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    Chateaubriand’s Voyage toward Jerusalem

    April 30, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    François-René vicomte de Chateaubriand: Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem. A. S. Kline translation. London: On-Demand Publishing, 2011.

    Part One: Greece.

    Part Two: The Archipelago, Anatolia, and Constantinople.

     

    Having voyaged to the westernmost frontier of European civilization, the United States of America, in 1791, meeting George Washington (“There is virtue in the gaze of a great man”), and finding material there for his novel, Les Natchez, in 1806 Chateaubriand undertook a similar journey for a similar purpose, from Paris to Jerusalem, returning through Egypt, Tunisia, and Spain. The literary result was Les Martyrs, a prose epic intended to complement his 1802 treatise, The Genius of Christianity. [1] His bête noir, Napoleon, had crowned himself Emperor of France two years earlier and had defeated Austria at Austerlitz in 1805; Napoleon would go on to ally France with the Ottoman Empire, a political liaison that may account for some of Chateaubriand’s asperity in his portrait of the Turks. While “in the deserts of America I had contemplated the monuments of nature”—complementing his earliest major work, Essai Politique, Historique, and Morale, sur les Revolutions Anciennes et Modernes considerés dans leurs Rapports avec la Révolution Français de nos Jours, in which he presented a theory of natural right [2]—and while he already “knew two of the realms of antiquity,” the Celts, ancestors of the French, and the Romans, their civilizational ancestors, he had never seen Greece, the civilizational cradle of Rome, or Jerusalem, cradle of the Christendom that had pervaded Greece, Rome, and France. “I may be the last Frenchman to leave my country to travel to the Holy Land with the ideas, aim and sentiments of the pilgrims of old, but if I have not the virtues that once illuminated the Lords of Coucy, de Nesles, de Chatillon, and de Montfort, at least their faith remains to me.” In this enterprise, Chateaubriand never strays far from the spirit of Jerusalem Delivered, Tasso’s epic poem of the Crusades. 

    Arms and religion. In Greece under the Turks, he will meet a man who cannot understand why he would travel “to see the various peoples, especially those Greeks who were dead,” but when he describes himself as “a pilgrim on my way to Jerusalem,” the man “was fully satisfied.” “Religion is a sort of universal language understood by all men. The Turk could not understand that I had left my homeland out of a simple motive of curiosity”—Aristotle’s dictum, “Man wants to know,” having no echo in his soul—but “he found it quite natural that I should undertake a long journey to pray at a shrine.” Nor was this only a Muslim assumption, as “I had found the savages of the New World indifferent to my foreign manners, but solely attentive like the Turks to my weapons and my religion, that is to say, the two things that protect mankind in regard to body and soul.” [3]

    Leaving French soil proper, he spends five days in Venice, then part of Napoleon’s Kingdom of Italy, a client state ruled by the Emperor’s son-in-law. He then embarked to Trieste, which had been returned to Austrian control by France only a few months earlier. “The last breath of Italy expires here on this shore where barbarism begins”—that is, modern Greece, under Ottoman rule. On the Austrian ship taking him to Messenia, during a storm, the Catholic captain hangs a light in front of an image of the Virgin Mary, reminding Chateaubriand of “the affecting nature of this cult that yields empire over the seas to a weak woman,” reminding him that “what unsettles human wisdom is the proximity of danger; at that moment mankind becomes religious, and the torch of philosophy reassures less in the midst of the tempest that the lamp lit before the Madonna.” With the captain and the sailors, he prays “for the Emperor Francis II, for ourselves, and for the sailors…drowned in those sacred waters.”

    Having “found ourselves at the gates of the Adriatic,” “I was there, at the frontier of Greek antiquity and the border of Latin antiquity”; “Pythagoras, Alcibiades, Scipio, Caesar, Pompey, Cicero, August, Horace, Virgil, had crossed this sea.” After all, “I journeyed to seek the Muses in their own country.” Chateaubriand does not travel in the manner of today’s tourist ‘sightseer.’ When he sees a site, he hears the voices of poets and historians. “Woe to him who sees not nature with the eyes of Fenelon or Homer!” Or the occasional philosopher: “climate more or less influences the tastes of a people,” Montesquieu observes, in Chateaubriand’s words. “In Greece, for example, everything is smooth; everything is softened; everything is as full of calm in nature a in the writings of the ancients”; this is “why ancient sculpture is so little troubled, so peaceful, so simple.” “In that land of the Muses, nature suggests no abrupt departures,” bringing “the mind to a love of consistent and harmonious things.” “Nothing would be more pleasant than natural history, if one were to relate it always to human history: we would delight in seeing the migratory birds forsake the unknown tribes of the Atlantic shores to visit the famed peoples of the Eurotas and Cephissus, and “perhaps some bird of the Americas attracted Aristotle’s attention on the waters of Greece, that philosopher failing even to suspect the existence of the New World,” and “often the marches of peoples and armies followed the wanderings of a few solitary birds, or the peaceful migrations of camels and gazelles.” “Long before mankind,” God’s creatures knew “the extent of man’s abode.”

    The sea is another matter. There, the sublimity of nature rivals the beauty of the land. On the island of Corfu, west of the Greek mainland, “Odysseus was hurled after his shipwreck,” Aristotle came in exile and, under the Romans, Cato met Cicero after the battle of Pharsalia. (“What men! What suffering! What blows of fortune!”) And “it was from Corfu that the army of crusaders departed that set a French nobleman on the throne of Constantinople”—the Count of Flanders, who led the Fourth Crusade in 1204, who reigned as Baldwin I, the first Latin emperor. Despite the glory of the ancients (that “glory must be something real, since it makes the heart beat in one who is only a spectator of it”), Christian martyrs have equaled or perhaps excelled them: “Is a martyr to freedom any greater than a martyr to truth? Is Cato, devoting himself to the liberation of Rome, more heroic than Sosipater, allowing himself to be burnt in a brazen bull, in order to announce to men that they are brothers; that they should love each other; help each other; and rise nearer to God through the practice of virtue?” The superiority of the Christians to the ancients will be the theme of The Martyrs.

    Chateaubriand landed at Methoni, on the western Peloponnese. Greece is now ruled by the Turks or, as Chateaubriand insists throughout, misruled. Yes, the chief civilian official of the city, the Agha, had cleared the roads of bandits, but his methods were not scrupulous. “It would have been too slow and too boring for a Turk to distinguish the innocent from the guilty: they killed, with a knock on the head as one kills wild beasts, all those hunted down by the Pasha. The robbers perished, it is true, but along with three hundred Greek peasants who had nothing to do with the matter.” When Chateaubriand sees the Christian and Muslim graveyards set next to each other, the Christian graveyard “dilapidated, without gravestones, and without trees,” “we see even in the freedom and equality of death a distinction between tyrant and slave.”

    Under this regime, Chateaubriand maintained vigilance, as even “the slightest sign of fear or even of caution, exposes you to their contempt.” “A Turk is as pliable if he sees that you do not fear him, as he is offensive if he discovers that he has inspired fear in you.” He had French honor to uphold. At the city of Coroni, he recalls the Frenchmen who participated in its retaking from the Turks in 1685. “I enjoyed discovering these traces of the path of French honor, from my very first entry to the true home of glory, and to a people whose people are such good judges of worth.” Of course, “where does one not find such traces!” Throughout his journeys he found them: “The Arabs showed me the graves of our soldiers beneath the sycamores of Cairo, and the Seminoles beneath the Florida poplars.” “If I myself have followed, without glory, though not without honor, those twin careers in which the citizens of Athens and Sparta acquired so much renown, I console myself by reflecting that other Frenchmen were more fortunate than I.” But now the Turks possess the olive trees of Coroni. “Tears came to my eyes seeing the hands of an enslaved Greek bathed in vain by those streams of oil that brought vigor to the arms of his forefathers so they might triumph over tyrants.” At once tyrannical and largely impotent, the Turkish state cedes effective rule to individual Muslims. The establishment of a public institution such as a drinking fountain or a caravanserai results from “the religious spirit, and not the love of country, since there is no country.” But even the religious spirit has waned. “It is remarkable that all these fountains, all these caravanserais, all these bridges are crumbling, and date from the early days of the empire: I do not think I encountered one modern construction along the way; from which one must conclude that religion is enfeebled among the Muslims and, along with that religion, Turkish society is on the point of collapse.” The regime will offer no help, however, as the state apparatus consists of “tyrants consumed with the thirst for gold, who shed innocent blood without remorse in its pursuit.” “If I had ever thought, with those whose character and talents I otherwise respect, that absolute government is the best form of government, a few months’ sojourn in Turkey would have completely cured me of that opinion.”

    In southwest Peloponnese, where the ancient Spartans had ruled, “I could scarcely convince myself that I breathed the air of the homeland of Helen and Menelaus.” Sparta now consists only of a single white cottage. “Tears sprang to my eyes, as I fixed my gaze on that little hut, which stood on the deserted site of tone of the most famous cities of the world, and which served only to identify the location of Sparta, inhabited by a single goatherd, whose only wealth is the grass that grows on the graves of King Agis, and Leonidas.” Not long after, his Turkish escort brought him to another site, with “ruins everywhere, and not one human being among the ruins”—Sparta having been not only deserted by the modern Greeks but forgotten. He recalls the Spartan prayer, “Let virtue be added to beauty!” But now, “the sun blazes down in silence, and ceaselessly devours the marble tombs,” the only remaining life being the “thousands of lizards, noiselessly climbing and descending the burning walls.” While “I hate the Spartan moral code, I cannot fail to understand the greatness of a free people, and I cannot tread that noble dust without emotion,” its nobility confirmed by “a single fact”: when the dissolute Roman tyrant Nero came to Greece, “he dared not venture to Sparta,” the memory of whose austerity remained as a silent rebuke of his life and rule. There is an ironic coda to Chateaubriand’s visit. The Spartans’ statues and altars honoring Sleep, Death, Beauty, and Fear (“which the Spartans inspired in the enemies”) have disappeared, but he finds what may have been the pedestal of the statue of Laughter “that Lycurgus erected among those grave descendants of Hercules.” “An altar of Laughter remaining alone in the midst of buried Sparta offers a gloriously triumphant subject for the philosophy of Democritus”—the philosopher of atomism who snickered at the human failure to acknowledge the inevitable dissolution of all things.

