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    Archives for March 2020

    Edmund Spenser on What to Do with the Irish

    March 26, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Edmund Spenser: A View of the Present State of Ireland: Discoursed by Way of a Dialogue between Eudoxus and Irenaeus. In William P. Trent, ed.: The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Company, 1903.

    Edmund Curtis: A History of Ireland. London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1950 [1936].

     

    “Lord! How quickly doth that country alter men’s natures!”

    Eudoxus

     

    In his elegant and judicious introduction to Spenser’s works, William P. Trent declares that “no idealist, no sensitive lover of ethereal beauty, no reader endowed with an ear trained to delight in the subtlest melodies and most exquisite harmonies, no dreamer enamored of the stately and romantic past, no willing prober of allegories and symbols, and, above all, no soul in love with essential purity can possibly remain indifferent to the appeal made by the poet and, to a considerable degree, by the man.” For any such reader, “to know Spenser at all thoroughly is to love him deeply” as the author of poems “gentle, pure, and lovely, rather than sublime.”

    “But,” Trent continues, “idealists, symbolists, ethereal natures, and readers trained to enjoy the subtlest poetic harmonies are, and always have been, rare. This is a work-a-day world actuated by a rather overpowering sense of the real.” In the modern world, he writes “the great national dramas killed allegory.” Trent wrote those words with the First World War little more than a decade distant. And with still worse to come, the taste for epic poetry along the lines of The Faerie Queene would lie even more deeply buried under the rubble left by tyrannic cruelty and egalitarian vulgarity.

    Had Spenser no sense of the real, though? He saw war. In his prose if not his poetry he unhesitatingly urged harsh measures against the enemies of his people, his queen, and his family. So much so, that Spenser’s literary admirers seem not quite to know what to make of his dialogue, A View of the Present State of Ireland, in which one character recommends the use of famine to break Irish resistance to English imperial rule, citing Machiavelli’s Discourses as an authoritative guide to mastering rebels. Spenser had to gather his wife and four children to flee an advancing Irish army, which burned his County Cork home down to the first floor. If an ‘idealist,’ he felt all the fury of a disillusioned one. Or would a closer reading of his poetry reveal toughness beneath the ethereality?

    The Spensers had been living on the forfeited estate of the Earl of Desmond, in the manor and castle of Kilcolm. How London-raised Edmund Spenser, son of a clothier, scholarship boy at Pembroke College, Cambridge University, found himself living in southern Ireland itself requires a mind-clearing draft of real Irish history, as served by Professor Curtis.

    Once a people centered in modern-day Austria but driven off by the Romans, the Celts arrived in Ireland around 350 BC. Spenser would have known the later Celtish claim, dating from medieval times, that they descended from the fierce Scythians, who established a nomadic empire in Central Asia in ancient times. Such claims notwithstanding, the Celts, with their “warlike, aristocratic, and masterful temper,” conquered the existing rulers, whose ancestors themselves had conquered peoples who’d arrived before them. The Gaels, as this branch of the Celts called themselves, practiced Druidism; the Roman authors Spenser would have read claimed that the Druids or priestly class practiced human sacrifice. The Druids shared authority with an aristocratic warrior class (in Caesar, the equites). In addition, the Fili—poet/seers who cast spells—served as “hereditary keepers of the ancestral lore and learning of Ireland as expressed in the Irish language.” Finally, the Gaels developed a set of laws, not written down until the eighth century AD, eventually called the Brehon laws, after the Brehons or judge-arbitrators who presided over cases under it.

    Gaelic rule did not go uncontested, as chiefs of non-Gaelic peoples brought Gauls in as military allies. The strategy failed, but many Gauls stayed, settled, and became absorbed into the Irish population. Charles de Gaulle traced some of his ancestors to this population, and later English dealings with Ireland may have added to his list of grievances against perfidious Albion. For although the Romans never ruled Ireland, the Anglo-Saxons, who arrived in Britain in the fifth century AD, would eventually make the attempt.

    The Anglo-Saxons may have been brought in as military guardians against the Celts, who were feared raiders in the region, poorly guarded since the end of Roman rule there, in 410. A young Christian born only about twenty years earlier, Patricius, son of Calpurnius, had been seized by Celtic raiders and served as a slave there—tending sheep, David-like, before escaping first to Britain and then to Gaul, where he studied for the priesthood at Auxerre. Dreaming that the voices of the Irish were calling on him to return and save them from Druidism, he received authorization from the Church of Gaul (then a more powerful element of the Roman Catholic Church than Rome itself) to launch an evangelizing mission. Consecrated as a bishop, in 432 the Church sent him on the mission which would indeed begin the end of Druidism and earn him recognition as a saint of the Church.

    Culturally, Gaelic Ireland thus became a blend of Fili tradition and Roman-Church learning, and remained so. The Norse conquerors who ruled for nearly two centuries left no lasting political or cultural mark. Eventually called the “Ostmen,” they became “in spirit and habit almost Irish.” Of much more political significance were the Normans, who arrived in 1166, one hundred years after they had conquered Britain and a dozen years since they had lost control of the English throne to the Plantagenets. Perhaps wanting to give this “aggressive baronial race” something to do, and following a precedent set by his Norman maternal grandfather, Henry I, Plantagenet king Henry II had already given them liberty to attack Wales. There they mixed with the native Celts and gained a knowledge of Celtic customs useful in dealing with the Irish. With superior fortifications and military equipage, they quickly established a substantial foothold in eastern and southeastern Ireland.  In October 1171 Henry II landed at Waterford, on Ireland’s southern coast, giving the first charter for Norman-English rule to Dublin, on the east coast. He appointed a viceroy and assumed control of land-titles, per English law. Staying only six months, he left the Norman-English “gentleman buccaneers” in de facto control of the territories they had seized.

    This established the fundamental political dynamics that persisted, in one permutation after another, throughout Spenser’s lifetime. The Norman-English, also called the Anglo-Irish and eventually the “Old English,” struggled for control with some of the Celts while intermarrying with others; they also struggled with the English monarchy whenever it attempted to exert greater control over its colonies. The Celts fought with one another, too.

    The viceroy or royal Deputy served as supreme judge, political ruler, and commander of the feudal levy in the Dublin government, whose territory was called ‘the Pale,’ a term referring to a fence made of stakes and meaning a boundary. Assisting the viceroy was an exchequer, a chancellor, a treasury, and a judiciary that followed English common law. The Magna Carta was extended to Ireland in 1217. Thus the Anglo-Irish enjoyed English rights. The Crown reserved the power of legislation to itself, consistent with the English understanding of the monarch as the ‘defender of the realm’ and ruler of imperial holdings. Locally, the English section established the shire form of government. But the native Irish there were reduced to the status of feudal villeins—essentially serfs with no rights under the English common law but no protection under the Brehon law, which the common law replaced.

    Independent of and sharply contrasting with the Pale, northern Ireland was ruled by Gaelic kings who observed the Brehon law. They maintained their sovereignty with the aid of Scottish mercenaries, the formidable ‘galloglasses,” capable of fighting even the warlike Normans. The Anglo-Irish called these kingdoms the “land of war.” In the central and southern areas, a compromise was worked out. There weren’t enough English settlers to rule there, but the king nonetheless claimed sovereignty. He devised an arrangement whereby Irish chieftains would rule by royal grant. Called the “march lands” or the “feudal Liberties,” these areas served as fields of conflict for centuries.

    As a result of these political arrangements, the Irish remained incapable of unifying against their conquerors but often could defend themselves locally. The Norman-English settlers also quarreled among themselves while at the same time intermarrying with the Irish and adopting many of the customs of the country—becoming increasingly Anglo-Irish. By the 1330s, Edward III had grown sufficiently alarmed that he abridged Anglo-Irish rights, provoking the formation of the first “Patriot party,” men unified not on the basis of Irish nationalism but by shared antipathy to political control centralized in Westminster. Edward assigned his second son, Lionel of Clarence, to settle the Irish question. Lionel called the Parliament of Kilkenny in 1366; to prevent Anglo-Irish “degeneracy,” he forced through a set of laws requiring the Anglo-Irish to maintain English language, laws, usages, even fashions, instead of adapting those of the “Irish enemies.” To counteract the charm of the Irish Fili, the new laws prohibited the employment of Irish minstrels, poets, and story-tellers as entertainers in English households. Violations of these laws would result in forfeit of lands—controlled, it will be recalled, by the monarch. Irish living within the Pale were excluded from all Anglican cathedrals and abbeys. This legislation succeeded in reinforcing ‘Englishness’ in the Pale, while effectively giving up on efforts to extend it in the other territories. Further, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw England distracted by more urgent matters than the governance of Ireland. Wars in France and the civil War of the Roses, which began in 1455, enabled the Irish to make political gains in some fifty to sixty provincial regions, where Irish barons, bards, and Brehons prevailed.

    During the English civil war, the Irish supported the Yorkist challenge to the Lancastrian dynasty. Retreating from England, the Yorkists found in Ireland a springboard for counterattacks. In the provinces west of the Pale, Anglo-Irish lords were ascendant, eventually dominated by Thomas, Earl of Kildare. Gerald, the eighth earl, called Garret More by the Irish, was the most impressive of the line. Edward IV attempted to rein him in by sending Leonard, Lord Grey, to replace him, but Lord Grey failed.

    So did the Plantagenets. When the Tudor king Henry VII ascended to the throne in 1485, replacing Richard III and ending the War of the Roses, England had its first genuinely ‘modern’ king—that is, a determined state-builder or ‘centralizer’ of English political authority. But in Ireland, the Earl of Kildare backed the anti-Tudor pretender, Edward VI, sending an expedition of Anglo-Irish and German mercenaries into England in 1487. They were crushed, and Henry had Kildare removed from power in 1494. He appointed Sir Edward Poynings as the new viceroy, tasked with “bridling the Irish Parliament,” as Curtis puts it, and with ending home rule by Yorkist aristocrats in Dublin. In doing so, Poynings secured the Pale. Recalling Poynings in 1496, Henry then reversed course and effectively co-opted Kildare, making him his Deputy in Ireland—a Deputy now unconstrained, but also unaided, by the parliament in Dublin and mindful that Henry could ‘unmake’ him as soon as ‘make’ him. Henry used Kildare this way for the next seventeen years. Dissatisfied with continued Anglo-Irish and Irish recalcitrance, Henry finally ruined the House of Kildare in the 1530s, reappointing Grey as his Lord Deputy. Grey called the “Reformation Parliament” in 1536, which attainted the Kildare family and revived the long-unenforced bans against Anglo-Irish marriage, employment of Irish minstrels and poets by the Anglo-Irish, and Irish styles of dress. To these regime changes to the Anglo-Irish way of life, the centralizing state added structural regime changes: reform of the Irish Church along more strictly Anglican lines; the end of aristocratic Home Rule; suppression of Brehon law; the territorial extension of the Pale. Henry had himself installed as the king of Ireland. Treaties with many of the Irish and Anglo-Irish lords allowed them to keep their lordships at the price of accepting tenure in office under the Crown. Henry’s successor, the Catholic Mary, Queen of Scots, who might have been expected to be more sympathetic to Irish and Anglo-Irish claims, in fact extended Henry’s policy by confiscating lands in the midland section of the island, replacing Irish landlords with English.

    This, along with the church reforms, led to a series of rebellions in the next half-century. It had been “hoped on the English side that the great lords and chiefs would gradually introduce and enforce in their own countries the English law, religion, and language.” But by the beginning of Elizabeth I’s reign in 1558 it had become clear “what a determined opposition the old Gaelic and Brehon order was capable of, even among the Old English.” The poets and bards had persisted in their role as “the chief inspirers of the native tradition,” maintaining “the haughty pride and warlike spirit of their patrons by their encomiums in verse.” The Brehons and chroniclers “kept up the native law and all its records.” Old-regime loyalists upheld an ethos in which the finest human type was held to be aristocrats who, Curtis writes “still lived in the heroic age, in the atmosphere of battle and foray, and who were expected by their poets, historians, and followers to be warriors rather than statesmen.” With the modernizing young queen on both the English and the Irish thrones, “the old Gaelic world, which had existed for two thousand years, was now to clash with the modern world as represented by the Tudor government.”

    The Reformation Parliament in the 1560s imposed the Book of Common Prayer on church services; established the monarch as the head of the Church of Ireland; and confiscated Catholic cathedrals and churches for use by the Church of England. Curtis summarizes the rebels’ motives in the phrase, “religion, land, and local lordship.” In religion, the Catholic Counter-Reformation was now underway, with Jesuits sharpening the issues with their astute use of dialectic and Puritans answering with their astute use of doctrine. This promised international support for the rebels. The land issue centered on the insecurity of land-titles held by Anglo-Irish aristocrats in Leinster and Munster, where they were threatened by the introduction of English-born planters. And the political issue centered on threats to the feudalism introduced by the Normans and to the even older Irish chieftanships. The modern state tolerated neither.

    Born in 1552, Spenser saw reports of the first rebellions against Elizabeth. In 1566 she appointed Sir Henry Sidney as Lord Deputy of Ireland. He enforced Westminster policy vigorously from Dublin. The First Desmond Revolt—named for the Earldom of Desmond, its locus—began in 1569. The Fitzgerald family, which held the Earldom, expected military assistance from Philip II of Spain. Preoccupied with his own rebels in Spanish-ruled Netherlands and with the expenses of ruling his extensive New-World colonies, Philip could offer very little to the Geraldines. Even with his own poorly-disciplined troops carrying the fight, the Earl managed to sustain the rebellion for five years before giving it up.

