Will Morrisey Reviews

Book reviews and articles on political philosophy and literature.

  • Home
  • Reviews
    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
  • Contents
  • About
  • Books

Recent Posts

  • Pascal Against the Jesuits
  • Medieval “Cures” for Modern Madness
  • Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: America Under the Nixon Administration
  • Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: Germany and Britain
  • Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: France and Austria at Their Apogees

Recent Comments

    Archives

    • March 2026
    • February 2026
    • January 2026
    • December 2025
    • November 2025
    • October 2025
    • September 2025
    • August 2025
    • July 2025
    • June 2025
    • May 2025
    • April 2025
    • March 2025
    • February 2025
    • January 2025
    • December 2024
    • November 2024
    • October 2024
    • September 2024
    • August 2024
    • July 2024
    • June 2024
    • May 2024
    • April 2024
    • March 2024
    • February 2024
    • January 2024
    • December 2023
    • November 2023
    • October 2023
    • September 2023
    • August 2023
    • July 2023
    • June 2023
    • May 2023
    • April 2023
    • March 2023
    • February 2023
    • January 2023
    • December 2022
    • November 2022
    • October 2022
    • September 2022
    • August 2022
    • July 2022
    • June 2022
    • May 2022
    • April 2022
    • March 2022
    • February 2022
    • January 2022
    • December 2021
    • November 2021
    • October 2021
    • September 2021
    • August 2021
    • July 2021
    • June 2021
    • May 2021
    • April 2021
    • March 2021
    • February 2021
    • January 2021
    • December 2020
    • November 2020
    • October 2020
    • September 2020
    • August 2020
    • July 2020
    • June 2020
    • May 2020
    • April 2020
    • March 2020
    • February 2020
    • January 2020
    • December 2019
    • November 2019
    • October 2019
    • September 2019
    • August 2019
    • July 2019
    • June 2019
    • May 2019
    • April 2019
    • March 2019
    • February 2019
    • January 2019
    • December 2018
    • November 2018
    • October 2018
    • September 2018
    • August 2018
    • July 2018
    • June 2018
    • May 2018
    • April 2018
    • March 2018
    • February 2018
    • January 2018
    • December 2017
    • November 2017
    • September 2017
    • August 2017
    • July 2017
    • June 2017
    • May 2017
    • April 2017
    • March 2017
    • February 2017
    • January 2017
    • December 2016
    • November 2016
    • September 2016
    • August 2016
    • July 2016
    • June 2016
    • April 2016
    • March 2016
    • February 2016
    • January 2016

    Categories

    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
    • Uncategorized

    Meta

    • Log in
    • Entries feed
    • Comments feed
    • WordPress.org

    Powered by Genesis

    Archives for June 2024

    Who Is the Teacher?

    June 26, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    Augustine: The Teacher: A Dialogue between Augustine and his son Adeodatus. In Augustine: Earlier Writings. Edited and translated by John H. S. Burleigh. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953.

     

    The son of Romanized Berbers, Augustine’s name derives from Augustus, denoting ‘venerable,’ a name that reflects the civil status of his family, who numbered among the honestiores or ‘honorable men,’ the aristocratic class. His own son’s name, Adeodatus, means ‘gift from God.’ If one were given to symbolism, the difference between the two names might be taken to register conversion to Christianity and the moral consequence of moving away from pride of family in the City of Man to humility before God in the City of God, the transfer of citizenship from one regime to another. Citizenship must be passed down from father to son or, for Christians, from the Father to the sons of God. But thoughtful citizenship in the City of God still requires education on earth. Augustine knew that the would-be teacher of virtue, Christian or other, faced serious problems, as shown in Plato’s Meno. The Teacher is in some ways a Christian reply to the Meno. Unlike Plato, Augustine makes himself a character in his own dialogue, along with his son; Anytus in the Meno assumed that fathers could readily teach virtue to their sons, and Augustine may think that Christians, unlike pagan aristocrats, can succeed. Jesus had recommended that sons break with their pagan families, but now that ruling families are Christians, families themselves need to be re-founded along the lines of the new Christian regime. To do so, the classical education that linked the generations also needed to be re-founded. Hence The Teacher.

    Augustine begins with a teleological question: “What do you suppose is our purpose when we use words?” We want “to let people know something, or we want to learn something”—making a statement or asking a question—Adeodatus replies. Augustine corrects him, saying that a question also lets people know something, namely, that we do not know and want to know—thereby suggesting a limit to the desire to learn, one that will vary from student to student. We are telling someone that we want to be told, we want to be taught. It might be that if Christians consider the Bible to set down what virtue is, that they need only to consult it, learn God’s words, in order to know virtue. Plato would reply that learning moral principles is not the same as being virtuous, and of course Augustine, that eminent chronicler of sin, knows that.

    But, Adeodatus objects, we use words to sing, often singing alone, not telling anyone anything. Yes, Augustine replies, “there is a kind of teaching, and a most important kind, which consists in reminding people of something”—a major theme of the Meno. [1] Augustine thereby broadens the purpose of words to include reminding. Music, Plato knows, gets into the soul; it is not mere knowledge but morally influential, setting the rhythm of the soul, causing harmony or disharmony among the ‘parts’ of the soul. But “I very rarely sing to remind myself of anything, almost always simply to give myself pleasure,” his son replies, giving his father a glimpse into his soul. Yes, but “what pleases you in singing is the melody”; we sing in words set to music, which isn’t the same thing as speaking. Birds sing, but do not speak (unless they are parrots, but parrots don’t tell us anything, that way, communicating in earnest only by squawks and shrieks). “You agree, then, that there is no other reason for the use of words than either to teach or to call something to mind?”

    Very well, then, Adeodatus says, but what about prayer? When we pray, we use words but not to “teach God anything or remind him of anything.” God is the supreme Knower. Augustine agrees, remarking that we speak to God in “our inmost mind”—the Christian answer to the problem of outer appearance and inner reality seen in the Meno is that God does not need to guess or to inquire into the true nature of any human soul. “God is to be sought and prayed to in the secret place of the rational soul, which is called ‘the inner man.'” And God is very close by, indeed, because his Spirit dwells in you, as the Apostle Paul testifies in First Corinthians. For a Christian, as distinguished from Socrates, the Logos is the Jesus, Son of God, accessible to the soul thanks to the Holy Spirit, residing in “the inner man.” The mind is the temple where God dwells, where we sacrifice passions and false beliefs to God, to Reason.

    There is also public prayer, prayer by a priest in front of congregants. One might expect Augustine to say that prayer is speech, talking to God, telling Him what we want or telling him that we fear and love Him. But by using words, Augustine means audible speech, and prayer is inaudible, except when a priest prays in a religious service, “not that God may hear, but that men may hear and, being put in remembrance, may with some consent be brought into dependence on God.” The audible prayer of priests tells the hearers what the priests want them to hear, and to believe. In the Meno, remembrance really means thinking—at best, ratiocination—but for Christians it is a re-centering of the mind on the presence of the Holy Spirit within them, consenting to his guidance; for a Christian priest, speech extends to both Christians and to non-Christians, the latter to be ‘reminded’ of their consciences, that element within their souls which is receptive to the Holy Spirit. “Such speech is nothing but a calling to remembrance of the realities of which the words are but the signs, for the memory which retains the words and turns them over and over, cause the realities to come to mind.” Public prayer calls up the “memory” of the Holy Spirit and His teachings. This is the kind of memory a Christian will cultivate, a memory of words, of the Word, not so much a ‘memory’ or set of logical deductions concerning geometric figures, as in the Meno.

    But more generally, “speech is nothing but a calling to remembrance of the realities of which the words are but the signs, for the memory.” As Adeodatus will later say, we use speech “in order to teach or to call to mind.” This shifts the dialogue (itself obviously an exchange of words, by definition) back from the purpose of speech, logos, to the elements of speech, words, logoi—from teleology to analysis. The men agree that words are signs, and that signs signify, that is, they mean something. “Things which do not signify something beyond themselves cannot be signs.” To consider this more carefully, Augustine then quotes Virgil’s Aeneid, Book II, line 659: Si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui (“If it pleases the gods that nothing be left of so great a city,” namely, Troy). The sentence has a purpose but analytically considered, do the words composing it have a purpose, a meaning? Do they refer to anything beyond themselves? If not, can a sentence, a thing composed of words, really mean something? Can we learn anything, know anything, by means of words? 

    There are eight words, thus eight signs, in the verse. “I suppose you understand the meaning of the verse.” Yes, says Adeodatus, by which he may mean the whole verse, the phrase. But Augustine wants him to analyze the verse, break it down into its elements. The first word, Si signifies not a thing but a “state of mind,” doubt, an answer Augustine accepts “in the meantime.” As for nihil, it seems to Adeodatus to signify “that which is not,” but Augustine raises an objection: if words signify something, how can any word signify nothing? Augustine suggests a tentative solution to this aporia in saying that nihil may also signify “a state of mind rather than a thing which is nothing,” joking that we should not let ‘nothing’ detain us. “At the proper time we shall understand more clearly this kind of difficulty, if God will.” In the Aeneid verse, nothing evidently means absence, the end of a war in which something, Troy, is reduced to nothing, a destruction approved by the pagan gods, the gods of the ‘City of Man’; in the Bible, God does the opposite, creating the heavens and the earth out of “nothing.” And in the beginning was not merely a set of words but the Word, the Logos. The Christian teacher needs to understand and to use the power of that Word, and of the words that compose the Bible. In the Meno, Socrates associates ‘memory’ or learning with geometry; in The Teacher, Augustine associates it with words because he is a Christian. Some of the moderns (notably Hobbes and Descartes) would attempt to undermine the Word by reconnecting reason with mathematics. Others, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, would undermine not only the Word but all words by deeming them mere conventions.