    Despite the rule of the Turks, Christianity has fared somewhat better. At Corinth, Chateaubriand recalls the Apostle Paul: “That man, ignored by the great, scorned by the crowd, rejected as ‘the sweepings of the world, only associating at first with two companions, Crispus and Gaius, and with the household of Stephanus: such were the unknown architects of an indestructible temple and the first Christians of Corinth. The traveler casts his eyes over the site of this famous city: he sees not a remnant of the pagan altars, but he sees a number of Christian chapels rising from the midst of the Greek houses. The Apostle can still give, from heaven, the sign of peace to his children.” Still, regarding Greece generally, “What silence! Unfortunate country! Unhappy Greeks! Will France lose her glory thus? Will she be thus devastated, and trampled, in the course of centuries?” Wherever he goes on this journey, Chateaubriand registers this strong sense of Sic transit gloria. “The Lord killeth and maketh alive: he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up” (1 Samuel 2:6), he recalls. “This changeability in human affairs is all the more striking because it contrasts with the immobility of the rest of nature,” inasmuch as “wild animals experience no alteration in their empires or change of habits.” “I saw, when we were on the Hill of the [Athens] Museum, storks forming their battalion and taking flight for Africa.” “For two thousand years they had made the same journey, and were as free and happy in the city of solon as they are in the city of the commander of the black eunuchs. To the heights of their nests, that revolution cannot reach.”

    The impermanence of human things may be seen at Salamis, which “is now almost completely erased from the Greek memory.” “The indifference the Greeks show concerning their homeland is as shameful as it is deplorable; not only are they unaware of their own history, but they virtually ignore…the ancient language which is their glory.” At Piraeus, now deserted, “I walked a while beside the sea which bathed the tomb of Themistocles; in all probability, I was at that moment the only person in Greece thinking of this great man.” And “though one could still recognize Athens from its ruins, one could also see from the overall architecture and the general character of the monuments, that the city of Athene was no longer inhabited by the same people.” He is left with the Athens of antiquity, where “the higher sentiments of human nature acquire something elegant…that they lacked at Sparta.” At Athens “love of country and freedom…was not a blind instinct, but an enlightened sentiment, founded on that taste for beauty in all its form, that the sky had so liberally disposed.” While “I would have wished to die alongside Leonidas,” I would “live alongside Pericles.” At the ruins of the Areopagus, he recalls not only Pericles but Alcibiades and Demosthenes, who spoke there “to the most thoughtless yet most intelligent nation on earth,” men who issued “many cruel and iniquitous decrees” but also “generous speeches against the tyrants of their country.”

    Chateaubriand prefers the Parthenon to the Areopagus. “The greatest masterpiece of architecture among both ancients and moderns,” the Parthenon’s harmony and strength [remain] visible in its ruins.” Modern architecture, “slender…when we aim at elegance,” “heavy, when we pretend to majesty,” cannot match the rule of reason, of mathematical balance, seen in the Parthenon. “We should not conceal from ourselves the fact that architecture considered as an art is in its principles predominantly religious; it was invented for the worship of the deity.” Moderns introduce its features into their homes, “ornamentation fitted only for the house of the gods.” And while Gothic architecture, the style which “is ours,” French, born “to speak with our altars,” elicits Chateaubriand’s praise, his fundamental sensibility leans toward the beautiful, not the sublime, despite his Christian convictions. “If after seeing the monuments of Rome, those of France seemed coarse to me, the monuments of Rome in turn seem barbaric now I have seen those of Greece.” And speaking of barbarism, “the Parthenon survived in its entirety until 1687, when the commercial Venetians “bombard[ed] the monuments of Pericles.” “A year of our warfare destroys more monuments than a century of fighting among the ancients. It seems that everything opposes perfection of the arts among the moderns: our nations, manners, customs, dress and even our inventions.” Continuing the ruin, Lord Elgin, citizen of still another modern commercial nation, “ravag[ed] the Parthenon” in order to transfer its bas-reliefs to the British Museum. “Only light reveals the delicacy of certain lines and colors,” but “this light is lacking beneath English skies.” In a larger sense, “What can have destroyed so many monuments of gods and men? that hidden force that overturns all things, and is itself subject to the unknown God whose altar St. Paul saw at Phaleron.”

    Not without human assistance. Chateaubriand recalls that after the Romans conquered Athens, “gladiators mounted their blood-stained games in the Theater of Dionysus,” replacing “the masterpieces of Aeschylus Sophocles and Euripides,” as Athenians “flocked to such cruelties with the same zeal with which they had flocked to the Dionysian rites.” “Perhaps nations, as well as individuals, are cruel in their decrepitude as in their childhood, perhaps the spirit of a nation exhausts itself; and when it has created everything, traversed everything, tasted everything, filled with its own masterpieces, and unable to produce new ones, it becomes brutalized, and returns to purely physical sensation.” So far, Christianity has prevented “modern nations from ending in such a deplorable old age: but if all religion were extinguished among us, I would not be surprised if the cries of dying gladiators were to be heard on those stages which today echo to the grief of Phaedra or Andromache” in the plays of Racine. In an echo of his argument in The Genius of Christianity, Chateaubriand remarks that even the ruins of ancient Greece found their first students among the Jesuits and the Capuchins. When later travelers visited the Parthenon, “already the priests, religious exiles among those famous ruins hospitable to new gods, awaited the antiquary and artist.” The priests “did not parade their knowledge: kneeling at the foot of the cross, they hid, in the humility of the cloister, what they had learned, and above all what they had suffered…amidst the ruins of Athens.”

    “In Greece, one indulges in illusions in vain: sad truth pursues one. Huts of dried mud, more suitable as the dens of animals than the homes of men; women and children in rags, fleeing at the approach of stranger or Janissary; even the goats frightened, scattering over the mountainside, and only the dogs left behind to welcome you with howls: such is the spectacle that robs you of memory’s charms.” There, under the Ottoman Turks, “a minaret rise[s] from the depths of solitude to proclaim slavery.” “These people destroy everything, and are a veritable scourge.”

    Chateaubriand traces the beginning of Greek decline to the Peloponnesian War. “The vices of Athenian government,” the regime of democracy, “prepared the way for the victory of Sparta,” since “a purely democratic state is the worst when it comes to fighting a powerful enemy, and when a unified will is necessary to save the country”—precisely the argument Charles de Gaulle would make against parliamentary republicanism, a century and a half later. “Obedient to the voices of factious orators, they suffered the fate they had earned for their follies.” Then it was Sparta’s turn, in its case succumbing to the vices of a military aristocracy, where the women, untouched by the military discipline undergone by the men, “became the most corrupt women in Greece,” and the children, imitating their fathers, gave themselves over to “tearing each other with tooth and nail.” Further, the Spartan regime made no effort to unite Greece under its sway, preferring to retreat back behind its walls, once Athens had been defeated. Had they “incorporat[ed] within it the peoples conquered by its arms,” they “would have crushed Philip [of Macedon] in his cradle.” “With nations it is not as it is with men; moderate wealth and love of ease, which may be fitting in a citizen, will not take a State very far”; “not knowing how to take advantage of one’s position to honor, expand, and strengthen one’s country is rather a defect of spirit in a people than a sense of virtue.”

    Although “I still think that there is plenty of spirit left in Greece,” thanks to human nature itself, “I am convinced that the Greeks are not likely to break their chains in the near future,” and even if liberated, “they would not immediately lose the marks of their irons.” The Ottoman Empire “has not brought them the harsh and savage customs of men of the North,” as the barbarians brought to Italy, “but the voluptuous customs of those of the South.” And the Koran, the other element brought them by the Turks, “preaches neither the hatred of tyranny, nor the love of liberty.”

    Departing the mainland for the Cyclades archipelago, “a kind of bridge over the sea linking Greek Asia Minor to the true Greece,” Chateaubriand arrived at the harbor of Zea, known in antiquity as Ceos, whose most renowned son was the lyric poet Simonides, considered by Plato’s Socrates to be a precursor of the Sophists and confident of Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse. [4] Chateaubriand judges him “a true genius, though his mind was nobler than his heart,” a man who sang the praises of the ruler Hipparchus and then “sang the murderers of that prince.” [5] “One must accommodate oneself to one’s times, said that wise man: the ungrateful soon shake off their feelings of gratitude, the ambitious abandon the defeated, and the cowards join the winning side. Wondrous human wisdom, whose maxims, always superfluous to courage and virtue, serve merely as a pretext for vice, and a refuge for cowardly hearts!” Chateaubriand has in mind the accommodations of his own generation of sophists, who accommodated themselves to the tyranny of Napoleon. He also thinks of the “eloquent sophist” of the previous century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who wrote that he wished to be exiled on an island in the Cyclades. Had this happened, “he would soon have repented of his choice”: “separated from his admirers, relegated to the company of coarse and treacherous Greeks, he would have found, in valleys scorched by the sun, neither flowers, nor streams, nor shade; he would have seen around him only clumps of olive trees and reddish rocks, covered with wild sage and balsam; I doubt that he”—the solitary walker—would have “liked to continue his walks for long, to the sound of wind and sea, along an uninhabited shore.”

    He finds Smyrna similarly bleak, having been fought over twice by the Turks and the Greeks, then “continually plundered” until, by the thirteenth century, “only ruins existed.” Recovering after the Ottoman Empire established itself firmly there, it was then ravaged by “earthquake, fire, and pestilence.” “There was nothing to see in Smyrna.” To those who might view this report with disappointment, he can only reply, “I have a confounded love of truth, and a fear of saying what is not, that in me outweighs all other considerations.” Smyrna did feature a civil society (“I was obliged to resume the aspects of civilization, to receive and pay visits”) but “it was not what we call society that I had come to the East to seek: I longed to see camels and hear the cry of the mahout,” the elephant-driver). 

    His spirit rebounds when he considers that in arriving at Smyrna he was, “for the first time, treading the plains of Asia Minor,” feeling “imbued with respect for that ancient land where civilization began, where the patriarchs lived, where Tyre and Babylon rose, where Eternity summoned Cyrus and Alexander, where Jesus Christ accomplished the mystery of our salvation.” And where Homer lived (would that “I might have acquired Homer’s genius merely by experiencing all the misfortunes by which the poet was overwhelmed”). And it is where Alexander the Great, a figure worthy of Homer’s art, defeated the army of Persia’s Great King in the fourth century BCE. “Alexander committed great crimes: his mind could not withstand the intoxication of success; but with what magnanimity he purchased his life’s errors!” Chateaubriand praises the “two sublime comments” Alexander made. At the beginning of his campaign against Persia, he gave his territory to his generals and when asked what he would keep, he replied, “Hope!” And on his deathbed, asked to whom he left the empire, he replied, “To the most worthy!” “His untimely death even added something divine to his memory; because we always see him as young, beautiful, triumphant, with none of those infirmities of body, with none of those reversals of fortune that age and time bring.” 

