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    Archives for November 2020

    Reconstituting Natural Philosophy

    November 21, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Nicholas Maxwell: In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life. Montreal: McGill-Queens University, 2017.

     

    Before Socrates, philosophers attempted to understand nature by direct observation. In doing so, they ignored the reputation of philosophy and of philosophers—soon considered at best odd and laughable, at worst dangerous to the city and deserving of exile or death. They also ignored the distortions to their own quest for wisdom imposed upon them by the opinions and customs of their political communities—unexamined assumptions that they had never considered philosophically. The polis endangered philosophy in two ways, one ‘external’ the other ‘internal.’ Externally, it threatened the lives and way of life of philosophers. Internally, it interfered with self-knowledge and therefore with the philosophic quest for wisdom; nonetheless, if considered carefully, political life might prove ‘epistemologically’ useful to philosophers. [1] By turning to political philosophy as the gateway to philosophy, by showing how philosophy might be both ‘politic’ and political, Socrates as presented by Plato and Xenophon showed how philosophers might better guard themselves from persecution while enhancing the philosophic way of life, refining its understanding of the nature philosophers had characteristically inquired into.

    For more than a century, philosophy as practiced in academia has eschewed both political philosophy and the natural philosophy it corrected. Politics has been consigned to the realm of the irrational (‘values’) and sub-philosophical ratiocination (‘facts’ uncovered by ‘political science’). Nature has been consigned to ‘science,’ consisting of theorizing founded upon mathematics and of practical, empirical experimentation intended to test the theories mathematics generated and, when confirming them, to put meat on their bones. Maxwell sets out to redeem philosophy as originally understood, as natural philosophy. “The central thesis of this book is that we need to reform philosophy and join it to science to recreate a modern version of natural philosophy; we need to do this in the interests of rigor, intellectual honesty, and so that science may serve the best interests of humanity.” “The best interests of humanity” suggests politics, although not the real politics of existing political communities; it suggests the politics or quasi-politics of some future ‘world state,’ the politics of ‘globalism.’ At the same time, the task of defining “the best interests of humanity” might well lead some academic philosophers to a renewed version of the Socratic turn, once they see that there is no such things as “humanity” as a politically organized entity. Maxwell himself hasn’t quite seen that, yet, looking instead to an imagined future wherein “our immense global problems” can be addressed “in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, thus helping us make progress towards a good world—or at least as good a world as possible.” This best of all possible worlds might leave little room for politics as such, and, if so, might not be the best of all possible worlds. Or so a Socratic philosopher might suspect.

    Maxwell does see this latter point when he looks around his own setting in a university—universities being eminently political institutions, where ‘ruling’ and ‘being ruled’ go on all the time. “We urgently need to reorganize universities so that they become devoted to seeking and promoting wisdom by rational means—as opposed to just acquiring knowledge, as at present” or, one might add, just advancing ideological dogmas, as at present in so many of them. This means regime change for the academy. “Academic inquiry needs to be reorganized so that its basic task becomes to seek and realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge, technological know-how, and understanding, but much else besides.” The regime of the modern university remains Weberian, affecting “our very psyches” by “the way we split off reason and intellect from feeling and desire, fact from value, science from art.” As Socrates might put it, modern academic philosophy has taken the philo out of philo-sophia.

    Modern science emerged from modern philosophy, and not always by turning away from political philosophy, as any reader of Francis Bacon will attest. Yet some of modern science at least seemed apolitical. Maxwell thus can assert, “Modern science began as natural philosophy,” as “one mutually interacting, integrated endeavor” aimed at “improv[ing] our knowledge and understanding of the universe” and “improv[ing] our understanding of ourselves as a part of it.” Natural philosophy made “profound” and indeed “unprecedented” discoveries then, in the seventeenth century, beginning with Galileo and Kepler, reaching its peak with Newton, ending with Locke. “And then natural philosophy died,” splitting “into science on the one hand, and philosophy on the other.” “But the two fragments, science and philosophy, are defective shadows of the glorious unified endeavor of natural philosophy.” This is “at root, a philosophical blunder” or series of such.

    What made modern natural philosophy modern? Galileo affirmed the atomism of the ancient natural science of Democritus, founded on “the key metaphysical tenet” that “the universe is made up of atoms in motion or, more generally, of physical entities in motion whose physical properties can be depicted in mathematical terms.” By so doing, Galileo “invok[ed] a key paradox inherent in the new natural philosophy: on the one hand there is an appeal to observation and experiment, while on the other hand, the new (or revitalized) metaphysical vision of the universe—atomism, or the corpuscular hypothesis—tells us that perception is profoundly delusive,” since we can’t see atoms with ‘the naked eye.’ “This paradox, unresolved, played an important role in driving science and philosophy apart.” Where the ancient atomists were sure of themselves, the modern atomists were not. Perhaps with a glance over their shoulders at revealed religion, eminently sure of itself, modern atomists saw in their atomism a claim that rested too much on faith to be quite scientific but too much on observation of nature to be religious.

    The sundering of philosophy from natural science did not and could not happen quickly because modern science needed philosophy; “natural scientists disagreed about crucial questions of method,” of how to go about the quest for knowledge, which is what ‘science’ means. “Should evidence alone decide which theories are accepted and rejected, or does reason play a role as well?” Like the ancient natural scientists, the moderns looked to the heavens rather than to the political regimes immediately before them, but in doing so they understood that “mathematics had an important role to play in science, along with observation and experiment.” Since “mathematical truths can be established by reason alone,” reason must “have an important role in science.” Modern natural scientists disagreed on what role that should be. Some held that “all knowledge comes through the senses, via experience”; reason plays the role of handmaiden to such ’empirical’ knowledge. Where, for example, does mathematics fit into Locke, that admirer of the eminently mathematical Mr. Newton? “Others—most notably Descartes and Leibniz—held that reason plays a vital role in natural philosophy,” developing new and powerful mathematical ways of knowing such as the calculus. 

    These controversies had both intellectual and moral implications. Given atomism, “how is it possible for human beings to acquire knowledge of the universe”? And “how is it possible for people to be conscious, free, and of value if immersed in the physical universe,” a universe consisting of nothing but “colorless, soundless, odorless corpuscles which interact only by contact”—that is, randomly? In sum, how can I know? And how can I choose? 

    Aristotle had answered these questions by positing four causes of natural effects: efficient, material, formal, and final. In his theory, “change comes about because objects strive to actualize their inherent potentialities, much as an acorn strives to actualize its potential to become an oak tree”; “purpose, goal-seeking,” ‘final’ causation “is built into the constitution of things.” Aristotle additionally claims that the earth, located at the center of the universe, exhibits “imperfection, change, decay,” none of which “observe precise, mathematical laws,” in contrast to the heavens, where “perfection, no decay,” prevail and “the motions of heavenly bodies” do observe precise mathematical laws.” In this sense the heavens are ‘above’ the earth both literally and in the sense of full self-realization. The new astronomy removed the earth from its cosmic centrality, seeing it as only “one planet among the others that encircle the sun,” partaking both of the mathematical precision observed in orbiting bodies. This means that “apparently wayward, haphazard terrestrial phenomena such as weather, growth, and decay, all occur, perhaps, in accordance with unknown, mathematically precise law.” At the same time, this also “may be taken to imply that since the earth is a part of the heavens, and imperfection, change, growth, and decay are everywhere apparent on earth, all this obtains on other heavenly bodies too.” ‘They’ are no better than ‘we’ are; as Tocqueville might have put it, modern science discovered that there is more democracy in the universe than Aristotle had thought. Begun by Copernicus, the culmination of the astronomical revolution culminates in Newton, via Kepler and Galileo (who, “more than any other single individual, was responsible for the demise of Aristotelianism”) and the adoption of the ‘mathematical’ understanding of nature, “or what we now call modern science.” If the moon has mountains and craters, if Jupiter has four moves revolving around it, where does that leave Aristotelian physics? [2]. No thoroughgoing empiricist, Galileo insisted that “physical objects and natural phenomena exhibit mathematical structure.” While appealing to “observation and experiment,” he equally insisted that “the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics,” and ultimately of simple mathematics, especially geometry. Empiricism and reason, experiment and mathematics: natural science. 

    For his part, with the help of the calculus—the geometry not of stable forms but of changing ones—Newton “put forward the first fundamental dynamical theory of physics ever,” the theory of gravitation. His Principia of 1687 “demonstrated how his universal law of gravitation was able to predict and explain the motions of the planets, moons, and comets of the solar system, together with a wealth of other phenomena as well.” Universal: the law of gravitation prevails on earth as it does in the heavens, and it explains why “the motions of the moons and the planets must deviate slightly from perfect Keplerian motion due to mutual gravitational attraction—the final, devastatingly convincing evidence in support of Newtonian theory.” 

    Newton made another natural-philosophic ‘move’ that had serious effects on subsequent philosophy. Asserting that he had derived his theory from observing the phenomena, he admitted (as he wrote) that he had “not been able to discover the cause of [the] properties of gravity from the phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.” In experimental philosophy, “particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction.” The subsequent Enlightenment movement, advanced most notably by the French Encyclopedists, taught that “no longer do natural philosophers need to engage in fruitless debate about metaphysics, philosophy, epistemology, and methodology.” Indeed, by the middle of the eighteenth century ‘metaphysics’ had become something of a byword for fruitlessness, and not incidentally a means of dismissing revelation even as it narrowed the scope of scientific reasoning. Under this dispensation, “new theories, in order to be acceptable, must meet two requirements: they must accord sufficiently well with the new metaphysical view of the universe” (namely, an atomism whereby the behavior of atoms conforms to “precise mathematical laws”); and “they must meet with sufficient empirical success, as tested by “the empirical method of careful observation and experimentation.” Only by meeting these requirements will science be “an endeavor that seeks to make progress in knowledge,” although (as Maxwell cautions) this progress must not to be taken as inevitable or even good.

    It is noteworthy that Maxwell himself pays no attention to the moral and political foundation of modern science in Machiavelli, namely, the invitation to conquer Fortuna or, as his follower Bacon put it, to conquer nature for the relief of man’s estate. Even on his own, strictly ‘natural-scientistic’ terms, however, Maxwell shows that modern science makes a metaphysical assumption, an assumption that underlies its physics. “A central concern of this book is to demonstrate that empiricism is not enough. Science needs evidence and metaphysics.” And if so, “we need a new conception of science which acknowledges explicitly metaphysical assumptions of science so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved.” He calls this new conception of science “aim-oriented empiricism,” a term which suggests that some form of teleology must be brought back into our understanding of nature and of science or knowledge of nature. The very notion of a scientific method itself suggests that there must be some telos the method aims at, and that there might be madness in one’s method, or sanity, because of that.

    Maxwell next considers modern natural science in more detail. As noted, Newton “makes the amazing claim to have derived his law of gravitation solely from the phenomena by induction,” a claim that led eventually to the abandonment of natural philosophy, its split into ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ begun in the eighteenth century and effected thoroughly by the nineteenth. But Newton has a method, his “rules of reason,” all of which “concern simplicity or unity” and “in effect make implicit metaphysical assumptions concerning the simplicity or unity of nature.” That is “a big assumption,” and a metaphysical one at that. So, for example, Newton’s first rule of reason tells us that “Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes” (very democratic, Tocqueville would smile)—obviously “a big, highly problematic metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe.” What is more, despite his avowal of strict deduction of the law of gravitation from observation of the phenomena, elsewhere “Newton is quite explicit himself that metaphysical hypotheses are involved and required” in his science. “Could it even be that Newton here knowingly practiced something like a confidence trick?” Was he an ‘politic’ writer, after all, a practitioner of exoteric writing, including the art of deliberate self-contradiction, at the service of an esoteric teaching? Is Newton’s natural science more Socratic than it seems?