    On to ex, a preposition, which means either ‘of’ or ‘out of.’ What the gods may want is for the Greeks to bring nothingness out of Troy, reduce it to rubble, although some Trojans might (and indeed did) survive, one of them going on to found Rome, the new “great city,” the one that would be conquered spiritually by Christians, re-founded in a manner pleasing the one God, not the gods to whom Virgil’s hero prayed, false gods—nothings that would make bring Troy to nothing. Augustine demurs: “I want you to show me, if you can, what are the things of which these [words] are the signs.” But Father, “what you ask cannot be done in conversation, where we cannot answer questions except by means of words.” Admittedly so, but can you not say a word and point to the thing it signifies, the reality it signifies? Only with “names signifying corporeal objects.” Really? What about color? It isn’t a corporeal object but “rather a quality of a corporeal object.” True, but by “corporeal objects” I mean “all the qualities of bodies which are susceptible to sense-perception,” or, more exactly, all visible objects. After all, I cannot show the corporeal object I mean to signify by a word if that object is out of sight. It is true, however, his father remarks, that one can point out invisible things, as deaf people do by the gestures of ‘sign language’ and as dancers “unfold and set forth whole stories” on stage? All right, Adeodatus concedes, but that doesn’t solve the problem of how to understand the word ex, which “neither I nor your dancing actor will ever be able to point out” the meaning of. 

    “But suppose he could,” Augustine says, persisting. Whatever that gesture was, the actor would still be using a sign, not the thing signified. He would still be “explain[ing] a sign by a sign.” In that case, what I just said, that is there “nothing”—that word again—which “can be shown without signs”? Yes, there is, because if—that word, again—I asked you what walking is, you could get up and walk, “using the thing itself to show me, not words or any other signs.” Embarrassed for the first time in the dialogue, Adeodatus admits that he overlooked this. At the same time, Augustine continues, not everything could be signified clearly without signs, since if I asked you what “hastening” means, and you walked fast, I might “conclude that walking was the same thing as hastening.” They soon agree that “there are two classes of things that can be demonstrated without signs: those which we are not engaged in doing when we are asked” and those we can immediately start doing, such as walking when asked what walking is, “and those in which the action consists in simply giving signs,” in the manner of deaf persons and dancers. Signs can be used to signify other signs, but only if “the question concerns signs merely.” To put the matter more generally, if words are only signs of signs, no one can learn, since in explaining one sign I am only substituting another sign for it. And if I point or gesture at something in an attempt to show you what the sign signifies, I need to know what the thing is that I’m pointing at, before I understand the sign. 

    To address this aporia, Augustine first directs his son’s attention to signs demonstrated by signs. Verbal signs come to us by the sense of hearing, gestural signs by sight. “A word is a meaningful articulate sound, and sound is perceived by no other sense than hearing,” but when “a word is written, a sign is given to the eyes whereby something that properly belongs to the ears is brought to mind.” Socrates precedes Plato, God precedes Moses, Jesus precedes the Apostle John. A “name” signifies “something or somebody”—Rome, Romulus, Virtue, a River—which Augustine calls “significables.” But the word “name” itself signifies not a significable but a sign, “the audible sign of audible signs.” “A name, therefore, is a word when it is pronounced articulately with a meaning.” Thus, for example, such words as “if” and “from” are words but not names; “just as every horse is an animal but every animal is not a horse, so every word is a sign but every sign is not a word.” And “all names are words, but all words are not names,” since a word is “the sign of a sign which signifies no other signs,” a sign that refers to a significable. Whereas a name is “the sign of a sign that points to other signs.” This notwithstanding, “in a general sense verbum [word] and nomen [word] have the same range of application” because “all the parts of speech have names”—nouns, verbs, conjunctions—”because pronouns can be substituted or added to them”; any part of speech can be referred to as “it,” any word or name referred to with one or another conjunction, none that “cannot be made the subject of a verb to form a complete sentence.” 

    Augustine then makes another distinction, this one directly relevant to teaching. Insofar as it is an articulate significant sound, a word “smites the ear.” But it does so for a telos, a purpose, namely, “that it may be perceived, remembered and known.” A word is “something that happens to the ear,” a name “something that happens in the mind,” in the “inner man,” as he had said near the beginning of the dialogue. The relation between word and name is no simple thing, however. “To use words to treat of words is as complicated as to rub fingers together and expect someone else to distinguish which fingers tingle with warmth and which help others to tingle.” What happens to your ear may register differently in your mind than in mine. If we say of Christ, “In Him was virtue,” we don’t mean that the word the word “virtue” is in Him but that the thing we name virtue is in Him. This raises a serious question about the authority of religious teaching. What if Paul was right—wielding God-given authority with respect to “realities,” the thing we name virtue in Christ—but not with respect to the word which he used to signify that reality, “especially when he himself confesses that he was unskilled in speech”? Adeodatus cannot think of a way out of this aporia. “You think that without authorities reason itself is hardly sufficient, but reason itself demonstrates that all the parts of speech may signify some thing”; if reason did not have the power to generalize, no word in Latin could be equivalent to any word in Greek. It may be that “some man, from greater stupidity or impudence, may not agree, but on the contrary may assert that he will give way only to those authorities who with universal consent are allowed to lay down the law in regard to words,” but reason tells us otherwise. Nature refutes thoroughgoing conventionalism because it can find contradictions, impossibilities, in some conventions. Words are understood not by redundant self-reference but by the ability of the soul to learn, by the logos within the soul, which ‘decodes’ the sign that would otherwise be only a noise rattling in one’s ear. In this, the teaching of The Teacher resembles the teaching of the Meno. Augustine departs from Plato and Plato’s Socrates in taking logos as the gift of the Logos, of God. But no less than Plato and Plato’s Socrates does he insist that we learn by logos working within us, not by thoughtlessly following what supposed authorities tell us.

    Augustine then proceeds to show this by asking what “the goal” we have striven “to reach by all these round-about paths.” Conventionally speaking, sons should simply go along with the authority of fathers, but if fathers engage sons in pointless tasks, does paternal authority really consist of, other than their own stupidity and imprudence? Conversely, many people, and not only sons in front of their fathers, become impatient with reasoning and simply want to be told. But if the teacher gives in to this, can he truly be said to have taught his student?

    Augustine’s son having demonstrated his capacity to learn, to reason, “You will pardon me, therefore, if I play with you to begin with, not for the sake of playing, but in order to exercise and sharpen our mental powers”—both of ours, not only yours—for the purpose of being able “not merely to endure the heat and light of the region where lies the blessed life, but also to love them.” In Plato’s dialogue, Meno had no such endurance, no such love. Adeodatus does: “Go on as you have begun, for I shall never think unworthy of attention anything you may think it necessary to say or to do.” That is, Adeodatus accepts his father’s authority because, just as he has proven his philosophic mettle to his father, so his father has proven the goodness of philosophy to his son, by bringing him to philosophize, to experience the good effects of philosophizing. Consideration of words, of logoi, entails philosophizing, and philosophizing orients souls away from the conventional dimension of words and towards logos. Sifting out the contradictions now seen in conventions can bring the soul to nature, to what is as it were above the conventions.

    Accordingly, Augustine turns from consideration of signs signifying other signs to signs signifying significables. Augustine quickly establishes to Adeodatus’ satisfaction that “we cannot carry on a conversation at all unless the words we hear carry the mind to the things of which they are the signs.” But there is a distinction to be made. If I use the word ‘lion,’ the word ‘lion’ has come out of my mouth, but a lion hasn’t. Adeodatus understands that “our words are signs merely of things”: “it is the sign and not the thing signified which comes out of the mouth of the speaker.” Augustine compliments him, again by invoking reason: “The very law of reason,” the principle of non-contradiction, the capacity to make distinctions, which is “stamped on our minds,” has “awakened your vigilance.” Logos is in us. Thus, one can see that the word ‘man’ is “both a noun and an animal” (in fact, a “rational and mortal animal”). “It is a noun when it is regarded as a sign, and an animal when regard is had to the thing signified by the sign.” “The rule, which naturally carries the greatest weight, is that, as soon as signs are heard, the attention is directed to the things they signify,” and that we should consider “that things signified are of greater importance than their signs,” inasmuch as “whatever exists on account of something else must necessarily be of less value than that on account of which it exists.” It is noteworthy that Augustine places his discussion of the word ‘man’ in the central paragraphs of The Teacher. It is man, not God or beasts, who can learn by reasoning.

    Adeodatus demurs. The Latin word for filth is lovelier than what it signifies: “Change one letter and caenum [filth] becomes caelum [heaven]”! Witty lad, he likes puns, but “importance” is not the same as “preferable.” If words signify things, Augustine replies, then they can increase our knowledge. “The knowledge conveyed by this word” from one person to another is “more valuable than the word itself” because, as Adeodatus says, when I use a word “I want to give a sign to the man with whom I am speaking, by means of which I may let him know what I think he ought to know”—that is, I want to teach him something.

    Nonetheless, Adeodatus insists, “this does not mean that the thing signified is better than its sign.” Yes, but “knowledge of filth is more important than the name”; the names, ‘filth’ and ‘heaven’ could be reversed but the things signified could not be; some word is necessary to indicate the thing, which is the more important thing to know. Augustine aims at eradicating any tendency in his son toward rhetorical ornamentation. He also would have had little patience for what would be called estheticism, l’art pour l’art, centuries later. 

    Hierarchy implies teleology. For example, “the advice to eat in order to live rather than to live in order to eat, is justly praised simply because it shows understanding of what is means and what is end, that is to say, of what should be subordinate to what.” If a rhetorician, “some loquacious lover of verbiage,” some glutton of words, were to say he teaches for the sake of talking, he could be corrected by saying he should talk for the sake of teaching. Generally, “the use to which words are put is superior to the words; for words exist in order to be used, and used to teach”; “knowledge is better than words.”

    But if the name, ‘filth,’ is preferable to filth itself, would not the knowledge of the name be preferable to knowledge of the thing? Adeodatus identifies “four terms here: the name, the thing, knowledge of the name, knowledge of the thing,” and just as the thing is “better” (in the sense of more important to know) than the name, so knowledge of the thing is better than knowledge of the name.” Augustine disagrees: knowledge of the word “vice” is “much inferior to knowledge of the vices.”

    Yet, squeamish Adeodatus objects, “Do you think that knowledge is preferable even when it makes us more miserable?” Yes, because without the knowledge, we will not know, and thus not be able to correct, the underlying evil. This points to a serious problem that teachers face: the resistance of students to obtaining knowledge of unpleasant things, realities they would rather not think about. But just as physicians need to tell patients what their illness is, in order to get them to take their medicine, and patients should not blame physicians for their illnesses, so student should not blame their teachers for the students’ ignorance or for the wrongly ordered souls that resist corrections.