    Constantinople brings him back to melancholy. The former capital of the Christian Roman Empire, it has been ruined by the Turks, its rulers since 1453. Amidst the “packs of masterless dogs,” “you see around you a crowd of mutes who seem to wish to pass by without being noticed, and have the air of escaping the gaze of their masters: you pass without a break from a bazaar to a cemetery, as if the Turks are only there to buy and sell, and to die…. No sign of joy, no appearance of happiness reveals itself to your eyes: what you see are not people, but a herd that an Imam leads and a Janissary slaughters,” a land with “no pleasure, but debauchery” and no punishment, but death.” “From the midst of prisons and bathhouses rises the Seraglio, the Capitol of servitude: it is there that a sacred guardian carefully preserves the germs of plage, and the primitive laws of tyranny.” “Such vile slaves and such cruel tyrants ought never to have dishonored so wonderful a location,” but so they have done. “I could not help pitying the master of this empire,” whose “unhappy end”—Selim III was deposed by the Janissaries, then murdered—justified Chateaubriand’s pity “only too well.” “Oh, how wretched despots are in the midst of their happiness”—once again, glancing at Napoleon—and “how weak amidst their power!” They cannot “enjoy that sleep of which they deprive the unfortunate,” their subjects. “I only like to visit places embellished by the virtues or the arts, and I could find, in that land of Phocas and Bajazet neither the one nor the other.” He embarked for Jerusalem “under the banner of the cross which floated from the mast of our vessel.”

     

    Notes

    1. See “Chateaubriand’s Defense of Christianity,” on this website under the category, “Bible Notes.”
    2. See “Chateaubriand and Political Philosophy,” on this website under the category, “Philosophers.”
    3. That it is a Turkish Muslim assumption, reflecting Islam’s turn away from philosophy and ‘secular’ learning generally, may be seen in Chateaubriand’s account of a village in which an orphaned girl, sent to Constantinople, returned having mastered Italian and French and with manners of civility, “which made her virtue seem suspect.” The villagers “beat her to death” and collected monetary reward “allotted in Turkey to the murder of a Christian.” The Pasha of Morea took his share of the blood money and then, claiming that “the beauty, youth, learning, and travels of the orphan gave him legal right to compensation,” that is, extra money. Thus did religion and corruption collaborate in murderous tyranny.
    4. Xenophon’s Hiero, a dialogue between the tyrant and the poet, occasioned an exchange between Leo Strauss and the Hegelian polymath, Alexandre Kojève. See Leo Strauss: On Tyranny: Including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence, Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) and Timothy W. Burns and Bryan-Paul Frost, eds.: Philosophy, History, and Tyranny: Reexamining the Debate between Leo Strauss and Alexnder Kojève. (Albany: State University Press of New York, 2016). See also “Tyranny and Philosophy” on this website under the category, “Philosophers.”
    5. In Felled Oaks André Malraux judges Napoleon to have been a man of great mind but small soul (a judgment de Gaulle does not share); Malraux was an admiring reader of Chateaubriand, and his allusion suggests that Chateaubriand may be thinking of Napoleon in this passage.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Hitler’s Intentions

    April 23, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Sebastian Haffner: The Meaning of Hitler. Ewald Osers translation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

    Jochen Thies: Hitler’s Plans for Global Domination: Nazi Architecture and Ultimate War Aims. Ian Cooke and Mary-Beth Friedrich translation. New York: Berghahn Books, 2012. (Originally published in Germany in 1976).

     

    On Hitler, opinions vary. Many consider him the worst tyrant of the catastrophic twentieth century—worse, even, than Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot. Others say he was no worse than they but nonetheless intended to lead Germany toward a worldwide empire. Others still maintain that he merely wanted a European empire. And then there was the British historian A. J. P. Taylor, who claimed that Hitler was a normal German statesman, intending to revive the Kaiser Reich, which, in the Führer‘s estimation, hadn’t lost the Great War militarily but was betrayed by the surrender of the political classes. [1]

    Sebastian Haffner was a journalist and contemporary of Hitler, witness to his meteoric rise to power, haunted by the question, ‘How did this happen?’ The man was a failure until the age of 30, having moped through school no real friends, avoiding any real job, winning no wife, producing no children. “Apart from politics and political passion, his was an empty life.” Born in Austria, despising the thought of serving in the army of such a polyglot thing, he fled to Germany, where he eagerly volunteered for military service at the outset of the Great War. “Strange though it may sound, his frontline experience was probably his only education.” And even in politics he wasn’t really political, having no taste for ruling and being ruled, only for ruling; “later he was quite simply the Führer, not answerable to anyone.” In his first and only political office, Reich Chancellor, “his political mode of working was never that of the top public servant but that of an unfettered independent artist waiting for inspiration, seemingly idle for days and weeks on end, and then, when the spirit moved him, throwing himself into a sudden frenzy of activity.” He was “the earliest, most persistent and most passionate devotee” of a cult he formed around himself.

    Hitler’s Austrian origin turned out to be decisive, despite his aversion to the place. (The old joke is, ‘The Austrians are the smartest people in Europe; they’ve convinced the world that Beethoven was an Austrian and that Hitler was a German.’) His hatred of Jews probably originated not from Germany, where “antisemitism was on the wane about the turn of the century” as “assimilation and integration of the Jews was desired and was in full swing,” but from Central and Eastern Europe, the atmosphere of Vienna not Berlin. His first public expression of antisemitism occurred after the war, however, when the November Revolution of 1918 and the subsequent victory of the German Democratic Socialists over the Communists allowed a foreigner like Hitler to begin a political career under laws guaranteeing freedom of speech. Hitler nonetheless denounced the revolution as the “November Crime,” given the crucial role played by Marxists in it. He objected to Marxism not because it was socialist but because it was Jewish and internationalist—the Jews being a people or ‘race’ without a country, seeking to dominate national governments everywhere, as per the fraudulent Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which Hitler read around this time. The workers, now pawns of ‘international Jewry,’ must be won over to a new, national socialism, persuaded that the revolution had caused the German defeat in the war rather than having been the result of it. To reverse this catastrophe, Germans needed to effect a new revolution, a new war, and especially a war against the Jews, as outlined in his 1925 book, Mein Kampf. In the meantime, his “breakthrough experience was his own discovery of his power as an orator,” his “ability to transform rallies of the most varied individuals—the bigger and more motley the better—into a homogeneous pliable mass” by a sort of alchemy of “mass hypnotism,” proved that “he could do something no one else could.” He could become Der Führer.

    That he gave Germans something they longed for may be seen in the example of poems by Stefan George, a contemporary who prophesied the coming of “the Man” who will found “the New Reich”: “The man! The deed! Thus pine both people and High Council.” Hitler’s oratorical powers made enough Germans believe him to be that Man that he could begin his own party in the Reichstag, a party revolving around himself, a party whose decidedly modest successes at the polls improved only thanks to the weakness of his opponents and the financial disaster of 1929. He also discovered in himself a talent for political organizing, which served him well once he came to power. Haffner reminds his readers that Nazi rule coincided with an “economic miracle”: full employment in Germany after only three years in office. “It is difficult to picture adequately the grateful amazement with which the Germans reacted to that miracle, which, more particularly, made vast numbers of German workers switch from the Social Democrats and the Communists to Hitler after 1933.” Having reversed the November Revolution, ending the Weimar regime, having recouped German economic strength, he could now remilitarize and rearm the country, which became the strongest European power by 1938, poised to invalidate “vital sections of the Versailles Treaty,” thereby achieving “a political triumph over France and Britain, and a radical transformation of the balance of power in Europe.” Germans reveled in it all, and indeed it was “a colossal achievement to have united virtually the entire nation behind him,” “not by demagogy but by achievement.” He had taken the postwar democratization of German society and politics, its “cult of the body and sex,” its emancipation of women and turned them into a “great social transformation that was Hitler’s personal work, what he called the “socialization of people.” That is, he had caused Germans to be “firmly fitted into a discipline from which they cannot escape.” In Haffner’s words, “if the goal of socialism is the liquidation of human alienation, then the socialization of people will attain that goal far more effectively than the socialization of the means of production” advocated by the Marxists.

    Hitler intended not only to unite German in Germany but ‘Aryans’ everywhere, with Germans as the elite among that racial elite in a “Greater Germanic” Reich, “an empire to which he did not even set geographical bounds in his mind but only a continually advancing ‘military boundary’ which might perhaps find its final place on the Volga, perhaps along the Urals,  or perhaps only on the Pacific.” Pace, Professor Taylor, but “in that respect there could be no greater contrast than between Hitler and Bismarck” or even Napoleon I—empire builders to be sure, but also institution builders. Hitler wasn’t a constructive statesman but a sort of embodiment of the Heraclitean flux, albeit with the drive for racial domination as its logos. “From 1930 until 1941 Hitler succeeded in practically everything he undertook.” By the end of that time, he ruled Europe. 

    Up until then, all his enemies were weak. “All his successes were scored against opponents who were unable or unwilling to offer real resistance.” His primary domestic opponents, the conservatives “who for a while challenged his succession to the Weimar Republic lacked a political concept, were divided amongst themselves and psychologically vacillated between resistance to and alliance with Hitler”; having denigrated ‘civilization’ and valorized ‘culture,’ Germans were no more political than Hitler himself, although far less fanatic. The Weimar Republic’s principal supporters—the “Weimar Coalition” of Social Democrats, Left liberals, and Catholics—enjoyed no parliamentary majority after the regime’s first year. It was a parliamentary regime, with no strong executive, although for most of the Twenties it did have “a capable Foreign Minister” in Gustav Stresemann and a competent bureaucracy, which actually ran the country. By the end of the decade, “even the Catholic Center” wanted a new, “authoritarian regime.” They got a tyrant instead. 

    Haffner distinguishes Hitler’s Nazis from Mussolini’s Fascists. “Fascism is upper-class rule, buttressed by artificially manufactured mass enthusiasm”; “nothing is more misleading than to call Hitler a Fascist.” [2] Nazism more closely resembled Stalinist Communism, substituting ‘race’ for ‘class’ in its analysis of politics, society, and economics while taking on its ‘totalitarian’ characteristics. 

    Hitler’s foreign rivals were equally ineffective. The European international system framed at the Versailles Conference “suffered from the same congenital weakness as the Weimar Republic”: “just as the Republic suffered shipwreck because, from the outset, it failed either to strip the German Right wing (still the strongest power group and one that was indispensable to the functioning of the state) of its power for good…or permanently to integrate it into the new republican state, so the Paris peace system foundered because it neither stripped the still strongest European power, the German Reich (still indispensable to European stability) permanently of its power, nor permanently integrated it,” as “Metternich had done with France following the Napoleonic Wars.” Instead, they chose a policy of humiliation while “allow[ing] it to keep its unity and independence,” the means by which Germans might take revenge for their humiliation. The Weimar politicians wanted to get out from under “what they had signed under duress” as much as Hitler did, and the other Europeans lacked the military power to stop them. The British policy of “appeasement” began not at Munich in 1938, under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, but at Locarno in 1925, “under his half-brother, Austen Chamberlain.” Weimar had whittled away at the Versailles impositions and, once in office, Hitler continued to do so (here, Taylor and Haffner agree), although the Brits “could not fail to notice that he was increasingly withholding from them the hoped-for collateral, participation in the consolidation of peace in Europe and shared support for a peace system revised in Germany’s favor.” “He had in reality accepted to increase his strength for a new war.” The war came, and his “greatest success,” the conquest of France, came against the advice of his generals, who “all had before their eyes the specter of the French campaign of 1914,” with its years of paralyzing trench warfare. In all of this, “Hitler invariably only toppled what was tottering and killed what was already dying,” having “less in common with the eye of the eagle than with the nose of the vulture.”

