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    Archives for May 2020

    Shakespearean Comedy: Two Points on the Compass

    May 31, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: The Merry Wives of Windsor.

    William Shakespeare: Much Ado About Nothing.

     

    Shakespeare’s only English comedy, The Merry Wives of Windsor is also the purest of his comedies—the merriest, the most thoroughly funny of them, a bedroom farce in which almost no one gets into a bedroom. Set in continental Europe, Much Ado About Nothing threatens to veer into tragedy at any moment.

    At Windsor, the English knight, Sir John Falstaff, scion of erstwhile warrior-aristocrats, has turned not merely to commerce but to the lowest commerce, the kind that has no respect for property upon which commerce depends, trafficking in swindles, more generally to speculating on what is not legitimately his own, with his schemes of adultery. He illustrates the self-contradiction of the commercial spirit, which, taken in its purest form, undermines itself.The only other ‘sir’ in the play is another figure of fun, a Welsh parson, in a regime where foreigners are funny. In commercial England, the most serious characters are bourgeois gentlemen and gentlewomen—the former a bit too serious, the latter witty but never dangerous avengers.

    Not so on the continent. There, peaceful commerce has yet to replace war. There, the aristocrats are lords and ladies, rulers of states. They make war as well as love, alliances as well as money. Foreigners could be marriageable friends or deadly enemies. Much Ado About Nothing isn’t. It’s a comedy because it ends happily, but nearly does not. 

    Likely performed first at the Garter Feast on St. George’s Day, in Greenwich, following the election of the new knights, preceding their installation at Windsor, The Merry Wives of Windsor has gentlewomen outsmarting one knight while teaching their husbands a lesson. As in so many Shakespearean comedies, the women are wittier than the men and act as the real rulers of society, but here their wit instructs the knights-elect in the audience, who are brought to witness the hazards of being laughable. The story goes that Queen Elizabeth, who had delighted in Sir John Falstaff as the most memorable comic figure in the English History Plays, wanted to see him in love. Since Falstaff is by nature incapable of being ‘in love,’ loving only food and drink, sex and money, Shakespeare entangles him in not one but two love triangles, which are really sex triangles as far as the rotund and covetous knight is concerned.

    An English comedy might well turn on comic twists of the English language. This one does, throughout, with word-benders foreign and domestic hacking their way into the weeds of self-deception. At the outset, Justice of the Peace Robert Shallow complains of abuses of English law he’s suffered at the hands of Sir John. His cousin, Slender, reverses the meanings of “successors” and “ancestors”—deranging time, that course upon which legitimacy in both law courts (with their respect for precedent) and marriages (with their need for heirs) both run. Meanwhile, the Welsh parson, Hugh Evans, mixes up “luces,” a species of fish, with “louses,” a species of insect; the parson verbally deranges not time but nature. As a churchman he stands ready to reconcile legalist Justice Shallow and lawless Sir John, but the judge would rather keep things out of the divine realm and take the case to the Star Chamber. Parson Evans then falls back on the attempt to deflect the men’s attention toward a plot to marry Slender to Anne Page, a young lady of substantial dowry. If the churchman can’t overcome Shallow’s natural anger with divinely blessed peacemaking, he might do it with natural love.

    They knock on the door of the father of Miss Page, but Falstaff is there, reviving Justice Shallow’s animosity. “He hath wrong’d me, Master Page” (I.i.91). He has beaten my men, killed my deer, and broken open my lodge. Indeed I have, Falstaff replies in his own defense, but the Council will laugh at your charges. In the mind of Sir John, property claims in men, beasts, and buildings made by commoners will amount to very little among his fellow aristocrats. Slender has his own charges against Falstaff’s companion, Pistol, whom he alleges to have picked his pocket. Slender draws a sober lesson from the experience: “I’ll ne’er be drunk whilst I live again, but in honest, civil, godly company, for this trick. If I be drunk, I’ll be drunk with those that have the fear of God, and not with drunken knaves.” (I.i.162-66). In Slender, Pastor Evans has found a pious soul indeed, hoping to be Spirit-filled when next spirits-filled.

    “The question is concerning your marriage,” Pastor Evans declares (I.i.197-98), getting things back on track. Imitating the court-language he would have picked up from his cousin on ‘the reasonable man,’ Slender allows that “I will marry her upon any reasonable demands” (I.i.102-03)—specifically, the command of the justice of the peace, whom Slender purposes to obey as if he were his father. But the pastor wants dimwitted Slender to love, not to reason: “Let us command to know that of your mouth or of your lips; for divers philosophers hold that the lips is parcel of the mouth” (I.i.204-07). For the first “mouth” he means “mind”; as for the second “mouth,” he is right literally—the lips can be considered part of the mouth—while contradicting his first assertion, which distinguishes merely verbal assurances from the true intent of the mind. In his Welshman’s mangling of English, he continues to garble nature. He defines love agapically—”can you carry your goot will to the maid? (I.i.207-08)—while Justice Shallow defines it more naturally, more mundanely—”can you love her?” (I.i.209). Slender remains the man of reason who cannot think for himself: “I hope, sir, I will do as it shall become one that would reason,” a human being, a rational animal (I.i.210-11). At further prompting, Slender avers to his cousin with malaproprian determination, “I will marry her, sir, at your request; but if there be no great love in the beginning, yet heaven may decrease it upon better acquaintance” (I.i.220-22); of that “I am freely dissolved, and dissolutely” (I.i.225-26). “I think my cousin meant well,” Justice Shallow construes (I.i.229).

    The audience first sees Falstaff at The Garter Inn, his natural habitat, where he drinks in the presence of the inn’s Host, along with Sir John’s four sometime partners in crime. He plots the seduction of Mrs. Ford, the wife of a substantial Windsor citizen; “she gives the leer of invitation” to me (I.iii.41)—a supposition his confederate Pistol takes to be wishful. “He hath studied her well, and translated her will out of honesty into English” (I.iii.45-46). In his own way truly English, Sir John’s motive isn’t so much erotic as economic; the lady “has all the rule of her husband’s purse” (I.iii.49-50). As if to illustrate how dishonest English can be, Falstaff reads a love letter he has composed both to Mrs. Ford and the equally rich Mrs. Page, its language a parody of the English one reads in a medieval romance or a poem by Dante. In Falstaff, chivalry is dead, money’s what counts and what one counts, aristocracy has reached its comedic nadir.

    Unfortunately for Sir John, there really is no honor among thieves. Pistol will tattle on Falstaff, doubtless angling for a material reward for himself.

    The audience next meets the other rival suitors for the hand of Miss Page. They are Dr. Caius, a French physician, and Fenton, a young gentleman. Dr. Caius mistakes Pastor Evans as his rival; the pastor has sent a message to the doctor’s acquaintance, Mistress Quickly, asking her to intervene with Miss Page on behalf of Slender’s suit, and the doctor assumes he must be angling for himself. For her part, mischievous Mistress Quickly separately assures both Caius and Fenton that Miss Page loves him and him alone, although she dismisses Fenton’s chances: “I know Anne’s mind as well as another does” (I.iv.147-48).

    Falstaff’s identical letters meet with the indignation of both respectable married ladies. They plot revenge upon him. But in one respect they differ. Mrs. Ford’s husband is a jealous man; Mrs. Page’s husband is not, and his disposition is not improved when Falstaff’s false pals inform him of Falstaff’s intentions toward his wife and her alleged attraction to him. Therefore, the wives’ counterplot against Falstaff’s scheming must not only punish Falstaff but correct Ford. Eventually, they will need to run three counterplots, one after the other, as Sir John persists in his lechery and avarice, and Ford remains adamant in his jealousy.

    Letters are composed of words, which are composed of letters, all capable of being rearranged for comic effect, usually by provoking anger, whether the indignation is righteous, foolish, or both at the same time. When Falstaff describes Mr. Ford as a peasant, cuckold, and knave to Ford disguised as another man, Ford sputters with fury at the imagined infidelity of his wife and the verbal affronts to his honor. When the French doctor challenges the Welsh parson to a duel over Anne Page, Justice Shallow asks, mockingly, “What, the sword and the word! Do you study them both, Master Parson?” (III.i.40-41). The Host arrives at the dueling site and plays the real peacemaker: “Disarm them, and let them question; let them keep their limbs whole and hack our English” (III.i.70-71). Let there be peace between “soul-curer and body-curer” (III.i.89). “Am I politic? am I subtle? am I a Machiavel? Shall I lose my doctor? No; he gives me the potions and the motions. Shall I lose my parson, my priest, my Sir Hugh? No; he gives me the pro-verbs and no-verbs,” the ‘dos’ and the ‘don’ts’ (III.i.91-95). Since verbs are words of action and actions speak louder than words, Gentlemen, do nothing injurious to one another. The Host gets at the essence of comedy, if not the Word of God.

    In the first of the ladies’ counterplots against Falstaff, they lure him to Ford’s house. He woos Mrs. Ford but she proves the more adroit manipulator of words: “Well, heaven knows how I love you,” she accurately replies to his suit; “and you shall one day find it,” she rightly predicts (III.iii.69-70). “Keep in that mind; I’ll deserve it,” Falstaff returns, condemning himself unknowingly. When on cue Mrs. Page approaches, announcing the imminent arrival of Mr. Ford, they hide Falstaff in a laundry basket and have him carted away, with instructions to the servants to dump him in the Thames. This reprises the scene in Aristophanes’ The Clouds in which Socrates is hoisted up toward the heavens in a basket; the Falstaff of The Merry Wives is Socrates as Aristophanes portrays him, a ridiculously false claimant to wisdom. His baptism in good English waters won’t cleanse his soul.

    For his second go at Mrs. Ford (urged upon him by the duplicitous Mistress Quickly), Falstaff again shows up at the Ford house. He falls for the same routine, as Mrs. Page arrives to warn of Mr. Ford’s approach. This time they disguise him as a woman for, as Mrs. Page tells her friend, “We cannot misuse him enough. / We’ll leave a proof, by that which we will do, / Wives may be merry and yet honest too” (IV.ii.88-91). That is, the proof of wit and honor won’t be in ever-elusive, ever-manipulable words, the things to which Mr. Ford gives too much credence, but in irrefutable actions. When the self-beleaguered Ford does arrive, he’s told that the disguised Falstaff is his wife maid’s aunt, a witch, a fortune-teller, a spell-caster—that is, an abuser of words who exploits the witless. Out-witted and gulled once again by words, Ford beats ‘her’ out of his house, thus expediting the escape of the man he expected to capture in flagrante. 

    Finally told of his own folly, Ford reforms, acknowledging his wife’s honor and chastising himself with such vigor that Mr. Page intervenes to tell him to “be not as extreme in submission as in offense” (IV.iv.11). But bruised, humiliated Falstaff still won’t give up. As water and blows haven’t worked, the ladies turn to spiritual terror and a suggestion of hellfire. Mrs. Page recalls a legend of Windsor Forest, an old wives’ tale about Herne the Hunter, the late gamekeeper, whose spirit returns every winter, decked with “great ragg’d horns,” changing the milk in cows to blood and frightening all those who see him (IV.iv.30). She proposes that they tell Falstaff to rendezvous with them in the forest, disguised as Herne. They will arrange for local children disguised as urchins, elves, and fairies to encircle him, dance, pinch him and burn him with candles. After “the unclean knight” has been so tormented, “we’ll all present ourselves; dis-horn the spirit, / And mock him home to Windsor” (IV.iv.56, 63-64). Pastor Evans pronounces this a set of “fery honest knaveries” (IV.iv.79-80).

    Meanwhile, Sir John is concealing his most recent humiliation, defending his remaining illusions of aristocratic honor with lying verbiage. The Host of the Garter Inn hears that a fat old woman has gone up to Falstaff’s room. Falstaff claims that yes, there was a woman, but she is gone now, after having “taught me more wit than ever I learned before in my life, and I paid nothing for it neither, but was paid for my learning” (IV.v.54-56). This is another parody of the life of Socrates, who tells the tale of Diotima, his teacher in the philosophy of love. Socratic eros begins with love of beautiful bodies, ascends to love of beautiful souls, and culminates in the love of “beauty as a whole,” of philo-sophia, the love of wisdom. Falstaff indeed would do well to begin his ascent on this ladder of love, but he will need a hard-earned lesson in modest practical wisdom before he can aspire to the heights.

    He isn’t the only erotic schemer in Windsor. All of Anne Page’s suitors know she will participate in the Falstaff-tormenting fairy dance. Each plans to spirit her away. Mr. Page tells Slender that his daughter will appear in white; Mrs. Page tells Dr. Caius that she’ll be dressed in green. Anne has feigned to consent to both parents, but she’s written to her favorite, Fenton, saying that others will be dressed in those costumes and that she will elope with him. 

    All goes according to the lovers’ plan, as inscribed within Anne’s parents’ plan. Slender makes off with the figure in white, Caius with the figure in green, Anne and Fenton with one another to a waiting vicar. Falstaff receives his just reward, after Anne, as the Fairy Queen, intones, “Evil be to him that evil thinks” (V.v.67). Here at last the right words fit the right deeds, as the children, singing “Lust is but a bloody fire,” singe the old bounder with candles. Duly mocked, Falstaff admits to having been an ass, while Ford vows never to distrust his wife again. When Pastor Evans mocks Falstaff in his heavy Welsh accent, Falstaff exclaims, “Have I liv’d to stand at the taunt of one that makes fritters of English?” (V.v.136-37). He has, indeed, and as Anne Page as the Fairy Queen has suggested, it’s the thought that makes language and action good or bad. Mr. Page promises him forgiveness at the price of further ridicule at dinner.

    But what of the deceived suitors? Slender reports first, complaining that the fairy he ran off with was “a great lubberly boy” and, compounding the indignity, the son of a postmaster (V.v.176). Slender resolutely attempts to salvage a shred of dignity by averring, “If I had been married to him, for all he was in woman’s apparel, I would not have had him” (V.v.182-83). Deceived by words and apparel, he can at least uphold the natural standard. Dr. Caius wasn’t so lucky. The French physician didn’t identify the nature of his ‘bride’ until the ceremony had finished. “I’ll raise all Windsor,” he declaims, a move that may not improve his reputation in the town (V.v.197).

    As Mr. Ford understates it, “This is strange” (V.v.200). “Who hath got the right Anne?” (V.v.200). The young lady herself stops by, husband by her side, asking her parents’ pardon for her disobedience. Fenton offers the apologia for love according to the principles of nature fake-Socratic Falstaff could never learn from his fake Diotima—that is, from himself. “You would have married her most shamefully, / Where there was no proportion held in love” (V.v.208-09). In love reciprocity is the natural way, as indeed the merrily indignant wives and the jealous husband had understood, when thinking of themselves and the rogue knight. Not only nature but God is on the true lovers’ side: “Th’ offense is holy that she hath committed; / And this deceit loses the name of craft, / Of disobedience, or unduteous title, / Since therein she doth evitate and shun / A thousand irreligious cursed hours, / Which forced marriage would have brought upon her” (V.v.212-17). Even Falstaff sees this, saying to the Pages, “I am glad, though you have ta’en a special stand to strike at me, that your arrow hath glanc’d” (V.v.221-22). Both Fenton and Falstaff have spoken in better English than any Slender or Caius could have offered, and the Pages, defeated at their own game of wit against each other and against their daughter’s good, concede defeat with grace and good humor. Mr. Ford is satisfied that he will sleep tonight with Mrs. Ford.

