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    Archives for March 2025

    The Comprehensive Strategy of Xi Jinping, 2012-2017

    March 27, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. Volume I: November 2012-June 2013. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2019.

    Xi Jinping: The Governance of China. Volume II: August 2014-September 2017. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017.

     

    Now President of China and, more importantly, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping spent his first five years as General Secretary explaining and implementing a comprehensive strategy for his country, the goal of which he identified in a press conference in November 2012 as “a happy life” for the people of China (I.3; see also Speech at a ceremony marking the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 71/16, II.40-41)). “A happy life comes from hard work” (I.4), and he unhesitatingly put himself, his Politburo colleagues, the Chinese Communist Party rank and file, and the people of China to work, so that “China can stand firmer and stronger among the world’s nations and make a new and greater contribution to mankind” (I.4). He singled out corruption as his most immediate target for attack and “maintain[ing] close ties with the people” as the CCP’s most urgent constructive task (I.5). These tasks were related, inasmuch as “we will work for the satisfaction of the people and correct any of our practices they are not happy about” (Speech at the Central Conference on judicial, procuratorial, and public security work, 1/7/14, I.163). However, he soon elaborated a “Four-Pronged Strategy,” consisting of a goal—to “complete a moderately prosperous society in all respects,” to be realized by the year 2020, and three “measures”: to “further reform, to advance the rule of law and to strengthen Party discipline” (Speech to Provincial Officials, 2/2/15, I.23). 

    To pursue this strategy, he emphasized the character of China’s regime, founded in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party, then ruled by Mao Zedong, who had founded the party in 1921. In a phrase that he would make famous, Xi called this regime a “socialist system with Chinese characteristics” (Speech to the first study group session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 11/17/12, I.6). He emphasized that “only socialism can save China” and that “only Chinese socialism can lead our country to development” in a manner that keeps the populous nation of numerous ethnic groups unified (ibid. I.7)—a perennial Chinese concern, given the history of conflicts between the emperor and regional warlords. Socialism “consists of a path, theory and system,” both a theory and a practice animated by the “scientific” methods of Marxism (ibid. 9). The “Four Cardinal Principles” of Chinese socialism are “the people’s democratic dictatorship,” leadership of the people by the CCP, Marxism-Leninism, and “Mao-Zedong Thought” (ibid. I.19 n.17). “Belief in Marxism and faith in socialism and communism are the political soul of Communists,” the “marrow of their faith” (ibid. I.16). The “path” governed by the Four Cardinal Principles has “economic development” along socialist lines as its “central task,” among many others (ibid. I.9). Because China is only at “the preliminary stage of socialism” (“socialist modernization…will take at least 100 years to take shape from the completion of the socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production in the 1950s” to its completion), the CPC, as “the core leadership for the cause of Chinese socialism,” has “shoulder[ed] a great responsibility.” To meet that responsibility “we must first run the Party well, and to run the Party well we must run it strictly” (ibid. I.15).  Corruption, inertia, incompetence, and separation from the people must be eliminated. This is because “the future and destiny of a political party and government depend on popular support,” the maintenance of which requires the Chinese Communist Party to “organize our people, communicate with them, educate them, serve them, learn from them, and subject ourselves to their oversight” (ibid. I.17). “Socialist democracy,” “consultative democracy,” the “people’s democratic dictatorship” must always be “led by the working class,” however, firmly upholds “the leadership of the CPC”; “we must remain committed to the Party’s core role in exercising overall leadership and coordinating the efforts of all” (Speech to the 60th Anniversary of the National People’s Congress, 9/5/14, II. 18 and II.314; Speech at the 65th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 921/14, II.318). Since “socialism with Chinese characteristics is a cause for all Chinese people,” always “under the Party’s leadership,” what Western political scientists, following Tocqueville, call civil associations require particular attention, inasmuch as they might interfere with the direct control of the central government, ruled by the CPC. “We must maintain and enhance the political nature of the Party’s work with social groups,” which “should always place themselves under the leadership of the Party and be consistent with the CPC Central Committee in politics, thought and action,” “guid[ing] the people to implement the Party’s instructions and follow the Party’s leadership, and unite their own people around the Party in the closest and most extensive way” (Speech to the CPC Central Committee conference on the Party’s work with social organizations, 7/6/15, II.335-336). For their part, the “social groups” should “learn work at the grassroots to learn about the people’s living conditions, becoming practitioners of the Party’s principle of serving he people, executors of the Paty’s mass line, and experts in the Party’s work for the people” (ibid. II.337).

    That is, the regime of Communist China is an oligarchy, the rule of the few who are rich, but an oligarchy of a kind first seen only in the previous century, in Soviet Russia. Whereas previous oligarchies consisted of persons already wealthy, the new, Russian Communist oligarchy consisted of persons who had seized the wealth of the wealthy, deploying it as the means to end the old oligarchy. In order to do so, a new oligarchy needed to be established, one that deployed the institutions of the modern, centralized state in order to end private property and, eventually, lead all societies to communism. In Lenin’s formula, the socialist state will “wither away.” But it didn’t. The Russian Communists confronted two problems: in the economic field, socialism failed to deliver prosperity; in the political field, it failed to deliver equality. They lost whatever popular support they may have enjoyed. As a result of these failures, pressured geopolitically by the prosperous and (relatively) egalitarian commercial republics, the Soviet Union eventually collapsed. Xi is acutely aware of these failures, seeing that they are endemic to socialist oligarchies—unless, as he urges, Communists discipline themselves and make the people “moderately prosperous” and thus “happy.” Chinese Communists must undertake to square the Leninist circle, winning the continuous support of the people while keeping their party firmly in power.

    To do this, the ruling body or politeuma must itself be united. “We have to unify the thinking and will of the whole Party, first in order to unify the thinking and will of the people of all China’s ethnic groups so that everyone works together to advance our reform.” In terms of the ruling institution or politeia, this will require “a complete set of closely connected and coordinated systems of the state.” Because the Soviet Union and its several Eastern and Central European satellites failed, “how to govern a socialist society, a completely new society, has not been clearly addressed by world socialism so far” (Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 11/12/13, I.101). Marx and Engels “had no practical experience in the comprehensive governance of a socialist country, as their theories about a future society were mostly predictive”; Lenin died before he could “explore this question in depth”; and the subsequent rulers of the Soviet Union “made serious mistakes and failed to resolve the problem” (ibid. I.101-102). This has left the task to “our Party,” which “has accumulated rich experience and achieved great success in improving our governance system and enhancing our governance capacity,” in “striking contrast to many regions and countries” today “that suffer constant chaos” (ibid. I.102). There are nonetheless substantial economic and political reforms remaining to be undertaken, given “the basic fact that China is still in the primary stage of socialism and will long remain so” (ibid. I.105). While the party has “a good blueprint” in hand for accomplishing these tasks, “what we should do is follow it through to the end and make it a success”; continuing his architectonic metaphor, Xi advises his colleagues, “we need to have a ‘nail’ spirit,” inasmuch as “when we use a hammer to drive in a nail, a single knock often may not be enough” (Speech to the second full assembly of the Second Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central  Committee, 2/28/13, I.446). “If a blueprint is good, factually based, scientifically sound [i.e., Marxist] and well-received by the people we should keep working on it, one administration after another, and the outcome of our work will be real and appreciated and remembered by the people” (ibid. I.446). Then, “as socialism progresses, our institutions will undoubtedly mature, the strengths of our system will become self-evident, and our development path will assuredly become wider.” “Marxism will not remain stagnant,” and it has not (Speech to the CPC Central Committee, 1/5/13, I.24); Chinese Marxism had its first stage under Mao, its second initially under Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1978, when China effectively adopted its own version of Lenin’s New Economic Policy in an attempt to ensure that socialism, state ownership of the means of production, did not suffocate economic growth and, in foreign policy, ended its geopolitical isolation. These latter-day policies might threaten firm Party rule over the country (as they did in 1920s Russia, a threat met with supreme force by Stalin, and again in the 1990s under Gorbachev, who did not meet the threat and lost the regime). 

    That is why “officials must be strict with themselves in self-cultivation, in the exercise of power, and in self-discipline” Speech to the Leading Group for Further Reform under the CPC Central Committee, 5/5/17, II.111). These are “Three Stricts,” outlined by Xi at a session of the Anhui delegation of the Second Session of the 12th People’s Congress in March 2014. Strictness in self-cultivation means a strong “sense of Party awareness,” firm “support of the ideals and principles of the Party,” and a certain high-mindedness, distant from “vulgar interests,” “unhealthy practices and evil influences.” Strictness in the exercise of power means exercising power “in the interests of the people” (very much as defined by the CCP Central Committee) according to the Central Committee’s “rules and regulations,” keeping power “within the confines of systemic checks” designed by the Central Commitee and never seeking privileges or abusing power “for personal gain.” Strictness in self-discipline means the willingness of “leading officials” to “always be ready to apply the rod to themselves,” prudently examining themselves in accordance with “Party discipline and state laws.” The Three Stricts must be supplemented by the “Three Earnests”; earnestly taking “facts as the basis of work planning, ensur[ing] that all ideas, policies, and plans are in line with actual conditions, objective laws, and scientific principle,” lest officials become “overly ambitious and divorced from reality”; earnestly being “down-to-earth” and “pragmatic in work” when undertaking new policies, facing and solving problems as they arise; and earnestly “upholding personal integrity,” by which he means loyalty to the Party, the people, and to Party colleagues. (Anhui delegation speech, I. 421-422). Such “internal Party scrutiny” “is the first and most fundamental means among all forms of scrutiny for the Party and the country,” but “it cannot work as a joint force without being integrated with scrutiny by state agencies, other political parties, the public, and public opinion.” Accordingly, “officials should invite scrutiny from all sides, showing both breadth of mind and confidence.” (Speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.206).

    During his years in Yan’an, after the Long March, Mao “put forward the idea of breaking the historical cycle of gaining political power only to lose it because of corruption that had often happened in Chinese history” (Speech to the Second Full Assembly of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.203). This task remains. “Discipline and rules are indispensable for political parties, especially for Marxist parties,” which rule in the name of the people (Speech to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/13/15, II.164). This means not only obedience to the Party Constitution and other state and party laws and policies but also “the traditions and working practices developed by our Party over the years” (ibid. II.164). The latter, unwritten rules are indispensable because the Party’s “very large membership” makes self-governance by rules alone impossible; no set of rules could be so detailed and pervasive as to govern such an organization effectively (ibid. II.164). And so, Party officials must avoid forming cliques of mutual self-promotion, oligarchies within the oligarchy; they must never make “careless and groundless remarks,” including gossip, rumors, and “inappropriate jokes” (ibid. II.165). Some kinds of grounded remarks are also forbidden, such as disclosing confidential information. In this vein, “some high-ranking officials have even compiled a coded language, which they use when speaking with their families and those close to them” (ibid. II.167). All of these practices subvert “the authority of the Central Committee” and “the unity of the Party” (ibid. II.168). Officials must “rein in our relatives and immediate staff,” not favor them (II.168). This bears on Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. Party members need “the moral fiber to denounce and rectify violations of Party discipline” (Speech to the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/14/14, I.440), building “a complete system of combating corruption through both punishment and prevention, strengthen[ing] education on combating corruption and upholding integrity” while “promot[ing] a culture of clean government” (Second Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/22/13, I.429; see also Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.197-200; and see also Speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/12/16, II.176-184). 

    In addition to the “social groups” or civic associations, the regime has a more formal institutional structure that reaches down to the people, namely, the units of the CPC organized on the level of the counties. At the beginning of 2015, Xi announced that all county party secretaries would be trained at the Central Party School, a “strategic move with long-term significance” aimed at “help[ing] Party secretaries better to understand and hence better to implement the decisions made” by the Central Committee by studying “theories of Chinese socialism” along with theoretical and practical problems faced in the counties (Speech at the Central Party School, 1/12/15, II.151). “Counties are a key link in our Party’s set-up and state power, an important basis for developing the economy, ensuring people’s well-being, and maintaining and promoting the enduring peace and stability of our country” (ibid. II.152). Although “not a high-ranking post,” the county secretaryship can also prove a stepping-stone to higher office; “looking back, quite a few well-known figures started their political careers at county level” (ibid. II.152). Apart from Marxist faith, there are opportunities for career advancement within the oligarchy, if a County Party secretary acts well. For a party secretary, “loyalty [to the CCP] is central,” “the greatest virtue” (ibid. II.154). “County Party chiefs are an easy target for all kinds of temptation, plots, flattery and excessive praise with an aim to topple you” (ibid. II.154). To avoid this, they “must always follow the correct political direction,” remember that they “are part of the organization,” think of themselves as “someone who belongs to the Party” as a person “genuinely committed, persistent and faithful to Marxism” (ibid. II.155). County Party secretaries must “address the most pressing and relevant problems that are of the utmost concern to the people, especially the problems that the people complain about, and address them promptly” rather than “indulg[ing] in wasteful showcase projects to prop up your own image” (ibid. II.156-157). “We must act conscientiously as if we were treading on thin ice, and standing on the edge of an abyss,” the abyss of popular discontent (ibid. II.161). 

    Overall, Party officials at all levels are subject to “discipline inspection” by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision Work under the Administrative Supervision Law (Speech to the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 1/12/16, II.185). These agencies will coordinate “discipline inspection tours” of the country, a Chinese tradition dating ack to the fourteenth century. While “our discipline inspectors are not ancient circuit inspectors…they must be authoritative,” being “vital to the development of the country and the Party,” both of which must minimize corrupt practices and ideological deviation in order to survive and to thrive (ibid. II.186). Regarding ideological deviation, Party members and prospective members are to study the Party Constitution and rules, along with Xi Jinping’s speeches, to practice the interaction between themselves and the people described above, and cultivate the virtues of honesty in thought, words, and deeds. “In strengthening the Party, the priority is to enhance its political philosophy, and the key is to ensure discipline among Party members and officials” (Directives on the “Two Studies, One Action” education program, 2/4/16, II.189). In selecting and training officials, the Party needs to have a clear understanding of “what a good official is, how to become a good official, and how to use the right officials for the right job” (Speech at the National Conference on Organizational Work, 6/28/13, I.461). The definition of a good official has changed over several historical stages of the Party. In the revolutionary war period, “good officials needed to be loyal to the Party, brae and skillful in battle, and unafraid to sacrifice their lives”; during Mao’s socialist construction period, “good officials needed to be politically and professionally competent”; in the early, Deng Xiaoping period of “reform and opening up,” good officials needed to “have professional knowledge and be determined to carry out reforms”; now, in the Xi Jinping period of reform and opening up, “we require that good officials be politically reliable, professionally competent and morally upright, and…trusted by the people” (ibid. I.461). That is, prior to the 1949 founding, the Party needed warriors; in the first decades of the regime, Communists whose loyalty had been proven in revolutionary war but lacked experience in government needed to learn how to rule; the first stage of reform and opening up also required such knowledge but also willingness to put some of the practices of the Mao period aside and implement the Chinese version of a New Economic Policy; once the increase of prosperity had taken hold, however, a more comprehensive set of characteristics is needed, characteristics that practice good government not only in terms of technical expertise but in moral and political virtues, “cherish[ing] the lofty ideal of communism” while following the precepts of Marxism, the practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics, serving the people in a “realistic and pragmatic manner,” never shirking responsibilities, and exercising power cautiously, “keeping it under control in a bid to sustain their political life” (ibid. I.462). Xi knows that “some Party officials…fail to meet these qualifications,” being “skeptical about communism, considering it a fantasy that will never come true,” believing not “in Marxism-Leninism” but in “ghosts and gods,” seeking divine advice”; some (horror of horrors) “even yearn for Western social systems  and values, losing their confidence in the future of socialism” (ibid. I.463). In a socialist regime, in any regime, “the most dangerous moment is when one wavers or begins to show doubt about one’s ideals and convictions” (ibid. I.464). Look at the fall of the Soviet empire: “I have long been wondering if we were confronted with a complex situation such as a ‘color revolution,’ would all our officials act resolutely to safeguard the leadership of the Party and the socialist system?” (ibid. I.464). Most would, but vigilance is still needed: “The exercise of power without supervision will definitely lead to corruption,” endangering the regime by weakening the popular base that underpins all regimes (ibid. I.468; see also Speech at the Fifth Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee 4/19/13, I.433-435). Assuredly, “if we tailor our practices to western capitalist values, measure our national development by means of the Western capitalist evaluation system, and regard Western standards as the sole standards for development, the consequences will be devastating” (Speech at the National Conference on Party Schools, 12/11/15, II. 356).

