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    Archives for October 2019

    Planning an American Islamic Republic

    October 29, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Shamim A. Siddiqi: Methodology of Dawah in American Perspective. Brooklyn: The Forum for Islamic Work, 1989.

    Mohamed Akram al-Adouni: “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America.” April 1991.

     

    The late Shamim A. Siddiqi (1928-2018) served for many years as the moving spirit of the Islamic Circle of North America—a New-York-City-area organization not to be confused with the Islamic Society of North America, which was founded by the Muslim Brotherhood and controls the Islamic Learning Foundation. A Muslim born in what is now India, he fled to Pakistan with his family after the Partition in 1947. He admired and met with the most prominent Pak Islamist, Mawlanda Mawdudi, eventually carrying the Islamist message to the United States, where he lived for most of his life.

    He states the core of that message, its purpose, in the opening sentence: “The book in hand is an effort towards the achievement of our cherished goal, i.e., how to make Allah’s Deen dominant on this earth.” Such dominance will lead to the Falah or deliverance “of the entire mankind” [sic], and the “methodology” outlined will cause the call [dawah] to all the peoples of North America to join the Islamic ummah or body of believers to be “properly projected and penetrated deep into the society.” Those peoples, but especially the people of the United States, “are in need of a superb ideology to counteract the menace of their social evils, economic upheavals, racial/color discrimination, political corruption and socialist/communist hegemonies on a global level.” Once converted, Western peoples generally will rise to the top of the worldwide Islamic movement, given their technological superiority to the rest of the world. The task is to show “how to make the message of Islam acceptable to the West,” thereby freeing “the Muslim world” from Western interference and intervention, “pav[ing] the way for the emergence of a global Islamic order.” He assures his readers that “it is Allah who guided my thoughts, my thinking process and its development in its entirety. Nothing in this book is mine. Everything is from Allah.”

    With all Muslims, Siddiqi holds up the Qu’ran as God’s “last and final Guidance” for a humanity that is otherwise “weak, ineffective and in a pitiful state,” with each individual “fearful of his own species” and nations “skeptical of each other.” He finds one hopeful sign in Afghanistan, where, as of 1989, the Taliban sought to establish “an ideal Islamic state, to serve as a model for the rest of mankind.” In a post-9/11 “Updating Note,” he praises the Taliban for having “tactfully disarmed the people” of the country and “establish[ing] the rule of Sharia within their domain.” The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by “the anti-Islam Western hegemony” and its regional allies under the pretext of counteracting Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. The “very tragic drama of September 11 was staged”; it was blamed on Bin Laden and the Taliban “without the least ascertaining the facts and looking elsewhere who were and are the greatest beneficiaries of this tragedy”—whom Siddiqi carefully leaves unnamed. Any attempted regime change in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the defeat of the Taliban will fail because “Stooges cannot fill the gap.”

    Be all of this as it may, Siddiqi returns to the project at hand—changing the regime of the United States and giving it “an alternative way of life.” This “is the responsibility of Muslims who fortunately migrated to Western countries after the Second World War, when there was a dearth of labor in Europe and America and the immigration restrictions were eased.” This must be done because “the sheiks and kings of the Middle East are all in the pockets of the Western powers, especially the U.S,” which aids those rulers in their attempts “to crush the Islamic forces ruthlessly wherever they raise their voice for establishing Allah’s Deen.” “This dirty game has been goin on throughout the Muslim world unabated for the last two hundred years” and true Muslims must not tolerate it. “This will be possible only by building Islamic Movements in the Western countries in the homelands of those who have caused and are causing incalculable loss to the Muslim world and casting baseless aspersions against Islam day in and day out.” Muslims must “remove the prejudices of the West against Islam.” To do this, they must play “a game of strategy” whereby they “find out and create new friends for Islam and its cause on the side of the enemy, inside and at the rear of the forces fighting against Islam.”

    This is right because “sovereignty belongs to Allah alone and denies all authorities besides Him…. Only Allah-given laws are to be accepted, practiced and implemented in an individual’s life and established in the society where the Muslims live”—the United States now being one such society. “A Muslim has to put all that he has either to change the society into an Islamic society or state or be perished for it [sic]. A Muslim has no other choice.”

