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    Archives for October 2019

    Logic and Ethics: Is There a Connection?

    October 7, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Henry Veatch: Realism and Nominalism. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1954.

    Henry Veatch: Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1980 [1962].

     

    David Hume disrupted philosophy by arguing that ‘is’ implies no demonstrable ‘ought.’ The mere fact that a thing is by nature or by convention does not tell me whether it is good. Natural laws may describe gravity, the growth of a tree, the traits of horses and humans, but they cannot tell me what I should do or become. Nature tells me what pleasures and pains me, not what is right. Similarly, no civil custom or law justifies itself; political society may reward me or punish me, but it cannot prove that it is right to do so. When writing about matters of good and bad, right and wrong, Hume could offer nothing other than experience as the criterion to which I should attend, claiming there is no other. When considering politics, he interested himself primarily in ruling institutions, which shape the experience of citizens and subjects, and history, which recounts the experiences of previous generations for the instruction of subsequent generations.

    Evidently, Hume must understand nature to be devoid of purpose. Like Hobbes, he recognizes material, formal, and efficient causes in nature, but not final causes. To put it in historical terms, he shares Hobbes’s rejection of Aristotelian philosophy. That is the fundamental reason for his denial of any connection between ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Nature, what is, can generate no such thing as an ‘ought.’ Those who claim otherwise therefore fall into both logical contradiction and groundless ethics.

    Henry Veatch has his eye on that claim, both as a logician and as a moral philosopher. But he begins well before Hume, considering the major philosophic controversy of the generation before Thomas Aquinas: ‘realism’ vs. ‘nominalism.’ He does so for no antiquarian reason. “Realism and nominalism may well be perennial issues in philosophy” (RNR 1); “today, no less than in the 12th century, there is a realist-nominalist controversy raging” (RNR 2). And this makes sense, inasmuch as the philosophic atmosphere, as it were, of that century resembles that of the mid-1950s: In the twelfth century, philosophers “knew little else in philosophy save logic”; for their part, today’s philosophers are “all pretty much agreed that the only really serious discipline in philosophy is logic” (RNR 2). Then as now, philosophers bind themselves with “logicism” (RNR 2).

    Veatch contends that “the current issue of realism vs. nominalism may be in large measure understood in terms of, and perhaps may even be said to have been caused by the rather uncritical use by modern logicians of a certain basic scheme, or ordering pattern, that quite literally dominates the entire vast corpus of modern mathematical logic” (RNR 3). This pattern begins with Gottlob Frege’s understanding of logic in the mathematical terms of function and argument. In any mathematical equation, there is a constant and a variable—for example, in ‘2x’ two is the constant, x the variable. Frege “proposed to generalize these notions so as to make them applicable far beyond the confines of mathematics in the narrower sense, extending them to the analysis of concepts and propositions in logic” (RNR 5). He translates these terms into logic by calling the logical equivalent of the constant the “function,” the x-factor the “argument.” To analyze the sentence, “Caesar conquered Gaul,” he treats “Gaul” as the function or constant, Caesar as the argument or x-factor.

    This sets up “the vast and elaborate quantification theory of modern logic, a theory, which it is claimed, almost infinitely surpasses the old subject-predicate theory of traditional logic in range and power” (RNR 8). In subject-predicate theory, “Caesar conquered Gaul” means just that. It registers “a simple one-place function.” But in quantification theory, anything could replace the function, “Gaul,” just as any number could replace the two in “2x.” “The propositions envisaged in quantification theory will involve besides one-place functions, two-place, three-place, four place and so on up to n-place functions!” (RNR 8-9).

    Bertrand Russell, for one, became so enamored of quantitative logic that he dismissed subject-predicate logic altogether, holding it “unable to admit the reality of relations” (RNR 10) Why so? Because subject-predicate logic limits itself to only one thing in relation to one other thing; it is cramped by concreteness. Quantitative logic, like numbers, ‘abstracts from’ the particulars: “The true function of logic as applied to matters of experience,” Russell writes, is to “show the possibility of hitherto unsuspected alternatives,” to “liberate the imagination as to what the world may be” (RNR 11). As Veatch puts it, in Russell’s view quantitative logic “provides an inventory of possibilities, a repertory of abstractly tenable hypotheses” (RNR 11). Veatch may be a bit too much of the gentleman to remark that this sort of thing fit rather well with Russell’s socialism, an imaginary construct of what the world may be, abstractly considered. With quantitative logic in hand, a philosopher might do seriously what Plato’s Socrates did ironically: make a city in speech plausible.

    In considering realism and nominalism in his thirteenth century, Aquinas distinguished ens rationis and ens naturae, while connecting this distinction to a distinction in logic. Reason, he argued, finds what he calls “intentions” in natural things “insofar as they are considered by reason” (RNR 12). By “intention” he means such attributes as genus and species. One doesn’t find such ideas as genus and species by means of one’s senses’ perception of things; the ideas “rather are consequent upon reason’s consideration of the things of nature” (12). Logic, thought guided by the principle of non-contradiction, does discover the genus and species of things by comparing one thing to another, observing that (for example) a diamond is not a ruby, a sheep is not a goat, because their attributes in some respect contradict one another, whereas a diamond and a ruby are both minerals, a sheep and a goat both animals, because their attributes in some respects are identical to one another, do not contradict at all. Veatch observes, “if the subject matter of logic is the sort of thing which St. Thomas here suggests that it is, then it is quite obviously not the sort of thing that Lord Russell says it is” (RNR 12). They are things of different species. “Liberating the imagination, or drawing up inventories of possibilities, or contemplating unsuspected alternatives as to what in the eyes of God or the devil or Lord Russell the world may be—all this is all very well, but it simply isn’t the business of logic,” since what Russell wants logic to “disclose and reveal are real possibilities; they are not mere intentions in the sense of beings of reason” (RNR 13).

    Thomas’s distinction between the natural things and logical “intentions” addresses the realism-vs.-nominalism question he inherited from his immediate philosophic predecessors by connecting reality to names in a logical, and indeed Aristotelian way. Logical intentions have nothing to do with things in the natural world, real or possible, as immediately perceived by the senses. “It is only as things come to be known, or better, it is only insofar as in coming to be known they acquire a status as objects of thought or reason… which otherwise and just in themselves they would not have at all” (RNR 14). If the “subject” we consider is hydrogen, and by measuring it we determine its atomic weight as 1.008, “we make ‘hydrogen’ the subject of a proposition and we predicate ‘having an atomic weight of 1.008’ of it” (RNR 14). Reason “may be said to find in hydrogen, insofar as hydrogen comes to be known and is made an object before the mind,” its atomic weight, the predicate of the sentence ‘Hydrogen has an atomic weight of 1.008’ (RNR 15).

    Moreover, “logical intentions, in addition to being consequent upon reason’s consideration of nature, are also instrumental to reason’s consideration of things” (RNR 15). That is, they are “the tools and means of human knowledge,” not only their products; “or better, they are produced in the process of knowledge, precisely in order that through them such knowledge may be made possible” (RNR 16). In nature, “hydrogen is neither a species nor a subject, but in its condition of being known and as an object before the mind, it takes on these purely logical features or ‘intentions,’ as they are called” (RNR 16). The mind classifies hydrogen with respect to it being “a species of a genus or a subject of a predicate” so that “we may thereby come to know that hydrogen really is an element or that it does in fact have an atomic weight of 1.008” (RNR 116-17). “The main instruments of traditional logic—concepts, propositions, and arguments—are, in form and structure, simply relations of identity” (RNR 17). As “tools,” they ‘dig out’ the characteristics of natural objects not perceived by the senses alone, characteristics nonetheless real, albeit real in a different way than sensually-perceived reality. “It is only intellectually or in the mind that what-a-thing-is is abstracted from the thing itself and then reidentified with it in a logical proposition,” such as ‘a sheep is a mammal'” (RNR 17). Through the tool, instrument, device of logic, the mind relates “a thing to its own ‘what,'” causing the thinker “to recognize what that thing is in fact and in reality” (RNR 18). “The relation of identity that the mind sets up between subject and predicate in a proposition is an intentional relation precisely in the sense that through it the mind or reason is able to intend things as they are in themselves and in reality”; when I say what a thing is I am ‘identifying’ it through language (RNR 19). That’s why I might be mistaken and, if my proposition is illogical, why I must be mistaken; I can’t show you how a thing can be or do opposites at the same time, with respect to the same part, in relation to the same thing. A subatomic particle may manifest itself as a wave or as a particle, but not at the same time, by means of the same observation.