    Hitler “wanted to be not only the Lenin but the Marx of Hitlerism.” And indeed, his “mixture of swaggering superiority and intolerance is found equally among convinced Marxists and convinced Hitlerites.” “His doctrine centered on race”—in his words, “the aristocratic basic idea of Nature,” racial hierarchy. Races engage in what Hitler called an “existential struggle” for survival and dominance, a struggle conducted primarily through wars for territory, “living space.” “Ultimately, the perpetual warlike struggle between nations is about world domination”: “Every being,” he wrote, “strives for expansion and every nation strives for world domination.” “We all feel,” he continued, “that in the distant future man will find himself confronted by problems which only a supreme race, a master nation based upon the resources and facilities of an entire glove, can be called upon to solve,” a nation empowered by “a state which, in an age of racial poisoning, devotes itself to the cultivation of its best racial elements.” That race-nation-state “must one day become master of the earth.” Exactly what a race or nation is, and exactly who is an Aryan, stayed a bit undefined, Haffner remarks, but Hitler evidently supposed his notion close enough for government work. That work’s primary aim was to de-toxify the Aryan race by ridding Europe of ‘international Jewry.’ In Hitler’s words, “If the Jew with the aid of his Marxist creed remains victorious over the nations of this world, then his crown will be the wreath on the grave of mankind, then this planet will once more, as millions of years ago, move through the ether devoid of human beings.” Near the end of his life, he told his personal secretary, Martin Bormann, “People will be eternally grateful to National Socialism that I have extinguished the Jews in Germany and Central Europe” because Jews, whether Communists or bankers, weaken the superior races, conspire against them, seek their destruction. For Aryans, it is kill or be killed. This doctrine is what distinguishes Hitler from the Pan-Germans of the Kaiser Reich, who indeed wanted an empire, a ‘place in the sun’ for Germany, but scarcely envisioned genocide or rule of the world following from genocide. 

    After conquering Europe, including Russia, and ruling the nations there either directly or as satellites, Germanized Europe would then challenge “America and Japan in a struggle for world domination,” “doing so with good prospects of success.” He failed, in part because he alienated Jews of German origin in the United States and elsewhere. Prior to Hitler, “German Jews in their great majority,” inside and outside Germany, “were positively in love with Germany.” “Jewish influence in the world had predominantly been a pro-German element, a fact which Germany’s opponents in the First World War were only too well aware of”; “in America it had long and effectively opposed the country’s entry on the side of the Entente.” German Jews had “played an outstanding part, during the first third of the twentieth century, in helping Germany—for the first time—to outstrip Britain and France in the intellectual and cultural sphere as well as in science and economic life.” Jews who escaped to America on the whole strengthened America at Germany’s, at Europe’s expense, enabling their new country to defend a Europe weakened by the war Hitler started against the Soviet Russia he hated and failed to crush.

    In the meantime, he did a lot of damage. The 1938 Munich Agreement not only solemnized “the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, which had relied in vain on its alliance with France,” but it effectively “mean Britain’s and France’s political withdrawal from the Eastern half of Europe and the recognition of Eastern Europe right up to the Russian frontier as a German sphere of influence,” exactly as Hitler had envisioned things, years earlier. Had Hitler taken the time to “consolidate this new Greater German East European empire,” he or his successors might well have been able to take Russia. But that would have taken “constructive statesmanship…and patience,” and Hitler “lacked just these two qualities.” He moved into Poland, rightly calculating that neither France nor Great Britain was prepared for war, then took France down. Once again, however, he pushed ahead, touching off his futile air war against the British and then, even more catastrophically, invading Soviet Russia, which appeared weak because its troops had performed poorly against Finland in 1939. (As early as the 1920s, in Mein Kampf, he had deemed “the giant empire in the east” to be “ripe for collapse.”) He lacked “the constructive imagination of the statesman, the ability to build enduring structures,” because for this modern Heraclitean, war was the norm, not peace. Insofar as peace was possible or desirable, it meant the annihilation of the enemy. Once understood by his enemies, this intention stiffened resistance against him. His “crowning mistake” was to declare war on the United States, a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. “There is to this day no comprehensible rational explanation for what one is tempted to describe as an act of lunacy.” Japan had just diverted American attentions away from Europe, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Japan, and Italy committed the parties only to a defensive alliance. “Moreover, he could do nothing to give Japan any kind of active assistance.” As it happened, he couldn’t give adequate assistance to himself, either, as the (now) two-front war loomed.

    No matter? Late in 1941, told a pair of foreign visitors, “If one day the German nation is no longer sufficiently strong or sufficiently ready for sacrifice to stake its own blood for its existence, then let it perish and be annihilated by some other stronger power.” Germans were failing him. 

    He could still succeed in one thing, however: the mass murder of Jews. “Hitler’s mass murders were committed during the war, but they were not acts of war” or, more accurately, not acts of war against the Allies. Jews, Gypsies, invalids (he killed 100,000 of these “useless eaters”), Poland’s educated classes (3 million non-Jews, along with 3 million Polish Jews), Russians (another 3 million): all of them deserved to die, in the Führer’s estimation, and he persecuted merciless war against them. In effect, he sacrificed his dream of world empire in order to concentrate on his dream of genocide. If race is the ultimate driver of ‘History,’ and Aryan victory is ‘History’s’ ultimate prize, then the lunacy (and the evil) serves as a pragmatic means to winning the prize of racial purification, since a Germany that cannot yet dominate the world will at least be ‘Jew-free.’ Even while losing to the Allies, “he was now able to indulge the delights of the killer who has shed his last restraints, has his victims in his grip and deals with them as he wishes”: “Who would reach his goal sooner, Hitler with his extermination of the Jews or the Allies with their military overthrow of Germany?” 

    Hitler’s “Final Solution to the Jewish Problem” thus entailed a three-stage end game. From August to October 1944 “he successfully prevented the discontinuation of the lost war and made sure there would be a fight to the finish”; from November 1944 to January 1945, “he made a surprising last sortie” not to the east but to the west in the Ardennes offensive; from February to April 1945, “he pursued the total destruction of Germany,” which deserved to be ruined, given Germans’ failure to live up to the demands he had placed upon them. This contrasts with the policy of Paul Ludendorff in the fatally weakened Kaiser Reich, who made peace in 1918 by uniting with his political opponents and requesting an armistice in order to preserve Germany from further destruction. (This policy was so successful that many Germans, including Hitler, couldn’t understand how it could be said that they’d lost the Great War.) Hitler did the exact opposite, arresting as many former Weimar officials as he could find. “His determination never again to allow a November 1918 [surrender] to happen was the main original impulse that drove him to become a politician.” By these last months of World War II, “the force of Hitler’s hatred, the homicidal drive in Hitler which had raged for years, against Jews, Poles and Russians, was now quite openly turning against Germans.” In March 1945, he issued an order to destroy all “material assets” within the Reich “which the enemy might in any way whatever make use of for the continuation of his struggle, either now or in the foreseeable future.” When his most-favored architect, Albert Speer, ventured to remark that this would injure Germans, Hitler explained, “If the war is lost then the nation will be lost also. There is no need to show any consideration for the foundations which the German nation needs for its most primitive survival. On the contrary, it is better to destroy those things ourselves. Because this nation has shown itself the weaker, and the future belongs exclusively to the stronger nation from the East. In any event, what remains after this struggle are only the inferior, for the good have died in battle.”

    Jochen Thies cites the work of his former teacher, Andreas Hillgruber, who regarded Hitler’s intention to rule the world as “the only logical consequence of Hitler’s biological thinking process, which was fueled by overpopulation and, the resulting need for more living space as well as continued population growth” among Aryans. Hillgruber eventually discovered documents showing that Hitler regarded 1941 as the decisive year, the year in which he planned to conquer the Soviet Union in three to four months; destroy Great Britain’s empire in the Middle East and occupy Afghanistan in preparation for pressuring the Brits out of India, later, in connection with Japan’s occupation of Singapore, approaching India from the east; taking Gibraltar and, subsequently, part of Northwest Africa “to create a war front position against the United States”—somewhat like the goings-on portrayed in the contemporaneous Hollywood movie, Casablanca. Hillgruber suspected that Hitler’s met with the Germanophile Japanese ambassador and Imperial Army general Hiroshi Ōshima in July 1941 in order to plan coordinated military efforts against the Allies. 

    Well before that, Hitler gave a speech in 1930 before faculty and students at the university in Erlangen, Franconia, proclaiming that Germany was “destined for global supremacy.” Earlier still, he had argued in Mein Kampf that Jewish internationalism, whether capitalist or socialist, required a worldwide movement by the “Aryan core races” to defeat it. Jewish guilt went back to Paul the Apostle, whose call for Christian missionary work led eventually to the destruction of the only genuine world empire, Rome. The Germans rose up to meet this threat the Holy Roman Empire, in fact a Teutonic empire originating in the meeting of Roman imperial rule with strong German blood, might have continued its sway, had it not been for the Thirty Years War, in which Christianity, that product of Judaism, “had robbed Germany of its chance to claim world supremacy” by shattering the empire into more than thirty mostly petty states. But this crime can be, must be, reversed, so that (as Hitler writes) “the highest form of human specimen has conquered and subjugated the world in which a way that he is sole ruler of the Earth.” Since the western democracies are controlled by Jews, this worldwide racial struggle is also a regime struggle. Thies makes the important point that “it is futile to analyze his possible plans based on the military potential that actually existed,” since one of his principal tactics was to undermine the political will of his enemies by the use of quislings and psychological warfare. “We can find men of this sort” in “every country,” Hitler calculated, men whose “ambition and illusion” bring them to aid the Nazis. “It is our strategy…to destroy the enemy from within to let him destroy himself.” In Czechoslovakia, he bragged to journalists, “the key to success was propaganda.”

    Similarly, those who say that German lacked the manpower to rule such an empire, even if it could obtain it, overlook the contemporary British and Soviet empires: “England with her few million people rules one-fifth of the world,” he complained but carefully noted, thanks to its nationalism, racial unity, and the political brilliance of its ruling class. Communist power and influence were equally pervasive. “Strength does not lie in the majority,” a democratic principle, “but rather in the pureness of will to make sacrifices!” The Bolsheviks enjoyed the advantage of “hordes of people possessed by a fanatical belief,” a fanaticism that must be matched by the Aryans, the Germans above all. Repeatedly, “Hitler demonstrated his idea of the world as a ‘challenge cup’ which Germany could win forever.” German quality can defeat the sheer quantity marshaled by Soviet dictators and American democrats, with the help of temporary coalitions with foreign countries. Of these, he regarded Americans as the more formidable, the country having been supplied with sound Aryan stock from the Europe it now rivals. But that stock had been corrupted by Jewry, and so can be defeated, eventually, by racially purer Germans, although nothing is certain. The choice, Hitler insisted was between “world supremacy” and “decline.” “The Nordic race has a right to rule the world, and we must make this right the guiding star of our foreign policy”; instead of the proletarian vanguard of Bolshevism, there must be an “Aryan vanguard.” “All of National Socialism would be worth nothing if it were limited only to Germany and if it didn’t seal its rule over the whole world for this highly valuable race for at least one to two thousand years,” a world in which the remaining populations would survive as helots.