    As Maxwell remarks, in subsequent editions of the Principia he replaced his rules of reason with “nine propositions, all baldly entitled hypotheses.” “Newton had powerful motives for attempting to convince his readers that his law had been derived solely from the phenomena,” at least in the first edition of his book, being “fully aware of the fact that his law of gravitation, apparently postulating the existence of a force operating across empty space, without any agency to convey it, would be found by some to be thoroughly objectionable”—some and perhaps most, being theologians committed to the notion of divine providence, others being natural scientists committed to atomist-empiricist induction. “Newton hated controversy,” and “may have hoped that his claim” in the first edition “to have derived his law solely from the phenomena would mean that the law [of gravitation] would not become a matter of controversy.” At the same time, Newton also rejected the metaphysics of the new science, that “the universe has a harmonious mathematical structure, and that all natural phenomena are the outcome of particles interacting in accordance with precise physical law.” Newton professed to affirm the theologians’ well-known ‘argument from design,’ that (as he put it) “this most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Maxwell quotes a letter Newton wrote in 1692, saying, “When I wrote my treatise about our [solar] system, I had an eye on such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a deity; and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose.” In sum, Newton engaged in “a conscious cover-up,” first seeming to accept the Baconian, empiricist-experimentalist understanding of science as “derived by induction from the phenomena, solely from evidence,” and then following this revision of modern science with a revision of Christian theology whereby certain natural phenomena really are thoroughly natural—not providential in any immediate sense but nonetheless derived from the deity’s initial rational act of creation. 

    This might have led to a debate over what Newton’s real method was. What actually happened was a debate in which Newton’s putative empiricist inductivism was ranged against the ‘rationalism’ of Descartes, a contrast (one might add) that eventually broadened into the familiar claim that the English are empirical, practical, soberly down-to-earth, and that the French are abstract, theoretical, and dangerously utopian. “No one thought to distinguish Newton’s physics from his [self-advertised] methodology.” Instead of comparing and contrasting Newton with Kepler and Galileo, contemporaries focused on “the great battle” between Newton and Descartes. As is well known, Descartes answered the question of skepticism by the method of skepticism itself, by doubting “everything it was possible to doubt,” including both his own senses and his reason. “But he could not doubt that he was doubting, or, in other words, thinking”; ergo, “I think, therefore I am.” “Having established beyond doubt that his conscious mind exists,” Descartes went on to claim that because he can “entertain the idea of a Being more perfect than himself,” such a Being “must exist, since, if He did not, He would lack perfection.” This second claim, the dubiousness of which Maxwell hints at, contrasts noticeably with Newton’s argument from design, which is perhaps no more demonstrable but rather more plausible. In any event, Descartes then argued that because such certain and distinct ideas as “I think, therefore I am” form the basis of knowledge, this royal road to knowledge leads us to acknowledging the clear and distinct science of geometry as the master science. In turn, the empirical phenomena may, must, be understood geometrically, insofar as we can attain any certain knowledge of them. This in turn led to him to claim that nature consists of atoms—invisible, intangible “corpuscles”—which are “whirling about in space in vortices,” that is, in geometrically measurable patterns. Descartes puts natural-science atomism firmly under the rule of geometric patterns In his own exercise of doubt, Maxwell observes that “the difficult and profound mathematical structure of modern theoretical physics hardly seems to bear out” the reduction of physical laws to clear and distinct ideas. However, whereas the Cartesians’ insistence that any empirical success in scientific discovery which contradicts “the Cartesian idea that natural phenomena are the outcome of the motion and impact of extended particles” must be invalid partakes of dogmatism, they “were absolutely correct to demand that physical theories must comply with metaphysical principles (in addition to empirical considerations) in order to be acceptable.” That their metaphysics was false is no objection to metaphysics itself.

    Nonetheless, the French Enlightenment did just that. Voltaire, for example, in his Lettres Philosophiques sided with ‘England,’ “praised Bacon, Locke, and Newton at the expense of Descartes,” promptly earning himself condemnation by the French Catholic Church and what would have been a prison term in the Bastille, had he not exiled himself. “Voltaire cast Bacon as the founding father of English empiricism, and even claimed he had anticipated Newton’s law of gravitation.” The Church knew a competing set of saints when it saw one. “With the defeat of Descartes and the triumph of Newton, and Newtonian empiricism, in France around 1750, modern science was well on its triumphant way,” beginning to act independently of philosophy, even if its practitioners refrained from declaring that independence, still calling their task “natural philosophy.” Metaphysics was scrupulously ruled out of rationalism, “empiricism dominated subsequent scientific developments, and authentic natural philosophy became all but invisible.”    

    But Einstein brought on his revolution in modern physics not by following the method of experimentation but with mathematics. His discovery that space-time itself is curved by matter, and matter by space-time, shows that there is no force of gravity at all, but rather a set of necessary pathways along which matter travels—at the same time without necessarily colliding, as in modern atomism. Quantum theory took this even further, proposing that particles of matter “exhibit wave-like features, and wave-like entities such as light exhibit particle-like features too.” Quantum theory replaces the Newtonian and Einsteinian deterministic theories with probabilistic ones. 

    Well and good, empiricists will reply, but how can you seriously question the spectacular real-world success of the experimental method in science? And how do you explain the failure of philosophy, or what is left of it, to make any noticeable progress at all? The Apostle Paul’s mockery of philosophers as men who are ever seeking but never finding finds its parallel in the critique of philosophy by defenders of modern science. The endless and often trivial wrangles that characterize ‘analytic philosophy,’ dominant in many Anglo-American philosophy ‘departments’ to this day, seems to confirm that critique. [3].

    In a sentence that may surprise and delight contemporary defenders of political philosophy, Maxwell contends (in language almost identical to that of Leo Strauss) that “the proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness, in the public domain, of our most fundamental problems, our fundamental problems of knowledge and understanding, and our fundamental problems of living, personal, social and global—especially those that are most important and urgent.” To this, Strauss would replace “global” with “political,” and remark that a philosopher will seek criteria by which to define the important and the urgent. He would nonetheless surely endorse Maxwell’s claim that “philosophy has the task of keeping alive awareness of the important role that fundamental problems, and our attempts at solving them, have in all aspects of life and thought.” Strauss doubts that philosophy should “encourage everyone to become philosophers,” but he would undoubtedly concur with Maxwell in maintaining that philosophy “does not have its own particular intellectual territory, its unique field of expertise.” Philosophy orients itself by “the fundamental problem of all of thought and life”: “How can our human world, and the world of sentient life more generally, imbued with perceptual qualities, consciousness, free will, meaning, and value exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe?” From this question flows other “slightly less fundamental problems, ranging from “the fundamental nature of the physical universe,” to the connection (if any) between free will and physical determinism, and to questions concerning justice, friendship, and love. In a paraphrase of Weber’s lament about specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, Maxwell writes, “relentless, unmitigated specialization has produced a situation such that our fundamental problem is scarcely considered at all in the university,” or in education and research generally.

    It was David Hume, Maxwell sees, who called attention to the unclothed condition of the emperor, Induction. According to the doctrine of “standard empiricism,” evidence “decides what theories are accepted and rejected in science”; “in science, no factual thesis about the world, or about the phenomena, can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of empirical considerations” as established by careful observation and experimentation. Hume argued that “for all we know, the course of nature may suddenly change, so as to falsify any or all” existing scientific theories, however well established they may be. “It is not evidence that rules out” any alternative theory “but some kind of underlying assumption of uniformity or unity.” That underlying assumption amounts to “some kind of assumption about the nature of the universe”—what Karl Popper would call a “conjecture,” “no more than a guess about that of which we are most ignorant, the ultimate nature of the universe.” “Rationality requires that assumptions that are influential, problematic, and implicit be made explicit so that they can be subjected to imaginative and critical scrutiny, in an attempt to improve them.” Like Socrates, scientists need to be brought to the knowledge that they do not know. But this means that they need to become more like philosophers, less like ‘knowers,’ that is, ‘scientists.’

    The grand assumption of science, and of philosophy generally, is what Maxwell calls “physicalism,” which he may mean literally as “naturalism” (‘physis-ism), as distinguished from ‘spiritualism’ or the belief that “spirits, demons, gods, or God govern the way natural phenomena occur.” Given the latter assumption, it’s “quite rational to adopt such methods as prayer, sacrifice, consultation of prophets, oracles, omens and dreams.” Absent that assumption, one will prefer to deploy mathematics, experimentation, and thinking generally governed by reason, by thought governed by the principle of non-contradiction. This means that “metaphysics determines methodology.” Choosing the wrong metaphysics will likely result in ineffectual methods of attempting to produce desired results. Witch doctors typically enjoy less discernible success than medical doctors, even if good results sometimes follow from incantations, bad from prescriptions. This fact doesn’t necessarily faze us, as “humanity has found it extraordinarily difficult to accept that mere impersonal regularities govern natural phenomena.” Hence Babylonians “failed to develop astronomy” even as they took “very precise astronomical measurements,” and China “made a wealth of technological discoveries” without developing science. Both of these regimes were quite ’empirical,’ but in both cases, “the one element missing was the vital metaphysical view of physicalism,” the concept of nature.

    Given this “big, persistent, metaphysical assumption,” the next questions are: “What ought this metaphysical thesis concerning the unity of nature to be? How can we best go about improving it?” Maxwell proposes “aim-oriented empiricism” as the way to reestablish natural philosophy. Aim-oriented empiricism consists of a hierarchy of seven assumptions. They are:

    1. That the universe is partially knowable. “If this assumption is false, we will not be able to acquire knowledge whatever we assume.” Just because, as Aristotle says, man wants to know doesn’t mean he can. Nonetheless, to say we know that we do not know is itself knowledge, and would mean that the assumption must be true. If instead we say we don’t even know that, then we are claiming to know that we don’t know that we don’t know—the regression is infinite.
    2. That the universe is meta-knowable. By this Maxwell means that “there is some rationally discoverable thesis about the nature of the universe which, if true and if accepted, makes it possible progressively to improve methods for the improvement of knowledge.” By “rationally discoverable” he means that the thesis “is not an arbitrary choice from infinitely many analogous theses.” “Not only can we acquire knowledge; we can acquire knowledge about how to acquire knowledge.” 
    3. That the universe is comprehensible. This means “that the universe is such that there is something (God, tribe of gods, cosmic goal, physical entity, cosmic program, or whatever), which exists everywhere in an unchanging form and which, in some sense, determines or is responsible for everything that changes (all change and diversity in the world in principle being explicable and understandable in terms of the underlying unchanging something).” Maxwell additionally claims that this “something” is “present throughout all phenomena,” although that may imply an additional assumption of ‘pantheism,’ the denial of a Creator-God, separate from His creation.
    4. That the universe is physically comprehensible. That is, “the universe is made up [of] one unified self-interacting physical entity (or one kind of entity), all change and diversity being in principle explicable in terms of this entity.” This means “that the universe is such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified physical theory of everything is true.” “Physicalism” is the name Maxwell gives to this thesis.
    5. The best current specific version of physicalism. Maxwell’s term for this is “the blueprint,” and, like all blueprints, it is subject to alteration or to rejection and replacement.
    6. Accepted fundamental physical theories. Currently, they are general relativity and quantum mechanics.
    7. Empirical data.

    Far, then, from being the most certain of all, empirical data are the most subject to change, whereas the thesis that the universe is partially knowable could only be revised if we obtained a sort of God-like knowledge, albeit quite likely without God-like power, and could therefore assert, ‘The universe is not only partially but entirely knowable, and we know this because we have attained thorough knowledge of it.’ As it is, however, every one of these categories is open to revision, revisions being increasingly more difficult as one goes up the scale.