    Xi understands that Marxism is a materialist form of historicism. “Time is the origin of thought, and practice is the source of theory” (Speech at opening ceremony of a study session on the guiding principles of Xi Jinping’s speeches, 7/26/17, II.66). Therefore, the “ideological progress” that must be “one of [the CP’s] top priorities” will emphasize the unity of theory and practice in time (Speech at the National Meeting on Publicity and Theoretical Work, 8/19/13, I.171).  “It is the requirement of materialistic dialectics to promote work in all areas by focusing on and tackling key issues” (Speech at a Study Session on the Guiding principles of Xi Jinping’s Speeches, 7/26/17, II.64). “To consolidate Marxism as the guiding ideology in China and cement the shared ideological basis of the whole Party and the people,” additional “efforts should be made to enhance the awareness of socialism with Chinese characteristics among the people of all ethnic groups, so as to inspire the people to strive for Chinese socialism” (ibid. I.172). This task takes on special urgency because the CP has “opened its door wider to the outside world,” exposing the people to non-Marxist ideas and beliefs (ibid. I.172). Xi takes care to explicate Marxism as adapted to China, first by Mao Zedong, then by Deng Xiaoping. Mao took Marx’s scientific socialism (“seeking truth from facts,” not abstractions) and Marx’s “mass line” (Party interaction with and leadership of the people) and added “independence”—that is, a refusal to follow directives from the Soviet Union, whose Communist Party under Lenin and especially Stalin attempted to direct Mao’s policies before and after the Chinese Communist revolution (Speech at the Symposium Marking the 120th Anniversary of Mao Zedong’s Birth, 12/26/13, I.27). Although facts obey the dialectical laws of history, which are “universal truths with eternal ideological value,” “classical Marxist authors did not exhaust truth but blazed a trail to seek and develop truth” (ibid. I.28); this, Mao understood. The “mass line” is what “enables our Party to maintain its vitality and combat capability” (one of Mao’s tracts is indeed titled, “Combat Marxism”); the mass line “translates the Party’s policies into the people’s conscientious action” (ibid. I.29). It “encapsulates the basic tenet of Marxism that the people are the creators of history” (ibid. I.29), and Mao likened the Communists to the “seeds” and the people to the “soil” (ibid. I.30). As for independence, in Xi’s paraphrase, “We should always rely on ourselves when seeking our national development and defending our national pride and confidence,” given our status as “an Eastern country with a large population and backward economy” (ibid. I.31). “The diversity of historical conditions determines the diversity of the development paths, chosen by various countries” (ibid. I.31). 

    Deng, who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, “never faltered in his faith in the scientific nature and truth of Marxism or in the bright future of socialism and communism” (Speech at Seminar Commemorating the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Deng Xiaoping, 8/20/14, II.3). His “firm faith in communism” and “unshakeable belief in socialism with Chinese characteristics” led him to policy departures, not departures in principle, from Mao (ibid. II.3). “His lofty revolutionary ideals and charisma will always be an inspiration to us on our path towards the Two Centenary Goals”—a “moderately prosperous society by 2021, the centenary of the CPC’s founding—and the full consolidation of the regime as “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious” by the centenary of the founding in 2049 (II.15 n.1). Like Mao, he endorsed Marxism as scientific socialism, “seeking truth from facts” and following the laws of historical/dialectical materialism, which, as he put it, “govern the development of human society” (ibid. II.4). But, as he also said, “The world changes every day, and modern science and technology in particular develop rapidly”; as a consequence, “anyone who fails to carry Marxism forward with new thinking and a new viewpoint is not a true Marxist” (ibid. II.8). This is why he “took another historic step in adapting Marxism to China’s conditions after Mao Zedong Thought” (ibid. II.8). While retaining Mao’s insistence on Chinese Communist “independence and self-reliance,” he opened China to the world because “the problem of development…concerns all mankind” and must be “stud[ied] and solv[ed] on that level,” most especially in reaching out to the Third World (ibid. II.10)—effectively following the strategy that had been recommended by Frantz Fanon, implemented clumsily by the now-failed Soviet empire.

    Such worldwide outreach makes sense to Xi because “no theory in history can match Marxism in terms of rational truth, and spread, and no theory has exerted such a huge influence on the world as Marxism”; Marxism therefore has an “irreplaceable role in understanding, reshaping, and advancing the world” as a synthesis of theory and practice (Speech at the 43rd Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 9/29/17, II.68). Marxism “must show the way to the people in modern times” and it can do so, if we Chinese Communists “upgrade Marxism on the basis of the realities of modern times” (ibid. II.69). Capitalism, too, has proved highly adaptable; “we need to enhance our research on modern capitalism” in order to “acquire a better understanding of the law governing the profound and complicated changes in capitalism and international political and economic relations” (ibid. II.69). Know your enemy. Learn from him even as you move to defeat him. Although “history will move forward,” Chinese Communists “should always retain the spirit of the Communists at the time of the founding of our Party,” continuing “to hold Marxism as our guiding philosophy” (Speech at a ceremony marking the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the CPC, 7/1/16, II.32). Indeed, Engels himself wrote that Marx regarded Marxism as “not so much a doctrine as a method” providing “not so much ready-made dogmas, as aids to further investigation and the method for such investigation” (ibid. II.33). Mao acknowledged this, insisting that such ‘bourgeois’ practices as accounting should be adopted without hesitation by Chinese Communists, now that they had a state to run. Today, “we must neither follow the old path of a rigid closed-door policy” as set down by Mao, “nor an erroneous path” of “abandoning socialism” by accepting not merely some capitalist techniques but capitalism and republicanism as a regime (ibid. II.39). The right path is to undertake “a new ‘Long March,” differing from, but just as arduous as the one Mao led, in its own way (Speech at a ceremony commemorating the 80theAnniversary of the Victory of the Long March, 10/21/16, II.49). “The victory of the Long March proved that belief in our hearts gives strength to our legs” (ibid. II.51). The new Long March will bring China to realize “a great national rejuvenation,” “building China into a strong, democratic and harmonious modern socialist country” (Speech at Beijing University Commemorating the 95th Anniversary of the May 4th Movement, 5/4/14, I.189).

    In terms of institutions, Marxist doctrine will be taught at the Party Schools. In them, “Marxism and communism come above all else,” Marxism as “the guiding thought of the Party,” communism “the lofty ideal,” the egalitarian social condition of humanity at the end of ‘history’ (Speech at the National Conference on Party Schools, 12/11/15), II. 354). As in any form of historicist thought, an ‘ideal’ for a Marxism means not an abstraction from material reality but the culmination of the evolution of that reality. “The CPC is a Marxist political party under a unified central leadership”—unity in “political stance, homogenized theory and practice” being “critical to the development and growth of the Party’s cause” (Speech at the National Conference on Party Schools, 12/11/15, II.171). Stance, theory, and practice should “always keep in line with the CPC Central Committee,” but “alignment in political stance, theory and practice is not as easy as correction of the physical formation” seen in a military drill (ibid. II.171). Xi again cites Mao’s efforts in the 1940s, which aimed at “reaffirm[ing] the practice of applying the basic theories of Marxism to the actual conditions of China’s revolution” (II.174 n.2). While criticism of Party and state policy is “welcome,” “no matter how sharp it may be,” “academic research does not justify impulsive remarks any time or remarks made for the sake of being different and seeking notoriety”—evidently as judged by the Party (ibid. II.173). Again, the “mass line” of the Party, “linking theory with practice” by maintaining close links with the people, undertaking criticism and self-criticism, exhibiting tenacity in work, pursuing the truth, and being pragmatic, has “underpinn[ed] one victory after another for the Party and the people” (Speech at the Program of Mass Line Education and Practice held by the CPC Central Committee, 6/18/13, I.401). Based on Marxian “dialectical and historical materialism,” the mass line remains “an essential requirement for the Party to maintain its progressive nature and its integrity” (ibid. I.403-404). Following the mass line will prevent the “Four Malfeasances”: going through the motions, excessive bureaucracy, self-indulgence, and extravagance, which “run contrary to our Party’s very nature and purpose”—which, as a form of historicist progressivism, must avoid anything that ossifies, anything that interferes with ‘history’s’ dialectical advance—and “are the problems that the public hates the most,” giving them reason to overthrow the regime (ibid. I. 411). 

    “Teachers are the engineers of the human soul, who undertake the essential mission of molding minds” (Speech to the National Conference on Education in Political Philosophy at Institutions of Higher Learning, 12/7/16, II.409). Beyond the Party Schools, all Chinese elementary and secondary school students shall be taught to “act conscientiously to foster and practice” the “thoughts of the ancient sages, the aspirations of public-spirited people, the ideals of the revolutionary martyrs and the expectations of ordinary people” (Speech at the Minzu Primary School, Beijing, 5/30/14, I.201). “Schools should attach greater importance to moral education and work hard to enhance the school spirit and teachers’ professional ethics” (ibid. I.202). At the university level, “education in political philosophy” also requires the integration of “moral and political education,” thereby serving “the people, the CPC’s governance of China, the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, reform and opening up, and socialist modernization”—in sum, adhere to “the correct political direction” (Speech at the National Conference on Education in Political Philosophy at Institutions of Higher Learning, 12/7/16, II.406, 407). By political philosophy, Xi of course means “the scientific theory of Marxism,” with its understanding of “the historical necessity of social progress and Chinese socialism” (ibid. II.407). With that foundation, university students can then achieve “an accurate understanding of Chinese socialism in comparison with other social systems in the world,” thereby enhancing “their awareness of China’s historical mission” in the world (ibid. II.408). Chinese higher education shall “firmly uphold CPC leadership” and shall be guided in that task by local Party secretaries and by party committees at the universities and colleges, which will “enforce Party leadership and discipline” (ibid. II.409, 410). 

    Xi therefore emphasizes the need to “develop philosophy and social sciences with Chinese features” (Speech at a Seminar on Philosophy and Social Sciences, 5/17/16, II.366). “Our standing in the areas of academic ideas, thought, viewpoints, and standards, and our voice in international academia, are still incommensurate with our overall national strength and international status” ibid. II.366). To remedy this disparity, in a sense a disparity of theory and practice intolerable to a Marxist, Chinese philosophy and social science should “bear three hallmarks”: they should “encompass all resources and legacies and retain their Chinese identity” (ibid. II.366); they “must display originality and zeitgeist” (ibid. II.370); and they “must be systematic and professional” (ibid. II.372). The resources include “the best of Chinese culture,” “the philosophy and social sciences of other countries,” selected according to Chinese Marxist criteria (ibid. II.367). “We should make the past serve the present, and the foreign serve China” for the sake “of the development trends of Chinese socialism” (ibid. II.367). The theory and practice of Chinese socialism can then be extended (according to “the law of evolution from particularity to universality”) from “domestic practices” to “suggestions and solutions for global issues” (ibid. II.369). “Originality and zeitgeist” refer to “the requisite of social, practical and historical progress” in philosophy and social science (ibid. II.370). All theories, “unexceptionally,” are “the product of their times and the result of pondering over and delving into prominent conflicts and problems of a given society at a given time,” as Marx contends (ibid. II.371). Recent examples include efforts to “strengthen the Party’s governance capacity” and to “build stronger armed forces” (ibid. II.372). “Systematic and professional” refers “an all-encompassing system of learning”: “strengthen[ing] Marxist subjects; improving “pillar subjects” (i.e., philosophy and the various social sciences); paying “great attention to important subjects in which we are strong”; “give priority to emerging and interdisciplinary subjects of great practical significance” while not neglecting “more marginal subjects that are of high cultural value or bear on Chinese heritage” (ibid. II.372-373). The main point is to promote and teach “Marxist theory,” to establish and fortify “centers of research into Chinese socialist theories, to academies of Marxism, and to newspapers, periodicals, websites and other platforms for ideological and theoretical work,” nationally and internationally (ibid. II.376).

    Party rule also applies to the “rule of law,” the laws being framed and enforced by the Party. The supreme law of the land, the Party Constitution, was adopted by the Party in 1982, following the first such constitution, which had been adopted in 1954 and its forerunner, the Common Program of 1949. The 1982 constitution set down the legal framework for Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy, intended to help the country recover from the excesses of Mao’s “Cultural Revolution,” begun in 1966 and ending in exhaustion ten years later. Deng sought stability, writing, “To ensure people’s democracy we must strengthen our legal system…so as to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes or whenever the leaders change their views or shift the focus of their attention”—as had happened under Mao who, rather like Stalin, ordered not only mass killings of class enemies but, far more concerning for Party members, purges of the Party. (quoted in Speech at a meeting of the People from all Walks of Life to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Promulgation and Implementation of the Current Constitution, 12/4/12, I.150). (Xi’s father was the victim of such a purge, and he himself was sent to a remote part of the country, from which he worked his way back, and up.) In this, Deng was a sort of Chinese Khruschev, and Xi is careful to show that he remained a Marxist, quoting him as saying “I am convinced that more and more people will come to believe in Marxism, because it is a science” (Speech at the Seminar on Philosophy and Social Science, 5/17/2015, II.358). Xi approves of the Constitution while calling for its “comprehensive implementation” of the 1982 Party Constitution in order to build “a law-based socialist country,” a “democratic dictatorship”—democratic in the particular sense of Communist oligarchic rule in order to achieve an egalitarian society which eventually will need no state apparatus at all (ibid. I.152). In the meantime, “law is written morality, while morality is conscious law” (ibid. I.157), meaning that the morality of socialism with Chinese characteristics must pervade the hearts and minds of all Chinese, backed by the Constitution, “a legal weapon to safeguard [the] rights and interests” of the Chinese as those rights and interests are defined by the Party as it monitors the people, prudently attentive to their complaints (ibid. I.157). “Upholding the Party’s leadership is fundamental to socialist rule of law” (Speech at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/23/14, II.120). As leaders, “we need to motivate the public to actively involve themselves in the practice of the rule of laws” as “devoted advocates, conscientious observers, and resolute defenders of socialist rule of law,” “integrat[ing] the rule of law with the rule of virtue” (ibid. II.122), considering that “law is a set of virtues in writing” and “virtue represents the law in one’s inner world” (Speech to the 37th Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 12/9/16, II.144). Given the historical progress anticipated by Marxism, Chinese laws, including the supreme law, will continue to be amended, a process which the CPC’s “Leading Group for Further Reform” will oversee. (See also Xi’s Speech to the National Conference on Law and Order, 9/19/17, II.416). 

    Xi’s socialism is doggedly Marxist, but what are its “Chinese characteristics”? “Imbued with the national spirit of patriotism, we have launched the great cause of rebuilding the country” (Speech at “The Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition, Beijing, 11/29,12, I.37). As a place and as a people, China and the Chinese people have suffered from “backwardness,” the failure to modernize which has “left us vulnerable to attack” by Western powers and by Japan. “All Party members” must “bear in mind” this lesson, fostering “the Chinese Dream” of “national rejuvenation” (ibid. I.38). Consider, then, that “the Chinese nation has an unbroken history of more than 5,000 years of civilization,” “creat[ing] a rich and profound culture” that has made “an unforgettable contribution to the progress of human civilization” (Address to the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, 3/17/13, I.41). The Chinese spirit,” a “national spirit with patriotism at its core” is also “the spirit of the times with reform and innovation at its core” (ibid. I.42). That is, patriotism can be artfully blended with Marxism (hardly a Chinese doctrine at its origin) by claiming, in the same sentence, that “patriotism has always been the inner force that binds the Chinese nation together, and reform and innovation have always been the inner force that spurs us to keep abreast of the times in the course of reform and opening up”—the spirit not only of Chinese Communism but of contemporary, Deng-Xi Communism at that (ibid. I.42). 

    This spirit should be made to saturate social institutions that might otherwise resist the Marxist state—families, ethnic groups, and religious denominations. Patriotism or nationalism holds the nation itself to be one big family. Therefore, “we must enhance civility in Chinese families and make it an important foundation for the country’s development, progress, and social harmony” by “combin[ing] the love we have for our families with our love for our nation and integrate our family dreams with the dream of the nation,” “work[ing] together with one heart to weave the wisdom and enthusiasm of our 1.3 billion people from 400 million families into a powerful force” that can realize “the Chinese Dream” (Speech at the First National Conference of Model Families, 12/12/16, II.382-383). Families should encourage “family members, especially he younger generation, to love the Party, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation” (ibid. I.384). After all, “traditional Chinese ethics,” taught in families, such principles as “”respecting the elderly and loving the young, gender equality, marital harmony, frugality, and neighborhood solidarity, while promoting loyalty, responsibility, family affection, learning, and public welfare” can surely reinforce a socialist regime, if not in all instances the regime of communism, far in the future (ibid. II.384). And as for ethnic groups, if they respect “the principle of equality” in relation to one another, they can “work together and achieve common prosperity,” thereby “consolidating the ideal that the Chinese nation is a community formed by all ethnic groups,” living in harmony under the rule of the Party (Speech at the Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs, 9/28/2014, II.328). Finally, in regard to religion, “the Party’s basic guidelines on religion result from its adherence to Marxist views on religion”—atheism being the leading one, discreetly unmentioned by Xi—guidelines that acknowledge the facts “prevailing conditions in China and the realities of religion in China” (Speech at the National Conference on Religion, 4/22/16). “The prime purpose and ultimate goal in implementing policies on freedom of religious belief is to unite believers and non-believers to the maximum extent” by “encourag[ing] religions to adapt to our socialist society,” “lead[ing] believers to love the country and the people” and to “embrace the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system,” endeavor[ing] to integrate religious tenets with Chinese culture, “participat[ing] in reform and opening up and socialist modernization” by “contribut[ing] to the realization of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” (ibid. II.329-330). To put the matter in plainer terms, over time religions in China will be coopted by the Party. 