    Shakespeare’s English comedy defends the right use of the English language, the right use of convention in the service of just love, love in proportion, the reciprocal love that animates the reciprocal rule of a husband and a wife over their household. The Falstaff of the comedy differs from the Falstaff of the history plays; he is ‘lower,’ less clever, because in the histories he operates in the presence of warring kings, whom he cannot underestimate, while here he finds himself in the presence of mere gentrymen and women, whom he can and does underestimate. Commercial, no longer aristocratic, English civil society lends itself to comedy in its denizens’ readiness to make sharp deals by hawking falsely advertised merchandise. In this kind of society, where there are no lions but plenty of foxes, nature as seen in love must live by the wits of true lovers. They can triumph, achieve comedy’s happy ending, but only if their prudence in plotting counter-deceptions equals their ardor.

    The Continental regimes enjoy no peace. They are always warring or preparing for war. The aristocrats are noble or, in one instance, evil, not figures of fun. The witticisms have sharper points. Love and marriage unite ruling families, not merely prosperous ones, and a failed courtship might ruin an alliance, incite a war. Much Ado About Nothing is a comedy without merriment. It ends happily, but only just. The fathers here are rulers, not merchants, and there are no mothers; the women are witty and good (more precisely, one is more witty than good, the other more good than witty), but they are daughters and nieces, and do not rule the action.

    Leonato is the governor of Messina in the Kingdom of Sicily. Don Pedro is a prince of Aragon, under which kingdom Sicily thrived as a subordinate but largely self-governing regime. Aragon itself had merged with Castile in 1479, forming the nucleus of modern Spain, Tudor England’s great rival. The Spanish Armada had sailed only ten years before Shakespeare wrote the play. 

    Don Pedro arrives in Messina in triumph, having won a battle as it were comically, happily, his troops having suffered few casualties. “A victory is twice itself when the achiever brings home full numbers” (I.i.7-8), Leonato tells his daughter, Hero, and his niece, Beatrice—eligible young ladies who themselves might well be ‘doubled’ or married to eligible suitors. They hear that a young Florentine named Claudio has acquitted himself well in the fight, “doing, in the figure of a lamb, the feats of a lion” (I.i.12). He will prove a fitting hero for Hero. As for Beatrice, she inquires about a “Signor Mountanto,” by whom she means Signor Benedick of Padua, a man she denigrates as a trencherman and lover-boy (both his name and his nickname suggests as much), leaving the audience wondering why a lady of her stature would inquire after such a nullity. But he is no nullity, the messenger from Don Pedro insists; he is a man of virtue, a brave soldier. Ah, but “You must not, sir, mistake my niece; there is a kind of merry war betwixt Signor Benedick and her; they never meet but there’s a skirmish of wit between them” (I.i.53-54). Beatrice immediately claims near-total victory in their last war of words, after which “four of his five wits went halting off, and now is the whole man govern’d with one,” leaving him at best human-all-too-human, “a reasonable creature” but little more (I.i.58-59, 62-63). Serves him right, too, as he “wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat; it ever changes with the next block” (I.i.66-67). 

    Claudio loves Hero, openly. Benedick exchanges verbal arrows with Beatrice, concluding, “I will live a bachelor” (I.i.213). Don Pedro wisely doubts it. But Claudio has no inclination to camouflage his feelings: Having looked upon Hero “with a soldier’s eye” before the war, having “had a rougher task in hand / Than to drive liking to the name of love,” upon returning, with “war-thoughts… left in their places vacant, in their rooms / Come thronging soft and delicate desires, / All prompting me how fair young Hero is, / Saying I lik’d her ere I went to wars” (I.i.261-67). Don Pedro promises to intervene with Leonato and Hero on his friend’s behalf.

    But Don Pedro’s bastard brother, Don John, resents his brother’s patronage. “I had rather be a canker in a hedge than a rose in his grace” (I.ii.22)—a sentiment anticipating Milton’s Satan, who would rather rule in Hell than serve in Heaven. And like Satan, Don John knows himself: “It must not be denied that I am a plain-dealing villain” (I.ii.25-26), who, “if I had my liberty, I would do my liking” (I.ii.28-29). Don John is an aristocrat who defines liberty like a democrat, as doing whatever he wants. Upon hearing that his brother has negotiated the beginning of a courtship between Claudio and Hero, he vows, “If I can cross him any way, I bless myself every way” (I.ii.58). He has no interest in the lovers whose happiness he would ruin, wanting only to injure his gracious brother. To him, the lovers are mere collateral damage. Unlike Falstaff, his vice is unnatural; he is not so much a bad man as an evil one who would ruin both brotherly love and chaste erotic love.

    For her part, Beatrice echoes Benedick’s anti-marital vow. “Not till God make men of some other metal than earth” shall she take one as her husband (II.i.51-52). More wittily, “Adam’s sons are my brethren; and, truly, I hold it a sin to match in my kindred” (II.i.55-56)—and there is indeed a touch of brotherly-sisterly raillery in the repartee of the obviously well-matched pair.

    Don John’s first plot against his brother has him lie to Claudio, telling him that Don Pedro really woos Hero for himself. When he confides his anger to Benedick, the scheme quickly dissolves, as Benedick tells Don Pedro, who announces the real result of his suit, confirmed by Leonato: “Count, take of me my daughter, and with her my fortunes; his Grace hath made the match, and all grace say Amen to it!” (II.i.271-72). So the romance seems to conclude, with joy. Don Pedro then purposes to exercise his matchmaking skills on a harder challenge posed by Benedick and Beatrice, enlisting Claudio and Hero as his allies.

    But Don John won’t surrender. I will “cross this marriage” (II.ii.7), thanks to a plan thought up by his follower, Borachio. Borachio’s lover is Margaret, one of Hero’s gentlelady attendants. If Don John can arrange to have Don Pedro and Claudio near her chamber window at night, Borachio will address her as Hero, letting them ‘discover’ Hero’s infidelity. This scheme has the advantage over Don John’s abortive one, as it arranges for its victims to see and hear for themselves. 

    At the same time, Don Pedro plots his own much more benevolent deception of Benedick, letting it drop that Beatrice is secretly in love with her verbal fencing partner. Don Pedro deplores the lady’s unwisdom in this, but Leonato, who’s in on the scheme, excuses his niece, saying, “O my lord, wisdom and blood combating in so tender a body, we have ten proofs to one that blood hath the victory” (II.iii.150-51). Claudio chimes in with the claim that Hero has told him that poor Beatrice will surely die if Benedick continues to spurn her. Don Pedro adds, “I love Benedick well; and I could wish he would modestly examine himself, to see how much he is unworthy of so good a lady” (II.iii.189-90). This combined appeal to Benedick’s real if unrealized love for Beatrice, his Christian humility combined with his aristocratic pride (sure to make him want to prove that he is indeed worthy of so good a lady), has exactly the intended effect on the young nobleman, who has been ‘secretly’ (so he imagines) listening in to the well-planned conversation. “If I do not take pity of her,” he tells himself, “I am a villain; if I do not love her, I am a Jew” (II.iii.239-40). “I will go get her picture,” that is, go see her and fall more fully in love (II.iii.240-41).

    And Hero goes to work on Beatrice, with the identical strategy: a conversation with her other attendant, Ursula, fashioned for the ears of her ‘eavesdropping’ friend, whom she describes as too prideful and self-absorbed to respond to Benedick’s love, which she has duly reported. “Nature never fram’d a woman’s heart / Of prouder stuff than that of Beatrice. / Disdain and scorn ride sparkling in her eyes, / Misprising what they look on; and her wit / Values itself so highly that to her / All matter else seems weak.” (III.i.50-54). After they leave, Beatrice steps forward, ashamed of herself and ready to requite Benedick’s love. Later, Hero will see that she’s come down to natural equality with others of their sex, “look[ing] with your eyes as other women do” when they are in love (III.iv.81-82).

    At this point, Benedick and Beatrice are well on the way to a comedic finale, but Claudio and Hero have been charted as firmly toward a tragic end as Romeo and Juliet are, by as malignant a villain. Enter, however, a band of English-like clowns who will blunder themselves into saving the day. Constable Dogberry selects a night-watch, charging them to guard Leonato’s door, “for the wedding being there tomorrow,” there must be no disturbance tonight (III.iii.84). From this post, the watchmen hear Borachio tell another of Don John’s followers how well his scheme worked, how Don Pedro and Claudio heard him courting Margaret-as-Hero, with Claudio swearing that he would go to the wedding ceremony and expose her betrayal to all the guests. The watchmen determine to report this, “the most dangerous piece of lechery that ever was known in the commonwealth,” to the good Constable (III.iii.152-53). Initially, however, when Dogberry attempts to tell Leonato of the plot, he is too buffoonish to get to the point, and the governor can only tell him to go back and complete his investigation of the men he’s arrested.

    At the church, Claudio accuses Hero (“She’s but the sign and semblance of her honor”); Don Pedro testifies against her (“upon my honor”); Don John condemns her vices as being beyond the “chastity” of language to be uttered in polite company; her father wishes she were dead or better, never born (IV.i.32,87,96). Under the weight of these sudden, false accusations, Hero collapses. Among the nobles, only Benedick doubts the charge; only Beatrice defends her.

    But unlike the notoriously foolish, corrupt, ineffectual clergymen elsewhere in Shakespeare’s plays, the Friar who was to have performed the marriage ceremony shows perception (“I have marked / A thousand blushing apparitions / To start into her face”), prefers not to exclaim or declaim, and speaks with the authority of both religion and experience without expecting any to defer to him on account of them (IV.i.158-60), while insisting that “there is some strange misprision in the princes” (IV.i.185). This gives Benedick an opening to express suspicion of “John the Bastard, / Whose spirits toil in frame of villainies” (IV.i.189), which in turn makes Leonato doubt his daughter’s accusers: ” If they wrong her honor, / The proudest of them shall well hear of it” (IV.i.191-92). That is, he will chastise even a prince of the kingdom that rules, albeit lightly, over the kingdom in which he governs one region. The same honor that inspires aristocrats to defend their countries and their allies stands in defense of their families, and if family honor is impugned civic honor will be shaken.

    Harmless as a dove, but prudent as a serpent, only Friar Francis sees the way to satisfy the requirements of honor and to defend civic peace, a way that exists because human nature is what it is, a way that the Friar sees because he understands human nature and also knows how it may be brought to follow justice. “Pause awhile, / And let my counsel sway you in this case” (IV.i.200-01). Hero has fainted and her accusers have walked out; let them believe her to be dead. This alone will change “slander to remorse” (IV.i.211). Hero will be “lamented, pitied, and excus’d, / Of every hearer; for it so falls out / That we have we prize not to the worth / Whiles we enjoy it, but being lack’d and lost, / Why, then we rack the value, then we find / The virtue that possession would not show us / Whiles it was ours. So it will fare with Claudio.” (IV.i.216-22). Benedick puts his own honor on the line, telling Leonato that he will find a way to vindicate his daughter.

    But first he must deal with his enraged fiancée, who demands that he kill Claudio. This is her love test, set for the man she’d accused of waywardness at the beginning of the play. In her ferocity, she wishes she were a man so that she could “eat his heart in the marketplace”—a use of the marketplace that would not occur to the English at Windsor. Although he tries to calm her, she extracts a vow to challenge the calumniator. Again, tragedy threatens.

    Fortunately, the forces of the English common law, remarkably at play in Messina, are still on the case. Constable Dogberry calls his officers to order, inquiring, “Is our whole dissembly appear’d?” (IV.ii.2). Dissembling schemers Borachio and his accomplice, Conrade, are indeed present, and the interrogation of the accused and their accusers wends its way eccentrically toward establishing the facts of the case. They report back to the governor’s house in time to interrupt Benedick, who has duly challenged Claudio, then departed. Borachio confesses. But Leonato continues his own plot, telling Claudio that although innocent Hero is dead, he has a niece who looks just like her, who stands to inherit not only his own estate but the estate of his brother, Antonio. Claudio happily accepts the substitute wife (it is a comedy, after all), and the wedding is set for the morrow.

    As for Benedick, he must return to a conversation with a lady who expects him to return with his shield or on it. He returns with it, his shield being his wit.  After telling her that he has indeed challenged Claudio, who will either answer it or be deemed a coward, he distracts her from her anger by reinitiating their badinage, asking her to say “for which of my bad parts didst thou first fall in love with me?” (V.ii.52-53). Why, “for all of them together; which maintain’d so politic a state of evil that they will not admit any good part to intermingle with them” (V.ii.54-56)—an anticipation of the kind of arguments Publius will unfold in Federalist 51. This will be a marriage of separate and balanced powers.

    “Thou and I are too wise to woo peaceably,” Benedick remarks (V.ii.63). Hardly so on your side, the maid replies, since the wise man rarely praises himself by calling himself wise. “An old, an old instance, Beatrice, that liv’d in the time of good neighbors; if a man do not erect in this time his own tomb ere he dies, he shall live no longer in monument than the bell rings and the widow weeps” (V.ii.66-69). Benedick is an aristocrat who understands the modern world, where humility no longer wins honor because neighbors no longer know or love you. For once Beatrice can bring no ready counter-witticism to mind. When Ursula interrupts with the news that Hero was falsely accused, Don Pedro and Claudio abused, and that Don John has fled the country, they hurry to the governor’s house.

    There, Hero unmasks herself, as Leonato explains, “she died…but whiles her slander lived” (V.iii.66); her slander now dead, her honor vindicated thanks to the Friar’s wise ruse, she has risen. She will marry Claudio. And after a bit more verbal sparring, which they begin by telling one another that they love one another “no more than reason” (V.iii.75,78), Benedick and Beatrice are kindly exposed by the newlyweds, who produce letters from each confessing love for the other. “A miracle!” Benedick pronounces it. “Here’s our own hands against our hearts” (V.iii.91). He silences any more less-than-beatific chatter by kissing his bride-to-be; the man Beatrice had derided as Signor Mountanto delivers a sermon from the mount in loving action, winning their war of words as surely as he had won the war which preceded the play’s beginning. That makes two miracles, uniting two couples; Much Ado About Nothing is as close to a divine comedy as Shakespeare would ever write. 

    When Leonato tries to delay a celebratory dance, Benedick makes bold to countermand his order, telling him to get a wife, as “there is no staff more reverend than one tipp’d with horn,” a merry joke about cuckoldry in the wake of one wedding and in prospect of his own (V.iii.117-19). A messenger then brings word that Don John has been captured and will return to Messina tomorrow, under armed guard. It isn’t Governor Leonato but Benedick who concludes, “Think not on him till tomorrow. I’ll devise thee brave punishments for him. Strike up, pipers.” (V.iii.121-23).

    And why not? He and Beatrice were the first among the aristocrats to suspect Don John’s perfidy, Hero’s innocence, and the others’ error. Although decent Claudio and Hero are the heirs to the fortune of the Governor and his brother, Benedick and Beatrice will be the real rulers of the city, as the wittiest and wisest aristocrats in town. A victory is twice itself when the victor brings home full number, Leonato had intoned. He has just been shown how his aphorism might be enacted.

    In his English comedy, Shakespeare shows how a decadent aristocracy in a peaceful, commercial society can be well supplanted by the wit of the gentry class or upper ‘bourgeoisie’—crucially, by the wit of women, wives whose virtues can now rule because commerce has supplanted war. But on the continent, wars will continue. In Shakespeare’s continental comedy, the witty woman needs to find her match in an equally witty, or even wittier man. And even they will need the assistance of a wise, politic churchman who knows how to moderate the tempers of still-indispensable warrior-aristocrats while awaiting the ascendance of the better angels of their nature. In commercial England, a tavern host serves as peacemaker, the parson as a good-natured foreign language-bender.

    In England, English words prove unreliable in dealings commercial and marital; actions speak louder. On the continent, words might prove unreliable, lying, but also whetstones of wit; actions bespeak love (a kiss to silence a too-contentious mouth) and harmony (a betrothal dance). In England, love requires the wit of deception to defend itself against the low, farcical eroticism commerce encourages. On the continent, love requires the wit of perception to defend itself against malignant scheming and excessive aristocratic spiritedness. In England, wit and prudence defend love against base assaults and surmises; on the continent, they defend love by contriving ‘miracles’.  