    Not so with Frege’s quantitative logic. It isn’t “intentional” in the Thomistic sense, for two reasons. First, “the relation of a function to its argument or arguments is not a relation of identity”; therefore, “the function can in no sense be regarded as representing what the argument or arguments are’ (RNR 19). ‘2x’ tells me nothing about what ‘2’ is. The person who speaks or writes ‘2x’ has formed no such (Thomistic) intention. As Veatch puts it, the sentence “Milwaukee is north of Chicago,” in which “Chicago” and “Milwaukee” are the arguments and “north of” is the function, tells me nothing of “what Milwaukee and Chicago conjointly are” (RNR 19-20). Second, “unlike the relation of identity between subject and predicate, the relation between argument and function is not one whose nature is simply to be of or about something else” (RNR 20). The relation of Milwaukee to Chicago in the sentence refers not to the ‘whatness’ of either city, but to “the order of parts in a whole.” It does not tell me what that whole is—if, for example, Milwaukee and Chicago form part of a ‘metroplex.’

    Returning to the question of realism and nominalism as they reappear in modern philosophic thought, Veatch observes that for Russell the word or symbol that is the “argument” in the proposition (say, Milwaukee, Chicago, Socrates) stands for an irreducible “particular”; the function sign (say, north of, or Plato) stands for a universal or a relation. In the sentence “Socrates was older than Plato,” “Socrates” and “Plato” are the particulars, the “arguments,” and “being older than” is the relation or universal (RNR 23-24). What does such a sentence, so understood, signify? It means nothing about ‘what’ the particulars are, but rather states (one aspect of) their relation to one another. Veatch calls this “logical atomism,” meaning that both the particulars and the universal/relational exist “outside of and along side” of one another (RNR 27). Russell himself soon saw that this means a word in a logical proposition, and therefore the logical proposition itself, need not have any relation to reality at all. A word of course “contributes to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs,” Russell writes, but that is a feature of language, not necessarily of any reality beyond language (RNR 31).

    Russell thus went from the quasi-Platonic realism of Frege, in which numbers “peopled the timeless realm of Being,” toward nominalism. W. V. Quine takes that final step, denying that there are any abstract entities at all. The word “appendicitis” “is a noun,” he writes, “only because of a regrettable strain of realism which pervades our own particular language” (RNR 35-36). As Veatch puts it, Quine regards “all supposedly ‘descriptive’ words as if they are ultimately and in principle no different from ‘logical’ words” (RNR 36). “This certainly sounds like nominalism”; “the function-argument scheme has indeed given rise to an extreme nominalist type of semantics” (RNR 37). Quine can deny that the ‘function’ side of the proposition, the ‘universal’ side, refers to any objective reality, arguing that “in any proposition involving a function-argument structure, while both parts of the proposition may be presumed to be meaningful and significant, still in asserting the proposition as a whole, what one asserts to exist are only the arguments and not the function” (RNR 40). One cannot, by means of logical propositions, understand anything that is ‘out there.

    Thus “modern logicians and semanticists have found themselves forced into one or the other of two very embarrassing alternatives” (RNR 45): either Quine is right, and logic is only a language game which tells one nothing about any reality beyond itself, or one must admit that ‘Milwaukee’ means a particular city, ‘Socrates’ a particular person, ‘north of’ a real direction, ‘older than’ seniority in years—an alternative that re-presents quantitative logic as a realism depending upon a leap of faith (which doesn’t sound entirely logical).

    But (Veatch argues) this only indicates that philosophers have entangled themselves in a pseudo-problem. “The entire trouble would seem to stem from the use in modern logic of a schema like that of function and argument, which turns out to be radically non-intentional, and hence not adapted to the proper purposes of logic at all” (RNR 46). Subject-predicate logic avoids this problem altogether because to use logic as a tool, instrument, device “certainly does not imply that one means or signifies by it a real universal entity existing extra-mentally, as the realists would seem to hold; nor is the only alternative to this the nominalistic one of supposing that in using a universal concept, one does not thereby mean or signify anything real at all” (RNR 47). If I assert that “many Wisconsin barns are red” I don’t mean that many Wisconsin barns are redness. I’m not saying that any particular barn or set of barns is the idea of redness, or indeed that it is the idea of barn-ness. Nor does such an assertion commit me to the idea of the Ideas in the supposedly Platonic sense of an ‘extra-mental’ set of realities above and beyond the particulars. In using language to form sentences I intend to bring out, some aspect of the particulars I am talking about; using language logically signifies an intention to correct errors in my perception of those particulars, to re-cognize them. As Thomas puts it in the Summa contra Gentiles, “although it is necessary for the truth of a cognition that the cognition answer to the thing known, still it is not necessary that the mode of the thing known be the same as the mode of its cognition” (RNR 51). In this, Thomas follows Aristotle, that logician who does not need ‘Platonic’ ideas in order to reason about things.

    “Somehow,” Veatch concludes (with a hint of exasperation) “one wonders whether, if only this simple and rather obvious principle of intentionality had been observed by modern logicians, there would ever have been the current and seemingly futile dispute between realists and nominalists among modern semanticists” (RNR 51). But what about modern ethicists? To use a recently-invented, Greek-sounding word Veatch avoids, has this ‘epistemological’ debacle twisted them in the wrong direction, too?

    Can Ethics Be Logical?

    Lord Russell famously answered with a resounding ‘No,’ having taken the ways of mathematical logic for those of logic as such and concluded that in ethics all we have are emotions (as in the fear behind his Cold-War slogan “Better Red than dead”) and that in politics all we have is imagination powered by emotion (as in The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism). In Rational Man, Veatch demurs, deploying Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics to refute not so much Russell as the existentialist ethics of William Barrett in his then-recent book, Irrational Man and also the language-philosophy stance of Charles L. Stevenson, who, in his 1944 book Ethics and Language, consigned substantive ethical questions to the realm of less-than-philosophic souls. Veatch intends not to explicate Aristotle but “to use him in a modern effort to set forth and justify a rational system of ethics,” an application of Aristotelian ethics to modern circumstances (RM xiii). “This book will have to do with just such normative questions as the currently regnant intelligentsia has come to regard as not philosophically respectable” (RM xxvi).

    Unlike Aristotle, whose ethical philosophy leads directly to political philosophy (a term he may have invented), Veatch promises to duck social and political questions, as in current circumstances so many ‘realists’ skip ethics entirely, jumping immediately to matters of society and politics, conceived simply as field of ‘power relations.’ Such Realpolitik thinkers, ‘Left’ or ‘Right,’ find unintended allies among linguistic philosophers. But what if philosophy has more to offer than language games, however rigorously played? “To most people it must seem that ethics has to do with more than just the meanings of words and the uses of language” (RM 2). What if they are right? Even if to think well about ethics one will need to clarify terms, among other acts of hygiene?

    Everyone wants to live well. And, after any number of blunders, most people see that living well requires “an art or technique that one must master, a skill that one must acquire before one can do [the act of living] well, or perhaps even do it at all” (RM 3). In an effort to help in this, optimistic parents send their children to college. But, “Let’s face it: modern learning does not have anything to do with living, or being learned with being human” (RM 4). In considering the lives of philosophers, Kierkegaard “trembles to think of what it means to be a man” (RM 5); Socrates replies that to philosophize one must know oneself and learn how to live. One must find a good way of life—a thought Socrates shares with the founders of major religions, such as the God of the Bible, who very much insists on His way, demanding that His people abjure the ways of Canaanites, Egyptians, Persians, and indeed all others but His own.

    In adjuring men to master Fortuna, to conquer nature, modern philosophy, the science it has produced, and the technology that science has produced offer “a truly amazing example of the relevance of knowledge to life” (RM 10). When modern science attends to human nature, it goes so far as to claim to control the lives of non-scientists, reducing human life to a set of “functions” (RM 10)—exactly what one would expect of a project animated by quantitative logic. But who is doing the animation? What is their character? “What is needed for ethics is knowledge not of how to control nature, but of how to control oneself” (RM 10), not only others. In this sense, ethics must precede politics, self-government preceding political rule. What can quantitative logic teach about self-government?

    Not much. “Isn’t it a truism nowadays that morals and ethics are relative matters, that is to say, matters of opinion, not of knowledge?” (RM 13) “Ethical relativism has become almost a sine qua non of the educated man, a sort of badge of the modern intellectual,” who maintains that one’s opinions are always ‘relative’ to, even determined by, one civilization, culture class, physical environment, biology, psychological drives. As proof, the intellectual points to the diversity, the contradictory multitude, of moral principles. But this is no proof of anything but the manifoldness of human ways, a fact as well known to Moses and Aristotle as it is to Lord Russell and Professor Stevenson. “The mere diversity in human moral standards does not in principle preclude the possibility of at least some of these standards being correct and others incorrect” (RM 14). Indeed, “the whole world might be wrong and a single individual right” (RM 15), as any number of philosophers (and not only prophets) have started out by thinking.