    One of the main propaganda tools Hitler deployed in Germany and elsewhere was architecture, which lasts so much longer than any newspaper or radio broadcast. Thies emphasizes its importance. “Architecture enlarges and completes the area of constant influence.” In Nazi Germany, Hitler himself took the position of “master architect.” In this as in so much else, Hitler publicly explained his view of the importance of architecture as a crucial component of regime politics. And once again, his model was Rome, inheritor of Greek culture. Rome was no unheroic commercial empire, Jewish in spirit, like Great Britain but one, as he put it, “founded on the blood of Roman citizens.” In Hitler’s telling, “there is an ‘eternal’ form of art: the Greek-Nordic type.” Squabbles over artistic ‘styles’ bespeaks the decadence of Paris and Weimar Berlin, not the nobility of “Nordic and National Socialist” beauty. 

    Accordingly, “all government buildings were to be built in granite so that they could be expected to last from three to four thousand years.” Churches must be replaced with Nazi Party buildings, assembly halls, massive squares and long, wide avenues for parades. Such grand architectural gestures would impress the idea of “the German people [as] the world’s master race,” first of all upon the Germans themselves. They would buttress the authority of the Nazi Party at home and make it seem more formidable to foreigners. Intended to span ten thousand by six thousand meters, the Nazi Party convention complex at Nuremberg embodied national unity against foreign envy. “The important point, both in Nuremberg and other places, was Hitler’s pseudo-religious role: despite the enormous dimensions, the architecture always emphasized the spot where Hitler would be,” giving him “the aura of the ‘Übermensch.'” As for Berlin, in Mein Kampf Hitler had already proposed that it be rebuilt to exert “the magical charm of Mecca or Rome”—the new “capital of the world.” Second only to Hitler as Germany’s master architect, Albert Speer described the world war as a struggle “being waged in order to gain world supremacy,” first prefigured and finally to be symbolized by its monumental edifices.

    Early in his reign, Hitler delivered an address to the highest-ranking army and navy commanders, outlining a two-step strategy. The first task was to defeat the Marxist regime in Russia, “one of the largest empires in the world” and “the most immediate threat to Germany and the world.” Thies recalls that this followed from his public speeches in the previous decade, with their theme of “an Aryan raiding party, representing the rest of the world, at war with Marxism.” In this stage, Germany would invite allies among the liberal democracies or, at the minimum, attempt to gain assurances of their neutrality. Once Bolshevism had been defeated, it would be the democracies’ turn. “We must simply hope that this conflict will not happen today, but that it will take years before it comes. The later the better.” But come it will. In a 1938 speech to army generals, he expressed his hope that the “unified bloc” of German people “in central Europe will one day own the world.” In Germany, he told the German press late in 1938, “there are 80 million people of one race, and surrounding us another eight million who from a racial point of view belong to us,” whereas there are only 60 million Anglo-Saxons in America (among a much larger overall population), 46 million in the British Empire, 37 million “real Frenchmen” (mostly in northern France), and 55 million “real Russians.” [3] Eighty million united Germans concentrated in one area, strategically crucial Central Europe, can defeat some 200 million ‘racially pure’ types scattered over thousands of miles, some of them in the Marxist regime that threatens the others. And fortunately, America was distant from Europe, so those 60 million potential enemies, likely kept neutral during a European war, raised no immediate concern. Once consolidated, Europe under Nazi rule would have a population of 500 million facing off against 230 million Americans—an even more advantageous ratio than that enjoyed by the Germans against the French in 1870 and the world wars. One of Hitler’s ambassadors in the United States looked to the future with confidence: “I am sure that the low morale in America sooner or later will settle among this politically stupid people,” with “far-reaching consequences.”

    Thies remarks the dissimilarity between the Bismarck policy and Hitler’s. “In the place of the Prussian officer…Hitler had offered the model of the ideological ‘fighter,’, a trusting functionary who would always obey the party in military questions and who would always be ready to follow his Führer.” [4] “One can do anything with a German soldier. It has to be determined who will dominate Europe and thus the world.” And again, now in 1940, “The Earth is there for whoever will take it for his own,” a “challenge cup that is snatched from those who become weak.”

    While the army would extend German rule in Europe, to extend it further would obviously require a much-expanded navy. Hitler detailed Speer to design and build a huge naval base at Trondheim; with a planned population of 300,000, it would make Singapore “look like a ‘toy town.'” From there, “super warships” could extend their range into a network of German colonies in Africa and to naval bases in the north Atlantic, a move “which would entail the complete suppression of North, Central, and West European countries to Germany.” “Germania” would provide the base for “Aryan global rule in the form of a colonial regime that would spread throughout the second half of the twentieth century, similar to British rule in India,” which it would replace. The Aryan emigrants to North America would return to their homeland, eager to rejoin the new land of opportunity.

    Overall, while Hitler held his intention throughout, he was capable of altering his plans readily, and he kept them fairly broad (Thies calls them “scenarios”) in keeping with his ‘Heraclitean’ sense of historical flux. By the 1940s, he envisioned a Germany ruling Europe directly or through satellites. Most of Africa would belong to Germany, as would the former Soviet Union. With those territories in hand, Germany would move into the Caucasus and the Middle East. Finally, “with the help of the system of naval bases in the Atlantic,” Germany would be “able to take the war to the coast of North and South America” with the naval forces augmented by long-range bombers then under development. Great Britain and its powerful fleet stood in the way; eventually, the battle for the Atlantic Ocean sea lanes would be on. In April 1941, he told the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs of this intention “to wage an ‘energetic war’ against the U.S.,” which would be considered in the autumn. That never happened, largely as a result of Germany’s loss of the Battle of Britain; Hitler had to settle for sending submarines to prowl America’s Atlantic coast. A year later, he admitted to his admirer Ōshima that he “did not yet know how to beat the United States,” but preparations for an air war against the enemy continued, with hoped-for targets ranging as far inland as the Great Lakes. He finally gave up only in 1944, when more pressing concerns piled in on him. By then, he dreamed of “miracle weapons” that would somehow reverse Germany’s fortunes, but the German-Jewish physicists who were developing the atomic bomb had fled to America, years earlier.

    In the event, the democracies sided with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, not with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. The hoped-for rift between the Americans and the British (“the second-largest core of the Aryan race in Europe”) never occurred, either, nor did the conquest of the British Isles or of Russia. He grossly underestimated U. S. capacity for weapons manufacturing, both in terms of quantity and (especially) of quality. His planned counterstrikes with long-range bombers on American cities, “in order to teach the Jews living there a ‘lesson,'” proved infeasible in the time frame he needed but miscalculated. 

    Had his war plans succeeded, how could Germany expect to rule a global empire? An engineer like Herbert Hoover wanted to see a real plan, devils being in the details. [5] But Hitler didn’t ‘think like an engineer,’ didn’t plan things out in detail before taking his first steps. He had intentions but thought more like the architect he had aspired to be, leaving the plumbing to less visionary minds. And that was when he engaged in anything resembling planning at all. Race above all, but also the cult of the heroic death and the Übermensch: Thies writes, “Hitler’s thought were dominated by myths right up to his death.” “The lack of a war plan against the United States or Japan is not surprising” (emphasis added) and the lack of “plans in the traditional sense” for the invasion of Soviet Russia, should come as no surprise, inasmuch as “even the war of 1939 had the character of something that was improvised.” 

    “The motto ‘world power or defeat’…didn’t mean the fulfillment of the goals of Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm, but as Hitler had clearly stated in public long before his seizure of power, meant either world domination or the demise of the German people,” all or nothing.

     

    Notes

    1. A. J. P. Taylor: The Origins of the Second World War. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961.
    2. See “Fascists” on this website under the category, “Nations.”
    3. The concentration of ‘Nordic’ Frenchmen in the north of France may explain why the Nazis ruled that region directly, leaving the ‘inferior’ racial stock of southern France under the rule of the puppet government at Vichy.
    4. For a similar assertion of strict ruling party control over the military, see “The Comprehensive Strategy of Xi Jinping,” on this website under the category, “Nations.”
    5. See Herbert Hoover: Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath, reviewed on this website as “Herbert Hoover’s Despairing Verve,” under the category “American Politics.”

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    The Derangement of Love in the Western World

    April 16, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Denis de Rougemont: Love in the Western World. Montgomery Belgion translation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

     

    While “classical Greek used at least sixteen different terms to designate love in all its forms,” modern languages make fewer distinctions and modern language speakers often fail to keep them straight. Today, “the West is distinct from other cultures not only by its invention of passionate love in the twelfth century and the secular elaboration of conjugal love, but by its confusion of the notions of eros, agape, sexuality, passion.” For de Rougemont, genuine love “seeks the welfare of the Other”; a loving soul controls itself, not the Other, and such love constitutes “the active principle of all human freedom.” In considering this book, readers should never forget its publication date, 1940, when the Nazis rolled into Paris. French Swiss de Rougemont, a Personalist and friend of Emmanuel de Mounier, protested Nazi tyranny in Europe and was exiled to the United States after Berlin applied pressure to Berne. Nazism can be understood as a grotesque deformation of German Romanticism, closely associated with German nationalism, which de Rougemont charges with continuing the derangement of Europeans’ understanding of love that had begun centuries earlier with the myth of Tristan and Iseult.

    Several versions of the myth were set down, beginning in the twelfth century. King Mark of Cornwall charges his nephew and knight, Tristan, with escorting Iseult, and Irish princess, from Ireland to Cornwall, where she is to wed the king as part of a peace agreement between the two kingdoms. En route, they inadvertently drink a love potion, which causes them to violate the fealty both owe to the king. After the arranged marriage, the lovers commit adultery; their discovery threatens the peace, foreign and domestic. In one version, King Mark kills Tristan.

    De Rougemont finds in this the archetype of the modern European novel, typically a story of fatal love. “Happy love has no history”; “romance only comes into existence when love is fatal, frowned upon and doomed by life itself.” Fatal love is passion, which “means suffering” and ruins married love, as celebrated (for example) in Edmund Spenser’s beautiful Epithalamium:

    But if ye saw that which no eyes can see, 

    The inward beauty of her lively spright

    Garnisht with heavenly guifts of high degree,

    Much more then would ye wonder at the sight….