    But there is a “greater problem,” mentioned earlier: Can “all actions which we can perform on being interrogated…be demonstrated without a sign?” The difficulty, as Adeodatus sees, is that if someone asks me, What is walking? and I get up and walk, without any explanation, he might imagine that “walking” means the distance I have walked, not the movement itself. He might suppose that “anyone who walked further or less than I had walked, had not in fact walked at all.” I need to speak or teach, to supplement the visual sign.

    Granted, but “don’t you think speaking and teaching are different things?” If all speaking is telling, and we “do not teach in order that we give signs,” merely to swap words, then they must differ. Whether you teach solely with words or with words and actions, “we give signs in order to teach,” do we not? It seems that our conversation has shown that nothing can be taught without signs; that some signs are to be preferred to the things they signify; and that the knowledge of things is better than the knowledge of their signs. If “we give signs in order that we may teach, and do not teach that we may give sings,” then “teaching and giving signs are different things.” But “do you think our results now stand beyond all doubt,” Adeodatus?  “I should dearly like to think that after all these turnings and twisting we have indeed reached certainty,” Father, but since you’ve asked the question, I am “anxious” that there might be more difficulties to come. Augustine commends his son’s fear of aporia as an indication of caution, as “a cautious mind” is “the best guard of tranquility.”

    Adeodatus’ caution turns out to be well-founded. To reach a hasty conclusion and hold fast to it will lead to trouble. Giving a fuller answer to the question of whether knowledge is preferable even when it makes us more miserable, Augustine observes that “it is the most difficult thing in the world not to be upset when opinions which we hold, and to which we have given to ready and too willful approval, are shattered by contrary arguments and are, as it were, weapons torn from our hands.” (This may well be the cause of Anytus’ anger in the Meno, an anger that contributed to the execution of Socrates; he fears defenseless, personally and politically.) We should resist the sentiment. Rather, “it is a good thing to give in calmly to arguments that are well considered and grasped, just as it is dangerous to hold as known what in fact we do not know,” falling “into such hatred or fear of reason that we think we cannot trust even the most clearly manifest truth.” That is, misology leads to radical skepticism, the refusal to learn based not on the principle of I know that I do not know but on the self-contradictory principle, I know that I cannot know. In Christian terms, misology would readily lead to hostility toward the Word of God, indeed toward God Himself. Just as Socrates died because he had offended the Athenians with his logical challenges to their opinions, so Christ died because He had offended Jews and Romans alike, as the Logos.

    It is true that some men can be taught some things by observing another’s actions, without signs. Natural objects are exhibited by God, and we can learn about them without any instruction from their Creator. Conversely, one often learns little or nothing by signs alone; a verbal description of a cat is hardly more instructive than seeing a cat. The word ‘cat’ is otherwise scarcely more than a sound to me. “We perceive the sound when it strikes our ear, while the meaning becomes clear when we look at the thing signified,” learning “the force of the word, that is the meaning which lies in the sound of the word, when we come to know the object signified by the word.” Whether we are Adam in the Garden or a child at home, typically we see something and then either assign a name to it or ask for the name that has been assigned. Teaching, then, is not simply a matter of talking, even if the aim of the talking is teaching. But the true learning goes on in the mind of the learner. In learning a thing, I do “not trust the words of another but my own eyes,” a fact that Groucho Marx plays with in his celebrated joke. A genuine teacher “bid[s] us look for things,” but does “not show them to us so that we may know them.” “He alone teaches me anything who sets before my eyes, or one of my other bodily senses, or my mind, the things which I desire to know,” inasmuch as “from words we can learn only words.” In passing, one notes that the ‘moderns’ who complained that the ‘Churchmen’ thought only in terms of words hadn’t paid attention to Augustine’s words: “Knowledge of words is completed by knowledge of things, and by the hearing of words not even words are learned,” since we do not yet know what the words mean. When we already know something, a word may remind us of it; in that sense, the teaching of the Meno, that knowledge is memory, is correct; if, however, “we do not know, we are not even reminded, but are perhaps urged to inquire.” That is, if someone uses an unfamiliar word, I know that I don’t know something, and I may ask what it means, preliminary to learning something.

    What about another kind of claim, the claims of historians and, most pointedly, of sacred historians? When it comes to names, “What about those young men of whom we have heard,” Ananias, Azarias, and Missel,” who passed through the furnace fire? “All that we read of in that story happened at that time and was written down, so that I have to confess that I must believe rather than know,” a distinction understood by the Prophet Isaiah himself, who said “Unless you believe you shall not know.” “What I know I also believe, but I do not know everything that I believe.” It is “useful” to believe “many things which I do not know, among them this story about the three youths,” which teaches readers to trust God. “I know how useful it is to believe many things of which knowledge is not possible,” including any historical information, sacred or secular, which did not occur in my lifetime, or, for that matter, information presented by reporters of the ‘news.’ Near the end of the dialogue, Augustine promises a further inquiry into “the whole problem of the usefulness of words, for their usefulness properly considered is not slight.” In this dialogue, he is concerned that “we must not attribute to them a greater importance than they ought to have.”

    It is different with “universals of which we can have knowledge,” ideas that we can discover through our own reasoning and need “not listen to anyone speaking and making sounds outside ourselves” to arrive at.  True, “our real Teacher is He who is so listened to,” but he is “said”—said—to “dwell in the inner man,” speaking to us of “the unchangeable power and eternal wisdom of God” not from outside of ourselves but providing us “wisdom [to which] every rational soul gives heed,” although “to each is given only so much as he is able to receive, according to his own good or evil will.” That is likely to be Augustine’s explanation of Isaiah’s monition, “Unless you believe you shall not know”; your soul must be ready to receive the truth, as indeed it must be ready to reason about theoretical or practical matters. Meno and Anytus will not philosophize; atheists refuse the invitation of God. “If anyone is ever deceived it is not the fault of Truth, any more than it is the fault of the common light of day that the bodily eyes are often deceived.”

    We need light to see colors, other “elements of the world and sentient bodies,” along with the senses themselves, to “perceive things of sense”—what Christian authors call “carnal things.” The mind then “uses” all of these material things “as interpreters in its search for sense-knowledge.” If I hear words relating someone else’s sense perception, I may believe what he says but I do not know it. The same goes for sense perceptions remembered by others as images in their minds. I may believe their words but I cannot know them to be true. As to “intelligible things,” what Christian authors call “spiritual things,” it is reason that enables us to pay attention to the “inner light of truth.” Put more expansively, regarding the things of sense, words suffice to teach the student that we say we perceive them, but “he learns nothing unless he himself sees what is asking about,” learning “not from words uttered but from the objects seen and his sense of sight.” These sense impressions then imprint themselves on his memory. It is in “the halls of memory [that] we bear the images of things once perceived as memorial which we can contemplate mentally and can speak of with a good conscience and without lying.” We can report them truthfully, but our listener “believes my words”—or not—rather than “learning from them.” The same goes with “the things which we behold with the mind,” with “the intelligence” in the act of noēsis and “with reason,” logos governed by the principle of non-contradiction. The “inner light of truth which illumines the inner man and is inwardly enjoyed” may be reported to another, but “if my hearer sees these things himself with his inward eye, he comes to know what I say, not as a result of my words but as a result of his own contemplation.” Strictly speaking, “it is not I who teach him,” as “he is taught not by my words but by the things themselves which inwardly God has made manifest to him.” Augustine is careful to acknowledge that such contemplation does not typically come as a result of the person’s own efforts. “It often happens that a man, when asked a question, gives a negative answer, but by further questioning can be brought to answer in the affirmative.” That is, Augustine remains a ‘Socratic,’ acknowledging the merit of dialogue and the rational dialectic it entails. Dialogue is necessary, given the “weakness” of human beings, “unable to behold the whole all at once,” but “when questioned about the parts which compose the whole,” can be “induced to bring them one by one into the light.” This of course is what Augustine has done in this dialogue with his son. In a philosophic dialogue, the words “do not make statements, but merely ask such questions as to put [the student] who is questioned in a position to learn inwardly.” (This contrasts with a police interrogation, in which questions are asked in order to force truthful answers out of the one questioned, so that the inquirer, or rather the inquisitor, may learn.) As a teacher, “I must put my question in a way suited to your ability to hear the inward teacher.” 

    To teach and to learn, then, both require a degree of humility as well as a degree of confidence. Christianity commends both humility and faith, and so can adapt itself to teaching. If a student hears what I say but does not know whether it’s true, he may believe it, suppose it, or doubt it. If knows that it is false, he “must oppose it and deny it.” If he knows it is true “he must testify to its truth.” But in none of these cases will he learn because he must, as the saying goes, see for himself. I can tell you all about Augustine’s dialogue, “The Teacher,” but you have learned nothing about it from my words unless you read the dialogue and see for yourself. It may be “useful to believe such things so long as ignorance lasts.” But unless some compelling reason prevents it, don’t let your ignorance last. You don’t even know if my words give you a good account of my own mind, since I might be ignorant or a liar. “A speech committed to memory and frequently conned,” as rhetoricians are wont to do, “may be spoken when we are thinking of something else entirely.” (Augustine then goes in for the kill: “This often happens when we are singing a hymn.”) Or the intended meaning of the speaker may be distorted in the minds of the listeners, as when, for example, the speaker has “simply called the thing he has in mind by a different name from the one we are accustomed to use.” This may be remedied by careful definition of the word, as Augustine has done in his own discussion of words, “but how often is a man to be found who is good at definition?”

    Even if the teacher’s words are understood according to the teacher’s intention, the student does not learn from those words whether “the words spoken are true.” “Who is so foolishly curious as to send his son to school to learn what the teacher thinks?” he asks, rhetorically but reasonably. “When the teachers have expounded by means of words all the disciples which they profess”—profess—to “teach, the disciples also of virtue and wisdom”—the theme of the Meno—then their pupils take thought within themselves whether what they have been told is true, looking to the inward truth, that is to say, also far as they are able. In this way they learn.” If, as educators once loved to say, educare means to lead out or to draw out, this is what the leading consists of.