    Ethical relativism follows from Hume’s is-ought dichotomy. The denial of this dichotomy leads relativists “to label their opponents ‘absolutists'” (RM 19n.). Linguistically considered, ‘absolute’ does oppose ‘relative.’ No one calls the knowledge of modern scientists “a purely relative matter”; yet no one calls it “an absolute knowledge,” either. “And if scientists can enjoy an immunity from the dilemma of relativism or absolutism, why may not moral philosophers as well?” (RM 19n)

    Some ethical relativists hope that relativism will bring forth greater toleration of differing opinions, and of those who hold them. The anthropologist Ruth Benedict believed so. But, then, so did Benito Mussolini, whose ghost-writer (probably the philosophy professor Giovanni Gentile) wrote for him, “Everything I have said and done in these last years is relativism by intuition…. From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable” (RM 20). Toleration, meet intolerance, each of you standing on the same leg (as do so many of the ‘post-modern’ Leftists whom Veatch, Benedict, Mussolini, and Gentile never lived to see).

    All of these would-be relativists face the same dilemma, as well as one another. “No human being can stop with just having convictions, he also has to live and to act. But to act is to choose and to choose is to manifest some sort of preference for one course of action over another. However, to manifest any such human preference means that, consciously or unconsciously, implicitly or explicitly, one has made a judgment of value as to which course of action is the better or the wiser or the more suitable or preferable.” (RM 22)  Benedict holds on high the banner of toleration; Mussolini self-assertion; “liberated youth” their “impulses and inclinations”; skeptics (Hume) “the standards of the community of which [he] is a member” (RM 23). All of these standards rest on “a glaring non sequitar: “Since no course of action is really better or superior to any other, I conclude that the better course of action for me to follow would be thus and so'” (RM 23). Obviously, there is “no possible way in which the denial of all standards of better and worse can itself be transformed into a kind of standard of better or worse” (RM 23). To get out of this impasse, one will need not self-assertion, whether spirited or dispirited, but self-examination.

    “Back to Socrates and Aristotle,” then (RM 27). Back, as it happens, to the facts, and to a consideration of facts prior to asserting the ethical equivalent of realism-vs.-nominalism, namely facts-vs.-values. Aristotle observes that every art and every investigation aims at some good (else why undertake it?). Is there a supreme good at which all our actions, taken together, aim? Since all beings have a nature, a set of characteristics defining what they are, the good for each kind of being must be the perfection of its nature. This means that ‘values,’ as they are called, “are simply facts of nature” (RM 29). It can’t be good for water, as water, to evaporate, although sometimes its evaporation may be good for other beings, or for nature as a whole. The distinctively human good, the one fulfilling the definition of what a human being is, “will involve what might loosely be called the maturity or healthy condition of the whole man, or of man in his total being” (RM 29). Further, “since man is a being capable of intelligence and understanding, and consequently of planned and deliberate behavior on the basis of such understanding, it may also be presumed that the way in which a human being attains his appropriate good or natural perfection will be rather different from that of a plant or an animal,” by “a conscious recognition of what the human end is and by deliberately aiming at this proper end” (RM 29). Such recognition, according to Aristotle’s subject-predicate logic, comes from using the “tool” of logic, by reasoning.

    Veatch illustrates this by a hypothetical which seems as if it were inspired by the late Franklin Roosevelt. Suppose that a person comes along who begins by “remind[ing] us of how precarious our existence is,” and then offers us a deal: From now on, he will see to it that we will enjoy “freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from worry,” on condition that “we shan’t know what is going on” (RM 32). In short, life under the soft despotism of administrative statism, ideally conceived. Would we take the deal? We might, “in moods of defeatism, of misery, and of utter hopelessness,” such as many experienced during the Great Depression and the Second World War. But in less dire circumstances “by and large no man in his senses would prefer the existence of a contented cow, however well fed and well cared for, to the existence of a human being with at least some understanding of what is going on” (RM 33). And as a matter of fact, modern rulers usually do not make their offer explicit, shrewdly assuring that the ruled are clever, informed, wise—the very opposite of those deplorable ignoramuses over there—”while in fact depriving them of the reality of all genuine knowledge and understanding,” or at least trying to (RM 33).

    Some, following Hegel, will say that human beings don’t want to know so much as they want to be ‘recognized,’ esteemed by their fellows. In running for Congress, the young Abraham Lincoln admitted that such was his ambition. But was that what Lincoln really wanted? “Why do we seek recognition so avidly?” “Because such praise and respect from our fellows somehow serve as reassurance to ourselves that maybe we have accomplished something or amounted to something after all” (RM 35). If so, then recognition or reputation, honor, is only a proximate end; we seek a sense of “our own worth, our own real achievement and perfection” (RM 35). Following Aristotle, Veatch conducts his readers toward self-examination, toward self-knowledge, by his very argument for self-knowledge as a constituent of human perfection. To perfect something or someone, one first must know what it or he is.

    What the English would call a ‘horrible’ lurks here. “It would appear that the good life for man, as Socrates and Aristotle envisage it, would turn out to be none other than the academic life, the life of the professor!”—”the pathetic reality of present-day academic life” (and mind you, Veatch is writing in 1962, years before the inmates took over the academic asylums) (RM 36). Perish the thought, preferably by refusing to allow thought to perish, even in academic groves. “Socrates is always careful to stress that the kind of knowledge and wisdom in which human perfection consists is the knowledge of ‘Know thyself’ and the wisdom that makes for the improvement of the soul,” whereas “there is something about nearly all modern science and scholarship that seems to make it not merely impertinent, but actually antithetic to anything on the order of Socratic wisdom” (RM 37). As Veatch’s readers have already seen, the misapprehension of the distinctively human characteristic, reason, and particularly of its tool, logic, has helped to make this so.

    Here Veatch ventures a rare departure from Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle proposes two kinds of human perfection or excellence: “the practical life of man as possessing reason” that aims at discovering and at walking along the right way of life; and then, in Book X, the theoretical life, the life of the philosopher (RM 38). But although discovering the right way of life does require (finally if not initially) theoretical reasoning about what a human being is, such knowledge aims at living the right life, not merely thinking about it. “Knowledge for its own sake can never be the be-all and the end-all of human existence, nor can the chief good of man ever consist in the mere possession or even the exercise of knowledge”; it must rather consist “in its use in the practical living of our lives under the guidance of such knowledge and understanding as we possess” (RM 40-41). That is human perfection or excellence, full humanity. “The intelligent man, in this sense, is the good man or the man of character, and, vice-versa, the good man, in the sense of the man who has attained his full perfection or natural end as a human being, is the intelligent man,” who has achieved eudaimonia or happiness understood not as a ‘feeling’ but as a condition (RM 41). Happiness is “not a matter of subjective feeling on the part of the individual, but something objectively determinable,” just as the health of an individual isn’t a matter of feeling healthy (RM 42). If one feels contented by some condition that is “anything less than what as a human being he is capable of and what… he is naturally ordered and oriented toward, then we should certainly say that such a person had settled for less than he should have, or that he didn’t know what was good for him” (RM 43). We would say, as Socrates says of some interlocutors, he has a wrongly-ordered soul.

    A modern scientist might reply to Veatch by saying that disease is no less natural than health, that nature has no end or purpose, that life and death are indifferent to nature, equally part of nature. Veatch answers, as he does to logical positivists, that modern science excludes consideration of natural end a priori. The ‘method’ of modern science, dovetailing with the method of mathematical logic, excludes considerations of ‘what-ness’ and ‘who-ness.’ But such considerations are exactly what ethical thought requires. This does not make ethical thought irrational; it only makes it unscientific. I once asked an atheist, who found the notion of God unscientific and therefore rationally inadmissible, if his little daughter knew him. If so, she could not know him scientifically, having no knowledge whatever of his chemical composition, his DNA, or nearly anything other things modern scientists can measure beyond his size, shape, and (to some extent) behavior. “The possibility of explanation in scientific terms must involve the exclusion a priori of all such data as do not lend themselves to the particular procedures of scientific testing and verification” (RM 46), as the possibility of explanation in mathematical terms must involve such exclusion of all things do not lend themselves to the particular procedures of mathematical measurement and proof. But these exclusions do not preclude reasoning in other ways, ways which (as Aristotle says) fit the things being considered.

    One might reply to Veatch by remarking that all of this depends upon the nature of nature, as it were. What or who are you knowing? Is it or he (or He?) good to know? Veatch, with Aristotle, answers that human being not only has a good but is itself good ‘for itself.’ God might reply, ‘Not so fast, sinner.’ But God will then offer the grace which makes nature better than it now is. And even a mere philosopher might justify his own way of life, in reasonable terms, by explaining that he too requires self-knowledge, and in knowing himself he knows that, qua philosopher, qua lover of theoretical and not only practical wisdom, his perfection consists in attempting to know the whole of nature, including its First Cause. The philosopher’s good is not exactly the same as the good of the practical man. It comprehends, or at least seek to comprehend, more than a good life in the social and political world. The scientific and mathematical ‘universes’ are not necessarily “the only reality there is” (RM 47). But does this leave “in the utterly unsatisfactory situation philosophically of having to acknowledge that truth is not one, but many”? (RM 48).