    Patriotism can also be deployed to counter foreign influences among Chinese who have studied abroad or emigrated to other countries. Xi tells scholars who have returned from foreign countries, “I hope you will adhere to patriotism” “remember[ing] that wherever you are you are a member of the Chinese family; the country and the people back home always care about their sons and daughters, and your homeland is always a warm spiritual land for you” (Speech at the Centenary Celebration of the Western Returned Scholars Association, 10/21/13, I.63, 64). As for the emigrants, they should “forward the Chinese nation’s fine traditions of diligence and kindness, and contribute to the development of the country and friendship between the Chinese people and the people in their host countries” (Speech at the 12th National People’s Congress, 3/17/13, I.45). “In the best of Chinese traditions, generations of overseas Chinese never forget their home country, their origins, or the blood of the Chinese nation flowing in their veins” (Speech at the Seventh Conference of Friendship of Overseas Chinese Associations, 6/6/14, I.69). Chinese living in other countries should “serve as a bridge for wide-ranging exchanges and cooperation between China and their new home countries” wielding Chinese ‘soft power’ (ibid. I.70).

    Whether in families, ethnic groups, religious congregations, or Chinese living oversea, “cultural soft power depends on the vitality, cohesion and appeal of the core values of a nation” (Speech at the 13th Study Group Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 2/24/14, I.181). In order to “cultivate and disseminate the core socialist values we must take traditional Chinese culture as the base” while “mak[ing] the past serve the present,” treating tradition with “a critical approach,” “eliminat[ing] the false and retain[ing] the true while “put[ting] forth new ideas” (ibid. I.182). “As spring drizzle falling without a sound, we should disseminate the core socialist values in a gentle and lively way by making use of all kinds of cultural forms,” whether literary works or “artistic images” (ibid. I.183). The gentle and lively ways must nonetheless be supplemented by “laws and regulations,” which “should act as a driving force for the spread of the core values” (ibid. 183-184). That is, the Party should “transform and boost traditional culture in a creative way,” as Xi urges in a September 2014 speech (II.341), even as we “carry forward the spirit of hard work and plain living,” a spirit not in the least inconsistent with Marxism (Speech to the fourth group of nominees and winners of national ethical model rewards, 9/26/13, I.177). This, he frankly contends, is a “strategic concept”; “deal[ing] with the relationship between material progress and cultural and ethical progress in a dialectical, comprehensive and balanced way, pursu[ing] progress in all aspects of social life in our reform, opening up, and modernization,” standing in the forefront of the times” as the Marxist vanguard with Chinese characteristics (ibid. I. 353). In literature, writers should “speak for the people” by “serving the socialist cause,” “firmly upholding the Marxist view” (Speech at the Forum on Literature and Art, 10/15/14, II.343). “Writers and artists should artfully tell Chinese stories, spread the Chinese spirit,” “giving foreign audiences a better understanding of China through their works, “introduc[ing] foreign audiences to the charm of Chinese culture” while taking care to follow Lenin’s exhortation to appeal to the workers (ibid. II.344-345). “Whether an artist can produce excellent work depends on whether he or she can stand for and speak for the people,” a characteristic with which, Xi assures his listeners, “all classics of Chinese literature are suffused” in their “humanistic vision” (ibid. II.345). As for Party members, so for writers and artists: “To bring down any invisible wall between you and the people, you should not only approach them physically but also empathize with them emotionally” (ibid. 347). And, consistent with Marxist historicism, one must understand that “each era has its unique art and literature as well as its unique spirit,” a spirit “epitomiz[ing] the social life and spirit of that era with coincident traces and features” (Speech at the 10th National Congress of China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and Ninthe National Congress of China Writers Association, 11/30/16), II.379). 

    Extending soft power is also the responsibility of the media, necessarily controlled by the CPC for the sake of “the governance and stability of the country,” inasmuch as “we must uphold the leadership of the Party, keep the correct political orientation, maintain a people-centered work ethic” in the dissemination of news (Speech at the Seminar on the Party’s Media work, 2/19/16, II.359). To “adhere to the Marxist view of journalism” the “fundamental prerequisite is the Party’s leadership over publicity” (ibid. II.360). The media “must represent the Party’s will and advocacy” (ibid.360). This extends not throughout China but to “international audiences,” as it can give the Party “a stronger voice in the international community,” “greater international influence” (ibid. II.362).

    And then there is the internet. Xi finds “two groups of people” using it: “new media professionals and social media ‘opinion leaders'” (Speech at the Central Conference on the United Front, 5/18/15, II.354). Because “cyberspace is a major domain for publicity,” “we must take the initiative in this field and win over these two groups,” “work[ing] to enlist the most prominent figures among them in the United Front”—since the 1930s, the term for a Communist strategy for a coalition with other Leftists against a common enemy—establish “regular contact, strengthen online and offline interaction, and seek a common political understanding” (ibid. II.354). In this case, “hostile forces at home and abroad constantly try to undermine our Party, attempting to make us abandon our belief in Marxism, communism and socialism” (ibid. II.355). More specifically, “Western political dogma,” including “Western capitalist ideology,” have seeped into the minds of some Chinese, even Party members, who “cannot see the underlying dangers of accepting the ‘universal values’ that have developed in the West over hundreds of years” (ibid. II.355). Since these dogmas include Marxism, this argument is an obvious smokescreen for fears of regime change in China, and indeed Xi goes on to say that “since the end of the Cold War, some countries, affected by Western values, have been torn apart by war or afflicted with chaos” (ibid. II.356). By 2016, he was prepared to impose restrictions. Since the internet “influences the way that people view the country, society, their jobs and also their lives,” and since “a society that lacks common ideals, goals, and values and that finds itself in disorder all the time will never achieve success,” the Chinese regime “will need to form concentric circles online and offline” (Speech at the Seminar on Cyber Security and IT Application, 4/19/16, II.363). Seeing that “netizens” are the new “grassroots,” the people the Party must listen to in order to ‘lead’—that is, rule—and seeing that “if members of the public go online, so does public opinion,” the Party must also “go online regularly, observing, charting, and posting their comments” (ibid. II.363). But more than that, “the internet cannot be a lawless place”; “the use of the internet to advocate the toppling of the government, preach religious extremism, or incite separatism and terrorism must be resolutely prevented and punished” (ibid. II.364). While continuing to “strengthen positive publicity” about the regime, the Party must also prevent netizens from “caus[ing] trouble” by “overstep[ping] the boundaries of the Constitution and other laws” (ibid.365). Although the CP began its “Golden Shield Project” (nicknamed the “Great Firewall” by an Australian journalist) in 1998 and had established the Cyberspace Administration of China in 2011, under Xi a new, stricter Cyber Security Law would be enacted in 2017. In a speech to the Second World Internet Conference in December 2015, Xi advised the attendees to observe “respect for cyber sovereignty”; if “cyberspace is not beyond the rule of law” and “greater efforts should be made to promote ethical standards and civilized behavior in cyberspace,” then China, as a sovereign lawgiver, ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, enforcer of ethical standards, is entitled to make its cyberspace conform to the laws and ethical standards of the CP regime (Speech to the Second World Internet Conference, II.12/16/15).

    Having established the happiness of the Chinese people as the purpose of the regime and considering “the ultimate purpose of economic development” to be “to ensure and improve people’s well-being,” Xi devotes substantial attention to political economy (Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session, 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/27/16, II.404). “It is the essential requirement of socialism to eradicate poverty, improve the people’s livelihood and achieve common prosperity” (Speech in Fuping County, Hebei Province, 12/29-30/12, I.209). As of 2015, some 70 million Chinese lived in poverty according to “our standards,” 200 million by World Bank standards (Speech at reception in Seattle, Washington, 9/22/15, II.30). This notwithstanding, he regarded the country as on track to become “a moderately prosperous society in all respects” by the CP centenary, a few years later, although, admittedly, some regions, usually the rural ones, will not have achieved this status by then (ibid. II.30; see also Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/29/15, II.73-75, 83). Rural areas need increased job opportunities (particularly in jobs that improve the Chinese ecosystem such as reforestation, relocation of many residents to the cities, improved education, state-sponsored investment, and “social security,” including public services and healthcare, with all of these initiatives ruled by “Party committee secretaries and Party governors,” themselves supervised by the higher authorities (Speech at the Central Conference on Poverty Alleviation and Development, 11/27/15, II.91 and Speech at a seminar on eliminating poverty, 6/23/17, II.96, 98). 

    “Key to realizing a moderately prosperous society” is “expanding the middle income group” by offering property rights, including rights to intellectual property (Speech at the 13th Meeting of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs under the CPC Central Committee, 5/16/16, I.397). But such prosperity, including the existence of a middle income group—dare one say a ‘bourgeoisie’?—brings its own problems. “In the past, we tended to think that the conflicts and problems afflicting the people resulted from a low level of economic development and low income; if only we could develop the economy, and if the people lived a better life, social conflicts and problems would consequently decrease. Now it seems that problems always exist whether the economy is undeveloped or developed, and that the problems arising when the economy is developed are no fewer than those arising when the economy is undeveloped—they can become more complicated.” (Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/29/15, II.85; see also Explanatory Notes on the “Decision to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform” Third Plenary Session, 18th CPC Central Committee, 11/9/13, I.78). Such complexity may be seen in Xi’s term for the Chinese political economy: “the socialist market economy of China” (Speech to the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 12/31/12, I.73). What might a “socialist market economy,” this “key breakthrough in theory,” be? (Explanatory Notes, op.cit. I.82).

    “The pivotal part of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics” is a policy whereby “public ownership is dominant” but “diverse forms of ownership develop side by side” with it (Speech at the 4th Session of the 12th CPPCC National Committee, 3/4/16, II.281). The public sector will guide the development of the private sector, as “it is imperative that all sectors work in unison” (ibid. II.283). Entrepreneurs must “maintain a positive social image,” with Party officials “build[ing] a gentlemen’s relationship with them,” unlike the relations “between feudal bureaucrats and entrepreneur holding official posts or between financial consortiums and politicians in Western countries” (ibid. II.288). Similarly, Xi’s version of “supply-side economics” centers not on tax cuts for private businesses but for state-supervised efforts to “ensure that the supply structure is more adaptive and flexible to changes in demand” by reducing “overcapacity and excess inventory” (Speech at Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/18/16, II.277). Such state supervision is necessary because “allowing people to share the fruits of reform and deployment is the essence of socialism,” “demonstrat[ing] the superiority of socialism and the Party’s whole-heartedness in its mission of serving the people” (Speech to the Second Fall Assembly of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/29/15, II.220)

    That is, the regime shall remain firmly in control as the proletarian vanguard. “We must make sure that the working class is our main force,” since “the working class is China’s leading class,” representing China’s advanced productive forces and relations of production,” serving as “the Party’s most steadfast and reliable class foundation” (Speech at discussion session of “model” national workers, 4/28/13, I.47-48). “Model workers are the cream of the country and role models for the people” (ibid. I.49). Accordingly, “we need to give leverage to the superiority of our socialist system, and let the Party and government perform their positive functions” (Explanatory Notes, op.cit. I.85). “We must put the interests of the state first when making deliberations” (ibid. I.98). While “the proposal to let the market play the decisive role in allocating resources is a breakthrough in our Party’s understanding of the laws governing the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics as well as a new achievement in the sinicization of Marxism,” this “does not mean that the market can replace the government’s functions,” which are primarily administrative, indirect, the exercise of “overall leadership” and the coordination of “all efforts” (Speech to the 15th study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 5/26/14, i.128-129). Further, the CP “should strengthen and improve the Party’s leadership” of its state-owned enterprises, “with a goal of making them the most reliable force of the party and the country and a major force in implementing the decisions and plans of the CPC Central Committee,” a “material and political foundation for socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Speech to the National Conference on Party Development of SOEs, 10/10/16, II.191). SOEs constitute a “modern corporate system with Chinese features…because it incorporates the party’s leadership into all aspects of their corporate governance and Party organizations into the corporate governance structure” (ibid. II.193). Such “democratic management” makes the “workers congress” its “basic element,” listening “to the views of workers in major decision-making” by including them in the SOE boards of directors (ibid. II.194). The Party committees that rule the SOEs with “strict discipline” “must take political philosophical education as a regular and basic task,” along with “resolving concrete problems” (ibid. II.195-196). The same kind of political structure characterizes financial institutions (Speech at the National Conference on Finance, 7/14/17, II.304-308).

    The “growth pattern of our country,” which “is evolving from an extensive economy to an intensive economy”—that is, from an agricultural and manufacturing economy to a technology- and innovation-driven economy—provides a major source of the complications which the “socialist market economy” is intended to address (Speech at the Central Conference on Economic Work, 12/18/15, II.261). Such an evolution “is an objective law, and we cannot go against it no matter what we think” (ibid. II.261). “We should see the Chinese economy dialectically” as good Marxists, understanding that the CPC’s promotion of industrialization has succeeded, now ranking “first in the world,” but that the world economy has itself moved forward technologically, animated by the spirit of the ‘information economy’ (Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/18/16, II.262, 270). “The world’s major countries are seeking to make new scientific and technological breakthroughs and gain competitive edges in future economic as well as scientific and technological development,” and China “must catch up and then try to surpass others” (Speech at the 17th Assembly of the Members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 6/9/14, I.132). As of 2014, “the foundation of our scientific and technological innovation [was] not solid enough,” as “we still have to depend on others for core technology in key fields”; “we cannot always decorate our tomorrows with others’ yesterdays” (ibid. I.135). Such dependence undermines Chinese sovereignty, especially in such areas as the combination of robotics with IT. “The most urgent thing in this regard is to remove institutional barriers so as to unleash to the greatest extent the huge potential of science and technology as the primary productive force” (ibid. I.134), by which he means that industry should be more tightly coordinated with the university research laboratories, all within “a national innovation system within which experts in all fields can interact and collaborate to achieve high efficiency” (ibid. I.139). The Party will grant scientists “freedom to experiment, always careful to set the goals for such experimentation (Speech at the Joint Session of the National Conference on Scientific and Technological Innovation, 18th Meeting of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 5/30/16, II.301). 

    Xi summarized his economic policy in a speech delivered at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee on January 18, 2016. “Despite being the world’s second largest, China’s economy is obese and weak” because “China has lagged behind” since “the advent of modern times,” having “missed the great development opportunities brought by the scientific and industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19the centuries” (II.223, 224). Innovation is “the primary driving force for development” (II.221). “According to the materialist dialectics” of Marxism, “things are universally related”; “the world is an interrelated whole and also an interactive system” (II.225). Recognition of this point has led to, among other things, the initiation of the Belt and Road Initiative, a transportation network intended to the prosperous east coast of China to the western hinterlands. Such development can be undertaken according to a “harmonious coexistence of humanity with nature,” as explained by Friedrich Engels in The Dialectics of Nature (II.228). “Only by respecting the law of nature can we avoid setbacks in developing and utilizing nature” (II.230). [1] He acknowledges “four difficulties” in doing so in China: inadequate supervision by the central government over actions taken by local governments and other central government departments; persistent “local protectionism” of polluting industries, which interferes with “the monitoring and scrutiny of law enforcement”; inadequate management of “cross-region and cross-basin environmental issues”; “difficulty in regulating and strengthening local environmental protection bodies” (Speech to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 10/26/15, II.423). That is, the solution to environmental protection is the implementation of stronger central rule by the regime. In addition to the need for technological innovation and “green development,” Xi calls attention to “economic globalization” (Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 1/18/16, II.232). Globalization began with Western imperialism, made possible by modern technology in Europe and North America. It continued after World War II, with “two parallel world markets,” capitalist and socialist (ibid. II.232). Globalization “quickened its pace” in the years following the end of the Cold War, but today Western dominance declines, the effects of the worldwide financial crisis have abated, and China’s share of the world economy and of “global governance” increases rapidly (ibid. II.232-235). Xi presents China as “the biggest driver of global trade liberalization and facilitating, resisting various forms of Western protectionism” (ibid. II.233). He leaves unmentioned the fact that the Chinese economy itself is largely illiberal, state-owned and state supervised, which means that international trade liberalization with Chinese characteristics embeds the Chinese Communist Party in every country with which it trades and in every foreign corporation it allows to enter its territory. [2]

    Xi describes all of this as “the people-centered philosophy of development” (ibid. II.235). “It displays the CPC’s fundamental purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly, and the materialistic historical view that the people are the primary force for propelling development,” “shared prosperity” being “a primary goal of Marxism” and even “a basic ideal of the Chinese people since ancient times” (ibid. II.235). “According to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, communism will eradicate the opposition and differentiation between classes, between urban and rural areas, between mental labor and physical labor; it will adopt the principle of distribution from each according to his ability to each according to his needs, so as to achieve shared of development of society and the free and well-rounded development of individualism in the real sense,” rather than the false, ‘bourgeois’ sense (ibid. II.235-236). Of course, “there will be a long historical trek through history to reach this goal,” and in the meantime socialism, the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by its vanguard, the Communist Party, must prevail (ibid. II.237). 