    Maxwell considers aim-oriented empiricism to provide physics “with a meta-methodology which facilitates improvement of the metaphysical assumptions and associate methods as physics advances…. As knowledge in physics improves, so metaphysical assumptions and methods improve as well, or, in other words, knowledge about how to improve knowledge improves.” An example of this might be the discovery of an impasse, an aporia, as seen in Socratic dialogues. Consideration of such a logical impasse, or an empirical impasse, can lead to improved understanding of what the problem is, and eventually to a possible rational resolution of it. 

    Maxwell takes his example from physics, as befits his natural-philosophy approach. “Einstein first discovered general relativity in the form of a metaphysical idea: gravitation is the variable curvature of space-time induced by matter and energy. He then had to work hard to turn this into a precise, testable physical theory.” With Newton, however, “not only did the then-current metaphysical ideas not lead to the new theory—they actually obstructed the correct interpretation of the new theory once it had been formulated.” The “standard empiricism” of Bacon, which Newton initially claimed as his own, “is refuted by its abject failure to solve the problem of induction,” as standard empiricism can’t even explain “the way theories are selected in physics.” “In physics only unified theories are ever accepted, with endlessly many empirically more successful disunified theories invariably being ignored: this means physics makes the big, implicit assumption that the universe is such that all disunified theories are false.” An assumption Newton shared with all physicists—this being an ’empirical fact’ about physicists, so to speak. Aim-oriented empiricism, by contrast, “faces no such contradiction” because “it openly acknowledges that persistent preference for unified theories in physics means that physics accepts a highly problematic metaphysical conjecture concerning the underlying unity of the universe,” part of the “hierarchy of conjectures” Maxwell has itemized. “What is really decisive is that aim-oriented empiricism succeeds in solving the problem of induction,” a problem fatal to the standard empiricism that denies the empirical reality of what physicists actually do. “Far better to adopt the view that physics does accept a substantial metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe, even if this thesis is a pure conjecture.” “The key argument for authentic natural philosophy” is the need to acknowledge that this assumption, that there is an underlying unity of the universe, “may be critically assessed, developed and, we may hope, improved.” Aim-oriented empiricism enables natural philosophers to discover their self-deceptions “because it requires us to explore the widest range of possible metaphysical conjectures, and associated methods, at different levels” of Maxwell’s ‘assumptions’ hierarchy. 

    There are two grounds for accepting such meta-knowability. First, throughout “the human endeavor to improve knowledge” there has been “a positive feedback between metaphysical conjectures and associated methods, on the one hand, and the growth of empirical scientific knowledge.” Otherwise, “we would still be stuck with Aristotelian science, or even the practices of witch doctors and shamans.” Inquiry into nature “becomes more rigorous intellectually if implicit assumptions are acknowledged explicitly,” whether or not such rigor results in empirical successes. Second, “as a result of accepting meta-knowability, our pursuit of knowledge may have much to gain and little to lose” because in that acceptance “we decide, in effect, that it is worthwhile to try to improve knowledge about how to improve knowledge.” Is it possible “that in the future intrinsically unpredictable changes in the laws of nature may occur which render our current knowledge obsolete”? Yes, but one gains nothing from “foregoing the attempt to acquire knowledge” for that reason.

    “Hume famously argued that what exists at one moment cannot necessarily determine what exists at the next moment”—the application of the critique of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy to the idea of physical causation. But the argument does not show that such necessary causation is impossible. The assumption of such causation is less absurd than its denial, given the observable regularities we find in the sequence of events. “Meta-knowability implies that, if we have no experience of them,” apparently causeless events “do not occur.” This is the empirical part of aim-oriented empiricism. The “aim-oriented” part of it acknowledges the act that “even our most modest items of common sense knowledge” imply major metaphysical and physical assumptions—that, for example, some undetected cosmic fire will not engulf me before I finish writing this sentence, an event that might make my effort to do so vain indeed. “Practical certainty has this usually unacknowledged conjectural and cosmological dimension inherent in it.” “If the success of science is illusory in a way we could not in principle discover, then this is a possibility we face whatever we assume; it is not something we can do anything about, and deserves to be ignored. If, on the other hand, the success of science is illusory in a way which can in principle be discovered, then aim-oriented empirical science provides us with the best means of unmasking the illusion. Either way, physicalism deserves to be accepted even in practical contexts.”

    What, then, of the most practical “context” of all, ethics? Our “most fundamental problem of all” is the question, “How can our human world, and the world of sentient life more generally, imbued with perceptual qualities, consciousness, free will, meaning, and value, exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe?” Descartes “quite clearly attempts to solve this problem” of the apparent contradiction between the human world and the physical universe by embracing it—by positing a dualism of morality and nature founded upon the distinction between the mind understood as wholly immaterial and nature as wholly material; the mind imposes its forms upon inchoate matter. But if so, how can the immaterial mind and the physical brain interact? “Given Cartesian dualism, there can only be free will if physical laws are violated in the brain,” but how can this be so? Worse, how can the clear and distinct ideas we conceive in our minds tell us anything about “the universe around us”? “How can experience deliver knowledge about the real world around us” to a mind that has no physical nature? From Locke to Berkeley to Hume to Kant to the analytic philosophers, the dilemma has persisted. The ‘analytics’ finally dismissed the problem as meaningless.

    But no one really thinks that it is. To solve it in terms of aim-oriented empiricism, Maxwell has recourse to a form of historicism. Being an empiricist, he cannot adopt the ‘idealist’ version of historicism propounded by Hegel. He instead invokes Darwin’s evolutionism, which “helps explain how and why purposeful living things can evolve—have evolved—in a physicalist universe.” Maxwell corrects Darwin’s Darwinism (or perhaps simply emphasizes the teaching of The Descent of Man, in which Darwin himself extends the claims of The Origin of Species) by saying that “the mechanisms of evolution themselves evolve as life evolves, purposive action playing an increasingly important role, especially when evolution by cultural means comes into play as a result of learning and imitation.” In this way “Darwinian evolution merges seamlessly with human history.” The mind-nature dualism of Descartes troubles itself with the false assumption “that physics could be in principle comprehensive and complete about the world around us,” whereas in fact physics “seeks to depict only a highly selected aspect of all that there is—the causally efficacious aspect, as it might be called, which determines how events unfold.” That is, theoretical physics “seeks to depict that which everything has in common with everything else.” That “does not mean that a complete physics would tell us everything factual about the world around us”—i.e., “what things look like, sound like feel like, or what it is like to be a certain kind of physical system (such as a living person.” A person blind from birth doesn’t know what redness is, but is not “debarred thereby from understanding all physics, including optics and the theory of color perception.” Physics “must omit these experiential qualities,” as to attempt to do so “would destroy the unity and explanatory power of physical theory.” Maxwell traces this distinction between the physical and the experiential to Spinoza, and then to Darwin, whose theory of evolution tells us what common sense also tells us, that “animals which could not see aspects of their environments, but only the contents of their own minds, would not last long in the real world.” The philosophers who follow Descartes “made a bad mistake” by supposing that “we really, most directly see, not aspects of the things in the environment around us, but rather the contents of our minds.” This subjectivist “blunder, perhaps more than any other, has condemned so much philosophy to irrelevance, and triviality.” This “initial blunder” severed philosophy from science. But “the insoluble consciousness/brain problem is created by the failure to formulate it properly in the first place.” This has led to what amounts to a political problem, the problem of the regime of modern academia, which restricts inquiry “to specialized research…ill-equipped to help humanity resolve problems of the real world.” Thus “humanity suffers from the failings of modern philosophy—failings most philosophers, even today, seem entirely unaware of.”

    Modern philosophy makes a mistake in abandoning modern science to scientists. But does modern science really need philosophy? Maxwell argues that it does because aimed-oriented empiricism can improve science in ways the standard empiricism scientists typically adopt cannot. Among other benefits, aim-oriented empiricism can tell scientists what the greatest scientists (Isaac Newton, James Clark Maxwell, Albert Einstein) actually did, which was not ’empirical’ as that term has come to be defined by modern scientists. As the term implies, aim-oriented empiricism raises the question of what modern science is for. Following Machiavelli, Bacon assigned science the task of conquering nature for the relief of man’s estate. But is that what science should be for? And is the answer to that question outside the realm of science. It is, but only if science is conceived as sundered from questions of ethics and politics, only if science is ‘value-free.’ But is it? 

    Maxwell isn’t out to return to pre-modern science. “If Aristotle’s view of the cosmos had led to a much more empirically successful research program for physics than Galileo’s Aristotle’s vision would be today accepted…instead of physicalism” in the modern sense. Modern physicalism is “empirically fruitful.” What does it mean to say that? “A metaphysical thesis, B, is empirically fruitful if a series of theories, T(1), T(2), [etc.], each more empirically successful than its predecessor, can be regarded as drawing every closer to capturing B in the form of a testable theory,” that is, if the series of theories can be unified. “The demand that a theory must be unified to be acceptable is thus a quasi-empirical demand. It commits physics to accepting the hierarchy of theses” outlined in Maxwell’s seven-level list, “all of which could be false, and could, in increasingly extreme circumstances, require revision.” Standard empiricism, strictly applied, can’t establish such hierarchical differentiation. Aim-oriented empiricism can. 

    Maxwell illustrates this point by arguing that Newtonian physics might have been led to Einsteinian physics more rapidly, had it been undertaken in the spirit of aim-oriented empiricism. That form of empiricism would also have quickly suggested that “the apparent contradiction between ‘waves’ and ‘particles’ in quantum theory must be addressed by “develop[ing] a version of quantum theory which specifies precisely what electrons, atoms, molecules may be when not undergoing observation.” In both of these cases he suggests ways in which scientists might have proceeded, both of which involve the thesis that “nature might be fundamentally probabilistic,” not deterministic in the strict way in which determinism is typically conceived. His point is not to prove such a hypothesis (he readily concedes that he isn’t a physicist or a mathematician) but that such matters “cannot really be discussed within standard-empiricism physics” at all. “The correct interpretation of Newtonian theory, Maxwellian electrodynamics, and quantum theory have all been delayed, for several decades, because persistent attempts have been made to interpret these theories in terms of outdated metaphysics.” 

    Consider, he suggests, cosmology, and think of a pivotal event in ancient natural philosophy. “Parmenides held that the universe is an unchanging homogeneous sphere” in which “all change and diversity is…an illusion” because change and diversity involve contradiction. Democritus rejoined that change and diversity do exist, but so does nothingness. The cosmos consists of atoms in motion, each surrounded by nothing, their collisions and combinations accounting for change and diversity. “Physicalism as I have formulated it” in its modern sense “emerges from Democritus’ reply to Parmenides.” But what if we “declare that Parmenides’ homogeneous sphere is a state of the entire universe, exhibiting unity, at a very special time, namely the moment at or just before the big bang,” that “state of extreme unity” that preceded the atomistic world (considerably revised from that of Democritus) that we now accept? The ‘big bang’ was then “an instant of spontaneous symmetry-breaking: the outcome is a multitude of virtual prior-to-big-bang states, virtual Parmenidean spheres, as it were,” from then on “unfolding” by means “of the interactions between these multitudinous virtual prior-to-the big-bang entities.” The cosmos “is composed of billions upon billions of fleeting virtual big-bang cosmic states of supreme Parmenidean unity.” Whereas Democritean atomism posits a dualism of empty space in contrast with solid, un-splittable atoms, “cosmic atomism” holds that being and nothingness inhere in everything, that change and diversity inhere “throughout all phenomena,” determine, perhaps probabilistically, the evolution of all phenomena. Maxwell does not claim that this conjecture is true, but rather that it is an atomism more consistent with Einsteinian physics, which posits space as curvilinear, and therefore not empty or shapeless. And he adds that standard empiricism rules out such conjecture, to the disadvantage of physics theorizing.

    More generally, “there is no agreed, acceptable, unproblematic metaphysical blueprint for physics today.” Contemporary physics confronts “four fundamental problems”: 1) Is nature deterministic or probabilistic? 2) How “is justice to be done to the quantum domain without any appeal being made to measurement? 3) How are general relativity and quantum theory to be unified? 4) How, and to what extent, is matter-and-force on the one hand, and space-time on the other, to be unified? Maxwell contends that metaphysics will form the prelude to new physical theories that address these problems, as indeed metaphysics did in the thought of Newton and of Einstein, whether they admitted it or not.