    Whether by natural reasoning or divine revelation, knowledge of the human good requires that human beings think ‘pre-scientifically,’ pre-mathematically. In the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Everything I know of the world, even through science, I know from a point of view which is mine or through an experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless” (RM 48). “We must first re-awaken this experience of the world,” Merleau-Ponty continues, “for science is its second expression. Science does not have and never will have the same kind of being that the perceived world has, for the simple reason that science is a determination or explanation of the world” (RM 48). This latter claim could (and did, in Merleau-Ponty’s case) lead not to Aristotelianism but to a historicist apology for tyranny, to a claim that morality consists in going with the ever-changing, Heraclitean flow issuing in a universal despotism. With Aristotle, Veatch rather doubts that, and would concur instead with Leo Strauss (who equally called for a return to ‘naive’ or pre-scientific understanding as the foundation of all knowing, including scientific and mathematical knowing) in recognizing that historicism is only another ‘ism,’ philosophically interesting but mistaken, and sometimes calamitously so. Accordingly, Veatch valorizes not Stalinism or Maoism but the less grandiose task of “try[ing] to return, in some sense at least, to the things themselves,” to “a return to this world as it is before scientific knowledge,” to “the concrete world of ordinary human experience” (RM 48-49).

    What happens if we do? “Living intelligently involves seeing things as they are and seeing oneself as one is, amid all the confusions and misrepresentations due to one’s own passions and predilections and prejudices” (RM 56). In so living, one finds the passions to be double-edged—often clouding the mind but also providing a useful mental shorthand, as the pain of a bee sting causes wariness of bees, around which one exercises caution ‘without thinking,’ from then on. “Without emotions and passions, a human being would not be human, but a mere clod, lacking the dynamic quality that is requisite for the attainment of human perfection” (RM 59); if passions run too high, they overpower thought altogether. “The virtuous man is the man who knows how to utilize and control his own emotions and desires,” the one who governs himself (RM 59). Fundamentally expressions of desire or aversion, emotions imply judgments of good and bad; this is why Aristotle puts such emphasis on the definition of virtues as means between extremes, and on the particular virtue of moderation. To understand courage (for example) as the mean or the middle between rashness and cowardice implies that the courageous soul leaves itself room for making a reasoned judgment of how to conduct itself in each circumstance which arises. Moderation, which ‘hits the middle’ regarding physical desires, is the virtue needed most often, addressing the ordinary challenges of our daily lives. Virtue understood and exercised as “the mean” also enables us to avoid judging simply according to habit derived from “mere social convention” (RM 61). It enables even a non-philosophic soul to ‘ascend from the Cave’ of social opinion. And it should not go unnoticed that “the mean” isn’t quantifiable; there is no mathematical formula we can devise to get us to hit it, except with respect to bodily goods, care for which requires us first to intend to hit the mean in the first place.

    Aristotle identifies magnanimity or greatness of soul as the crown of the moral virtues. Veatch ‘democratizes’ it somewhat, calling it “self-respect” (RM 62). “The man who manages to live well will be the man who has a just estimate of himself, being neither overly complacent about his capacities and achievements, not, at the other extreme, overly lacking in a sense of his own dignity and responsibilities” (RM 62). Veatch criticizes the tendency of many Americans toward “indifference or even… disgust for the purposes and responsibilities of life,” men who preen themselves on such evasion (RM 62). In academia, this attitude results in “your man of learning secretly delight[ing] in picturing himself as a sort of composite Ernest Hemingway, Jean-Paul Sartre, and perhaps Pablo Picasso,” while in reality is “only a Sir Walter Elliot” (RM 66), that model of vanity readers meet on the first page of Jane Austen’s Persuasion.

    Ethics consists in the art of living well, but it is more than an art. Aristotle warns that in the arts an intended mistake is not so bad as an unintended one, but in ethics, which involves practical wisdom as well as art, an unintended mistake is worse. That is because in ethics you need more than know-how; “in addition, you have to do” what you know (RM 71). If you know what to do but fail to do it you “would certainly not be a good man” (RM 72), unless unfavorable circumstances prevented a good course of action. What is more, “there just can’t be any knowledge of this sort of thing without doing” (RM 72), developing a desire to do the right thing, cultivating good “habits of choice” (73), having “learned how to let his choices and preferences be determined by such knowledge and understanding as he may have, rather than to proceed simply from chance feelings and impulses of the moment or from long established but mechanical habits of response” (RM 74).

    Is the “examined life” possible? Is it the good life for human beings, or are human purposes irretrievably irrational? Yes, it is possible and good because the good life is “the natural end toward which a human being is oriented by virtue of being human,” a “fact of nature” discoverable by reasoning although not created by reasoning (RM 79). That human nature requires deliberation and choice for its fulfillment becomes obvious in considering the many examples of persons lacking in self-knowledge, unable “intellectually to see or know the truth about [themselves], as in not being willing or disposed to see this truth” (RM 83). Such persons may be no less, and even more, intelligent than we are, but what a mess they have made of their lives. This underscores Aristotle’s remark that “in a science such as ethics the end is not knowledge but action” (RM 84). Choosing to do what’s right is harder than knowing what’s right; deliberate habituation in right action—”the repeated performance of just and temperate actions”—is more moral than moralizing. Generally speaking, “in the final analysis our human failures are ultimately due not to the fact that we don’t know what we ought to do, but rather to the fact that we don’t choose to act on our knowledge” (RM 97). Virtue “is more a matter of abiding by one’s knowledge or remaining constant to it, instead of letting it be forever displaced by numberless counter-opinions and judgments that are determined by our passions and whims of the moment” (RM 102). The fact that we may not do this, that we may indeed choose inconsistently, drifting from one opinion to another, one impulse to another, one course of action to another, indicates the human capacity for freedom of judgment. “It is not because of ignorance that we fail, ultiomately, it is because we don’t choose when we could choose” (RM 108).

    As for the force of circumstances, “for most of us, most of the time, our adversities and ill fortune are not such as to leave us completely without resources” (RM 115). Rather, “the important thing is how we take our good fortune, or our ill fortune. That is what determines whether we are well off or not, not the good or ill fortune itself” (RM 116). Circumstances seldom allow us to choose the best; they often prevent us from choosing what is especially good, but they always allow us to choose the better or the worse, until incapacity or death wrest choice from us.

    Behind the flaccid relativism of thinkers like Russell and Barrett stands Nietzsche, mocking the Last Man whom they comfort with their egalitarian niaiseries and proclaiming grandly, “God is dead”—”God” meaning not only the God of the Bible, and the gods of all books deemed holy, but any “objectively grounded moral order anywhere in the universe” (RM 129). “The purpose of [Rational Man] is to suggest that in Nietzsche’s terms, God is not dead after all, that nature itself, or at least human nature, does involve a moral order, which it should be the concern of human beings to recognize and act upon” (RM 129). Less stirring thinkers than Nietzsche have also supposed that nature offers no real moral support to human beings. Utilitarians, for example, make reason instrumental to the desires. Utilitarians commit what might call the fallacy of misplaced sociality. Their concern for the greatest ‘good’ for the greatest number—good being defined as pleasure—rests on the assumption that “morals or ethics involves only their relations with others and never their relations with themselves” (RM 130). They typically ignore the question of whether pleasure is good for oneself or, if so, what pleasures are good. Further, they “have always had some difficulty in showing why anyone has any obligation to think about others” if hedonism should rule us all. John Stuart Mill argues that we take pleasure in altruism, an argument Veatch finds “dubious, to say the least” (RM 132). It might be more accurate and kinder to say that it is idiosyncratic; what Veatch has in mind, however, is that pleasure is no guarantee of self-knowledge, that one might, on hedonic grounds, take oneself to be happy if permanently deluded with drugs or some other illusion-producing device.

    Mill also argues, it should be noted, that some pleasures are better than others, that it is better to be Socrates satisfied than a pig satisfied—assuming of course that one is a man, not a pig. But it also should be noted that in this claim he begins to move a bit closer to Aristotle, and away from Jeremy Bentham. The twentieth-century philosopher and contemporary of Russell G. E. Moore condemns Aristotle for committing what he calls the “naturalistic fallacy.”