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: Nations

    Founding the Christian Regime

    May 22, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Paul the Apostle: The Epistle to the Ephesians.

    John Stott: Ephesians: Building a Community in Christ. Notthingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 1998.

     

    Throughout the Bible, God founds regimes for His people—beginning with the simple regime of the Garden of Eden, which Adam rules as His vicegerent. The Bible also looks forward to a final regime for human beings, to be founded after the coming of the Messiah. Between the regime of Eden and the final regime, there have been several regimes, including both a republican and a monarchic regime for the ancient Israelites. There have also been several forms of ‘states,’ that is, communities vastly differing in size and centralization of authority—again ranging from tiny Eden to the Israelite empire at its peak.

    The universal character of the Christian ‘state’ also required a new kind of regime. If God no longer legislated primarily for a particular people, giving them a fully articulated regime while leaving the other nations, the ‘Gentiles,’ to their own political devices, what would this new regime look like? And if God did not intend to rule the world’s nations directly until the advent of the Messiah—if there was to be no legitimate ‘world government’ until then—how could the new regime advance throughout the nations? Would rulers and peoples of existing nations not regard the new founding with considerable suspicion?

    Saul of Tarsus’ spiritedness, his zeal in persecuting Christians, found itself redirected toward the founding and perpetuation of this new regime after his now-famous conversion on the road to Damascus. The Christian ecclesia or assembly, the Christian church, would be the institutional or formal element of the Christian regime, a regime ruled by God according to the purposes revealed in the Old and New Testaments. The Jewish community would continue to find authoritative guidance in the substantial body of law delivered through Moses in the Pentateuch. Paul addressed that community in his Epistle to the Hebrews. His main efforts concerned the Gentiles, peoples living under the rule of human laws and worshipping a variety of ‘gods,’ many of them declared enemies of the God of the Bible since the earliest days of Israel and indeed before that, when the Israelites were slaves in Egypt.

    Located on the coast of Ionia, now a province in Turkey, Ephesus had been a Greek colony, its patron goddess Artemis. The Temple of Artemis at Ephesus was one of the ‘Seven Wonders’ of the ancient world. The empires of Lydia, Persia, Macedonia, and the Seleucids ruled Ephesus before the Romans seized it in 129 BC. The emperor Augustus made it the capital of the Roman colony in Asia Minor. As a cosmopolitan and commercial city, a port city, it proved fairly open to Christian evangelism; Paul had lived there between 52 and 54 AD. However, its still-vigorous cultic societies were well-known for their practice of sorcery, so while Ephesus afforded Christian founders a degree of tolerance, they would also find determined enemies there. 

    By 62 AD, Paul was imprisoned in Rome. The salutation of his letter to the Ephesian Christians identifies who he is, what he is, and the source of the authority which entitles him to address them as their ruler: “Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God” (1:1) He also identifies his addressees: “the saints which are at Ephesus” and “the faithful in Jesus Christ.” Some interpreters claim that “saints” refers to Jewish converts, “the faithful” to Gentile converts; others claim that the distinction suggests that Paul addresses both the Christians at Ephesus immediately and Christians everywhere, wherever the letter may eventually circulate. Paul might also be suggesting the following nuance: “saints” emphasizes the fact that they are Christians in a place, a place with a regime foreign to the Christian regime, a place also limited in territory in a way the Christian state is not; “the faithful” emphasizes their own regime and state, ruled as they are by the universal God.

    Paul offers a triple blessing. “Grace be to you, and peace, from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual [pneumatikos] blessings in heavenly places in Christ” (1:2-3). This reciprocal blessing proceeds from God and His Son through Paul to the Ephesians, then from Paul back to God the Father and to Lord Jesus Christ—that is, from one who is ruled to his Ruler(s)—and finally to the blessing from Christ to both Paul and the Ephesians. These blessings have the effect of showing the bonds that unite Christians to Christ and to His Father, while simultaneously showing that these bonds are invisible, spiritual, in Heaven not on earth, even as both Paul and the Ephesians now live on earth, one of them literally imprisoned on it. For Christians, members of a new kind of regime and a new kind of empire, physical bonds matter less than spiritual bonds.

    What is the character of these spiritual bonds? Christ has “chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy”—separate from other regimes—”and without blame”—innocent of wrongdoing—and “before him in love [agape]” (1:4). The Ruler of the regime chose His subjects, not the other way around, from the other peoples ruling themselves in other regimes, to be law-abiding or blameless not only out of fear—the binding sentiment of most regimes, and one them in this—but out of the specific kind of love Christianity brings to prominence. Agapic love seeks not the possession of the beloved but his good, his perfection. As Paul elsewhere is never shy to remark, the radical defects of human beings make them impossible to perfect without divine power, manifested in the divine graciousness animated by that love.

    At the same time, Christians also seek to serve their Ruler’s good. God has “predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the beloved” (1.5-6). Here the image of the ruling body shifts from the regime of a political community to the regime of a family—far more intimate. Jesus is God’s Son; we Christians are Jesus’ adopted children. This puts His children under an obligation of gratitude; God deserves the praise of His glory precisely because He has adopted us, done something indispensable for the achievement of our good. 

    Through the centuries, most Christians have taken the strong language of God’s choosing of His people “from the foundation of the world,” His predestination of them, to mean that He has predetermined who will become a Christian, a ‘saved’ human being, even before human beings were created. Supplementing this is the argument that if God foreknows all events they are ‘as good as’ predestined. The question turns on the weight the interpretation gives to the word ‘predestinated.’ If Christians were predestined by God to become Christians, regardless of their own will, agency, intention, then God’s intention is mysterious. Why did He select these people and not those—especially since His grace demonstrably has no correlation with the discernible virtues of the individuals chosen, as distinguished from those not chosen? If, however, ‘predestination’ means instead that God wants all of his human creatures to join Him in His regime but leaves them free to choose whether they do join—if He leaves room for human consent—then their praise for the glory of His grace becomes a moral obligation, a matter of consent, and also more of a genuine good God’s creatures can bestow upon God.

    What is clear is the foundation of human gratitude to Christ. He redeemed them “through his blood,” through the sacrifice of His life, obtaining forgiveness for otherwise-indelible sins against the Father from the Father. In Christ “we have redemption”; that is, we are ransomed from slavery to the harsh non-Christian regimes, all of them condemned by God the Father as contradictory to His laws, His way of life. This is more than liberation alone. “The riches of his grace” preeminently amount to “wisdom and prudence,” sophia and phronēsis (1:8).The knowledge of Being, which philosophers seek, theoretical knowledge, and the knowledge all men, but especially political men, seek, the knowledge of practical affairs, of ‘what to do’ in the shifting circumstances of life in this world, both require divine assistance. But, as in the case of ‘free will’ or consent to God’s rule, interpreters have varied regarding the part human ‘agency’ plays. Does God simply lead men to their theoretical and practical discoveries? Or does he grant a certain ‘space’ for their own efforts? However this may be, obedience to God’s regime in His empire evidently heightens both theoretical and practical intelligence. As the Word of God, the Bible makes you smarter.

    In what way has God added to, or simply provided, the discoveries of these two kinds of wisdom? He has “made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed to himself” (1:9). That is, He has revealed to us certain matters that we could never discover on our own, and has done so for His own purposes, dependent as He is on no one. The good God seeks from us—indeed commands from us—is our just gratitude for the gifts of life, liberation, and wisdom. Our gratitude pleases Him without making Him in any way dependent upon us. His regime is not ‘political’ in Aristotle’s sense of politics as reciprocity of ruling and being-ruled. God rules but is not ruled in turn. His regime is what Aristotle calls kingship: the rule of one over the many, for the sake of the good of the many, as distinguished from tyranny, the rule of the one over the many for the sake of the one. The good rule of the one over the many may also serve the good of the one, and the bad rule of the one over the many may surely be bad for the one, even if he supposes it good. In that sense there is reciprocity of goods if not of rule. But in the case of divine as distinguished from human rule, the good of the One entails a humble, just duty of the many to the One; the One doesn’t need that offering, being capable of ‘happiness’ without any such homage, any such subjects, at all.

    God’s founding of His regime has yet to be completed. In “the fullness of times” he will “gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth; even in him: In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will: that we should be to the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ” (1:10-12). The regime of God in its future perfection will encompass all of His creation; the adopted children within His family will receive membership in this regime even as children of a human father receive their inheritance of property from him. The twelfth verse, central to the first ‘chapter’ of Paul’s epistle, repeats the purpose of this regime insofar as human beings contribute to it—the praise of God’s glory—and the terms in which it is permissible to offer it—as beings who have trusted in, have had faith in, Christ as their sacrificial redeemer. Underlining the dependence of human beings on God, and the independence of God on human beings, the subjects are to praise God’s glory; God’s glory exists whether or not they praise it, God having been glorious whether human beings existed or not.

    To enter God’s regime, one must first trust Christ—consent to His rule—then hear “the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation” (1:13). After believing it, you then receive the royal seal, the “Holy Spirit of promise,” which is the “earnest” or guarantee of the family inheritance “until the redemption of the purchased possession” (1:14). Having acknowledged the Ephesians’ membership in the regime, Paul thanks them and tells them that he prays that the Father will “give unto you the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him” in three ways: knowledge of “the hope of his calling”; what “the riches of the glory of his inheritance” are; and “what is the exceeding greatness of his power” toward all those under His regime (1:17-19). These powers were manifested in His raising of Christ “from the dead” and His setting of Christ “at his own right hand in the heavenly places” (1:20). That is, God’s power is so great that it can not only reverse death but it can raise His Son beyond the reach of the regime that killed Him, and indeed “far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come” (1:21). The spiritual, Christian regime is indeed enforced, not by human rulers but by God.

    The Father has set His Son at His right hand—that is, the hand of strength—so as to give him authority over “all things in the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all” (1:22-23). Although the Roman regime had broken Christ’s body on the Cross, the Church is His new ‘body,’ of which He is the “head” (1:22). Political communities or states, families, and bodies all have regimes—the latter still suggested by our term ‘regimen,’ a plan of diet and exercise.

    The first ‘chapter’ of the epistle thus describes a regime with a ruling body compared initially to a family, then to a physical body. The regime consists of a father and a son ruling their subjects, children, or members. The unique character of these rulers is their holiness, their separation from and superiority to all ordinary families, all ordinary bodies now alive on earth. The purpose of the regime is wisdom and prudence, knowledge of both ‘being’ and of practice. Since a fully-articulated regime also consists of forms of rule—the ruling structures or institutions—and a way of life, readers may expect or at least hope for an account of those things.

    Just as the rulers of the Christian regime are holy, so the subjects are also set apart. Christ has “quickened,” made living, his subjects; you “who were dead in trespasses and sins,” walking “according to the course of this world”—its way of life, its regime— according to “the prince of the powers of the air,” who rules “the children of disobedience” in all other regimes, has in effect done for you what His Father did for Him: raised you to life out of a spiritual death (2:1-2). The way of life of the prince of the powers of the air leads to death; that way is disobedience to the way of life of God. Since the subjects of God’s regime within the city of Ephesus manifestly remain physically alive, this new life must be spiritual. Paul emphasizes this by calling the non-Christian regime one guided by “the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh, and of the mind”; to live in that way is to live the way of beings who “were by nature the children of wrath” (2:3). This is why he compares the Church to a body; the natural body and the natural mind love ‘erotically,’ aiming at possessing those things that the body and the mind crave by their nature. Lives lived according to erotic love consist of ways of life that resist God’s way of life. 

    “But God, who is rich in mercy,” loves not erotically (there is nothing he needs, nothing he yearns to possess) but agapically (2:4); in justice, He could leave us in the way of life we have chosen, but by his grace He has chosen to save us from our own way of life, inviting us back into His regime. He has “raised us up together, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus” (2:5). His purpose in raising us above the natural regime of the human body and mind is to show us “the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness toward us through Christ Jesus” (2:7). Beyond the riches He has already bestowed upon His people in ‘this’ life, He will give them still more after their bodies die. Among these gifts will be companionship with his Son, rather as family members keep company with one another.

    Paul makes it clear that Christians’ newfound, elevated status was strictly “the gift of God,” having nothing to do with our own efforts (2:8)—which are ruled by the prince of the powers of the air, through natural eros. Human nature has been misdirected, but as “created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in,” that nature has now been redirected, placed into a new regime entailing a new way of life, this one marked out by God and involving works that are good, no longer misdirected.

    Gentiles are uncircumcised, unmarked by the physical practice that symbolizes membership in God’s regime, Israel. Without Christ, you were “aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world” (2:11). But thanks to a different shedding of blood—not of your own blood, by circumcision, but of Christ’s blood, by crucifixion—you have become members of His body, His family, under His regime. Christ shed physical blood, sacrificing the life which blood supports and symbolizes, in the world He created. When His Father raised Him to life at His right hand in Heaven, both Father and Son revealed a life beyond physical life in this world. But that better life can only come through obedience to God’s regime, as His Son demonstrated in the Garden of Gethsemane by determining to obey His Father’s command to submit to crucifixion for the sake of the human beings He had created.

    In this way God is “our peace,” having made Jew and Gentile “both one,” breaking down “the wall of partition between us, “abolish[ing] in his flesh,” on the Cross, “the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances; or to make in himself of twain one new man,” like Saul himself, a man at peace with himself (2:14-15). This new man, neither Jew nor Gentile, has also reconciled with God, being now “in one body by the cross” (2:16). By allowing His human body to be destroyed, Christ showed the way toward rejecting the erotic love of misdirected human nature by replacing that love with self-sacrificing and humble agapic love. Erotic love is the way of “wrath” in the sense that it aims at possession, aiming at what I want to be mine and not thine, which must lead to conflict, to war over who gets what he wants and who is left empty-handed. But if through Christ “we both have access by one Spirit unto the Father,” then we have no more cause for conflict (2:18). This is how Jesus “preached peace” (2:17), how His regime brings the union all regimes aim at but none other can deliver, misdirected as all of them are.

    “Now therefore you are no longer strangers and foreigners; but fellow citizens with the saints; and of the household of God” (2:19). Here the metaphor shifts. Not only are we members of one body, children of one family, but also citizens of one house, the “foundation” of which is “the apostles and prophets” (again, both Jews and Gentiles) and the “chief cornerstone” of which is Jesus Christ (2:20). The cornerstone ensures that the foundation is square; a square foundation is a stable foundation for the house. The house upon which the foundation is being built, consisting of the citizens God has chosen is “a holy temple” (2:21)—a new temple to replace the one in Jerusalem. You are “builded together” as a “habitation of God through the Spirit” (2:22); you, the Church or assembly of God’s people, are the new house of God, the new ‘body politic’ not insofar as you are of flesh, whether living flesh marked by circumcision or the solid and stolid ‘flesh’ of a stone temple, but a meta-physical, beyond-physical, house designed by God according to his architectural plan. Like a body or a family, a building has a ‘regime’: a ruler or owner; a structure designed by the architect; a ‘way of life’ determined by the owner but also partly determined by the structure; and a purpose or set of purposes such as shelter and comfort for its ‘citizens’ or residents.

