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    Archives for May 2023

    Lakotas

    May 31, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Pekka Häkäläinen: Lakota America: A New History of Indigenous Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019.

     

    In the Republic, Plato’s Socrates proposes three “noble lies” or myths teachers will tell their students. One of them, the myth of autochthony, strengthens citizens’ attachment to the territory of his proposed polis. Tell the young that their people initially sprang from the very soil the polis occupies; this land is your land because your ancestors literally grew up out of it, coming from nowhere else but here. In North America today, ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ Americans sometimes make this claim. We didn’t come here from Asia, traversing a ‘land bridge’ that connected the two continents, millennia ago. We originated here. The Lakotas claim ownership of large sections of the upper Midwest on exactly those, well, grounds, although it’s impossible to say whether they believe it. 

    Häkäläinen clarifies the matter. He sidesteps the question of Asian origins, contenting himself with showing that the Lakotas entered the territory they now claim much more recently from lands they had held farther east on the North American continent. This is only one result of his excellent approach—telling the story of the Lakotas not as an adjunct to the story of their American conquerors but as their story, “central and enduring protagonists who contended with a range of colonial powers since the seventeenth century variously diverting, foiling, and boosting their ambitions.” Telling the Lakotas’ story as their story does not, however, mean telling it as they tell it to themselves, and to others. Häkäläinen writes history, not mythology.

    By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Lakotas numbered among the several tribes of hunter-gatherers in the Eastern Woodlands of North America, a minor tribe (never more than 15,000 in population) clustered around the Great Lakes, with “no guns and no metal weapons” with “little political clout.” They nonetheless undertook “what may be the most improbable expansion in American history,” leaving “their ancient homelands and reinvent[ing] themselves as horse people in the continental grasslands that stretched seemingly forever into the horizon.” This was hardly inevitable, the working-out of some historical teleology. They pursued a strategy, one eminently successful as exercised with and against other Indian nations and empires and also with and against the French and British empires. “How Lakotas harnessed that imperial cauldron to serve their interests…is one of the great untold stories in American history.” It was the United States’s imperial venture that did them in, but even then not straightforwardly so, as “Lakotas and Americans expanded simultaneously into the West, often claiming the same tracts of land and water,” “neither compromis[ing] their core convictions about themselves and the world,” and “often talk[ing] past one another.”

    The Lakotas were part of the seven nations or tribes constituting what for convenience’s sake Häkäläinen calls the Sioux, or what the members of the confederation themselves called, and still call, the Ochéti Šakówin or Seven Council Fires (‘Sioux’ meant ‘enemy’ among their Indian enemies, primarily the Iroquois). They had come into the area immediately west of the Great Lakes from the central Mississippi Valley, “triggered by a warmer and wetter climate cycle that began in the ninth century, rendering the lands in the previously colder north and direr west more appealing.” Initially, the Lakotas were not even the most prominent Sioux tribe, that honor being held by “their close kin,” the Dakotas, who had entered the area before the other Sioux. The Lakotas settled farthest to the west, near the Minnesota Valley. In the Great Lakes region, their main enemies were the Crees, who lived along the northern shores of Lake Superior, and the Sauteurs, both of whom enjoyed the advantage of iron weapons, for which they had traded from the French. Between the Sioux and the French “lay dozens of Native nations, all of them inside the gun and iron frontier and all of them familiar with the European newcomers and their strange ideas and habits.” To make direct contact with the French, in order to obtain their novel and seemingly magical weapons, “each of those nations would have to be won over, pushed aside, or otherwise neutralized.” 

    Against the better-armed Crees and Sauteurs, the Sioux confederation pitted not only the warlike virtue of courage but better organization. As a whole, the confederation numbered some 30,000 by the middle of the seventeenth century; they recognized one another as kind, “bound to one another and the universe by a pervasive life-giving essence, wakhán.” The confederation shouldn’t be understood in a formal sense, having “no overarching governing structure or leaders who could speak for all members of the alliance.” Along with kinship, they shared the same language; the Council Fires called themselves the “real people,” distinguishing themselves “from strangers and thókas, enemies.” Nor did they think of their kinship primarily as a matter of blood; “anybody capable of proper sentiments, words, and deeds would become a relative, takúye.” It was a matter of ethos. “Sioux saw in every person a potential kin, which meant that their society had no predetermined boundaries.” Within each Council Fire several bands, villages, or “camp circles” lived together throughout the year; the circle, itself a symbol of “spiritual unity and cosmological order,” included twenty households, more or less. They necessarily occupied a set space, but only temporarily, moving from woodlands to grasslands to marshlands in an annual cycle. The Seven Council Fires consisted of “a human kaleidoscope where individuals, families, and bands moved around constantly, arranging themselves into different constellations as circumstances demanded,” united not by territorial boundaries but by “a thick lattice of kinship ties that transcended local and regional identities,” a framework wherein “they could travel anywhere within their realm and always be among kin.”  

    As for the foreigners, they too reinforced ties among the Sioux. Like so many ‘ancient’ peoples, they waged war frequently, “to protect their lands, to exact revenge, to secure hunting and trading privileges, to enhance their power and prestige by taking slaves, to preempt threats,” singing their war song: “I am going to War, I will revenge the Death of such a Kinsman, I will slay, I will burn, I will bring away Slaves, I will eat men.” If a father died in battle, his daughters “received slaves and had the right to decide whether they lived or died,” while the victorious warriors obtained wives from among the captives. 

    The smallpox epidemic which began in Massachusetts in the 1630s indirectly helped the Sioux. By the end of the decade, it was ravaging the Wyandots in the Great Lakes region, as the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes trade corridor “became a disease corridor,” with mortality rates around fifty percent of the population. “Despair and sorrow gripped entire communities, spawning apathy or, increasingly, violence to ease the pain.” This included the powerful confederation of the Five Iroquois Nations, who responded to their devastating loss of population by a campaign of conquest, with “warfare more ferocious than anyone could remember.” The Wyandots were among their victims, chased into the western Great Lakes, but they were not alone. “Several nations crumbled as political entities,” while others fled “in the face of the most concentrated projection of power in seventeenth-century America,” as “Iroquois war parties carried thousands of war prisoners into Iroquoia, where clan matrons slated them for slavery, adoption, or execution.” The lucky ones were “adopted into Iroquois clans and assumed the social role and name of the deceased, thereby repairing fractured lineages as newly born Iroquois.” 

    As the refugees from Iroquois depredations crowded into the area between Lake Michigan and the southern shore of Lake Superior, with their iron and guns, they threatened the Sioux. Using the Odawas as middlemen, Seven Council Fires established a treaty with the French, hoping to exchange furs for iron and guns. Since, “neither possessed the power to dictate to the other…they were forced to accommodate one another” as best they could, given “the yawning cultural gap that separated them.” And they intermixed through mutual gift giving and marriage. The Sioux called the French governor in distant Montreal the Onontio or father, a father conceived less as a commanding head of household as a kind and generous benefactor. In fact, they “hardly tolerated one another” but worked for their mutual interests to stabilize the region in order to maintain the benefits of trade. But the Sauteurs and other tribes, themselves pressured from the east by the Iroquois, maintained their advantage in weaponry. “Whatever the reason, Sioux remained outsiders. Odawas, Wyandots, and others would shun alliances with them and keep driving into their hunting lands” in “a massive war zone” where the Sioux “fought some dozen nations, vying for hunting rights, trade, and predominance.” The Sioux began to retreat to the west of the Mississippi River, only to find themselves at war with the Iowas. 

    “Yet the seven fires possessed a singular advantage: they were more numerous than any of their enemies, boasting a population that, by some estimates, was thirty times larger than that of the geopolitically privileged Sauteurs.” Their distance, their isolation, hurt them geopolitically but helped them to avoid contagious diseases, there being no evidence of any epidemic in Sioux territory in the seventeenth century. What they lacked in weaponry they made up for in warriors, fielding thousands on a battlefield against enemy war parties of a few hundred. And the western lands they had moved into were rich in bison; the French began calling them the “Nation of the beef.”  

    The French needed them more and more. The English had allied with the Iroquois, threatening the numerically inferior French. For their part, “what the Sioux needed was a thorough geopolitical realignment of the American interior.” They allied with their longtime enemies, the Sauteurs, to the delight of the French. By now, they were well established in the western lands, and even pushed back into the western Great Lakes. But in 1670, King Charles II of England chartered the Hudson’s Bay Company—bad geopolitical news for the French, who responded by strengthening their alliance with the Sioux and Sauteurs in the west. This enabled the Sioux to insist that the French come to them, rather than insisting that the Sioux venture eastward toward the French. “To be powerful in late seventeenth-century North American meant having allies and kin; not to need to move “connoted power,” as “the weak traveled to the more powerful, and markets were not so much opened as brought in.” In this, the Sioux had an unwitting ally in Louis XIV’s court: Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis’s finance minister, who issued an edict opening inland trade, quite in contrast with his usual mercantilism. With beaver pelts satisfying the French appetite for luxury clothing, the Sioux finally “had broken Lakes people’s grip on the fur trade,” with vastly increased “access to guns and iron”—a “terrifying development for the Great Lakes Indians.” “Dangerously isolated just a few years earlier, the Sioux country emerged in the 1680s as a central place where commercial and diplomatic circles converged. The Sioux now had allies, iron, and guns—and the eye of the French.” 

    With that, the Iroquois, armed with English guns and goods, pushed back, sending war parties into lands south and west of Lake Michigan and alarming the French, who knew a proxy war when they saw one. By now, the French knew that the Mississippi River flowed south to the Gulf of Mexico, not west to the Pacific Ocean. This made the lands between Lake Michigan and the lower Ohio and middle Mississippi Valleys all the more crucial for their empire. But the Iroquois had the warriors on the ground, and “New France was soon tottering.” Only the alliance with Sioux could save it. But further arming the Sioux “risked alienating the Lakes Indians, New France’s ancient shield against the Iroquois.” The shield turned against the one it had protected, as the French lacked the material goods to appease all of their allies. This gave the Sioux even greater leverage over France. 

    In general, “seventeenth-century North America was a vast Indigenous ocean speckled with tiny European islands.” The Europeans might claim “vast chunks of the continent through the doctrines of discover and terra nullius (no one’s land), but such claims mattered little on the ground where the Indians controlled the balance of power.” Not for long, however. The Europeans held the advantage of ‘modernity’: not only weapons technology but the centralized organization of the modern state. Machiavelli’s lo stato had already overwhelmed the feudal structures of medieval Europe, and they would do the same to the tribal regimes of North America. Those “fringe outposts were pockets of dense military-technological power that could shape developments far beyond their borders,” especially with contagious diseases serving as their advance corps. Trading posts in Indian territories “made empires,” and although the Indians found this “laughable,” interpreting the existence of the posts as indicators of their own power and prestige, the reality turned out to be quite the opposite, in the fairly near term. 

    For their part, the Lakotas, the westernmost Sioux, prospered amongst the bison of the Great Plains, warring against the Indians already living on those lands. As early as the 1680s, war had broken out between the Lakotas and the Arikaras on the Missouri River. The Lakotas “were in the West, but the West was not theirs.” “Each spring they returned east to the precious prairie-forest ecotone where they could enjoy one of the best diets on the continent” while trading with the other Council Fires. They tempered their enjoyment with the knowledge “that this new world”—new not only to the Europeans but to themselves—was “an unforgiving place where people often were expiring if they were not expanding.” They determined to expand, still westward. 

    It was not entirely a matter of their own choice. The introduction of horses to the Great Plains proved indispensable to this movement. The Spanish had brought horses to the New World, thousands of years after they had perished here, along with the many other extinctions that occurred during the Pleistocene era. After the Pueblo Indians of the Southwest temporarily eradicated Spanish settlers in the 1680s, the horses came into the hands of several nomadic tribes, including the Comanche. The horse enabled “a new kind of nomadism, one that transcended human and canine power to carry things and did not require giving up all but the bare minimum of possessions,” “at once a hunting tool and a weapon, allowing its owner to both chase game and kill enemies more efficiently.” As horses moved northward, even as guns moved westward, converging on the Great Plains in a timely boon to Sioux ambitions. Having been excluded from a 1701 peace conference in Montreal, whereby the Iroquois and some three dozen other Amerindian nations settled their differences with the French, the Sioux felt betrayed by their erstwhile allies. For their part, the English, alarmed at the prospect of increased French control of North America and with their own intra-European disputes with their main rival, entered into a war with the French on both continents. “The West, including the Sioux country, became a sideshow.” The Sioux were forced out of their territory; what had been a policy of seasonal forays into the west became a permanent shift—or could so become, if the Lakota, the westernmost Council Fire, could manage their relations with the Omahas, Otoes, and other nations already settled on the Plains. 