    Moore wonders why “a natural tendency” should “necessarily be a tendency toward the good” (RM 137). As Paul the Apostle observed long before him, Moore that some men aim at evil, adding that some aim at things morally indifferent. He concurs with Hume: One cannot logically derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ “Aristotle’s definition of the good is held to be mistaken, not because it does not fit the facts, but because it violates the logical canons of good definition: it attempts to define something not in terms of what it is”—a thing—”but in terms of what it is not”—a value (RM 139). That is, to define a fact as a value is to fail to define it at all, to fail to construct a proper definition in the first place. Veatch rejoins that this refutation ranges too widely. “On the same principles just about any definition of anything must also commit a fallacy,” since if you define A as A you’ve produced a tautology, but if you define A as B or C then you’re defining it “in terms of what is other than A, and this violates the principle that everything is what it is and not another thing” (RM 140). “This is far more than Moore himself ever bargained for” (RM 140), limiting the definition of ‘fish,’ for example, to ‘fish.’ If Moore means simply that it is contradictory to say ‘A is not-A,’ or ‘a fish is a not-fish,’ then the question remains, is a so-called ‘value’ a not-is?

    The fact/value distinction, progeny of Hume’s is/ought distinction, depends upon “an excessively static and atomistic conception of facts” (RM 145). But is there (in fact, one is tempted to say) “any fact at all that does not suggest all sorts of possibilities of how it might become other and different?” (RM 145). On the contrary, “the whole of reality is shot through with the distinction between potentiality and actuality, between what is still only able to be and what actually is,” between the imperfect and the perfect, the incomplete and the complete, the empty to the full” (RM 145). When Aristotle says ‘the good’ he means “the actual as related to the potential” (RM 145). A mangled hand cannot fully serve the purpose of a hand; a mangled soul cannot fully serve the purpose of a soul. The fact that mangled souls aim at evil or at least defective ends illustrates the point. It is only if he remain within the limits of quantitative logic and/or nonteleological modern science that we must deny that this is so. But the denial may be the product of the limitations of our way of thinking, which restricts rational thought too much.

    The existentialism of William Barrett, Jean-Paul Sartre, and other Nietzsche epigoni attacks not only Aristotelian ethics but any rationalist ethics. According to existentialists, “reason cannot tell man anything about how to live or what to live for” not because reason cannot be used for such a purpose but because there is no “ethical truth” to be discovered in the first place (RM 150). Faced with a universe devoid of meaning, human beings can only give meaning to their otherwise meaningless lives by freely choosing the way of life they happen to prefer. This argument replicates the is/ought distinction in its own way, holding up “disinterested, impersonal objectivity on the one hand and a committed subjectivity on the other” (RM 155). Veatch rejoins, choice alone can’t make the choice right. “The issue is whether one can ever choose rightly without knowledge” (RM 155). To deploy the term ‘commitment,’ as such thinkers do, sounds impressive, but why should Sartre prefer his commitment to communism over Hitler’s commitment to fascism? Merely because it is his commitment? This would elevate love of one’s own to unsuspected moral heights. Is ‘my own’ worth of a human being, given the nature of human beings? Is it worthy of my own potential? How, on the basis of existentialism, can I know?

    Sartre satirizes what Aristotle esteems as the spoudaios, the serious man. Such a man “tries to hide from himself that it is human freedom which decides on moral values,” that “if man is not the creator of being, he is at least the inventor of moral values”; such a man “takes refuge in the spirit of seriousness” in an attempt “to evade moral responsibility” (RM 155), which requires us not to follow our true nature or to obey divine law but to invent values ‘against’ an indifferent, amoral nature and to admit that divine law is human, all-too-human. But if there is no God—in the broad sense of no personal god or gods and no nature with moral content—then to act as if there were is nothing more than what Sartre calls “bad faith.” Veatch rejoins, to claim that God is dead is to claim “a certain understanding, a knowledge of what the score is” (RM 157). This must be “a morally relevant knowledge, a knowledge that indicates what we should do and what our responsibilities are in light of the facts” (RM 157). “Must not the very dialectic of their own position catch the existentialists up into the logic of ‘Know thyself’ and of the examined life, and ultimately into the ethics of rational man?” (RM 157) And to do that is at least tacitly to acknowledge one’s humanness, one’s givenness, one’s nature, to try to understand what it is, rather than escaping into imagining oneself as a Nietzschean superman, beyond good and evil, or into imagining a socialist utopia as a real future regime.

    “While in their capacity as scientists,” Veatch concludes, “men can attain a knowledge of nature that is literally limitless in its own dimension, yet in respects to other dimensions such a scientific knowledge of nature is both narrowly defined and rigorously restricted, not merely in fact, but in principle” (RM 158). Much the same is true for quantitative logic. Meanwhile, however, “men merely as human beings,” not as scientists or mathematicians, “can, by exercising their intelligence, achieve a kind of commonsense understanding of their own nature and of the nature of the world they live in which is different from scientific knowledge, and for which scientific knowledge is no substitute” (RM 158).

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Liberalism and Statism in America

    October 1, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.: The Decline of American Liberalism. New York: Atheneum, 1969 [1955].

     

    By ‘liberalism,’ Ekirch means not progressivism—which defines individual liberty as the right to thoughts and actions deemed legal within, and by, a substantial administrative state—but as an attempt “to limit the authority of both church and state, and to protect certain fundamental individual rights from interference by governing power.” These rights include individual and political rights to self-government: for the individual, freedom of conscience and property; for a nation, independence or self-determination. Liberalism does not mean democracy, inasmuch as majority rule might repress these rights, nor does it mean “philosophical anarchism,” as a liberal might well advocate republicanism or representative government. Liberalism endorsed “the idea of a universe governed by natural laws” and the corollary “faith in human reason and in the ability of the educated individual to understand the laws of nature and guide himself accordingly.” This inclines liberals to accept ‘religion within the limits of reason,’ that is, religious conduct that does not impinge the natural duties and rights of the believer or of anyone else. The original liberals  limited the powers of the state, inasmuch as “arbitrary state regulations not only interfered with the operation of natural laws, but also curbed the natural rights of the individual,” as established by natural laws. “Political economy was a science devoted to the discovery and better understanding of natural laws” as they pertain to the natural human inclination to truck and to barter. “The state was limited in its scope of operations to the preservation and protection of the natural rights of its citizens,” as the Declaration of Independence does indeed declare. Liberals intend all of this to advance “the perfectibility of mankind,” not in any grand, utopian sense but in the sense of giving human beings the best practicable chance to realize their natures, as individuals and as political societies.

    Ekirch won his most enduring support among libertarians or, as they came to call themselves, “classical liberals.” As a conscientious objector during World War II who worked as a self-described “political prisoner” in government-assigned civilian occupations for the duration of that conflict, he turned to the study of intellectual history in an attempt better to understand how such things could have happened with the enthusiastic support not only of government officials but of the American people. He received his doctoral degree in history (studying under Merle Conti), and published The Decline of American Liberalism in the aftermath not only of the war but of the Army-McCarthy hearings in the United States Senate, an investigation in which one formidable part of America’s central-state apparatus faced off against an elected representative deploying methods that did little to advance the cause of civil liberties. In a preface to the book’s second edition, published fifteen years later, Ekirch insists that “individual freedom continues to be threatened by the forces of nationalism and war—and the resultant concentration of ever greater powers in the institutions of the modern stat and its corporate adjuncts.” The newer, ‘progressive’ liberalism “becomes more and more identified with the mass or the group and with the rights and privileges associated with large-scale organizations and their aggregation of private or public power.” Progressives argue that “if certain traditional individual rights are lost in the process, compensation… will come in the form of new privileges offered by the modern welfare state.” Perhaps so, Ekirch concedes, but “what the government grants it can also withdraw.” Hence “what were considered natural rights at the time of the Declaration of Independence proceeds apace.” And “something of real value has been lost” in a political order in which wiretapping, government secrecy, and travel restrictions have become routine. It is true that there has been one substantial victory for liberty since 1955: civil rights for African-Americans. But even these are limited, since American blacks remain subject to the same legal obligations as whites, such as conscription.

    Under such conditions, “I do not think many of the traditional freedoms will remain in any effective sense. Instead of fundamental liberties we will have privileges granted or taken away as the occasion permits.” This will be the culmination of a “gradual and cumulative” erosion of American liberties, an erosion made possible by a sort of deception: “What frequently passes for liberalism today is too often an opportunistic philosophy which, by its extreme relativist definition of terms, effectively conceals the disintegration of the liberal tradition.” Progressives have used a philosophic doctrine, historical relativism, to undermine a natural-rights doctrine, liberalism. And as a historian, Ekirch seeks to expose the ‘use and abuse of history’ for that erosive purpose.