    Paul’s body now lives not in a physical temple but in a Roman prison. Although an outlaw in the eyes of the Roman regime, I am not, he writes, so much the Romans’ prisoner as “the prisoner of Jesus Christ for you Gentiles”; the “cause” or reason I am so imprisoned is to be a sacrifice, a sacrifice parallel to if not equal to that of Jesus, a sacrifice of the body in the service of the Spirit (3:1). In prison I can write this letter disclosing the “revelation [Jesus Christ] made known unto me” regarding the “mystery of Christ” (3:4). In previous times this mystery “was not made known unto the sons of men” (3:5). The revelation to Paul, a Jew, was that the Gentiles he had been persecuted “should be fellow heirs” to God’s inheritance (3:6). “I was made minister,” thanks to God’s grace, grace given “by the effectual working of his power” (3:7). Paul was given a ruling office in God’s regime. Just as ‘ministers’ in an ordinary political regime on earth execute the intentions of the ruler, the sovereign, so Paul has been selected to execute the intentions of God. To the question, ‘Who died and left you in charge?’ Paul answers, ‘Jesus died and left me, among others, in charge as His designated ‘representatives’ as executors of his Word. Paul’s physical weakness, his incarceration, serves to highlight his spiritual authority.

    In addition to his office as God’s minister, Paul is also a preacher of that Word, God’s spokesman. “Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ” (3:8). Why “the least”? Perhaps because he had been a persecutor of Christians: Paul does not say. What he does say is the purpose of his ministry and of his preaching: “To make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ” (3:9)—the last a fact not made known in God the Father’s revelations to Moses and his earlier prophets. The intent of Paul’s activities as minister and preacher in God’s regime is to “make known” the “manifold wisdom of God”—wisdom being the virtue most needed in a ruler (3:10). This newly revealed matter, centering on the existence, words, and actions of the Son, must be promulgated, as all legitimate commands are. Paul is a messenger ordained for that purpose, the human promulgator of God’s promulgation to him. This means that the ‘new’ regime is really the original regime; what is new is the revelation that the Son was there all along, that the Father created the world through Him, and that this authorizes him to unite Jew and Gentile in one regime, by this promulgation “unto the principalities and powers” (3:10).

    Any subject, and any citizen, will want access to his ruler or rulers. The Father has set down his “eternal purpose,” for which end He made “Christ Jesus our Lord” (3:11). Christians “have boldness and access with confidence” to Jesus through their “faith of him” (3:12). For this reason, Paul’s physical imprisonment, the effect of the power of the Roman regime over him, should not cause the Ephesians to “faint,” to ask ‘Where is God?’—to suppose that the foundations of God’s regime are unsteady, not worthy of confidence and courage (3:13). On the contrary, Paul’s “tribulations” will serve “your glory” (3:13), again in imitation of Christ’s greater sacrifice. Paul prays for them, “bow[ing] my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (3:14). The image of bowing is the image of the bow; the ‘goddess’ of Ephesus was Artemis/Diana, the huntress whose weapon was the bow. She is to be replaced by Christian ‘hunters’ and ‘fishermen,’ spiritual huntsmen and huntswomen. Paul prays that the Father “would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man” (3:16)—inner strength or power is spiritual not physical, agapic not erotic, the presence of the indwelling of God’s Holy Spirit and of His Son in the human soul. Paul further prays that Christian souls, “rooted and grounded in love” (3:17), will comprehend the vast dimensions of God’s regime, no longer restricted to the Israelites but to the nations, the Gentiles, as well; that they will know Christ’s love for them; that they will be “filled with the fullness of God” (3:19). As His new body, family, temple, city, you are His dwelling place, inwardly, in your hearts—that is, in your minds, newly repurposed for the purposes of God’s regime. 

    Paul expresses this in a paradox, praying that the Ephesians will know the love of God, “which passeth knowledge” (3:19). This means that they will know that God’s love exists by perceiving it inside themselves, without knowing why God offers it to them. To be filled with the fullness of God is a form of personal knowledge, not ‘abstract’ knowledge, just as one might say he knows a human person without being able to say what his chemical composition or other impersonal characteristics are. 

    Not only does God’s knowledge surpass man’s knowledge, His power far exceeds human power, in part because what He can do far exceeds “all that we ask or think” (3:20). Human power is limited in part because human knowledge is limited. The new knowledge available in the ‘new’ regime will enhance the power of human beings in the way Paul shows, by praying to God in the knowledge that He is the Father of our Lord, our ruler. Prayerful appeals to God as Father of our Lord, our Ruler, remain within the bounds of God’s just and gracious regime because they honor the right Person: “Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end” (3:21). In all regimes citizens and subjects are expected honor the rulers of their regime; when the rulers are no longer honored, revolution, regime change, may follow. That attitude of honor, along with the criteria for defining what is honorable, limits the uses of the powers they request from their rulers, and also limits the powers the rulers may use in attempting to meet those petitions.

    Having established the major premises of his argument in the first half of the epistle, Paul reaches his first conclusion, his first ‘therefore’ clause. “I therefore, the prisoner of the Lord, beseech you that you walk worthy of the vocation wherewith you are called” (4:1). Since I am less the prisoner of Rome than the willing “prisoner” of Jesus Christ, having prayed to Him to ask that the Ephesians know Him, he now ‘prays’ to the Ephesians, requesting that they follow the way of life God has established for them in His regime. A prisoner is confined; to walk is to be free; to walk along a given path is to consent to follow the restrictions and draw nearer to the end of that path. The first half of the epistle consists of teaching first principles and praying for their fulfillment among the members of the Church, although to describe Paul’s teaching as the enunciation of principles alone is incomplete and somewhat misleading, as the ‘principles’ include the filling-up, the animation, of human souls with the Holy Spirit, a Person not an abstraction. The second half of the epistle consists of Paul’s exhortation to actions in accordance with those principles.

    To follow the way of life of the Christian regime requires four virtues: “lowliness” or humility; “meekness” or gentleness; “longsuffering” or patience; and forbearance “in love” (4:2). Forbearance was originally a legal term meaning abstaining from collecting a debt; here, the forbearance derives not from self-restraint but agape. All of these virtues aim “to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (4:3). If the Church, God’s regime in its this-worldly manifestation, is to survive and prosper, like all bodies, families, buildings, and cities it must have some bond, some ligament, some structural tie to hold it together. Since the Church is first of all a spiritual unity, this bond cannot be sustained ‘automatically,’ like the bonds that sustain bodies and buildings do. A spiritual union requires moral and spiritual bonds—that is, those moral virtues most consistent with the rule of the Holy Spirit, the Son, and the Father. While the classical virtues of courage, moderation, wisdom, and justice are all esteemed by God and His people, these less natural virtues are the ones that put obedience to God above self-sufficiency or self-rule. They are the virtues that ‘shine’ less, giving glory to the Ruler and conducing to a willingness to abjure self-assertion and work toward the good of the regime as a whole.

    There is not one bond of unity but seven. They are: one body, one Spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, and “one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all” (4:6). This follows from the premises of the argument Paul has already cited. The Church body differs from natural bodies, animated by agapic instead of erotic love, by Spirit not ‘flesh,’ aiming at, hoping for, full citizenship in God’s regime. Central to the list is the Ruler of the regime, its “one Lord” (4:5), Jesus Christ—as indeed the matter of ‘who rules’ must be of central importance in any regime. God the Father is at once universal (“Father of all”), superior to (above all members of the regime), pervasive (“through all”), and present within each member (“in you all”). 

    But how can God the Father be universal, superior or “above,” pervasive, and present “in” each member of His regime, all at the same time? Universal and superior are manifestly consistent attributes; there is no contradiction in saying that a Being rules everywhere. It is the seeming contradiction between God’s ‘aboveness’ and His pervasiveness and ‘in-ness’ that can cause confusion. God’s pervasiveness evidently refers to the Church as a whole, whereas His ‘in-ness’ refers to each individual member of the Church. How so?

    Paul explains that “unto every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ” (4:7). The Father acts through His Son, who ‘measures out’ God’s grace, giving different gifts or abilities to different persons. The Son is the link or bond between the universal and infinitely superior Father and both human individuals and human organizations. When the Son “ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts to men” (4:8). Picking up his theme of imprisonment, Paul compares Jesus’ resurrection from the tomb to a liberation from jail, a liberation from the debtors’ prison in which all human beings are confined because they have violated God’s laws, and from which Jesus freely gives those prisoners their own freedom in God’s regime. He even liberated dead men from Hades, having also “descended first into the lower parts of the earth” (4:9). “He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens that he might fill all things” (4:10). Earth, Hell, the heavens, and Heaven: all the parts of God’s creation have now been ‘filled’ by Christ, used for His purposes. 

    What were the gifts Christ gave to human persons? They are the distinct but coordinate gifts needed to be apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers. A prophet of God receives direct revelation from God; a pastor or a teacher doesn’t receive such revelation, and does not need to receive it, having the revelations entrusted to the prophets available to him in the Bible. The purpose of actions in accordance with these various gifts is “the perfecting of the saints,” the “work of the ministry,” and “the edifying of the body of Christ” (4:12). Whereas the perfection of the natural person by natural means is ethics, as seen in the four ‘classical’ virtues, the perfection of the Christian as a citizen of God’s regime requires the four Christian virtues as revealed to those gifted by God in these enumerated ways, and then taught by those ‘gifted’ persons to the Church members both as individuals and as citizens and subjects of the regime.

    This teaching will continue “till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ” (4:13). Just as citizens of earthly regimes emulate the heroes held up by that regime, so the imitatio Christi will remain the task of each Christian. Paul exemplifies this in seeking to free the Ephesians from their earthly ‘prison’ while in Rome’s prison. In imitating the Ruler of the Christian regime, Christians intend to “henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine”—every breeze and every storm directed at them from the prince of the air—”by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive” (4:14). Philosophy, and especially Socratic philosophy, is the human cure for sophistry and rhetoric; philosophic dialectic is the means by which the philosopher can question sophists and rhetoricians, expose the contradictions in their arguments. Socratic philosophy does not, however, provide definitive answers to the questions, it raises, or at least to all of them. God’s revelation does provide answers to many of those questions, although the revelation is always partial, with God reserving some mysteries for Himself.

    “Speaking the truth in love,” Christians “may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ”—from whom “the whole body is fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in that measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love” (4:15-16). The Christian regime, like all regimes, seeks to educate its citizens. It does so, however, not only for the sake of the rulers, for the sake of their glory, but in agapic love—for the sake of the ruled. Paul here has recourse to his metaphor of the Church as a body, the most tightly organized of the several entities to which he compares the Church. Agape edifies or strengthens the body, builds it up, and at the same time does so justly, in right measure, as the head of a natural body animates and directs the inferior members. 

    This leads Paul to his second conclusion, his second “therefore” clause. “This I say therefore, and testify in the Lord, that ye henceforth walk not as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their mind” (4:17). Through His apostle, the head of the Church ‘body’ directs its members onto the way of life of the regime of God, and away from the regimes of other nations insofar as they depart from God’s regime. In its vanity or futility, the natural human mind (in fact unnatural, not in accordance with God’s original intention for it) leads all other regimes to some extent into wrong ways of life. Under those regimes, their “understanding [is] darkened,” “alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart” (4:18). They are blind, alienated, and ignorant because they are animated by the wrong love, erotic or possessive love.

    This leaves room for acknowledging that some regimes lead citizens and subjects in worse ways than others do, depending upon how much their ways intersect with Christian ways. Paul’s teaching also explains why he, and many other Christians, wind up in prison, or on other forms of the Cross. Christians live in the regimes of man, ‘the City of Man,’ while reserving their final allegiance to the regime, the City, of God. This may provoke the wrath of the regimes of men in which they live, which quite often dislike competition over the question of who rules and who does not rule. Christians live in the City of Man, but the City of God lives in them. That conflict will remain as long as the earth is not yet the new earth, under the rule of Jesus Christ.

    As Christians, human beings who now acknowledge that “the truth is in Jesus,” men have “put off” the “old man,” who is “corrupt according to the deceitful lusts” of erotic love, and are “renewed in the spirit of your mind,” “put[ting] on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness” (4:21-24). Without feeling the need for the competition, the wars, resulting from erotic or possessive love, Christians no longer feel the impulse to lie. A Christian can “speak truth with his neighbor, for we are members one of another” (4:25).

    Paul is no utopian. He does not claim that Christians will no longer become angry. Indeed, Jesus Himself became angry on occasion, expelling money changers from the Temple at Jerusalem in one notable instance. There is righteous anger, and there is sinful anger; righteous anger is for the defense of God’s regime, whereas sinful anger serves the ‘lusts’ or erotic love of the one angered. “Be ye angry, and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath,” giving no “place to the devil,” the prince of anger. Similarly, given our existing physical nature, we must eat. We must still acquire things, possess things, satisfy bodily eros to some extent. Therefore, “Let him that stole steal no more: but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth” (4:28). As for the natural mind, “let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying, that it may minister grace unto the hearers” (4:29). In each case, anger, greed, and the power of speech and reason are not only moderated—let not the sun go down on the first, let one work for bodily things, not steal them, let the mind use speech for truth-telling, not lying—but redirected agapically toward the good of others—indignation at offenses to God, charitable giving of the fruits of labor, Christian witness to partners in conversation.

    With the right kind of love, Christians can begin to “put away” bitterness, wrath, anger, clamor, and evil speaking, along with “all malice” (4:31). With the right kind of love, Christians can instead “be kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ’s sake hath forgiven you” (4:31). The grace-beyond-justice of God should be reciprocated not toward God, who doesn’t need our grace, but toward one another as citizens of God’s regime. Christian love of God is just gratitude; Christian love of men, whether fellow-Christians or even enemies, is graceful, more than just.

    This brings Paul to his third “therefore” clause: “Be you therefore followers of God, as dear as children” (5:1)—children of God, not vacillating children of men. Children of God imitate God, “walk[ing] in agape, as Christ also has loved us” (5:2). Erotic love must not be perverted to fornication, uncleanness, or covetousness, for the sake of the ‘name’ or reputation of the Church, the honor God’s regime ought to merit. The speech of Christians should be centered on their gratitude to God, not “filthiness, nor foolish talking, nor jesting” (5:4). Persons who speak and act in that way, who walk in that way of life, have no “inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God” (5:5). As with speaking, so with listening: “let no man deceive you with vain words” (5:6), words empty as the wind that carries them to your ears. 

    If there are citizen-subjects of God’s regime, and also those alien to it, foreigners, how to tell the difference? There are no physical markers; there aren’t even political borders to cross or town walls to protect. This too is a problem of knowledge, a difficulty in discerning truth, separating it from falsehood. The best human beings can do to distinguish “the children of light” from the children of darkness is to observe “the fruit of the Spirit” (5:8-9). The observable actions of men are the most reliable windows into their souls. “The fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness and righteousness and truth”; this is the proof or test of Christian citizenship. Typically, the “unfruitful works of darkness” are hidden from men because they are shameful, but there can be no shame in exhibiting the fruit of the Spirit—and no pride, either, inasmuch as they are the fruit of the Spirit, not the fruit of our own natural virtues. Evil things are “made manifest by the light”; ‘shining a light on them’ makes them visible. The Spirit is the light, and that light shines forth from its fruits, with neither shame nor pride.

    For this reason, Jesus commanded the dead to awaken and arise, “and Christ gave them the light” (5:14). If you awaken you need the light to see the way, and not to stumble over things you otherwise would not see. “See then that ye walk circumspectly, not as fools; but as wise, redeeming the time, because the days are evil,” “understanding what the will of the Lord is” (5:15-17). Unlike the will of a human being, the will of God is by definition wise, inasmuch as God is the ultimate reality; insofar as human beings are given to know the will of the Lord they are wise, enlightened, “filled with the Spirit” (5:18).