    There dwells sweet lawe and constant chastity,

    Unspotted faith and comely womanhod,

    Regard 0f honour and mild modesty,

    There vertue reynes as Queene in royal throne,

    And giveth lawes alone.

    Since Tristan and Iseult, Europeans have confusedly celebrated both marriage and passion. Love and marriage: you can’t have one without the other, but only so long as you understand married love as Spenser understands it, not as passion, which is by its nature unruly. Passion goes poorly with marriage. The story of Tristan and Iseult is the “one great European myth of adultery.” By “myth” de Rougemont means a code of conduct, a story that enables listeners to see “certain types of constant relations and to disengage thee from the welter of everyday appearances.” The source of the myth is always anonymous, shrouded in mystery. It needs to be, as “no myth arises as long as it is possible to keep to the obvious and express this obvious openly and directly. Unlike an ordinary work of art, a myth compels; “reason, if not silenced, becomes at least ineffective,” as the myth wields power over our dreams. “A myth is needed to express the dark and unmentionable fact that passion is linked with death, and involves the destruction of any one yielding himself up to it with all his strength.” The myth of Tristan and Iseult “set[s] passion in a framework within which it could be expressed in symbolical satisfactions.” Passion itself, obviously, already existed and would continue to exist if the myth disappeared, since passion is by nature. Catastrophe occurs when natural passion rules the other natural capacities of souls. The myth “operates wherever passion is dreamed of as an ideal instead of being feared like a malignant fever,” as seen not only in romantic novels but in Hitler’s impassioned Mein Kampf and his mesmerizing histrionics, which take passion for Germany and the ‘Aryan race’ beyond the point of insanity. “What I aim at,” Rougemont writes, “is to bring the reader to the point of declaring frankly, either ‘That is what I wanted!’ or else ‘God forbid!'”

    To do so, “remaining deaf and blind to the ‘charms’ of the tale, I am going to try to summarize ‘objectively’ the events it relates and the reasons which it either gives for these events or very oddly omits.” He begins with the name, ‘Tristan,’ which derives from triste, sadness, in the knight’s life the death of his father before he was born and the death of his mother in childbirth. As to the love potion, it too is clearly associated also with death. In the story, passionate love and death intertwine like lovers; their one issue will be the death of them both.

    Feudal rule consists of fidelity between the lord and his vassal. Without it, the social and political order of medieval Europe will decay and collapse. Courtly love, love between the lover and his lady, romance, the rule of chivalry, challenges the rule of feudality, the rule of marriage and of the aristocratic regime. [1] If the ideal is realized, it destroys that regime. Tristan delivers Iseult to King Mark only after drinking the love potion “because the rule of courtly love did not allow a passion of this kind to ‘turn into a reality'”; in this way, “Tristan chooses to respect feudal fealty, which is thus made to disguise and equivocally to abet courtly fealty.” In the love affair, “everything holds together and is connected after the manner of a dream, and not in accordance with our lives.” “Passionate love wants ‘the faraway princess,’ whereas Christian love wants ‘our neighbor.'”

    The ruinous thing is that the lovers act according to a necessity, the power of the potion, a necessity “that is stronger than the need of their happiness,” which requires the rule of passion by the better parts of the soul. This leads to irresolvable conflict of the Romance: “the demon of courtly love which prompts the lovers in their inmost selves to the devices that are the cause of their pain is the very demon of the novel as we in the West like it to be.” De Rougemont invites his reader to pull back from our passionate love of passion. True, “it would be idle to condemn; swooning cannot be condemned.” But the eros of the philosopher, dispassionate, will “meditate in the act of swooning”: “perhaps knowledge is but the effort of a mind that resists the headlong fall and holds back in the midst of temptation.”

    In so doing, de Rougemont observes that “the lovers do not seem to be brought together in any normal human way.” “Everything goes to show that they would never have chosen one another were they acting freely.” This puts them in “a thrillingly contradictory position,” having sinned unintentionally, not freely, therefore putting themselves beyond repentance, beyond forgiveness, beyond reform. “Like all great lovers, they imagine that they have been ravished ‘beyond good and evil’ into a kind of transcendental state outside ordinary human experience, into an ineffable absolute irreconcilable with the world, but that they feel to be more real than the world.” As a wise hermit tells them, “Love by force dominates you.” De Rougemont’s allusion to Nietzsche again glances at Hitler, Nietzsche’s malign dwarf-imposter. 

    Tristan and Iseult “do not love one another.” “What they love is love and being in love. They behave as if aware that whatever obstructs love must ensure and consolidate it in the heart of each other and intensify it infinitely in the moment they reach the absolute obstacle, which is death.” [2] Their love requires not “one another’s presence but one another’s absence” because they love their passion rather than “its satisfaction or on its living object,” “mutually encouraging their join dream in which they remain solitary.” Similarly, in political life, the tyrant ‘unifies’ his nation by dividing it, focusing the attention of each individual upon the tyrant, who remains an unreachable object of their impassioned longing. 

    And like tyranny, courtly love conceals a death wish. Tristan and Iseult “are seeking peril for its own sake,” for the thrill of it. Passion seeks the death of the impassioned. In the story, King Mark discovers them asleep together with Tristan’s sword lying between them. He replaces the lover’s sword with his own. “The meaning of this is that in place of the obstruction which the lovers have wanted and have deliberately set up he puts the sign of his social prerogative”—not only social but political—a “legal and objective obstruction.” Tristan takes up the challenge making the ideal of courtly love triumph over “the sturdy Celtic tradition which proclaimed its pride in life” in an attempt to be “redeemed and avenged” in obedience to “the active passion of Darkness.”

    The cause of all this, the love potion, is a form of magic. Like myth, “magic persuades without giving reasons, and is perhaps persuasive to precisely the extent that it withholds reasons.” It is “an alibi for passion,” a release from responsibility. “Who would dare admit that he seeks Death and detests offensive Day, that what he longs for with all his being is the annihilation of his being.” In the later poetry of modern Romanticism and its offshoots, the poetes maudit “did dare to make this crowning avowal,” to which sane people replied, “They are mad!” “It is because passion cannot exist without pain that passion makes our ruin seem desirable to us.”

    The mystique of Romance thus resembles Christian mysticism, but the resemblance is superficial. The Christian mystics did indeed experience the dark night of the soul, but with “a strict and lucid passion made strict and lucid by their faith in “an altogether personal and ‘luminous’ Will [who] would take the place of theirs.” “Their will power was not seized upon by the nameless of the love potion, a blind force or Nothingness, but by the God who promises His grace, and ‘the living flame of love’ that burns in the ‘deserts’ of the Night.” Passionate love is “the longing for what sears us and annihilates us in its triumph.” This is “the secret which Europe has never allowed to be given away,” the secret of one “who has willed his own fate”—Nietzsche’s amor fati. Its consequence is tyranny and war—yesterday, the great Romancier Napoleon, today Hitler (and, one might well add, Stalin). Western man “reaches self-awareness and tests himself only by risking his life—in suffering and on the verge of death,” which is “the most tenacious root of the war instinct.” One sees this in Machiavelli, in Hobbes, and in Hegel (as de Rougemont remarks), for whom “suffering and understanding are deeply connected,” “death and self-awareness…in league.” “On this alliance, Hegel was able to ground a general explanation of the human mind, and also of human history” in his dialectic, the dialectic of historicism, the doctrine that presents itself politically as either progressivist liberalism or progressivist tyranny. That is, the late-modern rationalism of the ‘administrative state’ oddly owes a sort of debt to Romance, of all things, and especially to Romance’s attempt to realize the Ideal through battles to the death.

    The dialectic of Tristan and Iseult has no rational content, however. It is a myth of “passionate love at once shared and fought against, anxious for a happiness it rejects, and magnified in its own disaster—unhappy mutual love.” “They love one another, but each loves the other from the standpoint of self and not from the other’s standpoint.” Because passionate love “disguises a twin narcissism,” “there pierces through their excessive passion a kind of hatred of the beloved.” Which is why it all leads to death. “The god Eros is the slave of death because he wishes to elevate life above our finite and limited creature state. Hence the same impulse that leads us to adore life thrusts us into its negation.” Once declared, passion “wants everything, and especially the unattainable: infinitude in a finite being.” It is a longing that can only be negated, killed, never satisfied.

    “Antiquity has left no record of an experience akin to the love of Tristan and Iseult.” Menander speaks for the ‘ancients’ when he calls passionate love a sickness. The eros of Platonism longs for “infinite transcendence” and de Rougemont associates it with the East, with Persian, Gnostic, and Hindu myths that pit spirituality against the flesh in the sort of dualism seen in Manicheism. Every such dualistic “interpretation of the universe holds the fact of being alive in the body to be the absolute woe the woe embracing all other woes; and death it holds to be the ultimate good, whereby the sin of birth is redeemed, and human beings return into the One of luminous indistinction.” They did not experience agape, Christian love, “the incarnation of the Word in the world—and of Light in Darkness—[as] the astounding event whereby we are delivered from the woe of being alive.” Christian dying to the self begins “a new life here below—not the soul’s flight out of the world, but its return in force into the midst of the world,” loving both God and neighbor. “To love God is to obey God, Who has commanded us to love one another,” and “the symbol of Love is no longer the infinite passion of a soul in quest of light, but the marriage of Christ and the Church,” a “truly mutual” love whose object is “the other as he or she really is.” [3]

    The East is dualistic as regards the world, monistic as regards the soul’s fulfillment, absorption into the one. The ancient West is dualistic s regards fulfillment, since we have communion with God but not absorption, a union paralleled in marriage. “God is not to be found by means of a limitless elevation of desire. However much our eros may be sublimated, it can never cease to be self.” Paradoxically, however, love as passion arose in the West in “flagrant contradiction between doctrine and moeurs.” This happened in the collision between ancient European paganism, especially in its Epicurean form, and Christianity, in which agapic love collides painfully with the world. The pain of passionate love amounts to “a terrestrial form of the cult of Eros,” a popularized Platonism which makes physical beauty its object,” combined with the pain of Christian struggle. The Church struggled to suppress the cult of Eros, but it transformed itself into the cult of courtly love, the love of the troubadours. “No European poetry has been more profoundly rhetorical” than that of the troubadours, with their “rules of love,” their “high-flown fervor,” their exaltation of women as terrestrial goddesses. The troubadours appeared simultaneously with the Catharist religion, with its neo-Manichean dualism asserting that God is love and the world is evil. With the Cathars, dualism eventuates in monism, as even Satan is finally reconciled to God and there is not eternal damnation. “The condemnation of the flesh, which is now viewed by some as characteristically Christian, is in fact of Manichaean and ‘heretical’ origin. For it must be borne in mind that when Saint Paul speak of the ‘flesh’ he means not the physical body but the whole of the unbelieving man—body, mind, faculties, and desires—and hence his soul, too.” Troubadours and Cathars frequented the same houses in southern France, extolled chastity instead of marriage, and preferred death to life on earth. Cathars jibed that the Roman Catholic Church (ROMA) inverted the very name of love (AMOR). They “extolled the Lady of Thoughts, the Platonic Idea of the feminine principle”—Diotima—and “the encouragement of Love contrary to marriage and, at the same time, of chastity,” and this may be seen in the contemporaneous decision to make the Queen in chess the greatest power on the board. Contrary to marriage and to chastity: “courtly love resembles adolescent love when this is yet chaste and hence all the more consuming.” Politically, the twelfth century saw “a marked relaxation of the patriarchal and feudal bond,” which the myth of Tristan and Iseult clearly registers; Cathars generally eschewed political life altogether. In their turn, Christian priests attempted to rechannel this eroticism into worship of the Virgin; “the monastic orders were then being founded were retorts to the orders of chivalry,” and monks were styled Knights of Mary. [4] Both Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas looked somewhat askance at the movement, and understandably so, inasmuch as courtly love’s “terms of expression have been taken up and used by nearly every great mystic in the West,” very much in contrast to the Christianity and Bernard and Thomas, for whom Logos is God and God is Logos. 