    “As China has increased its dependence on the world and its involvement in international affairs, so has the world increased its dependence on China and had greater impact on China.” Given both this new interdependence and “China’s development as a major country,” “we should uphold the CPC’s leadership and Chinese socialism” with an “independent foreign policy of peace,” of “promot[ing] democracy,” and of “uphold[ing] international justice,” especially as regards “developing countries” (Speech to the Central Conference of Foreign Affairs, 11.25/14, II.481-482). Accordingly, “we should abandon the Cold War mentality in all its manifestations, and foster a new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security” (Speech during the General Debate of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 9/28/15, II.572). [3] To be sure, “we should respect the right of all countries to independently choose their social systems and development paths and the diversity of civilizations,” at least insofar as commercial republics might penetrate China and its allies; “promoting democracy” evidently means promoting socialism with local characteristics (Speech to the Fifth BRICS Leaders Meeting, 3/27/13, I.356). Assuredly, “no matter how strong its economy grows, China will never seek hegemony, expansion or spheres of influence” (Speech at the United Nations Office in Geneva, 1/18/17, II.597). You can depend on that because “to abolish war and achieve peace has been the most pressing and profound aspiration of the Chinese people since the advent of modern times” (Speech to the Third Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the CCP 18th Central Committee, 1/28/13, I.271). To do so, under Mao China established the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (Speech to the Symposium Marking the 120th Anniversary of Mao Zedong’s Birth, 12/26/13, I.32). I.33 n.6). To those who might suspect otherwise, he insists that “China’s pursuit of peaceful development is not an act of expediency, still less diplomatic rhetoric. Rather, it is the conclusion drawn from an objective assessment of China’s history, its present and future.” (Speech to the Körber Foundation, Berlin, 3/28/14, I.293). More, China “present[s] the world with a major country meeting its responsibilities and upholding international humanism” (Speech to the National Health Conference, 8/19/16, II.402). 

    “Because different countries and nations have different historical traditions, cultural accomplishments and basic conditions, their development paths are different” (Speech to the National Meeting on Publicity and Theoretical Work, 8/19/13, I.174). Xi can thus appeal to diversity, the principles of the Peace of Westphalia, and so on while simultaneously praising China and working to advance the Marxist cause, now guided by the CCP, globally, upholding international humanism. “We should make the past serve the present and foreign things serve China,” as the ancient Chinese made Buddhism, imported from India, into “Buddhism with Chinese features” (quite literally, on the temple statues) (Speech at UNESCO Headquarters, 3/27/13, I.286). Or, as he puts it more plainly to his CP comrades, “Under the guidance of Marxist and socialist ethics, we should make the past serve the present and put forth new ideas on the basis of eliminating the false and retaining the true for the creative transformation and progress of traditional Chinese ethics, so as to lead the people on the way to yearning for and aspiring to life-long learning, respecting and obeying moral standards, so that every one of the 13 billion Chinese citizens can be part of a team to disseminate Chinese identify and culture,” “popularize our cultural spirit across countries as well as across time and space, with contemporary values and the eternal charm of Chinese culture,” “tell[ing] the rest of the world about the new Achievements of modern Chinese Culture,” thereby “strengthen[ing] our soft power” in the world (Speech to the 12th Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 12/30/13, I.178-179, 180). A well-known instance of this strategy has been seen in the ‘Confucius Institutes’ established on numerous college and university campuses in the West.

    Where acknowledgment of cultural diversity actually counts is in crafting geopolitical strategies in different regions of the world. In these early years of Xi’s rule, he was careful to emphasize economic development. In the Asia Pacific, he proposed a “modern Maritime Silk Road,” a trade route financed by the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, which just happens to have been “set up by the Chinese government” (Speech to the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia, 10/3/13, I.321). Similarly, “cast[ing] away the Cold War mentality,” Asian countries should cooperate with one another for “common security” while cultivating “mutual understanding and friendship” (ibid. I.322) among members of “the Asia Pacific family” (Speech at the APEC CEO Conference, Bali, Indonesia, 10/7/13, I.384). All of this, in an effort to push the Americans out of the region without being so crude as to say so.

    In its immediate neighborhood on land, Xi tells the CPC that “China and its neighbors are full of vigor and vitality, and show obvious strengths in development and high potential, with regional stability and a willingness among the smaller states to foster “cooperation with China” (Speech at the Seminar on the Work of Neighborhood Diplomacy, 10/24/13, I.326). “We must appreciate the situation to the full, devise appropriate strategies, and plan carefully, to perform better in our diplomatic exchanges with our neighbors” (ibid. I.326).  will see the land version of the modern Silk Road, again for improving transportation infrastructure, fostering “unimpeded trade,” enhancing monetary circulation, and “increas[ing] understanding between our peoples” (Speech at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan, 9/7/13, I.318), always “driven by…and serv[ing] the Two Centenary Goals and our national rejuvenation” (Speech at the Seminar on the Work of Neighborhood Diplomacy, op. cit. I.326). Eurasia will see the modern Silk Road on land as well as the one at sea under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, again dominated by China (Speech to the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 9/13/13). [4] The Road would extend not only to the member states but to Mongolia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. “China is the initiator and propeller of the Belt and Road Initiative, but the initiative is not China’s business alone,” as China “welcomes other countries to board China’s express train of development and help them realize their own development objectives” (Speech to the 31st Group Study Session, Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 4/29/16, II.547). The Road will not be function only as a travel route but as a comprehensive geo-economic program for “mutual learning” and “mutual benefit,” complete with “people-to-people contacts,” science and technology “exchanges,” and “green development” (ibid. II.558, 564). While it is evident that geo-economic cooperation with China is also geopolitical, Xi deprecates “outdated geopolitical maneuvering” (II.563). He does not rule out updated geopolitical maneuvering. 

    Both the Maritime Silk Road and the land-based Silk Road figure prominently in his approach to the Arab states. Invoking the centuries of “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit” between “the Chinese and Arab peoples,” including Chinese “support [for] the cause of the Palestinian people,” Xi proposes the “1+2+3” program for cooperation. The “1” refers to “cooperation in energy,” which is the “core” of the program; “2” refers to the “two wings” of infrastructure and trade/investment; “3” refers to using three advanced technologies, nuclear energy, space satellites and “new energy” as “breakthrough levers in an effort to raise the level of pragmatic China-Arab cooperation.” (Speech at the Sixth Annual Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, 6/5/14, I. 348-349). Knowing that Chinese persecution of Muslim Uighurs has increased tensions with the Arab states, he calls for “a consensus in the fight against terrorist and extremist forces” and exchange visits by “100 eminent religious leaders” under the auspices of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (Speech at the Arab League Headquarters, 1/26/16, II.503).

    China’s most important ally is in northern Eurasia. Xi emphasized that Russia was his first stop on his first overseas trip since becoming the Chinese president. “The relationship between China and Russia is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world” as well as “the best relationship between major countries,” a relationship that “not only serves the interests of our two countries but also provides an important safeguard for maintaining the international strategic balance as well as peace and stability in the world”  (Speech at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, 3/23/13, I.301).”China and Russia enjoy a high complementarity in development strategy,” he tells the Russians (ibid. I.301), and he is pleased to remark the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Treaty of Good-neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the PRC and the Russian Federation, three years later (II. 509). As for the rest of Europe, Xi treats it with anodyne pronouncements about “peace and stability,” “growth and prosperity,” “reform and progress,” and “common cultural prosperity” (Speech at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, 4/1/14, I.309-310). In an invocation of Mao’s “Thousand Flowers” campaign, he intones, “Let us work together for all flowers of human civilization to blossom together” (ibid. I.310).

    Africa, a continent of greater opportunity for China, rates more attention than Europe. “Unity and cooperation with African countries have always been an important foundation of China’s foreign policy” since the founding of the Communist regime (Speech at the Julius Nyere International Conference, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 3/25/13, I.337); he refers to the policy of supporting Marxist movements in the Third World, including that of Julius Nyere himself. Stirring any lingering resentment of European colonialism, he tells his audience that “China upholds justice and opposes the practice of bullying the small, the strong lording over the weak, and the rich oppressing the poor, just as it opposes interference in other’s internal affairs” (ibid. I.337)—a claim that might fall rather flat in, say, the Philippines. The line about interference in others’ internal affairs signals that China will not let human rights violations in African countries interfere with Chinese investment and financing there, or with the establishment of 18,000 “government scholarships” in the coming years (ibid. I.338). He erects “five major pillars” of Sino-African relations: political equality and mutual trust; mutually beneficial economic cooperation; mutually enriching cultural exchanges; mutual assistance in security; and solidarity and cooperation in international affairs (Speech at the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 12/4/15, II.496-497). 

    Regarding the one formidable enemy, the United States, Xi treads lightly in these early years. He establishes inroad in Latin America, telling journalists from Mexico, Costa Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago that “although there is a vast ocean between China and Latin America, we are connected heart and soul,” in “the common pursuit of beautiful dreams,” and China stands “ready to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries hand in hand, supporting one another and cooperating sincerely on the path to realizing the great dream of development and prosperity”  (Interview, May 2013, I.62). In the United States itself, he assured journalists that “bilateral cooperation” can be enhanced, thanks to the establishment of “more than 90 mechanisms for high-level dialogues on strategy, economy, culture and humanities (Remarks at a press conference with President Barack Obama, 6/7/13, I.307-308). These initiatives include the presence of some 190,000 Chinese students on American campuses and more than 20,000 U.S. students in China. He also praised efforts at cooperation in cyber security, “eschewing mistrust” (ibid. I.308). With President Donald Trump, he emphasized “pragmatic cooperation” in business dealings and “world peace, stability and prosperity” (Press conference, 4/6,17, II.534), exhibiting some awareness of the difference in the preoccupations of the two American presidents.

    Finally, there is the unusual category of foreign relations with areas the CCP refuses to recognize as foreign. Macao, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have (or for some time had) non-communist regimes. Regarding them, the CCP has leaned heavily on the nationalist side of things, announcing a “one country, two systems” formula for incorporating the two smaller places into the ‘People’s Republic (Summary of “talks” with chief executives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative region, 12/20/12, 3/11/13 and 12/18/13, I.247). “Our compatriots in Macao are masters of their own house, entitled to broad freedoms and democratic rights in accordance with the law,” which means that they are “upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation,” understanding “that the destiny of the future of Macao are intricately bound with the mainland” (Speech at a meeting celebrating the 15th anniversary of Macao’s return to China, 12/20/15, 459, 463). Xi uses similar language regarding Hong Kong, which “has joined us on our journey towards the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Meeting celebrating the twentieth anniversary of Hon Kong’s return to China, 7/1/17, II.471). According to him, “Hong Kong has retained its capitalist system and way of life, and its laws have remained basically unchanged,” with “more extensive democratic rights and freedoms than at any other time in its history” (ibid. II.472). It ought also be noted that the Communist regime took care to arrange the election laws in such a way that a pro-Beijing majority would be assured in the Hong Kong legislature. After all, “it is imperative to always act in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” (ibid. II.474).

    The Republic of China on Taiwan has been the much larger prize, since Chiang Kai-Shek retreated there, defeated by Mao on the mainland. Xi offers “the same treatment to Taiwan enterprises as to mainland enterprises in the fields of investment and economic cooperation,” which of course means CCP control of those enterprises (Main points of talks with Vincent Siew, honorary chairman of the Cross-Strait Market Foundation of Taiwan, and his delegation, 4/8/13 and 10/6/3, I.253). “We must increase political trust between the mainland and Taiwan and reinforce the common political foundation of the two sides,” although Xi doesn’t specify what that common political foundation might be, except to stipulate that negotiations must proceed “within the framework of ‘one China'” (ibid. I.254). Additionally, “we must handle cross-Straits relations on the basis of a clear understanding of the trend of history,” a trend Xi has often identified as a combination of Marxism and nationalist revival (ibid. I.257). “Forces and activities for ‘Taiwan independence’ remain a real threat to the peace of the Taiwan Straits,” he states, ominously. “It is therefore incumbent upon us to oppose and contain any rhetoric of move for ‘Taiwan independence’ without any compromise.” (ibid. I.258). “It is a simple truth that blood is thicker than water,” which is why the PRC and the Republic of Taiwan “share the same destiny” (Speech receiving Lien Chan, Honorary Chairman of the Kuomintang of China, and delegation, 2/8/14, I.261, 262). A footnote helpfully adds that a 1992 meeting between the two sides resulted in an agreement “that both sides would follow the one-China principle, each with its respective interpretation” (I.265 n.3). No doubt.

    With respect to threats to peace, Xi has presided over a substantial military buildup, already outlined in these early years of his tenure. Political power, Mao famously aphorized, grows out of the barrel of a gun, and the expulsion of Japan from Chinese soil during World War II was “the first complete victory won by China in its resistance against foreign aggression in modern times,” a triumph that “re-established China as a major country and won the Chinese people the respect of all peace-loving people around the world” (Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War Against Japanese Aggression” (9/3/15, II.484). Today, “we must uphold the Party’s leadership of the armed forces,” inasmuch as “the future of socialism, the enduring stability of the party, and lasting peace of our country” are “central to the nature and mission of the armed forces” (Speech to the Central Military Commission, 11/16/12, I.238). “The Party’s absolute leadership over the military is a defining feature of Chinese socialism, and a major source of political strength to the Party and the state” (Speech on the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation army, 8/1/17, II.452). To sustain this leadership, officers and soldiers must be given a “theoretical and political education” so that they “will follow without hesitation the commands of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission at all times and under all conditions”; for that reason, “we will apply political convictions as a measure when reviewing and appointing officers” so as to ensure that they “are reliable and loyal to the Party” (Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Chinese People’s War Against Japanese Aggression, op. cit. I.238). “We must build a modern and standardized military dedicated to our revolutionary goals” (Speech to the Guangzhou Military Command, 12/8/12; see also Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the People’s Liberation Army delegation at the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, 3/11/13, I.243ff.). This education will “develop the army’s military theory and constantly open up new horizons for the Party theory of Marxism and for military practice,” so that “the truth of Marxist military theory applied in practice will shine brighter in China” (Speech on the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation army,” 8/1/17, II.453). “We must be on the alert against any possibility of a ‘color revolution'” supported by the military (Speech at the Military Conference on Political Work, 10/31/14, II.435). 

    Accordingly, Xi lays down “Four Fundamentals” of CCP policy regarding the military. The Party must “foster our shared ideals and convictions” in the “new generation of revolutionary force,” particularly among “high-ranking officers” (ibid. II.436). The military must “love the Party, protect the Party, work for the Party and share [their] weal and woe with the Party” (ibid. II.437); “nobody is entitled to cross the red lines of political discipline and rule” and “those who do will have to pay a price” (ibid. II.438). The military must “uphold the standard of combat capability,” especially since “political work itself” depends on it; this includes not only combat capability but “winning local war in the informational era” (ibid. II.439). And finally, officers must “uphold the authority of political work” by serving as “role models,” combining “the power of truth” (Marxism) “with the power of their personalities,” while being pragmatic, fair, and honest (ibid. II.440). Institutionally, this means centralization of power under the Central Military Commission, power over the armed forces but also the “People’s Armed Police,” ensuring “the correct political direction” under the “absolute leadership” of the Party (Speech to the Central Military Commission, 11/24/15, II.443). This will achieve full “civil-military integration,” “a structure in which the military and non-military sectors develop together efficiently across multiple fields” (ibid. II.445). The “long-term endeavor to coordinate economic development with military defense” evidently means that the internal force of the People’s Armed Police will be deployed to enforce Party-driven economic initiatives, while the conventional army and navy will back up foreign trade relations. It will also tap the “tremendous potential for civil-military integration in such areas as infrastructure development, science, technology an industry for national defense, weaponry and equipment procurement, personnel training, outsourcing of military logistical support, and national defense mobilization to be “implemented in such fields as oceans, outer space, cyberspace, biology, and new energy, which can serve both military and civilian purposes” (Speech to the First Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Civil-Military Integration, 6/20/17, II.450).