    This goes for revelation and reason, both, including the revelation of truths perceived rationally within the framework of belief in revelation. Adeodatus has learned that “by means of words a man is simply put on the alert in order that he may learn,” and that “in order to know the truth of what is spoken, I must be taught by Him who dwells within and give me counsel about words spoken externally in the ear.” The philosopher loves wisdom, and by Christ’s “favor I shall love him the more ardently the more I advance in learning.”

     

    Note

    1. On the Meno see “Teaching Virtue?” on this website under the category, “Philosophers.”

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    What American Democracy Means for Europe, in the Estimation of Alexis de Tocqueville

    June 19, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America. Volume I, Part II, chapter 9: “Principal Causes Tending to Maintain a Democratic Republic in the United States.”   Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. and Delba Winthrop translation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000.

     

    Founding a democratic republican regime is one thing. The American Founders had done that. Maintaining it is another, as Benjamin Franklin famously remarked upon emerging from the final session of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, and as a sober young American attorney named Abraham Lincoln considered in his “Address to the Young Men’s Lyceum” in Springfield, Illinois, some two generations later.

    Writing a couple of years before Lincoln spoke, Alexis de Tocqueville understood that his fellow European hesitated to found democratic republics because they did not see how such regimes could sustain themselves in Europe, where geopolitical, constitutional, and civil-social circumstances differed substantially from those prevailing in North America. By then, Tocqueville remarked, Americans faced no formidable enemies, needed to fight no major wars, and consequently afforded no opportunities for some native Napoleon to hunger for military glory and move against republicanism. The American capital was no Paris, no Rome; a centralized government can fall prey to mobs, with ‘the democracy’ threatening the government—whether monarchic, as Parisians had seen in 1789 and would see again in 1848, or republican, as the Romans had seen in the military coup of Julius Caesar. And North America is much bigger than Europe; on such a large continent, “nature itself works for the people,” giving them an outlet for their restless ambitions. Dissatisfied with your lot in life? If you’re an American, go West, young man; set yourself up as a farmer, there’s no future in revolution. 

    Europeans enjoyed none of these advantages. Politically, they enabled the American Founders to constitute their national government as a federation, not as a centralized state. America’s strong township institutions, established long before the founding, had taught the people “the art of being free,” habits of mind and heart consistent with self-government from the village to the nation. Americans had anchored their civil and criminal courts in the counties, close to the people, who could be confident that they would be judged by their peers. And in democratic America, everyone was your peer.

    Most important, American hearts were animated by the principles of a “democratic and republican religion”; as he had earlier maintained, the first movement toward equality of condition was Christianity itself, teaching human equality before God. At the same time, American minds were enlightened by an education that was eminently practical, with the ‘Three Rs’ enabling citizens to read their Bibles for moral guidance, to read their newspapers for political information and for expressing their own opinions, and to calculate sums in business.

    In all, “American legislators had come, not without success, to oppose the idea of rights to sentiments of envy; to the continuous movements of the political world, the immobility of religious morality; the experience of the people, to its political ignorance, and its habit of business, to the enthusiasm of its desires.” It was true that American confronted one potentially ruinous dilemma absent from Europe: race-based slavery, the theme of the final section of Tocqueville’s first volume—one distinct from the problem of the overall civil-social equality, the democracy, in America. Europeans, however, faced the reverse problem: no slavery, but no obvious solution to the questions raised by democracy.

    On that front, Europeans enjoyed none of the advantages Americans possessed. Democracy was advancing in their societies as aristocracies weakened. But democracy, social and civic equality, need not issue in republicanism, in the protection of natural and civil rights. Napoleon had demonstrated this, only a quarter-century before Tocqueville ventured to the United States. “The organization and establishment of democracy among Christians is the great political problem of our time.” Indeed, “the question I have raised,” the question of what regime democracy will have, “interests not only the United States, but the entire world; not one nation, but all men.”

    Why? Under the civil-social condition of democracy, with no aristocrats standing between the people and the centralized state, one could see not only an absolute monarchy along the lines of Louis XIV’s France, but a new form of absolutism, a new despotism “with features unknown to our fathers.” The old absolutist monarchies retained a still-formidable aristocratic class. Firstborn sons inherited the estate, ruling but also protecting the peasants who worked their land, as their ancestors had done or centuries. Second-born sons entered the clerical aristocracy, the Roman Catholic Church, exerting influence on peasants, monarchs, and their fellow aristocrats alike. Under the old regime, wealthy merchants in townships and cities also commanded their own sources of revenue and manpower, independent of monarchs and aristocrats alike. Even under the rule of the Bourbons, then, there was “a love of freedom in souls,” among honor-loving monarchs, aristocrats, and merchants, all jealous of their prerogatives and capable of defending them. They ruled peasants and urban workers who understood that they, too, could one day see the face of God.

    But in the ever-advancing European civil-social democracy of Tocqueville’s century, the Enlightenment philosophes and their intellectual heirs had undermined faith in God; “nothing above man any longer sustains man.” And democratic men find themselves in a leveled society in which all classes mix together, as “the individual disappears more and more into the crowd,” readily “lost in the mist of the common obscurity,” and therefore no longer held responsible for his actions.” (In America, not long afterwards, Edgar Allan Poe would write his satirical short story, “The Man of the Crowd.”) 

    “When each citizen, being equally powerless, equally poor, equally isolated, can only oppose his individual weakness to the organized force of the government,” a regime of despotism would take on the harshness of late Roman imperialism, “those frightful centuries of Roman tyranny, when mores were corrupt, memories effaced, habits destroyed, opinions wavering, and freedom, chased out of the laws, no longer knew where to take refuge to find an asylum; when nothing any longer stood guarantee for citizens and citizens no longer stood guarantee for themselves,” where “one would see men make sport of human nature.”

    In the event, many Europeans would come under tyrannies even worse than those Tocqueville foresaw, regimes in which making sport of human nature meant hunting it down in death camps and world wars, resulting in tens of millions dead, killed by regimes where the modern state, armed with technologies permitting surveillance of its subjects, ended civil and political liberty for those who survived the onslaught, spurring the invention of a new word, ‘totalitarianism.’

    “Is this not worth thinking about? If men had to arrive, in effect, at the point where it would be necessary to make them all free or all slaves, all equal in rights or all deprived of rights; if those who governed societies were reduced to this alternative of gradually raising the crowd up to themselves or of letting all citizens fall below the level of humanity, would this not be enough to overcome many doubts, to reassure consciences well, and to prepare each to make great sacrifice readily?” For “if one does not in time succeed in founding the peaceful empire of the greatest number among us, democratic republics instead of democratic despotisms, “we shall arrive sooner or later at the unlimited power of one alone.”

    Against atheist ideologies, Tocqueville therefore called upon Europeans to renew their respect for Christianity. Against overbearing military and political ambition, he commended a spirit of peaceful commerce, of the ‘bourgeois’ life detested by aristocrats and socialists alike. Against the “sentiments of envy” he opposed the idea of individual and civil rights. Against government centralization, he urged praised federalism and the practical experience that local self-government provides to citizens. Against the threat of foreign wars, a strong executive, a constitutional monarch empowered to defend the realm could meet the threats without extinguishing civil and political liberty. And against the alienation of his fellow aristocrats, many of them resentful of the rise of democracy, Tocqueville warned against futile dreams of reinstituting feudalism, urging them rather to guide democracy, advise the new citizens, moderating their passions by teaching them how better to govern—as Tocqueville himself did in writing Democracy in America.

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Malraux and the “Farfelu”

    June 12, 2024 by Will Morrisey

    André Malraux: The Kingdom of Farfelu with Paper Moons. W. B. Keckler translation. New York: Fugue State Press, 2005.

    Georges Lemaitre: From Cubism to Surrealism in French Literature.  Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978 (1947).

    André Vandegans: La Jeunesse Littéraire d’André Malraux: Essai Sur L’Inspiration Farfelue. Abbeville: Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1964.

    Domnica Radulescu: André Malraux: The “Farfelu” as Expression of the Feminine and the Erotic. New York: Peter Lang, 1994.

     

    In 1921, the very young André Malraux dedicated his first published work of fiction, Paper Moons, to the Cubist writer, Max Jacob, an early friend and mentor in Paris. Paris in the years after the Great War saw a continuation of the artistic ferment that had begun before the war, an atmosphere of social and political security now of course long vanished. Lemaitre’s history evokes that time and place.

    The French, he writes, “with almost complete consistency,” have esteemed rationality and realism, considering themselves “the upholders of le bon sens.” Seen in the neoclassicism of the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment counter-rationalism of the eighteenth, what Malraux would later call the “mania for logic” has animated French minds. The stance has not been without its critics; Lemaitre cites the Rousseau of the Reveries and such Romantics as Gérard Nerval, Victor Hugo, Charles Baudelaire. Two generations before Malraux, the poet Stéphane Mallarmé strove to transcend ordinary reality, “to enter the realm of the Absolute, which for him meant simply a more or less abstract, immaterial conception of perfect, ideal beauty” evoked by literary incantations tapping into “the hidden magic power of words,” which he compared to sentient, animated “living organisms,” organisms that have lost their original vitality in “the drab, stale vocabulary of modern days.”  Once “freed from the tyranny of reality, released from the necessity of having to ‘mean’ something definite,” words “will encounter a thousand possibilities of self-realization,” re-revealing “the ‘other’ world—the world of the ideal.” In philosophy, this was the time of the ‘irrationalists,’ of Nietzsche’s will to power and of Bergson’s élan vital. Moreover, from the 1890s on, science and mathematics themselves seemed to corroborate the unreality of reality, as “a series of correlated discoveries…revolutionized the conception of the structure of the universe that had prevailed since about the time of the Renaissance,” dissociating “certain aspects of reality that had been hitherto considered as forming an indivisible unity.” Mathematical physics, atomistic chemistry, and experimental psychology together left “the impression that every sentiment we entertain and every solid object that we perceive is but a flimsy assemblage ready to collapse into fragments at the impact of some new discovery.” “The world of our experience” seemed to disintegrate “into minute particles,” as the world “was seen as “infinitely more complex than had ever been imagined before,” with “enormous and profound unknown forces” were now understood to “envelop human life on all sides.” Such claims were no longer the province of poets, mystics, and madmen; “human intelligence, which the rationalistic Frenchman had so long trusted as the safest guide in the intricate maze of puzzling reality, came to be regarded with suspicion and even with contempt.” Rousseau’s noble savage reigned once more: “Since intelligence had betrayed the confidence placed in her, the desire was to return to a pre-intellectual state, to a primitivism akin to that of the Negroes of Central Africa—a stage of development in which intellect had not yet had a chance to draw an interpretative veil between the core of reality and man’s sentient being.” 