    Having little to offer in trade, Lakotas resorted to warfare, centering on the river valleys of this arid region. “For Lakotas, river valleys were both havens and obstacles,” needed for survival but occupied by others. “This was the paradox of the grasslands: they were an immense reservoir of space and wealth that pinned people down” to “small ribbons of water and fertile earth.” “For the next half a century, well into the mid-eighteenth century, war would drive Lakota policy in the West,” as “Lakotas set out to conquer” the peoples that stood in their way in a “pitiless and protracted” struggle. Although their increased isolation from the other Council Fires interfered with coordinated foreign policy, each foothold in a river valley concentrated the Lakotas, enabling them to centralize politically and militarily; they did not have a modern state, but geography forced them to do by accident something of what statists in Europe had done as a matter of policy. Gradually, the fought and defeated not only the Otoes and the Omahas but the Poncas, Iowas, Suones, and Minneonjous. Refugees gathered in the Missouri River valley, perhaps as many as 50,000. In their newfound territories, the Lakotas “were feverishly trying to turn themselves into a true horse and gun powder” society, “but until they did, they would be dangerously exposed,” if their now-concentrated enemies allied against them. 

    To the east, the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713 reconfigured the geopolitics of the Great Lakes. The British obtained recognized rights to rule the area around Hudson Bay and to rule the Iroquois. The lower Great Lakes and the Ohio valley became a free trade zone where Indians could trade with either empire. Alliances with Indians in other areas remained a matter for competition. France was especially concerned about the lower Great Lakes, which linked the core of their New World holdings with the upper Mississippi and Illinois rivers. “Not only was Louisiana being severed from New France, but a door was opening for the Spaniards to ascend the Missouri and look for the Northwest Passage.” The Mesquakies, allies of the Sioux, occupied the area near Detroit; the French offered iron, guns, and military alliance to the Sioux, who abandoned their erstwhile friends, most of whom were then killed. The alliance did not lead to political integration, however, as the Sioux refused to conform to the way of life of the French and their Jesuit missionaries, insisting on the contrary that French settlers in Sioux territories “behave like, essentially to be, Sioux.”

    The French had little choice but to comply, especially since they sought a bigger prize. The Peace of Utrecht had barred them and the British from the “Spanish Pacific,” setting off a quest for the imagined Northwest Passage to the ocean. “A continent-wide French belt could isolate the British in Hudson Bay, open access to Mexican silver, and force the Indians to privilege Frenc traders over all the others,” additionally “bring[ing] France closer to China and its riches,” turning “the comparatively modest colonies of New France and Louisiana into pivots of a globe-spanning French Empire.” In this, the Cree, one of the nations still unconquered by the Sioux in the West, would prove an obstacle—unless the French could negotiate an agreement between the two nations. When the French couldn’t persuade the Cree to desist in raiding Sioux lands, they “directed them to attack the Lakotas” in the West, “apparently not realizing that this would draw the French into a conflict with the most numerous of the Sioux divisions.” Indian slave trading by the French meanwhile “alienat[ed] the very people they were trying to win over.” The struggle that ensued resulted in the Lakotas blocking further French advances in the West and in Sioux expansion into the Missouri River valley. The refugees there had another thing they wanted, in addition to land: horses, with which they could fight the remaining Plains Indians, the most powerful among them being the Crows. 

    To the east, the Crows remained a formidable rival, one of their chiefs declaring that the Sioux “were only good to eat.” To prevent that eventuality, the Sioux held back from attacking the French, preferring to use them as a source of guns and iron. This was “an extraordinarily difficult thing for their chiefs to do,” given a regime whose way of life required “retaliation to restore spiritual and emotional balance” when families lost kin. But by 1742, the policy of restraint paid off; when the governor of New France called another conference in Montreal, he made sure to invite the Sioux, whose demands he met. “The momentum of historical change was now on the side of the Sioux.” When, two years later, the British blockaded the St. Lawrence River, injuring French trade with the Indians, the Sioux remained prudently quiet, and when the war ended in 1748 the French strengthened trade ties with them. The Sioux agreed to allow the French to build three fortified trading posts on their territory as a convenience to both partners. The principal French trading agent, Paul Marin, “became a passionate advocate of the Ochéti Šakówin’s territorial integrity,” inasmuch as any imperial land grab would interrupt trade and prevent exploration in search for the Northwest Passage. His colleagues in Paris agreed, since the British were making inroads in the Ohio Country, threatening to cut off the Canada-Mississippi corridor. “The Sioux alliance was essential for French efforts to reverse the momentum,” which soon led to the French and Indian War, spiraling into the Seven Years’ War in Europe. The war enabled the Sioux to strengthen their foothold in the Missouri River valley.

    Hämäläinen pauses to admire Sioux powers of adaptation. Their “mythological hero,” Iktómi, is a shapeshifter. He wields the “rewarding and dangerous, unpredictable and uplifting” spiritual power to change course, including change political regimes, with changing circumstances. The Sioux conception of kinship as an ongoing regime change prevented them from thinking of families and clans as relatively fixed biologically-based entities; learn our language, accept our way of life, and you are one of us. “By the mid-eighteenth century the Sioux had shifted shape many times over.” They had forged an alliance with the radically alien French in the east while pushing into the Plains in the west. They now occupied nearly 100,000 acres of land, second only (among the North American Indians) to the territory controlled by the Comanche empire in the southern Plains. The Lakotas had shapeshifted more radically than any of the other Council Fires, becoming “the nomads and bison hunters of the prairie.” “Iktómi was guiding the Lakotas through a precarious metamorphosis, shifting shape with them in the vast new world in the West.” This, to the point of threatening their ties with the other Sioux: while the eastern Council Fires wanted peace with the Crees, the Lakotas attacked them as rival hunters. “Yet the Sioux endured as one people,” a “colossal force in the deep interior” of North America, precisely because they possessed their “startling malleability and ability to shift shape.” They ruled “a vast territory stretching from the upper Mississippi to the Missouri Valley” as “a central people who commanded attention and refused to be ignored.”

    Disastrously for the Sioux, the French lost the war, and the 1763 Treaty of Paris ruined their empire in North America, dividing the continent into Spanish territories west of the Mississippi, British territories to the east—all ‘over the heads’ of the Indians. The Lakotas continued to push west, fighting Crows and Pawnees and discovering the valuable Black Hills in 1776. Now, it was the British who saw them as an ally “who could deliver interior Indians behind Britain,” even as the Sioux “saw in the British an ally who could deliver guns for a fight against common enemies.” American colonists’ successful revolt against the British Empire freed Lakotas from any status as British cat’s paws, and they continued to win victories in the West against the Mandans and Arikaras, forcing them to abandon ancestral homelands. They also added another trade system, the St. Louis-New Orleans corridor, to their existing ties with Hudson Bay and Montreal; in both areas, they dealt with foreign merchants backed by imperial powers, enhancing their status as “a major center of geopolitical power” on the continent. In this, Lakotas and Dakotas alike could pool their knowledge; “the seven fires accumulated an exceptionally broad understanding of North America’s imperial and Indigneous landscapes,” with a “360-degree panorama of the continent and its peoples.” 

    But a new empire now loomed. The 1783 treaty ending America’s War of Independence had granted the United States rule over the Ohio Valley, confining the British to Canada. Americans now “claimed vast tracts of Indian lands, which settlers were filling with such fervor that [George] Washington believed nothing ‘short of a Chinese wall’ could restrain them.” It should be observed that the U.S. federal government enjoyed nothing like the power over mass immigration it would later acquire (even more than two centuries later, that power remains unsteady). What is more, for European powers and their former colonists to redraw lines on the map was one thing, actual control another. The Mississippi “was the master key to the continent, feeding everything—people, ambitions, commerce, violence, power—toward the center,” a “trunkline of an enormous system of naturally navigable tributaries” connecting “1.5 million miles of the interior to the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic circuits,” but it was hardly a secure boundary, especially since Spain, on its side “was an absentee landlord at best.” Recognizing this, the Spanish encouraged American settlement and trade in Louisiana, including the crucial city of New Orleans, hoping that they could make the emigrants “into loyal subjects who would defend Spanish Louisiana against other Americans.” In retrospect, the policy seems laughable, but at the time the Appalachian mountain range stood as a barrier to travel, threatening to split West from East, even as the slavery controversy nearly split South from North in the next century. The Spanish were counting on the United States remaining a country tethered economically to the Atlantic coast, with American emigrants tethered to the Gulf of Mexico. 

    As for the Lakotas, the Spanish considered them as the Americans of the north, potentially a buffer against encroachments on their territory from that direction. The Anglo-Spanish War of 1796 induced the British, in Canada, similarly to appeal to the Lakotas, hoping to send them down the Mississippi against the Spanish. The Spanish, controlling the Mississippi trade route, had the upper hand, however, and the Lakotas never invaded. “Lakotas needed the Spanish Empire to last.” Ally with the weakest; don’t ‘bandwagon’ with the strongest unless you have no realistic alternative: they understood this as well as any other people in the history of the world. “The late eighteenth-century Spanish Empire was weaker and more distracted than the French Empire had ever been, but if it survived, it could serve Lakotas well.”

    But it couldn’t, and so it didn’t. France’s soon-to-be emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, retaliated against the rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain, solemnized in the 1793 Jay Treaty, by purchasing Louisiana from Spain. He hoped to retake the trans-Appalachian region, or at least turn those American states into French allies. This also gave him the chance to reestablish their rule in Saint Domingue, to which he sent an armada of 50,000 soldiers, “the largest naval invasion force ever to cross the Atlantic,” to overthrow the rebel government headed by the ex-slave, Toussaint Louverture, who had exterminated the French colony there. In exchange, the Spanish would have French troops and settlers as a buffer against American expansion. Although the Jefferson Administration detested the thought of French rule over Louisiana, it feared slave rebellion in its own southern states, and therefore supported the French assault in the Caribbean.

    Foreshadowing the outcome of Napoleon’s imperial ambitions elsewhere, the ambitious plan collapsed in the face of yellow fever and Louverture’s army. Jefferson gave up on him, offered to take New Orleans off his hands (remarking to one correspondent that any foreign power controlling the port/chokepoint was ipso facto an enemy of the United States); knowing that the British still wanted to contain the United States to the eastern section of the continent, Bonaparte threw the rest of Louisiana into the bargain. “You have made a noble bargain for yourselves, and I suppose you will make the most of it,” the French negotiator, wily Talleyrand, accurately observed. Häkäläinen remarks that the Indians of the Louisiana territory thought it all “ludicrous,” but they proved mistaken, as American settlers overwhelmed them in a generation. Events in the South foreshadowed events elsewhere.

    For now, however, the Lakotas prospered. They “seemed to be everywhere in the upper Missouri country, trading, parleying, raiding, dancing,” “carrying countless men, women and children into captivity” as they sought to assimilate nearby nations. “Unable to contain Lakotas, smaller groups sought protection under their auspices.” The Lakotas had “shifted shape once again, now bending to the contours of the river that bestowed them with unprecedented power.” One important chief intoned, “We are seven bands and from now on we will scatter over the world, so we will appoint one chief for each band,” an ambition Häkäläinen is pleased to call “a distinctive intermesh of the sublime and the practical in the Lakota way of being.” A less charitable soul might call it a distinctive intermesh of the sublime and the ridiculous, but it would not have seemed so at the time, to the Lakotas and those they had conquered.

    President Jefferson was not done with continental expansion, sending Mssrs. Lewis and Clark on their expedition into northwest in 1804. “They were to inspect the flora and fauna” (very much in line with Jefferson’s scientific interests), “pioneer an all-water passage to the Pacific” (the dream of the Northwest Passage died hard), “end British dominance of the inland trade” (Jefferson’s Democrats had come to dominate national politics partly on anti-British sentiment), “harness the Missouri for U.S. commerce” (as part of the Mississippi-centered riverine system he had just acquired), “and project U.S. sovereignty into the West” (lest the continent continue to be a cockpit of warring nations, as it had been for millennia and as Europe would continue to be). Jefferson wanted friendship with the Indians, but under American sovereignty; the struggle for regime change was on. 

    More immediately, as he recognized, Lewis and Clark “must stand well” with the Sioux and the still-powerful Osages, “because in their quarter we are miserably weak”. But make no mistake, “Lewis and Clark were harbingers of empire”—specifically, what Jefferson called “the empire of liberty,” what Häkäläinen describes as “a new rational order [that] could be inscribed through a new science of remaking people and worlds”—James Madison’s “new science of politics” in tandem with the new, experimental science of Francis Bacon. “Jefferson, a republican purist who loathed the idea of a robust federal government, had launched a massive projection of state power into the North American West to mold its people into his model of an enlightened man—such was the hold of the Louisiana Territory on his imagination.” More precisely, such was the hold of the republican politics of the American branch of the Enlightenment on his mind. He was quite willing to see the future states of Louisiana and, by extension, the northwest territory, break off from the federal government, so long as they were organized as republican regimes that would maintain peace with the Mother Country.