    There can be no question that in his first years of supreme authority in China, Xi Jinping enunciated a comprehensive, not to say ‘totalitarian,’ strategy for the regime of China, with a ruling body (the Communist Party), ruling institutions (economic, educational, and military), a way of life (“moderately prosperous socialism” in pursuit of the “Chinese Dream”), all aiming at the purpose of a “happy life” of the people, a life consisting of hard work in the service of eventual, worldwide Communism.

     

    Notes

    1. Xi has spoken extensively about “green development” and “promot[ing] green, circular and low-carbon growth” by “integrat[ing] or climate change efforts into the country’s medium- and long-term program of economic and social development” (Speech at the Paris Conference on Climate Change, 11/30/15, II.576) in order to “usher in a new era of ecological progress” (Speech to the Sixth Group Study Session, Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 5/24/13, I.231) in order to “leave to our future generations blue skies, green fields, and clean water” (Letter to the Eco Forum Annual Global Conference, 7/18/13, I.233-234) and to promote a “green way of life” (Speech to the 41st Group Study Session, Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 5/26/17). See also his speech to the Sixth Meeting of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs, in which he announces a policy that will “revolutionize energy consumption” by “rein[ing] in irrational energy use” with “strict controls,” increase the supply of energy by technological innovation and NEP-like controlled allowance of market pricing, and “enhanc[ing] international cooperation” on energy supply with the Belt and Road Initiative, opening energy markets worldwide to China, and “intensify[ing] our efforts in energy exploration and extraction” of oil and natural gas, along with pipelines and storage facilities (6/13/14, I.143). Evidently, Xi wants his audiences to believe that increased use of fossil fuels will somehow co-exist happily with “green development.”
    2. Along these lines, see also Xi’s speech to the G20 Leaders Summit, 9/5/13, I.369-371); Speech to the Senate of Mexico, 6/5/13, 342-343.
    3. In this speech, Xi also observed that “China was the first country to put its signature on the Charter of the United Nations,” conveniently overlooking the fact that this was done by the Republic of China under Mao’s deadly enemy, Chiang Kai-Shek.
    4. Other member states at this time were Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Misunderstanding Tocqueville

    March 19, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop translation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000.

     

    Tocqueville’s Democracy in America likely rates as the ‘canonical’ work of political philosophy most esteemed by professional political scientists today. One often encounters those who have never read Aristotle’s Politics or Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, and Marx remains a much-controverted figure, but Tocqueville enjoys a privileged place.

    He does have his critics, however. They tend to be captious. Following are the principal objections to his book, with replies.

    1. Tocqueville doesn’t understand the American founding, which was intended to secure the unalienable, natural rights to equality—equality of the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

    Tocqueville isn’t concerned with the American political founding as such, although he does devote substantial attention to the Constitution, offering what amounts to a good summary of The Federalist, a book seldom read in Europe, then or now. The ‘founding’ Tocqueville wants to understand is the founding of democracy in America—the establishment of a civil society in which there are no titled aristocrats, like himself, a society of civic equals—not equality of natural rights but “equality of conditions” (Introduction, p.3). Equality is the “primary fact,” “the generative fact” that influences American laws, the “maxims” of those who govern, and “the particular habits [of] the governed” (Introduction, p.3). The “social state” has “become democratic” (Introduction, p.9).

    He wants to understand this because the aristocracies are in decline everywhere, but aristocrats continue to trouble European civic life. “A great democratic revolution is taking place among us,” among Europeans, and there are those “who hope to stop it” (Introduction, p.3, emphasis added). Europeans need to understand that “Equality can be established in civil society and not reign in the political world,” that political freedom can be lost under such conditions (II.ii.1). Political freedom is harder to maintain than civil-social equality. Without a strong aristocratic class located between central government and peoples, the regime choice now becomes that between “democratic freedom,” republicanism, and “the tyranny of the Ceasars,” “the unlimited power of one alone” (I.ii.9).  Tocqueville seeks to persuade his fellow aristocrats not to resist democracy but to guide it: “To instruct democracy, if possible to reanimate its beliefs, to purify its mores, to regulate its movements, to substitute little by little the science of affairs for its inexperience, and knowledge of its true interests for its blind instincts; to adapt its government to time and place; to modify it according to circumstances and men: such is the first duty imposed on those who direct society in our day” (Introduction, p.7). “The organization and establishment of democracies among Christians is the great political problem of our time” (I.ii.9). While Americans “furnish useful lessons in this,” Tocqueville’s adjuration has nothing to do with the American political founding, which Tocqueville admires; it is directed to Europeans, the French first of all.

    This democratic or egalitarian civil society might support any number of regimes—rule of one, few or many, good or bad. The political history of France up to Tocqueville’s time, and of France and Europe for a century and a half, and of Europe again today, shows the urgency of his enterprise. “There is no question of reconstructing an aristocratic society, but of making freedom issue from the bosom of the democratic society in which god makes us live” (II.iv.7).

    “I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought there an image of democracy itself, of its penchants, its character, its prejudices, its passions. I wanted to become acquainted with it if only to know at least what we [Europeans] ought to hope or to fear from it, ” given the advance of democracy in Europe (Introduction, p.13). The failure to see that the democracy considered in Democracy in America is civil-social equality and neither a natural right nor a form of government is, one might say, the primary error, the generative error, that readily leads to a host of cognate errors. 

    2. But the very feature you point to, Tocqueville’s emphasis on civil-social equality, denigrates the political, and especially denigrates the work of statesmen and of citizens generally because it focuses on the ‘given’ fact of the advance of that equality, downplaying the importance of the conscious, prudent choices made by political actors. That is, Tocqueville isn’t primarily a political scientist at all, despite his call for “a new political science for a world altogether new” (Introduction, 7). Unlike Publius in The Federalist, and despite his own extensive political career, he is really a mere sociologist, attempting to explain political life by attending to sub-political causes.

    The fact that Tocqueville devotes one of his longest chapters to “The Federal Constitution of the United States” (I.i.8) should be sufficient to impress the contrary opinion upon even the dullest sensibilities. There, Tocqueville vigorously explicates and applauds the republican institutions designed by the Framers.

    He also praises the jury system that long predated the founding. Juries are where the sovereign people meet law and “the idea of right,” here defined as “political virtue” or “duties toward society” which combat “individual selfishness” (I.ii.8). Juries put the people in contact with an “aristocracy” consonant with democracy: lawyers and judges, who teach them the nuances of law and how to apply the law.

    But even earlier than that, one might notice his treatment of the importance of estate law. “I am astonished,” the exclaims, “that ancient and modern writers have not attributed to estate laws a greater influence on the course of human affairs. These laws belong, it is true, to the civil order; but they ought to be placed at the head of all political institutions, for they have an incredible influence on the social state of peoples, of which political laws are only the expression.” That is why “the legislator regulates the estates of citizen once and he rests for centuries; motion having been given to his work, he can withdraw his hand from it; the machine acts by its own force and is directed as if by itself toward a goal indicated in advance”—by the legislator. Estate law makes the difference between an aristocratic and a democratic civil society. (I.i.3). And, of course, it is to be noted that the Framers of the United States Constitution outlawed primogeniture, thereby preventing the kind of aristocracy then seen in Europe from arising in America. More generally, American legislators “oppose the idea of rights to sentiments of envy” (I.ii.9: “Would Laws on Mores Suffice to Maintain Democratic Institutions Elsewhere Than in America?”). 

    The purpose of carefully describing and explaining democracy in civil society to Europeans is precisely to give them the basis for prudent and just legislation under modern conditions. Such democratic “penchants” as unpolitical “individualism” and statist centralization—the latter especially dangerous if animated by “the science of despotism,” which consists in satisfying the material desires of the people (II.iv.4)—are “not invincible”; “my principal goal in writing this book has been to combat them” (II.iv.3). “The whole art of the legislator consists in discerning well and in advance these natural inclinations of human societies in order to know when one must aid the efforts of citizens and when it would rather be necessary to slow them down. For these obligations differ according to the times. Only the goal toward which the human race should always tend is unmoving; the means of getting it there vary constantly.” (II.ii.15). 

    3. But what exactly is that “goal”? Here, Tocqueville fails to acknowledge the importance of unalienable natural rights, fails even to mention the Declaration of Independence in this very long book, fails to understand the Founders’ moral conception of the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as rational. By failing to mention the Declaration of Independence, he takes no cognizance of the rightful goal of government, which is to secure unalienable natural rights for the citizens within a civil society.

    It is true that Tocqueville never mentions the Declaration; he has no reason or need to do so, and some reason not to. The aristocratic statesmen of Europe in his day had seen enough of such declarations, particularly the French declaration of “The Rights of Man and the Citizen,” which had instigated a fair amount of violence against, well, aristocrats only a few decades earlier. 

    But that is hardly to say that Tocqueville denies the existence of unalienable natural rights or provides no sense of what the “goal,” the purpose, the telos of the human race should “tend.” “I conceive a society…in which all, regarding the law as their work, would love and submit to it without trouble”—in the Declaration’s language, government by the consent of the governed; a society “in which the authority of government is respected as necessary, not divine, and love one would bear for a head of state would not be a passion, but a reasoned and tranquil sentiment. Each having rights and being assured of preserving his rights, a manly confidence and a sort of reciprocal condescension between the classes would be established, as far from haughtiness as from baseness. The people, instructed in their true interests, would understand that to profit from society’s benefits, one must submit to its burdens. The free association of citizens could then replace the individual power of nobles, and the state would be sheltered from both tyranny and license.” (Introduction, 8-9). 

    That is, Tocqueville shares with Aristotle an understanding of the indispensable effect political life, ruling and being ruled in turn, produces in the cultivation of human nature. In political activity, “sentiments and ideas renew themselves, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon one another” (II.ii.5). At the same time, political right, the freedom to form political associations, is not the same as natural right; natural right begins with the recognition that men and women everywhere are of the same species (II.iii.1). Accordingly, “What one calls a republic in the United States is the tranquil reign of the majority…. But the majority itself is not all-powerful. Above it in the moral world are humanity, justice, and reason; in the political world, acquired rights”—both of these “barriers” to tyranny recognized by the majority (I.ii.10: “On Republican Institutions in the United States”). The exception to this is slavery, an instance of “the order of nature reversed” that was begun by Christians in the 16th century and imported to America in the 17th century (I.ii.10: “Position that the Black Race Occupies in the United States”). And even in “the America of the South, nature, sometimes recovering its rights, comes to establish equality between whites and blacks” (ibid.). Overall, however, Americans “believe that at birth each has received the ability to govern himself”; this ability owes its “moral authority” to “universal reason” among human beings by nature and its political power to “the universality of citizens” as distinguished from subjects (I.ii.10: “What Are the Chances That the American Union Will Last?”).

    4. Tocqueville fails to recognize the Founders’ conception of morality, (e.g., the natural right to liberty) as rational, instead attributing morality to religion and liberty to the realm of political contestation. 

    This again confuses the social manifestations of morality and liberty with their substantive content. In America, everything is not permitted “in the interest of society” (I.ii.9: “Indirect Influence the Religious Beliefs exert on Political Society in the United States”). Tocqueville finds religion to be the social guarantor and social source of morality and of rights, especially in democratic conditions. And it is necessary for political freedom. “How could society fail to perish if, while the political bond is relaxed, the moral bond is not tightened? And what makes a people master of itself if has not submitted to God?” (ibid.). He does not claim that morality and rights have no content beyond moeurs, only that moeurs embody morality and rights. As to rationality, Tocqueville maintains that “There are no great men without virtue; without respect for rights, there is no great people: one can almost say that there is no society; for, what is a union of rational and intelligent beings among whom force is the sole bond?” (I.ii.6: “On the Idea of Rights in America.” Emphasis added.). Further, “the means of inculcating in men the idea of rights and of making it, so to speak, fall upon their senses” is “to give the peaceful exercise of certain rights to all of them” (ibid.). That is, first, the idea of rights is distinct from making that idea ‘sensible’ to them; there is no reason to assume that the idea itself is irrational; second, religion is not the sole source of making rights felt and respected. Political life as Aristotle defined it, ruling and being ruled, also does that. While some of the harsh religious laws enacted by the Puritans “bring shame to the human mind,” more generally in America, the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom “advance in accord and seem to lend each other a mutual support,” whereby “religion sees in civil freedom a noble exercise of the faculties of man” and freedom “considers religion as the safeguard of moeurs; and moeurs as the guarantee of laws and the pledge of its own duration” (I.i.2). And this is quite natural: “Religion is…only a particular form of hope, and it is as natural to the human heart as hope itself,” “one of the constituent principles of human nature” (I.ii.9: “On the Principal Causes That Make Religion Powerful in America”). The “taste for the infinite and the love of what is immortal” form part of human nature itself (II.ii.12). Further, religion rightly understood has rational content. “It submits the truths of the other world to individual reason” (I.ii.9: “On Republican Institutions in the United States”). Consequently, “one ordinarily sees even in the midst of [Americans’] zeal something so tranquil, so methodical, so calculated, that it seems to be reason much more than heart that leads them to the altar”—a Pascalian wager essayed by persons who for the most part have never read Pascal (ibid.). 

    The tensions among equality and “human freedom” and religion exists not in America but in Europe. “Christianity, which has rendered all men equal before God, will not be loath to see all citizens equal before the law. But by a strange concurrence of events, religion finds itself enlisted for the moment among the powers democracy is overturning” because in France the republican revolutionaries were animated by Enlightenment rationalism, their monarchist and aristocratic enemies by traditional Catholic piety. Tocqueville would correct both sides. The non-religious and often irreligious “partisans of freedom” understand freedom as “the origin of the noblest virtues” and “the source of the greatest goods,” but they need to “call religion to their aid” for two reasons: “the reign of freedom cannot be established without that of moeurs“; and moeurs cannot be “founded without [religious] beliefs.” Tocqueville aims at an alliance between ‘secularists’ and the pious for freedom—reversing the coalitions seen in the French Revolution. (Introduction, 10-12). Against the materialism of the Enlightenment philosophes who inspired the French revolutionaries, Tocqueville insists that “the soul must remain great and strong, if only to be able from time to time to put its force and its greatness in the service of the body” (II.ii.16); paradoxically, if you want the benefits materialists promise, you had better not become a materialist yourself. Along with political freedom, religion “is the most precious bequest of aristocratic ages,” directing the egalitarian souls ‘upward’ under conditions that pull them ‘sideward’ and ‘downward.’

    5. Because he fails to recognize equal natural rights, he only envisions a possible civil war between the white and black races in America, not between non-slaveholding and slaveholding whites.

    This ignores the fact that the American Civil War did in fact mobilize black troops against the whites of the Confederacy. It also ignores the fact that Tocqueville does not consider wars within confederal democracies such as the United States to be civil wars but “only disguised foreign wars,” given the power of the state governments in confederacies (II.iii.26). Accordingly, “the only case in which a civil war could arise” in America “is one in which the army, being divided, one part would raise the standard of revolt and the other would remain faithful” (ibid.). And of course this is exactly what happened, as seen in the tragic case of General Robert E. Lee, among others. But more tellingly still, although Tocqueville doesn’t predict the American Civil War, he does predict disunion, due to the difference of moeurs between North and South—a difference he attributes to the effect of the presence of large numbers of slaves in the South on Southern slaveholders, whom he regards as examples of aristocracy within democracy (II.ii.10: “What Are the Chances That the American Union Will Last?”). And disunion did happen, if not de jure (as Lincoln insisted) then de facto, for four years.

    6. Since Americans’ “destiny” is “singular” in that “they have taken from the English aristocracy the idea of individual rights and the taste for local freedoms” (II.iv.4), this means that he supposes that they derive the substance of those rights from a civil-social class.

    This is an illogical inference. If, to oversimplify, one were to say that the American Founders took their ideas of rights from Hobbes and (even more) from Locke, would that not then mean that they took them from philosophers who lived in an aristocratic society, albeit one that was increasingly ’embourgeoised’? Yet, that has nothing to do with whether or not this conception of rights is right. Nor does Tocqueville suggest any such thing.

    On the contrary. Tocqueville does indeed devote a section to “the idea of rights in the United States.” In it, he writes, “The idea of right is nothing other than the idea of virtue introduced into the political world. It is with the idea of rights that men have defined what license and tyranny are,” and idea by which men are “enlightened.” The right to property, for example, comes to be felt when the child who takes from others learns that others can take from him; politically, in America each individual owns property, and so does not advocate the expropriation of wealth from those who own more property than he. That is, rights are rational ideas, ideas of enlightened men, but that doesn’t mean that they will be respected simply because they are rational. (I.ii.6: “On the Idea of Rights in the United States”).