    One littérateur who typified the Parisian scene near the turn of the century was the wealthy, garrulous, massively erudite absinthe drinker, Alfred Jarry, whose 1896 play, Ubu-Roi enjoyed a succès de scandale with its “hideous presentation” of “cupidity, cowardice, gluttony, lechery, bourgeois respectability, philosophical wisdom, and shar, dangerous cunning,” all set for with “a monstrous vital intensity reminiscent of the powerful creations of Rabelais.” King Ubu “stands as a symbol of the lowest human instincts, which, if given a free hand, might easily take possession of our whole being and…fasten the tyranny of ignoble appetites upon our entire personality”—a “bitter satire on the society in which we live,” a society in which the play “aroused either violent resentment or wild enthusiasm.” Among his young admirers were Guillaume Apollinaire, Pablo Picasso, and Max Jacob, the men who went on to start the Cubist movement in literature, painting, and sculpture. For the Cubists, Jarry “came to be regarded as the standard-bearer of a generation in revolt, a champion who had fallen”—he died in 1907 at the age of 34—in “a lofty struggle” against what young artists yawned at: the dullness of middle-class existence, with its stubborn insentience of the harrowing reality beneath the surface of worldly comforts.

    Picasso and Jacob befriended one another in Paris in 1901, the year Malraux was born. They met Apollinaire a few years later. “Cubism is the most direct and evident consequence of that collaboration,” finding an impetus in the statuettes now being imported from the Ivory Coast and Congo. “The candid expression of genuine, though brutal, sensations and sentiments stirred man in a way that was beyond the power of a clever, sophisticated technique,” that “hard crust of an age-old civilization,” with “the thick layer of interpretive notions and traditions which intelligence had deposited upon all things,” now held to be “the main obstacle to direct contact with the richest sources of human inspiration and emotion.” The “geometric simplification” seen in African art suggested that the artists had “succeeded in suggesting with almost overpowering force a mysterious order, not thrust upon passive objects by an organizing intelligence but existing, as it were, at the very core of things themselves.” A 1908 exhibition by Picasso’s friend Georges Braque provoked Henri Matisse (other art historians credit the critic Louis Vauxcelles) to describe the paintings as having been composed “with little cubes.” “At the bottom of the Cubist movement was an eager and fervent desire to penetrate beneath the motley exterior of material appearances and to grasp something of the fundamental substance of reality,” inasmuch as the structured atomism of geometric shapes leaves literary and visual art “utterly free from entanglements and compromises with the materialism of life,” especially as exemplified by those money-grubbing bourgeois. “Even though discursive logic was now discredited, the Cubists had little difficulty in persuading themselves that pure geometry reflected the basic architecture of the universe,” so long as it helped them “to dislocate the world of appearances” and got them well beyond the unthinking materialism of the middle classes. In a sense, they asserted themselves as a new class of aristocrats, inasmuch as this hitherto undisclosed geometrical metaphysic “was not to be determined logically, nor even mathematically, but solely by intuition” by “the poet and to the artist alone,” bringing forth a vision “reserved for those who have something of the poet in them” as the effect of paintings and poems intended “to arouse an enraptured response in the souls of the privileged few who held within themselves a spark of the sublime.” “Sublime” is exactly right: Cubist art had no patience for the merely beautiful, dismissing it as superficial, ornamental, decorative. Da Vinci’s perspectivism was out, medieval depictions of tortured saints in. The Cubists “were fully aware of the intervening rationalistic evolution,” the shift from Christian art to the art of Renaissance neo-classicism, “would have to be eradicated,” and they “were prepared to reject all the intellectual and technical advances achieved in the field of painting since the Renaissance,” which interfered with “a sense of the totality of the universe,” with “close contact with a sublime spiritual entity.” Whether “the force of spiritual energy” was Bergson’s élan vital, Nietzsche’s will to power, or T. S. Eliot’s Christianity, Cubists averred that it came “from the deepest recesses of man’s fundamental vitality.” As in Nietzsche, as in the Christian churches, music came to be seen as a more direct emanation from those deep recesses than any other art; Guillaume Apollinaire wrote, “We are drifting towards an entirely new art which will stand in relation to painting, as hitherto regarded, just as music stands in relation to literature.”

    Apollinaire classified Cubist painters into four groups. “Scientific” or “conceptual” cubists remained ‘geometric,’ taking (for example) those Renaissance masterpieces and “decomposing” them into their supposedly underlying triangles, circles, and squares; Picasso and Braque were the masters among them. “Physical” cubists depicted new structures, borrowing elements from physical reality, as seen in the later paintings of Henri Le Fauconnier, whereas “Orphic” Cubism borrowed forms not from physical objects spun them out of their own minds, as seen in the paintings of the Czech artist, František Kupka, a man given to theosophy and trance states. “Instinctive” Cubism, perhaps more properly described as intuitionist Cubism, took its bearings from Bergson; Matisse was among its many practitioners.

    Apollinaire—in Cubist fashion, he reshaped his Polish name, Wilhelm Apolinaris de Kostrowitzki— himself remained the foremost among the literary Cubists. His Catholic upbringing left “a spiritual exaltation [that] was always at work within him, concealed from public view,” an exaltation which did not interfere with either his “marked taste for the open and unrestrained enjoyment of material pleasures,” including “the art of eating,” or his “utter lack of respect for rules and self-imposed discipline.” He wrote copiously on the “Esprit nouveau” in literature, philosophy, and art, his masterpiece acknowledged to be his 1913 book of poems, Alcools. (Could a poem not be like a glass of absinthe, a delightful, risky, mind-bending intoxicant?) Unlike the shattered souls of the ‘Lost Generation,’ he found the Great War, in which he fought and was severely wounded, a source of “spiritual exaltation inspired by constant danger, the proximity of death, and a thousand weird and exciting adventures,” an event that caused a “universal breakdown of tradition values” that served as “an inspiriting confirmation of his own views and of his fondest hopes.” Jettisoning the French “superstitious reverence for good taste,” the “set of conventions and prejudices particularly developed in the old civilizations, that forbid the direct and unpolished expression of spontaneous and instinctive feelings,” Apollinaire insisted that “even the lowest, the crudest, the most banal, the most despised aspects of everyday existence, even the most hideous and repulsive actions committed in the war, were not to be excluded but joyously welcomed in their entirety,” as “they all contain a magic kernel of essential poetry which the vulgar may not perceive but which inspired men like Apollinaire himself can express with compelling power.” This “cannot be achieved through careful, rational analysis, nor through cold-blooded dissection of the external aspects of the world” but can be “realized only in a state of lyrical enthusiasm, when the soul of man enters into communion with the spirit of the whole Cosmos and the two vibrate together in perfect harmony,” the soul drawing upon the “superior, transcendental energy” or élan vital which animates all of Being. The poet-hero would then “be as much a benefactor to mankind as Christopher Columbus,” freeing man “to go and find something new, something real, at last.” Hence the practice of “automatic writing,” whereby the poet would go into a self-induced trance, writing down whatever popped into his head, kaleidoscopically. (It must be admitted that Apollinaire then took the trouble to edit the results.) This practice eventuated in, and was continued by, the Surrealist movement. [1]

    Apollinaire adapted the methods of Cubism to literary purposes by breaking up his poetic narrative “arbitrarily into short or long passages, arranged in direct sequence but with almost no ascertainable connection between them, interrupted by digressions, personal reflections, or unexpected anecdotes,” dislocating “the forms of reality” into the verbal equivalent of geometric shapes or atoms. “All statements are made abruptly, without any preparation or transition, in a manner suggestive of the angles and bare surfaces to be found in the paintings of the same period,” producing “an atmosphere of unbridled fantasy and odd supernatural occurrence, carrying the reader into a half-real, half-imaginary world where the objects are solid enough, although their setting has none of the compelling stability that our senses find in normal circumstances.” Drawing from but reversing the Catholic mysticism that had found new life before and during the Great War, Apollinaire’s poetry features “strange outbursts of sadism [that] call up disturbingly the truly infernal abysses existing in human consciousness.”

    Second only to Apollinaire among the literary Cubists, Malraux’s friend and mentor, Max Jacob, came from an entirely different milieu, a family of Jewish atheists in Brittany. He met Apollinaire in 1904, dabbled in occultism while taking care to make some money out of it. “His comic verve was prodigious,” as “he made fun of everything and everybody, including himself,” with the sole exception of his friend Picasso. Reaching for “the realm which was beyond the reach of his reason or his senses,” he eventually found it as he walked home from the Bibliothèque Nationale in September 1909, when “there appeared to him what he took to be an entrancing supernatural vision of the Deity Himself” and he fell, Paul the Apostle-like, to the ground, entranced, then picked himself up and reported to the nearest Catholic priest, who, suspecting a prank, laughed him off. Undeterred, he integrated his occultism and Cubism “within the compass of his Christian mystic revelation,” conversing with angels and “the blessed souls of the departing.” Nor did he abandon his “grotesque clowning,” now in front of God, acts of a “buffoon and prophet rolled into one.” “If I have sinned horribly on a certain day, then on the following day…I choke, I sob I cry, I beat my face, my beast, my limbs, my hands; I bleed, I make the sign of the cross with my blood, with my tears. In the end God is taken in.” His reader may be permitted to wonder if that were really the case, but in any event, he eventually received his baptism, “having Pablo Picasso himself for a godfather.” His years’-long, sincere-ironic soul-wrestling left him sympathetic to young men undergoing similar quests, including André Malraux. And none of his eccentricities should detract from his literary achievement. As LeMaitre writes, “Max Jacob has assisted perhaps more than any of our contemporaries”—he had died in a German concentration camp only five years before LeMaitre published his study—in “ridding the French sentence of all its superfluous literary ornaments and in reducing it to a plain, angular bareness reminiscent of the most aggressive Cubist paintings.” By doing so, he “struck at intellectual reasoning itself” by “ruining on principle the power of carefully arrayed words” in a quasi-Nietzschean foray into irrationalist estheticism which registered “the strangeness, the inexplicableness of the universe”—the spirit of the farfelu Malraux took on and never fully left behind. The marvelously named Fugue State Press, evidently the publishing arm of a university without walls, has made Lunes en Papier (dedicated to Jacob) and Royaume-Farfelu available in an English translation by the noted poet, W. B. Keckler.