    “Without fully realizing it, Lewis and Clark had stepped into a dynamic Indigenous world where power rested on rivalry,” as indeed power so often does. Such rivalry persisted not only between Lakotas and the other nations but within the Lakota regime itself, as in “times of crisis the entire Lakota society could realign around new political coordinates.” The explorers recognized one tribal chief at the expense of another, inadvertently ruining prospects of trade with a tribe that already enjoyed a solid place in the St. Louis commercial system. They thus took the slighted tribe as a barrier to their expedition, and were saved only by the Arikara nation, which wanted to get out from under Lakota dominance. An Arikara chief made it clear that “if Americans wanted peace and trade to flourish along the Missouri, they would have to first contain the Lakotas.” For their part, the Lakotas saw that an alliance among the Americans, the Arikaras, and the neighboring Mandans and Hidatsas might indeed contain them, and they wanted none of that. By building Fort Mandan, Americans “won entry into the greatest trading citadel of the northern Great Plains.” “Lewis and Clark wanted the Mandan trade for the United States, and to have it they needed Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras to form an alliance—and denounce the Lakotas.” As the Lakotas responded by tightening their hold on the Missouri Valley, the two rival empires readied themselves for conflict. Lakotas “welcomed America’s merchandise but not its paternal embrace; they had accepted the Americans as traders and potential allies,” initially, “but not as their sovereigns.” Indeed, “no Indian nation had done more to undermine the Jeffersonian vision than Lakotas.” Lewis and Clark completed their expedition, having “learned much more about the flora and fauna” of the region “than about Lakotas who remained a specter-like menace to them,” misunderstanding their new rivals as “an organizationally shallow robber regime that preyed on weaker, less mobile, and less capacious people who lacked their propensity for swift violence.” They did in fact so prey, but organizationally shallow they were not. They were an empire, not an empire of liberty in the natural-rights sense but an empire securing independence from other empires and of rule over the small. “Lakotas had transformed the Missouri’s longitudinal section into an imperial valley through diplomacy, persuasion, and raw military force. Almost all the people Lewis and Clark tried to win over were already in Lakota orbit as allies or dependents. Instead of delivering Native peoples into the U.S. fold, Lewis and Clark muddled through the Lakota Meridian as also-rans.” After they departed, the Lakotas treated with the Blackfoot Confederacy on their ever-flexible western boundary, beginning a shift towards “the vast animal-rich plains around them,” far beyond their imperial core.

    They also made overtures to the British in Canada, offering an alliance to “confront the new white nation now encroaching on Our Lands,” as one chief put it. Americans countered with the Zebulon Pike expedition, which went up the Mississippi River in order to find its source, to “clear British traders from the area, and negotiate land sales with Indians.” Pike didn’t find the source of the Mississippi, but he did find the other main Sioux Council Fire, the Dakotas, who hunted for British markets and fought with the Chippewas over beaver trapping stakes. Dividing in order someday to rule, Pike allied with the Mdewakantons, a subset of the Dakotas, built a fort, promising a trading post nearby, and established U.S. sovereignty to his satisfaction. Americans would soon find that fur traders were welcome, U.S. government forces not so much. The Lakotas continued to consolidate and extend their own empire, under their own regime.

    In the War of 1812, the Dakotas allied with the British, their trading partners, while the Lakotas remained neutral, taking care not to ride the wrong horse. As it happened, “Britain would never again seriously interfere with American ambitions of continental expansion.” Lakota prudence enabled them to resume their empire-building as soon as the war was over, fighting the Crows in the west, negotiating with Pawnees and Kiowas in the south, and keeping watch on the formidable Comanches, horse-warriors whose nomad-imperialism resembled their own. The Lakotas still “did not feel safe out in the open,” but they continued to foster their horse herds while envying the Crows and Cheyennes, who used the Black Hills in the same way the Lakotas used the Missouri Valley, as a safe hub for expansion into the plains. 

    Not to be outdone on the diplomatic front, Americans invited the western Indians to a parley at a site just north of St. Louis in the summer of 1815. There, they made treaties with six nations, including the Lakotas, making them all American protectorates. Or so the Americans supposed. The Sioux delegates “probably” understood the treaty “as a confirmation of the prewar status quo whereby Americans traded with them without dictating to them.” The United States established Pike-founded Fort Snelling along what is now the Minnesota River as their military and economic hub. This redounded to the economic benefit of the Lakotas, as settlers from Kentucky and Tennessee came into the lower Missouri Valley, displacing the Osage traders there and inadvertently pushing Amerindian commerce upriver, “delivering a bonanza for Lakotas,” as American fur companies competed with each other for their trade. This enrichment better armed them to fight Crows and Hidatsas, and by 1832 the Lakotas had eliminated the Arikaras from the upper Missouri. A further boon from the Americans came that year, the smallpox vaccine, which Congress had ordered to be distributed among the Indians to save them (in the words of the legislation) from “the destructive ravages of that disease.” This further detached the Sioux from British traders and agents, and it enabled them to maintain their population at approximately 20,000, while more westerly tribes declined in the wake of the epidemic. 

    More ominously from the Lakota perspective, Americans also built Fort Pierre in 1831, after a flood had shifted the channel of the Missouri River. It would later become the capital of the state of South Dakota.

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Voegelin, Hitler, and the Germans

    May 22, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Eric Voegelin: Hitler and the Germans. Edited and translated by Detler Clemens and Brendan Purcell. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999.

     

    In the summer of 1964, a generation after the conquest of Nazi Germany by the Allied troops, Eric Voegelin gave a series of lectures at Munich University on the question of German responsibility for the rise of Hitler’s tyranny. After all, the Nazi Party won a free and fair election in 1933, even if without a majority of the votes. And Germans increasingly supported the new regime Hitler installed, their enthusiasm peaking in the middle of 1940, with the successful blitzkrieg on France. How could these things happen? And once the war was over, Hitler and Nazism defeated and rejected, a new republican regime founded in the western section of Germany, had Germans truly come to terms with themselves? Or did the trials and convictions of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg leave the average German feeling exonerated? What about ex-Nazi functionaries who found government jobs in the apparatus of the new republic? Were not the hundreds of anti-Jewish acts of vandalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s profoundly troubling evidence that Nazi ideology still had its adherents among Germans?

    Voegelin advises his students to begin their study of political science not with abstract principles but with “the concrete political events you’re familiar with,” basing “your investigation on the political experiences and knowledge you have in daily life, in order to ascend from there to the theoretical problematic.” “Hitler’s rise to power [is]the central German experiential problem of our time. How was it possible? What consequences does it have today?” Hitler’s rise to power must be understood “in connection with the disposition of the German people, which brought Hitler into power.” What was that disposition and, “concretely, what happened in the different classes of the population?” 

    These historical questions mattered now because anti-Jewish sentiments persisted and because major German industrial firms, including IG-Faben, Krupp, and Siemens, used the available slave labor in the concentration camps, in which people “were completely worked to death and then incinerated.” Many of the top executives in those firms now were top executives then. 

    Voegelin tells the students that impeding your task of understanding of German complicity in the Hitler tyranny, then and, in a subtler way, now, stands a pile of “ideological junk.” Not only Nazi ‘race science’ and Marxist ‘class struggle’ but the principles of positivism, progressivism, and modern liberalism can prevent you from seeing matters clearly. These ideologies derive from “German philosophical language” first developed in the eighteenth century by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant. Such words as ‘intellect,’ ‘spirit,’ and ‘reason’ do not mean what they meant in the philosophical language of Plato, Aquinas, or today in the Anglophone world. The word ‘reason’ in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason does not mean the same thing as Platonic logos; Hegel’s Geist isn’t the Holy Spirit you meet in the Bible. The Greek philosophers’ nous or intellect and the Bible’s ruach (in Greek, pneuma, in English, soul) have a very different resonance than their apparent equivalents in modern German philosophy.

    How so? To understand the change, Voegelin argues, you must first overcome “a whole series of clichés” or shibboleths you have likely picked off the ideological junk pile. One such cliché is the phrase, “the unmastered past,” referring to Germans’ failure to come to terms with Nazism. “There is no unmastered past. What is past, is past. There are only unmastered presents.” ‘The present’ means “two different things”: the moment between past and future “on the line of time in the world”; and “the present in the sense of presence under God,” life as lived sub specie aeternitatis. When action isn’t judged “as action in the world under the orientation of its presence to God,” the present is unmastered. Germans have yet to master the present, have yet to judge their actions in the past as they have played out in the present as witnessed and judged by God. To master the present in this sense means that one can neither transfer guilt from you who are young onto your fathers, or (as seen in some ancient peoples) transfer the sins of the fathers to the sons, punishing the sons for the sins of the fathers. God tells His prophet, Ezekial, “all souls are mine”; each soul is responsible to Me for itself. “Each one of us is obliged to be just.” There is no “collective guilt,” in the sense of intergenerational guilt.

    There is, however, another quite valid meaning of collective guilt. Human beings live in societies; societies act through their representatives; if those representatives do evil, “even those who have nothing to do with the representatives’ misdeeds, have to bear, along with them, the consequences of these misdeeds, whether they are guilty or not.” If a society “chooses criminal imbeciles and crooks as representatives, then the society as a whole is in a very unpleasant situation.” Are Hitler and his political party solely responsible for genocide and for triggering the Second World War? No, and that leads to a further problem, very much a present reality in the Germany of 1964: the partitioning of the country into the republican West and the Communist East. Surely, “no responsible statesman in the East, whether Polish, Czech, or Russian, can, after all that this country has done, contemplate with equanimity that Germany should again become a great power.”

    Therefore, “our problem is the spiritual condition of a society in which the National Socialists could come into power.” Nazi rule reflected the souls of Germans, “among whom personalities of the National Socialist type can become socially representatives.”

    In the nineteenth century, in the wake of the philosophic revolution initiated by Wolff and Kant, German society “moved politically under the shadow of power politics,” as Bismarck moved to unify some 37 sovereign German states. Kant himself was a republican, as were many “intelligent people” in Germany, but after the failure of the revolution of 1848 those people “withdrew from politics” and Germans generally became politically passive. German liberalism, such as it was, became “nationalistic and chauvinistic.” This pseudo-liberalism died with Kaiserism at the end of the First World War. But the Weimar Republic that replaced the Kaiser Reich also failed. A genuinely liberal society, a society consisting of citizens who took on the responsibility of liberty, did not develop, although “it could have developed if the people had been a bit more intelligent than they were.” And today, in still another republican regime, Germans live “in the shadow of the occupation by the American and Russian armies,” the shadow of Cold War power politics. As a result, we Germans still lack any empirical, any experiential, “knowledge of what free Germany, in the sense of a Germany that gave itself a representation without being in the shadow of power politics, would look like.” Such representation would be twofold: “existential,” with a ruler or rulers who act(s) for the society in external and internal matters, the actual ruler(s) of the people; and “transcendental,” the degree to which the ruling element or politeuma “represents the transcendent order of the divine.” 

    Given this dual classification of “the sources of authority”—human and divine—three “propositions” arise, propositions “which are in contradiction with one another.” First: “Whoever has the power to shake the world, as Hitler did, is not contemptible” in his accomplishment, however contemptible he is as a man. Authority includes power, although it isn’t reducible to it. Power can’t be waved away, dismissed as a triviality. Second, “whoever shakes the world, even though or because he is irrational, is not contemptible.” He is dangerous, a destroyer of something better than himself. Third (and “most painful[ly], for us”), “a world that allows itself to be shaken by an irrational man is contemptible.” Paradoxically, then, “by the success of his contemptibility,” Hitler “has unambiguously proved the contemptibility of the world in which he had success”—an “eminent achievement.” Not only German society, unaccustomed to democracy in the sense of self-government, of political liberty, but “the surrounding Western democracies, have begun to rot spiritually and rationally in such a way that they are taken in by a man like Hitler and make possible his success.” Hitler’s success in this regard surprised even Hitler himself, confirming in his own perverse soul the rightness of his estimate of the world and his actions against it. The previous year, Percy E. Schramm had published Hitler’s Table Talk, an account of Hitler’s conversations (mostly monologues) with his inner circle. “They reveal in a completely open way his contempt for the people he had to deal with,” and his contempt was not ill-founded. “That is why Hitler’s remarks on this very point are of the highest value in a critical analysis of the period; and it is just for that reason that they are not welcome.” They point to uncomfortable truths about the Germans, who followed Hitler.