    What about the natural sciences—chemistry and biology, among others? Each division of natural science “needs to articulate and implement its own version of aim-oriented empiricism.” Not only will this acknowledge that scientific methods will vary from one division to another, and not only will this acknowledge that the aims of each division will differ somewhat from the aims of the others, but, “and most important,” aim-oriented empiricism “facilitates positive feedback between improving scientific knowledge and improving aims and methods (improving knowledge about how to improve knowledge” because aim-oriented empiricism is hierarchical, thereby enabling the scientist to ‘classify’ each step of his thinking in a coherent order.. “This positive feedback feature is, in my view, the nub of scientific rationality.” 

    Take, for example, scientific aims. Standard empiricism cannot say what scientific aims should be. Yet, ’empirically’ or as a matter of fact “all branches of natural science seek truth that is of value, either intrinsically or intellectually because of its inherent interest to us, or in a amore utilitarian way in that it can be used to obtain other things of value—health, prosperity, travel, entertainment, that is, the whole technological panoply of the modern world.” “We want science to discover that which is significant or of value”; “values, of one kind or another…pervade all of science.” Maxwell cautions that this doesn’t mean that “considerations of value can be permitted to influence judgments of truth”; “that it would be desirable or of value for something to be true does not, in itself, make it more likely to be true,” and we are better off not with wishful thinking but with skeptical thinking, with rigorous testing of happy-sounding claims of truth. We need to know what we don’t know, but we also need to know what we need to know, while never confusing what we suppose we know about what we need to know to be genuine knowledge. “Standard empiricism prohibits all this, in demanding that metaphysical ideas, and ideas about what is of value, are excluded from the intellectual domain of science.” If modern science “cannot determine what is just, or good” then it is intrinsically aimless, unable to distinguish trivial knowledge from important knowledge and therefore unknowing. This is why “we need to see science, ultimately, as a part of , or as contributing to, philosophy, rather than see philosophy as something that needs to be excluded from science.”

    How can modern natural science be better integrated into philosophy overall? Here is where Aristotle’s idea of teleology re-enters, although Maxwell is too shy to say it that way. “All living things are purposive in character”; they pursue goals. “Darwinian theory tells us what the basic goal of living things is: to survive and reproduce. All other goals pursued by living things contribute to this basic goal.” This doesn’t mean that evolution itself is purposive; Darwin regarded it as determined by “random inherited variations and natural selection,” factors “devoid of purpose.” Nor does this mean that all living things are conscious in pursuing survival and reproduction, that a living thing “knows what it is doing.” It only means that that’s what they do. Now, (and again unacknowledged by Maxwell), Aristotle would regard such a claim as too narrow. Living things do not necessarily act as if they ‘treat’ goals other than survival and reproduction as subservient to (as he puts it) mere life. They rather act, consciously or not, to fulfill their own nature, to flourish in accordance with their nature. Maxwell might or might not admit this, but he would quite likely say, ‘That is why the natural sciences need aim-oriented empiricism—precisely to enable such an Aristotelian considerations to be entertained.’

    Among those organisms that are conscious, observers notice “an enriched form of purposive explanation, which I shall call personalistic explanation,” explanations “enriched by imaginative identification with the person, or being, whose actions are being explained and understood.” Conscious beings are capable of “evolution by cultural means,” by “something like Lamarckian evolution,” whereby behavior becomes inherited, and habitual, inherited traits might eventuate in physical changes via ‘cultural’ selection. “Darwinian theory must itself make use of both kinds of explanation, physical and purposive—or, when sentient and conscious beings are involved, physical and personalistic.” This, Maxwell argues, might “help us understand how purposive, and personalistic, life has come to be in an ultimately purposeless universe.” Purposiveness evidently enhances evolution, in that sexual selection (“typically [by] females”) has the effect of enhancing “certain characteristic features” in a given species; Maxwell gives as his example the peacocks’ “splendid tails,” which have become more splendid over time because peahens have preferred peacocks that are endowed with them. And in the most self-conscious and ‘cultural’ being, the human being, language has developed, endowing human beings and human beings alone with “art, science, democracy, justice, elaborate technology, planned social progress, even wisdom.”

    That doesn’t show how purposiveness originated, only that it was evolutionarily useful when it did. Maxwell can only go so far as to suggest that “we need a new version of Darwinism which interprets the theory to be about life, not genes, which recognizes that all life is purposive in character, and which holds that the mechanisms of evolution themselves evolve so as to incorporate purposiveness in increasingly substantial ways until something like Lamarckian evolution emerges with the arrival of evolution by cultural means.” 

    The cultural means he has in mind primarily is education, which should be reoriented to encourage the “mammalian instinct” of “inquisitiveness.” Without it, “the fundamental impulse behind science has been lost.” To prevent this from continuing to happen in the schools, Maxwell recommends a “problem-oriented approach to scientific education” whereby teachers would set students to attempt to solve a “genuine, even unsolved scientific problem.” This would “cause curiosity to flourish and not die” in part by having students follow up on their “own questions—to transform feeling of stupidity and bafflement into articulated questions” and thus to bring them not only to science but to natural philosophy, to an awareness of the fundamental problems.

    More generally, can aim-oriented empiricism be “exploited by the general human endeavor to make progress towards as good a world as possible,” in personal life as well as public life? In terms of public life, under aim-oriented empiricism “social science emerges, not primarily as a science devoted to improving knowledge about social phenomena, but rather as a social methodology or social philosophy, devoted to helping humanity learn from, and exploit, the methodological methods of natural science in order to make social progress towards as good a world as possible. We especially we need a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic intellectual aim becomes to promote wisdom—wisdom being construed to be the capacity and active endeavor to realize (apprehend and create) what is of value to life, for oneself and others.” [4] In terms familiar to readers of Aristotle, this would entail sophia or theoretical wisdom—culminating in a glimpse of human nature—and phronēsis or practical wisdom, which aims at real-world actions that will induce that nature to flourish.

    Modern science has decisively informed modern philosophy from Descartes onward; “natural science creates the problems philosophy seeks to solve,” the problems addressed by “political philosophy, moral philosophy, aesthetics.” Modern science “has major and very alarming implications for questions about what is of value,” seeming to show that “all of human life” amounts to nothing more than physics, that free will and consciousness are illusions. “Do arguments concerning rival political systems make sense if everything is governed by physical law?” Since “our moral, political, and artistic life takes place in the real world, and it is science that tells us what sort of world this is, what it tells us cannot just be ignored.” Does modern science tell us that “moral nihilism” or moral relativism is true? “Or can we make sense of the idea that value qualities exist in the real world—some people objectively possessing moral qualities such as friendliness or courage, some works of art being objectively beautiful, graceful, passionate, profound? Is our world imbued with value features, or does science prohibit the existence of such features altogether?” It is philosophy which must give aims to aim-oriented empiricism, since standard empiricism rules itself out of so doing. What modern science tells us will set limits to our practical sense of how to realize our aims, but it cannot tell us what they are. That is, instead of reading the morally, politically, and esthetically nihilistic implications of modern science into our aims, it is necessary to see that modern science by its character rules out teleology, and therefore in principle cannot tell us anything about aims. This is a limitation on modern science, not a limitation on philosophy, and philosophic nihilists merely register a category mistake. What is more, the modern “philosophy of science” “helps to undermine the very thing it seeks to understand” by preventing itself from addressing why science is good, in the first place. “Only when science and the philosophy of science join together in creating aim-oriented empiricist science—thus recreating natural philosophy—can we have a genuinely rigorous kind of science.”

    For its part, the rational method of science will “help us improve problematic aims.” One’s “basic aims often are bad choices,” but if we consider our aims in the light of reason we will make fewer such choices. This means that “the whole character of philosophy needs to change” by “ceas[ing] to be a specialized discipline alongside other disciplines, obsessed with its own esoteric, specialized puzzles,” but rather “become again what it once was, that endeavor which seeks to keep alive awareness of our most urgent fundamental problems,” problems that concern “humanity as a whole and planet earth.” “Philosophy needs to become again what it was for Socrates: the attempt to devote reason to the growth of wisdom in life.” 

    Maxwell therefore titles his final chapter “Implications of Natural Philosophy for the Problems of Citizenship.” These implications, he maintains, are “profound and revolutionary,” leading, “potentially, to a new kind of academic enterprise–wisdom-inquiry.” “Humanity faces two great problems of learning: learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it, and learning how to create as good, as wise, as civilized a world as possible.” The first task is a theoretical problem, the second a practical one. “We cracked the first problem in the seventeenth century” with the discovery of modern natural philosophy,” with its “method for progressively improving knowledge and understanding of the natural world”—the “famous empirical method” which Maxwell has attempted to rescue from those who have obscured or misunderstood it along the lines of standard empiricism. “As long as humanity’s power to act was limited, lack of wisdom, of enlightenment, did not matter too much: humanity lacked the means to inflict too much damage on itself or the planet,” but now that the method, so misconceived, has succeeded to the extent that human beings actually can conquer nature—if hardly all of it, enough of it to transform the planet earth and humanity itself— then “wisdom has become, not a personal luxury, but a global necessity.” Having solved the first “great problem of learning,” it has become crucial to solve the second. What is more, we can “learn from our solution to the first great problem of learning how to solve the second one,” to “apply these general, progress-achieving methods to social life—to the unending task of creating a better, wiser world.” Unending: although human beings aim at ends, there will be no ‘end of history.’ Sensibly enough, Maxwell concedes that “the aim of creating global civilization is inherently and profoundly problematic.”

    Indeed so. Maxwell criticizes the Enlightenment for seeking to apply a “generalized scientific method, not to social life, but merely to social science.” It helped social scientists “improve knowledge of social phenomena” without “helping humanity learn how to become more civilized by rational means.” “This is the blunder that is at the root of our current failure to have solved the second great problem of learning.” By “civilized” Maxwell mean “a state of affairs in which there is an end to war, dictatorships, population growth, extreme inequalities of wealth, and the establishment of a democratic, liberal world government and a sustainable world industry and agriculture.” 

    Well, that’s quite a mouthful, and some if it tastes like mush. Here is the problem with Maxwell’s solution to the problem. First, in addressing the problem of how to learn about the nature of the universe, “we” didn’t actually crack the problem. Natural philosophers did, and those natural philosophers lived in the West and nowhere else, indeed in certain countries in the West and not, initially, others. This suggests that Socrates was right: that political philosophy comes before natural philosophy in order of rank, in priority, if not in chronology. If the modern political-philosophic enterprise begins with Machiavelli, then reaches into natural science with Bacon, then ‘we’ in the twenty-first century are looking at a ‘global’ problem of the nations and their political regimes, not simply at a problem for ‘the planet’ or for ‘humanity,’ neither of which exist under one regime. Maxwell tacitly admits this in a “world government” with a particular regime, liberal democracy. Second, this means that the problem of “learning how to create as good, as wise, as civilized a world as possible” can only be addressed, let alone solved, at the level of nations and their political regimes. That is (for example) the problem of education cannot be severed from the problem of regimes as it manifests itself within each nation, but especially the most powerful nations, and as they defend and advance their regime interests and their regime principles in competition (sometimes violent competition) with one another. Why would the rulers of China, of Russia, or of Iran cooperate with the rulers of the United States? As a matter of fact, they don’t, as the cacophony of the ‘United Nations’ attests, to say nothing of cyber warfare, control of information flows, and other forms of conflict so obviously demonstrate. 