    In 1579, twenty-seven-year-old Edmund Spenser was introduced to the Earl of Leicester by his young friend and fellow-poet, Philip Sidney, son of the now-former Lord Deputy. Spenser became his secretary, but soon found a new patron: Arthur, Lord Grey of Wilton, who was appointed as Lord Deputy the following year, bringing Spenser with him as his aide.

    By then the Second Desmond War had erupted. Initiated by James FitzMaurice Fitzgerald, commanding forces that included papal troops, this was (as the rebels put it) “a war for the Catholic religion and against a tyrant who refuses to hear Christ speaking by his Vicar”—namely, Pope Pius V, who had excommunicated Elizabeth a decade earlier. Henry Sidney, now on the Privy Council, supported stern repression. Arthur warred against the rebels unmercifully but ineffectively, and was recalled to face criticism in 1582. Among the decisions criticized was his conduct of the siege of Smerwick, a town west of Dingle on the southwestern shore of the island; Spanish and Italian soldiers had surrendered but were nonetheless massacred by Arthur’s troops. Yet Spenser never ceased to admire him, calling him in a set of verses of dedication to The Faerie Queene “Most Noble Lord, the pillar of my life, / And Patron of my Muses pupillage.” Writing his book from the “savage soyle” of Ireland, Spenser defended the Tudor policy of Anglicization in Ireland, and spared no pity on those who resisted it.

    The rebellion ended in 1583 with the Crown forces triumphant. Beginning in 1586 English colonists were installed on the Munster Plantation in County Cork. Spenser was among them; his influential friend, Sir Walter Raleigh (who introduced him to the Queen a few years later) amassed some 40,000 acres; Spenser had to be content with a mere 3,000, residing in the confiscated manor and castle of the Earl of Desmond. He also won appointment as the Clerk of the Office of Munster.

    Catholic resistance to Anglican rule hardly ended with the Desmond Wars. Most spectacularly, the Spanish Armada was wrecked only two years later; had the expedition succeeded, the lives of the English settlers would have been forfeit. And in 1594 the Tyrone War, also called the Nine-Year War, resulted in the aforementioned destruction of Spenser’s home.

    The provinces of Tyrone and Ulster are nowhere near Munster. They are located to the northwest and northeast, respectively, of the Pale. In Ulster the old Gaelic regime had continued, and there “Red” Hugh O’Neill initiated the conflict, soon joined by his brother-in-law, Hugh O’Neill. They won several victories over the English, but with no artillery or siege weapons they failed to take Dublin. Hoping for Spanish aid, they nonetheless intended to prolong the war until the now-elderly Elizabeth died, in the hope of extracting a better settlement from her successor, James VI of Scotland. Enraged by the early defeats, Elizabeth appointed Sir Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy as Royal Deputy. In Curtis’s words, Mountjoy “decided that the war could only be ended by a general famine” brought on by burning crops—a policy Spenser’s patron, Arthur, had already tried. A war of containment and attrition followed. Mountjoy used this induced scarcity as a prelude to buying off many commanders and their vassals. Modest Spanish military assistance did come, but it was ineffective, and Hugh O’Neill surrendered in March 1603, four years after Spenser’s death. When James ascended to the English throne in the same year as James I he inherited a largely pacified Ireland.

    Published in 1596, Spenser’s dialogue on Ireland may or may not have had some influence on the militarily successful English policy. It wasn’t published until 1633, but it circulated in manuscript shortly after Spenser completed it. Spenser also prepared a brief report to the Queen, giving her the gist of his argument. What is certain is that it provides arguments in favor of harsh means for achieving the end of regime change in Ireland, whereby it might be more firmly fixed in the Empire.

    The interlocutors are Eudoxus, which means ‘Good Opinion,’ and Irenaeus, which means ‘Peace.’ Irenaeus has just returned from Ireland, reporting on its “good and commodious soil.” Eudoxus begins with a statement of wonder: “I wonder that no course is taken for the turning thereof to good uses, and reducing of that savage nation to better government and civility.” Irenaeus says that “good plots” have been devised for doing those things, but “they say”—he never identifies them—that all such plots or plans fail for four reasons, two ‘pagan’ and two Christian. They say the “genius” of the soil interferes with good plots; a “genius” is a presiding spirit, good or evil, determining the character of a person, place, or thing. It is present from the beginning—hence the root it shares with ‘generation—and is ineradicable. “They” also say the influence of the stars interferes; in Renaissance astrology, “genius” itself may be determined by the alignment of the stars at the time of origin. More pious persons say that God has not yet appointed the time of Ireland’s reformation, or that God may be reserving Ireland “in this unquiet state” to use it as a scourge of England.

    Mr. Good Opinion knows bad opinions when he hears them. He dismisses them as “vain conceits of simple men” who “judge things by their effects, and not by their causes.” The real causes of failure must be unsound counsels and plans or else “faintness in following and effecting” them. “Through wisdom, [Ireland] may be mastered and subdued,” “since the poet sayeth, ‘The wise man shall rule even over the stars,’ much more over the earth.” [1] Eudoxus’ inclination to wonder, and his desire to get to the real causes of things marks him as more than merely a man of good opinion but as a political philosopher, or a would-be political philosopher, or perhaps a political man who seeks practical wisdom. He asks Irenaeus to enumerate the evils he’s observed there, as a “wise physician” diagnoses the disease before he treats the patient. This reinforces the impression that Eudoxus guides himself by the light of nature, not revelation ‘ancient’ or ‘modern.’

    Irenaeus deplores “the infinite number” of evils in Ireland, which he likens to Pandora’s box. But the worst, “most ancient and long-grown” of these are the laws, the customs, and the religion.

    How can laws, intended for the good of the commonwealth, be a source of evil? Eudoxus asks. Irenaeus replies that it is with laws as it is with a physician’s remedies: a given regimen may be good in itself but bad in the circumstances; or it may have been good in the original circumstance, bad when that circumstance changed. What is more, if medical or legal prescriptions are not consistently followed, evils will result.

    By laws, Eudoxus asks, do you mean English common law or statutes enacted by Parliament? Both: the common law, brought over by William the Conqueror, “fitted well with the state of England then being” because the English at that time were a peaceable people tyrannized by their king, eager for change. William and the Norman laws were looked upon as improvements by this law-abiding population. “But with Ireland it is far otherwise, for it is a nation ever acquainted with wars, though but amongst themselves, and in their own kind of military discipline, trained up over their youths.” Indeed, “they scarcely know the name of law,” having “kept their own law,” the Brehon Law, which Irenaeus judges to be scarcely worthy of the name of law at all. Like the English common law, it is unwritten and traditional, but unlike the common law it is “in many things repugning quite both to God and man’s law.” For example, in criminal cases the Brehon does not so much judge as arbitrate between the parties to determine compensation. Even murder cases are settled with payment. More, the Brehon is appointed and controlled by the local lord, and can be depended upon to “adjudgeth for the most part the better share unto his lord.”

    These practices continue despite the Irish acknowledgment of Henry VIII’s sovereignty and of English law. “What boots it to break a colt,” Irenaeus asks, “and to let him straight run loose at random?” The current generation disavows any agreement made by their fathers, since they Irish are not bound by oaths sworn by any previous generation. And indeed they are not so bound, under their own laws of succession, which are based not on inheritance but on tanistry: In Ireland, after a lord or captain dies his people elect a new ruler, usually a brother or cousin of the deceased, not one of his children. What they do respect and adhere to are “all the former ancient customs of the country.” This includes the rule that property not be ceded to strangers, “especially the English.” Tanistry ensures that they will have adult rulers, better defenders of the land than boy-kings or girl-queens dominated by their regents.

    Eudoxus asks, how can this be remedied? Mr. Peace invokes Cicero: “all is the conqueror’s as Tully to Brutus saith.” Henry VIII did not sufficiently force the recognition of the right of conquest on the Irish, although the Irish parliament gave lip service to obedience. But perhaps, Eudoxus suggests, “it seemed better under that noble King to bring them by their own accord unto his obedience, and to plant a peaceable government among them, than by such violent means to keep them under.” And surely his daughter Elizabeth can rectify matters.

    Irenaeus doesn’t think regime change comes so readily. “It is no so easy now that things have grown into a habit and have their certain course, to change the channel, and turn the stream another way, for they now have a colorable pretense to withstand such Innovations, having accepted other laws and rules already.” Ireland is no blank slate. Further, the William the Conqueror stayed “in person to overlook the Magistrates, and to overawe the subjects with the terror of his sword and the countenance of his Majesty,” whereas in Ireland neither the Plantagenet Henries nor the Tudor Henries did any such thing for a sustained period. Further, and crucially, “laws ought to be fashioned unto the manners and customs of the people, to whom they are meant, and not to be imposed unto them according to the simple rule of right; for else… instead of good they may work ill, and pervert Justice into extreme Injustice. For he who would transfer the laws of the Lacedaemonians to the people of Athens should find a great absurdity and inconvenience.” The Lacedaemonians were a military people, like the Irish, although better disciplined.

    When the Irish grow weary of war “they sue for grace, til they have gotten new breath and recovered their strength again.” For this reason, “it is vain to speak of planting laws, and plotting of policies, til they are altogether subdued.” But were they not subdued by Henry II? Yes, but the Irish then retreated “into the deserts and mountains,” beyond the reach of the laws, as the English could not do in 1066. The Anglo-Norman settlers stayed under the law and enjoyed its benefits among themselves, but when the Irish returned, desperate for food and shelter, they were placed under vassalage by the foreign aristocrats, “who scarcely vouchsafed to impart unto them, the benefit of those laws, under which themselves lived, but every one made his will and commandment a law unto his own vassal.” The law of England “was never properly applied unto the Irish nation, as by a purposed plot of government”; the aristocrats evaded it. Then, when the War of the Roses began, the Anglo-Irish left to fight. The Irish, seeing the countryside “so dispeopled and weakened,” repossessed many of their former lands. And so Ireland has gone ever since—sporadic English attempts to rule interspersed with Irish rebellions in times of English weakness or distraction.

    Satisfied with this account of the efficient causes of disorder in Ireland, Eudoxus requests an analysis of the problems of adapting English common law to the circumstances there. Irenaeus sets down as a first principle that laws must “take their first beginning” from “the manners of the people and the abuses of the country” for which they are “invented.” The aim of the laws should be justice, by which he means the prevention of “evils” and the safety of the commonwealth. So, for example, under ordinary circumstances it is wrong to punish thoughts—only words or acts—except when “devis[ing] or purpos[ing] the death of the king.” Regicide threatens the safety of the commonwealth itself, and must be punished capitally even if detected at the planning stage. “So that jus politicum, though it be not of itself just, yet by application, or rather necessity, it is made just; and this only respect maketh all laws just.” English common law, though invented in Normandy, fit the character of the English people; it does not fit the Irish people.

    For example, English common law provides for jury trials, with juries “chosen out of the honestest and most substantial freeholders.” But a jury of Irish freeholders will always decide in favor of the Irishman against the Englishman, even against the Queen herself. In the latter cases, the Crown loses revenues. In their dealings with the English generally, the Irish “are most willfully bent,” never hesitating to perjure themselves or to cheat, a “cautelous and wily-headed” people, especially when armed with a smattering of legal knowledge. And if (as Eudoxus) suggests, English magistrates appoint English juries, then the Irishman will “complain he hath no justice.” And if, per impossibile, this could be done without stoking further resentment, witnesses called from “the base Irish people will be as deceitful as the verdicts” of Irish juries—”so little feeling have they of God, or of their own souls’ good.”

    Would “heavy laws and penalties” against perverse jurors reform the courts? No, Irenaeus answers: “When a people are inclined to any vice, or have no touch of conscience, nor sense of their evil doings, it is bootless to think to restrain them by any penalties or fear of punishment; but either the occasion is to be taken away, or a more understanding of the right, and shame of the fault is to be imprinted.” For if the lawgiver had prohibited theft among the Lacedemonians or drunkenness among the Flemish, “there should have been few Lacedemonians then left, and fewer Flemings.” Other Irish acts of exploitation, abuse, and evasion of the common law include clever ways of dodging responsibility for the receipt of stolen property. Even outright rebels can avoid confiscation of their lands by the Crown if they convey those lands into a trust, prior to rebelling. They can enjoy their profits from the comfort of exile in some country ruled by “her Majesty’s professed enemies.” Generally, in Ireland and indeed in England, the great lords have too much power and can too readily defy the authority of the monarchy in their struggles to shift the regime toward de facto aristocracy.

    In addition to being antiquated, many statute laws, too, are misapplied because the judges have too much leeway in their interpretation. “It is dangerous to leave the sense of the law unto the reason or will of the judges, who are men and may be miscarried by affections, and many other means. But the laws ought to be like unto stony tables, plain steadfast, and immovable.” In Ireland the rule of law is a hard principle to maintain, as when a lord is charged with treason he is required to “bring forth” his kindred in order to be “justified”; he thus assembles a small army of men who serve under the accused traitor, “who may lead them to what he will.” Eudoxus shudders, “In very deed, Irenaeus, it is very dangerous, especially seeing the disposition of all these people is not always inclinable to the best.”