    In this, Christian unity means both sameness and differentiation: sameness in the sense that all understand the will of the Lord, as given by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, itself delivered to them by God through His prophets; differentiated in that members of God’s regime should speak to themselves “in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing and making melody in your heart to the Lord” in gratitude” (5:19). Each singer brings his own voice. In this Paul sees what Aristotle saw about unity in a sound political regime. Some would-be regime founders, Aristotle writes, attempt to homogenize the many elements of the polis. But this is to reduce “a theme to a single beat.”

    Closely related to anger, but in appearance opposite to it, is fear. Just as there is good anger and bad anger, so there is good fear and bad fear. Bad fear is the fear of men. Good fear is fear of the Lord, which the prophets of Israel called the beginning of wisdom. Although Paul emphasizes the obligation of love of God and neighbor over the obligation of fear of God, he never forgets the necessity of fearing God. “Submit yourselves one to another in the fear of God” (5:21); “wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands as unto the Lord,” because “the husband is the head of the wife”—giving direction to the household—even “as Christ is the head of the church” (5:22-23). Further, as Christ is the savior of the Church, so the husband protects the household. This leads to Paul’s next “therefore,” which is really an argument from analogy: “as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing” (5:24). Those who assume that this spells tyrannical rule of husbands over wives should guess again. Paul writes “as the church is subject unto Christ.” The Church is rightly subject unto Christ because Christ loves the Church not erotically but agapically, and husbands are to follow His standard. “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it,” sacrificing his life under torture (5:25). His purpose in so doing was to “sanctify and cleanse” the Church, “washing [it] with the water of the word,” so that “he might present it to himself a glorious church,” a church “holy and without blemish” (5:25-27). “So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself.” (5:28) This is why a man shall “leave his father and mother,” his flesh and blood, “and shall be joined with unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh” (5:31).

    If Paul and Aristotle concur in understanding a sound regime as analogous to a musical harmony, blending many into one, they diverge somewhat in their understanding of marriage. Aristotle regards the family as the foundation of the polis. The husband is the head of the household, but rule over the children and slaves within the household is shared by husband and wife, who rule reciprocally, “ruling and being ruled in turn.” This is the political relationship, strictly speaking. In Paul, the husband rules absolutely, as Christ does His Church, but with the agapic love that seeks the good of the beloved. The closest thing to absolute rule with agapic love in the Aristotelian family is the rule of the parents over their children, a rule that aims at the good of the children. 

    Christ’s love of the Church, the Church’s status as “members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones,” is “a great mystery” (5:30, 32). Paul doesn’t say why it is mysterious. It may be because the head of the body would usually sacrifice the other members of the body to preserve itself, but Christ is the head of the body of the Church, yet He sacrificed Himself for the sake of His members. The mystery, however, dissolves with His resurrection, his placement at the Father’s right hand; His sacrifice was real, but it issued in His return to rule over His church on earth, from a seat above the heavens. As to husbands still on earth, “let every one of you in particular so love his wife even as himself; and the wife see that she reverence her husband” (5:33). Do husbands not sometimes go so far as to sacrifice themselves for their wives and children? When they do, they imitate Christ.

    This brings Paul to consider the children in the family. “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right” (6:1). This isn’t blind obedience, but obedience in the Lord, who gives light. Honoring your father and mother brings the benefit of living well and long. Just as fathers should be reverenced by their wives, they should be honored by their children, but again with indispensable condition that they do so lovingly, not provoking their “children to wrath”—that is, to the natural, unrighteous anger Paul has already criticized. “Bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord” (6:4). The Lord’s nurture and admonition, opposites in one sense, equally bespeak His agapic love. That love frames and pervades the Christian family, even as it frames and pervades the Christian Church or assembly. 

    Regarding the third element of the household, the slaves, they too shall obey their masters “according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ” (6:5). They should obey their masters “not with eyeservice, as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart” (6:6). In Aristotle’s household, the husband and wife rule the slaves absolutely, aiming at the good not of the slaves but of themselves. (This is why Aristotle may be said to subtly question the moral foundation of slaveholding.) In Paul, slaves obey masters not insofar as the masters are human—human nature as it exists now is no badge of honor, and no measure of justice—but because in doing service “in good will” they serve Christ, indeed imitate Him (6:7). And they do so “knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free” (6:8). This is the equality of master and slave. In ordinary life under the nations’ regimes, slaves are not citizens. But they are citizen-subjects under God’s regime, a kingdom not a tyranny because the Ruler rules for the good of His people.

    What kind of military protection does this regime need? Being a spiritual regime, without physical power on earth, the Church may seem weak. On the contrary, Paul insists. It is strong in the way that it needs to be strong in order to fight the war it must fight. “Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might. Put on the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil.” (6:10-11). This strength, this armor, consists first of wisdom, ‘theoretical’ and practical, second of the moral strength to resist temptation. Both wisdom and moral strength are crucially informed by the Holy Spirit, with whose wisdom and strength Christians can “wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places” (6:12), a struggle they must lose, and were losing, without the Holy Spirit. “Wherefore take unto you the whole armor of God, that you may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand” (6:13). As Stott remarks, “A thorough knowledge of the enemy and a healthy respect for his powers are necessary for victory in war” (58). 

    Paul’s final set of metaphors consists of the armor and weaponry for the spiritual warrior who defends and advances the spiritual regime. His belt is truth; his breastplate is righteousness; his marching boots are “the gospel of peace”; his shield is faith; his helmet is salvation; his sword is “the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God” (6:13-17). The sword of the spirit thus hangs on the truth; righteousness protects his heart; salvation protects his head, which directs the course of the rest of his body. His boots protect his feet, which march in either defensive or offensive operations; since the aim of any war is peace (as Aristotle observes) the Christian war aims at peace, peace on the only terms that can endure, the peace of agapic not erotic love. The shield of faith is “above all” the other accoutrements of battle, as it enables him “to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked” (6:16). Paul puts the defense of the faith above its advancement, although he was himself perhaps the most effective evangelist the Church has seen; he doesn’t want to extend the range of Christ’s regime at the expense of allowing it to rot from within. Hence his epistles to the several Christian churches.

    What action does Christian warfare consist of? Prayer and vigilance: Christians should be “praying always with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance and supplication for all saints” —with guidance from God and care for all members of God’s city. What role will Paul play in this war? As God’s ambassador: He shall “open my mouth boldly, to make known the mystery of the gospel,” its witness to Gentiles as well as Jews; even in the prison, “I am an ambassador in bonds,” an ambassador who, unlike other ambassadors, stays in one place and speaks not ‘diplomatically’ but “boldly, as I ought to speak” (6:19-20). He is an ambassador who appoints his own ambassador, who is not imprisoned but free to travel to Ephesus, so that “you may know our affairs, and that he might comfort your hearts” (6:22), showing them how Paul bears witness to the Gospel even as he sits in a jail of the Roman regime. The epistle itself shows that, too.

    Paul ends with a blessing. He wishes peace to his brothers in the Christian family. He extends agapic love and faith to them, as well. This peace and this love are from “God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ” (6:23). This peace, and not any peace, is the aim of Christian warfare. To peace and love with faith he adds the wish for the grace of God for all those who “love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity” (6:24). Just as agapic love must be protected by the shield of faith, that love itself must be real, not feigned, in a spiritual regime, a regime not satisfied with mere outward compliance with its laws.

    Paul thus contributes to the founding of the Christian regime in Ephesus and, by extension, anywhere. He identifies its Ruler; he describes its way of life; he discusses its purpose. Of the four elements of a regime identified by Aristotle, he takes little note of the regime’s form or structure, its ruling institutions, although he does list the functions of its several officers, including his own. The unique character of this regime is its spirituality. It does not fight physical wars. It exists within other regimes, threatening them in challenging their spiritual foundations. With regard to those other regimes, the Christian founding is at once the least threatening and the most dangerous of all foundings. It in no way resists the physical power of those regimes, posing no military threat, no threat of domestic insurrection. It does resist—more threatens—their underlying claims on the human soul.

     

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    The Wisest Beholder

    May 15, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    William Shakespeare: The Winter’s Tale.

     

    Produced by the Michigan Shakespeare Festival. July 2011. Directed by Janice L. Blixt.

     

    The Winter’s Tale is a play about kings first presented before the King’s Court in November 1611, after a run at the Globe Theater beginning earlier that year.

     

    At the palace of Leontes, king of Sicilia, a Sicilian lord, Camillo, and a Bohemian lord, Archidamus, compare their countries. “If you chance, Camillo, to visit Bohemia, on the like occasion whereon my services are now on foot”—namely, an extended visit to Sicilia by the Bohemian king, Polixines—”you shall see, as I have said, great difference betwixt our Bohemia and your Sicilia” (I.i.1-3), namely, that Bohemia is far less wealthy. At the planned reciprocal visit to Bohemia next summer by Leontes, you will never see such “magnificence” as we Bohemians have seen here (I.i.12). Archidamus playfully suggests that we will need to give all of you Sicilians “sleepy drinks, that your senses, unintelligent of our insufficience, may, though they cannot praise us, as little accuse us” (I.i.13-14). Camillo assures him that a stronger bond than expense in hospitality binds the two kings. It is the natural bond of a friendship close to brotherhood. As boys, they shared the same education and planted a seed of “affection which cannot choose but branch now” (I.i.22), separated even as they have been by “their more mature dignities and royal necessities” (I.i.23). They are loving brothers, and Archidamus agrees that “there is not in the world either malice or matter to alter” their love (I.i.31-32).

    This amity in their foreign policy matches the amity King Leontes enjoys at home. His young son, Prince Mamillius, “is a gentleman of the greatest promise that ever came into my note,” Archidamus says (I.i.33-34). And the king’s subjects love both father and son. Sicilia enjoys the blessing of a sound regime and the civil peace it fosters.

    Elsewhere in the palace, the two kings discuss King Polixenes’ departure. Unlike King Leontes, faction may be arising in Bohemia. He fears “sneaping winds at home” (I.ii.13)—biting, rebuking criticism by his subjects for his nine-months’ absence. Nor does he wish “to tire your royalty” by prolonging his visit (I.ii.14). “My affairs / Do drag me homeward” (I.ii.23-24). When his liberal request to his friend to extend his stay still further fails, King Leontes turns to his queen, Hermione, to plead his case. Addressing her guest through her husband, she says to tell him that all in Bohemia is well, and that she grants Leontes permission to stay a month longer when he visits Bohemia. She good-humoredly threatens to take Polixenes prisoner. 

    He yields. Reminiscing to her of the childhood he shared with her husband, he tells her that each then supposed he were “to be boy eternal” (I.ii.64). “We knew not / The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dream’d / That any did.” (I.ii.69-71). Had the “stronger blood” of sexual maturity not overtaken them, they could have stood before God in complete innocence (I.ii.72). 

    This friendly dialogue, slightly suggestive of possessiveness and eroticism, causes what could only have been a deep reserve of jealousy in King Leontes’ soul to erupt. “My heart dances,” he tells himself in an aside, “But not for joy, not joy” (I.ii.110-11). Considering his son, he reassures himself that Mamillius looks “like me” (I.ii.135). No adultery went into his making. But his wife is pregnant, nearing childbirth, which corresponds agonizingly with the nine months his brother has been in his palace. Does he linger in Sicilia only to witness the birth of a child who is really his own? Is that why Hermione wants him to stay a month longer? 

    Leontes casually asks Polixenes if he’s as fond of his own son as Leontes is of Mamillius. Indeed so: “If at home, sir, / He’s all my exercise, my mirth, my matter; / Now my sworn friend, and then mine enemy; / My parasite, my soldier, statesman, all.” (I.ii.165-68). A true son. But Leontes has used his question only to set up his friend and his wife for surveillance; as he prepares to take his own son for a walk and leaving them alone, he confides to the audience, “I am angling now” (I.ii.180). He watches as they converse, taking ordinary gestures of two friends in conversation as proof of adultery, and even universalizing them: “It’s a bawdy planet” (I.ii.201). This inverts the Christian theme that God created the universe in the spirit of agapic love; in the eyes of jealousy, the world consists instead of erotic anarchy. When Camillo refuses to confirm his suspicions of the queen, even going so far as to defend her honor, Leontes puts him on the traitor list, too. To Leontes, slender evidence weighs heavily: “Is whispering nothing?” (I.ii.284). If their many gestures of affection are nothing, “then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing; / The covering sky is nothing; Bohemia nothing; / My wife is nothing; nor nothing have these nothings, / If this be nothing.” (I.ii.292-95). The answer is that yes, all these tokens are not-nothings, literally, but nothing much when it comes to grounds for reasonable suspicion. Small ‘somethings’ may or may not add up to a bigger one. Only prudence and moderation will tell the difference. But that isn’t an answer Leontes would hear. In making something out of nothings, he apes God while throwing his regime into chaos. The king is a creative un-creator, about to unmake his family and hazard the unmaking of his family’s rule.

    In Leontes’ mind, Camillo can redeem himself from the charge of treason by passing a kind of love test or loyalty test. He must agree to poison Polixenes—a lethal version of the sleeping potion with which Archidamus had playfully proposed to dope Camillo and the rest of next-year’s Sicilian visitors in Bohemia. This is the only way Leontes can eliminate his imagined rival while maintaining Hermione’s reputation, which he needs to keep inviolate so as not to call the royal succession into question.

    As befits his name, which means ‘freeborn,’ or ‘noble,’ Camillo will have nothing to do with the murder. To obey such a master would be to obey “one who, in rebellion to himself, will have / All that are his so too” (I.ii.354-55). He hints of the plot to Polixenes, who appeals to him to disclose it fully: “I conjure thee, by all the parts of man; / Which honor does acknowledge, whereof the least / Is not this suit of mine, that thou declare / What incidency thou dost guess of harm / Is creeping toward me; how far off, how near; / Which way to be prevented, if to be; / If not, how best to bear it.” (I.ii.401-06). That is, your obligation to human nature overrides your obligation to your master. Camillo does yield to the higher obligation, asking only that when Polixenes embarks for Bohemia he take Camillo with him. Polixenes rightly believes the lord’s story, as he saw for himself a malignant glance his friend cast at him when last he saw him. “This jealousy / Is for a precious creature; as she’s rare / Must it be great; and, as his person’s mighty, / Must it be violent; and as he does conceive / He is dishonor’d by a man which ever / Profess’d to him, why, his revenges must / In that be made more bitter.” (I.ii.451-57). Love and honor rightly comport with one another, but here their combination has turned lethal.

    The two men have been ‘brothers’ not in birth-nature but in the more refined natural relation of friendship. Yet they are also kings, and kings must concern themselves with conspiracies against their rule. They will hear rumors of such conspiracies, or even suspect conspiracies without hearing rumors but by observing the behavior of possible rivals. King Leontes invents a conspiracy against himself by ‘over-reading’ the behavior of his brother and his wife. When a trusted advisor disagrees with his misinterpretation, he not only rejects his testimony but commands him to murder the man he wrongly accuses. King Polixenes observes hostile behavior but only puzzles at it; when told of a possible conspiracy by a man subordinate to the conspirator, he carefully tests his testimony, confirming it by comparing it to his prior observation. The clinching evidence is Camillo’s willingness to exile himself, to join Polixenes in fleeing Sicilia. Living up to the meaning of his name, which means ‘hospitable,’ Polixenes tells the older man, “I will respect thee as a father, if / Thou bear’st my life off hence” (I.ii.461-62). Given Leontes’ jealousy-sparked, lethal madness, Polixenes is glad to ‘adopt’ a new father in place of his natural, deceased father. His brotherly friend has made himself unnatural by rebelling against his own nature and his own rule, causing faction in Sicilia where there had been unity both in the ruling household and among the elders, and sundering the alliance between Sicilia and Bohemia. Obsession with loyalty ruins the union the obsession demands.