    What the Romantics of the nineteenth century first called ‘courtly love’ spread from southern France to northern France, a movement de Rougemont associates with the marriage of Eleanor, Duchess of Aquitaine, to the future King Louis VII. In de Rougemont’s telling, Eleanor brought her troubadours and courtly love with her, which may explain some of Bernard of Clairvaux’s hostility towards her. Chrétien de Troyes learned “the rules and secret of courtly love” from one of Eleanor’s daughters; he brings courtly love to the Arthurian legend, a legend into which Tristan and Iseult’s story was integrated. After the annulment of her marriage to Louis (she had borne him no male heir) she married Henry, Duke of Normandy, later Henry II of England, bringing courtly love even further north, to the land where the ancient Druids had already practiced a dualistic religion which made Woman a symbol of divinity. In the Irish myth, as distinguished from the earliest version of the French myth as told by the poet known only as Béroul, “what brings disaster” to the lovers is “a secret but unerring wish” rather than “an entirely external fate.” De Rougemont’s interpretation of Tristan and Iseult’s story tracks the convolution of the myth, beginning with fate, the love potion, but uncovering the death wish.

    It was Gottried von Strassburg who brought the myth to Germany, also in the twelfth century. Gottfried “discloses better than all the others a fundamental element in the Myth—a sensual fret and a ‘humanistic’ pride that makes up for the fret.” While depicting “the sexual instinct” as a resented “cruel fate” and “tyranny,” pride enters in “because the tyranny is imagined to become a divinizing force—setting man against God—once it is decided to yield to it,” a paradox that “heralds Nietzsche’s amor fati“, and Wagner’s.” Gottfried alludes to Bernard of Clairvaux’s teachings in order to invert them, valorizing darkness and dissolution, not light and salvation. In ‘his’ Church, a bed is substituted for an altar. Gottfried is a Gnostic, believing that one purges instinct only by first yielding to it. “His Tristan is far more profoundly and indisputably Manichaean than the Divine Comedy is Thomist.” Thus, in de Rougemont’s Europe and the West generally, only a half-century or so after Wagner and Nietzsche, “the passion which novels and films have now popularized is nothing else than a lawless invasion and flowing back into our lives of a spiritual heresy the key to which we have lost.” The breakdown of marriage in contemporary nations “is nothing less than a struggle between two religious traditions,” even if it seems a conflict between traditional religion and ‘secularism.’

    The similarities of courtly love to Christian mysticism and its differences from it need more elaboration, which de Rougemont now provides. The “fatal love” of the courtly writers is a form of mysticism; mysticism is not a form of fatal love. Drinking the love potion, Tristan “transgresses the rule of the Pure,” obtaining “his symbolic kiss by force,” unleashing “the powers of evil.” “Tristan is but an adulterated and sometimes ambiguous expression of courtly mysticism,” which seeks not the spiritual marriage seen in Christian marriage, whether of God and Church or of man and wife, but fusion with what transcends life, which turns out to be death. Tristan exhibits knightly pride—danger for its own sake, passion leading to death misinterpreted as self-divinization, whereas genuine Christians exhibit humility in their prudence, their rigor, their clear-sighted obedience to God because Christianity reveals Jesus as God incarnate, God who came down to us, obviating the need for passionate, prideful self-transfigurement. “Passionate love tends to grow like the exaltation of a kind of narcissism,” while Christian love says, “Not my will, but Thine.” “The central event in the world from the standpoint of every kind of religious life that is Christian in content and in form must be the Incarnation. To shift however little from this center involves the double peril of humanism and idealism. The Catharist heresy idealized the whole of the Gospel and treated love in all its forms as a leap out of the created world. The craving for this flight into the divine—or enthusiasm—and for this ultimately impracticable transgression of human limitations, was bound to find expression, and thereby to betray itself fatally, through the magnification in divine terms of sexual love. Conversely, the most ‘Christocentric’ mystics have had a propensity to address God in the language of human feeling—the language of sexual attraction, of hunger and thirst, and of the will. This is a magnification in human terms of the love of God.” A Christian who “die[s] to self” commences “a more real life here below, not the ruin of the world.” He disbelieves the possibility of union with the divine, which “renders human love possible within its own limits.” Thus, “what is the language of human passion according to the heresy corresponds to the language of divine passion”—Christ being the Man of Sorrows, who dies horrifically—in Christianity. “On the far side of trances and askesis, the [Christian] mystic experience culminates in a state of the most thorough ‘disintoxication’ of the soul and of the utmost self-possession. And only then does marriage become possible, meaning as it must, not the employment of eros, but the fecundity of agape.” 

    True to the Catharist origin pf their beliefs, the devotees of courtly love “did not know that “Darkness is the Anger of God—called forth by our rebellion—and not the work of an obscure demiurge.” “Refusing to be taught by the Light in this life and by means of ‘matter,’ misunderstanding an Agape that sanctifies creatures, and so ignorant of the true nature of what they held to be sin, they ran the risk of being irremediably lost in sin precisely when they thought they were escaping from it” in what was really “an exaltation of narcissism,” an intensity of sentiment, intoxication by passion.

    De Rougemont then turns to the history of the courtly love theme in European literature from the Roman de la Rose to Stendhal and finally in Wagnerian opera. This account necessarily addresses the ‘Tocqueville theme’—the move from aristocracy to democracy, from high to mass culture. Throughout the late Middle Ages and into the Protestant Reformation, “the Church of Love was reproduced in countless sects more or less secret and more or less revolutionary,” sects denying “the dogma of the Trinity, at least in its orthodox form,” rejecting both the Roman Catholic Church and the major Protestant churches (“Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli fought these dissenters with the same violence that Rome had employed against its own sectarians”), and upholding “an egalitarian spirit, extending in some cases to complete communism.” The Roman de la Rose itself exhibits the two tendencies, the first part having been written in the ‘idealist’ vein by Guillaume de Lorris and published in 1230, the second written in the ‘realist’ vein by Jean de Meung and published in 1275. De Rougemont traces the influence of the first part to Dante and Rousseau (whose La Nouvelle Héloise, though hardly Christian, does culminate and marriage), the second to the gritty French fabliaux. “Dante is never more passionate than when Philosophy is the theme of his song, unless it is when Philosophy has turned into Holy Science”; he exemplifies the Christianization of the courtly love tradition, as does Petrarch, who moves from the world of courtly love (as in The Triumph of Love) to Christianity and divine forgiveness. Following de Meung, however, “the glorification of wanton indulgence was carried to the same extreme as the glorification of chastity” in the fabliaux, which “heralded the comic novel, which in turn heralded the novel of manners, which heralded the controversial naturalism of much of the fiction of the nineteenth century.” The gauloiserie, the bawdiness, of the fabliaux “expresses an attitude which is simply the inversion of Petrarch’s”; “if chivalry made a mockery of marriage from above, gauloiserie was undermining it from below,” as in the Dit de Chiceface, featuring a monster who feeds only on faithful wives and is consequently reduced to a perpetual condition of emaciation. (Bigorne, Chiceface’s companion, feeds only on submissive husbands and is fat, given their abundance.) 

    Among the playwrights, in Romeo and Juliet Shakespeare writes the only “courtly tragedy”—fittingly so, as Verona was a center of Catharism in Italy. In the final scene, “death’s consolamentum has sealed the one kind of marriage that Eros was able to wish for.” Corneille “giv[es] battle to the myth” of courtly love”: His “originality lies in having sought to attack and deny this passion by which he was sustained,” attempting “to preserve at least the principle of freedom…without however sacrificing to it the delightful and tormenting effects of the irresistible ‘love potion’—here metaphorical,” and making “the wish to be free a highly effective instrument of the passion which it claimed to cure.” While exhibiting “a rather morbid acceptance of the defeat of mind and of the resignation of the senses,” Racine in his Phèdre brings the myth “up into the light,” making passion “finally succumb to the Norm of Light.” But not in the manner of Thomas Aquinas or of Dante, since Racine embraced Jansenist Catholicism, “a religion of retreat—perhaps the final insult to intolerable day.” The trace of troubadourism remains.

    The advance of rationalism and of rationalist Christianity in the seventeenth century brought on a temporary “eclipse of the myth.” Marriage made a comeback and “emotion was imprisoned in the showy contrivances of the classical baroque.” Many writers replaced “the separation of mind from believing soul” with “the distinction between mind and body.” With “intelligence and sex” now considered the principal division within human beings, passion could have no elevation, real or imagined. “It became the fashion to talk of passionettes or little passions,” since the passions had been belittled. However powerful the passion of Don Juan (first seen in Tirso de Molina’s The Trickster in 1630, then in Molière’s Don Juan in 1665), it is a low, a sensual passion. Don Juan “is the demon of unalloyed immanence, a prisoner of worldly appearances, and the martyr of a more and more deceptive and despicable sensation,” unlike Tristan, “the prisoner of a realm lying beyond night and day and the martyr of a rapture which is transformed at death into unalloyed bliss.” Tristan’s sword is the sword of a knight, Don Juan’s sword only a phallic symbol. “Amid so much pliancy, so much intellectual and sensual refinement, so much satiation, one most profound human need was left unsatisfied—the need of suffering.” This need was fulfilled, but now in the lowest way, by the writings of the Marquis de Sade, a soul in the grip of “dialectical frenzy.” “Only murder can destroy freedom, and it must be the murder of the beloved, inasmuch as loving is what fetters us.” 