    Siddiqi lays down the basics of dawah as presented in Muslim Scripture. Man has free will, but he must choose rightly, according to God’s commands: “The achievement of both heaven and hell depends on the treatment which one accords to the guidance from the Creator.” Free will exists because God intends to “test him and ascertain who among the human beings accepts Allah and His Guidance by his freewill which will qualify him to be the citizen of the next world.” Choosing the right way of life or regime on earth will entitle you to citizenship in the best regime, hereafter. The Prophet Muhammad struggled to “rout out” the wrong way of life and found Allah’s Deen in “the body politic of the Arabian Peninsula”; “this was to serve as a prelude to make Al-Deen-Al-Islam dominant in the rest of the world.” Or, as Muhammad himself said, his disciples must act to “bring Arabs under your control and bring the non-Arab world under your domination [La Yuzharahu].”

    In this “revolutionary” struggle, the idolators’ “political hegemony” was threatened. These tribal chieftains were given the chance to change their regimes, as Muhammad, using Mecca as his base, delivered a series of dawah speeches to them. “We should realize the magnitude of this Dawah effort. Continuously for ten years, every tribe was echoing with the challenge of [Muhammad’s] message.” Subsequent to this, after establishing a new base at Medina, he fought battles against those who resisted. He also undertook “a letter-writing campaign” to “all the Kings and rulers around him,” displaying “the political sagacity and statesmanship of the greatest order, ” warning them that “Arabia was not weak” and “was now dominated by a revolutionary Movement” which non-Arabs were welcome to join—or else.

    The Prophet’s way of life exemplifies the way in which all Muslims should live. “He took advantage of every opportunity to expose and project [his vision] to the people around him,” making the objective “supreme” in his life; “everything was subservient to it.” “Dawah work, whether in America, Europe or elsewhere in the world must have this clear objective in the mind of the Da’ee [proselytizers] that they are out to establish Allah’s Deen in the land or the society in which they are living.”

    For this task, “Allah Himself poured upon [Muhammad] through startling revelations of Al-Qur’an in bits and pieces at the time of every need, every difficult situation, every turning point and every calamity in the shape of short and long, forceful, and eloquent verses to meet the situation.” He command Muhammad to “develop and build up [a devoted and dedicated] character in each individual who responded to his call in the affirmative.” His message “most attracted the youth.” Opposition came not only from tribal chiefs but tribal elders and parents, who “realized the revolutionary aspect” of the message. But convinced that their choice was between an eternity in Paradise or Hell, “no amount of torture, oppression or hardship could move the believers even an inch from their position.” Persecution strengthened them, as it winnowed out the weak and enabled Muhammad to “pick up the best souls from the society of Mecca for the cause of Allah”; bribery and other inducements did not tempt such souls. To them, Allah “was the dearest of all, dearer than their parents.”

    Muhammad’s Meccan converts numbered in the dozens. Threatened with death at the hands of his enemies, he listened to Allah’s command to migrate to Medina. The Hejira “sets a model to Muslims all over the world to migrate to a place where there are better prospects to practice, preach and establish the Deen of Allah. The migration of Muslims to America today presents a parallel situation provided the Muslims reorient the objective of their stay in this country and live by the commitment which they have with their Creator, Allah” to “spread His Deen.” At Medina, Muhammad took three steps to establish his base: building a mosque “to serve as a place of worship, a meeting ground, a guest house, a parliament, a conference hall, a court room, a training camp; establishing a covenant with local Jews “through which the power and the mischief-mongering habit of the Jews was neutralized” and “transferred the political and judicial authority” of the  city into the hands of Muhammad; and founding “The Brotherhood,” whereby all Muslims “share[d] the economic burden” of their newly-founded political community. This enabled Muhammad to organize Medina into “a military camp and the Muslims into a very active mobile military force,” aided by “a very effective system of gathering information” (as we would say, ‘intelligence) about surrounding tribes. Muhammad’s “political maneuvering and many preemptive military actions were thus always timely and befitting to the development of events.” “The stage of Peaceful Resistance was over,” and Medina became “a real Islamic State.”

    “Through well-planned diplomatic activities,” Muslims “dismantled the enemy’s trust among themselves,” dividing them and preparing them for the kill. At the same time, “determined to carry out his mission to logical conclusion,” Muhammad never ceased revealing “Qur’anic injunctions revealed to him” by Allah, guiding “the transformation of society from ignorance into Islam.” In this way he “was constantly busy in building, developing and consolidating the team of his devoted and dedicated workers into a dynamic force of the Islamic Movement.” “Only such a team of workers would be capable of establishing Allah’s Deen in today’s world.” Thus Siddiqi presents himself as modeling Muhammad in contemporary America.