    At Eudoxus’ request, Irenaeus turns to a consideration of Irish customs, the Irish way of life, which underlies Irish law. Three peoples have contributed their customs to the Gaelic people: Scythians, Gauls, and English. This comes as no surprise, as “no nation now in Christendom, nor much farther, but is mingled and compounded with others.” Ethnic purity is a myth. And this is a good thing because God in His providence brought northern European nations to the south, where they encountered Christianity.

    The interlocutors discuss the difficulty of tracing specific influences by consulting tradition. There can be no “certain hold of any antiquity which is received by tradition, since all men be liars, and may lie when they will.” For example, it is well-established that a people arrived in Ireland from Spain, but they might have been Gauls, Spaniards, Goths, or Moors. Of these peoples, however, the Gauls were the ones who had an alphabet, so he considers them the likely immigrants.

    Such mingling can be good or bad, depending on the various sets of customs and the way they mix. The English colonizers have now “degenerated and grown almost Irish.” Eudoxus wonders, again: “What hear I? And is it possible that an Englishman, brought up naturally in such sweet civility as England affords, can find such liking in that barbarous rudeness, that he should forget his own nature, and forgo his own nation?” Yes, as a matter of fact, thanks to “the first evil ordinance of that Commonwealth,” by which Irenaeus evidently means Ireland, not England. But before going any further on that theme, he analyzes the evil traits which now characterize the Irish nation.

    Scythians contributed seven. Like their Scythian ancestors, the Irish live in waste spaces, pasturing cattle, which leads to licentiousness, a life beyond the reach of the law. They wear mantles, allowing an outlaw “to cover himself from the wrath of heaven, from the offense of the earth and from the sight of men.” The mantle serves rebels and thieves alike, concealing weapons and booty. Prostitutes disguise themselves and swaddle their bastard children in the mantle, and even housewives can “lie and sleep in it, or… lowse themselves in the sunshine,” evading work. They wear their hair long, enabling themselves to mask their identities. “Uncivil and Scythian-like,” they howl in battle and indulge in “immoderate wailings” at funerals; this “Irish hubbabowe” gives vent to their savage passions. In their battle they go forth in a “confused order of march, in heaps, without any order or array.” Their barbaric religious customs include swearing by their swords and drinking bowls of blood to solemnize their warrior-bonds before battle. And the Irish, like the Scythians, claim that they turn into wolves once a year. The fact that they make such a claim bespeaks a longing for subhuman ferocity in predation.

    The Goths contributed the customs of revering and supporting bards and drinking the blood of enemies. As for the English, their decent customs have been perverted by “liberty and ill example.” Making “private wars against each other,” English lords recruit allies among the Irish themselves; this corrupts the English and emboldens the Irish. The English “are now grown to be almost as lewd as the Irish,” except for the ones who live in the Pale. And this is no wonder, as “proud hearts do oftentimes (like wanton colts) kick at their mothers,” including their mother-country. Alliance often entails intermarriage, too. “Great houses there be of the old English of Ireland, which through licentious conversing with the Irish, or marrying, or fostering them, or lack of good nurture, or other such unhappy occasions, have degenerated from their ancient dignity, and are now grown as Irish as Ohanlan’s breech,” which is very Irish indeed.

    Eudoxus can only gasp, “Where the lords and chief men wax so barbarous and bastardlike, what shall be hoped of the peasants, and base people?” Irenaeus brings him back to a more sober view. “It is but even the other day since England grew to be civil.” In Henry II’s day, English customs themselves were “very rude and barbarous.” That is to say that the English colonies in Ireland were themselves ill-founded.

    For example, the English in Ireland abused their own language by speaking “Irish.” Eudoxus finds this strange, inasmuch as “it hath been ever the use of the conquerors to despise the language of the conquered, and to force him by all means to learn his,” as the Romans did. [2] Irenaeus explains this by recalling the English habit of intermarrying with the Irish and/or giving their children to Irish nurses. “The child that sucketh the milk of the nurse, must of necessity learn his first speech of her, the which being the first that is enured to his tongue, is ever after most pleasing to him,” even if he learns English later on. And not only speech: Anglo-Irish children also learn Irish “manners and conditions,” for “small children be like apes, which will affect and imitate what they see done afore them, especially of their nurses whom they love so well, they moreover draw unto themselves, together with their suck, even the nature and disposition of their nurses; for the mind followeth much the temperature of the body; and also the words are the image of the mind, so as, they proceeding from the mind, the mind must needs be affected with the words.” An Irish heart will come from Irish speech, “for out of the abundance of the heart, the tongue speaketh.” The most intimate of infant experiences proves the path to a different regime.

    So does the most intimate of adult experiences. Intermarriage with a foreign people is “a dangerous thing in all commonwealths,” as “the simplest sense” perceives. “How can such matching” of English with the Irish “but bring forth and evil race, seeing that commonly the child taketh most of his nature of the mother.” By mothers children “are first framed and fashioned,” and what they learn at her knee will be “hardly ever after forgot.”

    Mr. Peace leaves no doubt regarding what habits of heart will be learned from the Irish. They are the habits of warriors. Although Eudoxus thinks that Irenaeus’ description of Irish garb, which reflects Irish spiritedness, takes them away from their discussion of customs, it is not so. If Irish customs underlie all Irish law, warfare underlies all Irish customs. They are Scythians and Goths first, civilized English only superficially if at all.

    Thanks to the Goths, they have bards to urge them on. Irenaeus distinguishes bards from poets. They share with poets the task of “set[ting] forth praises and dispraises of men in their poems and rhymes.” “None dare to displease them for fear of running into reproach through their offense, and to be made infamous in the mouths of all men.” They mold public opinion. Mr. Good Opinion asks how they differ from poets. They differ, not in their art but in their use of their art. Poets “do labor to better the manners of men, and through the sweet bait of their numbers, to steal into young spirit a desire of honor and virtue.” Poets “are worthy of great respect.” Not so “these Irish bards.” “Far from instructing young men in moral discipline,” it is “they themselves [who] do more deserve to be sharply disciplined.” They praise not “the doings of good men for the ornaments of their poems, but whom soever they find to be the most licentious of life, most bold and lawless in his doings, most dangerous and desperate in all parts of disobedience an rebellious disposition, him they set up and glorify in their rhymes, him they praise to the people, and to young men make an example to follow.” They excoriate the English and encourage the “lewd liberty” of the Irish. “Evil things are decked out and suborned with the gay attire of goodly words, may easily deceive and carry away the affection of a young mind,” leading it to honor its own passions. As a result, Irish youth are “brought up without awe of parent, without precepts of masters, without fear of offense, not being directed, or employed in any course of life, which may carry them to virtue.” With bardic encouragement, a boy “waxeth most insolent and half mad with the love of himself, and his own lewd deeds; for such a youth, “his music was not the harp, or the lays of love, but the cries of people, and clashing of arms.”

    Irish political customs also conduce to disorder. The Irish hold popular assemblies on hills, where disputes between townships are settled. This practice originated not among Scythians or Goths but among the Saxons, but in Ireland it is abused by “the scum of base people,” who “confer of what they list,” inflaming those desires as they do so. As a result, Englishmen who have ventured to attend such meetings have been murdered. Local democracy practiced by “a people so evil-minded” must be restrained. Eudoxus, who harbors republican sentiments, regrets the proposal but Irenaeus firmly insists that the meetings be abolished. The Irish are not ready for self-government; they need a stronger hand, and one not their own. Their very militancy makes them ungovernable: In this “country of war” with armies “scatter[red] around the country,” soldiers routinely requisition food and lodging from civilians. This provokes “great detestation of soldiers” among the common folk, which issues “into hatred of the very government, which draweth upon them such evils.” If soldiers are not seen as protectors but as plunderers, government itself will be distrusted, whoever attempts to govern. This too feeds licentiousness.

    The last custom Irenaeus describes is economic. Landlords and freeholders rent farms to tenants on a year-to-year basis, or even during pleasure. Nor will tenants take land for longer periods. As a result, tenants fear landlords’ peremptory demands for both horses and humans, not knowing when their landlord will requisition either or both. The landlord, expecting the departure of his tenant at any time, “hover[s] in expectation of new worlds”—new tenants, new relations. With this unstable combination of liberty and arbitrary rule, tenants never invest in the land, which for them is here today, gone tomorrow. Their homes are “rather swine-steads than houses.” This here today, gone tomorrow attitude toward property injures not only local economies but the commonwealth as a whole.

    On religion, his third set of Irish evils, Irenaeus will have “little to say.” The Irish profess Catholicism, but they are “so blindly and brutally informed (for the most part) as that you would rather think them Atheists or Infidels.” The problem stems from “the first institution and planting of religion” in Ireland. By then, religion had been “generally corrupted by [the] popish trumpery” of the priests. “What other could they learn from them, than such trash as was taught them and drink of that cup of fornication with which the purple harlot had then made all nations drunken?” Irenaeus asks, a touch rhetorically. Priests, pope, and people “have all erred and gone out of the way together.” So far, no reform has been possible, again because Ireland has been continually at war. “Instructions in religion needeth quiet times, and ere we seek to settle a sound discipline in the clergy, we must purchase peace unto the laity; for it is an ill time to preach amongst swords.” That is, civil or regime reform and stability must precede ecclesiastical reform.

    It isn’t that Irenaeus lauds the Church of England. Simony, greed, “fleshly incontinence,” and sloth infect that church, too. It’s simply that the Roman Church is even worse. Merely replacing English with Irish clergy won’t help, as Irish prejudice against the English will prevent any real reform.

    Given these legal, conventional, and religious evils, what is to be done? Irenaeus first highlights actions that haven’t worked. Certain military captains will not prosecute war vigorously, worrying that if they win they will be out of work. Some of the Crown’s appointed governors also do little, hoping to prolong their appointments. Other governors will conceal problems, passing them on to their successor. “The governors usually are envious one of another’s greater glory.” As a result, there is no peace. “The longer that government thus continueth, in the worse course will that realm be; for it is all in vain that they now strive and endeavor by fair means and peaceable plots to redress the same, without first removing all those inconveniences and new framing (as it were in the forge) all that is worn out of fashion.” The Irish will continue to resist, and resist successfully, any reform because they fear expropriation of their property, as happened when the Norman English first occupied their island, so long as dilatory half-measures prevail.

    “Therefore, the reformation must now be the strength of a greater power,” for “it is vain to prescribe laws, where no man cares to keep them, nor fears the danger of breaking them.” The sword must come first. “All these evils must first be cut away with a strong hand, before any good can be planted,” as a tree must be pruned in order to “bring forth any good fruit.” Mr. Peace does not shrink from the task: “Where no other remedy may be found, nor no hope of recovery had, there must needs this violent means be used.”

    He hastens to say that he does not recommend what we now call genocide. “Far be it from me that I should ever think so desperately, or wish so uncharitably.” It is “not the people which are evil.” And those among them who are evil “by good ordinances and government may be made good; but the evil that is of itself evil will never become good.”

    Irenaeus then offers a detailed and comprehensive plan for regime change. First, England must send an army adequate to put down the ongoing rebellion. This means a force of 10,000 foot soldiers and 1,000 cavalry. It will take them about eighteen months to do it. These men must be well provisioned (as they are not now), so that they won’t need to requisition supplies from civilians. Military efforts should focus on the strongest rebel force, the one led by the Earl of Tyrone. Because the Irish are guerrilla fighters, it is useless to pursue them. Instead, set up four encampments in Ulster. From these encampments, gather intelligence on the enemy’s movements and drive him from one English stronghold to another. Do it in winter, when there will be less cover, more hardship. Offer amnesty to all those who surrender in twenty days from the beginning of the campaign.

    After this, the remaining rebels will be the hardened and incorrigible ones, men upon whom no compassion need be wasted. Above all, lay waste to their food supply—cattle and grain. This worked in Munster (where Spenser had served), and Irenaeus doesn’t spare Eudoxus a picture of the result. After eighteen months, the rebels there “brought to such wretchedness, as that any stony heart would have rued the same. Out of every corner of the woods and glens they came creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs could not bear them; the spake like ghosts crying out of their graves; they did eat of the dead carrions, happy were they if they could find them, yea, and one another soon after, insofar as the very carcasses they spared not to scrape out of their graves.” “In all that war, there perished not many by the sword, but all by the extremity of famine, which they themselves had wrought”—presumably by their refusal to surrender sooner. Eudoxus can only say, “It is a wonder that you tell and more to be wondered how it should so shortly come to pass.”

    No need to wonder, Irenaeus rejoins. The battle-ready Irish have no secure property. Accustomed to live off the land, they readily take from one another, up to and including devouring one another. As for the English destruction of livestock and crops, “this is very necessary to be done for the soon finishing of the war.”