    At the palace, Hermione temporarily hands off her son to the ladies in attendance: “He so troubles me, / ‘Tis past enduring” (II.i.1-2). Judging from the boy’s badinage with the lady, he is indeed something of an insolent little wiseacre, and a pregnant mother might well find him taxing. When Hermione returns, she tries to settle him down by asking him to tell her a tale. “A sad tale’s best for winter,” the boy replies, foreshadowing more than he knows; he proposes a story about “sprites and goblins” (II.i.26). Before he begins, Leontes enters the room, along with Lord Antigonus and several other courtiers. He will prove the greater goblin than any the boy might imagine.

    Having heard the report that Polixenes and Camillo have fled, confirming to him that they must have been plotting against him, he continues to believe that Hermione was a co-conspirator and is now pregnant with his brother’s child. “She’s an adultress,” a “bed-swerver,” and a traitor (II.i.78,93)—a royal home-wrecker who, because royal, has betrayed her country, as well. He orders her imprisoned. Hermione takes his decree stoically: “There’s some ill planet reigns. / I must be patient till the heavens look / With aspect more favorable.” (II.105-07). She will not weep, adjuring the onlooking lords and ladies not to weep, either. Weep only if you “know your mistress / Has deserved prison” (II.i.119-20). As for Leontes, “Adieu, my lord. / I never wish’d you sorry; now / I trust I shall.” (II.i.123-24).

    Lord Antigonus remonstrates, and Leontes rejects his criticisms as he had rejected those of Archidamus. “Why, what need we / Commune with you of this, but rather follow / Our forceful instigation? Our prerogative / Calls not your counsels; but our natural goodness / Imparts this….” (II.i.162-66). In the mind of the jealousy-addled tyrant, his will trumps his counselors’ reason because his will bespeaks the mind of a natural superior. “We need no more of your advice” because the whole matter “is all properly ours” (II.i.168-70). Jealousy registers love of one’s own; overweening jealousy registers a love of one’s own that spurns reason, including rational advice, for the solipsism of fury. He recognizes only one authority above himself. He’s sent to Apollo’s temple at Delphi for the word of the oracle, which he expects to confirm his charges not in his own mind but in the minds of his subjects.

    Paulina, wife of Antigonus, attempts to visit Hermione in prison. She is allowed to see only the queen’s attendant, Emilia. Hermione has given birth to a daughter. Paulina would bring the infant to King Leontes in the hope of softening his heart at the sight of the child. When the jailor worries that he might be punished for letting the child out of jail, Paulina appeals to nature: “You need not fear it, sir. / This child was prisoner to the womb, and is / By law and process of great Nature thence / Freed and enfranchis’d—not a party to / The anger of the King, nor guilty of, / If any be, the trespass of the Queen.” (II.ii.48-53). What is more, “I will stand betwixt you and danger” (II.ii.66). That is, the child was imprisoned by natural necessity because her mother was, but now that she has been born she cannot justly be imprisoned any longer, being as innocent of wrongdoing as any human being can be. To this argument in principle, this rational argument from natural right, Paulina prudently adds a promise of political protection, inasmuch as arguments from principle can have no purchase in the world as it is without political security.

    With his Polixenes the “harlot king” out of reach, King Leontes plans capital punishment for Hermione, the imagined accomplice and traitor. Meanwhile, sleepless and without appetite since hearing of his mother’s “dishonor” (II.iii.13), Mamillius has taken ill. Completing the derangement of nature within the royal household, the king too has been unable to sleep. But that hasn’t prevented him from strategizing. Calculating that King Polixenes’ throne is too secure and his alliances too strong for a successful attack on Bohemia, King Leontes reserves revenge on him for another time. This speech provides two important insights into the king’s mind: first, he isn’t so thoroughly insane as to have lost his ability to reason altogether; second, his jealousy isn’t a mere pretext for making war on Bohemia. His irrationality is limited to one dimension of his soul and his rule, albeit a dimension that threatens to ruin both his soul and his rule.

    Paulina approaches the king’s court with Hermione’s baby in her arms. Delayed by one of the attending lords, she tells him not to fear the king’s “tyrannous passion” more than “the Queen’s life” (II.iii.27-28). Her “gracious, innocent soul” is “more free than he is jealous” (II.iii.28-29). When he persists, she tells him “I do come with words as medicinal as true, / Honest as either, to purge him of that humor / That presses him from sleep.” (II.iii.37-39). Hearing the disputants, the king comes forth to command his men to remove her. A woman of spirit, Paulina threatens to scratch their eyes out if they try, provoking the king to call her a masculine witch, to accuse his attendants of treason, and to charge “thou dotard” Antigonus with fearing his wife (II.iii.74). “This brat is none of mine” (II.iii.92). He commands that mother and daughter both be burned.

    Knowing that the king can’t commit this act of judicial murder without accomplices, Paulina turns to the attendants. Look at the evidence: The infant’s features are miniature copies of the king’s. Appealing to “the good goddess Nature,” she suggests that not only the shape of the body but “the ordering of the mind, too,” is under Nature’s rule, and that yellow, the color of jealousy, has no rightful part in her natural order. This only enrages Leontes further, as he tells Antigonus he deserves to be hanged for failing to “stay her tongue”—to which the good lord coolly replies, “Hang all the husbands / That cannot do that feat, you’ll leave yourself / Hardly one subject” (II.iii.109-11). Threatened by the king with burning, Paulina professes to “care not,” since “it is an heretic that makes the fire, / Not she which burns in’t” (II.iii.113-15). You, king, in an attempt to defend your honor, and therefore the crown that depends upon its maintenance, make yourself instead “scandalous to the world” (II.iii.120). Your rule has become the derangement of the honor upon which your authority depends.

    Paulina catches the king in another contradiction. Having called his passion tyrannical, she stops short of calling him one: “I’ll not call you tyrant,” only cruel and daft, a ruler whose acts that savor of tyranny which “will ignoble make you” (II.iii.115, 119). Leontes sputters at his courtiers, “Were I a tyrant, / Where were her life? She durst not call me so, / If she did not know me one” (II.iii.121-24). But she did in fact not call him so, and therefore, by the logic of his own charge, she must know him one. She hands the infant to her husband and issues a parting insult to all the king’s attendants: “You that are thus so tender” of the king’s “follies will never do him good, not one of you” (II.iii.127-28). Obedience is not enough, when dealing with the anti-natural, the tyrannical. She effectively calls for civil disobedience by the king’s men, and unknowingly prophecies the ruin of her own husband.

    After accusing Antigonus of setting his wife to this action, King Leontes initially commands that he burn the child, or he will dash out her “bastard brains” with “these my proper hands” (II.iii.136-37). When his fellow lords attest to Antigonus’ innocence, Leontes cries, “You’re liars all” (II.iii.145). In his insane jealousy he has constructed an entirely fictional world around himself, all founded upon the initial fiction that his wife and brother have committed adultery against him.

    King or rather Tyrant Leontes hasn’t lost every vestige of sanity, however. Evidently seeing that he faces a palace revolt, he tells Antigonus that he will pardon his wife in exchange for his vow to carry the child out of Sicilia and leave her exposed, “Where chance may nurse or end it” (II.iii.182). Thus the end of Act II echoes the beginning of Act I, when the Bohemian Lord Archidamus told his Sicilian counterpart, Camillo, that he would see the “great difference” between Bohemia and Sicilia if chance were to bring him to Bohemia. Chance has brought Camillo to Bohemia, fleeing in the company of the Bohemian king; the important difference between the two countries has turned out not to be an ‘economic’ difference, the difference in wealth, but the political difference between kingship and tyranny, between a just and reasonable natural ruler and an unjust, irrational, unnatural one.

    Leontes now learns that Cleomenes and Dion, his messengers to the Delphic oracle will arrive in an hour. Having failed to hear the voices of natural reason, even when Nature is described as a goddess, what will the voice of the god tell him? And how will he respond to its ruling?

    On the road to the Sicilian capital, the messengers discuss the beauties of Delphi—its delicate climate, its sweet air, its fertile soil, and its impressive temple. In describing the oracle, Cleomenes moves from the beautiful to the sublime: “The ear-deaf’ning voice o’ th’ oracle, / Kin to Jove’s thunder, so surprised my sense / That I was nothing.” (III.i.9-11). Dion affirms that when the sealed contents of the oracle’s answer are revealed, “something rare even then will rush to knowledge” (III.i.20-21). In precise contrast to Leontes’ attempt to make something out of nothings, something significant out of human-all-too-human trifles, the Delphic oracle’s teachings make human beings feel insignificant in comparison to the wisdom and power of Jove’s son, Apollo. What Leontes has deranged the oracle would set right, substituting divine knowledge for the king’s baseless surmise.

    Meanwhile, the tyrant Leontes wants to be “clear’d of being tyrannous” in Sicilia’s law court (III.ii.4-5). Submitting to the rule of law gives the appearance of constitutionalism to his rule. Hermione stands charged with treason on three counts: as queen, she has committed adultery; she has conspired to murder the king; she has aided the flight of her co-conspirators. The murder charge is a new invention, derived from the first invention; it was of course King Leontes, and only King Leontes, who conspired to have a king murdered. 

    Hermione points out the lawless character of the king’s appeal to the law. “Mine integrity / Being counted falseness,” she is being considered guilty until proven innocent (III.ii.24-25). She nonetheless makes her defense, appealing to three authorities: the “pow’rs divine” (III.ii.26); “my past life” (III.ii.31); and the king’s own conscience. With respect to her past life, she says she loved Polixenes “as in honor he requir’d” as a visiting king and as “yourself,” Leontes, “commanded” (62, 65). In her central answer, the evidence of her good character, she cites her chaste and true previous conduct, her status as a royal wife, herself the daughter of “a great king,” the emperor of Russia, and mother of a prince, and, finally, her integrity, the evidence for which she brings out by saying she prizes her honor, not her life (III.ii.31-43). “My life stands in the level”—the gunsight—”of your dreams, / Which I’ll lay down” (III.ii.78-79). Now deprived of her husband’s favor and of both her children, she is unafraid to die, but will continue to defend her honor. As for the king’s conscience, he has replaced proofs with “surmises,” exhibiting “rigor, and not law” (III.ii.110,112). 

    The only appeal among these that might sway the king is the appeal to powers divine. Accordingly, Hermione asks for the oracle of Apollo, which she expects will vindicate her honor. Leontes agrees to her request, sure of his own charges. When the messengers appear and are duly sworn, the court officer breaks the seal and reads a message from Delphi that not only exonerates Hermione but calls the king “a jealous tyrant” and prophesies that “he shall live without an heir” (III.ii.131-33). To this, Leontes proves his tyranny by denying the authority of the god: “This is mere falsehood”; let the trial continue (III.ii.139). He would make the oracle from Delphi a nothing.

    But the god is not to be mocked. One of Leontes’ servants reports that Mamillius has died of sickness brought on by worrying over his mother’s peril. Leontes immediately understands this to be evidence of Apollo’s anger at “my injustice” (III.ii.143). His line of succession has been destroyed. He was quite willing to deny the words of the god, but he cannot deny the action of the god. He confesses, “I have too much believ’d mine own suspicion” (III.ii.149). He speaks one of the very rare prayers in all of Shakespeare’s writings, asking Apollo to pardon “my great profaneness ‘gainst thy oracle” (III.ii.151) and promising to atone by reconciling himself with Polixenes, “new woo my queen,” and recall “the good Camillo,” a “man of truth, of mercy” (III.ii.151-53). He confesses that his several jealousies led him “to bloody thoughts and to revenge” (III.ii.156) against persons who unfailingly acted with humanity, honor, self-sacrifice, and piety. 

    But Apollo has not done acting. The queen has collapsed, and Paulina pronounces her dead. She condemns Leontes, telling him that the gods will not forgive him, however contrite he may be, or seem to be. “Therefore betake thee / To nothing but despair” (III.ii.206-07). This would be the final “nothing” for him; nothing came of nothing.

    But the king shows that he really is contrite. “Go on, go on,” he tells her; “thou canst not speak too much,” as “I have deserved / All tongues to talk their bitt’rest” (III.ii.212-14). When Paulina herself repents and asks his forgiveness, he replies with humility, “Thou didst speak but well / When most the truth; which I receive much better / Than to be pitied of thee” (III.ii.229-31). After burying his queen and his son in one grave, he will continue to rule Sicilia “in shame perpetual” “so long as nature” will let him live, visiting the chapel where the grave will be (III.ii.235,237). Nature, the true ‘something,’ which he had spurned and deformed with his passion and the acts deriving from that passion, will have the last word.

    On the seacoast of Bohemia, Antigonus, with the king’s infant daughter in his arms, hears the mariner who has escorted him say that the area is “famous” for its “creatures of prey” (III.iii.12-13). Antigonus fears rather the spirit of Hermione, who appeared to him in his sleep last night;”ne’er was dream / So much like waking” (III.iii.18-19). “Good Antigonus,” the spirit told him, “Since fate against thy better disposition, / Hath made thy person for the thrower-out / Of my poor babe, according to thine oath,” call her Perdita, meaning ‘lost.’ (III.iii.27-30). As punishment, you will never see your wife Paulina again. Antigonus obeys the spirit, whom he takes as having been sent by Apollo. He places the infant on the ground, “either for life or death” on the ground ruled by the one he mistakenly supposes to be her father, King Polixenes (III.iii.45). He puts a bundle down beside her; if she is found, its contents will pay for her support. “Most accurs’d am I / To be by oath enjoin’d to this” (III.iii.52-53). He is indeed: As a storm blows up, one of the local creatures of prey, a bear, attacks him. “I am gone for ever” (III.iii.57), a victim of nature at its most violent, driven into it by a tyrant whose name means ‘lion.’

    Not so, Perdita. A shepherd finds her and, believing some “waiting-gentlewoman in the scape” abandoned her, determines to “take it up for pity” (III.iii.72-75). His son arrives to report that the ship which had carried Antigonus has capsized in the storm and Antigonus has been mortally wounded by the bear. Their mood brightens considerably when they discover that the infant comes equipped with a sack of gold and jewels. The shepherd is suddenly rich.

    Suddenness is a recurring motif in the play. Leontes veers from apparent contentment to raging jealousy to just and humble penitence. Paulina too goes from severe judge to pleader for forgiveness. Suddenness is a form of the interaction of thought, speech, and/or action with time, and Act IV opens with Time himself speaking to the audience in the role of a chorus. I “please some, try all”; I bring “joy and terror,” “good and bad”; perhaps above all, Time “makes and unfolds error” (IV.i.1-2) (as Viola sees in Twelfth Night). Therefore, Time continues, it is no crime in me if I violate the laws of the classical ‘unities,’ which decree that all actions in a play occur within a twenty-four-hour span. After all, “it is in my pow’r / To o’erthrow law, and in one self-born hour / To plant and o’erwhelm custom” (IV.i.7-9). And so I shall now “slide o’er sixteen years” (IV.i.6) and return you to Bohemia, where King Polixenes still lives with his son, Florizel, and Perdita has “now grown in grace / Equal with wond’ring” (IV.i.24-25).

    At the palace, plots are being formed. Camillo laments the loss of his country, which he hasn’t seen since he fled with the King. A faithful lover of his own, he wants to be buried there, and now it is safe for him to return, as in the intervening time King Leontes has shown himself as penitent in action as he had been in speech. In contrast, King Polixenes still doubts the sincerity of his friend’s longstanding shows of remorse, having seen how quickly the man’s mood can turn. He has another task for his trusted courtier; he wants him to accompany him to the house of the wealthy shepherd, whose daughter Florizel has been courting, according to reports the king has received from his spies. Even in childhood Florizel was changeable, Polixenes had told Leontes, back in Sicilia. So he has longstanding reasons to keep his eyes on him. The ing and Camillo will disguise themselves and investigate, as Polixenes remains a cautious man when it comes to his own suspicions. This mission is far more urgent than Camillo’s natural but private longing, as the prince’s alleged action implicates the royal succession in Bohemia.