    By the eight year of the Hejira, Muhammad had 10,000 followers under his command. Fortified by a peace treaty with his enemies and with God’s protection, Muhammad accelerated his dawah efforts, re-entered Mecca and converted “the entire population of Mecca.” Now, “the Deen was only for Allah.” “The Islamic state of Medina which had the authority all over the Arabia, was now a power to be reckoned with,” and Rome’s Caesar “was alarmed” at “this growing power at the Eastern frontier of his empire.” Soon, “the frontiers of the Islamic State [came into]… open confrontation with one of the superpowers of the time.” Although remaining “hypocrites in Medina” hoped to exploit this confrontation to “administer a fatal blow to the Movement in case [Muhammad] could be defeated by the Roman Empire,” they “were finally warned to accept Islam or be ready to fight,” “either to accept Islam or pay Jizyah [a tax on non-Muslims] and live a life of second class citizen [dhimmitude] under the bounds and bounties of [the] Islamic State.” That settled the matter, and Muhammad took the opportunity to practice dawah, universally. “This directive is binding on all Muslims until doomsday. It is now incumbent upon all Muslims to deliver the message of Islam to mankind and struggle their best to make His Deen dominant, irrespective of where they are and what they are doing.” In the late twentieth century, “this is now the only way left for Muslims to regain the leadership of this world.”

    Accordingly, Siddiqi devotes his central chapters to the United States. Dawah “is the primary job,” there. In order to accomplish it, Muslims must organize themselves, and educate themselves for that job. American Muslims find themselves in the stage of jihad called “peaceful resistance.” They should wage “a relentless war against immoral practices, drugs, pornography, alcoholism racial discrimination, homosexuality, and other[s] like these.” Not only will this struggle bring the Da’ee into “direct contact with the people of the land at a grass-roots level,” it “may also offset the prejudices of Judeo-Christians against Islam,” leading them to “cooperate with the Muslims with better understanding and a with a soft corner in their hearts.” By so “creat[ing] the necessary goodwill among the people,” the Da’ee “will pave the way for the spread of Dawah deep in the society which otherwise would not be possible.”

    Although this “initial stage” may prove “smooth sailing,” that won’t last. “Alarming signals will be raised by the so-called ‘free press,'” and “the Judeo-Christian anti-Islam propaganda machinery will then let loose its game of hate against Islam and the mission of the Prophet Muhammad,” filling the air with “baseless allegations” against them. Fanatics, reactionaries, conservatives, fundamentalist, and terrorists: the name-calling will begin, to be faced “with patience, cool-minded temperament, good behavior and exemplary character.” As “the Movement” begins to “penetrate deep into the hearts of the common folk,” a “counter-offensive campaign against the false propaganda,” coupled with a quest for “legal protection from court for fundamental human rights to propagate what its adherents believe to be correct and to profess the  same through democratic, peaceful and constitutional means,” can begin. Nonetheless, circumstances will worsen; “a period of trial is a must and is inevitable for Muslims wherever and whenever they rise and try to build the Islamic Movement for the establishment of Allah’s Deen”: “this is the logical consequence or the reaction of the society whose values and fundamentals of life are different from those of Islam.” Fortunately, the very character of the American regime, mere human artifacts though its laws may be, “provid[es] the opportunity to individuals or to a group of people to profess, practice and propagate any ideology of their choice.” Thus “the Muslims of America will also be free to mobilize themselves and carry out the program of Dawah Illallah [calling the people to the fold of Islam] to every nook and corner of America,” there being “nothing to hold them back” in “an almost congenial environment for Muslims to work,” at least initially. In this way the Muslim task will be easier in modern America than it was in tribal Arabia, with its “society of ignorance,” its lack of recognition “for fundamental human rights.”

    Opposition “will come from the vested interests in the society,” such “modern idolators” as “the secular press cum media, the agents of capitalists, the champions of atheism (Godless creeds), the missionary zealots and extremely influential Jewish lobby of America.” These interests notwithstanding, “the Peaceful Resistance will… go on winning the hearts, the minds and the imagination of the people all around. There will be no status quo.” This campaign will prepare the way for the final two stages. Eventually, Allah will provide some territory in which true Muslims establish the Deen. Muslims worldwide may then emigrate to that territory. This may be in the United States, or not. In due course, Allah will make his choice manifest. “The Islamic Movement of America, resorting to intensive Dawah work, fighting Munkar [XXXX], rendering useful services to common folk through various projects of service-to-humanity, may influence a region or a state overwhelmingly,” resulting “in getting political strength through state legislatures and gubernatorial elections.” Muslims can then “try to make it into a model Islamic society within the power available under the constitution of the U.S.A and what it does not prohibit.” In turn, “this will pave the way to get hold of other states in a like manner. Thus, without disturbing or violating the constitution of the U.S.A., they can prepare the ground for the emergence of Islam as a way of life acceptable to the electorate of this country,” sending representatives to Congress and establishing “a strong lobby in Washington for the promotion of Islam and its cause in this country as well as elsewhere in the world.” Siddiqi insists, “This is not daydreaming. This is possible as well as feasible, if the Muslims are determined to play their part as Muslims in this country,” showing the American people that “the only way to get their past sins pardoned by God” and “to enter into paradise after death” in accordance with “the American way of life” is peaceful conversion to Islam. “This process is wide open in this country. It is anybody’s game.”
    “The establishment of ‘God’s Kingdom’ on earth will not be a distant dream. It can emerge in the U.S.A. within the next two to three decades,” if Muslims take care not to test the limits of American constitutional law prematurely.