    With the French Revolution, its Terror, and the wars subsequent to it, suffering returned. With German Romanticism, “for the first time, the worship of Darkness and of Death rose up into the field of lyrical awareness,” as poets revived the Tristan themes. German Romanticism wavers between enthusiasm and “metaphysical melancholy,” analogous to the Manichaean dialectic of day and night. Gradually, the metaphysical element declined, as “the myth became progressively more thoroughly internal” and “all vestiges of a ‘sacred’ element vanished from social life.” This gets into the European novels that appeared soon after, especially those of Stendhal, who writes in the ‘realist’ line. His hero returns “to a state in which the beloved will be viewed as she actually is,” and the way back to reality is low: “the antidote to the love potion is inconstancy,” a plot in which tragedy turns into farce. For the realists, passion is merely an error, as there can be no grandeur in materialism. In lesser novelists (Alexandre Dumas, Henri Bataille) the myth is popularized in an “attempt to normalize passion for the middle class.” The King Mark figure is only a cuckold, Tristan only a gigolo, Iseult only an “idle, dissatisfied wife who reads novels.” This is “the idealization of tame desires.”

    Wagner resists all of this. “He understood that [passion] is one of the fundamental decisions open to a human being, a choice exercised in favor of Death if Death is release from a world under the sway of evil.” The “religion of passion” is essentially lyrical, better expressed not in words but in music. It is operatic. Wagnerianism takes a sinister form when introduced to mass, democratized politics, with Fascism and Communism, aiming to “deify the here-below.” Whether in literature or in politics, passion responds to “the need of idealization which the human mind had acquired from a mystical understanding first condemned, then lost.” “Politics, the class war, national feeling—everything nowadays is an excuse for ‘passion’ and is already being magnified into this or that ‘mystic doctrine”” in a return “to the age of abduction and rape.” The ancients used warlike metaphors to describe “the effects of natural love,” but the tactics of war and the ways of lovers were not linked; different rules prevailed. In the twelfth century, this changed, as erotic language became those of possession and surrender, the rules of chivalry prevailing in both war and love. “At no other time has an ars amandi given birth to an ars bellandi.” But now, just as “the detailed formality of war was devised to check the violent impulses of feudal blood,” aristocratic thumos, “the cult of chastity among the troubadours was intended to check erotic excitement.” By contrast, Renaissance Italian princes preferred to buy the enemy’s army, not to fight it (a trend Machiavelli deplored), and preferred to buy love, too, as courtesans became respectable citizens (this, Machiavelli somehow neglected to deplore). The cannons and common soldiers of France under the command of King Charles conquered Italy, in an early demonstration of the power of centralized monarchy and democratized society against the aristocrats, but modern European warriors still retained a certain formality. War became chess-like, deaths again minimized in “the supreme achievement of a civilization whose whole aim was the regulation and ordering of Nature, matter, and the determinism of both, according to the laws of human reason and of personal benefit.” This “may have been an illusory aim, but without it no civilization and no culture are possible.” Neoclassical Europe refused “to see any nobility in disaster,” placing “the greatness of man in his ability to limit” the effect of war and passion “and to make them serve other ends.” Even the libertines of the eighteenth century preferred “crafty diplomacy” to fighting, as they “did not intend to jeopardize the refinements of life.” Talleyrand comes to mind, but de Rougemont is thinking of the Marshal de Saxe, who insisted that “a good general can make war all his life” without ever fighting a battle, and the Scots financier in Louis XV’s court, suggested buying the enemy’s artillery instead of waging a war.

    The French revolutionaries changed that. Regicide meant that passion had returned, perhaps as a deformation of Rousseau; “the violence that had long been pinned down by the classical formality of warfare became once again something at once horrifying and alluring.” This “cult and blood-spilling mystery…gave rise to a new form of community—the Nation,” which, in the already existing spirit of democracy, must be “translated to the level of the people as a whole” in the characteristically passionate form of narcissism, now a collective self-love. “Passion requires that the self shall become greater than all things, as solitary and powerful as God,” unknowingly making death its object. “Napoleon was the first to take the passion factor into account each time he gave battle,” invoking “the passionate might of the Nation” in his rhetoric. Although Chateaubriand has strong affinities with the Romantics, he remained enough of a neoclassicist, and became enough of a Christian, to oppose Napoleon. [5] The German Romantics were not so moderate, even as they, as nationalists, sided with their rulers in Prussia against Napoleon’s armies. “And the essentially passionate philosophies of thinkers like Fichte and Hegel” reinforced nationalism, as well. As a secular religion, nationalism ensured that “it was no longer rival interests that came into conflict, but antagonistic ‘religions'” and, “unlike interests, religions do not compromise,” making religious and quasi-religious wars “by far the most violent.” 

    The Battle of Verdun, a century later, changed the face of war yet again, aiming not at conquest but destruction, thanks to new military technologies that dealt death “from afar.” This “has no equivalent in any imaginable code of love,” which assumes or at least aspires to intimate knowledge of the other. “Total war eludes both man and instinct; it turns upon passion, its begetter.” Politics of nationalism and party became the only conduit for passion, as “the masses respond to the dictator in a particular country in the same way as the women of that country respond to the tactics of suitors.” In Mein Kampf, Hitler understands the crowds in front of him as essentially feminine, himself as their seducer-master. De Rougemont predicts that in modern tyranny or ‘totalitarianism’ ruling institutions will eventually fail because the gulf between those institutions and the everyday lives of individuals will become too great, and the binding force of the ‘charismatic’ lover-leader will weaken, as one such tyrant follows another. Without any real morality or culture, the regime will weaken and collapse. 

    In the liberal regimes, it is marriage that is in crisis. As Montaigne demonstrates, modern life centers on individuality and, as a result, individual choice has been made the new basis for marriage. It is not a sound basis. The “middle class morals” of today, devitalized elements of what was once a living faith, along with “romantic morals” or passion, a “profaned and therefore distorted” version of courtly love, threaten the foundation of civil-social order. Marriage had been founded on three conditions: rituals or “sacred compulsions”; community moeurs; and religious doctrine, especially the promise of eternity. “Passion and marriage are essentially irreconcilable,” and in the contemporary West “the dream of potential passion acts as a perpetual distraction to paralyze the revulsions of boredom.” Madame Bovary doesn’t understand that “passion is a woe,” not a relief, and she is not the only one who doesn’t understand that. Indeed, “passion wrecks the very notion of marriage at a time when there is being attempted the feat of trying to ground marriage in values elaborated by the morals of passion.” Whereas “earlier victims of the myth” could “throw off its spell” by “escaping out of the finite world,” now “a passion calling itself ‘irresistible’ (as an alibi for the discharge of responsibility) cannot even discover how to be called faithful, since its end is no longer transcendence” and the phrase ’till death do us part’ therefore makes no sense to those who mouth it. “To be faithful is to have decided to accept another being for his or her own sake, in his or her own limitations and reality choosing this being not as an excuse for excited elevation or as an ‘object of contemplation,’ but as having a matchless and independent life which requires active love,” since “any man opposed to compromise is inconsistent in marrying.” That is, the mutual ruling and being-ruled of a husband and wife teaches the mutual ruling and being ruled of politics. [6]. Nations being nations and regimes being regime, contemporary tyrants, having no use for genuine politics, ruling according to their own passions and by fomenting passion in their subjects, have attacked sexual libertinism not by reviving religion but with collectivism, re-branding it as a producer of future soldiers. “Like passion, the taste for war follows on a notion that life should be ardent, a notion which is a mask of a wish for death.” 

    “First and last, at the beginning and the end of passion, there is no ‘delusion’ about man or about God—and a forteriori no moral delusion—but a crucial decision: a man wishes to be his own god.” Reasoning cannot cure this, and appeals to the realities of life are worthless, since they are what the passionate man condemns. “Such a man’s passion can be overcome only by killing him before he can kill himself, and in some other way than he wishes to die.” If by bodily nature human beings are polygamous, if human imagination attempts to elevate us beyond life in a passionate embrace of death, in married love “the self rises into being a person—beyond its own happiness.” “That shows how different are the meanings of the word ‘to love’ in the world of Eros and in the world of Agape.” Agapic love is commanded, not spontaneous, active not passive: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.” Not even God can “demand of a man a state of sentiment,” but He can demand actions. Otherwise, “the imperative, ‘Be in love! would be devoid of meaning; or, if it could be obeyed, would deprive a man of his freedom.” Agape “is the expression of being in action.” With Christianity, “salvation is no longer something beyond, and ever a little more out of reach during the indeterminable ascent of Desire, the consumer of life; it is here below and is attainable through obedience to the Word.” The “idealistic askesis” of unChristian love is what “Nietzsche unjustly lays at the door of Christianity.” But if animated by agapic love, a husband’s “dearest wish is for the other’s good.” Marriage is “the institution in which passion is ‘contained,’ not by morals, but by love.” Marriage does not simply negate passion, which would be impossible; it limits passion, enables marriages to endure after passion weakens.

    “All of my morals, my passion, and my politics derive from the composition and tension of opposites,” the concordia discors of the cosmos itself, as created by God. Without that concordia, with the attempt to reduce a theme to a single beat, human beings succumb to the modern form of tyranny, ‘totalitarianism’ by destroying in their own lives “the existence of essential Love.”

     

    Notes

    1. “Courtly love” is itself a term invented by the Romantics of the nineteenth century, but the thing itself originated in the high Middle Ages.
    2. This is why the love potion acts like a drug, exerting a power that is “solipsistic, narcissistic, and segregative,” just as passion is. “Their passion does not touch the reality of the Other but loves only its own image”—which is “why marriage cannot be based on passion.”
    3. One may doubt that de Rougemont is quite fair to Plato and his Socrates, since the philosophic eros, in one sense zetetic or perpetually questing, and questioning, engages fellow human beings in the quest for noēsis, however incomplete or tentative the noetic experience will be. By knowing that they do not know, philosophers tacitly acknowledge that only a God who grants insight into Himself by grace could fully satisfy their quest.
    4. De Rougemont views the Franciscans with some suspicion, too, considering them spiritual knights-errant. “The rhetoric of the troubadours and of the courtly romances was the direct inspiration of the Franciscan poetic impulse.” St. Theresa of Avila, who “doted upon” the romances of chivalry in her girlhood, also “employs and even refines upon courtly rhetoric.” “What an extraordinary return and incorporation of heresy by means of a rhetoric devised by heretics for use against the Church, and which the Church, thanks to the saints, eventually wrested from them!”
    5.  See “Chateaubriand Against Napoleon,” on this website under “Nations.”
    6. “Inasmuch as when taken one by one most human beings of both sexes are either rogues or neurotics, why should they turn into angels the moment they are paired?” This is why stability in marriage requires belief in God, the eternal; only with such belief can one attempt to “live perfectly in imperfection”—a “sober folly that rather closely simulates behaving sensibly; that is neither heroic nor challenging, but a patient and fond application,” “a pledge given for this world.” “Fidelity secures itself against unfaithfulness by becoming accustomed not to separate desire from love. For if desire travels, swiftly and anywhere, love is slow and difficult; love actually does pledge one for the rest of one’s life, and it exacts nothing less than this pledge in order to disclose its real nature. That is why a man who believes in marriage can no longer believe seriously in ‘love at first sight,’ still less in the ‘irresistible’ nature of passion.”

     

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