    Bohemia, land of predators, features at least one human specimen of the breed. A rogue named Autolycus (literally, ‘wolf-self’) ambles along a road near the shepherd’s house singing of spring, when “the red blood reigns in the winter’s pale” (IV.iii.4). The sixteen years’ shift in chronology accompanies a one-season shift in the natural season, from winter in Sicilia to spring in Bohemia. Red blood hints at both love and predation; while the prince walks in the spirit of the first, Wolf-Self walks in the spirit of the second. He was once a servant of Florizel, but has been let go, from the Bohemian court to the Bohemian wilds, where a self-made wolf belongs. 

    He finds his next prey in the shepherd’s son, who’s been sent to purchase food, spices, and flowers for a feast Perdita is planning. Pretending to have been beaten and robbed, Autolycus picks the youth’s pocket, relieving him of money the youth would have given him, in pity. Enjoying his sport, Autolycus blames a man named ‘Autolycus’ for the beating. He is a true lord of misrule, but unfit for Twelfth Night celebrations, fit only for the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ avant la lettre—shammer, liar, law-breaker. 

    At the shepherd’s cottage, Florizel and Perdita also play with role reversal, but for love, not profit; he’s dressed as a shepherd swain, she as a queen. Perdita worries that the king, “by some accident,” might discover them and object to their play (IV.iv.19), but Florizel tells her that it’s only done in “jollity,” that the gods themselves condescend to take the forms of beasts, for love (IV.iv.19,25). Apollo himself transformed himself into “a poor humble swain, / As I seem now” (IV.iv.30-31). Such an allusion to Ovid’s tales, which suggest a rather bawdy planet indeed, might well unsettle a virtuous shepherdess, but Florizel assures her that unlike the gods, “my desires / Run not before mine honor, nor my lusts / Burn hotter than my faith” (IV.iv.33-35).

    Yes, but what of the real difference in rank between the prince and the shepherdess? She remarks that “Your resolution cannot hold, when ’tis / Oppos’d, as it must be, by the pow’r of the King” (IV.iv.36-37). One of us must change, for real. Florizel brushes her worries aside; “prithee, darken not / The mirth of the feast” (IV.iv.41-42). If forced to choose, “I’ll be thine” and “not my father’s” because “I cannot be / Mine own, not anything to any, if / I be not thine” (IV.iv.42-45). He will be constant in this purpose, even if “destiny say no” (IV.iv.46). Think of today’s feast as the precursor to the celebration of that nuptial which “We two have sworn shall come” (IV.iv.50-51). Perdita can only hope that Lady Fortune will “stand you auspicious” (IV.iv.52). Very well, he says, the guests approach, so “let’s be red with mirth” (IV.iv.54), with the rising blood of the Bohemian springtime.

    To whom does the prince belong? His father considers him his own, by nature. As ruler, and as future ruler, both belong to Bohemia, and it to them. The prince considers himself more fundamentally his own, by an even more elemental nature; having vowed to marry his beloved, he anticipates becoming ‘one flesh’ with his bride, and has made this a matter of honor. Marriage is the natural foundation of the political community, but this marriage seems to challenge the natural foundation of the ruling family, the regime of that community. Perdita sees the tension, even contradiction, between the ruling intentions of father and son, king and prince. The prince, ardent for her, prefers not to think about it.

    The shepherd wants to prepare his adopted daughter for rule, in his own more limited domain. You, Perdita, are “hostess of the meeting” (IV.iv.64). The guests include shepherds and shepherdesses, but also King Polixenes and Camillo, in disguise. Welcome these “unknown friends” to the feast; in the absence of your mother, whom Perdita assumes to be the shepherd’s late wife, put away your girlish blushes “and present yourself / That which you are, Mistress o’ th’ Feast” (IV.iv.65-68). And she does so, greeting king and courtier with gifts of rosemary and rue, dried flowers that keep “all the winter long,” representing “grace and remembrance” (IV.iv.75-76).

    The king wants to know her better. Complimenting her beauty, he graciously remarks her gifts of “the flowers of winter” fits the old age of his uninvited but welcomed guests (IV.iv.78). She tells him that the springtime flowers, carnations and gillyvors, are hybrids, “nature’s bastards,” and she will not grow them in “our rustic garden” (IV.iv.83-84). They are products of art, not nature. The king corrects her, however, arguing that “nature is made better by no mean / But nature makes that mean; so over that art / Which you say adds to nature, is an art / That nature makes.” (IV.iv.89-92). Marrying “the gentlest scion to the wildest stock” “does mend nature—change it rather; but / The art itself is nature” (IV.iv.93-97). Given her own vows, she cannot but agree. The king seems to bless the union: “Make your garden rich in gillyvors, / And do not call them bastards” (IV.iv.98-99). Bastardy had been exactly the issue respecting her own birth, unbeknownst to her; unbeknownst to him, he is teaching the girl he was falsely accused of siring. Both understand nature; neither knows the other.

    She distributes more flowers, always in accordance with the nature of the flowers and the age of her guests, matching nature with time. She flirts with Florizel, whose name means ‘flower.’ In turn he calls her royal by nature. Polixenes stands amazed at “the prettiest low-born lass that ever / Ran on the green-sward; nothing she does or seems / But smacks of something greater than herself, / Too noble for this place” (IV.iv.156-59). Camillo can only agree: “She is / The queen of curds and cream,” queen of the natural (IV.iv.160-61). The lovers dance.

    Autolycus prowls in, now disguised as a piper, avoiding recognition by any of the three men who know him from the king’s court. Ever ready to separate others from their money, he sings of the trinkets he would like to sell. The lovers have other goods in mind. Florizel professes his love for Perdita in front of his disguised father, saying he loves her more than any other of his gifts: beauty, force, or knowledge. The shepherd happily gives his daughter to the man he takes for another shepherd. 

    The king, however, has a few questions for his unsuspecting son. “Soft swain,” he begins, “Have you a father?” (IV.iv.383). Yes, “but what of him?” (IV.iv.384). Not an auspicious beginning. Does he know of your plans to wed? “He neither does nor shall” (IV.iv.385). Ahem. “Methinks” (Polixenes opines) “a father / Is at the nuptial of his son a guest / That best becomes the table. Pray you, once more, / Is not your father grown incapable / Of reasonable affairs?” (IV.iv.386-90). Not at all, he is quite healthy. But then surely there is something “wrong” and “unfilial” about your conduct; a man should use reason to choose his wife, “but as good reason / The father—all whose joy is nothing else / But fair posterity—should hold some counsel / In such a business.” (IV.iv.398-402). Florizel agrees, but insists that “for some other reasons… I do not acquaint / My father of this business” (IV.iv.403-04). He means that he has already pledged himself to Perdita, although he may also be thinking of Perdita’s warning about his father’s likely objections to their difference in rank.

    It is indeed both understandable yet astonishing that Florizel and Perdita have formed no plan, conceived of no plot, beyond marriage. What exactly do they intend to do after the ceremony and the wedding night? This is understandable in view of their ardor, but astonishing in view of the remarkable circumstance which they both see so clearly, the incongruity of a prince marrying a shepherdess—however rich the bride’s father may be. Father Time, whom we met at the beginning of Act IV, cannot be on their side. In this, the dilemma of springtime in Bohemia, the season of red blood in the land of natural riches and civil-social poverty, parallels the dilemma of winter in Sicilia, land of civil-social riches of natural poverty. In Sicilia, the king’s love of his own ruins itself with marital jealousy; in Bohemia, the king’s love of his own threatens to ruin itself with filial and patriotic jealousy.

    The enraged king rips off his disguise, excoriating first his son, “whom son I dare not call,” as “too base to acknowledge”; then the shepherd, an “old traitor,” whose hanging, unfortunately, would only shorten his life for a week; and finally Perdita, “thou fresh piece / Of excellent witchcraft” who has taken advantage of his fool of an unworthy son (IV.iv.410-15). Polixenes behaves exactly as his brother had done in his succession crisis, although in this case he has command of the facts. Disowning his son, barring him from succeeding to the throne, he threatens Perdita with death if she ever contrives to see his son again. With that, he stalks out, leaving not only the lovers but Camillo behind. In his rage he has forgotten his own teaching on nature, which he had delivered to Perdita—that purity of breeding is no more, and perhaps somewhat less natural than intermixing of breeds by the art that is itself natural, including the natural arts of family formation and even politics, the founding and maintenance of cities.

    “Even here undone!” Perdita says (IV.iv.433)—here in the countryside, far from the court. She remains a woman of spiritedness, saying she would have liked to tell the king that the same sun which shines on his court shines on this cottage. And she doesn’t forget to remind her beloved that “I told you what would come of this” (IV.iv.439). For his part, the shepherd blames both Florizel and Perdita for bringing ruin upon him.

    The prince remains happy to relinquish his future throne for her: “I am heir to my affection” (IV.iv.473), heir to his truest nature, the nature that aims at reasonable and artful ‘hybridization.’ Camillo objects: “This is desperate, sir” (IV.iv.477). You may call it so, Florizel replies, “but it does fulfill my vow,” uphold my honor (IV.iv.478). “Not for Bohemia, nor the pomp that may / Be thereat glean’d, for all the sun sees or / The close earth wombs, or the profound seas hides / In unknown fathoms, will I break my oath / To this my fair belov’d.” (IV.iv.480-85). He intends to put to sea with her; he does not say whereto, because he doesn’t know. He announces that he and his future bride will be “slaves to chance” (IV.iv.532). And so he must be, having failed to respect old father Time any more than he respected his father the king, conveiving no erious plan for the future, for the day after the wedding.

    And that’s the problem. Florizel is full of noble sentiments, but unlike his betrothed, and (fortunately, as it happens) the prudent Camillo, he never thinks more than one moment ahead. Old Father Time knows him, but he doesn’t know Old Father Time; he lives entirely in the present and the immediate future. Camillo sees how his own intention, to return to Sicilia, and Florizel’s intention, to escape Bohemia with Perdita, may unite for the benefit of all. Citing his loyal services to his father, he suggests that he can be equally devoted to his son, the one “nearest to him” (IV.iv.514). If you will but “embrace my direction,” I can contrive a better plot than whatever Fortune likely will impose. “You know / Prosperity’s the very bond of love, / Whose fresh complexion and whose heart together / Affliction alters.” (IV.iv.564-65). Perdita objects, saying that “affliction may subdue the cheek / But not take in the mind” (IV.iv.568-69)—another worthy sentiment, to which Camillo gives due praise, but not a thought that addresses the problem at hand.

    Camillo proposes that they embark for Sicilia, where King Leontes will treat you as a son, having lost his own son as one consequence of his jealous rage, sixteen years ago. Once again, the couple will disguise themselves. Florizel will wear the clothes of Autolycus, which he obtains in exchange for his fine court-garments. For his part, Camillo will return to King Polixenes, report the escape, then accompany the king in his chase after them, to Sicilia—effectively hitching a free ride on the royal train.

    As for Autolycus, he never lacks a scheme of his own, never lacks a way to exploit time. He has just returned from picking the pockets of a crowd gathered to hear the shepherd’s son sing to his two favorite shepherdesses, which is “the time that the unjust man doth thrive” (IV.iv.662). He doesn’t so much plan ahead as he seizes immediate opportunities, “smell[ing] out work for th’ other senses” (IV.iv.664).  Just as Leontes defined the world in terms of bawdry, Autolycus defines it in terms of theft. The young prince is stealing himself from his father. The gods themselves are thieves, and Mercury, the god-thief, is Autolycus’ model. Although he could disclose Camillo’s plot to the king, he won’t. “I hold it the more knavery to conceal it; and therein am I constant to my profession” (IV.iv.672). A person whose wit is all in his senses, his knowledge is the cunning of the ‘con’ artist, his morality the honor among thieves.

    The times provide him with another ripe opportunity for gain. The shepherd’s son advises his father to tell King Polixenes that Perdita isn’t his daughter but a foundling. He can prove this by showing the king the “secret things” he found in the bag next to the infant (IV.iv.684). Now dressed in the finery he acquired from the prince, Autolycus overawes the rubes, frightens them into giving him some of their gold as protection money, then accompanies them on their mission to catch up with the king before he leaves for Sicilia. Autolycus pauses to praise himself: Fortune is courting him now “with a double occasion and a means to do the prince my master good, which who knows how that may turn back to my advancement?” (IV.iv.816-18). 

    By far the longest scene in the play, Scene iv of Act IV takes more time because in it Shakespeare portrays the intricate patterns human beings can weave into time, and have been woven into by it, and by the nature that weaves its own patterns, in time. Human beings can improve nature by their art, especially by prudent ‘breeding’ of flowers and of themselves, through marriage. Good marriages can perpetuate a good regime, through time. Human beings can also corrupt nature by their art, by thinking of nature and the gods as their partners in crime. Human beings, and especially rulers, can corrupt nature by letting their natural passions, especially their love of their own, override their natural reason. What King Leontes did to himself, to his family, and to Sicilia in letting his love for his own wife run beyond any reasonable limits King Polixenes has begun to do in his love for his own son, and his son has begun to do in his love for his own beloved. Camillo, who also loves his own, his own native country and king, is the only one who has the prudence to plot a good end to the badly plotted plans of the others.

    At the palace in Sicilia, Cleomenes would persuade King Leontes that he has done his penitence, performing it with “saint-like sorrow” for many years, more than repaying his trespass (V.i.2). “Do as the heavens have done: forget your evil; / With them forgive yourself” (V.i.5-6). Cleomenes speaks rather like a twenty-first-century therapist or New-Age ‘Christian’ pastor. The King will not forgive himself for making his kingdom “heirless” and for causing the death of his wife, “the sweet’st companion that e’er man / Bred his hopes out of” (V.i.10-12).

    Concurring with the king, not the counselor, Paulina speaks like her namesake, the Apostle Paul, one who never overlooked human guilt. You killed your wife, she reminds him—a woman superior to the amalgamation of all the virtues of all the other women in the world. Leontes can only ask Paulina for mercy, if in the kingly manner of commanding: “Say so but seldom” (V.i.19). 

    Cleomenes persists. You, Paulina “might have spoken a thousand things that would / Have done the time more benefit, and grac’d / Your kindness better” (V.i.21-23). Here, time means circumstances, the conditions prevailing at this time—more specifically, the political circumstances, which Cleomenes would have Paulina consider in accordance with nature (kindness) and grace, which might be a human enhancement of nature or a gift of God. Dion unfolds the political consideration more fully, saying that the king should marry again. In refusing to consider such an act, Paulina shows no pity “for the state” of Sicilia, and no “remembrance” of the king’s “sovereign name” (V.i.25-26). You “consider little / What dangers, by his Highness’ fail of issue, / May drop upon his kingdom and devour / Incertain lookers-on” (V.i.27-29). Given this time, what could be more holy than a new marriage for the king, a new heir to his throne for his kingdom?

    Paulina has a ready answer to this politic consideration: God disagrees. Apollo’s oracle has decreed that Leontes shall not have an heir until his lost child has been found. This, she adds, is as unlikely as the chance that her husband Antigonus, long missing and rightly presumed dead, will rise from the grave. And she reminds the king that even Alexander the Great left his crown not to an heir (his wife was pregnant with his only son) but to “th’ worthiest” man in his empire, “so his successor / Was like to be the best” (V.i.98-99); she refers to one version of Alexander’s last words, “I bequeath my kingdom tôi kratikôi“—to the strongest. Stopping short of imitating Alexander, whom Paulina has turned into a man who thinks of honor and goodness, the king agrees that there are “no more such wives” as Hermione, and “therefore no wife” for him (V.i.56). If I were to take another wife, Hermione’s spirit, he says, would arise to rebuke him, and he swears never to marry without Paulina’s permission, which she tells him she will not grant unless another “as like Hermione as is her picture” appears (V.i.74), or rather “when your first queen’s again in breath” (V.i.83).