    Thirty years since Siddiqi published those words, this has not happened, whatever inroads political Islam may have tunneled since the 1980s. Siddiqi sees the difficulties, soberly warning Muslims against “the fallacies of their wishful thinking.” At present, “Dawah work is pretty much limited to Afro-Americans and some other ethnic minorities,” and usually to those in prison. Worse, “the revolutionary aspect of Islam is rarely brought before the new converts, as in most of the cases the Da’ee himself is not conversant with it.” And it is “really a great tragedy” that the many Afro-American Muslims themselves are “divided into hundreds of water-tight compartments with no unity, or united platform or central leadership.” Dawah work remains “haphazard, irregular and without any planning.”

    The same disunity prevails among Muslim organizations generally. “There is no central leadership and no common platform.” But “this is the only process through which the Muslims of America can emerge as a united political entity in the body politic of America.” Further, this platform requires a strategy, one designed for American circumstances. And it needs money, which it will need to acquire not from poverty-stricken African-American ex-convicts but from Muslim immigrants, who “are mostly affluent and can meet the target” of $25-$30 million per year, which would finance radio and television networks, schools, media, and research centers “to attract talented Muslim youth in and outside America to compete with the secular world.” Therefore, the African-American Muslim communities, who have the population numbers, and the mostly Arabian immigrants, who have the wealth, must combine in one Muslim Community of America.

    But these organizational and financial issues pale before “the main cause of Muslims’ failure to come forward and meet the obligation lying on their shoulders”: “lack of vision.” “A Muslim has no place in this world until he undertakes what he is raised for in this world as a Khairal Ummah, the Best of Nations.” So long as Muslims “cut themselves off from the Qur’an,” or “study it in an academic fashion,” they will never found the Deen. Only when professing Muslims practice Qur’anic teachings will the deeper meanings of Allah’s message be revealed to them. Siddiqi insists that to know the Qur’an the believer must know it in ‘the Biblical sense’: intimately, in his heart, as a part of his inner self. “There have always been thousands and thousands of learned scholars of the Qur’an, Hadith, and Fiqh throughout the last thirteen hundred years, but they could not establish Allah’s Deen anywhere in this world in its totality after the first four Caliphs and Umar Bin Abdul Aziz.” “As a result, the Qur’an could not present itself as a practical reality to these learned scholars as it was to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions,” who were “cavaliers of the Islamic Movement,  not academicians of the Qur’an.” Such scholars are “perhaps” more sinful in God’s eyes “than one who is ignorant,” as they have no excuse. This is why, regardless of success or failure, which depend upon God’s Will, American Muslims must formulate a plan for action, where they are, now.

    What kind of person is a true Da’ee? “Islam is a way of life.” The Da’ee must understand with “the fundaments” [sic] of that regime, its basic doctrines including the sovereignty of Allah, “Islamic social justice,” “the concept of Jihad and its necessity,” and “the principle of excellence on the basis of piety.” He will find these principles stated in the Qur’an but also embodied in Muhammad’s person and way of life. He must carefully assess the existing American regime, with its expanding economy under “the goddess of capitalism,” its notion of human, popular sovereignty, and the results of those features: “Gradually, America is growing into a colony of vested interests and international Zionists’ caprices and intrigues.” Moreover, “individual liberties and personal freedom have been distorted to serve only as a means to create lust for sex in the society, promote pornography and adopt perverted attitudes and violence in human relations.” As a result of these converging forces of corruption, popular sovereignty “has been eroded to an alarming state,” “women are challenging the authority of men’s domination in every field, resulting in the emergence of a society of unisex at an accelerated pace,” and “personal freedom amounts to a free license to dismantle the moral values and ethical standards of the society both by individuals and the media.” American material, military, and political greatness remains, but it is “ideologically and morally very poor.” Only Islam can truly enrich it.