    Eudoxus sees a problem. When Arthur, Lord Grey imposed exactly this policy, the Queen’s compassion was aroused and those around her claimed that “he regarded not the life of her subjects no more than dogs.” Irenaeus agrees that “the Good Lord [was] blotted with the name of a bloody man,” when he was in fact a “gentle, affable, loving, and temperate” man acting under “necessity.” At Smerwick he made no promises to the Spaniards, who were not “lawful enemies”—having admitted to being adventurers, sent by neither the Spanish king nor the pope—and therefore not protected by the law of nations. As for his dealings with the rebellious lords, “he spared not the heads and principals of any mischievous practice or rebellion, but showed sharp judgment on them, chiefly for example’s sake, and that all the meaner sort, which also then were generally affected with that evil, might be terror thereof be reclaimed and saved, if it might be possible.” [3]

    Irenaeus insists that before this harsh course of action be initiated, “it must be foreseen and assured, that after once entering into this course of reformation, there be afterwards no remorse or drawing back for the sigh of any such rueful objects as must thereupon follow, nor for compassion of their calamities, seeing that by no other means it is possible to recure them, and that these are not of will, but of very urgent necessity.” The property of those executed for their crimes should go to their heirs, not to the Queen. In this Irenaeus takes a thought from Machiavelli, he observes that men feel the sting of losing their patrimony more sharply than that of losing their father. Perhaps to strengthen Elizabeth’s resolution, Irenaeus recalls that she had raised up the chief rebel, the Earl of Tyrone, who now takes advantage of her kindness. And if any might question the right of England to rule Ireland in the first place, Ireland belongs to England by right of conquest, a feature of the law of nations—the right the Anglo-Irish themselves invoke against the Crown, when they resist its authority. [4] Lands owned by rebels who are not executed will be confiscated and added to Crown lands.

    Very well then, Irenaeus, once the war is over, what do you propose to do with the victorious troops? Will they not be dangerous if they return to England, or hire themselves out as mercenaries for foreign powers? Irenaeus would maintain 6000 of the troops in garrisons on Irish soil; the remainder should be given farms there. Some will be assigned duty in Munster, the likely point of any Spanish attack. Few if any will return to England.

    The enemy must be disarmed and all but the leaders should be given land to farm. Other Irish commoners can be made tenant farmers on English-owned plantations, so that they can be watched, with the garrisons on call if any serious trouble arises. The plantation owners will pay for the soldiers’ upkeep, needing them for protection; this will relieve the Queen of any burden.  Indeed, such a standing army will prove less expensive than sending troops over to Ireland every seven years or so, to quell the latest rebellion. This simply reprises the Roman policies when they conquered England. The lack of such policies explain why Henry II’s conquest didn’t issue in civil peace.

    Further, each garrison would have a town associated with it, a commercial town populated by additional English settlers. With civil peace assured, increased prosperity for Ireland, and increased revenues for the Crown will surely follow.

    Irenaeus disapproves of locating the Lord Deputy’s office in Dublin, within the Pale, on the western shore. He should rule from Athy, “the main-mast of the ship,” located in the Earldom of Kildare along the River Barrow.  Kildare is the section directly west of the Pale, and therefore a strategic borderland where Irish and Anglo-Irish influences meet—an inflection point, as it were, and also the place where the rebel Fitzgeralds live. From there, the Lord Deputy should act on the general guidelines established by the Queen’s council of ministers, but he should be supervised, and subject to review by a new officer, the Lord President, a man trusted by the Queen for his justice and equity. However, within that framework of safeguards, he should be given much greater discretion to act with energy and rapidity as a genuine executive of the laws, not needing to consult with his superiors before making a move. In recurring to this point near the end of the dialogue, Irenaeus will add, that “this (I remember) is worthily observed by Machiavel in his discourses upon Livy, where he commendeth the manner of the Roman government, in giving absolute power to all their Consuls and Governors, which if they abused, they should afterwards dearly answer it: and the contrary thereof he reprehendeth in the States of Venice, and Florence, and many other principalities of Italy who used to limit their chief officers so straightly, as that thereby oftentimes they have lost such happy occasions as they would never come into again.”

    After a detailed discussion of specific actions to be taken to pacify the several most rebellious regions, Irenaeus concludes with his recommendations to remedy the three main “evils” he had outlined earlier. Regarding law, at this point “we cannot now apply laws fit for the people, as in the first institution of commonwealths it ought to be,” and as he had wished it had been done by Henry II and his colleagues. With English common law longstanding, “we will apply the people, and it them to the laws.” This can become possible only because many more English will settle in Ireland and participate in the Irish parliament, and because in the aftermath of the war the Irish will be more submissive. Irenaeus also recommends that the Irish upper house be packed with English aristocrats. Since the Irish nobles fomented the rebellion, not the people, they deserve to be shouldered aside, at least to some extent, in the Irish House of Lords.

    Irish submissiveness can be prolonged, and civility enhanced, if the Crown divides the country into small, easily policed subsections. This will rid the country of the bandits and will also facilitate a regularized system of tithing. The precedent here is what King Alfred did in England when it resembled Ireland in its lawlessness, with “every corner having its Robin Hood in it.” With officials appointed by the Crown and answerable to it, these English-style shires will ensure that revenues are “withdrawn from [the] lords, and subjected to [the] Prince.” “By this the people are broken into man small parts, like little streams, that they cannot easily come together into one head,” “adhering unto great men.” In all this one readily sees the lineaments of a modern state, wherein a subordinated and co-opted aristocracy finds itself replaced by agents of the central government.

    Irenaeus is confident that these new legal and institutional arrangements will foster reform of the Anglo-Irish aristocrats who exploit their tenants, cheat Her Majesty out of her rightful revenues, and become too Irish. The Old English “need a sharper reformation than the very Irish, for they are much more stubborn, and disobedient to law and government than the Irish be, and more malicious to the English that daily are sent over.” This elicits a shudder from sober Eudoxus: “Lord! How quickly doth that country alter men’s natures!” Irenaeus demurs, a bit: “No times have been without bad men…. Neither is it the nature of the country to alter men’s manners, but the bad minds of them, who having been brought up at home under a straight full of duty and obedience, being always restrained by sharp penalties from lewd behavior, so soon as they come thither, where they see laws more slackly tended, and the hard restraint which they were used unto now slacked, they grow more loose and careless of their duty; and as it is the nature of all men to love liberty, so they become flat libertines, and fall to all licentiousness, more boldly daring to disobey the law, through the presumption of favor and friendship, than any Irish dare.” With reformed laws, some of the dangers of English and Irish living together will be diminished, especially if they both must pay the same tithes.

    As his final legal stroke, Irenaeus would ban the use of Irish names. New family names should be chosen, a surname description of the man’s trade, or “some quality of his body or mind,” or the name of his dwelling place. No more “Oes and Macks”—O’Brian (for example) meaning the grandson of Brian, McDonald meaning the grandson of Donald. The Irish way of naming was introduced for “the strengthening of the Irish” by recalling family lineages. Prohibiting the practice will help to blend the English and Irish populations rightly, so that each Irishman “shall in short time quite forget his Irish nation.”

    As for customs, what Eudoxus calls the “manner of life,” Irenaeus intends to tame Irish warlikeness. Each non-freeholder shall have a trade. All trades are either manual, intellectual, or mixed. First and foremost, Irish commoners should become agriculturists, as agriculture is “the enemy of war,” replacing aggression with patience, contempt for property with respect for it. Husbandry is “the nurse of thrift, and the daughter of industry and labor.” In this it contrasts with herding, which conduces to habits of command, to marshaling masses of the obedient, and to long periods of idle dreaming which stoke ambitions of conquest—all consonant with a warlike people.

    For others, a liberal education is indispensable, especially for “the sons of lords.” “That wretched realm of Ireland wanteth the most principal [trade], that is, the intellectual; therefore, in seeking to reform her state, it is especially to be looked into.” Liberal education can teach the arts of “civil conversation”—precisely what glory-loving would-be warrior scions of the Irish aristocracy need, if they are to participate in a civil not military society.

    As a last-resort discouragement to the old way of life, and to give teeth to the new one, the Queen should appoint Provost Marshalls to patrol the countryside with a set of deputies. These men will round up stragglers and runaways, “terrify[ing] the idle rogues,” and wielding power of life and death over them.

    Eudoxus calls liberal education second only to “the knowledge and fear of God.” Irenaeus has a few thoughts on religion. In noticeable contrast to the civil order, religious orthodoxy “is not sought forcibly to be impressed into [the Irish] with terror and sharp penalties, as now is the manner, but rather delivered and intimated with mildness and gentleness, so as it may not be hated afore it is understood, and [its] Professors despised and rejected.” Nor should Englishmen take the forefront. “Discreet ministers of their own countrymen” should be “sent among” the Irish, so as not further to associate Protestantism with the English. Irenaeus esteems the examples of St. Patrick and St. Columba, who proved that converting the Irish to Christianity was not impossible, even if they left the job woefully incomplete. He criticizes Anglican ministers for lack of energy in their missionary work, unlike their rivals, the Jesuits. He recommends repairing churches, in order to draw the people into them voluntarily.

    Returning to matters secular, Irenaeus would build not only churches but better transportation infrastructure—roads and bridges which would support bigger markets and more national unity. He wants to see more market towns, with a ban on black markets supplemented by the branding of livestock, which will discourage both cattle-rustling and livestock smuggling.

    He ends by adjuring his countrymen to remove legal corruption respecting public offices. The Lord Deputy must not sell offices “for money,” nor sell pardons, shares of bishoprics, or commercial licenses. The same prohibition goes for cronyism.

    Spenser himself succinctly summarized his thoughts for the benefit of the Queen in “A Briefe Note of Ireland,” dated October 1598, a year before he died. First, “there can be no conformity of government where there is no conformity of religion”; second, “there can be no sound agreement between two equal countries” within the same empire; third, “there can be no assurance of peace where the worst sort are stronger.”

    Of these precepts, the matter of religious conformity would be more effectively solved by religious toleration, or better, religious rights so long as the practices claimed by the religious do not violate civil order. That is (and to use an anachronism) the liberalism Spenser himself exhibits in his intention to shift the Irish, and especially Irish and Anglo-Irish aristocrats, away from war and toward peaceful civil and commercial ways of life would be supplemented by religious freedom. In this, he is seriously handicapped by his lack of a theory of natural right which might undergird the practice of religious liberty.

    The matter of empire would be solved by the end of genuine empires and, in the case of what was soon to become Great Britain, the establishment of the British Commonwealth. As for the claim that peace cannot prevail when the evil predominate, that stands, despite the efforts of Bernard Mandeville and other ultra-Machiavellian political thinkers and practitioners. Like the later liberals, Spenser would dilute the evil influences within all human hearts by carefully-designed political institutions.

    In considering regime change, Spenser enjoys the advantage of knowing what a regime is, in all its dimensions. The purposes of a good regime may be seen in the names of his interlocutors, “Peace” and “Good Opinion.” He clearly identifies who will rule in Ireland. He sets down the ruling structures to be established by law. And he understands the importance of custom, the way of life of a people. He sees how all these regime elements relate to each other.

    Americans have undertaken regime change for themselves, and for nations they have defeated in war, on several occasions. Like Spenser, they have found that lasting regime change occurs only if the ruled consent to it (as did the Amerindian nations the Washington administration reformed) or, alternatively, if the ruled are first devastated and then supervised by the conqueror (as in Germany and Japan, after the Second World War). Half-measures induced by humanitarian critics prove ineffective and ultimately inhumane.

     

    Notes

    1. The poet cited is Jeun de Meun in The Romance of the Rose. He is following Thomas Aquinas, in contradistinction to William Gower’s Confessio Amantis, in which not the wise man but the prayerful, pious man rules the stars by the grace of God.
    2. Not quite so: one must recall the Trojan-Latin settlement, described in the Aeneid.
    3. In his 1598 report to Elizabeth, “A Briefe Note of Ireland,” Spenser took up this matter directly with Her Majesty. “Great force must be the instrument and famine must be the means, for till Ireland be famished it can not be subdued.” (See The Poetical Works, p. 849.)
    4. The right of conquest proceeds from the mercy the conqueror has shown the conquered: he has allowed him to live. Obviously, this can apply only if the conqueror fought a just war in the first place. The English likely could have claimed that their war of conquest was just because the Irish had raided English shores repeatedly, for many years.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Mathematicians in America

    March 18, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    David Lindsay Roberts: Republic of Numbers: Unexpected Stories of Mathematical Americans through History. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019.

     

    One might say that David Lindsay Roberts has written a ‘lost’ chapter of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. Tocqueville does write generally on American intellectual life of the 1830s, especially education. He judges that New England remained at the forefront of American regions at that time, having been founded two centuries before by a population of immigrants among whom “there was a greater mass of enlightenment… than within any European nation of our day” (emphasis added). That is, despite the ‘secular’ Enlightenment of the European eighteenth century, still a matter of contention in Tocqueville’s lifetime, New Englanders of the 1630s were on a whole a better-educated group. The Puritans established a publicly-supported school system dedicated to teaching the Bible. “In America, it is religion that leads to enlightenment; it is the observance of divine laws that guides men to freedom.”