    In modern, ‘democratic’ times, religion and morality will not serve as adequate sources of the respect for rights. “Do you not see that religions are weakening and that the divine notion of rights is disappearing? Do you not find that moeurs are being altered, and that with them the moral notion of rights is being effaced?” This is happening because religious “beliefs” now “give way to reasoning,” moral sentiments to “calculation.” “If in the midst of that universal disturbance you do not come to bind the idea of rights to the personal interest that offers itself as the only immobile point in the human heart, what will then remain to you go govern the world, except fear?” (I.ii.6: “On the Idea of Rights in the United States”). This is exactly what Publius inclines to say. That is, the ‘rational choice calculations‘ of individuals living in democratized and increasingly ‘secularized’ societies must be directed by prudent legislation aimed at securing rights. Neither Publius nor Tocqueville does it implies that rights are products of self-interest, any more than they are the products of religious beliefs or of moral sentiments.

    Finally, while the Americans “took” the idea of individual rights—i.e., civil and political rights—and the taste for local freedoms from the aristocrats, they have transformed them into “that bourgeois and democratic freedom of which the history of the world had still not offered a complete picture” (I.i.2). The settlers were smallholders, not grandees. As to natural rights, Tocqueville quotes John Winthrop,” himself paraphrasing Aristotle, who wrote that “Liberty is not to do what you want: it must be good and just”—not only “civil” but “moral” (ibid.). From this has arisen (now glancing at one of Thomas Jefferson’s letters) a “natural aristocracy that flows from enlightenment and virtue” (ibid.). 

    7. Tocqueville speaks of rights as if they were given by human beings to one another, not by the laws of nature and of nature’s God. And so, he writes, “I know only two manners of making equality reign in the political world: rights must be given to each citizen or to no one” (I.i.3).

    Here, Tocqueville explicitly refers to the right to equality in politics, which he does not regard as divinely ordained, as he does not believe in ‘divine right’ of kings or of anyone else. He addresses a problem endemic to politics as conducted in democratic/egalitarian civil societies. In them, the passion for equality is stronger than the passion for liberty. The passion for liberty can be either “manly and legitimate” or “depraved,” dragging everyone down to the proverbial lowest common denominator. Political “absolutism”—in France, during the later decades of Old-Regime monarchism and more recently under the rule of Napoleon I—brought the people to “equality in servitude.” Even “inequality in freedom,” seen in feudalism, is preferable to that. Equality in freedom is better than both, but “when citizens are all nearly equal, it becomes difficult for them to defend their independence against the aggressions of power,” since they are no longer shielded from the centralized modern state by the aristocrats. (I.i.3). [1] To avoid this danger, Tocqueville famously proposes the substitution of civic associations for the now-vanished feudal estates.

    8. Tocqueville followed Rousseau in rejecting natural law, regarding all general ideas as false and attributing the equality principle not to nature but to Christianity, as when he writes that “it was necessary that Jesus Christ come to earth to make it understood that all members of the human species are naturally alike and equal” (II.i.3). Insofar as he admits ‘generality’ into his argument, he endorses Rousseau’s General Will, not natural right or natural law.

    The quotation itself suffices to show that Tocqueville regards Christianity as having made the equality principle understood, not that Christianity somehow invented it. He mentions this in reference to the doctrine of natural slavery, best known from a passage in Aristotle’s Politics. “The most profound and vast geniuses of Rome and Greece were never able to arrive at the idea, so general but at the same time so simple, of the similarity of men and of the equal right to freedom that each bears from birth” (II.i.3). But if human beings as a species bear an equal right to freedom from birth, then that can be nothing other than a natural right. Christianity impressed this truth upon Europeans when Europe was aristocratic and therefore disinclined to perceive it; it was the entering wedge of the principle of equality, leading over the centuries to the social condition of equality, as seen in Tocqueville’s history of France (Introduction, 3-6).

    The claim that Tocqueville adheres to Rousseau’s doctrine of the General Will is based on an out-of-context misreading. The reference to “the sovereignty of the human race” comes in his discussion of majority tyranny. “I regard as impious and detestable the maxim that in matters of government the majority of a people has the right to do everything”—the maxim soon to be advanced in America by Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. “Nonetheless I place the origin of all powers in the will of the majority. Am I contradicting myself?” Obviously not, since might, “power,” is not right, but Tocqueville puts it differently: “A general law exists that has been made or at least adopted not only by the majority of this or that people, but by the majority of all men. This law is justice,” which “forms the boundary of each people’s right.” “Therefore, when I refuse to obey an unjust law, I do not deny to the majority the right to command; I only appeal from the majority of the people to the sovereignty of the human race.” (I.ii.7). No competent student of political philosophy can fail to see that Tocqueville here refers to the law of nations. The law of nations is not the same as the law of nature but it in no way contradicts that law; in fact, it can and did incorporate it, as seen in what was then the most important recent treatise on the subject, Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations, subtitled Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs by Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, originally published in 1776. As Tocqueville observes, “only God can be omnipotent without danger, because his wisdom and justice are always equal to his power” (I.ii.7).

    Tocqueville makes this even more explicit in his chapter “On Honor in the United States and in Democratic Societies.” “The human race,” he writes, “feels permanent and general needs that have given birth to moral laws; all men have naturally attached in all places and all times the idea of blame and of shame to the nonobservance of them. Evading them they have called to do evil, submitting to them, to do good.” Evil “penchants” are “condemnable in the eyes of the general reason and the universal conscience of the human race,” although some of these might be condemned “only feebly” in a given civil society under certain circumstances; in the United States, “the love of wealth” is necessary in order “to transform the vast uninhabited continent” that Americans have come to possess (II.iii.18). This is only to recognize the adjustment of naturally derived moral laws to the variety of human conditions, as Aristotle commends in the Nicomachean Ethics.

    9. Worse, Tocqueville doubts the truth of natural equality because he is a nominalist who rejects such a “general idea.” “God does not ponder the human race in general”; being omniscient, He “has no need of general ideas,” unlike mere humans. In reality, Tocqueville continues, “there are no beings in nature exactly alike”; ergo, there are no “identical facts” and “no rules generally applicable to several objects at once.” We humans are left with our “incomplete notions.” (II.i.3).

    As Tocqueville good-humoredly acknowledges, his very “use of the word equality in an absolute sense” exemplifies this necessary human intellectual practice (II.i.16). The habit is especially strong among those who live in democratic conditions, partly because there really are more similarities among individuals in such societies. But this does not commit him to nominalism; it simply cautions his readers to pay attention to details, not to lose sight of individuals. There is a crucial political as well as a philosophic reason to do so: sweeping generalizations in political life can lead to tyranny. “To force all men to march in the same march, toward the same object—that is a human idea. To introduce an infinite variety into actions, but to combine them in a manner so that all these actions lead us by a thousand diverse ways toward the accomplishment of one great design—that is a divine idea” (Appendix XXIV, p.703).

    10. If not a nominalist, then Tocqueville is a historicist, a sort of democratized Hegelian, propounding a claim that social equality is part of an inevitable ‘march of history.’ 

    In his correspondence, Tocqueville mentioned Hegelians he had met in Germany, remarking shortly, “I detested the Hegelians.” [2] Hegelianism is a form of pantheism, and in the Democracy Tocqueville decries that doctrine. “Among the different systems with whose aid philosophy seeks to explain the universe, pantheism appears to me one of the most appropriate to seduce the human mind in democratic centuries; all who remain enamored of the genuine greatness of man should unite in combat against it” (II.i.8). In the same chapter, Tocqueville criticizes the immoderate perfectionism that democratic souls to which human souls in democracy so often succumb. Pantheism plus perfectionism equal historicism incline the soul of man under democracy to such historicist doctrines as ‘Progressivism,’ which Tocqueville’s discussion anticipates. Tocqueville also rejects the materialist historicism of Artur de Gobineau, with whom he engaged in extensive correspondence. [3]

    Far from being a historicist, Tocqueville regards historicism as a danger endemic to democratic conditions, as seen in his critique of “historians who live in democratic times,” who “take away from peoples themselves the ability to modify their own fate…subject[ing] them either to an inflexible providence or to a sort of blind fatality” (II.i.20). “It is not enough for them to show how the facts have come about; they also take pleasure in making one see that it could not have happened otherwise” (ibid.). Aristocratic historians, by contrast, “particularly those of antiquity,” make it seem “that to become master of his fate and to govern those like him, a man has only to know how to subdue himself,” to subject his passions to his reason (ibid.). But while “historians of antiquity instruct on how to command, those of our day teach hardly anything than how to obey”; “if this doctrine of fatality, which has so many attractions for those who write history in democratic times, passed from writers to their readers, thus penetrating the entire mass of citizens and taking hold of the public mind, one can foresee that it would so paralyze the movement of the new societies and reduce Christians to Turks” (ibid.). Already incline to materialism, democrats “are only too inclined to doubt free will because each of them feels himself limited on all sides by his weakness,” pressured by a ‘mass’ society of equals, no longer the ‘vertical’ pressure from aristocrats above them but the ‘horizontal’ pressure of fellow democrats around them. Against this, one must “willingly grant force and independence to men united in a social body,” in civil and political associations, as “it is a question of elevating souls and not completing their prostration” (ibid.). 

    The charge of historicism leveled against Tocqueville usually arises in response to his passages in the Introduction, emphasizing the “providential” advance of democracy since Jesus of Nazareth laid down the principle of the equality of men under God. By Providence, Tocqueville means “a thousand circumstances independent of the will of man” (I.ii.9: “On the Accidental or Providential Causes Contributing to the Maintenance of a Democratic Republic in the United States”). In America, such circumstances include the absence of formidable neighbors, the absence of a large capital city, ancestors who imported the “love of equality and freedom” to these shores, and the sheer size of the continent, which makes “nature itself” work “for the people” by giving them places from which to escape from the rule of any aristocratic class that might form ‘back East’ (ibid.). But he immediately observes that these “providential” causes are not politically decisive; French Canada, also an egalitarian civil society, rests under monarchy. 

    Democracy has replaced aristocracy not because ‘History’ so dictates but because it is more natural. “One can change human institutions, but not men” (II.iii.13)—an observation that contradicts the Rousseauian doctrine of the malleability of human nature taken up soon thereafter by historicists. “The manners of aristocracy placed beautiful illusions over human nature,” illusions that could not withstand the slow workings of reality (II.iii.14), but “the constitution of man” is “everywhere the same” (II.iii.17). This goes right down to the most fundamental distinction among humans, the distinction between male and female: “The reason of one is as sure as the other, and her intelligence as clear” as his (II.ii.12).

     

    In sum, to understand the American founding, the founding of a republic on a democratic civil-social base, one must go to the writings of the statesmen who effected it. They explained themselves, thoroughly and often eloquently. To understand democracy as a civil-social condition, its causes and effects, its advantages and its dangers, one must consult Tocqueville.

     

     

     

    Notes

    1. See also II.ii.1: “Why Democratic Peoples Show a More Ardent and More Lasting Love for Equality Than for Freedom.”
    2. In a letter to Francisque de Corcelle from Bonn dated July 22, 1854, Tocqueville elaborates: “You are, of course, aware of the part played by philosophy during the past fifty years in Germany, and especially by the school of Hegel. He was protected, as, no doubt, you know, by the ruling powers, because his doctrines asserted that, in a political sense, all established facts ought to be submitted to as legitimate; and that the very circumstance of their existence was sufficient to make obedience to them a duty. This doctrine gave rise at length to the anti-Christian and anti-spiritual schools, which have been endeavoring to pervert Germany for the last twenty years, especially for the last ten; and finally to the socialist philosophy, which had so great a share in producing the confusion of 1848. Hegel exacted submission to the ancient established powers of his own time; which he held to be legitimate, not only from existence, but from their origin. His scholars wished to establish powers of another kind, which became, according to their views, equally legitimate and binding. This did not suit the official protectors of Hegel. Yet from this Pandora’s box [i.e., “this sensual and socialist philosophy’] have escaped all sorts of moral diseases from which the [German] people is still suffering.” That is, not only does Tocqueville detest Hegelianism, he also clearly sees that materialist historicism that derives from it (Marx being the preeminent example), as well as the denial of political liberty regimes established on the principles of historicism attempt to legitimate.
    3. Alexis de Tocqueville: Correspondence with Gobineau. John Lukacs, editor and translator: The European Revolution and Correspondence with Gobineau. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    What Has Wittgenstein To Do With Political Philosophy?

    March 12, 2025 by Will Morrisey

    John W. Danford: Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: A Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

     

    For more than a century, doubts have arisen about modern science, despite its extraordinary achievements of discovery and invention. The conquest of nature has not uniformly relieved man’s estate, as Francis Bacon promised. Empowering man, it has not emended man himself, that mixed bag of a creature. And even if undertaken with good intentions, any such emendation might worsen him. Somehow, modern science is ‘missing something.’ And it isn’t simply a matter of the results of the enterprise. Its philosophic foundations give some philosophers pause, as seen in Edmond Husserl’s starkly titled The Crisis of the European Sciences. While, as Danford writes, “the reality which science presents is said to be the only reality,” is it? Social science in particular is open to question. Eschewing ‘value judgments,’ it “loses its connection with the prescientific world,” and to lose that connection “is precisely to lose its meaning for us.” Husserl remarks that modern science’s empiricism leads not to truth—now deemed a ‘metaphysical prejudice’—but to approximation or even mere acceptability. Such a culture-bound science stands “but a short step from…radical nihilism,” the claim that scientific theories “are actually creations of the human will.” Husserl wants to give an account of the whole, of that which transcends the empeiria. Danford rejects transcendental phenomenology as “a mysterious project,” seeking instead to look at the philosophic origins of modern science, especially modern political science, to see if they withstand scrutiny. 

    “The monopolistic attitude toward knowledge which characterizes modern scientific method…emerged in the great intellectual revolution of the 17th century,” when Thomas Hobbes “proclaimed himself the founder of political science qua science.” Hobbes claims that “what is required to make knowledge scientific is nothing more than attention to method.” Previous political philosophers had emphasized the centrality of practical wisdom, prudence, to political life. The best elaboration of ‘ancient’ political science may be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics. Hobbes, Bacon’s most brilliant disciple, argued that analysis followed by systematic construction held much more real promise than unmethodical deliberation, however intelligent and upright its practitioners might be (but seldom were). Here is where Wittgenstein comes in. “Hobbes’s rejection of Aristotle is the very portion of Hobbes’s thought about which Wittgenstein’s philosophy raises questions,” specifically on the topic of language, which Hobbes and his own disciple, John Locke, address extensively. “According to Wittgenstein’s account, we must conclude that Hobbes and Locke were mistaken in their understanding of language,” and if so, they were also mistaken about “the proper method for political science.”

    What, then “distinguishes modern science from early rationalism,” the rationalism of philosophers prior to Hobbes and his mentor, Francis Bacon? Hobbes writes that previous philosophers had “strangled” science “with snares of words.” Such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas came only to uncertain conclusions; because uncertain, their philosophic doctrines led to subversive, disputatious, uncivil discourse, theoretically and practically unsatisfactory. Despite their vaunted reasonableness, philosophers have divided into factions, never achieving the wisdom they claim to love and seek, what Hobbes calls “the perfect knowledge of the truth in all matters whatsoever.” In this quest, geometers have done much better, having produced indisputable knowledge. Geometric knowledge is anything but high-flown, metaphysical, its theorems being based on ‘low’ or self-evident axioms that no one can disagree with, and its aim being not some beauteous vision but utility—the construction of buildings, roads, dams. Hobbes would make political science similarly low, self-evident, useful, based on sense perception and memory, by which means they can discover facts. The “experience of fact” is low but solid, indeed; we share it with the “brutes.” 

    By contrast, prudence is merely “conjecture from experience,” uncertain. There are two kinds of knowledge: “knowledge original” or sense-knowledge and “knowledge of the truth of propositions,” which is science proper. Both are experiential, but science consists of “the experience men have of the proper use of names.” Truth is a true proposition, the human way of knowing. The truth of propositions, propositions rightly conceived in the brain of the proposer, distinguishes human knowledge from brutish knowledge. Science requires language; it is more than the purely phenomenal knowledge of brutes. Humanly understood evidence “always involves language.” A parrot speaks but forms no conception of what it is speaking; it might repeat a proposition, but it doesn’t know what it’s talking about. When it does know, it expresses itself not in language but in shrieks.

    But if words are “arbitrary marks or signs, which ‘stand for’ our thoughts,” then one could use the wrong word to express a thought. Further, how can we know if “the thought which we use a word to signify is the same as someone else’s”? Truth cannot be “merely private or subjective” if science is to be a real thing, but how “to guarantee that words have meanings which are objective”? “Hobbes never, to our knowledge, satisfactorily resolves this problem.” Locke and Wittgenstein number among those who make the attempt.