    In the frontispiece, Malraux calls Paper Moons “a small book in which one learns of several little-known conflicts, and a voyage among objects familiar but strange, all of it true.” But true in what sense? That is the question, Hamlet might ask, if in an epistemological mood. What is true, if we are take the author at his word, is that “There are no symbols in this book.” According to Jean Moréas, author of The Symbolist Manifesto of 1886, the poetry of the Symbolistes—Stephane Mallarmé, Paul Verlaine—would “clothe the ideal in perceptible form.” There is nothing ideal about the perceptible forms sketched in Paper Moons; blink, and they have changed, a band of shape-shifting teases.

    The beings we meet are geometric figures, beginning with the moon itself, which, “like a luminous advertising sign”—a novel thing, in 1921—changes color “in phases,” reflecting on a lake, itself changing with every ripple, producing “the play of light and water.” Geometric lines define what is, as seen in Plato’s Meno and, among Frenchmen, Descartes. They give the appearance of clarity, stability. But what if the lines undulate, thanks either to an electric current or a summer breeze? Do these surfaces not then reflect the inner instability of things, the physics and metaphysics of Cubism? Not stability but metamorphoses—even, as Malraux himself will style it, decades later, The Metamorphosis of the Gods.

    The moon laughs and produces children whose eyes, “fearful and ironic,” evidently perceive the unstable nature of the world into which they have been born. [2] Fearful, because they cannot know what will come next? Ironic, because there is little to revere in what cannot be permanent? The moon-children can be irritated, however—their moods are no more stable than the world. They see “ominous balloons” on the lake, “a harem of smooth, hairless, roly-poly sultans” (sultans, who by convention keep harems); when the moon-children realize that the balloons are not “carrying out complicated, invisible duties” as rulers are expected to do,” when they “realized the truth” Malraux has promised to tell, they become “indignant,” their noses shift shapes into billiard cues, and they knock the balloons around, only to bounce indifferently on the shimmering water, “inflam[ing] the jealousy of the baby moons, who wanted them dead.” 

    The balloons prove unkillable, even undeflatable, at least under billiard cue assault, yet not imperturbable; they “found themselves, alas, forced to act,” and, seeing “a flickering amber palace” thrown up by an “enchanted fountain,” they determine to invade it, anticipating “all kinds of lovely infamy” to be perpetrated therein. The palace’s inhabitants, hanging from the crossbeams under the roof, hoping to escape a beating, are tied up by the “savage balloons,” metamorphosed into beings of action from their previous languor on the lake. Among the inhabitants are philosophers, “black radishes full of sound.” In the world of paper moons and sultan balloons, philosophers are indistinguishable from the windbag rhetoricians and shape-shifting sophists we meet in the Platonic dialogues. Like all distinctions in the anti-bon sens universe, these blur. 

    The balloons’ triumph doesn’t last, any more than anything else does. Insolently jeering at the “genie of the lake,” a “cat-shaped pincushion,” they are soon punished. The Genie captures them and decides to inflict the death penalty, after finding that no one wants to take them. “Since no one desires these cruel balloons, We, the Genie of the Lake, who possess rights of justice, high and low, over the totality of this, Our Fiefdom, condemn these balloons to death in the name of justice,” indistinguishable from revenge. And rightly so, by the light of the occasionally silvery moon, inasmuch as justice in a world of flux can only be a matter of arbitrary passion. But when they are hanged, the balloons’ tongues don’t stick out, and the frustrated Cat-pincushion hangs himself, exclaiming, “O passion, you’re about to lose your little Cat Deluxe!” His paws lay “fittingly across each other in the shape of a cross,” a parody-Christ who commits suicide. The weight of the Cat’s body pulls the ropes tight on the balloons, causing the balloons’ tongues to stick out, after all. The death of this mock-Christ consummates his intention not by saving but by humiliating his enemies. 

    And yet some of the balloons are resurrected, metamorphosed—some “blossom[ing] into huge flowers,” others into “fruits with the soft gleam of antique polished wood,” but all exuding an “aphrodisiac aroma” which draws stuffed alligators out of the antique shops, running after them. One of the fruits then produces nine “new beings,” seven of whom are the Deadly Seven Sins, of which two, Envy and Greed, promptly explode, leaving Anger, Lust, Gluttony, Sloth, and Pride—fittingly the largest of the brood—who introduces his companions. One of the other surviving beings introduces himself as Hifili, a name perhaps derived from the Hebrew hifil, denoting causation. (“Perhaps” indeed—who knows? But to pretend it’s so runs with the spirit of the Lunes.) “Before the metamorphoses that gave me this balloon soul,” he announces, “I was a man who carefully studied shapes,” especially glassware, and among glassware especially the retorts, long-nosed flasks (he is a “red Pinocchio”) used in alchemical transformations. To shift from science to alchemy is to shift from ancient and modern geometry, from stable definition to the metamorphic geometry of Cubism. “I loved the retorts most of all,” beings that “would have run to eat out of my hand if they had known how to eat,” sardonic presences given to “contemptuous laughter,” and so the spirit of irony, regnant throughout the story. “I am the master of glass.” The other red being, who never gives his name, recalls his previous life as a musician, “before I had the mind of a balloon.” In that former life, he had been trapped by “an immense translucent lace” emitted by some fifty small rods “all hopping up and down like bobbins.” He was trapped, and “the trunk of my body had been replaced with a mandolin,” which sounded discordantly. “Can you imagine my despair?” And he couldn’t tune himself because the tuning pegs and the neck of the mandolin “were hidden inside my head!” Quel dommage. Pride offers them a role, to replace the exploded sins. “Being a mortal sin can not only give your life a purpose, but is also a career with many attractive benefits.” They accept, “for a number of reasons,” the Mandolin announces. “You will never know them all,” except this one: “If we didn’t accept your offer, we would end up in a lot of trouble,” which he leaves unspecified. Evidently, the trouble won’t come from God, who has by this day and age become “completely oblivious,” replaced by Satan. 

    Would Satan, then, be the cause of trouble for the newly-minted Sins, if they hadn’t accepted Pride’s offer? Possibly, but Pride is as rebellious against Satan as was Satan against God. “We could take over from Satan.” But “our authority would be almost nil,” Anger complains, as “Satan’s best ally, Death, will destroy us.” Not to worry, Pride insists, “We’ll just kill Death!” And so the campaign, the expedition, begins.

    They march into the forest, where “they saw the at the low-hanging leaves made geometric patterns: spheres, cubes, prisms and each pattern had a luminous core, like the bright eye of an ironic Russian hare.” The forest is a Cubist wonderland. Death seeks to destroy the Sins, but while soft Gluttony worries (“Maybe we should take some precautions”), “ingenious Hifili,” master of glass and of alchemical transformations, demurs: “No point. Because Death has an impoverished imagination.”

    “Everyone knows that ‘Death’s empire’ is called the Kingdom of Farfelu,” Pride observes. Farfelu, André Vandegans explains in his erudite, exhaustively researched study, derives from a Greek word for bubble of air; in Rabelais (where Malraux found it) it means a bagatelle, fantasy. As Malraux himself wrote, a few years later, “The talent of a writer of fantasy consists almost always in perceiving that the commonly accepted world is only a dream, not because it is not true, but because it is fixed.” In the Lunes, the life world isn’t fixed and the kingdom of death isn’t final. Both are susceptible of being mocked, since neither finally can impose itself on anything or anyone.

    On the way toward the river “that led to the Kingdom of Farfelu”—Lethe?—”they were delighted with themselves, because they saw how much Creation is in need of touching up, and how much more harmonious it could all be through the contributions of Sin.” They seem to have forgotten their troubles. Hifili, “metamorphosed into Greed now,” having replaced him, “watched all the sins brightened,” feeling he “could accept them as true friends,” but when they face the river his “reverie” ends. “An animal musk, intoxicating as ether,” arises from tufts of red fur floating on the river; “he felt that fruits of the flesh were against his lips, that he took a bite, and that the fruits were bursting open, splattering all across this face their sugared blood.” Birds hover above the river, then fall in, their feathers mixing with the animal fur. Nor is the reptilian absent, as the snakelike Bigophones appear, frightening the Sins, who, “without knowing why,” understood “that great and tragic events loomed ahead.” The carnival-cardboard instruments promise to drive the Sins “to the very edge of the Kingdom of Farfelu,” with their “banal poems and stupid songs, too frightful to image,” a prospect the former musician rescues them.

    After a night at an inn managed by a poet, the Sins soldier on to the walls of the Kingdom of Farfelu, where the townspeople are celebrating but the queen Death herself, “was suffering a bout of listlessness” and has called for a retinue of physicians. Queen Death “inhabited a chamber with immense mirrored walls, reproducing to infinity the furniture in the room”—an illusion of infinity. As for Her Majesty, she “resembled a giant insect, because of her dinner jacket,” which fluttered in the breeze, giving the impression of wings. Death boasts to the head physician of her new skeleton, made of aluminum: “We must keep up with project,” as in modernity “everything has become mechanical, metallic, dazzling, and yet my beauty remained Gothic. I was slipping into passé.” Death, too, feels the desire to metamorphose, to keep up with ever-changing fashion, which imitates the ever-changing Cubist universe. 