    Being mostly Protestants, Americans then and now don’t restrict Bible learning to a spiritual aristocracy. “Primary instruction there is within the reach of each,” although “higher instruction is within the reach of almost no one.” All Americans “can readily procure for themselves the first elements of human knowledge.” These included reading, writing, arithmetic; the doctrines and proofs of one’s own religious sect; the history of the United States and of one’s own American state; and the federal and state constitutions. And New England was not alone. Although the southern and western Americans didn’t put as much emphasis on education as New Englanders did, they too took care to establish schools and churches, read newspapers, and participate in civic life (inasmuch as “genuine enlightenment arises principally from experience”). Even on the western frontier, “I do not believe that so great an intellectual movement is produced in the most enlightened and populated cantons of France.” In all this Americans reinforced their regime: “One cannot doubt that in the United States the instruction of the people serves powerfully to maintain a democratic republic.” Indeed, “in the United States, the sum of men’s education is directed toward politics,” whereas in largely undemocratic, unrepublican Europe education’s “principle goal is to prepare for private life.” With broad-based participation in public life precluded, education can have no other object.

    In all the many pages of Tocqueville’s Democracy one finds no mention of American mathematics or mathematicians. As Roberts shows, there wasn’t much for him to write about at that time. Of the twenty-three “mathematical Americans” he considers, only two had come to public prominence by the time Tocqueville visited in 1831-32. Mathematics in America wouldn’t begin to mature until after the Civil War. When it did, it exhibited so many of the marks of the American regime Tocqueville had described that it is easy to imagine how unsurprised Tocqueville would have been at the worries and opportunities Roberts’s mathematicians faced. He had, after all, titled one of his chapters, “Why the Americans Apply Themselves to the Practice of the Sciences Rather than to the Theory.” “It is evident that in democratic countries the interests of individuals as well as the security of the state requires that the education of the greatest number be scientific, commercial, and industrial rather than literary.” America is a commercial as well as a democratic republic.

    During the years of the American founding, mathematical education in America didn’t amount to much, if judged by European standards. There was no advanced mathematical research. Americans who used math were surveying land and navigating ships—engaged in conquest and commerce, acquisition of property. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson saw the beauty of higher mathematics, but did not commend its appreciation to the average citizen. Their younger contemporary, Nathaniel Bowditch, grew up in Salem, Massachusetts when it was the sixth-largest city in the country, a center of merchant shipping that already took New Englanders as far as Asia. Having left school at the age of ten to work in his father’s barrel shop, Bowditch taught himself math and science thanks to Salem’s library, which had a collection of science books captured at sea in 1780. Bowditch himself went on five voyages on the merchant ships around the turn of the century. Captains on such expeditions needed to calculate their longitude and latitude, typically consulting The New Practical Navigator by the Englishman John Hamilton Moore. Bowditch made substantial corrections to this book—so many that the American publisher “took Moore’s name off and put Bowditch’s name on, while altering the title to New American Navigator.” (“Copyright in the early United States was only casually observed, especially for books originating in the country from which the United States had so recently emancipated itself.”) The mathematical topic navigators need is trigonometry, which enables the navigator find his location at sea by measuring the distance of the ship from its port in relation to the North Star, the one fixed point in the sky. Given the curvature of the earth, this can work precisely “for short distances,” but Bowditch introduced refinements that overcame the problem, for practical purposes.

    Practical purposes animated Bowditch throughout his life, as he retired from seafaring and entered the insurance business, where his skills were equally useful and more lucrative. Two decades later he joined the Harvard Corporation and assisted in righting the College’s shaky finances. And he hired a Harvard student named Benjamin Peirce to translate an important French math text; Peirce would go on to teach astronomy and mathematics at his alma mater, “recognized as a major national figure in science and mathematics in the United States, a status to which Nathaniel Bowditch, for all his talent, never seems to have truly aspired.” In his day, government and commerce were simply more needed, and consequently more prestigious, than academic studies.

    If Bowditch represents the commercial side of American mathematics in the decades after the Founding, Sylvanus Thayer represents its military side. Thayer had two undergraduate degrees, one from Dartmouth and the other from West Point. He helped to design coastal fortifications during the War of 1812. In 1815, in the aftermath of the war, Secretary of War James Monroe sent the Thayer, now a brevet officer, to inspect military facilities in France. He returned to take command of West Point two years later. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries military engineers “were the intellectuals of the battlefield,” not only designing fortifications but measuring distances and “pondering the angles of impinging forces”—”the ones who defined the environment” of battles. Roberts recalls that no less a commander than Napoleon, “himself an accomplished student of mathematics,” collaborated with the mathematician Gaspard Monge, throughout the General’s career, “a rare and possibly unique relationship between a first-class mathematician and a powerful political leader.”

    While Monge was a theoretical pioneer in mathematics—effectively inventing the field of descriptive geometry, whereby three-dimensional objects can be depicted in two-dimensional figures—the less brilliant but eminently practical American followed not Monge’s example but the example of the École Polytechnique in Paris, which he’d visited during his stay in France. “Whereas Frederick the Great’s Berlin Academy… had employed mathematicians to glorify the sovereign and sometimes to provide technical advice to the government, the Polytechnique explicitly gave mathematicians the mission of teaching and examining the new generation, thus exerting an influence beyond the achievements of any one person, or any one generation of scholars.” The despotic Enlightenment of Frederick’s Prussia deployed mathematics in service to a monarchic regime; the Polytechnique, “founded in 1794 by the Revolutionary government,” served the purposes of a democratic republic. Thayer, along with almost all other Americans, and very much in line with the democratic-republican Madison and Monroe administrations, set the American military academy on a mission to teach. As it did: West Point graduates would go on to write math textbooks and to teach in many colleges and high schools across the country. At the behest of President Monroe’s Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, West Pointers began to design the roads, bridges, and canals needed not only in military expeditions but in western expansion generally. Civil engineering worked with military engineering to carry Americans west to the Mississippi and beyond. Thayer stayed at the Point or sixteen years, longer than any other superintendent before or since. “Consequently, his impact lingered long,” long after he resigned in irritation at the rather anti-academic tendencies of President Jackson’s administration. One of his most prominent hires, civil engineering professor Dennis Hart Mahan, named his son after his patron. Alfred Thayer Mahan went on to “become the greatest theorist of naval power of his time,” effectively the founder of the American school of geopolitics. Geopolitics requires precise mapping, which requires precise measurement or mathematical calculation. In this sense, Sylvanus was the step-grandfather of American geopolitics.

    By far the most famous American Roberts recalls is Abraham Lincoln. No mathematician (having received altogether about twelve months of formal schooling—somewhat beyond the average U.S. citizen of his time), Lincoln was nonetheless profoundly influenced by mathematics. His first non-manual employment was as a surveyor in the years 1833-36. He was “respected for his work,” but his ambitions far transcended it. He began his political and legal careers at the same time, and eventually found a way of bringing the three kinds of knowledge together. By the 1840s, now an experienced lawyer, a former state legislator, and a former member of Congress, Lincoln began to reflect on what it means to prove an argument, and to do it in a way that will convince juries and voters. “He had gleaned that such certainty was a central feature of mathematics in general, and that the Elements of Euclid in particular was considered by many to be the epitome of demonstrative reasoning.” And so he taught himself the Euclidean proofs, which consist of definitions, postulates (things to be done), axioms (things to be thought), and theorems (the results of syllogisms constructed of postulates and axioms). To be certain, the truths of plane geometry must be founded upon postulates and axioms that are ‘self-evident’ or undeniable. Lincoln then saw that the Declaration of Independence was a logical syllogism, analogous to a Euclidean proof, drawing its conclusion (“these colonies are, and ought to be, free and independent states”) from self-evident propositions (“all men are created equal,” that is, “endowed with certain unalienable rights”). Hence Lincoln’s celebrated phrase in the Gettysburg Address, that by their Declaration Americans dedicated themselves “to the proposition that all men are created equal”—a striking example of using mathematical language to vindicate the principles of the American regime.

    As a professional historian of mathematics in a country that has come to deny fixed principles derived from the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God, Roberts is quick to jump in to object that Lincoln, “like almost all Americans then and now, had no conception of mathematics as a living, growing activity.” “He was learning what appeared to him as a fixed body of incontestable knowledge.” But in Lincoln’s lifetime “a small network of advanced mathematicians in Europe were indeed questioning” Euclidean geometry, doubting that Euclid’s fifth postulate—that “two straight lines, which intersect one another, cannot be both parallel to the same straight line”—is necessarily so, genuinely self-evident. A non-Euclidean geometry was possible; “Euclid’s geometry might not necessarily offer the best description of physical reality.” Albert Einstein “would fully exploit this new standpoint in his general theory of relativity.”

    Further, the discovery/invention of non-Euclidean geometry shows that mathematics doesn’t stand still; it changes. It has a history. At the Johns Hopkins University, founded in the decade after Lincoln’s murder, historicism and the mathematics of a nature that changes would be brought together, issuing politically in Progressivism, the claim that human rights derive not from permanent natural principles but from the process of evolution, and in the valorization of government by bureaucracy—an administrative state, staffed by experts, wielding knowledge often derived from the mathematical field of statistics, guiding the direction of historical progress and the attendant evolution of rights produced in its course. Whether the undeniable (one might say, almost self-evident) progress of mathematical and scientific knowledge means that the principles of nature are themselves ‘progressive,’ evolutionary-historical; and whether those aspects of nature than (again, undeniably) do change over time alter the principles of human right remains a vexed question—one that Roberts doesn’t address here, having other fish to fry.

    Roberts exhibits one of the characteristics of the changing conception, if not reality, of rights by including Catherine Beecher in his survey. Because he didn’t consult Tocqueville, however, he underestimates the status of women in the America of Beecher’s time. “In almost all Protestant countries,” Tocqueville writes, “girls are infinitely more mistresses of their action than in Catholic peoples.” Moreover, “in the United States, the doctrines of Protestantism come to combine with a very fee constitution and a very democratic social state; and nowhere is the girl more promptly or more completely left to herself.” Even as a child, the American girl “already thinks for herself, speaks freely, and acts alone,” quickly coming to consider the world “with a firm and tranquil eye.” “The American woman never entirely ceases to be mistress of herself”—as much a model of self-government in her own way as an American man is in his way. “Although Americans are a very religious people, they have not relied on religion alone to defend the virtue of woman; they have sought to arm her reason” as well, providing “a democratic education to safeguard woman from the perils with which the institutions and mores of democracy surround her.” Miss Beecher exemplified the type.

    Daughter of prominent Boston clergyman Lyman Beecher, Catherine Beecher founded the Western Female Institute in 1833 in Cincinnati, where her family had moved the previous year. She later returned to New England, founding the Hartford Female Seminary in Hartford, Connecticut. For classroom use, she published a math textbook, along with other books “she could then use in her school.” Most of her books were not widely adopted, although her 1841 Treatise on Domestic Economy enjoyed many reprintings; in it, she aimed at “put[ting] a woman’s work in the home on the same footing as academic subjects,” and she undoubtedly succeeded in advancing what would later be called ‘home economics’ as a longtime staple of secondary-school education. Overall, however, it must be said her relatives and acquaintances far exceeded her own influence and renown. Not only her father but her sister, Harriet (author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin), her friend, William McGuffey (author of the famous Reader), and even her husband, Alexander Metcalf Fisher, (professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at Yale and “a leading light of the as yet tiny community of American academic mathematicians), surpassed her own respectable but modest achievements. But Roberts understands that to write history in the United States in the first quarter of the twentieth century brings with it a solemn obligation of race-class-gender ‘inclusiveness,’ an obligation he does not neglect to fulfill.

    Born in the next generation of Americans, Josiah Willard Gibbs proved another sort altogether. Professor of mathematical physics at Yale, “Gibbs is often considered the greatest American scientist of the nineteenth century and indeed one of the world’s greatest scientists,” a man of whom Einstein himself “spoke glowingly.” In 1861 Yale was the first American college to award a PhD; Gibbs received his two years later. He then went to Europe, where he attended lectures in math and science in Berlin, Heidelberg, and Paris (he was also a linguist), returning to teach at Yale in 1869. There he mentored several prominent American mathematicians and physicists. Gibbs’s specialty was thermodynamics, yet another iteration of the science of change, inasmuch as it is “fundamentally concerned with irreversible processes,” such as entropy. (Roberts aptly illustrates the point by citing one of novelist Thomas Pynchon’s characters, Thermodynamic Officer Chick Counterfly, who remarks, “You can’t de-roast a turkey,” an excellent example of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.) Gibbs showed that the principles of thermodynamics could be expressed with geometric figures, using these “pictorial representations to offer a more comprehensive”—and more comprehensible—”understanding of phase transitions among solid, liquid, and gaseous forms of a substance.” He went on to provide “the foundation of the field of physical chemistry” by positing his “phase rule,” which provides a mathematical formula for understanding the way in which a given set of chemical substances will change their “phase” (that is, their condition as gas, solid, or liquid), given such variables as temperature and pressure.

    Gibbs then turned to “his last great project,” statistical mechanics. Everyone can see that matter can be considered microscopically or macroscopically. But how is the “macroscale” behavior of matter (temperature, for example) caused by “the microscale behavior of the tiny particles making up the matter.” You can’t know exactly “what all the individual particles are doing.” However, “if one could estimate the likelihood that a certain proportion of the particles were moving in certain ways, then one might be able to somehow average the whole conglomeration of motions.” This Gibbs proceeded to do, publishing his findings in 1902. His Elementary Principles in Statistical Mechanics won the esteem of Dr. Einstein and of the distinguished French mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré, who called it “a little book, little read, because it is a little hard.”