    In terms of geopolitics, American dominance has bred ‘Third-World’ resentment. As a result, “an economic war is imminent.” In Europe, the European Union, along with Japan, will also challenge the United States, as will the Soviet bloc. (In a later note, Siddiqi admits that “Russia has disintegrated and has become the ‘sick man’ of Europe,” but correctly insists that “still it has the potentials [sic] to play a third-party role in world politics in collaboration with China, North Korea and Cuba.”) In the Middle East, the state of Israel “is a smoldering bomb,” currently the instrument of U.S. policy but with dreams “of dominating” the region, with American partnership “in this dirty game.” As it also seeks to please “the so-called moderate Arabs,” America has “landed in a quagmire.” As for Latin America, “the people need some superb ideology to give redress to their problems and peace to their mind”; once again, Islam is the answer. So, because “America, in the present context of the world, has the potential to remain s superpower for many decades to come,” the Da’ee must continue to study world events, seeking opportunities to advance the cause.

    Still, mere knowledge will never suffice. If a Da’ee “is weak in character, if he lacks in manifesting cool temperament, palatable manners, the requisite amount of devotion and dedication to the cause, if he is short of patience and perseverance against provocations and if he is devoid of determination to carry out the mission against all odds, he will not be able to meet the challenge.” “No amount of knowledge can bridge this gap.” Such character “cannot be produced in the cozy atmosphere of the drawing room or sitting in a corner like a hermit or Sufi and keeping aloof from the world and its happenings.” An umbrella organization of American Muslims must arrange for Dawah field work, whereby the Da’ee will get out and deal with people, deepening his knowledge of Islam by his practice of it among the American people—conversing, organizing, taking care to model the character type of the man under Allah’s regime. Without such practice, it is “rather impossible to generate the sterling qualities of heart and mind and acquire the required amount of personal endurance” necessary to advance that regime politically. Social work, service to the needy, will “gain recognition” for Muslims, “generate the goodwill of the masses and muster the support of the electorate.” “The process of learning, practicing and preaching will go together.”

    Siddiqi emphasizes the importance of distributing “Dawah literature” in the United States, a point made to him by Mawlanda Mawdudi himself in a conversation at the end of Mawdudi’s life, after he had emigrated to Buffalo, New York, where his son practiced medicine. “We have to produce our own literature in the American perspective,” tracts that register “the moods, the temperament, the psychology of the people and the needs of this country.” Also, the Islamic organization should not depend on immigrants (such as himself) to lead the movement here. The immigrants “should remain in the background,” training American converts to serve as the spokesmen. And of course the Da’ee must avail himself must pray to Allah, asking to avail himself of Allah’s power.

    Because “America is a predominantly secular cum permissive society” in which “people are mostly dominated and dictated by their physical urges,” “slaves to their physical instincts,” and governed by “a secular, rigid constitution that guarantees unrestricted personal freedom to act, to speak, to behave, to assemble, to move around and enjoy life the way they desire”; and because the slogan “In God We Trust” “is simply a slogan coined by their forefathers,” with “no bearing on their living condition,” religion “is nowhere visible in the life pattern of the people,” in what Aristotle calls their Bios ti; and because “the Judeo-Christian God is powerless, keeps away from the people’s lives, and has nothing to do with their social, economic and political activities” (“except in very small pockets of conservative Jews and Christians”); “for all practical purposes, America is a Godless society and purely materialistic in every walk of life.” This being so, America resembles the kind of society Muhammad encountered in seventh-century Arabia, “the society of ignorance (Jajhilayah)”. It is the society of modern ignorance. Therefore, “the basic principle for the presentation of Dawah Ilallah should naturally be the same: to call upon the people to obey God and accept Muhammad as God’s messenger.

    But although America is a free society by habit and by law, “when the question of Islam arises, centuries-old prejudices come in the forefront,” such as “the distorted image of so-called terrorism” in the Middle East. Why “so-called”? Siddiqi doesn’t say, but it is likely that he regards acts of violence committed by devout Muslims as legitimate acts of jihad. To correct this such ‘distortions,’ the Da’ee must “proceed patiently, cautiously and diligently with Hikmah (wisdom) in the presentation of Islam to the American people. This will be possible because both God and prophethood are familiar to Jews and Christians. The Christian understanding of God as one Godhead, three Persons, should be challenged as polytheistic or else illogical. “The concept of Trinity appears to be unreasonable and self-contradictory”; the Da’ee must argue against “the dogma of the ‘human-God’ of Christendom, innovated by the Jewish conspiracy against Prophet Jesus.” It is noteworthy that Siddiqi intends a rational argument (aimed initially at priests and pastors). Siddiqi optimistically contends that “there is no reason why positive response will not be forthcoming, at least from the moderate Christians”; as for the immoderate ones, they can be made “shaky in their beliefs” in this way. [1]