    Maxwell sees this, in the end, at least to the extent that he writes, “Politics, which cannot be taught by knowledge-inquiry, becomes central to wisdom-inquiry, political creeds and actions being subjected to imaginative and critical scrutiny.” Indeed, “economics, politics, sociology, and so on, are not, fundamentally, sciences, and do not, fundamentally, have the task of improving knowledge about social phenomena.” They rather “articulate problems of living,” propose and assess policies, ranking those problems and policies into a hierarchy of aims. In this, they share with the humanities the task of “enhancing our ability to enter imaginatively into the problems and lives of others,” especially (one might add) when presented in the literary form of dialogue, as Socrates is portrayed to have done. 

    What can these inquiries into politics learn from natural-science empiricism as Maxwell understands it? Several things. Although human civil societies can scarcely be subjected to the double-blind experimental method—for starters, controlling the variables is a dauntingly balky task—some “proposals for action can be shown to be unacceptable quite decisively as a result of experience acquired through attempting to put the proposal into action.” The attempt to act in accordance with the proposal sometimes wrecks the aim of the proposal, as for example the many attempts to impose civil-social equality by empowering a centralized state charged with enforcing it, a regime change which more or less universally succeeds in instituting a new ruling class, and the civil-social inequality that goes with that institution. Given the difficulties of rigorously-controlled social experimentation, aim-oriented empiricists will need to resort to thought experiments and to ‘comparative politics’ (whereby they consider the results of regime paths actually taken); the sloppiness inherent in such inquiries counsels the virtue of patience, especially inasmuch as “humanity does not have the aptitude or desire for wisdom that scientists have for knowledge,” as Maxwell drily remarks. 

    What institutional reforms could be attempted? Maxwell ends by thinking about the regimes he knows best, those of the modern universities. “Every national university system needs to include a national shadow government, seeking to do virtually, free of the constraints of power, what the actual national government ought to be doing. The hope would be that virtual and actual governments would learn from each other.” This may strike one as a wan hope. At present, it is as likely that virtual and actual governments would corrupt each other, primarily because that is what they have been doing, lately. Modern university administrators are anything but “free from the constraints of power.” Almost all of them depend upon monetary support from governments, support that quite understandably comes not with strings but often with chain attached. Further, they have increasingly accepted constraints imposed by militant student groups, often egged on by faculty, to bend the educational purposes and methods of the universities in directions not suggested by aim-oriented empiricism. 

    “The world’s universities need to include a virtual world government which seeks to do what an actual elected world government ought to do, if it existed,” “working out how an actual democratically elected world government might be created.” But why would this happen? Why would a consortium of the world’s universities instead replicate that other world-government experiment, the woebegone United Nations? More fundamentally, would a world government, even one (somehow) democratically elected, be a good thing for humanity to have? 

    The good thing about “aim-oriented empiricism” is that it does allow the intellectual leg-room to walk into and around such a question, and many others. In this, Maxwell is a good Peripatetic. 

     

     

     

    Notes

    1. On the philosophic necessity of political philosophy, see Delba Winthrop: Aristotle: Democracy and Political Science (2019), reviewed on this site under the title, “What Good Is Democracy?” and Heinrich Meier: “Why is Political Philosophy?” in Meier: Political Philosophy and the Challenge of Revealed Religion (2019), discussed on this site under the title, “Chateaubriand and Political Philosophy.”
    2. For a defense of Aristotelian physics in light of modern physics, see David Bolotin: An Approach to Aristotle’s Physics: With Particular Attention to His Manner of Writing (1997), reviewed on this site under the title, “Aristotelian Physics.”
    3. See Stephen Schwartz: A Brief History of Analytical Philosophy (2012), reviewed on this website under the title, “What Is Analytic Philosophy?” For critiques of analytic philosophy, see Henry B. Veatch: Two Logics: The Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy (1969), reviewed on this site under the title, “Is Logic ‘About’ Anything?” and Stanley Rosen: The Limits of Analysis (1980), reviewed on this site under the title, “Delimiting Philosophy.”
    4. Maxwell elaborates this point in two books: From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities (London: Pentire Press, 2007) and Science and Enlightenment: Two Great Problems of Learning (Cham: Springer, 2019).

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    State and Regime in America: The Articles of Confederation, Pro and Con

    November 14, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    George William Van Cleve: We Have Not a Government: The Articles of Confederation and the Road to the Constitution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017.

     

    At the end of August in 1787, the French chargé d’affaires in the United States reported to his superiors at Versailles that the American “provinces” tended toward democracy, and therefore to instability. As the turmoil increased, he predicted, the Union would dissolve, as the federal government lacked the authority to prevent its own demise. The French government, he added, could watch this devolution with equanimity; by its timely intervention in the American war for independence, the French had deprived Britain of “that vast continent.” Given the geopolitical purposes of the Bourbon monarchy, that sufficed. Further American woes “will not be regretted by us.” They might indeed prove beneficial, as a North America divided into small-to-medium-sized states, along European lines, could lend itself to a French return to imperial balance-of-power ‘great politics’ on the continent. 

    For the Americans themselves, Van Cleve writes, “the true heart of the controversy over the Confederation’s collapse was whether Americans were willing to transfer sovereignty—tax and enforcement powers—to a central government.” More precisely, the American people needed to decide whether to delegate a greater portion of their own sovereignty from the states to the central government. That government already had some elements of such delegated sovereignty but it lacked power to raise money to make them effective.

    “Like the revolution, the Confederation’s final years were marked by deep divisions about whether and how two fluid, potentially conflicting ideas—empire and republicanism—should be embodied in any new central government.” To elaborate, Americans disputed what kind of state they wanted and what kind of regime they wanted. In terms of the state, how big did Americans want their country to be, and more, how centralized did they want their government to be? In terms of regime, it was agreed that the United States should be a republic, but what were the implications for republicanism of increasing the federal state’s size and centralization? Would America become the Rome of the New World, eventually sacrificing its republicanism on the altar of empire? 

    In pointing to these political questions, Van Cleve rightly corrects the socio-economic interpretations of Charles Beard and Merrill Jensen, who deny that the Confederacy suffered from any real crisis at all, claiming that the 1787 of the Constitution amounted to little more than a power grab, a “conservative counter-revolution” by the American gentry class. Without in any way ignoring the financial and other economic dimensions of the matter, Van Cleve emphasizes that “Confederation reform was driven most heavily by the perceived need to create a sovereign national government”—sovereign in the sense of power delegated by the sovereign people, sovereignty they are forever entitled to rearrange to their liking, under the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” Such a government “could preserve American independence, protect western expansion, combat foreign trade aggression, provide unified continental government and law enforcement, and maintain internal order.” He adds, “the Confederation lacked every one of those capabilities.” 

    Van Cleve begins with a description of American civil society as it emerged from the Revolutionary War. Socially, the war democratized American society; having won their independence on the battlefield, ordinary Americans scarcely intended to turn their governance over to the native gentry classes. The 25,000-to 30,000 American war deaths were the equivalent of 3 million deaths today, with the South suffering the most. On the civil-social level, the gentry could not rule alone, as “the increased prominence of the middling class…played a role in shaping the new constitutions adopted during the war by nearly all states” in the Union. In many states, this meant that voting rights were extended far beyond any other country in the world—even in Massachusetts, where John Adams’s 1780 constitution “was clearly intended to maintain rule by property owners,” and much more dramatically in Pennsylvania, where property qualifications (“other than” for purposes of “tax paying”) were eliminated altogether.

    At the same time, the war threw the federal government far into debt. Like so many governments before and since, the government sought to reduce its debt by inflating the currency, issuing “about $241 million in paper money”—a sum that may have been “larger than the entire American gross domestic product at the time.” Although the peace treaty with Britain stipulated that British creditors were to be permitted to recover “the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts,” that wasn’t going to happen. Not only inflation, but the attendant high interest rates, lack of capital for investment, the absence of proper bankruptcy laws, and a severe recession did nothing to improve the temper of the sovereign people, ninety percent of whom lived on farms and thus needed to borrow money against the projected value of their annual harvests. 

    Politically, the republican regime therefore faced threats from foreign creditors—European empires, some still with a military presence on the continent—and a formidable class of domestic ‘creditors,’ namely, the soldiers, a class of men known to have overthrown republics in the past. How to proceed?

    Congress debated several policies. The federal government might retain the existing “requisition” system, accepting monies from the states to pay federal debts. It might design new tax powers for itself. It might also sell its vast western lands. It might even turn “most if not all of the Confederation debt over to the states for repayment.” “Some historians claim that transferring the domestic debt to the states and land sales would have solved the Confederation’s debt problem without any need for requisitions.” Mere budget-cutting and deficit financing, both of which the government did, didn’t come close to solving the problem, and by 1786 by Confederation “was not even covering its normal operating costs.” 

    The requisition system failed because states were either unwilling or in some cases, especially in the South, unable to pay. But “states chose not to pay requisitions primarily because they were politically unpopular, not because the states or their people could not afford to pay them.” This raised questions about the viability of civil-socially democratic republics, which evidently lacked sense of moral responsibility needed to govern themselves sufficiently to meet their financial obligations. “No one ever proposed a workable method of forcing states to comply with requisitions”; as Elbridge Gerry remarked, even if the foreign and domestic debts were separated, the Southern states wouldn’t repay the Northerners, and the Northerners would retaliate by “refus[ing] to pay their share of the foreign debts or Confederation expenses.” What is more, many in the war-ravaged South saw little or no reason to pay anything to the Brits: As more than one aggrieved debtor asked, “If we are now to pay the debts due the British merchants, what have we been fighting for all this while?” And obviously, too pay any of the debt in sharply depreciated currency amounted to welshing on the loans by other means. Either way, the federal state would soon disintegrate altogether, its public credit ruined, the political credit of democratic republicanism to follow.

    What about selling the Western lands? To be sold, they first needed properly to be surveyed. In 1785, surveyors in the Western territories reported to Congress that two of the Amerindian tribes had politely let it be known that if they were to proceed in their assigned task they would be “made prisoners, or killed and Scalped.” In its compassion, and perhaps in view of their uneasy fiscal relations with the army, Congress relented. Further, “the western lands proved to be worth little in the 1780s.” Supply exceeded demand, demand having slackened considerably in view of Indian hostility. Congress did sell some five million acres by 1787, garnering some $760,000. Given the $50 million federal debt, this was unimpressive.

    Taxation by Congress proved equally disagreeable to American democrats, who “firmly believed that granting the Confederation taxation powers would lead inevitably to the creation of a British-style aristocracy or monarchy, destroying republican freedom.” That is, solving the financial dilemma of the American national state by granting it the power to tax would destroy the American national regime. True, the slogan of the American Revolution had been ‘no taxation without representation’; true, Americans had won representation, republicanism, in that revolution; nonetheless, they still didn’t want to pay taxes. Redistribution of the tax burden “based purely on ability to pay was either politically unthinkable or unlikely to have succeeded politically.”  In the end, states did pay about one-third of the national war debt, but any more was politically, though not financially, impossible.

    Several attempts to empower Congress to impose taxes also failed. Opponents deprecated such measures on both ‘regime’ and ‘statist’ grounds, despite support from such luminaries as George Washington, James Madison, and Robert Morris. For most of the 1780s, the argument that Congressional power to enact an impost “was exactly the same kind of claim made by the British government before the revolution to authorize it to tax Americans.” Even the implication “that Congress had inherent tax powers” was too much for opponents to countenance. This notwithstanding, eight states soon agreed to an import tax, but to no more than that. Farmers, especially, had no interest in helping to fund the national debt, since their markets were local, not international, and good relations with foreigners meant nothing to them. “Many Americans” also “feared that if Congress became more powerful, it might seek to control the states in the interest of an aristocratic elite or a new king.” And, that being the case, “nothing in the Confederation’s structure required or even encouraged the states’ leaders to consider anything other than their individual states’ economic and political interests.”