    Ekirch thus earns credit as one of the earliest scholars to identify the historicist, specifically Hegelian, source of liberal anti-liberalism. In the nineteenth century, he observes, economic nationalism and imperialism amounted to the thin end of the wedge that pried loose the forces of “the totalitarian nationalisms” (and internationalisms?) “of the twentieth century.” “Plans for state education and social security were advanced side by side with the conscription of individuals for military service,” especially in Bismarck’s Prussia but also in England. “During these years certain English intellectuals became admirers of Bismarck’s state socialism, while Hegel, according to the French historian Halévy, had more avowed followers in Britain than in Germany.” Limited government under the rule of law seemed much too slow and inefficient to ardent reformers, who “were prepared to welcome a coming era of strong executive administration.” By 1900, English liberals were caught between “two extremes”: ‘Left’ demands for social legislation and economic reforms; ‘Right’ demands for protective tariffs to finance a bigger navy, defending the empire for formidable rivals—very much including Wilhelmine Germany, successfully united by Bismarck and the first Wilhelm and now ruled by Wilhelm’s unruly son in association with military aristocrats. Under Liberal Party leader Lloyd George, “Liberals gave up their individualism and instead turned to new taxes”; the First World War would “wreck the Liberal party and fatally undermine English liberalism.” This would serve not as a warning to Americans but as a model. By the 1912 election, the forlorn sitting president, William Howard Taft, would come in a distant third to progressives Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt.

    America had been settled by men and women “fleeing absolutism.” Such persons were welcome to go, as far as the European regimes of absolute monarchy were concerned. Except for slaves and indentured servant, American colonists were substantially free if not civilly and socially equal; even slaves and servants were intended for liberty, subjects of “educating and Christianizing” preparation “for eventual freedom.” Whether Deists or evangelical Christians, Americans affirmed “the importance of the individual in religion and his emancipation from older and more conservative”—read ‘hierarchical’ or ‘authoritarian’—”forms of worship.”

    In philosophy, Americans turned away from Calvinist determinism and toward John Locke’s view (as Ekirch not-so-accurately depicts it) of a “plastic theory of human nature” whereby “man’s nature was subject to change and that reform could be achieved through an improvement of the environment.” This confuses Locke theory of the human mind as a tabula rasa with his much less “plastic” account of human passions, which Locke considered both innate and selfish. It would be better to say that Locke comes down somewhere between Calvin and Rousseau. But he does indeed reject the assumption that subjects must never rise up to make citizens out of themselves, forthrightly asserting a right to revolution unseen in his liberal philosophic predecessor, Thomas Hobbes.

    “The American Revolution was an event of transcendent importance in the history of the liberal tradition,” asserting self-government on the basis of the natural rights of individuals. “Better than any other single document, the Declaration of Independence stated the liberal political philosophy on which the ideology of the Revolution was based,” and did so in the “mild and dignified” language of Thomas Jefferson’s syllogism, which “argued the cause of revolution in a rational and restrained manner.” Showing that the imperial state and monarchic regime of Great Britain waged war against them, not the other way around, the revolutionaries did not so much as call Americans to arms (as the French would do, later) but “appealed to world opinion to recognize the justice and merits of the American position.” This resulted in a commercial republic governed initially and only in part by General Washington, not a military republic followed by a military despotism ruled by General Bonaparte.

    Ekirch imagines that most of the Founders “probably thought in terms of freedom and equality only for those already free or of freedom for political man as he existed in the eighteenth century.” In this dubious assumption he anticipates the ‘Left’ criticisms of the Declaration and the Constitution familiar today. But unlike these latter-day polemicists, he observes that “the question… was at least left open,” and even if (for example) “only a quarter of the adult male population was able to vote,” this “moderate concession to popular rule was regarded as a real advance toward democracy,” given the political conditions prevailing everywhere else in the world at that time. Even during the Revolutionary War itself, “many Americans, despite the state of hostilities, were able to carry on their normal peacetime interests and pursuits.”

    It should be added that many were not: Loyalists eventually were driven out and their property confiscated—an omission that tells on Ekirch’s argument very quickly. He calls the Constitution produced by the 1789 Constitution convention the product of “conservative reaction.” But of course the real ‘conservatives’ had been driven out; the politics of throne and altar, even in its mild, unwritten-constitution British form, no longer had any real partisans in America. What Ekirch calls “the shift in thought in the period between the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution” could not have been a fundamental shift, as there was no one among the Framers who denied the natural right to liberty. To appropriate the formulation of an early American progressive, it wasn’t that progressives wanted to use Hamiltonian means for Jeffersonian ends (in fact, as Ekirch rightly observed, progressive ends weren’t Jeffersonian at all, and their means weren’t simply Hamiltonian). Rather, Hamilton wanted to use Hamiltonian means for Jeffersonian ends, that is, to use government to secure natural rights, rights he never failed to endorse in The Federalist and on every other relevant occasion. A stronger federal government, the national bank, the protective tariff, and internal improvements were all so intended. The quarrel with Jefferson and his followers centered on whether such means advanced or instead threatened the agreed-upon end.

    As Ekirch remarks, following Henry Adams, by the beginning of the next century “the defeated Federalists… had the grim satisfaction of seeing their Jeffersonian opponents embrace many of the same consolidating principles”—more accurately, means—”that they had earlier bitterly denied.” Jefferson’s “liberalism and radicalism fell mainly within the periods when he was not holding an administrative public office.” Just so, and rightly so, one might comment, as the president “came to grips with the heart of the liberal’s dilemma,” namely, “there was danger that any government entrusted with authority would degenerate into one of force and tyranny,” and yet governmental authority must have recourse to force, if not tyranny, if it is to govern those persons, foreign and domestic, that seek to ruin it and the liberalism animating it. This is tantamount to admitting what should be obvious: liberalism needs a political regime to instantiate its philosophic and religious principles. Loyalists, ‘Tories,’ monarchists, eventually fascists and communists likely will not go quietly; their liberties, even at times their lives, may well be violated by the elected representatives of the people in a liberal regime in defense of the lives and liberties of the citizens of that regime. Ekirch wants to warn that in such efforts of self-defense, liberals may encroach upon their own liberal principles by altering their liberal practices, and so they may. But that is not to say that the Founding-era liberals, whether Federalist or Anti-Federalist, later Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian, truly ‘anticipated’ or paved the way for the administrative state. They made such a state possible only in the sense that they did in fact preserve a state in America, the federal union that served as part of the centerpiece of American political controversy, along with slavery and the increasingly anti-republican, oligarchic regimes of the Southern states, from Washington to Lincoln.

    And so, for example, Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase was indeed an extra-Constitutional move but, as Jefferson wrote at the time, control of the Mississippi River was geopolitically and economically indispensable to the safety and prosperity of Americans. Such vagaries were not merely “related to the fatal dilemma posed by the long drawn-out war in Europe,” but a recognition that what Jefferson called the Empire of Liberty was indeed imperial, that is, a form of rule exercised over a territory that ought to be configured in such a way as to secure the natural rights of the citizens of the American regime. The question in such circumstances will always be a matter of prudential not theoretical reasoning, of means to an end. Citizens will need to remain vigilant in those circumstances, but it is when the end changes that they may need to reach for their muskets.

    One of Ekirch’s merits is that he does see this, intermittently. “In contrast to a policy of economic nationalism which [Jeffersonian] Republicans had proposed after the War of 1812, the Jacksonians revived in realistic and practical fashion much of the old Jeffersonian individualist philosophy.” Less “optimistic than the Jeffersonian apostles of the Enlightenment had been about the nature of man and the possibility of his achieving Utopia,” the Jacksonians accepted industrialism and forged an alliance between urban workers and farmers—”a program for the lower middle class, or the plain people” which guarded their rights, including their liberty to be capitalists. Jacksonians frowned on internal improvements sponsored by the federal government, but they didn’t try to stop the states from undertaking them, and they did. “Economic liberalism of an agrarian, laissez-faire nature was as much a part of the states’ policies as it was of the national government’s from the 1830s until the Civil War,” always with the vicious exceptions of mistreatment of slaves and Indians. In fact, Ekirch underestimates the Jackson Administration’s Indian policy, taking the now-exploded view that the president intended the removal of the Five Civilized Tribes from Georgia as an attack on their rights rather than as a (botched, catastrophic) attempt to protect them from the Georgians. Ekirch returns to firmer ground in observing that western expansion, including the Mexican War, amounted to a sort of “agricultural imperialism” that “linked democracy to expansionism” (as later seen in Senator Stephen Douglas’s unbridled version of popular sovereignty) that made the Civil War “possible.” What it really did was to make the Civil War even more likely, although a regime-based analysis of the Southern states would indicate that such a war was quite possible with or without expansion, since the Northern republicanism and Southern oligarchy didn’t really ‘mix.’

    Slavery was “the greatest single factor in the decline of nineteenth-century American liberalism.” Ekirch gives the standard economics-based account of Southerners’ newly ardent defense of slavery—the industrial revolution in general, the cotton gin in particular—but also gives prominence to decline in “the older faith of the Enlightenment in the natural rights of man,” bringing on attacks on “the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence with its assertion of the equality and natural rights of man.” Even in the North, segregation of the races increased, and the proposal to emancipate and resettle blacks in Africa replaced the earlier intention to educate and Christianize them. Nat Turner’s armed revolt in Virginia spurred anxieties; as Southern prejudices hardened, the small but vocal Abolitionist movement contributed to the climate of polarization which led to civil war. Although Ekirch cites Calhoun and James Fitzhugh as critics of the Founders’ principles, he makes no attempt to link their opinions to the historicist doctrines he cited previously.