    Alongside this deployment of reason (or sophistry, as the case may well be), the Da’ee should also invoke the passion of fear. This is the approach not so much to priests and pastors as to the people. Tell the people: You will be held accountable before God on the Day of Judgment. Better get this right, or else. “The fear of God and the fear of accountability in the Hereafter will keep the people on the path of righteousness.” Heed the prophets, including Jesus and Muhammad—especially the latter, since “when a new prophet came the previous code of conduct was automatically canceled” “it is essential for every man and woman on earth to follow the latest Guidance brought by the last messenger of God,” namely, Muhammad. For these reasons, the people “have no choice but to accept the Qur’an as the only Guidance now available to mankind to follow.” [2]

    “The Christian community of America will need a special approach to make them understand their misguided concept about Jesus.” On this, Siddiqi logic-chops thusly: God created Adam with no father or mother, Eve without a mother. Christians don’t “ascribe the attributes of God to either one of them. How then can they profess Jesus to be the Son of God? It is illogical and quite absurd.” The syllogism, such as it is, amounts to this: Adam had no father; Adam was not God (he did of course have some of the “attributes” of God, but let that pass); therefore, Jesus cannot be the Son of God. But (obviously) if Jesus is not the same kind of being as Adam, why not? Somewhat more seriously, Siddiqi then claims that ‘making’ Jesus into a human-God “is clear idolatry,” inasmuch as “making partners with God is a sin,” and an unforgiveable one at that. But if Jesus’ godliness and humanity, if Jesus was fully God and fully man at the same time, this is self-contradictory only if He was fully God and fully man in the same way as He was in His fatherliness. The designation of the second Person of the Trinity as the Son of God indicates otherwise.

    Once Christians (and presumably “shaky” Jews) have had their convictions de-centered, they will be prepared to receive the message of the Messenger as the only way out of their predicament. Verbal argumentation is one thing, but printed tracts and pamphlets are indispensable for this “important task [that] has been neglected so far by the Muslim organizations of America/Europe due to lac of vision.” Islamic publications shouldn’t be restricted to things aimed at the masses. A magazine “to serve as a vehicle to carry out the message of Islam to the intellectuals of the society presenting an alternative system of life against what is in practice today” will “prepare the ground” for “the better educated and informed segments of the society” to “accept Islam as their way of life.” Congruently, “For Dawah work in the universities and colleges, it must be pointed out that there should be more concentration on the teachers than the students, or equally on both.” The teachers are “free, they have the time and they exert a lot of influence upon the students. If they are convinced about Islam as a way of life, they can motivate their students to that effect in great numbers. Teachers will therefore be the special Dawah targets of the Islamic Movement.”

    In all these efforts, “the Da’ee must know the inhabitants, to whom the message is to be delivered, well.” “Their mood and temperament, their habits and tastes, their likes and dislikes, their fields of interest, the qualities of their character”—in sum, the ethos of the regime—must be thoroughly understood. “The job of a Da’ee is like that of a doctor,” diagnosing and prescribing to his patient. Once cured of his spiritual ills, the patient may himself become a doctor, or at least a medical paraprofessional, a partner in the task of Islamification. As the cure in its initial stages will be verbal, the doctor of Dawah must be alert to “the situation and timing” of his presentation, waiting until “the contactee is in a receptive mood,” changing the subject if “an addressee is found yawning or restless or absentminded or [un]interested.” And of course “when the attitude of obstinacy comes into the dialogue or the addressee becomes adamant,” “refus[ing] even to listen to logic,” the Da’ee should retreat with the intention of “meet[ing] again at some future time.” “In no way should he hurt the feelings of his contactees.” “Neither force nor any coercive method is to be applied while presenting Dawah to non-Muslims.” In America, at least. “Pray to Allah for the opening of the heart of the contactee and beg from Him to present the message in soft but effective language and in a palatable manner.”