    But, sad for Queen Death, the physician turns out to be Pride in disguise, who prepares a liquid to destroy her. Being prideful, Pride orders the other Sins out of the room, “back into hiding,” but the Mandolin ex-musician admonishes, “No melodrama, please. A sin owes it to himself not to act as his title suggests. Even the various loves of Lust were only chimeras, and didn’t last.” Pride glares, “jealous of the musician’s intelligence,” but commands no more, proceeding to poison Death, who is thankful for whomever “helped me out this sorrow.” Sorrow? Yes, because, you see, “the world is only tolerable to us because of our habit of tolerating it,” and “my departure” from it “will be a great practical joke,” inasmuch as I am called Death “but you know perfectly well that I’m only Chance. Slow decay is just one of my disguises.” The farfelu world is really the world of atomism, but not the atomism of Democritus, who supposed atoms to be impenetrable. Now, atoms themselves are dissolvable, not to say dissolute, as scientists know that they can be split into careening sub-particles, driven by chaos-making energy. 

    “Death was dead.” The Mandolin-musician muses, asking: “Forgive me, dear friends… When I was a man, I was subject to a kind of mental anemia. So please don’t mind too much if I ask: Why, exactly, did we kill Death?” The Sins “put their heads into their hands and wept,” as they can’t remember.

    Readers will remember. The Sins set out to kill Death because they feared that Death would kill them at the behest of Satan, who has replaced an indifferent God and whom the Sins, spurred on by Pride, wanted to overthrow. But Cubist sins partake of the same randomness as the rest of things, and so cannot form any lasting intention, being finally mindless. The readers, considering Malraux’s art, however, will see that he has drawn order out of this disorder. As Vandegans remarks, in a contemporaneous article on Cubism Malraux paid homage “to the effort of art”; “fantasy and the fantastic are the modes of expression of the independence of the artist in relation to the world and of his individuality that are especially effective” against the randomness, the absurdity, of the world. Cubism, Malraux wrote, reveals “the desire of purity and of construction,” the “desire of discipline” seen in the literary style of the writers and painters who are its practitioners. He called this the opposite of “Hamletism,” of indecision, “the creation of an autonomous reality”—of paper moons, moons written on paper, or painted on it, as Picasso does, exhibiting “absolute creation.” [2] Vandegans finds this in Lunes en papier, “an absolute creation” which “opposes to the real a universe of art.” “Dominated by Death,” the “world is the kingdom of malice, of cruelty, of the absurd, of combat always renewed against enemy forces,” a combat so banal that Death herself has wearied of it. With the Cubists, Malraux opposes vitality against Death, order against Chance. 

    Malraux’s second and final purely farfelu fiction, Royaume-Farfelu, appeared seen years after Lunes, in 1928. In it, Malraux has abandoned Cubist geometric figures, however, replacing them with human beings, however fantastic. What had intervened in those years was Malraux’s experience of a real alternative reality, one that needed imagination not to create but to understand: the East, Asia, “a civilization,” Vandegans remarks, “radically different from his own” one ruled by European imperialists. While in Cambodia, he made contact with the anti-imperialist members of Jeune Annam. “In Asia, Malraux had submitted to the grip of the real,” confronted no longer by risible modern Western banality, the regime of the bourgeoisie, but with the harder side of the French regime, which jailed him for stealing some ancient bas-reliefs, which he hoped to sell to a Paris collector. In response, he wrote The Temptation of the West and The Conquerors. 

    The Temptation of the West is an epistolary novel, the correspondences being two young men, the European “A.D.,” symbol of the West after the turn to Christianity, and “Ling,” whose name means ‘sensibility.’ Ling sees in Europe “an attentively ordered barbarity,” as seen in Christianity, in which “all the intensity of love is concentrated on a body that has been tortured.” One body: the West also prizes individuality. Whether Christian or Napoleonic, the individual aims at conquest. True enough, A.D concedes, but China’s Confucianism, its sensibility, its refinement, nears collapse in the face of the West. While he feels his friend’s anguish, he neither embraces the Chinese sensibility nor adverts to the faith of Christianity. Instead, he faces the crisis of East and West with courage and “voracious lucidity.” With these virtues, he will resist “the most subtle temptation” that faces the young men of the West, which is the passion for ingenious artistic revival—obviously, the several ‘movements,’ announced in ‘manifestos,’ that proliferated just before and just subsequent to Malraux’s own arrival in Paris as a youth: Symbolism, Cubism, Fauvism, Dadaism, Surrealism. A.D. and Malraux ready themselves for new discoveries.

    The Conquerors takes the same struggle from words, the letters in an epistolary novel, to actions, the events narrated in a novel on a workers’ rebellion in Canton. These Chinese are no longer men of sensibility but of political revolution, ‘Westernized’ Chinese, organized by Borodine, a Soviet agent. In this novel, one character offers the first enunciation of what eventually came to be called Malraux’s “tragic humanism”: “it is rare, ein Mensch…a man”—a genuine man, conscious of his own humanness and standing against those who would reduce him, and other men, to sub-humans, to the conquered. Such dehumanizing conquest may be seen both in capitalism and in Bolshevism. Malraux called The Conquerors “above all an accusation against the human condition,” the condition of fatedness, of oppression of human beings by human beings and indeed Being itself, a condition to be resisted defense of the humanity that is capable of resisting tyranny. [4]

    Published in 1928, the same year The Conquerors appeared, Royaume-Farfelu takes the artistic techniques of Cubism and literally humanizes them. That is, instead of characters who are anthropomorphized geometric figures—anthropomorphism itself being one of the many metamorphoses Cubism valorizes—the characters here are human (with a few devils thrown in). The fiction begins with a warning: “Watch out, curlyhaired devils: ghost images are forming on the silent sea. This hour no longer belongs to you.” Curlyhaired devils aren’t really devils but the men of the West, where “gilded popes and antipopes walk along the empty gutters of Rome; behind them, demons with silken tails—who are former emperors—laugh mutely.” Church and state are ruined, and “a king, who no longer cares for anything but music and the art of torture, wanders the night disconsolate, blowing on upraised silver trumpets, leading his dancing subjects onward.” In the East, “a broken conqueror sleeps in black armor, surrounded by restless monkeys.” The Western project of conquest has exhausted itself. 

    The narrator (“a mysterious voice,” Vandegans calls him) is on a voyage, along the coast of Turkey, where “merchants threw themselves upon us as soon as we touched land.” One of them sells phoenixes, but the phoenix he burns to impress the voyagers reconstitutes itself from its ashes and “took advantage of the merchant’s foolhardy joy and escaped.” “As I left all of this behind, I thought: Oh seas of Asia, I yearn for the pale light of the medusas that drift on your warm tides,” for the “barks and vessels of the Orient, whose “scent rests in my heart.” But this Oriental reverie is interrupted by a summons to the prince, the Little Mogul. Neither the conquests of the West, nor the commerce of the Near East, nor dreams of the dreamlike Far East can evade the human reality of obeying the ruler.

    He listens as the Little Mogul interrogates a messenger named Idekel, “an old man, sweet-tempered,” whom he had sent on an expedition to Babylon, whose hanging gardens, Idekel reports, have collapsed. The farthest reaches of the Little Mogul’s domains are deserts, now. His daughter, whom Idekel guided to “the fish-eating tsar” of Russia, now “rules by herself” in an empire in which she oversaw a “deathly flotilla” of the gods of the old religions, gods who rotted “while the Christian priests sang.” Like the narrator, the Little Mogul longs for the East, but specifically for the Princess of China, embodiment of the grace and wisdom of her civilization. Does he order his armies to advance toward Persia in order to move closer to China, to her? [5]

    The Little Mogul appoints the narrator to the post of Historian to the Prince, who, after having destroyed the Persian army, intends to conquer Persia’s great city, “the undefended Ispahan.” The expeditionary forces of the Little Mogul seized Ispahan and the historian wrote the narrative of the conquest, aided by Idekel, who deems his youth “spent in scholarship” as an apprentice magician to have been worthless. “I journeyed with all the other magicians to the islands of Hell,” where he saw “the damned file along trough snow, like lines of miserable ants, escorted by fluttering demons.” The magicians’ spells scattered the demons, but they returned “to conquer us in the end.” In the aftermath of this disaster, “bit by bit I forgot my conscience; I was indifferent to learning, teaching, everything.” After conquering the city, the soldiers sacked it. “This night,” Idekel says, “was certainly one of the greatest nights in the history of the world, one of those nights when the stunned gods surrender the earth to the savage demons of poetry.” “And didn’t we find every last scrap?” But as for the narrator, “I found nothing.” “A few hours passed: I remained sprawled out on the roof, conquering cities in my daydreams,” while “the demons of the ruins were born, who are faceless and live in our own bodies.” The demon who inhabits the narrator tells him, “You won’t remember Ispahan, because Ispahan belongs to the beasts,” who were even then returning to its ruins. Ispahan’s “crown of desolation will protect it from your cursed comrades and their vile officers.” “Dream of your death, artist.” And each soldier, too, “heard the voice that rose up within him, and was shattered by it.”  The conquerors fled the city.

    “It seemed as if mankind had disappeared from the earth, and that plants, silent animals, and stones lived in the perfect liberty that follows upon hopeless abandonment.” The remaining army retreated across the desert, chased by an “immense insect sheet” of scorpions. “Madness suddenly seized the whole multitude of troops and threw them by handfuls like grains of sand out to the vultures of the desert.” 

    “I will never know how I reached Trebizond,” one of several smaller successor states to Byzantium, conquered by the Turks. “I arrived there dazed, senseless, guarded by children covered with amulets,” and “the prince took me in.” He now “manage[s] to make a living selling beautiful shells,” some of which “communicate with demons in hell, but nobody knows it.” Having collected two sirens, he intends to sell them to the prince of Trebizond, whose “Christian minister” denies the existence of. “With the money he will give me, maybe I’ll book passage on one of the ships that sail to the Fortune Islands. I’m only sixty years old….” The Fortune Islands, the Isles of the Blessed celebrated by ancient Greek poets, were supposed to be somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean, reserved for aristocrats who had chosen to be reincarnated three times.

    The Kingdom of Farfelu, instantiated in the Persian city, is both the Kingdom of Death and the Kingdom of Madness, setting limits on the ambition to conquer. The narrator himself survives but is mad, driven mad by the uncontrollable forces within the limbo between West and East. 