    The “incompatibility of war and liberalism becomes even more true in the case of a vast internal conflict such as the American Civil War.” He cites President Lincoln’s assumption of such extraconstitutional powers as troop call-ups and suspension of habeas corpus without Congressional approval, and conscription (initiated by the Confederacy, but enacted by Lincoln soon afterward). He also objects to the expansion of military training, which continued after the war, along with the pensions granted to Union military veterans, whose lobbying organization, the Grand Army of the Potomac, also enabled “a host of ambitious Republican politicians” who “would be able to refight the Civil War in their election campaigns.” The need to pay for these postwar programs caused Republicans to turn the Whig Party’s policy of higher tariffs. “The downfall of the lost cause was not the real tragedy of the Civil War, for the South in its perfervid defense of slavery had long since ceased to be the champion of liberalism. The essential tragedy of the Civil War was rather the failure of free society in the North to follow up the liberal ends implied by its wartime goals of the preservation of the Union and the abolition of slavery” by inculcating a “new nationalism, involving a frank repudiation of a former American liberalism.” By this, Ekirch means first of all the failure and corruption of Reconstruction, which “encourage[ed] the freedman to believe that he was a privileged ward of the Federal government.” Second, Reconstruction gave full civil rights to freedmen immediately, before the needed period of civic education; Republicans wanted black votes in order “to stay in power” in the South. This, coupled with eventually successful Southern resistance to Reconstruction, set liberalism back.

    Once again, however, Ekirch misses the regime issue, writing that “it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the rights of all individuals and groups were regarded as inferior to the overriding demands of a victorious nationalism and statism.” What if Republicans needed to stay in power precisely because they —were republicans, politicians who intended to prevent the antebellum oligarchies of the Southern states from reconstituting themselves? While claiming that “the remnants of the older natural rights and state rights philosophies of government were now replaced by the new teachings of nationalism,” he fails to cite any examples of this, and, as Forrest Nabors has shown, the Radical Republicans consistently explained their policies in terms of natural rights and republican regime change, not nationalism. [1] If “the Reconstruction policy of the North, based on force and military occupation of the former Confederacy, was the opposite of liberal,” then why was the Revolutionary War not the opposite of liberal? Liberalism without a regime is only a theory, and a regime that will not enforce its principles will not survive.

    Nor is there much evidence that Republicans assumed that the United States Constitution was “a permanent contract”; Lincoln and others instead maintained that popular sovereignty was limited by natural rights and constitutional consent, the latter rejecting secession only as unconstitutional if the other parties to the contract did not consent. In the sentence immediately following his assertion that Unionists understood sovereignty to reside “in the people as a whole and not in the states or in the people of the separate states,” he claims that “northern writers on politics now located sovereignty in the Federal government.” But sovereignty can’t rest in the people and the government at the same time. It must be one or the other. He is right to remark the way in which such writers as Elisha Mulford replaced “John Locke and other philosophers of the natural rights and compact theories of government” with “Hegel and the German idealists, whose philosophy glorified the role of the state,” “following Hegel in giving the state the human characteristics of personality and conscience,” but Mulford was an academic, not a Radical Republican in the Reconstruction-era Congress.

    Ekirch notes the tendency of the renewed Southern oligarchy, led by the “Redeemers,” as they were called, to brandish state rights with one hand while holding out the other for protective tariffs and internal improvements, a habit which would persist into the 1930s Tennessee Valley Authority projects and beyond. In the North, civil service reformers urged the replacement of party-selected bureaucrats with professionals: “Generally overlooked, however, in the American enthusiasm for civil service reform, were those few individuals [E. L. Godkin among them] who complained that a class of Federal officeholders, guaranteed permanent tenure, might become an insolent aristocracy comparable to the bureaucracies of the Old World.” In addition, the Homestead Act, intended to help small farmers settle the West, was mis-crafted, enabling speculators to purchase large tracts for development by large railroad corporations and forcing “authentic homesteaders” further west. With the exception of Henry George, whose agrarianism recalled Jeffersonian individualism and agrarianism, “doctrines of laissez-faire and of the limited state were being twisted and distorted from their original meaning,” toward the defense of corporations re-defined as ‘persons,’ even as the nation-state increasingly was re-defined. The Supreme Court now extended the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporate ‘persons,’ and such Congressional enactments as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Antitrust Act of 1890 (which “actually encouraged monopoly in the new form of the holding company”) extended governmental centralization, establishing nonpartisan regulatory bodies “with quasi-judicial authority”—effectively the beginnings of a new branch of government. Indeed, the political struggles of subsequent decades featured corporate ‘persons’ against the ‘person’ of the national state, with real persons, individuals with natural rights, left behind as spectators, diminished as citizens.

    “The abandonment of liberalism was to be made explicit in the 1900s, when the reformers adopted the name Progressives and accepted much more than the liberals or Populists a frank nationalism and centralization under the aegis of the Federal government.” Although usually animated by an intention to curb corporate abuses, Progressives established federal bureaucracies that the corporate oligarchs often captured. As corporation attorney Richard Olney shrewdly argued, respecting the Interstate Commerce Commission, “the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things.” Therefore, “the part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.” Progressivism, Ekirch remarks, drily, was “not primarily a liberal movement,” but “was based on a new philosophy, partly borrowed from Europe, which emphasized collective action through the instrumentality of government”; in Wisconsin, where “German influences were powerful,” the famous reforms of Robert La Follette rested squarely on his “great admiration for the social legislation of the German states.” For his part, University of Wisconsin president Charles R. Van Hise maintained that “The United States cannot successfully compete in the world’s markets without large industrial units,” which therefore deserved federal-government protection along with regulation—an arrangement corporate executives found not entirely uncongenial. “American reformers and scholars” had turned “to Bismarck’s Germany and to the Fabian Socialists in England as models for their political and economic theories.” Reformers even redefined the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer (itself ontologically identical, if economically opposite, to Progressivism) as a call not for competition but cooperation and social control: “governments and reform agencies, the progressives believed, could help reshape the environment to meet the needs of individuals or of the species. Darwinian evolution, expressed in social terms, became reformism”—a democratized, materialist Hegelianism sometimes calling itself ‘pragmatism,’ as in the writings of John Dewey. [2]

    Ekirch depicts the nationalist side of Progressivism less convincingly, amalgamating the military preparedness doctrine of Theodore Roosevelt with the imperialism of Senator Albert J. Beveridge—”big navy and dollar diplomacy” men. That they were, but Beveridge was a real imperialist who advocated the military conquest and colonial rule of Latin America, whereas Roosevelt wanted no part of real imperialism, preferring to extend the American defensive perimeter by establishing naval bases located at geopolitical chokepoints around the world, typically with the consent of the local government (although admittedly defining ‘consent’ rather loosely, in some cases). Ekirch also badly misreads the Progressive internationalism of Woodrow Wilson—quite distinct from either the Beveridge or the Roosevelt policies—as nationalistic, adding erroneously that Wilson only began to “embrace the nationalistic and progressive currents of his time” when he left academia for politics; as a matter of fact, Wilson made his academic reputation with his article “The Administrative State,” while still a professor at the Johns Hopkins University, and whatever nationalist sentiments he may have harbored were powerfully qualified by his advocacy of a Kantian League to Enforce Peace among nations, with its obvious diminution of national sovereignty. Predictably, Ekirch deplores Wilson’s decision to lead America into the First World War (conscription, war-spirit fed by propaganda, curbs on free speech and press) on the grounds “that a German victory posed a greater threat to American democracy than the illiberalism and militarism that he expected would accompany American belligerency.” But he does not show that Wilson was mistaken. Also predictably, he dismisses the postwar moves against Communism as an overblown attempt at “stamping out so-called radical activities.” Overblown that attempt may have been, but “so-called”? Surely regime of tyranny at the alleged service of economic and social equality must strike Americans, even Progressives as well as liberals, as a tad on the extreme side? That kind of regime was, after all, what the “activities” of the American Communist Party aimed at. “Although much of the radical movement was liberal in neither its methods nor its goals, the toleration of dissenting minorities and the free expression of dissenting opinion had always been cardinal liberal tenets.” True, but not unqualifiedly so—as American Loyalists and Confederates had learned, much more harshly, when they ran afoul of the American regime.