    Abstruse as Gibbs’s writings may have been, this did not prevent their appropriation by at least one prominent non-mathematician: Henry Adams. In The Education of Henry Adams and in his essay, “The Rule of Phase Applied to History,” Adams proposed that the natural laws of thermodynamics, and particularly entropy, explains the course of events—a sort of anti-progressivism historicism whereby decline not advancement rules the nature of things. There may have been a measure of irony in the puckish Adams’s presentation, but Roberts takes him seriously and is supremely unimpressed. Adams shows “little appreciation for or interest in the productive interplay between precise logical reasoning and shrewd approximation that characterizes modern physical science,” and this results in “a parade of undigested scientific terminology in the service of Adams’s increasingly gloomy view of the human condition. For Adams, words such as entropy, critical point, phase, and equilibrium never achieve more than amorphous content.” Against Adams’s characterization of modern mathematics as naïve idealism, with causation in the material world spurred by “immaterial motion” conceived “only in the hyper-space of Thought,” Roberts ripostes that “this entirely misses the decidedly utilitarian spirit of Gibbs’s approach to mathematics”; “the importance of Gibbs’s rule of phase for science lies not in vague implications but in its explicitly numerical character: if certain simplifying assumptions are made, certain precise results follow, and these results can be used to predict specific useful phenomena in the world.” That Adams may have offered his formulations with the intent of annoying morally earnest Progressives, among whose moral descendants we may count Professor Roberts, does not occur him.

    There can at least be little doubt regarding the utilitarian character of Charles H. Davis, a naval commander who also edited the Navy’s Nautical Almanac, a publication no one has ever confused with the writings of neo-Platonists, ancient or modern. In his early career he was a man of action, helping to put down a whale-ship mutiny in the western Pacific and intervening in an ill-judged attempt by the prominent Tennessean, William Walker, to seize control of Nicaragua and turn it into a launching pad for “a great slave empire encompassing the entire Caribbean basin.” He later became served the United States as a planner of and participant in naval operations against the Confederacy, including the capture of Memphis. But his main contribution to mathematics was administrative. Although “a skilled mathematician,” he “made his most significant mark by organizing the mathematical talents of others,” introducing mathematical theorists to the experts in applied mathematics and overseeing the symbiosis during the course of preparing the Nautical Almanac, which appeared in 1852 and went through multiple editions.

    Meanwhile, far removed from Davis’s Cambridge, Massachusetts, South Carolinian West Pointer and math professor Daniel Harvey Hill wrote an algebra textbook with a decidedly Calhounian edge, as in: “A planter hires a slave and the slave’s clothing at a certain annual rate and then returns the slave too his master after only eight months, with a cash payment but minus the clothes. What was the value of the clothes?” Not to neglect balance, Hill’s exercises did not overlook illustrations of Northerners “as cheaters in commercial transactions, cowardly in the face of danger, tolerant of the absurd notion of women’s rights, and hypocritically miserly when given the opportunity to buy the freedom of a slave.” Not to mention the Salem witch trials and “the disloyalty of the New England states during the War of 1812.” Simultaneous linear equations have seldom been taught with such verve. Hill also became professor of mathematics and artillery at the North Carolina Military Institute, interrupting math and science education only for the war, when he “led the entire body of the college, students and faculty, into the Confederate service” and achieved the rank of major-general in The Cause. “Hill retained to the end of his life the belief that better leadership could have saved the South as an independent nation,” although he also saw that slavery in some respects kept Southerners from learning math and science, as the planter class contented itself with master-ship at home and commerce abroad, at the same time promoting verbal and mathematical illiteracy not only among slaves but among lower-class whites.

    After the Cause became the Lost Cause, the study of mathematics in America coalesced in the newly-elaborated university system, increasingly modeled on the pattern of the German research universities. Vassar graduate Christine Ladd wrote her doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins on “the algebra of logic,” under the eye of that genius, Charles Sanders Pierce, the American pioneer in the field of symbolic logic, which transformed logic into “a part of mathematics and not an odd appendage of philosophy” by substituting mathematical symbols for words in logical syllogisms. “By designating propositions with letters and treating the logical operations of and, or, and not analogously with the operations of multiplication, addition, and negation in arithmetic,” logicians “turned logical deductions into an exercise in rule-based symbol manipulation, like algebra.” Johns Hopkins declined to award the PhD degree to Ladd for some forty years, a dilatoriness Roberts sensibly ascribes to prejudice against women. Married to Hopkins math professor Fabian Franklin, she continued her mathematical studies. When Franklin took a job in New York, she lectured (without pay) at Columbia.

    Ladd’s contemporary at Hopkins, Kelly Miller, was an African-American graduate of Howard University and “the first African American graduate student of mathematics in the United States.” He studied physics and astronomy at the graduate level, as well. He never received a degree, but returned to Howard as its only black faculty member and, “for a time, the only black mathematics professor in the United States.” Believing that “Christian faith and mathematically based scientific knowledge were the essential foundation for future advancement of African Americans,” Miller soon turned to the newly-invented discipline of sociology, which he taught exclusively in the last three decades of his career. He published extensively on the race question, bringing his mathematical expertise to bear on bogus claims of then-respected ‘race science’ quacks. And he may have had a hand in hiring Elbert Cox and Dudley Woodard, “the first two black Americans to earn a mathematics PhD,” for the Howard math faculty.

    Despite such self-imposed handicaps, pure mathematics emerged “as the dominant concern of academic mathematicians in the United States” between the close of the frontier in 1890 and World War II. Mathematics moved west with the frontier, with the University of Chicago leading the way. The chairman of the Chicago math department, E. H. Moore, worked for separating the study of mathematics from the study of astronomy and physics, giving institutional recognition of mathematics as an independent discipline. On the practical side, the needs of the 1890 United States Census brought Columbia University statistician Herman Hollerith to invent a technique for aggregating data on census tally sheets. By translating the data to patterns of holes punched in cards, and then inventing a machine that could ‘read’ the card “by probing the card with pins, so that only where there was a hold would the pin pass through the card to make an electrical connection,” Hollerith enabled the federal government to present the information collected by its field workers into usable statistical tables.

    This first sign of what Woodrow Wilson would call “scientific administration” in the United States was well understood by Tocqueville, who had seen the beginnings of it in European statism. Bureaucracy, he saw, is a crucial underpinning of the centralized state, and this has important implications for public education. “Education as well as charity,” he writes, “has become a national affair among most peoples of our day. The state receives and often takes the child from the arms of his mother to entrust him to its agents; it takes charge of inspiring sentiments in each generation and furnishing it with ideas. uniformity reigns in studies as in all the rest; diversity like freedom disappears from them each day.” If a time traveler were to tell Tocqueville that American students of the twenty-first century were to be instructed uniformly of the benefits of diversity, he would say only that democracy lends itself to such uniformity of opinion, and to the centralization of powers within the administrative state.

    The Progressive movement appealed powerfully to school teachers, who formed the core of support for such politicians as Woodrow Wilson and, later Franklin Roosevelt. One way in which Progressives took control of the public schools was to continue and accelerate the longstanding American attempt to democratize mathematics education. Cal Tech math professor E. T. Bell wrote books popularizing mathematics as an attractive activity. His 1937 book, Men of Mathematics, obviously the precursor to Roberts’s book, sold well, touting mathematics as “the queen of the sciences” and calculus as “the queen of mathematics.” Charles M. Austin, first president of the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, founded in 1920, worried that as “progressive ideas of education” (and therefore of democratization) “were creeping into the schools,” “easier subjects” like social science and civics were being substituted for algebra and geometry. The NCTM was designed to fight the trend, which was given intellectual respectability among educators by John Dewey, for many years the resident philosopher at Teachers College, Columbia University. Dewey urged that “education needed to be totally reoriented to accommodate the industrializing twentieth-century world.” “Since students would be graduating into an ever-changing environment, general thinking and problem-solving skills were more valuable than any fixed bodies of knowledge.” Although Dewey didn’t intend this as a move to cut back on math in public schools, and although modern math had arisen as a challenge to the notion that mathematics and logic were static disciplines teaching fixed bodies of knowledge, his strictures were often interpreted as if justification for beheading the Queen. After World War II, Lithuanian-born Holocaust survivor Izaak Wirszup spearheaded the movement called the “New Math,” which attempted to meet both the Progressives’ desire to democratize education and the concern over ‘dumbing-down’ the curriculum.

    Such worries proved somewhat overwrought because, as Hollerith had demonstrated, mathematics proved highly useful to the other dimension of Progressives’ government, the administrative state. If the Progressives talked of democracy, and moved to enhance it with such devices as the popular election of United States senators, ballot initiatives and referenda, and reform movements directed against political bosses, they also moved to establish a new form of aristocracy: a cadre of experts trained in the science of administration. E. B. Wilson, sometime chair of the MIT physics department and professor of public health at Harvard, a former student of Willard Gibbs, eventually came to teach a course in mathematical economics in Harvard’s sociology department, where he mentored Paul Samuelson. ‘Social science‘ as a would-be science would make its most lasting mark in economics, with Samuelson’s famous textbook leading the way for several generations of economics students.

    Although social science claimed to be ‘value-free,’ it seldom was. In a sort of mirror-imaging of Confederate stalwart Daniel Harvey Hill, Lillian and Hugh Lieber wrote math books proclaiming that “Mathematics (capitalized throughout) with Science and Art (also capitalized)” revealed the great truth that (in their words) “Internationalism and Democracy are very deep in the human spirit.” This seems to have had something to do with the abstraction from the concrete seen in mathematics, theoretical science, and modern art, all of which take the mind away from such physical facts as armies wielded by national governments and police work at the service of social hierarchies. In a book published after the Second World War, Mrs. Lieber “made a plea for world peace and expressed alarm about the dangers of biological warfare and the atomic bomb.” By the end of the Forties, the Liebers were “an intellectual power couple in New York City”—alas, without much ‘pull’ in the Kremlin.

    The war itself and the decades following saw mathematics applied to computers. Grace Hopper developed some of the earliest computers while working for the Navy in a research program at Harvard. She later joined a firm that became part of Sperry Rand. Joaquin Basilio Diaz, armed with a Brown University PhD, pursued his career in the military arm of the administrative state, never dismantled after the war because the Cold War soon followed. At Princeton, the brilliant John F. Nash, Jr. developed “game theory,” initially proposed by John von Neumann of Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study in the mid-1940s, into a tool usable in both business and military strategy and organization.

    Beginning in the New Left’s assault on ‘Enlightenment rationalism’ injured the Progressive ideology of such persons as the Liebers. Former NCTM president Frank B. Allen decried this “anti-intellectual counterculture,” with its “disparagement of science and technology” and its rejection of “rationality in general.” To counter the counterculture, Allen proposed an approach to algebra (the experience of which has turned no small number of high school students away from rationality in math, if not in general) which emphasized the logical character of mathematical proofs. His 1966 book, Modern Algebra: A Logical Approach, was intended to stem the tide, but his own organization, the NCTM, soon became infected by “fads such as cooperative learning and vain attempts to solve the racial, economic, and environmental problems of society through the schools.” The controversy would continue into the next century.

    Roberts concludes that “the lives recounted in this book do not suggest a static future” for America mathematics, which may turn increasingly to the science of computer modeling, with results he hesitates to predict.

    Filed Under: American Politics

    What Is Sanctification?

    March 13, 2020 by Will Morrisey

    Sinclair B. Ferguson: Devoted to God: Blueprints for Sanctification. Carlisle: The Banner of Truth Trust, 2016.

     

    Ferguson knows his audience: Americans, who pride themselves on their practicality—American Christians no less than any others. Hence such locutions as “blueprints for sanctification”—designs for “building an entire life of holiness” with the aid of this “manual of biblical teaching on holiness.” And the Bible does indeed insist on right human practice. God issues commands, telling his creatures what to do and what not to do. But Ferguson is much more interested in teaching what sanctification is and why we should want it. “This is not so much a ‘how to’ book as it is a ‘how God does it’ one.” A ‘pragmatic’ people may incline to insist on taking their own way, becoming do-it-yourselfers of life. But for Christians, only by first understanding God’s purposes and God’s ways of achieving those purposes can we rationally address the question of what we should do. Putting human action, human ‘methods’ and ‘techniques’ at the forefront inclines us to exaggerate our already ample desire to serve ourselves. “Many modern Christians are often too interested in the development of the self but little interested in the development of their understanding of the triune God.”

    Understanding God’s holiness and human sanctification may also clarify modern minds confused by the philosophic doctrine of historicism. In Hegel, preeminently, ‘God’ means the ‘Absolute Spirit.’ He describes the Absolute Spirit as being “immanent” in all things, going so far as to compare all of Being as symbolized by Christ, by God-become-man. But the God of the Bible is a Creator-God, not an immanent force— a holy God, separate from His creation. Sanctification means holiness or becoming-holy; the main difference between the two words is ‘merely verbal,’ as the “sanctification” derives from a Latin root, “holiness” from an Anglo-Saxon root. One aspect of God’s holiness is His separateness from sin; another is devotion, “the intensity of the love that flows within the very being of God, among and between each of the three persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.” Love is a desire for someone or some thing; one cannot love something that is not in some way separate from ourselves. At the same time, love aims at uniting what is separate or distinct, whether these are the Persons God manifests within Himself or, more surprisingly, the creatures separated from their Creator, first by the fact of their creation itself, then compounded by their sin, which has altered their original nature. Holiness in such profoundly flawed creatures means devotion to Him, “being entirely his, so that all we do and possess are his”—still separate in the original sense, in their status of creatureliness, but redeemed from the further separation of sinfulness, even as they cannot claim to be sinless. Agapic love reunites God and human beings; it also provides the basis for uniting human beings with one another, under God, animated by His Holy Spirit.