    To the clichés of “mastery of the past” and “collective guilt,” Voegelin adds “the State” as defined by Hegel. Hegel regards the State as the supreme manifestation of the Absolute Spirit, and thus the supreme authority on earth. Voegelin brings his students down to earth. When you consider the State, what you really want to know is whether its officials know what they are doing, whether they are energetic in the performance of their duties, whether they have at least some minimal degree of moral probity, not “whether the state is the reality of the moral idea.” That is, “in politics we have to do with human things,” indeed human beings, persons. “If in place of the men who are the representatives, we put the state as cliché” the way Hegel does, “then we have already got completely away from political reflection.”

    Then there is the matter of the regime, the form of government prevailing in the state—in West Germany, democracy. Here, Voegelin rejects what he calls Aristotle’s regime theory, classifying regimes into the rule of the one, the few, and the many, with democracy of course being the rule of the many. In fact, Aristotle also defines regimes into moral categories: good and bad rules of the one, the few, and the many. Voegelin does that, too, but with a continued focus on bringing his students to see reality. He first quotes George Santayana, who wrote that “Democracy is the unrealizable dream of a society of patrician plebeians,” a regime in which the many are themselves good, as (genuine) aristocrats are. He then quotes Winston Churchill, who “defined democracy as the worst form of government with the exception of all the others.” That is, realistically speaking, democracy will not be “patrician” or virtuous because democrats are not especially good; this notwithstanding, monarchs and ‘the few,’ neither genuinely aristocratic, behave even more badly than the people do. For his third quote he turns to Mark Twain, who said that democracy depends on three factors: “freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them.”

    In Voegelin’s rendering, the consequence of these three mots is the need in politics, very much including democratic politics, for courtesy, compromises, concessions to others. “Whoever has a fixed idea and wants this to be carried into effect, that is to say, whoever interprets freedom of speech and freedom of conscience to the effect that the society should behave in the way that he considers right, is not qualified to be [a] citizen of a democracy.” By contrast, genuinely “political interplay,” which Voegelin calls patrician (the Greeks, the Romans, and the English would say ‘gentlemanly’), may be seen specifically in Aristotle, who defines politics itself as ruling and being ruled in turn. “It is based on the fact that one thinks a lot about what the others do, but does not say it; that one is always aware that in the society there is more than one good to achieve, not only the good of freedom, but also the good of security, the good of welfare, and that if I specialize in one or other of these good, I could thereby bring the whole society into disorder, because I could destroy the balance between the realization of good on which the society is based.” Such single-minded concentration on one good leads to irreconcilable factions, as in reaction to my hard single-mindedness you will engage in “counterhardening,” bringing about the impossibility of social cooperation.” No democratic regime can endure without prudence, practical wisdom. Voegelin is teaching the new generation of Germans how to think politically, a way of thought occluded by both the prevalent philosophic theories and the political practices prevailing in Germany for nearly two centuries.

    It is only with a sense of ‘the present’ reality in this concrete sense that one can ascend from practice to theory. Voegelin now turns to the pre-modern and Biblical understanding of humanity and its enemy, “radical stupidity”—the sort of stupidity that permits tyrannical rule. What is man? And “what are the symptoms of the falling down and the derailment of man?” Once again, in asking these questions he directs his students to pay attention to concrete circumstances in which these questions arise.

    Concretely, then, “When was man as such discovered? and “What was he discovered to be?” In Hellenic society, philosophers “experienced” man as a being constituted by nous or rational intellect. In Israelite society, man was experienced as constituted by pneuma or spirit, as a being “to whom God speaks his word,” “a being who is open to God’s word.” “Reason and spirit are the two modes of constitution of man.” This means that “man experiences himself as a being who does not exist from himself” but rather lives within “an already given world,” a world mysteriously given, present, a world that raises the question. Where did this world, and I, Man, within it, come from? “Dependence of existence [Dasein] on the divine causation of existence [Existenz] has remained the basic question of philosophy up to today.” In Leibniz’s formula, Why is there something rather than nothing? and Why is the something as it is? 

    Man has wants. Most distinctively, he wants to know. To want is to love, and “the loving reaching out beyond ourselves toward the divine in the philosophical experience and the loving encounter through the word in the pneumatic experience” amounts to a “participation in the divine.” “Insofar as man shares in the divine, insofar, that is to say, as he can experience it, man is ‘theomorphic,’ in the Greek term, or the image of God, the imago Dei, in the pneumatic sphere.” This is what is meant by the claim of “human dignity.” In abandoning this quest, man stops participating in the divine, gives up the distinctively human activity, and so this “dedivinizing” of man invariably causes his “dehumanizing,” the loss of his dignity. Whenever an individual or group of individuals closes himself, itself, to the rationally divine or the pneumatically divine, they also close themselves to reality, to the ground of being which supports the beings, including human beings.

    And so we read in Novalis, “The world shall be as I wish it!” In that phrase, “you have the whole problem of Hitler.” The world is not as we wish it, and is highly unlikely ever to be such. As human beings, we are as much ‘givens’ as the world is. To take the classification of human types Aristotle proposes, a classification first set down by Hesiod, the best man “considers or thinks through all things,” teaches himself; the second-best man “listens to the best,” learns from them; the least impressive man neither thinks for himself nor learns from those who do. The best man is truly free because he “lets himself be led by his own nous.” The second-best man is partly free, inasmuch as he follows reason without fully exercising it. The ‘last’ man (to borrow a later philosopher’s term) Aristotle calls the natural slave, Hesiod calls the useless man. Voegelin rejects these terms because the Greeks tied these terms to what they took to be a natural social hierarchy, although not necessarily the conventional one. To avoid confusion, to acknowledge the fact that slavish, useless men exist “at all levels of society up to its highest ranks, including pastors, prelates, generals, industrialists, and so on,” he deploys the term “rabble.”

    The rabble are stupid and illiterate. By stupidity, Voegelin means the condition in which “a man, because of his loss of reality, is not in a position to rightly orient his action in the world in which he lives.” Not guided by intellect or spirit, consequently out of touch with reality, this man “will act stupidly.” In Hebrew, this man is the nabal, the fool, who causes “disorder in the society” because he refuses to obey God’s revealed Law. For Plato, this is the “irrationally ignorant man, the amathes (literally, the unknowing one), who either “does not have the authority of reason or who cannot bow to it.” For Aquinas, he is the stultus or fool, combining the Hebrew nabal and the Greek amathes. He is an illiterate man, not in the sense of being unable to read or write but a one who lacks the language needed to characterize “certain sectors of reality,” the things that require either theoretical or practical reasoning. “They do not get it.” 

    In Germany, such illiteracy “runs through the elite.” It lends itself to manipulations of language—lies and propaganda. Such was the way of the Nazis, who employed the tactic of telling the truth once, thereby gaining credibility, then lying believably ever after. For example, “in the Thirties, in Germany, there was a saying, in constant use, that the National Socialists had never touched a hair on anyone…. But that was about the only thing they did not do,” and it wasn’t long before they were touching plenty of hairs on plenty of heads, too. Nazis did that in their diplomatic ventures, too, beginning with their just complaints about the real damage the Treaty of Versailles had caused Germany, then fabricating a series of false justifications for acts of aggression, all of them supposedly taken to redress Germany’s just grievances. Even in postwar Germany, courts have excused “various concentration camp murderers” on the grounds that “under the given conditions of German society it was not possible for a man to recognize a crime as a crime.” 

    “How does a man bring himself to commit crimes, and at the same time dispute he ever committed them, and still be honest?” It is quite possible, thanks to stupidity. It is surely true, Voegelin concedes, that under circumstances of extreme disorder, “qualities such as cunning, craftiness, and violence are indeed necessary in order to preserve one’s life and to prevail, and whoever lacks them is incompetent and perhaps may perish.” And under orderly conditions, such qualities become symptoms of stupidity, since “a man who behaves in this way will be socially boycotted.” As Aristotle would teaches, “stupidity is always to be understood in relation to the social and historical context” in which you think and act. 

    In his 1937 essay, “On Stupidity,” Robert Musil identified here two kinds of stupidity: simple stupidity or lack of understanding and the higher stupidity, intelligent stupidity. The more interesting, higher, stupidity comes from hubris or “spiritual arrogance.” “The spirit now becomes the adversary, not the mind.” Much earlier, Schelling had called this “pneumopathology”—not psychopathology or madness but “sickness of the spirit,” a closing off of the mind from God (from “the ground of Being,” as Voegelin likes to say) caused by a refusal to train the intellect on what it naturally wants, the truth. The opposite spiritual quality, Anstand, quite often appears not in the elites but in the middle classes (the class Aristotle wanted in the polis because it moderates the greedy few and the envious many). Honesty, diligence, cleanliness, reliability, moderation: these are the modest virtues of a regime within the overall regime, a way of life that keeps intellects open to reality. These virtues can be misdirected, however, as a Nazi functionary, the man who ‘only follows orders,’ may exhibit them. This is “the problem of the simple man, who is a decent man as long as the society as a whole is in order but then goes wild, without knowing what he is doing, when disorder arises somewhere, and the society is no longer holding together.” As a ‘second-best’ man without the best men to guide him (whether in the form of living persons or in the written words of wise teachers and lawgivers), this “citizen par excellence” will careen into evil, without intending any such thing or recognizing that that is what’s happening to him.

    As for the higher, intelligent stupidity, it is the province of the elites, the educated, the sort of people who served in the German parliament and gave Hitler the power to enact laws without their consent. Such persons are sophisticated in the literal sense of the word—entangled in their own sophistries. They lack prudence, deceiving themselves. 

    “There is no right to be stupid.” German elites have indulged in stupidity in part because German philosophers have deranged the philosophic quest, and German theologians have joined them in their derangement. Stupidity issues from derangements of the spirit. Deranged spirits revolt against God, revolt against the ground of Being. “In the classical and Christian sense,” the will is the voluntas of Aquinas, “always and only the rationally ordered will.” The “classic Christian” term for human intention that separates itself from reason and spirit is libido as in Augustine’s libido dominandi or Aquinas’s concupiscentia. This “existence-powerful desire” is, however, what German philosophers, notably Fichte and Nietzsche, call the will. When people call Hitler a strong-willed man, they take on the now-characteristic German definition of the term. But in classical and Christian terms, “there is no willpower in Hitler at all,” no “existence that was ordered by reason or spirit,” only “an extraordinary existence-intensive libido,” which “he maintained up to the end.” In him, “reality and experience of reality are replaced by a false image of reality,” one he insisted was reality, and which came into “constant conflict” with reality itself, culminating in his suicide beneath the rubble of the capital city. [1]

    How, then, did Hitler come to tyrannize the Germans? Some, he simply misled. Cut off from the teaching of the churches, many Germans responded to what later generations would call Hitler’s ‘charisma’—itself a perversion of a religious term. Such persons are analogous to those who understand the wise at second hand, but instead of heeding right reasoning they heed the only thing that can replace right reasoning: the libido. “The one who reacts only to power succumbs to the aura of the existence-power that radiates from Hitler.” Those who retain “a certain spiritual rank” do not succumb. Voegelin recalls the women who sat in the front row at the Nazi rallies, fascinated by his sheer energy and by “the aura of the blue eyes.” It is not a uniquely German phenomenon, as in the America of the Forties girls swooned at Sinatra concerts, although in those instances they may have been paid. The example of later ‘rock concerts’ may be a more just analogy, although even that stupidity is often enhanced by drugs.

    “The tragedy of the German character,” so to speak the birth of tragedy in Germany, comes into relief “when this filthy rabble comes into power” and “the culture is finished.” Against genuine intellectual and spiritual culture arises the cult, the Hitler cult. Voegelin describes Hitler’s ideas on religion as “those of a relatively primitive monism”—a set of beliefs based not on God but nature ‘scientistically’ understood. In this, it resembled the positivism of Auguste Comte, except that the science was biology, not sociology. The German zoologist, Ernst Haeckel—a distinguished zoologist but wretched theorist—founded the Monist League near the beginning of the century, calling it “the monistic church,” whose underlying doctrine was “the omnipotence of the law of matter.” He adhered to a version of ‘race science’ which held that the several human ‘races’ evolved separately, a claim which he appended to Social Darwinism. Hitler drank it all in. Looking at him, and also the likes of Lenin and Stalin, Thomas Mann wrote, “Never before have the powerful, the makers and shakers of the world’s affairs, taken it on themselves in this manner to act as teachers of a people, indeed of mankind.” Napoleon and Bismarck, for example, founded new states with new regimes, but they didn’t think of themselves as beings marching in History’s vanguard. Hitler wanted “to get his own way,” no less than they did, but in all areas of human thought and practice. He never read philosophy or great literature, but why, in his mind, would he? In principle, he already knew everything, so reading was only a matter of extracting information or ideas that could be fitted into his “world-view.” “There is absolutely no question of learning from reality,” as he already had his ‘values.’ A book is, “so to say, a rubbish heap from which one pulls out relevant things”; “the entire area of the spiritual and rational, which is based on meditation and reproduction of meditative experience, is systematically excluded from perception.” And so, for example, in reading (or much more likely, reading of) Heraclitus’ aphorism, “War is the father of all,” he took this to be an early statement of Social Darwinism, the ‘survival of the fittest,’ and said so in a 1942 speech to young officers of the Wehrmacht. Adding Haeckelian ‘race science’ to this, Hitler had his imperative to make war against Jews and Slavs. 