    European imperial interests further impeded Americans’ efforts at international trade. Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, with its important arguments in favor of free trade among nations, had yet to make a favorable impression, and in any case Europe’s rulers “thought that American expansion would inevitably harm their economic and military interests.” Europeans considered free trade desirable within their empires, not among them, and typically tied their trade agreements to their military alliance structures. Without a strong federal government, American trade negotiators had no leverage with their counterparts. 

    Britain remained America’s major trading partner, but it had closed the British West Indies to American trade before the close of the war and had no intention of reopening it. British imperialists and merchants backed Lord Sheffield, who advocated continued restriction of imperial trade to British ships manned by British sailors. Americans had no choice but to deal with Brits on British terms because only “British merchants would provide American merchants and consumers with credit” to purchase their manufactures; “other European countries would not provide credit.” Moreover, in Sheffield’s words, “the interests of the States are so opposite in matters of Commerce,” and Congress’s authority was so limited, that “no defensive precautions need to be feared on the part of the U.S.” France and Spain were no more cooperative.

    Even in the United States itself, strong desire for international commerce was limited to the merchant classes along the Atlantic coast. Some Americans worried “that increased commerce would allow the spread of luxury, which they thought inevitably corrupted republican virtue”; some wanted protection for domestic manufactures; others imagined that trade caused “money scarcity”; still others thought merchants “greedy, unpatriotic monopolists.” By contrast, sturdy agrarian, republican yeomen seldom sold their crops to foreign countries. 

    But the states faced a serious problem. Their own tariff restrictions on foreign imports didn’t hold. If one state imposed a restriction, “it was in the interest of other states to undercut it and reap the benefits of the trade lost by the state engaging in retaliation.” At the same time, they could not agree to strengthen the federal government since, as the Massachusetts delegation in Congress wrote to the state legislature, a stronger government “will afford lucrative Employments, civil & military.” “Such a government is an Aristocracy, which would require a standing Army & a numerous train of pensioners & placemen to prop & support its exalted Administration.” Such a regime change would in turn result in the breakup of the federal Union. 

    The Annapolis Convention of September 1786 reached an agreement to hold a constitutional convention in Philadelphia the following year. But it was poorly attended; only three states’ delegations showed up, a grand total of a dozen men. Yet the convention, famously, occurred. Why did legislatures in such key states as Virginia and Massachusetts change their minds?

    What united North and South in support of a convention was the set of controversies arising over western expansion, which both regions wanted to see, and neither could do effectively without a stronger federal government. In the 1780s, “the West was the scene of ruthless conflict and terrorism.” “More than half the landmass it covered was Indian territory,” and they killed some 1,500 white settlers “in Kentucky alone.” The settlers themselves were squatters on “Confederation lands”—i.e., lands also claimed by the Indians, in many if not all instances. Allied with the still-remaining British forces which hadn’t been evacuated from their western fortifications, the Iroquois Six Nations Confederacy was formidable, given the imbecility of the United States government. The states couldn’t help, either; in 1784, Virginia simply ceded its claims in the Ohio Valley. Under existing conditions, George Washington suspected, the western settlers might turn to secession, bringing in foreign powers as allies. He was correct. There were indeed separationist settlements among the settlers.

    Spain and Britain were the principal foreigners in question. In the South, Spain regarded its Indian allies as “critical to maintaining their positions in Louisiana and Florida,” blocking American expansion. Spain signed a secret treaty with the Creeks, providing them with substantial armaments; it stopped short of sending troops, however. In the North, where Britain did have troops, the containment policy consisted of encouraging the formation of an Indian confederacy, which launched damaging raids on American settlers. They didn’t give arms to the Indians outright, but were happy to sell, as the Iroquois Confederacy made good revenue from the fur trade. “Britain’s and Spain’s western strategies were made less costly” because Congress refused to establish a standing army of any size. “As a result, the United States had only a few hundred troops in the West after 1783.”

    Virginians couldn’t fund a war against Indians who attacked settlers in Kentucky, then part of Virginia. Without military support from the federal government, either, “many Virginians now decided that they wanted the Confederation strengthened so that it would have a military force to assist them against Native Americans, the British, and other possible enemies.” 

    Meanwhile, the Spanish Empire closed the Mississippi River to American navigation. The Mississippi was critical to western settlement, as it provided an outlet for western farm produce, which could scarcely be transported over the Allegheny and Appalachian mountains in the days of dirt roads and Indian harassment. Like the Americans and the Indians, the Spanish claimed “much of the Mississippi River and surrounding territory at least north to the Ohio River.” They were willing to grant a trade treaty with the United States, but at the price of continuing the ban on American use of the Mississippi. The treaty John Jay negotiated with Spain conceded this point, but the Southern states particularly opposed it, Congressman Charles Pinckney of South Carolina going so far as to charge that it was part of a New England plot to retain its trade advantages. “Northern and southern states had reached an impasse not just on the treaty but on the viability of the Confederation itself. Both sides threatened secession.” The Northern state representatives in Congress decided to call the Southerners’ bluff, forcing the treaty through. This only sharpened secessionist intentions in the South, as many Southerners calculated that it would be better to relinquish the Union than to give up the prospect of navigation on the Mississippi.

    What brought the Northern states’-righters to their senses was Shays’s Rebellion in western Massachusetts, a revolt of farmers against the merchants in Boston who controlled the state government. Although the rebellion failed, Massachusetts politicians saw that they might well need federal military assistance in suppressing future violence, and several other Northern states came around to the same realization. 

    The rebellion centered on two grievances: debt relief and tax relief. Debt relief was tied to the states’ use of paper money. Because currency inflation enabled debtors to stiff creditors, who were wealthy, Benjamin Franklin regarded it as effectively “a tax imposed largely on the wealthy.” Creditors understandably thought otherwise, noting that non-payment of debts, or repayment in depreciated currency, gave them a strong incentive not to lend money at all in the future, which would paralyze the economy, including the farm economy. Politically, the struggle played out as a question of democracy. South Carolina politicians “justified their economic relief program on the basis that democratic majorities had power to take necessary actions to protect the public good”; the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Charleston intoned, “Vox Populi Vox Dei.” Popular sovereignty entitled legislatures to pass post facto laws altering debt contracts “to protect debtors, including by paying specie debts with paper money instead.” This “gave republican majorities unlimited power over both private and public contracts,” a power regarded as majority tyranny by creditors. Democrats defended their claim by condemning bankers as oligarchs, but even that staunch democrat, Thomas Paine, condemned such legislation as ruinous to republicanism because it violated the trust—quite literally the ‘credit’—upon which equal citizenship must rest.

    Rhode Island, the most strongly democratic state in the country, illustrated Paine’s argument. “Some merchants left the state; others refused to sell good, including food, and closed their stores rather than accept paper money.” Other states were enraged when Rhode Island paid its debts to them in Rhode Island paper money, calling its citizens “cheats,” “traitors to the nation,” “armed plunderers of their neighbors,” democratic tyrants, and examples of “human depravity.” This edged more and more Americans toward demanding institutional reform of the federal government “to prevent interstate harms.” 

    In Massachusetts, struggling farmers in the western part of the state demanded paper money, debt relief, and tax relief. The insurgency began in August 1786, and initially consisted of armed men blocking judges from the courts in which debt and tax cases were tried. Tax delinquencies in the state had already emptied the state treasury, and the state needed “to borrow money from merchants to fund an army.” Even that wasn’t enough. The government was powerless to act when the rebels moved against the federal arsenal in Springfield. United States Secretary of War Henry Knox persuaded Congress to reinforce it with federal troops, but Congress “had no money to pay its new troops,” either, and borrowed money against sale of western lands to fund the expedition—the very lands in which American rule was disputed by Indians, the Spanish, and the British. 

    The crisis sobered the more sensible Massachusetts democrats. Men like Washington and Madison, Adams and Jefferson, needed no convincing on the matter of a new constitution. They already wanted one, and some regarded Shays’s Rebellion as relatively minor, in itself. But now many of the skeptics also relented. All agreed that Massachusetts’s inability to quell the rebellion without federal assistance portended ruin for both republican regimes in America and what Madison would soon call the “extended republic,” America’s federal republican empire. “There are combustibles in every state,” Washington warned. With most Massachusetts politicians now firmly on board, prospects for a constitutional convention brightened.

    The Virginia legislature approved Madison’s convention proposal in November, citing the Confederation government’s “inability to pay the nation’s debts as the primary reason why reform was needed.” In the words of the legislature’s resolution, “the crisis has arrived at which the good people of America are to decide the solemn question, whether they will be wise and magnanimous efforts rea the just fruits of that Independence which they have so gloriously acquired.” Although U.S. indebtedness was the primary reason, for the first time the Virginians “imposed no limits on the reforms the convention could consider.” This “unmistakably signaled to other states Virginia’s acceptance that they would propose consideration of additional reforms such as Confederation commerce powers.” 

    New York politicians remained divided, many unintimidated by Shays’s Rebellion. Governor George Clinton based his electoral coalition on the farmers, not the merchants of New York City. He and his ally, State Senator Abraham Yates, wanted to prohibit any reforms proposed by the convention “repugnant to or inconsistent with” the New York state constitution. This would have barred consideration of granting power of taxation to the federal government and in the end “would have prevented any agreement by the convention at all.” This attempt didn’t work; New York did send delegates to Philadelphia. But as late as the first presidential election under the 1787 Constitution, Clinton would continue to resist enhanced federal authority, effectively delaying the proceedings of New York’s electors until they could not arrive in time to cast their votes in the Electoral College. In the end, only Rhode Island boycotted the Convention.

    Ever-prudent General Washington held back from committing to attend the Convention until he was convinced that it was serious. If it were not, the Union might dissolve and his reputation would suffer. He wanted to see that this would be no Annapolis Convention, with a small minority of states participating. He also wanted to see delegates chosen who were not ciphers but “capable men who were unfettered by restrictive state instructions intended to block the ‘radical cures’ that he thought were needed.” Satisfied that these criteria had been met, he headed north. “Washington’s overarching goal was to create a government that was a sovereign power capable of governing America as it expanded westward—a continental empire.” “Sovereign” meant the power to tax, a power that would enable the government “to pay its just debts and to support an army”—fundamentally, as Washington put it, to provide “the means of coercion in the Sovereign [that] will enforce obedience to the Ordinances of a General Government; without which, everything else fails.”

    Van Cleve concludes that state politicians came to the same conclusion for different reasons, whether it was fear of domestic insurrection, the need to defend settlers from Indian attacks, the threat of the containment strategies enacted by Britain and Spain, indignation at the failure to repay debts, or concerns about economic calamity. The delegates to the Convention “took very large political risks not out of selfish class interest, and not just from perceived necessity, but from objective necessity.” To secure the safety and happiness of the people—the just purpose of any government, according to the Declaration of Independence—a better-designed federal government was simply indispensable. “The inescapable reality was that the United States existed in an imperial world. It would either maintain” what Washington called its “foederal dignity,” by “strengthening its national government or it would inevitably face dissolution followed by eventual European imperial takeover or civil war.” Or both, in either sequence.

     

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Regime Change in Japan

    November 5, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Toshio Nishi: Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1944-1952. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

     

    Japan’s defeat in World War II resulted not merely in surrender, but unconditional surrender to the United States and its allies. The United States had imposed unconditional surrender on a regime enemy before—in 1865, in defeating the Confederate States of America. Both the Confederacy and the Empire of Japan suffered physical devastation during those wars. Both the Confederacy and the Empire of Japan were also required to change their regimes from oligarchy to republicanism, or to what Nishi calls “unconditional democracy,” requiring years of political ‘reconstruction.’ Once its political structure was reintegrated into the United States, the Southern states backslid, as local political elites allied with working-class whites to reinstitute social and political subordination of the freed slaves. In Japan, however, ‘regime change’ or political revolution proved far more successful. Nishi, a Hoover Institution research fellow and teacher at the Institute of Moralogy in Kahiwa, Japan, shows how the Americans brought that off.