    Proselytizing can also take the form of action. “Every worker of the Islamic Movement, through service to the people in his neighborhood and vicinity, should acquire prominence as a person to be sought after in time of need,” not for the sake of “fame or reputation” but to “earn the sympathy of the people for the sake of Allah and then go deeper into the society for Dawah work.” For this, the elderly—many of them “sick or incapacitated and confined to homes or elderly people care centers—”are a useful electorate” and a rich potential source of community outreach, if converted. On the other side of the spectrum, runaway children, foster children, abused children, and other needy youngsters will respond to “fatherly guidance” from the Da’ee. Model foster hopes and hostels in which Islam is taught will bring this opportunity to fruition, as they will amount to a parallel to the care facilities available to the elderly. Finally, “counseling service to battered husbands and battered wives will ultimately bring them nearer to Islam,” as “they will all feel obligated to the teachings of Islam that changed their lives and made their matrimonial life happier and rejuvenated.” All such services can help to effect regime change, “bring[ing] before this nation Islam as a way of life” and counteracting depraved sexual behavior by “creating hate/contempt against the existing lifestyle of the people” of America—which, as he has already contended, has sunk deep into sinfulness.

    Siddiqi concludes with a personal postscript. “In 1982, I went around the world and visited many countries, with the sole objective of finding out the place where an effective Islamic Movement could be developed in the present context of the world in order to make Allah’s Deen dominant somewhere on this earth.” He found that “America is the most suitable place in the Western hemisphere for that glorious end to be started.” But it has barely begun. “A serious Islamic Movement for the establishment of Allah’s Deen is yet to emerge in the body politic of the U.S.A.” He calls for existing Muslim organizations to “take up the task of Dawah Ilallah along the lines suggested in this book,” to unite without delay in working toward that end. Among those who seem to have done so was Mohamed Akram al-Adouni, then a member of the Board of Directors of the American chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, and at this writing the General Secretary of the Al Quds International Forum, which finances the Hamas organization in Gaza. In “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” published in 1991, Akram praised “the brothers in the Islamic Circle”—Siddiqi’s organization—for their “attempt to reach a unity of merger” with other like-minded organizations. In Akram’s language, the purpose of such an organization does indeed resemble Siddiqi’s stated intention, albeit expressed more tartly: workers “must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ it miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions.” Whereas Siddiqi emphasizes the rhetorical content and methods of Dawah, Akram focuses more on the need for organization—the beginnings of the politeia of the new regime, beginning with Islamic Centers “in every city.” “The center ought to turn into a ‘beehive’ which produces sweet honey,” a civil-social political society in itself, offering education, recreation, social activities, and headquarters for political campaigns. The role of the Islamic Center “should be the same as the ‘mosque’s’ role during the time of God’s prophet… when he marched to ‘settle’ the Dawah in its first generation in Medina.” In modern times, such organizational tasks were first begun by Hassan al-Banna, “the pioneer of the contemporary Islamic Dawah” and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the decades before the Second World War. In America today, “the big challenge that is ahead of us is how to turn… seed or ‘scattered’ elements into comprehensive, stable, ‘settled’ organizations that are connected with our Movement and which fly in our orbit and take orders from our guidance.” Larger and better-funded than Siddiqi’s Islamic Circle of North America, the Brotherhood was indeed better situated to effect Siddiq’s program.

    Controversy remains on whether the American organization heeded Akram’s memorandum. But why would it not?

     

     

    Notes

    1. As Christian theologians from Augustine forward have observed, the Trinitarian understanding of God involves no contradiction if the three Persons are understood as Personae of the same God or “Godhead,” to use the preferred term of these thinkers. Otherwise, it would be impossible to ‘have faith’ in the existence of such a God, since one cannot have faith in any person or any thing who or which is inconceivable. If you tell me to accept on faith that you are holding a square circle in your closed hand, at most I can believe that you are holding something you call a square circle; because I can’t conceive of such a thing, I cannot ‘have faith’ that you have a real square circle in your hand, not knowing what you could possibly be talking about.
    2. In fact, Jesus tells his Jewish disciples that not one jot or tittle of the Jewish law has been suspended for them. He does not require non-Jewish converts to take up obedience to that law, but that is not a cancellation of the prophecies already heard by the Israelites insofar as they were directed exclusively to them.

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Sufi Islam

    October 24, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Hujjat al-Islam Abu Hamid Muhammad Ghazali Tusi: On Knowing Yourself and God. Muhammad Nur Abdus Salam translation. Great Books of the Islamic World, 2010 [2002].

     

    Born in Tus, Persia around 1056, al-Ghazali saw several regimes and nations, living in Baghdad in the 1080s, then Damascus beyond the turn of the century, before returning to his native town of Tus in 1106, five years before his death. Some accounts claim he also visited Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina. Sufi Islam often finds itself classified as a form of mysticism, but al-Ghazali—frequently cited as a major contributor to the development of that sect—uses no such term. Why is Sufism nonetheless so classified, and is the classification correct? How does Sufism differ from other forms of Islam, according to a leading Sufi or proto-Sufi?