    Where, in all this, were the real churches? They, too, had allowed themselves to sink into pneumopathology. Voegelin begins by distinguishing the several meanings of the term, ‘church.’ First, it means the Evangelical and Catholic Churches of Germany “as social institutions”; it also means churches in other countries, also as such institutions. There are also supranational institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church. There is “Christ’s Church,” a “collective term for all ecclesial institutions that confess themselves as Christian, and there is finally the corpus mysticum Christi, which includes all human beings “from the beginning of the world to its end.” In terms of the first definition, in the 1930s almost all Germans were ‘churched.’ These churches were intended to be “nothing other than the representation of the spiritual transcendence of man.” In this sense, there could be no separation of church and state because church members and citizens were the same people, the same Germans, “only with different representations, temporal and spiritual.” This means that Germans’ “spiritual and intellectual disorder” afflicted both churches and the state. 

    “Loss of reality had already taken place within the church itself,” as “contact with the reality of man in his individuality as theo-morphes, and thus his real human nature, had got lost.” This happened, initially, because the churches in Germany no longer (in some instances, never had) recourse to classical philosophy, with its understanding of human nature as noetic. “This picture of man in classical philosophy was never available in Germany because of the parallel decline of university philosophy,” which had taken up Wolff, Kant, Hegel and the Romantics instead of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas. Practically, this meant that the churches, since they did not uphold the right understanding of man, inclined to defend their own “institutional, cultural-political interests” while remaining “indifferent to the interests of man.” Their criticisms of National Socialism remained on this superficial level. 

    For this reason, the churches were also blind to the character of Nazism and Communism. “It was characteristic for Germany that contact with the temporal reality of politics was not established by humanism, Renaissance, natural law, and Enlightenment, but through German Romanticism and irresponsible chatter about Volkstum,” as seen in the writings of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn. The nationalism or ‘folkishness’ of the German Romantics had closed German churches to the universality of the Christian teaching. 

    Voegelin finds this pathology more readily among the Evangelical churches because their theologians are entitled to interpret the Bible freely, and so their teachings are not “disguised by the iron discipline of the organization,” as they are in the Catholic Church. With only rare exceptions, such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, evangelicals in Germany quite openly mixed Christianity with ‘race science,’ and particularly anti-Semitism. “This is why…from the ecclesiastical side, Hitler was able to come to power: because the very ones the people relied on for their spiritual guidance told them to vote for Hitler and obediently voted for Hitler themselves,” having “no spiritual organ for perceiving the problem posed by National Socialism.” Moreover, and ominously, “this situation of decadence, predating Hitler and National socialism, has not essentially changed since Hitler.”

    Intending to preach from the Bible but blocked from understanding this by the pile of intellectual and spiritual detritus that had accumulated for more than a century, Evangelical pastors in Thirties Germany often cited Romans 13, in which the Apostle Paul tells Christians to obey the divinely ordained powers of Caesar. Voegelin recognizes this command as a borrowing from Stoicism: “The idea is that of a hierarchy of authorities in the cosmos, where God is in the highest place, in the lower places are the authorities in society, in the lowest place is man himself.” It implies that the imperial government “in fact obey[ed] and sanction[ed] the moral law in the Stoic sense.” It does not imply “that one should be subject to any authorities whatsoever, let alone…that one should have to be subject to the authorities even when they do evil.” Voegelin suggests that Martin Luther, in basing his understanding of the Gospel on the words on the page alone, missed the political circumstance in which Paul wrote, inadvertently distorting his meaning. Paul was writing to “persons in the Christian community” of his time “who misunderstood the freedom of the Christian under God as meaning that one no longer has to obey the ethical order of society”—antinomians. But if, as Paul goes on to say, the fullness of the law is love, in social terms love of neighbor, then this “is not very different from Aristotelian politics,” which identifies “the fundamental ethic of the political community as the philia politike in the spirit, the homonoia, the noetic virtue,” as constitutive of the right political order. The Christian addition to this order is agapic love, love of the person ‘unconditionally,’ as one says nowadays, as a fellow creature made in the Image of God. To those who complain that this is too ‘unselfish,’ that it neglects the need to protect oneself and the political community from evildoers like Hitler, whom Christians must also love, the Christian may well reply that I can hate the sin while loving the sinner, and therefore must oppose the sinful acts of the sinner out of love for the sinner. At any rate, “all of this has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with one having to be subject to any kind of authorities—above all, naturally, nothing to do with having to comply with the Hitler laws,” as Evangelicals and Catholics alike commanded.

    Whereas German Protestantism tends to be open to science—or rather to opinions about science, including race pseudo-science—Catholicism tends to be open to philosophy. As a result, the German Catholic Church denounced Nazism before the Nazis took power but accommodated it afterwards, in a show of false prudence, but not a theoretical capitulation, as with Protestants. “Under the pretext that the church as against neopaganism but had really no objection to an authoritarian regime the matter dragged on for some time.” The Gestapo became suspicious: Might not the Catholic Church be doing what it had done in other countries, “adapt[ing] itself to the outer forms and thus use camouflage to work its way in,” going so far as “speak[ing] of Jesus as the Führer”—a horrifying apostasy in the eyes of any dedicated National Socialist, who held there to be only one Führer, Adolf Hitler, with none before him.

    The Catholic Church in Germany tread lightly, opposing Nazi policies of sterilization, euthanasia, attacks on baptized Jews, but “not in a very intense form.” To make sure that his students would not be tempted to suppose that the concentration were ‘not so bad,’ Voegelin read passages from Karl Kraus’s uncompromising 1933 anti-Nazi satire, Die Dritte Walpurgisnacht, which accurately anticipated the enormities the new regime would commit. [2] Among the very few Catholic clergymen who diagnosed the underlying problem was Father Alfred Delp, who wrote, “We are somehow lacking the great courage that comes, not from hot blood and youthfulness nor unbroken vitality”—the ‘vitalism’ or life-worship of Nietzsche, vulgarized by the Nazis—but “from the possession of the Spirit and the consciousness of the blessing we have received,” the courage that comes from knowing that we act “before the sovereign God.”

    For his part, Voegelin sees that today “there is no revival of philosophizing in the church.” Attempts to supplement Catholic Church doctrines with such current intellectual fashions as “positivistic sociology or psychoanalysis or existentialism” fail to recover the Church’s “intellectual order” because these fashions partake of the reality-denying ‘philosophy of freedom’ that shouldered Thomism aside. Instead, the Church should return to its fundamental principles, abjuring pride, recognizing that it is “by the grace of the Word man will be elevated above his nature,” not from anything he does himself. Thus, “Christ is the head of the corpus mysticum” and “not the president of a special-interest club.” Further, the Christian’s elevation above his nature by grace “does not relieve one of the duty of being a human being”; it does not make you into a god. Nor does it elevate those who wield state power into gods, contra the misreading of Romans 13, or make rulers into the fathers and mothers God commands us to honor. Similarly, the nation isn’t a god and German Romantic nationalists aren’t fathers of the Church. In all, when Jesus tells us, “Blessed are the poor in spirit” He does not say, “Blessed are the weak in the head.” Only the weak in the head and the arrogant of spirit will imagine that Jews are less than human; only they will fail to say with the prophet Ezekial, “If you warn the wicked to turn from his way, and he does not turn from his way, he shall die in his iniquity, but you will have saved your life.” Voegelin cites Aquinas, who understands Christ as the head of all men, not only of Christians. Moreover, “the presence under God, and the presence of God in the world,” means that “all of mankind is a member of the corpus mysticum in the sense of inclusion in God, as he realizes himself in history.” No one church, not even the one that calls itself catholic, can set itself up “as the one and only corpus mysticum.” “This ghettoizing tendency,” Voegelin writes, recalling the mistreatment of Jews in Germany, and elsewhere, with Kraus-like satirical intent, really ought to be resisted by every Christian church, given the creation of Man as the imago Dei. Philosophers are not exempt from this stricture, either, as the human being as characterized by intellect and spirit, “the one who is immediately understanding” reality, “is always only one individual human being, and whether he is a prophet or a philosopher makes no difference.” Theologians and philosophers, clergy and laity, need to think about politics, but this time with intelligence.

    Thinking intelligently about politics is hard for modern men. The greatest political philosopher, Aristotle, thought about politics within the polis, a small political community in which political speech and political actions were more easily heard and seen. We moderns “do not have a polis anymore” but a large and complex nation-state. As for the spiritual life, the first giving of God’s Word occurred in one nation, now scattered, with no “determinations of any kind about how a society should be organized, not even that of the chosen people.” [2] Nor did Jesus leave instructions on how to organize His ecclesia. 

    Early Christians met the problem by inserting Ciceronian natural law “into the Christian idea of order in the world.” Political order therefore entails not only the Covenant at Sinai or the Sermon on the Mount “but also the philosophic insight into the nature of man and the ideas of human and social order arising from it, as they were taken over from the pre-Christian philosophic complex.” But this caused the Catholic Church to take on “the role of guardian of natural law,” a role clergy are not “particularly suitable” to undertake. “For all the propositions of the natural law derive from the noetic experience, whereas within the church the noetic experience is not the primary source of experience and truth for clerics and theologians, but is replaced by the pneumatic experience of revelation.” This circumstance inclines clergy to denature and deform “a very considerable stock of knowledge of order coming from philosophy…because it had to be inserted into a complex of pneumatic symbols of revelation not intended to establish the order of temporal society.” In contemporary Germany, this led to the well-meaning but risible attempt by Social Democrats who wanted to get rid of Marxism, replace it with natural law, but had no source of information on natural law than the Catholic Church. 

    Having offered his critique (and not in the Kantian or Marxist sense) of German philosophers and churchmen, Voegelin turns his attention to the German lawyers. Their faults also predated Hitler and also “are still here today.” Their faults result from the doctrine of legal positivism, which locates right not in God or in nature but in human laws. Legal positivists claim that the law is the law, and that is all there is to say. But “if the question about who makes the law is eliminated, then you again have the situation of rabble-like demoralization,” which ignores the question of the order that frames the law, the criteria of justice. This makes it “psychologically impossible to rebel, if the content of the positive law, that is to say, of the laws, is criminal.” If the sociopolitical order, the regime, itself becomes corrupt, you will need good laws more than ever but be even less capable of framing them. “If the men are corrupt and not capable of law and justice, or if they proffer some kind of ideology under justice, then, of course, one cannot have any legal order.” 

    The history of law in modern Europe ranges from Jean Bodin’s argument in favor of putting all legislative power in “the hand of the prince”—thereby excluding authorities outside the state (pope, Holy Roman Emperor) or inside it (legal guilds) from lawmaking—to the replacement of monarchic regimes with republics, with popular sovereignty, to the separation of powers that prevents any branch of government to make a law “without the others.” This history confirms that it is the ethos, the character of the political society, and it alone, that finally determines whether laws will be just, and whether good laws will be justly enforced. But under legal positivism, that point is fatally obscured. Even in the Federal Republic, where law is said to be based upon the “dignity of man,” described as “inviolable,” one can find no suggestion within the legal code regarding what that dignity consists of, how a legal violation of it might be identified, were one to occur. “It is very fine if one protects the dignity of man, but what happens if men degrade themselves? There is no protection from the state against that.”