    He begins with a brief, useful overview of modern Japanese political history. From 1604 to 1867, the Tokugawa Shoguns ruled the country, maintaining an oligarch-‘feudal’ hierarchy within Japanese society. For most of that period, they kept Japan in a situation of splendid isolation from the West. By 1844, King William II of the Netherlands, that eminently commercial country, urged the Japanese to open their country to foreign trade, to avoid having it opened by force. In the 1840, British, French, and American naval commanders issued the same warning. Underestimating the military power now at the disposal of the Western countries, power afforded them by the technological advances made possible by modern-scientific experimental methods, the Shogunate refused to comply. In July 1853 U. S. Commodore Matthew C. Perry, President Millard Fillmore’s special envoy, arrived with an imposing naval squadron. The Japanese regime temporized, but by the following year Perry could return home with a Treaty of Peace and Amity in hand. With American English, Russian, and Dutch access to a limited number of ports, “the treaty introduced the concept of extraterritoriality to the Japanese people”; now not only present on Japanese soil but “immune from Japanese laws,” the foreigners soon provoked “bitter resentment among the Japanese” at what they took to be a form of colonization. 

    The lower-ranking Samurai rebelled, calling for a new imperial regime. Worried at the prospect of a military coup, the regime changed policy, now intending, as the rulers said, to “clear the barbarians out of the country.” A marriage between the presiding Shogun and a princess of the Imperial House “confirmed for the Japanese people the ultimate legitimacy of imperial governance.” But to make the expulsion of foreigners certain, the rebels waged civil war against the Shogunate, installing a new regime in 1868. “The new regime was named ‘Meiji’ or Enlightened Reign.” To the existing hierarchic “class structure based upon Confucian ethics,” the Meiji added modernization, understood as industrialization based on “adopting Western technological skills.” “The imperial government constructed new industrial plants and sold them to a few private merchants. Government protection, no competition, and great opportunities for expansions enabled those merchants to develop their firms into huge conglomerates, commonly called zaibatsu (literally, ‘financial cliques,’), that dominated the market through oligopoly.” Surely, the modern West must have “some vital secrets that were responsible for its superior technology.” “Various missions and many bright students were sent abroad to search them out.” Today’s readers will recognize the identical strategy in post-Maoist China. Upon returning to Japan, the young scholars brought back not only scientific knowledge but an ideological mishmash of Rousseau, British liberalism, Prussian statism, the various and contradictory economic notions of Malthus, Smith, Mill, and List, and the philosophic doctrines of modern historicism found in Kant, Hegel, Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. The regime frowned upon much of this, especially Western political thought. 

    “Enrich the Nation! Strengthen Its Arms!” “The regime neither question nor resisted the imperialistic propensity that was inherent” in these slogans, instead “dreaming of a civilized and mighty utopia,” somehow blending Western technology with Eastern spirituality. Japan’s first prime minister, Ito Hirobumi, proclaimed bushido, the “warrior’s code,” based on what he described as “an education which aspired to the attainment of Stoic heroism, a rustic simplicity and a self-sacrificing spirit unsurpassed in Sparta, and the aesthetic culture and intellectual refinement of Athens”—none of which produced modern technology because none possessed the spirit of modern science, founded on the aspiration to conquer nature, a project imbued with neither heroism, nor rustic simplicity, nor self-sacrifice, nor aesthetic culture, nor classical philosophy. Sure enough, the Education Act of 1872, with its emphasis on vocational training and “success in life,” in many respects replaced the Confucian Analects with Samuel Smiles’s Self-Help, a tract famed for its aphorism, “Heaven helps those who help themselves.” Regime control over the academic world successfully bridled those whose ‘Western learning’ had gone in politically distasteful directions.

    Ideational incoherence notwithstanding, the policy worked, for a while. In 1895, Imperial Japan defeated China; ten years later, it defeated Russia. It chose the winning side in World War I. “Because of its xenophobic fascination with the West,” Imperial Japan “was extraordinarily sensitive to the military and political movements of the Western powers,” even as the Chinese regime has become, today. “This sensitivity found expression in a fervent and uncompromising nationalism; the Japanese oligarchs of the late nineteenth century had ‘rectified’ the nation’s indulgent dependence upon the West and restored the ‘real Japan,'” as militarism “began to pervade Japanese domestic and foreign policies.” After the war, the multiplying apprehensions of the Western regimes led them to sit down with the Japanese at the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference, resulting in a naval arms limitation treaty preserving American and British superiority. This, coupled with “racist treatment of Japanese immigrants” in the United States (whose Progressive intellectuals were still under the sway of ‘race-science’ illusions), “left a lasting bitterness in the minds of the Japanese people.” “Ironically, the American treatment of Japanese immigrants matched the Japanese treatment of Koreans and Chinese people in Japan was well as in their native countries,” now dominated by Japanese military power. 

    The year 1931 saw the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. Stung by the League of Nations’ condemnation of the invasion, Japan withdrew from the league, the regime feeling “that they were humiliated every time they succeeded in the very game that the West had introduced to Asia.” The military and industrial oligarchy “collectively interpreted the civility of one nation toward another as a clear sign of weakness,” and convinced themselves that “foreign policy was not a matter of diplomacy but of conspiracy.” By 1937, nearly 69 percent of the Japanese gross national product was going to military expenditures. By then, the regime had abrogated the Washington Naval Agreement. The Ministry of the Army began its statement of policy with a principle drawn not from Confucius but from Heraclitus: “War is the father of creation and the mother of culture.” Since war requires the proverbial sinews of war, “the Japanese emphasis on material wealth was an ideological necessity for nation building,” and material wealth in modernity required “a literate and skillful labor force.” Nonetheless, by the aftermath of the Great War Japan saw riots sparked by inflation in rice prices caused by crop failure and hoarding. 

    Presiding over this regime was the Emperor, who “filled an important symbolic role for the new and insecure regime.” “At once the most personal and the most transcendent institution” in the country, the Emperor “became the ultimate political instrument that the imperial oligarchy used to solidify and legitimize its power” both at home and in its empire. The 1889 Imperial Constitution described the imperial line s one “unbroken for ages eternal” and the Emperor himself as “sacred and inviolable.” The three ruling bodies of the regime—the ministers of state, the military forces, and the Emperor’s Privy Council (the latter an extraconstitutional body) framed “the crucial policies of imperial Japan,” with the imperial legislature set to one side as “a vigorous debating society.” The Constitution “affirmed itself as ‘an immutable fundamental law,” and did indeed remain unchanged until its abrogation by the Allied occupiers in 1946. 

    Every regime needs its myths, and Imperial Japan nourished its share. Shinto, “the Way of the Gods,” valorized deceased emperors and empresses as gods, as “the regime instituted a cult of antiquity” to go along with its cult of modernity. The gods themselves endorsed imperial rule and Japanese nationalism in a regime in which “dissent was treason” and indeed sacrilege. “Suppression of civil liberties grew so habitual that the Government stopped justifying its actions. It interpreted the public fear, silence, and acquiescense as public tranquility.” Then as now, much nonsense was thought about economic growth somehow leading to civic freedom. On the contrary, “internal solidarity had been engineered at the expense of freedom of thought and action—freedoms that might have grown, as Japanese intellectuals of both left and right had once thought, to be inherent by products of modernization and industrialization.” “Every aspect of Japanese life was now dominated by war,” under the approving gaze of the sacred Emperor.

    The big war that came next ended in disaster for the Meiji regime. The political outcome proved much less disastrous than it did for Germany because, although at the July 1945 Potsdam Conference the American president, Harry Truman, gave Stalin’s Russia control over the Kurile islands, rule over the rest of the country remained in American hands, specifically those of General Douglas MacArthur. Although the Japanese rulers who stipulated provisions for freedom of speech, religion, and thought and other “fundamental human rights” may not have “fully comprehended nor accepted these provisions,” MacArthur understood them quite clearly, and set about implementing the new ruling institutions that would secure them for the Japanese people. And of course this occurred after the United States firebombed Tokyo and dropped nuclear devices on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By early September, the Emperor ordered his people “to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out all the provisions of instrument of surrender and the general orders issued by the Japanese government,” as he in turn had been ordered to do by the United States. For their part, General MacArthur and his occupation forces would introduce “radical policies aimed at destroying everything that was even suggestive of Japanese loyalty to the ancient regime.” 

    Advised by President Truman that “our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender,” that “your authority is supreme,” and that “you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope,” MacArthur additionally, and quite sensibly, opposed any sharing of power in Japan with the Soviet regime, which had already massed troops on the 38th Parallel in Korea. Efforts to establish civilian control, or at least limitations, upon the general by the State Department proved feeble, as MacArthur’s executive powers, exercised ‘on the ground’ in Japan and not in Washington, D.C., trumped all others. When U.S. officials (quickly) saw that the Soviets were no friends of the United States, the Cold War began and MacArthur’s authority stood unchallenged. He used it to change the Japanese regime.


    Immediately after the surrender documents were signed, MacArthur recalled that “Commodore Perry, ninety-two years ago,” had intended “to bring to Japan an era of enlightenment and progress by lifting the veil of isolation to the friendship, trade, and commerce of the world. But alas the knowledge thereby gained of Western science was forged into an instrument of oppression and human enslavement.” Now that “freedom is on the offensive, democracy on the march,” Japan would be turned toward “a simple philosophy embodying principles of right and justice and decency,” away from its odd regime combining feudalism (by which he meant oligarchy and civil religion) with modern science and a form of nationalism that despised human rights. Under this regime, the Japanese had become “not only politically illiterate but politically indifferent,” having had no serious opportunity for civic life. Under American occupation, Japan had now “become the world’s great laboratory for an experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian military rule and for the liberalization of government from within.” 

    The experiment was daunting, as most republican regimes had arisen only after a long apprenticeship of limited self-government—typically, some form of constitutional monarchy. MacArthur had no such luxury. On the other hand, the collapse of the Meiji regime presented a novel situation: what MacArthur called a “collapse of a faith” which “left a complete vacuum morally, mentally, and physically.” But “the plight of the Japanese, MacArthur bluntly told the Japanese, was their own fault.” His fifteen-point policy aimed at filling that vacuum. “First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernize the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women. Release political prisoners. Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize education. decentralize the political power. Separate church from state.” He also called for Christian missionaries to establish themselves in Japan. Some 10 million Bibles were distributed, as MacArthur hoped Christianity’s “spiritual repugnance of war” would take hold among the people. Conversion rates were unimpressive, however. More effective was his use of athletics to teach rules of fairness and to redirect the strong Japanese sense of honor to a peaceful form of competition. 

    These types of civil-social forms of rule were indispensable supplements to the institutional revolution. The Japanese needed to assimilate republican forms of government, learn to use them, habituate themselves to them. First among these efforts was demilitarization. He purged the government of its military men and proclaimed former prime minister and army general Tojo Hideki “Japan’s first war criminal.” Tojo gave MacArthur unwitting assistance by failing at his suicide attempt, intensifying his dishonor by using a pistol instead of the traditional samurai sword. By October 1946, after a process of screening by the Japanese government, MacArthur had removed 186,000 employees from the national government; all military personnel were barred from holding public office. He also ordered a national election for a new, and newly-empowered House of Representatives. Crucially, Japanese voters avoided candidates from the far left and the far right. By April of the following year, old-regime elements had also been purged from the local governments in time for the country’s first election of provincial and municipal executives and assemblymen. In May, Japan had its first prime minister elected by the people, the democratic socialist Katayama Tetsu. 

    On the religious front, “Japanese conservatives worried that without Shinto and imperial sovereignty japan would never be strong again.” To counter this sentiment, MacArthur redoubled his efforts to sever all connection between Temple and State. “One conspicuous reason for the ferocity of GHQ’s attack on the former state religion was that the origins of the imperial system and of Shinto were virtually indistinguishable,” the emperor being “the object and primary practitioner of Shinto rituals,” combining the functions of High Priest and principal deity. MacArthur and his team described this as nothing short of “ideological tyranny so insidious and all-pervasive as to reduce to impotence all opposition, whether of individual or of ideas.” 