    Having reached this aporia, Danford turns to Hobbes’s critique of classical political philosophy. As noted, the “ancients'” offer only prudential knowledge, which in modern scientific terms isn’t really knowledge at all, being grounded on opinions, which are always dubious. Hobbes wants political truths based on a priori, necessary premisses, analogous to his social contract, the foundation upon which his political architecture rests. Philosophers thus need to agree upon these foundational definitions before they build their ‘republics’ or regimes. Philosophy aims at knowledge of causes. Modern scientific knowledge requires analysis, breaking down the thing you are examining into its “elements” (a term borrowed from Euclid). Elements consist not only of physical parts, right down to atoms, but such features as shape, motion, and visibility. That is, real science is founded upon an analogy to the only sure science hitherto conceived, geometry. We “understand the ‘wholes’ of geometry (squares, triangles, pentagons), because we see how they are constructed from, or can be reduced to, simple ‘parts.'” Admittedly, all science, including geometry, “rests on a foundation which is assumed or unprovable.” In Euclid, these are definitions, postulates, and axioms. Definitions, for example, “are not proven: what we mean by ‘square’ is explained by a definition, but that squares exist and what the properties of squares are, are what geometry demonstrates”; “the definitions require only to be understood,” whereas “the propositions must be demonstrated or proven.” Similarly, the postulates are “the assumptions necessary to the practice of geometry but in themselves unprovable” (e.g., all right angles are equal) and axioms or “the rules of logic.” “Within its own subject matter, geometry is absolutely certain because we construct, in full view and from principles accepted by all (who practice geometry), the propositions concerning the nature of triangles, circles, rectangles, and so on,” principles not arbitrary but based on empirical observation from which the propositions are ‘abstracted.’ Abstraction means to get the universal and necessary “out of the particular and unnecessary” or “accidental.” 

    That works when we ‘do geometry.’ But can politics be treated that way—analyzed, broken down into simple elements? Hobbes answers with a characteristically resounding ‘yes’: individuals are the elements of political life, and they are composed of two basic impulses: appetite and aversion, motion toward and motion away. Political science rests on these elements, and definitions of them are the “first principles” of demonstration in political science, “the keystone of Hobbes’s epistemological archway.” That is, definition comes between analysis or “resolution” and constructive deduction, synthesis or “composition.” “The resolutive-compositive method itself is closely connected with an understanding of language according to which unambiguous definitions are in principle possible and which permit us to give a clear account of the nature of anything.” Under this method, words ‘stand for’ unambiguous concepts. Geometry issues in physics, physics in psychology, psychology in political science. [1] “Forthright and unidealistic observation of the political world, according to Hobbes, quickly teaches one that the central fact of politics is competition and the struggle of each individual to further his own interests.” Hobbes claims no originality in making that claim but he goes further, analyzing bodies politic into “individual, atomic men, each motivated by his own passions”; political motives are reducible “to a few simple passions.”  Viewed scientifically, without passion, these impassioned individuals may be sorted into the law-abiding and the law-breaking; law itself is only the “command of him or them that have coercive power.” The purpose of the political body is peaceful enjoyment of desired objects, avoidance of feared objects; desired objects are acquired by one means, power,” but in order to acquire desired objects and enjoy them, one needs to set self-preservation as the first goal of all individuals and bodies politic. Otherwise, bodies politics will dissolve into the “terrible state of nature,” that war of all against all, in which no law prevents the violent collision of the atomic men. A well-ordered body politic will channel the “permanent struggle for power” into “the peaceful struggle for power in the form of wealth,” which assuages man’s primal aversion, his fear of violent death.

    Hobbes does not intend his account of the state of nature and the social contract that (precariously) puts an end to it as a ‘history lesson.’ “He is attempting to ‘reform’ language by showing what political terms can legitimately mean, what they necessarily mean”—showing that the word ‘justice’ rightly, necessarily means law-abidingness, not some grand ‘republic’ of the soul or of the polis. Not only previous philosophy but especially religion “prevented the rational development of language,” which Hobbes now undertakes to free from such “phantasms of the mind.” Hobbes’s quest for certitude may respond as much to Paul the Apostle’s derision of philosophers as “always seeking, never finding.” He more than implies that Christians, like the ancient philosophers, are at most certain about mere mental phantasms.

    But if the geometrical/analytic method sets down definitions that are impossible to prove, definitions nonetheless necessary “in order, quite simply, to do science, how are we to understand the relation of science to the world?” The reason that Socrates’ regime (for example) is unlikely, perhaps impossible, to be realized in practice is that it ‘abstracts from’ concrete reality, even as the philosopher claims that his regime in speech is, in some sense, more true than concrete reality. Hobbes counters: the theoretical political science he practices against the political science of ‘the ancients’ “can be practical only because it orders, simplifies, abstracts, and so makes the world manageable.” In this, it resembles “the new natural science, which was based on a new understanding of that relationship between theoretical purity and practical utility.” Indeed, political philosophy actually can be more scientific than natural science because political institutions are constructed in accordance with the blueprint of the social contract. Bacon understands scientific experiments to torture nature in order to force her to reveal her secrets, but torture doesn’t always yield true confession; “we know only what we construct,” and in politics we construct things out of language: laws, states, monarchs—all of them man-made phenomena. Language itself is an invention. “It is the invention of language which permits man access to knowledge properly speaking,” to the framing of propositions. “By carefully observing human nature and history, and reducing it to the essential elements which must always have been present, we can reconstruct the situation in which the first terms of political discourse were needed and thus invented.” On that solid foundation, we can then erect a body politic (an “artificial man,” as Hobbes calls it) which really does secure our desire for self-preservation and the peaceful enjoyment of our desires that sustained self-preservation and the lawful competition for wealth make possible. 

    Another problem then appears. If “the meanings of the political terms are the result of human construction,” if the world consists of many peoples with different languages, are such political terms as ‘justice’ not “merely conventional, with different meanings at different times” and places? And if that is so, Hobbesian political science itself “may be of only limited validity,” “historical” not natural. “Hobbes rejects the historicist conclusion, because he believes that meanings necessarily emerge in the same way everywhere because of man’s permanent nature.” Eventually, Rousseau would challenge that belief, and the apparently stable bedrock of modern natural right would erode. What, then, can modern natural rights philosophers say about language that will defend their foundational definitions, their use of language?

    “Hobbes’s understanding of the possibility of a political science, including the resolutive-compositive method and the understanding of propositions, is connected with a particular attitude toward common speech. Behind that, in turn, lies a certain understanding of the nature of language,” to which Danford now turns. Hobbes claims to be “the first to see clearly the relation between language or words on the one hand and knowledge or science on the other.” Language, he asserts (in his characteristically anti-Biblical fashion) is a human invention, a too, a code invented to send messages. Words are first of all marks for remembrance, invented by an individual; they then become signs, signifying the same thing to more than one person, signs of human conceptions of things, not directly of the things themselves, arbitrary on both their individual and social manifestations. The conceptual character of language, the deployment of such universal terms as ‘Man,’ makes it likely that words may be equivocal. Hobbes isn’t clear on where we get our conceptions, but he does want to understand them, to clarify them, to make our agreements as to their meaning (crucially, when making an indispensable social contract) certain, reliable, understood by everyone. He never quite gets there.

    Enter John Locke, with his conception of “simple ideas” or sense-impressions, which precede language in human understanding. The simple ideas are “the bedrock of our mental processes.” What makes them reliable is that the human mind is “entirely passive” in receiving them; they are the unanalyzable elements of experience, which consists of them and our reflections upon them. How can we communicate our experiences to others in order to frame a civil society? Words abstract from, represent, experience; “language is impossible without abstraction,” but since “the general ideas are the same for everyone,” communicating them from one person to another is possible. (One remarks, in passing, the homology between words that represent things and persons who ‘represent’ others in the body politic.) This abstraction distinguishes man from brutes, “permit[ting] men to think and speak.” “Only the fact that the mind is passive in receiving simple ideas guarantees that men share the same ideas simply.” Such complex ideas as “social” and “contract” are composed of simple ideas. Complex ideas can occur naturally in the mind, from outside the mind, via observation of things in the world—Locke calls these “substances”—or from within the mind itself, which can put simple ideas together “by its own power”—Locke calls these “mixed modes.” Against Aristotle, then, framing a definition, making someone else understand by a word what the word stands for, is analytic, an act of breaking down complex ideas into their simple elements, using simple language for simple ideas. 

    Consequently, “our knowledge of the physical or natural world will necessarily be less perfect than our knowledge of the human world simply because the real essence of that natural world is inaccessible to us,” our knowledge of it approximate. Nature is best understood in terms of simple ideas, not in terms of arbitrary “mixed modes,” which admit of the combination of simple ideas of different kinds, human conventions. Human conventions, being self-generated, are quite understandable but less necessarily true to our own nature, arbitrary. Locke includes such ideas as incest, parricide, and justice as examples of such ideas, a classification which calls into question Biblical certainties, it must be remarked. “How is it, then, that Locke is also the most famous and influential theorist of natural law?”

    Lockean natural law as it pertains to human beings consists of moral certainties. Because moral terms are entirely human (not divine, given from outside the human mind) and therefore understandable, we are “capable of a true moral science, of complete and perfect knowledge of moral matters and moral principles,” a systematic demonstrative science of morality and politics “more certain than natural philosophy.” But which of these laws, these mixed-mode complex ideas, can be shown to be free of arbitrariness? “It is reasonable to suspect that Locke could not have failed to grasp the relativist implications of this view of language. Nevertheless he, like Hobbes, rejected them,” going ahead with deriving “principles of natural right from the facts of the state of nature.” He would “discover in human nature a standard which tells us what the minimum content of moral and political terms should be,” joining Hobbes “in the claim that the starting point for this enterprise cannot be what men say in common speech.” Rather, the philosopher must “look directly at the nature of human beings uncomplicated by their beliefs and opinions about why they do what they do,” before they construct their mixed-mode complex ideas for their convenience. Convenience, utility, not the conventional words, is the window that permits him to look at human nature, unimpeded because “what is useful is connected with what one needs.” Find out what men really need by analyzing their words and you can construct a sound morality for them based upon “an empirical study of human psychology.” Obviously, “although Locke departs from Hobbes in the content of his political philosophy, his method—the approach of imagining the construction of society from the elements themselves, and ignoring what men say—is identical with Hobbes’s resolutive-compositive method” and “deriv[ing] all moral and political principles from one primary natural law,” a law discovered by the use of that method.

    As does Hobbes, Locke attributes the failure of previous philosophers to find this method and to achieve these results not to ‘original sin’ but to an original misconception. “Men did not understand themselves or their true needs” because “their vision was obscured above all by their pride,” particularly in their belief that God initially provided for them, continues to provide for them, watch over them. In reality, men are needy; Locke’s state of nature is not Hobbes’s state of war, but it is a state of scarcity, neediness. All very well, but for one noticeable thing: the evidently conjectural character of any ‘state of nature’—Hobbes’s, Locke’s, Rousseau’s—lands modern philosophers back into the philosophic factionalism Hobbes deplores. It seems that both ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ philosophy incur relativism, the first because there was an ‘outer’ standard of morality, the nature of which philosophers did not agree upon, the second because there was an ‘inner’ standard of morality, the nature of which philosophers did not agree upon.  Yet, “if Hobbes and Locke were unsuccessful in their hope, they nevertheless took the decisive step of establishing the split between the natural world and the world of human constructs on an epistemological footing,” a footing “inextricably linked with a certain understanding of the way language works.”

    Danford describes and advantage the ‘ancients’ enjoy over the moderns. Their aporia are more promising of at least some tentative resolutions because “they understood there to be more kinds of knowledge than Hobbes accepts.” If knowledge comes in different kinds, it may not be certain, nor may it aspire to certainty, but it covers more ground, comprehends more, in both senses of the term. In thinking about justice, for example, they begin “not by denying common speech or what men say, but by considering various ordinary opinions about it, opinions reflecting a variety of situations in which justice is relevant.” Here is no “geometric certainty,” but here is no unrealistic expectation of geometric certainty masquerading as tough-minded realism. The problem with the ‘ancients,’ however, is that they provide no “systematic account of language” to go along with Aristotle’s comprehensive account of the kinds of knowledge. Hence Danford’s interest in Wittgenstein, who does give such an account without succumbing to the linguistic and epistemological simplism of Hobbes and Locke.

    Initially, Wittgenstein held the Hobbes-Locke position, that words stand for things, representing objects. But he eventually concluded that the evocation of images is only one thing that language does. A word may also signify, point to a use. To say ‘No!’ is not to conjure up a mental picture of an object; words are not only “symbols in a communications code.” For example, if I call out “Slab!” I may mean ‘Bring me a slab!’ or ‘I want a slab!’ “Words function in numerous ways, often combining with activity in what Wittgenstein calls “language games.” Speaking, using language, is a human activity; his term, ‘game,’ does not imply ‘fun and games,’ although it includes fun and games. Language is often, even usually, undertaken with serious intent. Contra Hobbes and Locke, the multiple uses of language are not in themselves confusing; it is rather the reduction of language to “the method of science” that confuses us. “Wittgenstein tries to show why the reductionist method of natural science is not appropriate to the understanding of language: reducing language to a small number of ‘simples,’ or to one model, inevitably causes us to misunderstand it.” 

    “Learning words means learning how to use them.” Learning a language, however, “means learning how to play many different language games, in which words are used in different ways,” for the purpose or purposes of those games. “Understanding a word, we may say, is like understanding a lever in the cab of a locomotive: fully understanding it requires in a sense an understanding of the whole mechanism, that is, of what the mechanism is for.” Understanding the whole “entails understanding what that human activity is, what it for, why it is played.” Human action is teleological, as Aristotle maintains. Unlike other teleological motions, such as plant growth, it involves speech, reason; at the same time, human speech differs from Hobbes’s parrot but also differs from Hobbes’s man, who has no good way to think of purposes outside of his own passions, his subjective desires and aversions. “It makes no sense to speak absolutely of the simple parts of something” because a word has no meaning outside “the language games it is used in,” games that are purposive. And so, for some purposes, in analyzing a chair I might consider it as composes of “pieces of wood and screw,” while for another purpose I might analyze it in terms of “the atoms which make up the materials themselves.” In each case, what you think of as the ‘real’ table “depends on what you are going to do” and the purpose you pursue in doing it.

    In a political community, the meaning of the word ‘justice’ requires knowledge of the purposes of the political community. “In considering the vast range of political phenomena, from taxes to trials, our judgment proceeds not from the fact that they share or lack some simple element of ‘just-ness,’ but rather from their relationship to the goals we understand our political community to aim at.” Goals: “the whole,” political or other, “may be heterogeneous and not reducible” to its parts.

    If there’s “no ‘core’ meaning common to all its forms,” how, then, to define language itself? That there is no clear-cut definition of the kind Hobbes and Locke seek may be seen in the notion of ‘games.’ “The activities we call games”—poker, chess, baseball, sometimes politics—are “related to each other not in any single way” to which they can be reduced and defined “but as members of a family, each of whom resembles others in some ways, but not in all.” Wittgenstein offers the metaphor of a thread, “the overlapping of many fibers.” Is such a blurred concept really a concept? Yes, in the same way as an indistinct photography a picture of a person. For some purposes (the obscuring of blemishes, for example), one might prefer the indistinct photo. Exactness, certainty isn’t always a solution; sometimes, it’s a problem. When considering what a game is, “we cannot really say what a concept means,” but then that doesn’t mean I don’t know it. I can know how a clarinet sounds without being able to say how it sounds. “Our knowledge is in many cases an inarticulable knowledge,” or only a partially articulable one. Ask not only ‘what’ the word means but how you learned its meaning because “an understanding of how human beings learn to participate in this activity will shed light on the activity itself.” Parents don’t teach their children the rules of grammar first; “as children, we learn by hearing words used by those around us, and used in the language games or contexts in which the words are customary.” The word by itself doesn’t tell you the substance of what it is. “The grammar of a word might be said to include all the various expressions win which we can use of the word, and the situations in which these are suitable”—not “simply a verbal matter,” but one that “encompasses situations, contexts, and activities in the world.” That is, in addition to an Aristotle-like teleology, language also registers an Aristotle-like attention to circumstances, an attention on full display in the Nicomachean Ethics. 

