariah in the eyes of China, and that’s important), while the last seems highly unlikely—unless the general meant that Russia might eventually become a satellite of China. Moreover, as one American major-general put it, the original battle plan “was the worst plan on earth,” spreading Russian forces “too thin” and neglecting to set up adequate supply lines for the troops, since they expected a blitzkrieg-like victory reminiscent of the Germans in France in 1940. And “furious, united Ukraine” had a regime advantage; as a republic, its military had instituted a “flexible hierarchy, one that empowered lower-level officers to make decisions in real time.”
For its part, the United States provided a range of weaponry to Ukraine, while worrying about what weapons to send and how the Ukrainians might use them. Would the Ukrainians launch a major barrage against targets within Russia? Would that lead to a third world war? Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky did in fact request a missile that could hit targets deep within Russian territory. “Putin was out to kill [Zelensky] and eradicate his country” in “a war [Ukraine] would never win if Putin could fire on Ukraine from Russian territory” with impunity; “Biden’s preoccupation was avoiding escalation.” Putin took full advantage of these worries, threatening to use short-range nuclear weapons against Ukraine if faced with what he defined as “an existential threat for our country”—leaving the parameters of his existentialism conveniently undefined. “Anyone who hoped the age of nuclear gamesmanship had ended with the collapse of the Berlin Wall discovered that the holiday from history was over.” For a brief time, when Ukrainian counterattacks pushed Russian forces out of Kharkiv and Kherson, “Washington was swept by a haunting fear, that the Ukrainians were so successful…that Putin would conclude he had only one real option left to avoid the humiliation,” to make good on his nuclear-war threat. Instead, he issued a military call-up of 300,000 “more men to throw into the fight.” The Ukrainians, who had argued that “Putin would threaten repeatedly but never press the button” on nuclear weapons use, could at most intimidate Ukraine’s allies—bad enough, in Zelensky’s eyes.
As to the Chinese, “understanding Biden’s preoccupation with Ukraine,” might it not “conclude that the moment had come” to attack Taiwan? In light of China’s June 2022 declaration of “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction” over the Taiwan Strait, denying its status as an international waterway, that possibility had become more likely. Biden countered by distinguishing Taiwan from Ukraine. Taiwan, he noted, is an island democracy whose partnership with the United States stretches back decades that is also host to the most critical network of semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the world. “If Taiwan ceased to exist—or smoldered under Chinese artillery barrages—the digital economy would crack apart.” While geopolitically important, Ukraine isn’t as important. Accordingly, America would not intervene with troops in Ukraine, but Taiwan was another matter. Yes, trade (including trade in semiconductors) had increased between Taiwan and Communist China, trade relations scarcely translate into peace, as Germany and France had proved, repeatedly, in the years 1870-1940. Just before a scheduled visit to Taiwan from House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the CCP navy “shot eleven ballistic missiles into the sea around Taiwan,” perhaps to indicate that Speakership is less impressive than Actionship. “By circling the island, they were saying that this was all Chinese waters.” Taiwan is economically and geopolitically important not only because it sits along a major sea lane but because it is the leading manufacturer of microchips, “the technology America let get away” because U.S. technology companies have “gradually moved production overseas without much thought about the national security implications of becoming so dependent on the supply of chips from a single vulnerable island off the coast of China.” That is, corporate executives thought exclusively in terms of free international market markets and not in terms of political regimes that can make them unfree for military, political, and (national) economic advantage, “a strategy reinforced by the reassuring myth that in a globalized world, it didn’t really make any difference where you produced the semiconductors that fuel the information age”. Corporate executives are sophisticates when it comes to economics and luxury items, but often naifs when it comes to geopolitics. “America’s dependence on a complex, easily severed supply chain for [micro]chips became even more acute than our dependence on the Persian Gulf for oil” had been before the discovery of substantial reserves of natural gas in North America.