    The first step to economic reform was equally draconian. The U.S. government initially reduced the Japanese to “a subsistence economy” in order to “accelerate the disintegration of the Japanese Empire and guarantee the future paralysis of any potential Japanese war machines” while effectively destroy socioeconomic hierarchies which supported the old regime. Consequently, “MacArthur swiftly began dissolving zaibatsu, those family-centered financial conglomerates that had played such a part in the development of Japanese business and commerce” as modern versions of feudal fiefs. To avert mass starvation, MacArthur distributed food to the Japanese; hunger took much of the remaining ‘fight’ out of them. But the Americans saw that a subsistence economy could and should not be maintained for long, concluding “that the risk of a strong, capitalistic Japan becoming a future military threat to the United States was less than that of an economically feeble Japan becoming a prey to international communist encroachment.” The newly-formed Central Intelligence Agency understood that the nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-Shek was on the brink of defeat in China, with Mao Zedong’s Communist Party poised to take over rule of the mainland. For their part, Japanese civilian leaders “understood that the United States needed Japan as much as they themselves wanted American money and security.” The two sides began to bargain.

    A substantial spur to Japanese economic recovery was MacArthur’s land reform; from the American “standpoint of making every Japanese laborer a good capitalist, his land reform was brilliant policy.” Landlords were forced to turn their lands over to “those farmers who actually cultivated it.” Unlike Russia and China, Japan saw no inroads by the communists in the countryside. Since communist organizers had used peasants in other countries as a crucial element in their revolutions, this reform contributed substantially to ruining communist hopes for a ‘people’s revolution’ directed by Stalinists. 

    Despite MacArthur’s efforts to present himself as a mere guide to the Japanese on “the road to democracy,” they “knew he was over and above even the emperor.” This meant that MacArthur’s long-term presence in the country could not be justified, if Japan was truly to adapt its way of life to a republican regime. For a few years, however, the militarist ethos the Meiji regime had instilled in the people worked in the Americans’ favor; the fact that MacArthur and the Americans had won and their leaders had lost valorized the Americans and dishonored the Japanese militarists. As far as many Japanese were concerned, there was no objection to starting the war, but losing it was a disgrace. It would take another generation to substitute that ethos for a commercial-republican one.

    Accordingly, press freedom in postwar Japan most immediately meant freedom from old-regime propaganda, and emphatically not “destructive criticism of the Allied Powers” or “the Allied forces of occupation.” MacArthur did abrogate prewar laws and ordinances “that subjugated the press” to the Japanese government, an important move in the long run. On balance, “American democracy, no matter how one interprets it, offered far more intellectual freedom and political liberties to the Japanese people than they had ever experienced before 1945.” 

    Nishi describes MacArthur’s dismissal of “the possibility of a spontaneous development of Japanese democracy” as self-righteous. It was hardly that, but rather a matter of common sense. “The Japanese leaders were more comfortable with the familiar tyranny of the oligarchic cliques than with the tyranny of the ignorant masses, which was what they imagined popular sovereignty to be.” As MacArthur therefore saw, “We could not simply encourage the growth of democracy. We had to make sure that it grew.” There was no time for Burkeanism. Accordingly, MacArthur set the Japanese to writing a new, republican constitution. When the first draft came back looking rather like a Japanese version of the Southern ‘Redeemers’ policies in post-Reconstruction America, the general rejected it. “Their skill in fashioning facades involving no structural remodeling” of the old regime institutions “was notable,” the general remarked, tartly and accurately. The Japanese wanted to continue the emperor’s anointment as a “supreme and inviolable” being. The last Meiji prime minister stated that the surrendering regime accepted the Potsdam Declaration with the proviso that the Emperor’s prerogatives would be infringed in no way, but by New Year’s Day 1946 the Emperor himself “denied his divinity.”

    That was an indispensable beginning, but regime change requires the right institutional framework, not just declarations. MacArthur ordered his staff to write a constitution consistent with the regime America wanted. When “the Japanese Government finally realized that MacArthur had no interest in compromising his version of what the United States wanted—or what Japan in future should want,” the government split into supporters of the new Constitution and its enemies. The supporters prevailed, partly because MacArthur at least granted the emperor status as “the symbol of the State,” whereas other American proposals would have deprived him of even that. After Emperor Hirohito proclaimed it law, MacArthur could call it “the most important accomplishment of the Occupation,” and so it has proved to be. Aside from the desacralization of the emperor, the main features of the new constitution were elimination of kolutai, the imperial national policy; the guarantees of civil and political liberties; and Article 9, the “no-war clause.” 

    Why did it work? Nishi remarks that one must not assume “that the Japanese [were] so rooted in tradition that they could hardly change their political orientation or preferences.” After all, the Meiji regime itself dated back only to 1868, less than a century before the Americans arrived, and the aspiration to modernize had gripped Japanese elites a couple of decades before that. Indeed, “the celebrated Meiji Constitution of 1889 itself was an idealized version of Prussian constitutional absolutism”—that is, an importation from the West. Moreover, “Japanese reality during the 1940s was a nightmare, the end of which encouraged a mood of idealism and risk taking in conqueror and conquered alike.” In the event, whereas “Japanese conservatives attempted to preserve the structure of imperial sovereignty” by “inject[ing] some democratic practices into it to placate domestic and foreign suspicions,” MacArthur “did the reverse,” abolishing imperial sovereignty and “inject[ing] undemocratic practices for the sake of achieving democratic ends.” MacArthur prevailed because the Japanese people had had enough of the regime of imperialist oligarchs. “The vast majority of the people welcomed the substance of the new Constitution.” 

    Like all serious political founders, MacArthur understood he who rules the education system rules the country. In his own generation, American Progressives had done just that. Having framed a new constitution for Japan, “MacArthur had to teach the Japanese people how to use it in their daily lives.” Accordingly, “education in occupied Japan was fiercely political; to the U.S. government, it was the best instrument for achieving basic ideological change,” as it had been for American Progressives and indeed for the American Founders. Ergo, “no nationalism, no militarism, and no communism in Japanese education.” The need for this was urgent, because the Meiji regime had done such a thorough job of promoting its own ruling principles that “the word ‘intellectual’ in Japanese society automatically connoted ‘political.'” 

    Because the Meiji had promoted what amounted to a ‘success’-based ideology, its failure prepared the Japanese to respect “the invincible Americans.” General MacArthur made no effort to dissuade them of that sentiment. He used his absolute authority “not only to improve but actually to revolutionize the Japanese way of thinking about self-government,” to “constitutionally prevent the Japanese from fighting another war in the future” by “disarm[ing] the Japanese mind.” By October 1945, military training in the schools was abolished, military officers on school staffs were removed, and plans for reeducating teachers were formed. But that was not enough, as the Japanese Minister of Education dragged his feet. “The Americas understood [his] covert intention: to keep imperial sovereignty alive” in the minds of Japanese youth. To counter his efforts, MacArthur commanded that the Japanese government “revise the content of all educational instruction ‘in harmony with representative government, international peace, the dignity of the individual, and such fundamental human rights as the freedom of assembly, speech, and religion.'” More, the educational system would become a sort of permanent ‘truth and justice commission,’ informing students, teachers and the public about “the part played by  militaristic leaders, their active collaborators, and those who by passive acquiescence committed the nation to war with the inevitable result of defeat, distress, and the present deplorable state of the Japanese people,” as one directive put it. Since “the identification of the individual with the state was one of the primary themes” in Japanese education, “serv[ing] as a powerful reinforcement for the doctrine of state supremacy,” MacArthur’s education emphasized individualism based on human rights inherent in the human person as such. As for modern science, already esteemed by the old regime, MacArthur’s educational system taught that, contrary to the militarists, “a scientific attitude…was a peaceful attitude,” one rightly regarding “Japanese mythology, folklore, and even a sense of historical continuity [to be] something shameful and tainted with defeat.”

    Reforms extended to the Japanese language itself. The Japanese people had used a combination of three forms of writing: Katakana, the simplest form; hiragana, a “slightly more complex” form; and kanji, a “visibly more complicated” form. Robert King Hall, chief of the Education Section of the Planning Staff for the Occupation of Japan at  the Civil Affairs Staging Area, strongly recommended the use of the simplest form of written language in the educational system—in obvious contradiction to the spirit of aristocratic/oligarchic education embodied in kanji. After struggling to master the complexities of kanji, Hall argued, Japanese students “may lack the linguistic abilities essential to democratic citizenship,” such as reading “daily newspapers and popular magazine.” Nishi objects that Germany and Italy, Japan’s allies, had had vernacular languages for a long time, and turned to fascism anyway, this misses Hall’s point. German and Italian fascism were mass movements, ‘democratic’ and indeed demagogic. Further, to say that a vernacular or ‘democratized’ language does not necessarily result in a regime of democratic republicanism does not require one to deny that a highly complex language inclines the educated classes toward attitudes that fit an aristocratic civil society.

    The Americans introduced a final, structural reform to Japanese education. Since “the interests of individual human beings were not to be subordinated to those of the state,” control of education needed to be devolved from the central government to local school boards. Americans and Japanese alike “understood well that America-initiated school boards would take away power and prestige from the central government in Tokyo.” Problems arose because many Japanese didn’t understand the process, having never governed themselves at the local level. 

    By May 1946, the Japanese Ministry of Education effectively surrendered. In their Guide to New Education in Japan, they identified five defects of “Japanese outlook and character,” all deriving from the “general defects” of the “body politic and especially “in the wrong way of thinking of the people themselves.” First, they understood that “Japan is not sufficiently modernized,” by which they meant that the Japanese had “learned how to use steam engines and electrical apparatus” without “adequately learn[ing] the scientific spirt which had built these things.” Teachers must “make better use of our abilities to embrace and assimilate and take in the fundamental principles of Western Civilization, digest these principles and be able to use them as our own.” Second, “The Japanese Nation does not sufficiently respect Humanity, Character, nor Individuality”; since human beings have “free will,” each one has “a nature peculiar only to that particular person.” Education should proceed on this assumption. Related to this point and thirdly, “The Japanese lack critical spirit and are prone to obey authority blindly.” They must learn to reject “the idea that officials are better than civilians.” Fourth, “the Japanese people are scientifically backward and have a poor sense of logic.” Those who “are inclined to obey authority blindly” are also those who “did not have the ability to think logically.” To think logically, to be capable of analyzing policy proposals rationally, was the sine qua non of democratic self-government. Finally, “the democratic people are self-satisfied and narrow-minded,” taking “an arrogant and egoistic attitude toward those below them who are blindly obedient to their superiors.” Japanese racism and religious prejudice result from this unwarranted self-conceit. The May 1947 Fundamental Law on Education reinforced these policy changes, which were also regime changes.

    As the Japanese people began to grow “restless with the Occupation” (“Would it never end?” they wondered), the American government recommended that MacArthur negotiate a permanent peace treaty for the Cold War era. MacArthur initially demurred, but when the Korean War began in June 1950, and the purge of communists intensified, he inched toward such a settlement, completed in 1951. The occupation itself ended the following year.

    Nishi concludes that although “the Japanese people had to swallow many alien ideas and practices,” “much to their surprise…the people found these ideas and practices far from unpalatable.” “The Japanese people discovered democracy to be a pleasant, efficient, and even commercially profitable way of life.” The one remaining shadow over the new regime—which has endured nearly as long as the Meiji regime—”is best described as a craving for the aesthetic simplicity of vertical loyalty,” exploited by MacArthur, “unintentionally perpetuated” by him, and persisting as “a powerful undercurrent of indigenous emotion that runs against the tide of democracy.”

     

     

     

     

     

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