    Why is this ‘grammatology’ not merely arbitrary, conventional, vulnerable to the same criticism leveled at the ‘moderns’? Wittgenstein does in fact say that our concepts “are natural, at least to some degree.” That is because language games and grammar “are grounded in or based on characteristic ways we human beings have of living and acting together, characteristics of human beings simply.” They are “natural conventions,” since by nature we may not settle upon any one language, grammar, or set of language games but that by nature we do settle on some language, grammar, or set of language games. Conventional, yes; arbitrary, no. Language registers natural human feelings—happiness, anger, pain, all of which “are indeed built into our grammar. More, these things are “based on natural characteristics of human life on this planet, on our forms of life.” Human life has a nature, heterogeneous but not reducible to its parts. As Wittgenstein puts it, there is no “agreement in opinions”—like regimes, languages differ—but “in forms of life.” “The grammatical conventions, the language, are grounded in form of life which human being share, which are somehow natural to them.” Ways of life are patterns of action, not patterns of images. “The crucial notion here is that these activities are not reducible to something simpler; the terms that we use in a language game are not necessarily constructed out of simpler elements.” The sharp, modern distinction between human nature, reduced to, say, fear of violent death, and mind-entangling conventions (beauty, truth) gives way in Wittgenstein to ways of life that must be understood on their “own terms.” Wittgenstein would “inquire into the relations among our forms of life without necessarily seeking to reduce complicated ones to more simple or basic ones.” How, then, might we rank these forms of life—very roughly, these regimes? Within a given regime, such ranking would take place with a view to the purpose of the regime. Within a language game, such ranking would take place with a view to the purpose of the game. But is it possible to rank one regime in relation to another, one game in relation to another? Or does Wittgenstein give us only a more sophisticated form of relativism, leading once again to nihilism? 

    Danford suggests that “conceived in the above terms,” the modernity of Hobbes, Locke, and even of Wittgenstein, “the project of understanding justice is indeed hopeless.” “Once certainty is made the criterion of science, it is difficult to see how there can be a science of a practical matter such as politics.” Aristotle and Plato argue against certainty as the criterion of science, or at least of all science, and thus leave space for a workable science of politics. “Once certainty is made the criterion of science, it is difficult to see how there can be a science of a practical matter such as politics,” a difficulty Hobbes “circumvents” by “replacing the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences with the distinction between theoretical sciences and applied sciences” in an attempt to treat political purposes—for example, securing peace—as “no different from the application of geometry to solve a surveyor’s problem of measurement.” Science serves practice; the purpose of knowledge is power; political science seeks peace, seeks to conquer the state of nature, which is a state of war.” But “in order to be useful, a science must be indisputable”; in needs the authoritative certainty commanded by religion, and in order to vindicate that certainty it must bring the peace Christianity merely promises. It hasn’t, and that raises uncertainty about the utility of Hobbesian political science.

    But it may be that the ‘ancients’ have a better way, if not a way that satisfies the human longing for certitude. Danford begins with “the place of classical social science” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In Aristotelian science, theoretical reason concerns matters of truth and falsity, while practical reasoning concerns matters of good and bad action. Aristotle elaborates five kinds of knowledge. Science, epistemē, concerns things that are necessarily so; it is teachable, either by induction (reasoning from particulars to universals) or, more strictly speaking, by deduction, syllogism. Because a syllogism cannot question its own ‘first principles,” a truth or truths that must be held as self-evident for the sake of making logical deductions, one also needs nous, intelligence, which discovers the first principles, the archai, of science. Sophia or theoretical wisdom understands both first principles and the results of science, beginnings and ‘ends’ or purposes. Art, technē, concerns the means to those ends; it is productive but neither discover first principles nor make logical deductions from them nor judge the worth of what it produces. Practical wisdom, phronēsis, which concerns action, involves deliberating about obtaining the good and the advantageous; it knows particulars, not principles. Being more vulnerable to the extremes of pleasure and pain than the other forms of knowledge, it should be associated with moderation, sophrosynē. A person of practical wisdom and moderation will practice these virtues, perhaps along with others, without necessarily knowing why they are virtues, an inquiry that requires theoretical wisdom. Practical wisdom points to political science and is most likely to be found among men and women of experience, not the young. Whereas science is teachable, political science is not; “it is not a science in the strict sense.” It differs from theoretical wisdom, too, in that theoretical wisdom concerns itself with the nature, including human nature, as such. Political science, which comprehends practical wisdom but is not restricted to it; it “not only explains what things are good for human beings, but also seeks to explain why, thus bridging the gap between an autonomous virtue which can be practiced by the man of prudence without knowing why, and the realm of philosophy which requires an account of everything that is.”

    What, then, is the source of virtue? There are two types of virtue. The “lower sort” is “natural virtue,” a “kind of unthinking disposition to be virtuous, which is found even in children, but which is liable to be harmful if it is not combined with ‘intelligence’ (nous).” “Virtue in the full sense,” on the other hand, “has intelligence”; it knows the first principles and the ends of action. “The good which results from the ‘blind natural virtue is a matter of accident; virtue in the full sense requires the sight of intelligence, part of the rational faculty.” “It is a product of right reason (orthos logos); it is the true knowledge of what is good for human beings.” Political science, then, is architectonic. It directs human action, including the quest for scientific knowledge, toward good purposes, since “theoretical knowledge about virtue is a reliable goal in itself.” By contrast, Hobbes doubts that the higher virtues are really virtues at all, that they tend toward irresolvable disputes, war, and that it is the “lower sort” of virtue alone can deliver peace. While Aristotle finds human reason to be “at home in the world,” Hobbes finds it “in an alien world of matter and motion,” that it therefore it “can know for certain only what it constructs.” Aristotle considers dialectic, the rational examination of contradictory opinions, as the way to discover first principles, whereas Hobbes considers “resolution,” analysis, to be that way. Aristotle maintains that “wholes are not understandable strictly by understanding parts.” Further, “on Aristotle’s account, ‘opinions generally held’ (common speech) are necessarily the starting point for any inquiry,” Hobbes “insists that one who begins from ‘vulgar discourse’ or common speech will never reach the truth.” For Aristotle, definitions are the goals, the results of dialectical examination of common speech; for Hobbes, definitions are to be found in the axioms of the proof. Aristotelian dialectic “seeks a perspicuous understanding rather than a reductive understanding because it is not based on the idea that knowledge can only be secured by reconstructing the combinations of ideas which are added together to make a concept.” Accordingly, political science, knowledge of politics, will seldom if ever achieve the certainty Hobbes would have its practitioners strive for. Live with it. “We must…consider the possibility that the surface of things is the reality with which a truly political science must deal,” that “our access to the phenomena of the human world must necessarily be through an understanding of them which is contained in the way we think and speak about them.” It is true that Aristotle offers no “critique of language” and that Wittgenstein wrote nothing on political science. All the more reason, Danford suggests, to see whether Wittgenstein’s un-Hobbesian language-based ‘epistemology’ can supplement Aristotelian political science.

    Before attempting to do that, Danford considers “the method of classical political science,” the means of inquiry into the nature of human things, especially the nature of virtue or excellence (aretē), exemplified by Plato’s Socrates in the Meno, “an encounter between a great teacher and an unteachable man.” [2] The name “Meno” derives from the Greek word for memory; if you know everything you need to know already, what need do you have for learning? When asked what virtue is, he replies with a mere list of virtues. Socrates sets up a contrast by pretending to have a poor memory, wondering how Meno’s listed virtues fit together and how they might fit into “a larger whole, which in the largest sense is our whole experience, our world.”  For this, he posits his famous theory of the Ideas or Forms. “Nothing seems further from the spirit of Wittgenstein than the Platonic doctrine of the Forms, at least on the conventional understanding of Plato.” Apparently, he contends, as his Socrates does here, “that to understand something like human excellence is to isolate and contemplate the essence underlying all particular manifestations,” although, as Danford remarks, in the dialogues he wrote Plato “never has his Socrates offer a clear definition of human excellence.” It may be “that Plato was himself aware of the issue Hobbes charged the classics with ignoring, the issue of method.” 

    Under the pressure of the ‘Socratic method,’ dialectic, Socrates forces Meno “to see the inadequacy of his original approach”; he “takes refuge in a certain idea of scientific method,” geometry, even as Hobbes would do, albeit far more impressively. Socrates “appears to prefer an approach which sticks as closely as possible to ordinary nontechnical meanings,” which are heterogeneous, contradictory and susceptible to dialectical treatment, which is consistent with the idea that “the whole is heterogeneous,” not reducible to Hobbesian elements and therefore not understandable by the analytic method. Dialectic proceeds not by breaking things down but by discovering coherence, connections among the heterogeneous parts, discovering what makes them a whole, despite and often because of their heterogeneity. Dialectical argument, desirous of truth (“erotic”) and friendly, contrasts with something that looks very much like it: eristic argument, spirited and antagonistic, a bit like Hobbes’s state of nature but in speech only. These two ways of arguing from opinions find favor among two different characters, persons of two different “moral outlooks.” Meno sees no distinction between the noble, the spirited-antagonistic, and the good. Plato’s dialogue illustrates that character and philosophic inquiry are related: “what one thinks excellence or virtue is depends to a great extent on what one’s conception of knowledge is” and what one’s conception of knowledge is, along with how one attempts to inquire after it, depends to great extent on what one’s character is. “We are compelled to wonder whether Meno’s preoccupation with wealth, honor, and power as the goals does not somehow go along with what he will directly reveal to be his deeper conception of knowledge, which is that it does not exist,” with “a radical skepticism.” Similarly, Hobbes (following Machiavelli) “argues that since men cannot agree on any goals except avoiding the evil of violent death, all men seek power (in the form of wealth, or honor, because power allows them to pursue any good”; “skepticism about the goals most men claim to believe in…seems to be the natural accompaniment to both an unrestrained selfishness and a cynicism about our ability ever to know anything beyond the ‘truths’ which are ‘operational’ (what is true is what works).”

    Socrates’ character leads him in a different direction. Originally, Meno had objected, eristically, to Socrates’ definition of human excellence because it used undefined terms. He demanded a scientific-geometric definition. The problem is that “there is no starting place for such an inquiry which will not be open to the objection of undefined terms.” Socrates thus prefers not to begin with a clear definition but “to proceed somewhat tentatively, ascending by means of connections from ignorance to a more comprehensive understanding.” His theory of latent knowledge, of anamnesis, which he claims to prove by his comic dialogue with the slave boy, who is supposed to have known geometry all along, ends in pointing to an irrational number, a number that is alogoi or unsayable. That is, the apparent certainty of geometric thought can lead to a certain uncertainty. This conversation is “an analog of the problem of defining excellence; in that case too, perhaps, no clear ‘answer ‘ is to be found, but something like an answer can be pointed to.”

    Anamnesis or “recollection,” a “method of philosophizing about the human things,” requires questioning, repeated questioning, “many times” and in “many ways” about “the thing under investigation.” Danford remembers Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophic problems “are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.” Like the irrational number, virtue or excellence is something we may not be able to define but nonetheless “feel we ‘somehow’ know.” “Wittgenstein suggests that knowledge is, in a way, contained in our language.” Plato’s Socrates begins with opinions, contradictory definitions of words, subjects them to dialectic and thereby eliminating the false opinions, the ones that cannot withstand logical scrutiny. “In some sense knowledge emerges in the process of inquiry and is revealed only to the active participant in the dialogue.” Meno is unteachable because he doesn’t really want to participate; he wants to be told, definitively, what virtue is. He is intellectually lazy. He doesn’t want to put things together, “to discover the whole by discovering how things fit together or by finding the place of each thing in the whole.” “The grammar of our language is the Wittgensteinian parallel to Socrates’ understanding of the relationship among the human phenomena.”

    Virtue cannot be taught in any straightforward way. If it could be, Pericles could have taught it to his sons, as he did horseback riding. There are no teachers of virtue, and even the sophists, whom Meno admires, disagree among themselves about its teachability. How, then, is virtue related to knowledge? Scientific definitions in this realm “are open to a decisive objection,” namely, that “they distort the phenomena we seek to know about.” “Socrates’ method, to the extent to which it may be called scientific, is more like the sort of argument ‘by hypothesis.'” “We are not wholly ignorant” of the nature of virtue; “the dialogue has partly uncovered the outlines of human excellence, its eidos, or shape.” It may be seen in the ordinary man, the average citizen, while also in “the excellence of the leader, or best human being.” This latter form of excellence, at its apex, finds its embodiment in the philosopher, who “somehow combines wisdom and justice on an entirely new basis” than that of the citizen’s decent opinions, “a basis connected with the erotic, but noncompetitive,” non-eristic, “social character of the philosophic life rather than with the noble ambition of the life a statesman,” who embodies citizen virtue so long as virtue remains on the level of citizenship, within the polis. These “two poles of aretē are not simply different; they cannot be separated.” Rather, “each informs the other, and together they constitute the thing we call excellence; that grammar of this concept points in two partially contradictory directions is a result not of our failure to analyze it far enough, but of the nature of human language and human life simply.” Wittgenstein wants to understand “the grammar of a thing,” and this resembles “what Plato means by giving an account of a thing,” to “reveal the place of something in the whole, or to see ‘what kind of a thing anything is.'” Hobbes is right that this knowledge is uncertain. But when it comes to political things, it may be the best we can do.

    Danford begins the conclusion to his book by asking himself, quite reasonably, whether these similarities between Plato, Aristotle, and Wittgenstein really amount to much. He begins with Plato and Aristotle, who, quite famously, do not agree with one another on a lot of things. For starters, Aristotle has more respect for “the natural appearance of phenomena” than Plato is, looking for “the fullest possible articulation of [each phenomenon] as we ordinarily understand it, “more inclined to leave complexity where complexity appears, and less inclined to pursue apparent contradictions.” This may be example of Aristotle’s prudence, his ‘politic’ philosophy: “He allows the simply good man to stand on his own ground without reasons.” The two classical philosophers nonetheless agree that certainty is “unnecessary, not to say impossible, in political science inquiry.” Like Hobbes, they eschew eristics but unlike Hobbes they distinguish it from genuine philosophic dialectic, which can lead not to war but to concurrence, albeit tentative. The tentativeness, the zetetic character, of classical philosophy reflects its erotic character. Hobbes finds the only justification of philosophy in its utility, which requires certainty, whereas the classics “understand that men may pursue the inquiry for its own sake,” erotically not thumotically. A philosopher might employ eristics in defense of philosophy—knowing, as Socrates knows, that he may thereby sacrifice his life for the sake of philosophy’s life. But he prefers friendly dialectic.

    Danford has described the affinities between Plato and Wittgenstein, so he now turns to their disagreements. When it comes to language, “Wittgenstein is more tolerant of ordinary usage than Plato,” who exhibits “a certain impatience with the common opinions about meanings which he,” or rather his Socrates, “elicits from interlocutors at the beginning of a dialogue.” Both philosophers seek to draw out “contradictory implications” in ordinary speech, but Plato inclines more to remedy these defects, or perhaps to clarify our way of speaking, whereas Wittgenstein thinks that “language is ‘in order as it is.'” Once contradictions are uncovered, Wittgenstein has little more to do. He is not “just interested in language, or in words” because language “comprises also the circumstances of their use, the world in which the words appear, as it were.” This suggests that Wittgenstein might be quite interested in political philosophy insofar as it identifies regimes as substantial parts of those circumstances, as seen in Aristotle and, among moderns, Montesquieu and Tocqueville. Plato’s Socrates, however, wants to look not only at regimes but to look for the best regime, the regime according to nature, beyond conventions. For Plato, “politics and political orders [regimes] demand the attention of philosophy if philosophy is to survive,” even if philosophy cannot really be useful, as Hobbes wants it to be. “The philosophy of classical thinkers was public-spirited out of necessity.” For Wittgenstein, living in modern England, and for many American philosophy professors, the danger to philosophy seemed to have “disappeared”; “the private side of philosophy has emerged as the most important.” A moderate Hobbesianism, the Hobbesianism of John Locke, established its regime tolerably well. The regime conflicts that began elsewhere but at the same time—Lenin’s regime, Hitler’s regime—and the modern project of the conquest of nature itself have put this confidence into question. Today, ‘Lockean liberalism’ continues to attract formidable enemies, foreign and domestic.

    For Wittgenstein, “there may not exist any natural horizon to which we can ascend by means of philosophy.” It’s caves, all the way down. At best, “philosophic inquiry can be concerned only with coming to understand better one’s own linguistic cave; and thus political philosophy, which is the name for the enterprise of comparison, is no longer a possibility.” Danford doesn’t go that far, calling rather for political scientists to “moderate our habitual skepticism about knowledge not secured by scientific method.” What Wittgenstein provides is warrant “to question what has to many of us seemed unquestionable, namely, that the only knowledge one should be willing to stand behind is scientific knowledge in the strict sense” and to avoid the reduction of political motives to safety, income, deference, the will to power, or some other apparently but not really all-explanatory theme. Sweeping generalizations won’t do. “While we do not have sufficient grounds to reject the side taken” in the controversy between the ancients and the moderns, Wittgenstein does give us “cause to reconsider the entire controversy.” 

     

    Notes

    1. The resemblance of the political science of Harold Lasswell, once of the most influential members of the American Political Science Association in the twentieth century, to the political science of Hobbes, has been carefully observed and described by Robert H. Horwitz: “Scientific Propaganda: Harold D. Lasswell.” In Herbert J. Storing, ed.: Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962.
    2. See “Teaching Virtue” on this website, under the category, “Philosophers.”

     

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