    As the arch-surrealist, Lenin, once pointedly asked, What is to be done? Voegelin summarizes his main theme. There is a “first” reality, the actual moral, social, and political condition human beings face, the one he had directed his students to consider in his opening lecture—reality here and now. There is also a “second” reality, a mythical condition that seeks to replace it. Sancho Panza sees the first reality, Don Quixote imagines and wants to impose the second. “If there are enough people who believe some tomfoolery then this will become a socially dominant reality, and whoever criticizes it moves into the position of the buffoon who must be punished.” “I believe that what I imagine is in fact really so,” and, on the receiving end, so to speak, if the authorities say it, it must be so. Thus, language becomes “a second reality within which one operates, without having the relation to the first reality.” Voegelin sees this in the writings of Heidegger, devotee of what he called the inner truth and greatness of Nazism. Although “it is certainly not Heidegger’s intention thus to characterize language as second reality…he has in fact done that.” That is why he and his followers are “no longer thinking in relation to reality.” Under such circumstances, “words acquire their own existence; language becomes an independent reality in itself,” as seen in German Romanticism. A century later, ‘modernist’ literature (he has in mind Gottfried Benn, among others) partook of this “highly concentrated imbecility.” And after Heidegger, beyond Voegelin’s critique of Heidegger, thinkers calling themselves ‘postmodernists’ have performed much the same trick on themselves, although the more cynical ones have limited the con to those they intend to subordinate. Under the aegis of the second reality, “political conviction is understood as a kind of slit in an armored car through which one glimpses only arbitrary facets of reality.” Instead of noetic perception, one adopts a ‘worldview.’

    “Aristotle had defined nous as the core of personality. If man doesn’t love his core, and thus his own self, he has lost contact with reality.” This kind of self-love in no way conflicts with Christianity, inasmuch as “Love your neighbor as yourself” means you are right to love your self, insofar as it partakes of you as an imago Dei. And love of your self as an imago Dei implies love of “the divine.” 

    The philosophic revolution effected by Hegel was followed by four German thinkers “of world rank”: Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and Weber.  They shared three traits, regarding man in terms of passion and conflict, not reason and political order, unmasking moral principles, now demoted to the status as ‘values,’ as masks for interests and instincts, and an aversion to the ordinary citizen, especially the bourgeois. But “even if Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche thoroughly murder God and explain him away as dead, divine being remains eternal and man must still get on with living his life sealed by his creatureliness, and by death.” All such attempts “to transform [man] from the imago Dei into an imago hominis” conflict “with the first reality, whose order continually exists.” The “world-immanent apocalypses of history created by Kant, Condorcet, Comte, and Marx” never quite happen. When these false apocalypses of the gods that fail, “there arises the phenomenon of disillusionment,” the “suffering of Godforsakenness” experienced by Nietzsche, who grasps not for reality but for yet another surreality, the Superman. And even this brings no final consummation, only the endless cycle of Nietzsche’s ‘Eternal Return.’ 

    Among these thinkers, Voegelin thinks best of Weber, who has at least the sense to despair at the condition of modern man. For Weber, since there no genuine purpose of human life, and no “dimension of the vita contemplativa” that could discover one, “the life of reason has sunk to nonreality, replaced by the world-immanent activism of science”—Voegelin-speak for the fact that science progresses, new discoveries “superseded in thirty to forty years at most,” but the progress is pointless. True, Weber “thought he possessed the recipe for the solution of evil: The sights of a value-free social science should and could educate the revolutionaries to a sense of responsibility by making them aware of the consequences of their action.” This hope makes Weber un homme sérieux. He nonetheless “suffers from the false attitude” of one who wishes for moral responsibility without asking, ‘Responsible to whom? To what?’ “As a result we find in him an extreme spiritual sensitivity, which recognizes the falsity and wishes to resolve the tension, but no definitive breakthrough.” In the end, he cannot “break through the closure and turn back to openness toward transcendence.”

     

     

    Notes

    1. On the highest level, Nietzsche, in valorizing the ‘will to power,’ suffered because “he knew what reality was” from reading Pascal. “The constant debate between Nietzsche and Pascal is stimulated precisely by his recognition of genuine reality in Pascal and his knowledge of himself as having a false idea of reality and that he constantly lived in this tension between the image of the swindle he is pursuing and the reality he admires in Pascal.” To assuage the tension, he lied to himself, since “it is necessary to lie constantly” in order to cover up the truth. Far below Nietzsche, in between Nietzsche the philosopher-tyrant and Hitler the ideologist-tyrant one finds the “swindling petty bourgeois” man, in the Nazi regime the orders-following bureaucrat, unaware of the swindle, lying in “good conscience” to himself and to others.
    2. This is an unusual claim, given the very extensive legal code Moses brought down from Mount Sinai. Voegelin probably means that the Mosaic Law aims primarily at fixing moral limits and rites of worship for Israelites, not ruling institutions as such. 
    3. The Third Walpurgis Night wasn’t published until 1952, as Kraus, an Austrian Jew, feared retaliation by the Nazis against German Jews, few of whom had had the chance to flee the country. Among many other thrusts, Kraus called the language deployed in Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda, “Germanogibberish,” and wrote of the Führer himself, “Hitler brings nothing to my mind”—a succinct remark on the tyrant’s nihilist core.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    The Holocaust Reconsidered

    May 10, 2023 by Will Morrisey

    Tzvetan Todorov: Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps. Arthur Denner and Abigail Pollak translation. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.

     

    In his account of the Spanish conquest of Mexico and the Caribbean, Todorov, a self-described moralist, deployed the instruments of ‘postmodernism’ to arraign the Spanish Crown and the Spanish Catholic Church. Upon examination, postmodernist instruments proved a weak reed. Serious moral critique needs more than ‘deconstruction’ in the service of ‘intersubjectivity.’ [1] By the time he turned to the Nazi genocide, Todorov may have reached the same conclusion, as he now engages in more straightforward moral reasoning, based on Kant—using a German against the Germans, as it were.

    He begins not in Germany but in Poland, with books on the Warsaw Ghetto revolt of 1943, in which Jews attacked the Nazi occupiers, and the Warsaw Rising of 1944, when Poles attempted the same thing in an attempt to seize control of the city before the oncoming Red Army could take it. Both attempts failed, heroically.

    Warsaw 1944 consists of interviews conducted by Jean-François Steiner with survivors of the Rising. “I was actually reading a reflection on heroism,” but “what exactly is heroism, I asked myself.” He associates heroism with the exercise of free will in defiance of “the status quo.” Further, the hero is an ‘idealist’ in the sense that he tends to believe that if he can dream it, he can do it. Poles fought the Nazis not for the sake of saving the people of Warsaw or Polish territory but in defense of “an abstraction called Poland” or, more accurately, an idealized person, for Poland conceived as the sister of the Blessed Virgin. More concretely, “it was not the Polish people who had to be saved but, rather, certain qualities of theirs: their will to freedom, their desire for independence, their national pride”—without which Poles would have risked, in the words of one resister, “a terrible moral collapse.” And not only Poland: the invading Russian communists threatened the West, civilization, humanity itself. Polish self-sacrifice can “stir the conscience of the world,” resisters believed. In Todorov’s estimation, “nothing less than the absolute can satisfy these heroic spirits.” 

    The cardinal virtues of heroes are fidelity and courage. The hero stands alone because “family and friends, by their very existence, make him vulnerable,” threatening to make his self-sacrifice a sacrifice of others. Before going to war, he must kiss them goodbye or bid them farewell with one last drink at the bar. He may well miscalculate. In Poland, the Soviet forces held back from supporting the rebel Poles, allowing the Germans to quell the insurrection at the price of 200,000 Polish lives, the deportation of 700,000 more, and the destruction of Warsaw, later rebuilt along the lines of the squalid, Soviet-style architecture which comported with a squalid, Soviet-style regime. But “for a Pole,” one survivor declares, “it is better to die than to be a coward,” and better to be dead than Red. Todorov doubts that such heroism can extend very far, since if everyone is dead, who will remain to live for Poland? He exaggerates somewhat, however, when he claims that “to the hero, death has more value than life” because one can attain the absolute, a humanly unrealizable ideal, only by dying. Rather, most of the Poles who rebelled regarded their sacrifice as a way, under the circumstances the only way, to Polish freedom. Still, it is true that at least one fictional hero, and not a Polish one, can cry, “Prize me no prizes, for my prize is death.” [2]

    Todorov prefers the more cautious and (at least many times) saner route. After all, “one can act like a hero for fear of seeming a coward,” feeling “a particular kind of fear, the fear of being afraid,” along with the fear of being shamed by the heroic ones. Critics of the insurrectionists described them as suicides, men “who sought refuge in a glorious death because they didn’t have the courage to face the difficulties of life”—life, it must be added, under Soviet tyranny. Todorov stands for prudence, although he never uses the word: “One needs to anticipate the consequences of one’s decisions while keeping in mind the actual course of events, not merely what one wishes would happen.” If you would be a hero, emulate wily Odysseus instead of raging Achilles.

    Todorov distrusts the hero’s Manicheanism. “In Warsaw of 1944, it was not simply the forces of good and evil that confronted each other but the Russians and the Germans, the Home Army and the People’s Army, the government in exile and the civilian population. In circumstances this complex, reaching the best solution—in this instance, unfortunately, merely the lesser evil—requires a careful consideration of all sides rather than unswerving loyalty to an ideal. The values of life are not absolute values: life is diverse, and every situation is heterogeneous. Choices are made not out of concession or cowardly compromise but from a recognition of this multiplicity.” The weakness of such prudential thought and action is that “it does not lend itself well to stories,” by which Todorov means the stories of heroism that inspire faithful and courageous action, which is needed (one should add) if prudence is not to devolve into mere pragmatism or self-interested calculation. The ideal may unrealizable but it serves as a standard, and quite possibly not a dispensable one.

    The Jewish Ghetto Rising occurred in a different set of circumstances. Here, Todorov avails himself of the account in Shielding the Flame, a conversation between survivor Marek Edelman and Hanna Krall. Although at the time Edelman thought of himself as heroic in the classic sense, he now saw that “All it was about, finally, was our not letting them slaughter us when our turn came.” The Warsaw Jews know they are going to be killed by the Nazis, so they might as well go down fighting, taking some of the enemy down with them. Todorov calls this second stance an instance of “ordinary virtue,” as distinguished from “heroic virtue.” Ordinary virtue vindicates human freedom. It is animated not so much by fidelity and courage as by a sense of “dignity,” the “capacity of the individual to remain a subject with a will,” confirming his “membership in the human race.” “For the hero, death eventually becomes a value and a goal, because it embodies the absolute better than life does. From the standpoint of the ordinary virtues, however, death is a means, not an end; it is the ultimate recourse of the individual who seeks to affirm his dignity.” Todorov thus partakes of the modern philosophy of freedom, regarding the free will rather than reason as the distinctively human characteristic. [3] The second anchor of ordinary virtue is “caring,” the attempt not only to respect oneself but to help others—not generalized or ‘abstract’ others (nation, civilization, humanity) but other individuals. Hiding the refugee, shielding the body of a child. 

    Why did the Polish Home Army not reinforce the Ghetto rebels? The Jewish witnesses ascribe this not only or even primarily to Polish anti-Semitism but to “the pro-Soviet position of the Jews,” many of them socialists but almost all of them (quite understandably) hating the Jew-hating Nazis more than the bourgeois-hating Soviets. For its part, the Home Army “was just as hostile to Stalin as it was to Hitler”—also understandably, as Stalin no less than Hitler intended to destroy Polish independence and subordinate the Poles in his empire. The Soviets acted the same way during the Warsaw Uprising, knowing that it “was directed as much against them as against the Germans.” Calling this “the logic of resentment,” Todorov asserts that in both instances “ideological conviction took precedence over concern for protecting human lives.” The problem with this argument is that the ideological convictions of the persons endangered, the persons calculatedly not helped, were themselves murderous. Jewish preference for Soviet tyranny as against Nazi tyranny remains readily understandable, but was it good for Poland (Jewish and non-Jewish alike)? Polish detestation of both enemy regimes was justifiable. This may be seen in the fact Todorov cites: “the anti-Soviet forces” in 1944 did not really threaten the Soviets. But the Soviets refrained from intervening because they wanted to weaken the Poles, the better to take over Poland in order to advance their ideological cause. That “the anti-Soviet Polish forces were not really threatened by the Jewish rebels” in 1943 is much more likely true, although the Poles surely would have been threatened had the Jewish rebels sided with the Reds, opening a dangerous second front after the Nazis had been defeated. And had Polish Jews welcomed the Soviets at the expense of the Poles (whom they had little reason to trust), who is to say that the Soviets would not have turned on them, once the Poles had been brought to heel?

    Todorov’s prudential reasoning rests on more solid ground when he considers the logic of Warsaw Jews in rebelling. This was indeed “a sane reaction to a policy of systematic extermination”; “every day, the Nazi occupiers of Warsaw sent a trainload of victims”—most of them Jews—to the Treblinka concentration camp, “to be killed on arrival.” Warsaw Jews chose the manner of their deaths, being sure to die, one way or another. “The uprising in the Warsaw ghetto must be respected not so such because of its display of heroic virtues but because it was the right political answer to desperate circumstances.” Exactly so.