    As in so much here, such a one will appear suddenly, accompanying the son of his childhood friend. Leontes himself so remarks: Florizel’s arrival is “out of circumstance”—untimely—and “sudden,” which suggests to the experienced king that “‘Tis not a visitation framed, but forced / By need and accident,” especially in view of the few attendants accompanying the couple (V.i.91-92). For her part, Paulina is skeptical in another way. To the servant who announces their approach, praising Perdita as “the most peerless piece of earth, I think, / That e’er the sun shone bright on,” she laments, “O Hermione / As every present time doth boast itself / Above a better gone, so must thy grave / Give way to what’s seen now” (V.i.93-98). True enough, but the servant insists, that this woman—well, “Women will love her that she is a woman / More worth than any man; men that she is / The rarest of all women” (V.i.110-11). When the couple does arrive, Leontes sides with the servant, calling Perdita a goddess, while expressing his regret, misery and remorse for “mine own folly” in ruining his family and his friendship with his childhood friend, Florizel’s father (V.i.136).

    Florizel has prepared his covering lies. His father commanded him to come to Sicilia with the message that he remains Leontes’ friend, that only infirmity prevents him from making the trip himself, and that Florizel’s ‘wife’ is from Libya. Their retinue is modest because he has ordered several of his attendants to return home to assure King Polixenes of his son’s safe arrival. Again suddenly, news arrives that the supposedly home-ridden king has arrived with Camillo, whom Florizel assumes has betrayed him. 

    Having caught the young man in his lies, King Leontes at first gravely admonishes him: “I am sorry / Most sorry, you have broken from his liking / Where you were tied in duty; and as sorry / Your choice is not so rich in worth as beauty, / That you may enjoy her” (V.i.210-214). Florizel can only plead faithful love as his defense. Fortune may have proved an enemy, bringing the king of Bohemia so soon behind his own arrival, but Fortune has the power “to change our loves” (V.i.218). This being so, King Leontes, remember when “you ow’d no more to time / Than I do now,” when you were young, with few years behind you (V.i.219-20). Be “mine advocate” with my father; he will listen to his old friend (V.i.221). Leontes quite reasonably doubts that he will do so, and (the very Pauline) Paulina chimes in to chide the king for looking too intently at the beauteous Perdita, and to tell him to remember something else, namely that Hermione “was more worth such gazes / Than what you look on now” (V.i.226-27). After excusing himself to his own accuser by remarking the astonishing resemblance of Perdita to his wife, he tells Florizel that, in light of her beauty, he will defend him to his father on the grounds that “Your honor [was] not o’erthrown by your desires” in choosing her (V.i.230). 

    Shakespeare does not present the discovery of Perdita’s true identity. He the description of the scene to observers. In front of the palace Autolycus, who very much wants to know what has happened, asks a gentleman who witnessed the scene from a distance, having been ordered out of the room along with all who were not principals in the matter. When shown the contents of the bag the shepherd found with the infant, the gentleman reports, Leontes and Camillo “look’d as they had heard of a world ransom’d, or one destroyed. A notable passion of wonder appeared in them; but the wisest beholder that knew no more but seeing could not say if th’ importance were joy or sorrow—but in the extremity of the one it must needs be” (V.ii.14-18). The wisest beholder cannot know the human things only by seeing; he must hear human speech, as Socrates taught by going to the marketplace instead of gazing at the stars (then supposed to be the rulers of human destinies) as Plato taught in the dialogues he wrote after following his teacher  to the marketplace, listening silently to his conversations with the persons he meets there. So Shakespeare teaches in every play.

    A second gentleman arrives; he has heard them speak. “The oracle is fulfill’d: the king’s daughter is found” (.ii.23-24). This satisfies their wonder at what’s been seen; the first gentleman saw joyful not sorrowful men. But who is the king’s daughter? A third gentleman, the king’s steward, emerges to tell them that it is Perdita, and that the royal families have reconciled, and that Paulina’s sorrow at hearing the suspected death of her husband, many years earlier, has found a countervailing joy in the fulfillment of the oracle, the return of Hermione’s daughter. 

    The third gentleman concludes his report by saying that Perdita and her newfound families have gone to see a statue of her mother “which is in the keeping of Paulina—a piece many years in doing and now newly performed by that rare Italian master, Julio Romano, who, had he himself eternity and could put breath into his work”—as God had, and as God did—would “beguile Nature of her custom, so perfectly is he her ape.” (V.ii.90-94). A pupil of Raphael, a contemporary of Shakespeare’s grandparents, Romano was an extraordinarily versatile artist—painter, architect, sculptor, and, perhaps dearest to the playwright’s heart, a costume and scenery designer for comedies. And like his master, Romano combined Christian and classical motifs in his works, furthering the same dialogue between the ‘ancients’ and the (Christian) ‘moderns’ Shakespeare himself engaged in.

    The gentlemen leave to witness the viewing, leaving Autolycus, the shepherd and the shepherd’s son (newly ennobled by the prince for their services to himself and the royal families) to perform their own parody of a reconciliation, which depends not on true speech but empty words, when the son promises to pronounce Autolycus “as honest a true fellow as any in Bohemia” when presented to the royals (V.ii.150-51). After all, if shepherds can become nobles by being pronounced to be such by a prince, surely a rogue may be pronounced honorable by the newly ennobled. Wiser beholders of the scene will consider that while words are indispensable supplements to sights, when it comes to insight, their mere incantation has no power at all (independent of consent, obedience) unless pronounced by a supremely powerful god whose words themselves constitute the power of action. Both kings learned this. Leontes learned that thinking and calling his wife an adulteress didn’t make her one; Polixenes learned that commanding his son to obey didn’t make him obedient. 

    At the chapel on Paulina’s property, the two kings, their children, Camillo and Paulina wonder at the statue of Hermione. Before the unveiling, Leontes and Paulina exchange graceful blessings; Paulina especially, knowing the harshness with which she has treated the king for so long, welcomes his coming here: “It is a surplus of your grace, which never / My life may last to answer (V.iii.7-8). 

    When she unveils the statue, all wonder at its lifelikeness, its likeness to nature, even to the detail of new wrinkles on her skin, wrinkles Romano is said to have added, revising her face in accordance with time—in Paulina’s words, “mak[ing] her as she liv’d now” (V.iii.31). Leontes marvels at the statue’s appearance of “warm life,” shamed once more “for being more stone than it” (V.iii.35,38). The statue is “royal,” magical in its “majesty,” because it has “my evils conjured to remembrance” and caused Hermione’s living daughter to stand still, like a statue, transfixed (V.iii.38-42). Her father’s words reawaken Perdita’s power of speech and action. “Do not say ’tis superstition that I kneel” before this statue (V.iii.43); it is so lifelike, I do not commit idolatry. She addresses the statue as if were her mother, asking, “Give me that hand of yours to kiss” (V.iii.46). 

    Paulina interrupts to warn that the statue is newly-painted, not yet dry; do not touch it. She would like to re-veil it, lest Leontes think it really moves, and indeed Leontes does so think, saying its eyes seem to move, its veins pulse blood. When he moves forward to kiss the statue, Paulina again warns against staining oneself “with oily painting” (V.iii.83). Obeying the command not to touch, Leontes and Perdita nonetheless refuse to leave off gazing. This forces Paulina to make a crucial choice. 

    “If you can behold it”—if you are strong enough to bear it—I’ll “make the statue move indeed, descend, / And take you by the hand” (V.iii.88-90). But then you will think not that I am an idolater but a witch—the accusation Polixenes had leveled against Perdita, perhaps unbeknownst to Paulina. To do so, therefore, I require you to “awake your faith” or, if you refuse, to leave (V.iii.95). No one leaves; each passes the test set by Pauline Paulina.

    “Music, awake her,” she commands (V.iii.98). Music, which had enlivened and given harmony to the dancing shepherds in Bohemia—music, the sound which keeps time, and to which human beings keep time—accompanies Paulina’s command to the statue. “‘Tis time; descend; be stone no more; approach; / Strike all that look upon with marvel…. Bequeath to death your numbness, for from him / Dear life redeems you.” (V.iii.99-103). It is time: words and actions now fit the circumstance not only of the king’s contrition but of the daughter’s return, the redemption of the mother’s hope. And to the living witnesses: “Start not; her actions shall be holy as / You hear my spell is lawful” (V.iii.104-05). Hermione is no less good than she was when falsely accused, but from ‘standing accused’ she now moves, living, among the living. “O, she’s warm!” Leontes exclaims (V.iii.110)—alive as she had seemed to him when looking but disallowed from touching. “If this be magic, let it be an art / Lawful as eating” (V.iii.111-12). He had obeyed Paulina’s command not to touch the ‘statue’ as a king respecting the property of a citizen. He now issues a royal command to legalize good magic. 

    If it is magic. The king may well doubt it. The funeral of wife and son which he attended but Shakespeare did not describe; the claim that an Italian artist had painted wrinkles on a statue to make the figure appear to have aged; his own perception of life and movement in the figure as he stood beholding it; Paulina’s prudent caution in speaking truth (I am not a witch) even as she maintains a pious lie: all this points to the truth, that Hermione has been living in seclusion at her friend’s house, all along. And Hermione’s words confirm this. To her daughter she says, “Thou shalt hear that I, / Knowing by Paulina that the oracle / Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserv’d / Myself to see the issue.” (V.iii.125-28). If she had been a statue, she could have known nothing, heard nothing; if she had been a statue, she did not preserve herself. Statues don’t make themselves, although some of Shakespeare’s Romans might be said to aspire to make themselves into statues. [1] 

    “There’s time enough for that” hearing of the story, Paulina interrupts—again discreetly, knowing that the elaborate ruse she and Hermione have now completed ought to be disclosed opportunely, at the right time (V.iii.128). But first she laments, all of you are “precious winners” in this plot, but “I, an old turtle[dove] / Will wing me to some wither’d bough,” with no living mate (V.iii.131-33). Good-humored King Leontes puts an immediate stop to her understandable self-pity. “O peace, Paulina! / Thou shouldst a husband take by my consent / As I by thine a wife” (V.iii.135-37). Camillo shall be your “honorable husband” (V.iii.143). The honor of every member of the royal party has been vindicated. 

    Calling Polixenes again his brother, asking his pardon, and Hermione’s, “that e’er I put between your holy looks / My ill suspicion” (V.iii.148-49), King Leontes concludes, “Good Paulina, / Lead us from hence where we may leisurely / Each one demand and answer to his part / Perform’d in this wide gap of time since first / We were dissever’d. Hastily lead away.” (V.iii.152-55). The king has learned to use time well: slowness for discussion, haste for executive action. Seeing is the knowledge reason brings, insight; hearing is the knowledge faith brings by taking someone at his word; touch is the knowledge action brings, the only knowledge that affects both knower and known at the same time. Leonine Leontes has learned how to rule rightly by coordinating all these senses, and all the ways of knowing they represent. 

    The royal succession of both regimes has been secured, along with the alliance of Sicilia and Bohemia, founded upon the renewed brotherly friendship of the kings. Paulina’s rapid action in leading the royal party—in her leading, her Pauline character is acknowledged by the king—will lead to leisured discussion, the prerequisite of learning. They each will learn of the parts performed by the others. By fusing the fiction of the characters’ many plots with the reality of actors playing roles on a stage, Shakespeare returns his audience to reality, having invited them better to understand nature and convention, truth-telling and lies, seeing, hearing, and touching—the portals of understanding—better than they had before.

    Love, especially the love of one’s own, and honor stand at the core of the play. Each can be perverted into jealous passion that dismisses any evidence contrary to the suspicions of the lover. The remedy for restoring the lover to reason, to bringing the honor-lover back from the dishonor incurred by his passion cannot be philosophy if the lover is no philosopher, and has no prospect of becoming one. The remedy must be another form of love. This is where the Christian themes of humility and agapic love come in. Paulina’s love for King Leontes is Pauline—harsh and exacting on the sinner but for his own good, and open to mercy and forgiveness when true repentance has been demonstrated. This partly explains her patience, another distinctively Christian virtue, seen in the long endurance of her plot to conceal the queen’s survival. In keeping with the theme of time, and timing, throughout, Paulina understands that ‘only time will tell.’

    Paulina’s plot also bespeaks her patient faith in the oracle of Apollo. The mixture of classical-pagan and Christian themes in the play has led to disputes over when the action occurs. Clearly, given the specific reference to Giulio Romano, it must be set in Christian-modern times, at the height of the Renaissance. Renaissance Italy extended the familiar practice of typology—of seeing Old-Testament figures as ‘types’ or precursors of Christ—to figures in classical antiquity. Apollo was often represented as one such; Michelangelo gives the Christ in his painting “The Last Judgment” the face of the Apollo Belvedere. In this play, Apollo is described as the son of Jove, and in English the pun on ‘son’ and ‘sun’ can be deployed in allusion to the pagan god’s association with the sun, carried daily in a chariot across the sky. In Italian Renaissance literature, in Dante and Ficino, this association was well-established; more, Apollo was understood to be the enemy of Aphrodite, a god of reason not of passion. Jesus, who commands his followers to be as prudent as serpents and harmless as doves, who firmly opposes eroticism in favor of agape, can thus be considered as having been foreshadowed by the pagan god, now considered as entirely mythical. Both natural sun and the Son of God do indeed shine on courts and cottages alike, as Perdita once remarked.

    Christianity also enters into Shakespeare’s treatment of time. In the New Testament, time does not always march steadily, as old Chronos does. Time is not only chronos but kairos. It can overthrow laws and either plant or overwhelm customs, not only by wearing them down over the years but suddenly, in an hour as it were, in the moment of God’s creation or in the resurrection of Christ. The suddenness of so many events in the play registers this dimension of time. Hence also the importance of memory, necessary in a world in which time brings changes, slow or instantaneous; without remembrance, timeless nature and timeless divinity cannot be respected.

    It is the Christian aspect of the play that confuses playgoers and readers accustomed to Shakespeare’s comedies and tragedies. In his comedies, Shakespeare often presents an incipiently tragic circumstance, happily resolved. In his tragedies, Shakespeare always brings in fools, clowns, and loveable rogues, often showing the tragic folly of his heroes. Nonetheless, the genres are clear-cut. The Winter’s Tale points to Christ, Christian love—to the tragic death of the Man of Sorrow which nonetheless has a supremely happy ending in His Resurrection, and looks ahead, with patience, to the final happy ending prophesied in the Book of Revelation. In this play, Shakespeare first separates tragic Sicilia from comic Bohemia, then marries them. In this he is quite Christian.

    It is also true that to represent Apollo as a ‘type’ of Christ can go in the other direction. Many atheists conclude that Apollo isn’t the type of Christ but the prototype, that Christianity merely takes up Jewish and pagan motifs. Such ambiguity may be seen in the play. Is Hermione first a woman, then a statue magically or miraculously transformed into a woman again? Or is she rather the natural Hermione, all along? In the first case, the wonder of the royal party is religious; in the second, it is philosophic or, more precisely, proto-philosophic.

    When Shakespeare leaves his stage, he always leaves such wonder behind. He sees his characters and he sees his audience, hears them and speaks to them, and acts out of knowing them and loving what is best for them. He is the wisest beholder. 

     

    Notes

    1. This is a point made by Michael Platt in his fine study, Rome and Romans According to Shakespeare, reviewed elsewhere on this website.

     

     

    Filed Under: Manners & Morals

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