    Ferguson begins his exposition of these points with I Peter 1:1-7. The churches in Turkey were having their faith tested; Peter writes his letter to strengthen their understanding of what faith entails. As Ferguson summarizes the passage, these Christians “have been chosen (elect) through the love God had set upon them (foreknowledge) in order to be reserved by the Spirit (sanctification) with a view to their devotion to Christ (obedience) and the enjoyment of a life of covenant fellowship with him (sprinkled with his blood).” To know how to live, what way of life to walk, you must know, first, “whose you are,” then “who you are,” and finally “what you are for.” Similarly, when Moses meets God manifested in the burning bush he wants to know who God is and who he, Moses, is, to have been chosen by God for the mission God commands him to undertake.

    Martin Luther wrote that “this little letter,” I Peter, “contains virtually everything a Christian needs to know.” And while Ferguson rightly allows that “the German reformer had a fine line in hyperbole,” he agrees that “Peter’s opening words constitute one of the New Testament’s most comprehensive descriptions of what it means to be a Christian.” Without holiness or sanctification, “no one will see the Lord,” the Apostle Paul writes, in concurrence. Although ‘belief in’ God is a gift delivered by the Holy Spirit, holiness is not a gift. It is “worked into us” over time: “We actually become holy.” In so becoming, we are ‘justified’ in the root meaning of the word: aligned with the will of God, the source of the good, the right. “Justification never takes place apart from regeneration which is the inauguration of sanctification.” Sanctification occurs as we obey the rule of God; it is the result of that obedience. “We are not justified on the basis of our sanctification” because only God can realign us, straighten us out. “Yet justification never takes place without sanctification.” Even the thief crucified with Jesus, who had only a short time left to live, undertook sanctification by “confess[ing] his own sinfulness,” “recogniz[ing] Jesus’ lordship,” manifesting respect for Jesus, and praying—even “rebuk[ing] his companion,” the other criminal, “for the vitriol he heaped on his new-found Master.”

    In acting to sanctify Christians, “God is restoring in our lives the image which we were created to reflect,” “changing you from what you were to what he means you to be—making you more and more like himself.” Holy or separate from sin Himself, He makes you more nearly separate from it. Ferguson identifies six “foundations” of this new life.

    The first foundation is God’s purpose. “God chose us in order to sanctify us.” That is, “everything depends on God taking the initiative.” All three Persons of the Trinity contribute to this sanctification: as Father, God chooses or ‘elects’ us to citizenship in His kingdom; as the Holy Spirit, God sanctifies us, guiding us along the way of life that characterizes His regime; as the Son, God provides the ruler of his regime, the one whom we shall emulate and obey. “Every Christian’s experience, wherever it begins, has its ultimate origin before the dawn of time in the heart, mind, and heavenly love and purpose of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,” and “the whole Trinity co-operates in bringing me to the goal,” cooperating among themselves and with me “in order to make me more like Christ.” “God has in the past destined us, and in the present is transforming us, so that in the future we will ‘be conformed to the image of his Son.'”

    The second foundation of the Christian regime is a command, “the commandment of God to be holy,” as seen in Leviticus 19 and I Peter1;15-16: “Be holy, as I am holy.” In obeying this command, we open ourselves to God’s agapic love. “Sanctification is growing in holy-love; love is growing in holiness.” Ferguson rejects the claim sometimes heard in churches, that the Old Testament is ‘legalistic’—requiring merely “outward obedience to the Ten Commandments.” The prophet Isaiah, for example, “realized that he was a sinner, not just someone who had committed various sinful act contrary to the divine standards”; “sin infected his own lip and came to expression whenever he preached.” This is the meaning of the purification of his lips with the “searing heat” of the coal the angel pressed on his lips. His wrong acts had issued from his own ‘being,’ and it was his ‘being’ that needed purification. Be holy, as I am holy “now means, ‘Become like Jesus.”

    Thirdly, Christians should understand themselves as the Israelites understood themselves when they left Egypt—as exiles. When Augustine called Christians a “third race” of men, he meant they were a new nation, neither Greeks nor Jews. This nation had been founded at great cost. Jesus was a sacrifice, redeeming His chosen people “not with silver and gold”—as most debtors are redeemed—”but with his own blood,” the matter that animates the living body. Fourth, having been so redeemed, so liberated from debt, Christians then find themselves ‘ministered to,’ brought to the new way of life, by the Holy Spirit. In terms of the family, the Holy Spirit guides us in “a real transformation of our lives so that we begin to develop the characteristics of our adoptive family” as “the children of God.” Nation derives from natio or ‘birth.’ In antiquity, the Israelites were the sons of Israel, Moabites the sons of Moab, and so on. Nations often were named for their ‘founding father,’ and they share some of the characteristics of that father, certain family resemblances. For Christians this means that “we love what we once despised, and despise much that we once loved,” inasmuch as Christ, the founding father of the Christian family and nation, Himself manifests the agapic love which animates the Persons of the Trinity for one another, and for creation.

    Families and nations typically undergo severe trials, and not only in the ‘founding period.’ Four score and seven years after the American founding, Abraham Lincoln called the Civil War a test of the endurance of the American regime “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” No less do the trials God sends to His people or allows them to suffer test the genuineness of their devotion to Himself, their ruler, and to propositions (and more) the commands He has set down for them. God “knows he can rely on and test his own work.” “Why does he do this?” Christians ask. “To build Christian character, making us more like Christ.” “The Christian character is strengthened by stress.”

    Finally, the sixth foundation of God’s way of life for His nation is the reward of faithful obedience, “the glory to come.” “The New Testament teaches us to live in the light of a future reality that is far more substantial than the present.” So enlightened, His subjects have reason to live now in a way that will enhance their lives then. “This final salvation will be holiness completed,” as Christians “will see the face of Jesus Christ and be transformed into his likeness.” All regimes have this characteristic, holding up models of persons deemed worthy of emulation. For Christians, living in God’s regime as exiles from all others, “those who will enjoy holiness there and then are those who want to pursue holiness here and now.”

    Wanting to pursue holiness is one thing, knowing how to do so another. Ferguson is quite fond of lists; sure enough, as there are six “foundations” of the Christian’s new life, so there are four “principles” by which it should be guided. The first is that “sanctification flows from the gospel,” which centers on the depiction of “God’s character and grace.” More specifically, “divine indicatives (statements about what God has done, is doing, or will do) logically precede and ground divine imperatives (statements about what we are to do in response),” faithfully and obediently. God’s grace “effects”—does not merely affect—”our faithfulness.” “This is the logic that explains the power of the gospel.” This is very different from thinking, “If I do this then God will do that.” Such a belief “stands the gospel on its head.” God’s actions always come first, whether it is the initial act of salvation in Christ or “what the Spirit is now doing in me.” Obedience means “we should no longer live for ourselves but for Christ,” even as a true patriot lives not himself but for his country and, if subject to a king, ready to sacrifice his life for his king.

    The second principle follows from the first; “Sanctification is expressed physically.” “We express ourselves only by means of our body. In that sense we are our bodies.” Sin makes us aliens in God’s country—more than aliens, witting or unwitting enemies of God. Each day our bodies, through our senses, are tempted or tested by sin at the hands of the rival ruler, Satan, the anti-Christ, “but we can face it well-armed if the eye, or ear, or mouth, or hand, or foot has already been devoted as a living sacrifice to the Lord Jesus Christ.” What we do with our bodies today reveals our allegiance. “For all our sophistication (not to say riches) the western world may not have seen so many tattoos since the days of paganism.” The rule of atheism causes men to abandon “the biblical teaching that we have been made as the image of God,” reducing the body to a billboard for the passions and thus “reduc[ing] man to biological functions.” “Now the body is everything, whether it be the human body, animal bodies, or the earth body.” Paganism induces men to worship earth as a goddess.

    The third principle, “mind renewal,” counteracts this materialism. Who will rule your mind? The regime or way of life informed by materialism (especially if matter is said to have divinity immanent within it) “gradually” and “imperceptibly” forms our mind, as any regime will do to those who live under it. But if human beings do not consist only of matter in motion, then that way of life, the habits of mind and heart that it inculcates, will not satisfy. “Knowing who we are will shape how we live”; Ferguson deploys the contemporary term ‘lifestyle,’ but the Bible offers the less frivolous term used also by classical political philosophers, the way. God consistently speaks of “My way.” He opposes ‘our’ way, the human-all-too-human way. He commands from us a metanoia, a change of mind. God’s instrument in mind-changing is the Gospel. “In receiving it we are actively passive,” by which Ferguson means it is a message from God to us, not the other way around, but a message we must act on, after receiving it.

    By so acting, Christians test the will of God, coming “to see it as ‘good and acceptable and perfect.'” “Faith in Christ involves an experiment—we trust him, but we cannot second-guess what the consequences will be in our lives.” In other words, we are not putting God to the test; He is testing us. “We learn to discover what God’s will is in each situation only as we find ourselves in it and as his providence slowly unfolds his purposes.” This is what Jesus means by telling His disciples to be prudent as serpents; prudence, practical wisdom, is the characteristic of the good ruler, who knows what to do in each circumstance, what speech or action will advance his regime. Here, God is the ruler, and it is up to His subjects to guide their own actions by His spirit. “When we thus yield our lives to the Lord, and our thinking is renewed by his word, we also begin to find God’s will is acceptable—it becomes a delight to us.” To those who refuse God’s rule, “God’s will is inevitably unpleasant, simply because it is his will and not their will.”

    How then to discern God’s will? To do so unassisted by God is obviously impossible. “What does God do in order to bring us to the Christlikeness which is his ultimate goal?” Ferguson cites Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians: “I have been crucified with Christ. It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.” The ‘I’ who has been crucified is a body, but even more a way of life. The gospel does not denigrate the body. “Rather it changes the kind of life we live in the body.” God has shown what kind of life might be lived in a human body by “taking and sharing our human nature”; “his union with us in our flesh, and not our faith union with him, is the foundation of our fellowship with him.” Having lived a life ‘within’ human nature, “in all its frailty and poverty,” but at the same time being God, and therefore capable of rejecting every temptation, every Satanic testing, and of ruling that nature instead of being ruled by it, and moreover having “died for our sins,” sacrificing that human physicality for the sake of all those still stuck in and with it, having been “raised into new life, and ascended to his Father in the nature he assumed,” Jesus as Christ has given the Holy Spirit the “resources” which can justify, sanctify, and “indeed even… glorify us.” Sin’s wages are death, but Jesus broke “the power of death in his resurrection.” In the letter to the Hebrews Paul calls Jesus “the founder” of Christians’ salvation, a salvation made “perfect through suffering.” The Greek word for founder, archēgos, means the one who embodies the archē—which means both ‘beginning’ and ‘form’ or framework, as in our word, ‘architect.’ The word “is used only four times in the new Testament, always of Jesus.” Aristotle calls politics the “architectonic art,” the art of beginning or ‘founding’ the forms or institutions of rule which direct the pathways on which human beings live their lives. His word ‘regime’ refers to rulers (especially the founding rulers), the forms or institutions they devise as means of ruling, the way of life of those who live within the framework of institutions, and, finally, the end or purpose set by those rulers, reinforced by those forms, and pursued by citizens or subjects according to that way. For Christians, the Ruler, Who is holy and His subjects, the faithful, all have one archē, the same nature: “The Sanctifier must share the same nature, and in that sense be one flesh, with those he sanctifies.” “By coming into the family of flesh and sanctifying his whole life, then by dying our death and being declared righteous or justified in his resurrection,” Jesus became the archēgos “of both justification and sanctification.” It is the Holy Spirit who connects us with the Founder, and who strengthens our connection or bond, our ‘political’ union with Him, our rightful ruler.

    This means that a Christian lives in faith in the Son of God, “transfer[ring] trust from self to Christ, all the while recognizing that I cannot carry the heavy load of my sin and guilt, but he can,” being divine not human, all-powerful not frail. Ferguson points especially to Paul’s eschewal of the word ‘Christian.’ “We never find him describing believers as ‘Christians.'” “He speaks only of believing in Christ” and indeed about “believing into Jesus Christ.” By this Paul means that “faith brings us into a person-to-person union and communion with Jesus Christ so that what is ours becomes his and what is his becomes ours.” All regimes need union; the American Founders were obsessed with it, Lincoln defended it. But the Christian “union and communion” is more intimate, and stronger, than any merely human union can be. Ferguson calls this “the deep melody of grace.” Aristotle compares political union with a harmonic scale, warning against reducing this to “a single beat,” as he accuses Socrates of having done in his simply-ordered ‘ideal regime.’ For those ‘in Christ,’ there is no such danger, as in Christ there is “hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Colossians 2:3).