    Aristotle would recommend against examining such an extreme circumstance in order to understand ordinary virtue. Todorov insists that one can learn about such virtue precisely when it is under the most pressure. “My intent is to use the extreme as an instrument, a sort of magnifying glass that can bring into better focus certain things that in the normal course of human affairs remain blurry.” One might go farther still: the egalitarianism of democracies lends itself to moral relativism, to blurriness in principle. Democrats incline to be ruled by their desires, by neither logos nor thumos.

    As “the extreme of our political life, modern tyranny or “totalitarianism” puts the now-characteristic European regime of democratic republicanism into sharper relief. Totalitarianism’s animating sentiment is terror, the sentiment modern liberalism, beginning with Hobbes, seeks to guard against. In both the totalitarian regime as a whole and its concentration camps in particular, the enforced confinement under pain of death, the reign of secrecy, the strict social hierarchy (in the name of egalitarianism), “the implication of everyone in the functioning of the machine,” the “corruption of the soul under constraint,” and the “constant presence of violence and death” all serve the intention of ruling by means of terror. 

    Todorov is a moralist, but hardly a self-righteous one. On the contrary, “any reflection of mine on the subject of the extreme that did not implicate me personally and draw on my own experiences was likely to be a futile exercise.” He had himself lived in Bulgaria, under a communist regime in the Soviet empire, until his mid-twenties. This “gave me my first intimate encounter with political evil, but as something done by me, not to me.” Like the subjects of tyranny everywhere, he too had walked the walk laid out by the regime in “mute acceptance of the status quo.” “For this interpretation of the lessons of totalitarianism and the camps, I alone will be responsible.”

    In the extreme circumstances within these extremist regimes—heroic in their own perverse way, aiming at the realization of such unrealizable if malignant ideals as racial purity or worldwide communalism—in the concentration camps, many victims struggled only to survive, abandoning all moral convictions. But others did not. “Matters of conscience are not at all rare in extreme situations, and their very existence attests to the possibility of choice, and thus of moral life”; the regime or way of life of the camps did not obey “only the law of the jungle,” as much as its rulers wanted it to. Free will continued to exert itself, and with it the ordinary virtues. The tyrants organized the camps in particular and their regimes in general according to “the principle that the behavior of the individual depends not on his own will but on the conditions surrounding him, that life is a war of all against all, that morality is no more than a superficial convention.” Marx and Nietzsche alike had subscribed to such moral fatalism, and even some of the survivors of the camps continued to think they were right. But on the contrary, the endurance of ordinary moral virtue in the camps proves “that moral reaction are spontaneous, omnipresent, and eradicable only with the greatest violence.” Hobbes’s state of nature is not natural but must instead be forced upon us. “Except under extreme constraint, human beings are prompted, among other things, to communicate with one another, to help one another, and to distinguish good from evil.” The ordinary virtues remain the middle ground between the desire for self-preservation at any cost and the heroic choice of death at the expense of life. It isn’t so much that “moral life was superior in the camps” but that “it was more visible and thus more telling there.” “I examine both sides of moral life—the virtues, ordinary and heroic, and the vices, ordinary and monstrous. Finally, I attempt to analyze our responses in the face of evil.”

    Todorov identifies the ideal of the hero as excellence—seen in Achilles, who embodies “the model of heroic perfection,” but not so much for the purpose of the war, which is to avenge the theft of Helen by the Trojans. Physical strength, physical and moral courage, and energy comprise this ideal; glory is its reward—a name that will not die when the hero does. For Achilles, “the choice is between a life without glory and a glorious death.” In “choosing death over life,” he elevates himself above ordinary mortals, who cringe at the prospect of dying. The Christian equivalent of the hero is the saint, a person of “spiritual strength” who, “like the hero, rejects compromise.” Todorov goes too far in claiming that the saint’s love of God “leav[es] no room” in his heart “for a comparable love of his fellowman.” If Jacobus de Voragine’s Golden Legend tells us of saints who push family members aside in order to martyr themselves, it does so because de Voragine would inspire us, too, to love both God and children; his saints set an example for their children as well as for us. Combining the heroism of the ‘ancients’ with the saintliness of the Christians, the knight of the Middle Ages lived by the code of chivalry, indeed “a very different model from that of Achilles” but still animated by “the aristocratic virtues and the concept of honor.” 

    Against all of these high-toned human types we see Benjamin Franklin. “With the triumph in Europe of the ideology of individualism toward the end of the eighteenth century, the heroic model falls rapidly out of favor,” replaced by the man who “aspire[s] to personal happiness or even, quite simply, to a life of pleasure.” Less impressive examples than Franklin include such fictional characters as Julien Sorel and Emma Bovary, figures who have, as Todorov drily remarks, “little in common with Achilles and Antigone.” “For the world of the Greek heroes is the opposite of modern democracy.” 

    Todorov identifies “two ideological models” which “preside over the sphere of human interactions” today: public figures will point to military careers, fine ’causes’ fought for in war or in peace—heroic virtues for the middle class; in the private sphere, the ordinary virtues—including but not restricted to what are now called ‘family values’—constitute the ordinary virtues of life lived in the quotidian. Although Todorov has deprecated the heroic virtues, he recognizes that they have their place, as when a war really is just. “From the minute it became clear that there was no other way to contain Hitler, going to war against him became the right choice,” and in such a war, “I prefer Churchill to Chamberlain, de Gaulle to Daladier.” But since “war is not the continuation of peace by other means,” and “the fact that many people believe otherwise is one of the major proofs that the history of the world does not obey the laws of progress,” “sending heroes into retirement once the war is over may be less an expression of ingratitude than a mark of lucidity.” Oddly, he gives Churchill and de Gaulle as examples of such sensible conduct: “left in power” after World War Two, “they might have become dangerous.” In fact, both returned to power after the war, Churchill not dangerous but ineffective, probably a bit too old for the job, de Gaulle not dangerous but (for the most part) beneficial, the founder of the Fifth Republic. At any rate, he prefers the heroism of Sacha Pechersky, the Odysseus-like leader of an escape from a Nazi extermination camp, and the saintliness of Father Maximilian Kolbe, who offered himself as a substitute for a man designated for death by starvation in Auschwitz. “Sometimes, heroic behavior” has been “subordinated to the welfare of real human beings.” Todorov is more comfortable with the defense of persons than with the defense of England or of France, while continuing to respect the defenders of England and France.

    With respect to the ordinary virtues of dignity and caring, totalitarian regimes seek to eradicate both. “We decide how long you stay alive and when you die, and not you!” the guards shouted at the prisoners in the camps. They sought to sever the connection between the dignity of human freedom and the dignity of actions supporting freely chosen moral principles. In this sense, then, the ‘philosophy’ of modern tyranny counters the modern philosophy of freedom. Something more than freedom alone suffices to make a conviction moral, however. While it is true that the Nazi, too, may act “in accordance with his convictions,” his convictions themselves are rotten. “Moral behavior requires more than harmony between acts and ideals; it requires also that those ideals not work against the good of humanity.” 

    Caring in the camps sometimes took horrifying forms, as when nurses killed newborn children to save the mothers from execution by the Nazis for the ‘crime’ of giving birth (the children would have been murdered, anyway). Women generally “survived the camps better than men did” because caring was the virtue tradition had instilled in them. “The women were more practical, more likely to help one another than were the men,” whereas “the men were more likely to deaden themselves, to become hard and indifferent, to turn on one another.” Todorov distinguishes caring from solidarity, which he associates with caring only for ‘one’s own’—family, friends, countrymen. In this way, he separates politics, the realm of solidarity, from morality, the realm of caring for human beings as such. With caring, “the choice is made according to criteria other than nationality, profession, or political persuasion; each person who is cared for is deserving in an of him- or herself.” Nor is caring charity, which cares even for those one does not know, one who can never reciprocate the gesture. Nor is caring sacrificial, as heroism or charity can be: “the giver can hope to receive benefits in return, should the roles be reversed.” Caring entails mutuality in a way that heroism and charity do not. 

    Todorov knows that moral life consists of more than sentiments alone, whether heroic, saintly, or ‘ordinary.’ There is also the life of the mind, whether it aims at the search for truth, the search for the beautiful, or both. Even in a concentration camp, one might seek out the truth “not simply because it can help one survive or because it can help others fight a hateful system but because unearthing the truth is an end in itself.” In law, in philosophy, and in religion alike, there is merit in being a witness. “This is the paradox: stories of evil can create good” because “to observe, to remember, and to pass on to others what one has seen is already to take a stand against inhumanity,” “one way of remaining human and, for that reason,” to commit “an act with a moral dimension.” It is of course true that the single-minded pursuit of the life of the mind can go wrong, as in the seriocomic example of Todorov’s father, whom Todorov suspects of welcoming the Communists’ takeover of Bulgaria because, as a librarian, this would mean “the modernization of Bulgaria’s libraries.” At least the old man’s purpose wasn’t harmful in itself, as everyone is familiar with Werner von Braun’s rocket science in the service of Nazi Germany. In such extreme cases, Rousseau’s well-known complaints about the corrupting influence of the arts and letters actually make some sense. 

    In considering the heroic/aristocratic, intellectual/philosophic, and democratic/’ordinary’ virtues, Todorov ranks them not according to the ‘postmodernist’ categories he once upheld, but in terms of the categorical imperative. Unlike the other virtues, “caring is by its very definition coincident with the moral stance that hold other people to be ends in themselves, whereas for the life of the mind this engagement with others is optional, and when dignity is at stake, the subject’s welfare can be an altogether extraneous issue.” He thus distinguishes “the morality of sympathy” from “the morality of principles.” A principle abstracts from the particulars, something “by definition universal,” but sympathy “is a sentiment one feels as a direct result of someone else’s experience,” whether it takes the form of compassion at the sight of suffering or of “vicarious joy” at the sight of another’s triumph. The quest for justice is a quest to act in accordance with a principle or perhaps a set of rules. The ‘social justice warrior’ may in practice rescue people or run them over with a truck. Indeed, moralism, as distinct from morality, “consists of practicing justice without virtue, of simply invoking moral principles without feeling that they apply to oneself,” of demanding justice without being just. “To say that one is in favor of morality is not a moral act; most of the time it merely signifies conformity or a desire to live at peace with one’s conscience.” Subscribing to morality is like subscribing to a magazine; it doesn’t mean that you read it. Unlike principles, “action cannot be generalized.” It always affects specific persons and things. 

    And so, it’s easy “to denounce slavery” when and where it no longer exists. “There is nothing moral in speaking out against slavery today; all it proves is that I’m in step with my society’s ideology or else don’t want to find myself on the wrong side of the barricades,” and “something very similar can be said about condemnations of racism, although that would not have been the case in 1936 in Germany.” When pursuing justice, one does well to think less of one’s moral perfection, more of what is right for the others. Moral perfection in matters of justice may at most number among the side effects. 

    What can happen when ordinary people, with their ordinary virtues, find themselves plunged into the extreme condition established by the extreme regime, modern tyranny—the concentration camp? “In the literature of the concentration camp, evil is the main character.” Arendt was right: the evil of the camps was indeed “banal” in one sense. The guards were mostly not sadistic or fanatical; “they followed the rules.” In the words of Vasily Grossman, “The new state did not even require servants—just clerks.” “To call this evil banal is not to trivialize it; precisely what made this evil so dangerous was that it was so easy, that no exceptional human qualities were required for it to come into being.” Its very enormity was possible only because its component parts were small, easily assembled and maintained. The ordinary virtues had been countered by ordinary vices, by what one writer calls “the cold, systematic manner of the military ‘categorical imperative.'” To explain the camps, one needs not a psychological but a political explanation, an account of the regime that established them. “The societal trait that allows such crimes to be carried out is totalitarianism, the only attribute that Nazi Germany shares with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and China.” The human beings within those regimes were “no different from any others; what sets them apart is the political regime under which they lived.”

    The characteristics specific to that regime are: identifying ‘regime enemies’ not only in foreign countries but ‘from within,’ whether it be the race enemy of the Nazis or the class enemy of the Communists; establishing the state as “the custodian of the society’s ultimate aims”; and (consequently) establishing state rule over “the totality of the individual’s social existence.” The enemies held up by modern tyrannies are not simply critics but “absolute” enemies, “embodiment[s] of evil,” elements against whom one is said to have a moral obligation not merely to criticize but to make war against. By “making itself the sole arbiter of which ends are to be pursued,” the totalitarian regime enables its subjects to “take comfort in being relieved of personal responsibility for their decisions” while “demand[ing] that [they] restrict themselves in thought and deed to instrumentality,” treating “every action as a means to something else rather than an end in itself.” This enables ordinary people to pervert their ordinary virtues to the service of evil ends. The concentration camp guards “were not deprived of a moral sensibility but provided with a new one.” A regime change always does that, for evil or for good. Todorov recalls that in Bulgaria the exercise of ordinary virtues at home and among friend seemed an escape from “totalitarian control over at least one part of our lives,” but in doing so Bulgarians gave “the state free rein to regulate our social existence, which is to say, our lives as a whole.” “We were consolidating the power of the regime itself.” 