    Radulescu devotes most of her book to tracing the theme of the farfelu from Malraux’s most celebrated novel, Man’s Fate, and to his last great book, his ‘anti-memoir,’ Mirror of Limbo. In Man’s Fate the farfelu character is Clappique, erstwhile dealer in antiques and art, now an arms dealer, happy to sell his wares to either side in the ongoing civil war between the communists and the nationalist Kuomintang. Clappique, “the incarnation of the ‘farfelu,'” acts as “an anomaly in the midst of all that is normal, natural,” a “skinny Polichinelle,” the marionette, Punch, in the Punch-and-Judy show, who attempts to conceal the force of the strings that jerk him around from others and from himself with alcools and mythomania. But in this novel, “Malraux opposes mythomania, the conscious denial of reality, the grimacing laughter of the clown.” Clappique hangs out in the Black Cat bar; Radulescu remarks that in Christian folk tales the black cat is the agent of the Devil, “who, in his turn, negotiates best with women.” Clappique is a bit of “a prostitute himself,” perpetually “asking for money and perform[ing] services for money”—a capitalist who demonstrates the absurdity of pure capitalism, which would sell arms not only to the forces controlled by the Shanghai business corporations but to the communists who would ruin those capitalists and throw wheeler-dealers like Clappique into ‘re-education’ camps. Radulescu sees that Clappique is not all talk; “his actions make crucial points in the development of the narrative,” and that is the problem. His fantasies turned into action destroy the best man in the novel, Kyo Gisors, the head of the rebellion. Having learned that Kyo will be captured and killed in the next day or two if he doesn’t get out of the city, Clappique goes off to gamble at the casino (a type of fantasy land), instead of warning him. At the gambling table, “he surrenders entirely to hazard,” to Fortuna, to the strings that jerk him around. He himself will later take care to escape, disguised as a sailor. 

    Radulescu goes easy on Clappique, calling him “a quite endearing figure,” a Trickster who “floats through the novel as a symbol of aesthetic values, opposed to both the Capitalist and Communist values.” But that is the problem. Clappique refuses the responsibility of humanness, as seen when he looks at himself in the mirror and makes faces, grotesquely. “A world made only of clowns, fluttering Pierrots, and watery creatures can well form the main substance of poetry,” or of prose fantasies like Paper Moons, “but it becomes aesthetically insufficient for a novel.” Yes, but not only aesthetically insufficient: it is morally and politically insufficient, deadly to the bodies of others and to the soul of the fantasist. Clappique’s “betrayal of Kyo” and “his abandonment to the round ball of the gambling table are all deliberate actions through which Clappique takes hold of his own destiny.” This is exactly wrong. He is abandoning himself to man’s fate, not resisting it. In a bit of misplaced feminism, Radulescu observes that “the tragic heroes, the complete men in the novel [emphasis in the text], die the violent and transformative death of fire, the masculine element, which consumes and reduces them to a substance other than their own.” This misses the climactic moment in Man’s Fate, when Kyo, about to be thrown into a furnace by his captors, takes the cyanide capsules he had secreted on his person in the event of such a fate, giving them to his terrified companions; when the men drop the capsules and grope blindly for them, one of his nameless comrades grips Kyo’s hand and says, “Even if we don’t find it….” The gesture of self-sacrificing human fraternity is the real answer to the human condition, a condition of mortality, fatedness. [6] In Man’s Fate, farfelu freedom meets the real freedom of responsibility, leaving its attentive readers with the sense that responsibility is better.

    Radulescu is much more reliable in her discussion of the farfelu in Days of Limbo. Here, the farfelu floats in the air, an aspect of the Eternal Feminine, seen in the legendary figure of the Queen of Sheba, for whose lost temple Malraux searched, and in the imagery of flowers and butterflies and fire, and above all the image of the cat, no longer simply the devil of medieval Christendom, instead betokening a femininity “unleashed and ironic, a new kind of sensuality, dynamic and haunting.” The farfelu, like fate, is beyond human control, but it is not ‘fatal,’ destructive of human beings. In Man’s Fate, the women (Kyo’s wife, May, and Valérie, independent-minded mistress of the inhuman capitalist, Ferral) balance the men; so, too, in Mirror of Limbo, where even General Charles de Gaulle’s wife, Yvonne, appears as the courageous partner of her husband, responding to a failed assassination attempt by brushing the shattered car window glass off her clothes and straightening her hat. 

    Malraux imagines a butterfly lighting on the nose of the Queen of Sheba. He encounters butterflies once more when he meets Méry, a former French colonial official in Indochina, now living in Singapore, whose hobby is butterfly collecting. They speak of colonialism, Méry wondering why individualistic Europeans forgot their taste for liberty “when the found themselves in the fact of another civilization.” Malraux deepens the question to the question of the memoir itself: “How do we become what we are?” “How does man become the Man that he carries in himself?” His answer is the answer embodied by Kyo’s act in Man’s Fate, an act seen again in Mirror of Limbo when a French Mother Superior interrupted his interrogation by a Nazi officer to bring him food, which Malraux offered to share with the Nazi. Méry takes the point, then raises the political question of mass, rather than individual, sentiments. This brings him to a discussion of butterflies, which he identifies with nature, with which “we begin to converse only when we begin to converse with death.” “In the face of Asia, I feel myself singular; in the face of the butterflies, humanity seems to me unprecedented”; nature is “the life that will continue if all men disappeared.” Malraux cites a Hindu text, in which butterflies descend upon the bones of dead soldiers on a battlefield. “Qu’importe?” Given the indifference of nature, what does human life mean, whether it confronts us in its grim aspect of death or in the beautiful indifference of life? Men ask that question in the face of death, women when they look at the face of a child, the face of new life. The answer Malraux’s book gives remains the answer of the anonymous prisoner: Even if we don’t find it in some metaphysical sense, we have it in one another, in our shared understanding that we are not fate, even if we are fated.

    Radulescu cites one of Malraux’s favorite anecdotes, the story Mallarmé told about his cat. One night, Mallarmé listened as the neighborhood cats talked with one another in the ally outside his room. “Whose cat are you?” one asked. “At the moment, I pretend to be the cat of the Mallarmé household.” “Malraux, too, glided gracefully through History as if among pieces of temporary furniture” with an “ironic smile at his own different incarnations”—young literary arriviste in Paris, fascinated by the Cubism that came out of but opposed the Symbolisme of Mallarmé, adventurer in Asia, novelist of tragic humanism and winner of the Prix Goncourt, fighter in the Spanish Civil war, Résistant during the Second World War, writer on art and its metamorphoses, Minister of Culture in de Gaulle’s cabinet in the first decade of the Fifth Republic, anti-memorialist. A cat’s tail curls like a question-mark. What does it all mean? Life, he writes at the beginning of the book, “like the gods of vanished religions, appears to me as the libretto for an unknown music.”

    Radulescu considers Malraux’s visit to the cave at Lascaux, where some boys looking for adventure found paintings on the wall made by the earliest humans on French soil, men of pre-History. She speaks of the sexual imagery of the cave itself, with its evocation of the return to Mother Earth; decades earlier, upon his return to earth from the near-fatal airplane ride through a desert storm after his attempt to locate Sheba’s tomb, he thought of the lines on the earth as resembling the lines on his mother’s palm and, one might add, that his own lifeline was long. He sees that tourists’ breath has caused the paintings to deteriorate; the paintings can be saved on condition that men stop “coming there as they please”—that is, for light, ‘farfelu‘ reasons. In another irony, in this novel full of war and rumors of war, the conservation work has been left to the conscientious objectors. Here, for this task, they are the responsible ones.

    Why does the Minister of Culture minister to culture? Because even near the beginning of human life, the man who took refuge in the earth against the certainty of death and the velleities of life left his mark on the earth, his art not a mere expression of estheticism, of beauty, but of human freedom, distinct from the human condition. The metamorphosis of the gods effected by men, differs from the farfelu metamorphoses of Cubism because the men who effect them take responsibility for them and for themselves, for human beings. What the Cubists did unwittingly, Malraux does deliberately, understanding even an art that bows to atomism as art, beyond the mystery of matter.

     

    Notes

    1. The most prominent of the political Surrealists was Louis Aragon, later an apologist for Stalinism. Stalin himself might be described as the apogee of political Surrealism, murderer of tens of millions, albeit in the name of a ‘scientific socialism’—in the hands of genocidists, a self-contradictory, irrationalist rationalism.
    2. Domnica Radulescu remarks that “the birth process of the Moon Children is the opposite of a real birth: the little Moons are born as a result of their mother’s laughter, without pain, tears or blood. They effortlessly fall off and float through the universe.”
    3. Radulescu sees this clearly: “The noun ‘paper’ points to the writing of literature” and of painting. “Malraux’s later view of art as an ‘anti-destin‘ is being prefigured here.” Additionally, and insightfully, Radulescu, writing after ‘second-wave’ feminism took control over much lit-crit terrain, emphasizes the Rabelaisian sexuality of the Lunes —the way in which the beings change sex, as sexual boundaries too loose their “corporeal nature, acquiring instead a playful, yet grotesque, quality” as changelings, as linear, phallic masculinity intermixes with round, fecund femininity in acts of “poetic alchemy.” Although sympathetic to feminism, Radulescu justly vindicates Malraux from charges of misogyny, as “the bizarre universe of this tale offers, in fact, a criticism of misogyny, a mockery of the male’s arrogance, for the protagonists and their actions are constantly projected into comedy, never truly taken seriously by either the author, whose tome is touched throughout by irony, or the Sins, since each of their undertakings stats with pomp but ends in a failure of some sort,” Pride leading the way to buffoonish failure in his very success. 
    4. For a discussion of The Temptation of the West and The Conquerors, see Will Morrisey: Reflections on Malraux: Cultural Founding in Modernity (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984.
    5. Radulescu makes much of the Princess of China, describing her as “the embodiment of female beauty and grace,” a person “entirely identified with Nature, in all of its majesty and succulence,” which “appears clearly dissociated from the fabricated world of man.” She is not Queen Death in the Lunes, and the Little Mogul would possess, not kill her. “She is a combination of death and nature.” One might add that for Malraux nature is ‘farfelu’ or self-contradictory, giving birth and dealing death, seductive and dangerous, a siren, a point Radulescu herself makes, in her conclusion to her chapter. 
    6. See Morrisey, op. cit., Chapter 3.

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

    • 1
    • 2
    • Next Page »