    The same problem arises in Ekirch’s critique of the National Origins Act of 1924, which he finds illiberal on the grounds of racism and economic protectionism; under the Act, most legal immigrants came from Northern and Western Europe, and nearly half from Great Britain. And he is a hundred times right to despise the likes of Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, contemporary writers who wrung their hands over “the rising tide of color against white world supremacy,” as Lothrop graphically called it in his principal tome. However awkward it may be to say so, however, any regime, even a liberal regime, is still a regime, with a way of life to maintain. British immigrants in the 1920s may well have been admitted rightly, even if for the wrong reason; their ‘racial’ or ethnic identity should have been irrelevant (though I have no doubt that it was relevant to the legislators of the day) but their way of life was indeed more amenable to that of, for example, my own maternal grandparents, who had arrived from Galicia at the turn of the century. Their children readily adapted to the American way of life, in large measure because those running the public school system set out to ‘Americanize’ first- and second-generation students. But it is understandable to think that such a system could have been overwhelmed by a very large number of students who didn’t speak English at home and whose parents had grown up under such despotic regimes as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had ruled Galicia in the years before the First World War. To say so is not to endorse the resurgence of the inane if dangerous Ku Klux Klan, a well-known excrescence of the 1920s.

    Ekirch justly recurs to the writings of V. L. Parrington to summarize the political problem of the 1920s, looking ahead to the next decade and the Franklin Roosevelt Administration. In a letter to a friend written just before he died in 1929, Parrington lamented, “We must have a political state powerful enough to deal with corporate wealth, but how are we going to keep that state with its augmenting power from being captured by the force we want it to control?” Just so, and Ekirch adds that in his 1932 campaign speech at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco Democratic Party candidate Franklin Roosevelt betrayed no such qualms, more or less openly calling for a new regime to replace the old republic. Such counter-attacks as Herbert Hoover’s The Challenge to Liberty and Walter Lippmann’s Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society had little practical effect on a people stunned first by economic depression and then by another world war. Even FDR himself considered changing course, toward “a program of encouraging competition and enforcing the antitrust laws,” but the war (and perhaps an already entrenched bureaucracy) put a stop to that. In the run-up to the war, conscription and restrictions free speech returned. Indeed, “After 1914… the swift succession of two world wars, interspaced with the depression of the thirties, put a strain on liberalism that the new crises of cold war and Korean struggle did nothing to alleviate.” Ekirch goes so far as to write, “The new totalitarian liberals argued that [the old liberalism] had become outmoded,” that what the polemicist Max Lerner called “democratic collectivism” had, and should, prevail. A “permanent war economy” emerged, with the Cold War against the Soviet Union, along with peacetime conscription and a substantial national security apparatus. Government and private corporations interlocked more and more; if postwar prosperity blunted criticisms of the new regime, Ekirch (following such economists as Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises) observes that American prosperity might have been even greater if less public-private collaboration had occurred.

    Ekirch goes too far in endorsing C. Wright Mills, who claimed (in Ekirch’s words) that “labor could be forced to cooperate with the conservatives’ views” on an anti-Soviet foreign policy, “in order to prove its innocence of communist connections.” As a matter of fact, the AFL-CIO was well aware that no free trade unions were allowed to exist under the Soviet tyranny (and later oligarchy). Its leaders had seen what had happened to social democrats under Communist rule, and they had every reason to prevent that from happening in the United States. To argue that President Truman’s failed attempt to keep nuclear-weapons technology away from the Soviets “quite naturally intensified Soviet fears of American power” by signaling U. S. “distrust of Russia” somehow does not quite capture the not-so-innocent character of Josef Stalin. With similar overenthusiasm for his libertarianism, Ekirch goes along with Senator Paul H. Douglas’s claim that “if it were not for war the government colossus could be trimmed to almost pygmy stature.” But of course domestic social programs were already substantial in the 1950s, and President Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ programs pushed such expenditures to well over fifty percent of the federal government’s total outlays in the next decade.

    Writing in the aftermath of the McCarthy hearings, Ekirch criticizes its excesses. American Communists’ “essential loyalty to the United States was certainly open to question,” he wisely concedes. But “the dilemma” facing Americans “was how to handle the communist problem without destroying fundamental American liberties,” a dilemma they addressed poorly because “the actual number of Communists in the United States after World War II was small”—”somewhat over fifty thousand persons” in a nation of millions. Therefore, he concludes, “communism represented no threat to the American way of life that could not be met in the free market place of ideas.” True, “there were undoubtedly among American Communists some who stood ready to work in conjunction with Soviet agents to do damage to the United States,” but “this damage would be of a criminal sort that could be detected by the American police and intelligence systems and prosecuted under the laws forbidding such conduct.” Concede all that, and the argument still doesn’t quite work. Well-placed Communist operatives could readily influence American policy, without breaking any criminal laws whatsoever. One sees this even in the slippage noticeable in this sentence: “The danger rather lay [not in ‘McCarthyism’ but] in the assumption that there was a minority class or group of political lepers guilty of so-called wrong thinking.” But to accuse adherents of Communism merely of wrong thinking “so-called” wasn’t to “censorship of ideas”; it was censure of those ideas. Ekirch backtracks: “the whole problem of disloyalty among government employees would have been far better handled by an extension of the practice of allowing supervisors to dismiss, without prejudice and without record, those individuals whose conduct, or even whose views, they had reason to suspect.” Very well, then, one must concede, as he does, that “if liberalism is to remain viable… liberals had to face the unpleasant fact that liberty and security were not always compatible, either for the individual or for society.”

    On a wider level, Ekirch objects to the “growing nationalization and centralization of all values” seen during the early 1950s. In public education, for example, “there had not been any direct control exercised by the Federal government” before then. “But in the battle for men’s minds, which was one of the more important features of modern integral nationalism, the educational system was a natural object of increasing official attention and interference”; under anti-Communist pressures initially, but under other pressures subsequently, “the school and the college became the adjunct of the nation,” and this was especially true of higher education, as universities and research professors succumbed to the temptation of chasing federal grant monies.  Although the teacher loyalty oaths required by some thirty states eventually disappeared, the grants didn’t, and what could be used by anti-Communists to promote ‘Americanism’ in one generation could be used to promote other leftist ’causes’ in the following generations, once illiberal or (in Ehrlich’s terms) progressive convictions took hold among federal ‘educrats’ and their university-based sympathizers and (in many cases) teachers.

    Ekirch views matters with a refreshing refusal to entertain any serious hope for reversing illiberal trends, ending his book with an invocation of “the subversion of the ideals of the Republic of Rome in the new concepts of the Empire,” which, as we all know, ended badly. He will only say that such “decline need not blot out the great achievements already recorded.” “Liberals will at least be able to look back with some satisfaction into the distant past, while they do their best to challenge the fate held out by an increasingly illiberal future.”

    What have we here, then? A cri de coeur from a Left-libertarian (Quaker-influenced?) soul, undoubtedly. But also a pioneering work of scholarship. Although American writers (such as Emerson), politicians (such as Wilson), philosophers (Dewey most prominently) and social scientists (again, Wilson, and a legion of others) never concealed their indebtedness to German philosophy, and especially to doctrines deriving the ideas of moral and political right from history, not God or nature, several generations of scholars obscured that fact, maybe because they wanted to appropriate the term ‘liberalism’ for historicist/’progressive’ purposes and (in later generations) to obscure the intellectual origins of their historicism from a nation which had fought two world wars against Germans and a ‘Cold War’ against a regime animated by one version of that historicism. By the mid-1970s, such scholars as Paul Eidelberg and John Marini had picked up the trail, but Ekirch had got on it nearly twenty years earlier. And for all the criticisms one might raise concerning his assessment of such genuine natural-rights thinkers as Hamilton and Lincoln, some dubious ‘policy’ judgments on banks, immigration, and war (among others), and above all his lack of clarity about the exigencies of establishing not simply liberalism as a doctrine but a regime animated by liberalism as he defines it, both his recovery of American intellectual and political history from historicist distortions and the heft that work gives to his Tocqueville-like warnings against despotism ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ deserve recognition and appreciation, more than half a century after he wrote.

     

    Notes

    1. See Forrest Nabors: From Oligarchy to Republicanism: The Great Task of Reconstruction. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2017.
    2.  Ekirch writes that Dewey rejected “the absolutist philosophy of Hegel and the German idealists, imposed upon him while he was a graduate student” and adapted by German nationalists prior to World War I. He had turned to pragmatism, and viewed “the war as a conflict of ideas in which the German mind was quite incompatible with the American mind.” Aside from the fact that President Wilson had by no means abandoned the historicist idealism imposed upon him while he was a graduate student, it must be said that Dewey never abandoned historicism—only idealism. To his credit, he didn’t turn to Marxian historicism, which produced worse tyrannies than the absolutism of the Kaiser, preferring a more modest historicism founded on social experimentation with no ‘end of history’ assumed. But the laws of nature and of nature’s God, as the Founders understood them, and which Ekirch defends, are not invited to the pragmatist party.

     

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    Filed Under: American Politics

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