    Every regime includes certain habits of mind and heart, excludes others as enemies to its structure and its way of life. The Christian, the one who lives in Christ, believing into Him, asks the Holy Spirit to guide him in crucifying, killing, making war against his ‘old’ or sinful nature, his membership in “the family of Adam,” who disobeyed and was expelled from the homeland God made for him. Since “the crucified Christ to whom I am now united is also the risen Christ,” “I cannot be united to him in his crucifixion without being united to him in his resurrection as well.” The sacrifice of our old ‘self’ will be for the sake of a supremely good and joyful purpose: life beneath the new Heaven and on the new Earth, in our new, resurrected bodies, under the perfect Ruler. Therefore, “I no longer live, but Christ lives IN me,” dwelling in us “through the Holy Spirit.” This means that we not only enjoy an intimate union with God, but an intimate union with fellow-members of His regime. The sum of the Law is to love God and to love one’s neighbor as oneself. This becomes possible among Christians, imperfectly, in their lives in the Christian ecclesia, assembly, ‘church’ on this earth, and will become our way of life perfectly in the world to come. “It is a truism that we become like the people with whom we live” because “the intimacy of life and love together has brought” us “to think, act, and react, as one.” As in the family, as in the city, so in the City of God—only more so and better so.

    Union with Christ has three dimensions: an eternal dimension, inasmuch as God “chose us in Him before the foundation of the world”; a covenantal and incarnational dimension, “since in his incarnation Christ was obedient as the second man and last Adam”; and an existential dimension, “since the Holy Spirit brings us into a real spiritual bonding with the risen and ascended Lord.” Although baptism is something we do in the sense of ‘going through the motions,’ it symbolizes what God has done for us, our baptism “into Jesus Christ”—rather like the formalizing of a resident alien’s citizenship or, to use Ferguson’s analogy, the naming of a child, who integrates the name into his own identity later on. In being “named for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,” you join the family of God, the Kingdom of God. “As believers we possess an permanent and irreversible new citizenship.” As in all families and regimes, you will then be taught what it is to be a member. In this case, the Gospel amounts to a comprehensive citizenship lesson: “Thinking through the logic of the gospel corrects, cleanses, recalibrates, transforms, and sanctifies us emotionally as well as intellectually.” Your soul turns its attention away from the principles and habits of your former ‘family’ or ‘country,’ In entering the new regime you put aside the habits of mind and heart you once had. “How can we who died to sin still live in it? You cannot both have died to something and still be living in it. There is a law of non-contradiction: you cannot be in one and the same sense, at one and the same time, in both and the same realm, both dead and alive.” “This is gospel logic,” and the conclusion of the syllogism is that we have, in Paul’s words, “died to the reign, the dominion, the authority, and the rule of sin.” “We are no longer sin’s citizens” or, more accurately, its slaves. Christian freedom means freedom from sin, in Christ; as with any regime change, freedom from one regime entails entering another. Not all revolutions or regime changes are for the better, but in this case, “by nature we were in Adam, but now we are in Christ”—“transferred from Adam-Land to Christ-Land,” a substantial improvement. Baptism thus “means fellowship with the Trinity through union with Christ in his death and resurrection.”

    Any regime requires a certain way of life. “Know your new identity,” your new family name, your new citizenship, “and it will determine how you live.” It is the responsibility of the Holy Spirit, and also of the human rulers of the Christian ecclesia, to teach that way of life through action or example and through rhetoric and logic. This will be necessary because (again like any regime) this one will face conflict, ‘civil’ and ‘foreign.’ “We are now involved in a Spirit-against-flesh war.” This war differs from the wars we fought in the previous regime. “We may have experienced inner conflict before we became Christ’s. But any conflict we experienced then with the flesh was in the flesh—instances of “simply battling with ourselves.” The rule of reason over thumos, the rule of reason-directed thumos over the appetites seen in (for example) Plato’s Republic, is a triumph of natural morality. But it isn’t Gospel morality. Paul maintains that “only if we live by the Spirit can we avoid gratifying the desires of the flesh”—philosophy, the love of wisdom, being a naturally better rule of flesh over flesh. “Flesh” means not only our bodies but our minds and hearts. We can defeat sin “only by refusing the desires of the flesh and simultaneously living in the power of the Spirit.” In this we model Jesus in His crucifixion (“the ultimate negativity”) and His resurrection (“the ultimate positivity”). When Augustine writes that Christians live as captives and strangers in the earthly city, he means we have become aliens to our former regime by rejecting its way of life, members of the regime of the Spirit. “I used to be a citizen of the first. I have become a citizens of the second.” To be sure, the “flesh” is still in you. It is impossible for a human being to emigrate from one country to another, or to undergo a change of regimes in his own country, without carrying with him some of the habits of mind and heart he absorbed when living that way of life of the old regime. You will always speak the new language with a trace of the old accent. But you can be progressively sanctified, be made more and more separate from the way of life of the old regime and more attuned to the way of life of the new regime.

    Therefore, to advance in sanctification, to ‘naturalize’ ourselves in the new regime, the new citizen should ask himself: Does this thought, sentiment, action “enable me to overcome the influence of sin, not simply in my outward actions but in my inner motivations? Does it increase my trust in and love for the Lord Jesus Christ,” the Ruler of the new regime? Since sin’s “root cause is the worship of self,” how does a given thought, sentiment, or action turn my soul away from myself, and toward God? Ferguson calls attention to Paul’s command to “put away orgē,” usually translated as wrath but more precisely as exasperation or impatience.” “The root cause of impatience and exasperation lies in our response to the providence by which God superintends our lives,” a passion which “at its heart is a self-exaltation over others, and a dissatisfaction with the way God is ordering and orchestrating the events of our lives.” When Christ “comes by his Spirit to dwell in each of the members” of His regime, he gives them the authority to rule the passions, even the thoughts, that disoriented us in the past, and threaten to disorient us again. “Expulsion” of in and “infilling” of the Holy Spirit “must accompany each other” if sanctification is to occur.

    The Gospel amounts to a sort of Declaration of Independence. “The Spirit does not bypass our minds and work directly on our emotions or affections” but instead “addresses our minds through the word of God, simply because we are created as rational, thinking beings. How and what we think determines how we feel, will, and live.” As with the Declaration of Independence, this means war, an “inevitable” war because, like the Americans of 1776-1781, “we have not yet been fully and finally delivered” from the grip of the tyrant. Like the Signers of the Declaration, we are personally responsible for acting on our declaration, enabled to resist by the Spirit but acting in self-defense. And we must will ourselves to fight. The reasons so to will are the rewards we will gain, justice, and gratitude. That is, we will gain the better way of life, forever; we will fulfil our obligations to the God Who created us; and we will acknowledge the sacrifice God made to redeem us. And ‘we’ is the correct term. The church is indeed an assembly, an association or fellowship. For all the French revolutionaries’ exaltation of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, “where you deny the place and role of God the Father you cannot maintain the family concept beyond its genetic and nuclear context”; soon the Terror commenced, and so it has done in many subsequent, far worse, regimes that have purported to uphold communitarian principles.

    All this talk of the Spirit and of God’s love might suggest that spirituality and agapic love, the powers that unite the new Christian regime, have displaced the laws of God detailed in the Torah. Ferguson rejects the sentimentality of love, even agapic love, unstructured by law. Hence the denigration of the ‘legalism’ many Christians charge against the Israelites, and often against modern Orthodox Jews, as well.

    But “the role of the sanctification of the Christian cannot be quite as simplistic as a radical love or law antithesis might suggest.” As the ‘Old’ Testament makes clear, “love was always at the heart of God’s law,” which He gave “by love to be received in love and obeyed through love.” Although we now live in “an antinomian world in which the law of God is regarded as the enemy even if human laws are still necessary,” “Jesus himself teaches that if we love him we will keep his commandments.” Indeed “not only does love not abolish law, but law commands love,” as seen in the double command to love God and love your neighbor as yourself. “Love provide motivation for obedience, while law provides direction for love.” God wants his creatures to love Him, but not in any way they choose. He sets the terms and conditions of rightly-offered human love, whether it is directed toward Himself or toward human beings. He has also set conditions on His own love for us, as seen in His covenants.

    Ferguson points to changes in God’s regime and therefore His laws. The law governing Adam and Eve differed from the law delivered to Moses, and both of these differed from the Noachide Commandments. Like all wise founders, God laid down laws suitable to the people for whom He legislated, living in the circumstances of their time and place. For example, “the Ten Commandments… expressed, largely in negative terms, what God originally willed I a positive way for Adam and Even in the Garden of Eden.” The law again “takes on a new context and shape after Pentecost—Jesus is now the model of obedience. Yet it is, in essence, one and the same law of God.” It aims at the human good as defined by the Creator of human beings, not as human beings define or misdefine the human good. After the Fall, “major distortions and malfunctions have affected our instincts.” “Were that hard-wiring totally destroyed we would cease to be distinctly human,” but “relics” or “fragments” of it remain, and all of God’s postlapsarian regimes, and all of His postlapsarian legal systems, build on that.

    Jesus’ own life on earth showed “what perfect obedience to the law looks like.” “In him we see God’s law in human form.” Further, Jesus teaches ‘the spirit of the law’—its meaning. He condemns the scribes and Pharisees not for their legalism but for what Ferguson calls their “externalism,” their failure to understand and live by the law’s purpose. “By contrast,” Jesus “shows the spiritual significance of the law” insofar as it “deals with inward thoughts and not simply outward actions.” The law commands men not to commit adultery by their actions, but its intent, its spirit, is to rectify their minds and hearts, to curb their sexual passions.

    With respect to the structure of the Mosaic law, Ferguson finds in it three divisions. The moral law, the Decalogue, “was foundational.” The Decalogue “was then applied to the life of the community in the land in civil legislation and a penal code.” Additionally, some of the laws were ceremonial, “directives given for the restoration to sinners of a way of access to and fellowship with God.” Because the Decalogue underlies the others, they alone were “spoken to the whole congregation”; they alone “were written on stone tablets”; they alone “were written by the finger of God”; and they alone were kept in the Ark of the Covenant. The civil laws, by contrast, were not directly written by God and were “to be kept while the people were ‘in the land'” of Israel. Unlike the moral laws, the civil and ceremonial laws “possessed no inbuilt permanence” but were “in place only until the coming of the promised Messiah.” It is of course the status of Jesus as Messiah, and as God, which divides Jews from Christians to this day. In maintaining that Jesus is Messiah, that Jesus is one person of the Trinity, Christians maintain that “the final sacrifice” has been made, thus abrogating the ceremonial law, and that the international ecclesia of the faithful has been founded, making the civil laws of ancient Israel no longer necessary. The law now exists “in the hearts of God’s people through the indwelling of the Spirit.”

    With respect to “the moral dimensions of the law,” Jesus fulfilled them by obeying the law and “also by paying the penalty for our breach of it.” “The law-maker became the law-keeper, but then took our place and condemnation as though he were the law-breaker.” His death and resurrection fulfilled the law’s ceremonial dimension because Jesus acted as High Priest, “offering himself as the real sacrifice that would take away sins once for all.” There would subsequently be no need for repetitive sacrifices, except in the sense that Christians sacrifice not themselves but their sins in their Holy Spirit-guided and empowered efforts at sanctification, at aligning their hearts, minds, and actions with God’s regime. And finally, Jesus fulfilled the civil dimensions of the law by founding a kingdom “not limited by either geography or a distinct ethnicity.” “We can still learn important principles from the way in which the Decalogue was applied in the sphere of civil law, but we are no longer ethnic Israel.” The Christian equivalent of the exodus from Egypt to the Promised Land is the exodus from the human regimes, ‘the world,’ to God’s regime, His ecclesia. Ferguson quotes the Book of Jeremiah 31:31-34 as the prefiguration of this: “I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts.”

    Sanctification therefore means the imitatio Christi. All regimes aim at some conception of ‘the good’ for those who live within it. Paul “defines ‘good’ in terms of God,” saying “that the ultimate ‘good’ towards which all things work together is our conformity to Christ.” As Ferguson puts it, “only those who are like him will be able to see him as he is”; “only what is Christlike can survive in his presence.” This regime end or purpose and the means by which the laws of God direct us to reach it draw “a demarcation line between Christians and non-Christians”—not the physical borderline seen on maps and enforced by armed guards and walls but a spiritual borderline that may or may not be respected by ordinary ‘worldly’ regimes in their dealings with Christians.

    Why does God love us enough to grant grace to us? After all, we aren’t all that loveable. “God does everything for his own glory.” This makes sense if it means that God requires the beings He has created and redeemed to glorify Him. This is the basis of man’s agapic love for God as a command, as a law. In describing the way God’s love for man works in this world, Ferguson carefully translates the phrase in Romans 8:28, panta sunergei eis agathon. Translators often render this, “All things work for good.” Looking at the context of the passage in the argument Paul is making in chapter 8, Ferguson prefers the meaning, He works all things for the good. “God himself is the worker, perhaps more specifically the Holy Spirit whose ministry Paul has been particularly expounding in the preceding verses.” This is the holy God, not the immanent Absolute Spirit of Hegel. His human creatures are sanctified or made more nearly like Him by the working of the Holy Spirit, “the executive of the Trinity.” “Likeness to Christ”—in suffering, death, and resurrection—”is the ultimate goal of sanctification. It is holiness. It is therefore also the ultimate fruit of being devoted to God.”

     

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