    This explains not only why most Jews didn’t revolt against the Nazis—they were a minority trapped among Germans who were hostile or indifferent to their calamity—but also why “a billion Chinese [are] not in revolt right now.” “Once the totalitarian system is in place, the vast majority of the population—people like you and me—are at risk of becoming accomplices in its crimes,” “fall[ing] into behaviors they understand are evil.” We “prefer to forget Kolyma and Auschwitz…because we fear discovering that the evil of the camps is not alien to the human race” or, more uncomfortably, to ourselves. “Evil is not accidental; it is always there at hand, ready to manifest itself. All it needs to emerge is for us to do nothing.”

    What of the persons ruling in the regime? On the lower level, “there was no guard who was wicked through and through,” as all “seemed subject to constant shifts in attitude and temperament,” cruel one moment, kind the next. This suggests no mental illness, no clinical ‘split personality,’ but rather the absence of the rule of reason—an absence itself the effect of the overall regime, founded upon pseudoscience and animated by terror. True, as everyone has noticed, a guard might torture a prisoner while listening to Bach—people “with university educations could be every bit as cruel as the illiterate”—but “a sense of morals” is hardly “something one learns at universities.” And again, famously, many of the guards were good ‘family men.’ “My impression is that these individuals needed to fragment their lives in this way so that no spontaneous feelings of pity might hinder them in their ‘work,’ and also so that their admirable private lives might serve as a counterweight, at least in their own minds, for the things that may have troubled them about their professional activities.” At the top of the regime, Todorov remarks, Lenin was the same way, a man of “sensitivity, delicacy, gentleness, courtesy” with those he did not deem his ‘class enemies.’ Even Stalin is said to have had his jovial side and Hitler loved his dog. In Germany, “it was up to the Führer to decide an objective, and for everyone else to mind his or her own area of expertise. This is the totalitarian subject’s standard way of thinking.” Each person concerned himself “with only one small link in a vast chain and seeing their task as a purely technical problem.” The bureaucratic structure of the totalitarian state gave institutional form to this way of life, reinforcing “this absence of feelings of responsibility” and the workings of conscience. James Madison emphasized exactly the critical importance of responsibility in government, holding up the American regime as reformed by the 1787 Constitutional Convention as a model of a set of institutions that enforce strict responsibility upon the persons who occupy public offices. Hitler’s regime, all of the modern tyrannies, aim at exactly the opposite effect: Give your soul to me and get on with your assigned tasks. It is easy to see why so many Nazis regarded themselves as innocent of all wrongdoing. And insofar as the republics have given themselves over to bureaucratic rule, one sees some of the same moral effects.

    Chief of those effects is depersonalization. Crucify not your body for the sake of the souls of others; crucify your soul for the sake of the nation, or of communism. “Totalitarian doctrines can thus properly be called antihumanist,” anti-Kantian. Do not act as if a person be used as an end in itself, but always as a mere means. “Far more than any sadistic or primitive instincts, it is depersonalization, of the other and of oneself, that is responsible for totalitarian evil.” In this sense, the policy of stripping prisoners naked and starving them was a way not only of subordinating the prisoners but of getting the guards to treat them like animals. Similarly, give them numbers to replace their names; kill them en masse, not in small groups or individually; identify them in terms of some impersonal category (‘Jews,’ ‘kulaks’); herd them into gas chambers, so as not to see them die. Hitler wished that Germany had a religion like the Japanese “who regard sacrifice for the Fatherland as the highest good,” or Islam, which “would have been much more compatible to us than Christianity.” 

    I was only following orders, was the famous excuse. “Someone who only follows orders is no longer a person. The originality of totalitarian crime resides precisely in this possibility.” As the Nazi governor-general of Poland phrased it, “Act in such a way that if the Führer knew of your action he would approve it.” Hitler is your new god. On the Soviet side, Pravda means ‘truth’; if the newspaper Pravda says so, it must be true. The truth is spoken into reality, parodying the Book of Genesis. Husbands and wives believed the ‘Word’ of the ruling Party more than they believed the testimony and character of their spouses. Joined with bureaucratic compartmentalization, ideological indoctrination transformed persons so much “that they could suspend their usual responses to fellow human beings.” And although Nazis and Communists alike valorized honor and loyalty in words, “what the totalitarian regime calls loyalty is really nothing other than the ordinary vice of submission.” Courage? “Totalitarian pseudoheroes know only one form of sacrifice, that of others, while they themselves take pride in having enough fortitude to watch the ordeals of their victims without trembling!” Hitler knew it, too, “never miss[ing] an occasion” to sneer at old-fashioned Prussian rectitude and to scorn the chivalric tradition. The tyrant is no aristocrat but a ‘democrat’ in the Tocquevillian sense, one who intends to level all others beneath himself and his ruling ‘apparatus.’

    If all that need be done to permit such a regime to emerge is to do nothing, what shall one do? Democratic regimes in the ordinary, non-Tocquevillian sense—democratic and commercial republics—do help. They foster “ideological pluralism,” lessening the danger of “fanatical indoctrination.” Religious conviction, too, can thwart ideology, although Todorov draws the line at Christian pacifism. He cites the example of the Dutch pacifist, Etty Hillesum, who acted under “two imperatives: forswear hatred of the enemy and fight evil in oneself rather than in others—that is, with moral, not political means.” If I see “no resemblance” between myself and my enemy, I am “destined to resemble [my] enemy.” While such “moral action can perhaps be more effective than we think” (he cites some impressive but limited examples), “there are times when taking up arms is the only appropriate responses,” as when “Hitler’s armies are streaming across borders.” “In fighting Hitler (and hence for justice) we are not imitating him: he is fighting for injustice.” Indeed, “might a position like Hillesum’s even facilitate the spread of evil”? True, Jesus tells us that His Kingdom is not of this world, that His followers will join Him in it, someday. But while we remain in this world, we need the prudence of serpents as much as the innocence of doves. “The most effective barrier to the political fact of totalitarianism is itself political: an active democracy concerned with both individual freedom and the advancement of the common good, tolerant of criticism and transformation from within but at the same time intransigent toward democracy’s real enemies.” Moral actions are indispensable for the maintenance of republics, but republic give moral intentions freedom of action.

    Resistance to tyranny in combat carries moral risks. “If the only change is that those who were hunted become the hunters, then the new kingdom,” the regime that emerges after the war “will not be so new after all.” (This was precisely the problem de Gaulle addressed, successfully, and is the theme of one of Churchill’s best books, The Aftermath.) “Persecuting the persecutors does not erase the debt; the debt in fact is increased.” Here again, the very justice Todorov had said is no virtue returns, as he tells his readers, “Take a stand against evil and fight it out of a sense of justice, not hatred.” When it comes to postwar trials begin by distinguishing “between legal guilt and moral responsibilities,” between those who “actually committed the crimes and who alone are properly the concern of the judicial system” and “the passive spectators who are responsible at most for not coming to the aid of those in danger and thus who need answer not to the courts but to history or their own consciences” or, one might add, to God. True, under totalitarianism “all are involved in maintaining the status quo and thus all are responsible,” but “at the same time, all are subjugated and act under constraint.” When regime “pressures are truly great, our judgment of the individual must take them into account.” As for the criminals, the main thing is to delay judgment, whether stern or lenient, until the truth of the accused’s conduct has been fully brought out. “There is a vast difference between leniency and concealing the truth”; as the great jurist Francisco de Vitoria understood, “justice is not just a question of meting out punishment” but “also involves bringing the truth to light.” 

    Those whose business it is to bring the truth to light bear a unique responsibility. Heidegger, Schmitt, Jünger, Benn: “one cannot ignore the role, and hence the responsibility, of certain currents of thought in the rise of totalitarian regimes,” such currents as “anti-universalism” (i.e., exalting one race, class, or nation above all others), “hyper-determinism” (the claim that ‘race’ or ‘class’ or ‘gender’ or, animating them all, ‘History’ determines character and conduct), and “conflictualism” (the exaltation of warfare as ‘the supreme law of life”). Todorov engages in no ‘more-virtuous-than-they’ finger-pointing, here. “If I had stayed in Bulgaria, I would have spent the next thirty years writing half-truths,” inasmuch as “one of the most striking characteristics of totalitarian regimes” is that “everyone becomes an accomplice,” everyone “both inmate and guard, victim and executioner.”

    Nor should those still further removed from direct responsibility for tyrants’ crimes exonerate themselves. The peoples conquered by the Nazis during the Second World War and those conquered by the Soviets afterwards at times “show[ed] a marked complacency toward what was taking place on their soil.” The French, for example, who provided a safe haven from Communism, “ought to be grateful to Eichmann and his colleagues for having chosen Poland as their extermination ground.” Had they chosen France as the site for the camps, “we might have learned yet again that, as Napoleon said, the word impossible is not French.” Those countries that did shelter Jews (Denmark and Bulgaria) or at least did not turn them over to the Nazis (Greece, Yugoslavia) combined “the absence of deep-seated anti-Semitism in the population” with “the willingness of a few politicians to make courageous decisions and stand by them.” As for the citizens of the free countries that remained unconquered, they did very little to oppose the tyrants in the years before the world war. “News of the Nazi death camps leaked out early on,” and “there was never any lack of information” about the Soviet gulags, “even as early as the 1920s.” Shamefully, both Great Britain and the United States feared that Hitler might expel ‘his’ Jews instead of killing them, throwing them onto their own shores. And of course, one must not discount the fear of war, both in the aftermath of the First World War and in the aftermath of the Second. Too, there was no shortage of intellectual and journalistic apologists for the tyrants, especially for the Communists. Men like Albert Camus, who “dared to mention a network of concentration camps as the very foundation of a presumably Socialist system, were vilified and ostracized by their colleagues.” In all, “most onlookers, whether close or distant, let events take their course.” “They knew what was happening and could have helped but did not.”

    It being “beyond human strength” to “take upon ourselves all the suffering in the world, ceasing to sleep peacefully so long as there remains somewhere in the world even the slightest trace of injustice,” we will need to confine ourselves to more modest efforts. One of these is to listen to the witnesses of modern tyranny, “so that the truth can be established,” but more than that to understand: “Our memory of the camps should become an instrument that informs our capacity to analyze the present,” to “recognize our own image in the caricature reflected back at us by the camps, regardless of how much this mirror deforms and how painful the recognition is,” a recognition that “contains lessons for us, who think we live in a completely different world.” It isn’t completely different, since human nature hasn’t changed and since tyranny is still with us, as seen in China and ‘post-Communist’ Russia. 

    Does such understanding preclude just judgment? “I couldn’t disagree more. If I try to understand a murderer, it is not to absolve him but to prevent others from repeating his crime.” The law is impersonal, justice framing good laws an abstraction, but “the impersonality of the law must not lead to the depersonalization of those it condemns.” We cannot not judge. It is rather to judge without falling into the Manichean wrong of ignoring or excusing the evil in ourselves. There is telling or witnessing; there is understanding; there is judging. None of them can be sacrificed if we are to acknowledge our responsibility, which is to say our humanity morally understood. Whereas in his book on the conquistadors Todorov confined morality to ‘intersubjectivity’ and deprecated teleology, he now sees that we need both. Not only are moral judgments “not arbitrary,” they “can be argued rationally,” with reason the human guide toward “seek[ing] the good of specific individuals” in action and not only in words. “Morality cannot ‘disappear’ without a radical mutation of the human species,” one that removes its capacity to reason and to care for the good of one another. As a modern liberal, wary of statist tyranny, Todorov doubts that morality in his strict sense can be had in political life, which he confines to the establishment and increase of a just framework for moral life. Nor can philosophy make us moral, being an act of “reflection on morality, which is a search for truth more than a search for goodness” (he includes his own book in this category). Again, like politics, philosophy can lend itself to a moral way of life.

    What does modern tyranny or totalitarianism, in its extremism, teach? It teaches that “a code of ordinary moral values and virtues, one commensurate with our times, can indeed be based on the recognition that it is as easy to do good as to do evil.” The “banality of evil” seen in the Nazis finds its counter in “the banality of good.” We need neither imitate saints nor fear monsters, as “both the dangers and the means with which to neutralize them are all around us.” 

     

     

    Notes

    1. See “Spanish Conquistadors Through a ‘Postmodernist’ Lens,” on this website.
    2. As Lancelot declaims in Tennyson’s The Idylls of the King.
    3. See “The Effects of the Philosophy of Freedom on Modern Tyranny” and “The Critique of Rationalism in the Philosophy of Freedom,” on this website.

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

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