The Biden Administration understood that “the technology race for advanced chips and the arms race with China had essentially merged,” with surveillance satellites, killer satellites, hypersonic missiles, military drones, and quantum computers now expanding battlespace into outer space and cyber space, the latter including both the gathering of information and the dissemination of ‘disinformation.’ “The Chinese were relying on American innovation—and the openness of the Western system—to build the tools intended to defeat its creators,” eyeing Taiwan while ramping up its own technological infrastructure. The complexity of the matter made the emergency difficult to convey. This wasn’t only a problem of domestic politics but of international politics. “While both capitals insisted that they were not requiring countries to pick a side, it increasingly appeared that is exactly what they were seeking”—inevitably, given the regime conflict and its geopolitical scope. “Dozens of small, seemingly technical decisions” had large, indeed worldwide implications. There are now “three interlocking arms races,” the race for nuclear weapons, the race for dominance in outer space, and the race for dominance in cyberspace, including artificial intelligence—all depending, “at their core, on who can produce the most potent next-generation chips.” “Which countries would join the ban on selling the most advanced chips to China?” Which would purchase Chinese technology, including technology with spyware built into it? Which would line up on Taiwan’s side if Communist China attacked? Most statesmen would prefer not to choose, even as American statesman preferred not to choose sides in European wars in the first century and a quarter of U.S. foreign policy. But the new, worldwide character of international relations and the new ‘totalitarian’ regimes animated by the new historicist ideologies have made that stance largely untenable, whatever one’s wishes may be.
In the more purely economic realm, Beijing practiced “a tactic known as ‘debt-trap diplomacy.” The CCP’s much-touted Belt and Road initiative, consisting of international transportation and other development projects linking China with numerous countries across Asia and into Europe, plunged countries into debt to Beijing; the price of repaying the debt, unpayable fiscally, was Chinese ownership of that infrastructure, thereby increasing Chinese influence over governments and populations. If a government moved to cancel a Belt and Road project, as Malysia did in 2018, the CCP was happy to launch cyberattacks upon it until it backed down, as Malaysia did. American apologists for China claimed that “China was going through the same learning curve that the United States had gone through in the twentieth century—in which some of its aid initiatives were successful and some sparked debt crises.” But of course the American regime differed from the Chinese regime. A closer analogy would be America’s turn-of-the-twentieth-century ‘Dollar Diplomacy,’ whereby the American Navy could be sent to protect American business assets threatened by foreign governments. However, the abandonment of ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ wasn’t a matter of moving along a learning curve; it was a matter of returning to principles already learned and taught by the American Founders. Chinese policies are entirely consistent with the principles of Marxism with Chinese characteristics, and so any learning curve will be entirely a matter of refining tactics, not of changing fundamental strategy.
As the war in Ukraine continued, NATO pulled together and, in the case of Finland, expanded to the Russian border—precisely Mr. Putin’s stated worry about Ukraine, although in fact Russian conquest of Ukraine would mean an advance toward, not a buffer against NATO. This notwithstanding, as Finnish president Sauli Niinistö remarked to Sanger, while there may be two billion citizens of commercial republics worldwide, there are about eight billion subjects of tyrannies and oligarchies. To counter this imbalance, the West can only appeal to ‘quality’ instead of ‘quantity,’ to technological advances in military and intelligence-gathering capacity and to some extent a more reliable alliance structure, given the distrust despots so rightly entertain regarding one another’s motives. Still, although both sides play divide-and-conquer, neither has divided or conquered its enemies and the much-predicted political demise of Putin and, lately, of Xi have not materialized. (Nor would the ruin of their political fortunes necessarily alter their states’ foreign policies for the better.)
Sanger summarizes: state sovereignty now has taken the lead against globalist complacency, very much including the assurance of secure international supply routes; republican regimes are on the defensive against “strongmen”; the China-Russia alliance is “stronger than at any point since the Korean War”; nuclear sabers are rattling, mass terror well publicized. The new ‘multilateral’ world, rather like the pre-World War I world but with weapons of mass destruction, “may indeed prove a near-permanent condition for the next several decades.” “The addition of new players, acting sometimes independently and sometimes in tandem, makes the current era far more complex to manage than the old one.” And much more simply, “America has never faced a competitor like China before.” This is the challenge faced by the Trump Administration most immediately and by the American people and their allies, fundamentally..
Note
- See “The Comprehensive Strategy of Xi Jinping, 2012-2017,” on this website, under the category, “Nations.”

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