    Given his travels, al-Ghazzali had firsthand knowledge of the ways of life followed by several of those forms. He had the foundation for being what we would call a ‘comparativist,’ no hidebound dweller within one religio-political regime.

    A Sunni not a Shi’ite (as most contemporary Iranians are) Al-Ghazali is also associated with the Asharite school of Islam, which points to the authority of clerical interpretation of the Qu’ran, as distinguished from the Mu’tazillite school, with its emphasis on logical analysis of that scripture. To what extent does al-Ghazali reject ratiocination, thus further contributing to the reputation of Sufism as a form of mysticism?

    This book contains two of al-Ghazali’s writings, one on human nature (The Alchemy of Happiness), one on God (On Knowing God). Al-Ghazali emphasizes the exoteric character of these works, identifying places at which he deliberately fails to elaborate or deepen his argument. His orientation thus shares at least one quality commonly associated with mysticism, namely, the protection of a secret teaching. In explicitly pointing to the existence of such a teaching, he evidently intends to whet the appetite of at least some readers to undertake the effort of discovering them.

    Al-Ghazali divides The Alchemy of Happiness into eighteen sections. He begins by indicating that this work is a prolegomena to On Knowing God. “The key to the knowledge of God” is self-knowledge because it is the key to all knowledge: “There is nothing closer to you than you. If you do not know yourself, how can you know anything else?” In this Socratic task seven questions arise:

    1. “What sort of thing are you?” What is your nature insofar as you can be ‘classified’ within the natural order?
    2. “Where did you come from?” What is your origin or genetic cause?
    3. “Where are you going?” Where will your current path, your current way of life, take you?
    4. “Why have you come to this stopping place?” What is the reason you have now paused to reflect on yourself, and more broadly to seek knowledge?
    5. “For what purpose were you created?” What is your natural telos? This will provide a standard by which you can judge your way of life.
    6. “What is your happiness and in what does it lie?”
    7. “What is your misery and in what does that lie?”

    The fourth, central question forms a sort of hinge in the overall structure of the list, which moves from the ‘given’ to incentives for action, change. The question asking you to classify yourself requires self-examination. Self-examination will show you that four “attributes” exist “inside you”: those of beasts of burden; those of predatory animals; those of demons; those of angels. Beasts of burden find their “nourishment and happiness” in “eating, sleeping, and copulating.” Predators find their “nourishment and happiness” in “giving free rein to tearing apart, killing, and rage.” Demons by nature encourage “evil, treachery, and deceit.” Angels “find their nourishment and their happiness in the contemplation of the Divine Presence.”

    Given the decidedly mixed nature my self-examination reveals, what then? Al-Ghazali distinguishes the “external form” of a human being, its body, from the “internal spirit,” “vital principle” (jan), soul (nafs), or heart (dil). Among these terms, he chooses “heart,” which is very often the term seen in the Old Testament. The heart is “not the lump of flesh which is found in the left side of the chest,” which is visible and can be seen in many beasts, as well as the dead. With Augustinian language, he maintains that “the true nature of the heart is not of this world”; “it has come into this world as a stranger and a wayfarer.” It nonetheless rules the body as its rightful monarch, as it alone among the human attributes can know God and witness “the beauty of His Presence.” It is the attribute that distinguishes human beings from beasts.

    How to cultivate this distinctively human trait? “If a person closes his eyes and forgets about his body and forgets the heavens and the earth and all else that the external eye can see, he will come to know his own existence out of necessity and become aware of himself, even though he is unaware of his form and the earth and the sky and all that is in them.” In performing what we today might call a thought-experiment, he will “perceive that his physical shape will be taken away from him, yet he will remain in place and not be annihilated.” There is something about ‘me’ that can be so-to-speak abstracted from my body and all bodily surroundings. That something is the core of my nature.

    This leads me to the discovery of two “worlds.” The “world of creation” is subject to “linear measurement, amount, and quantity.” “The root meaning of ‘creation’ is ‘calculation, estimation.'” But the “world of command,” the human spirit, “has no amount or quantity, and for this reason cannot be divided.” It is creative, partaking of the world of creation by commanding it. It is “the essence of a person, and all form is subject to it.” “Its true nature is very difficult to comprehend,” and “it is not permissible to expand upon this.” Here the esoteric teaching would begin, but esoteric teachings by definition do not get committed to writing in any explicit way. Al-Ghazali will give some hints, however, later on.

    What can be elaborated upon is the heart/spirit’s status as “the monarch of the body.” The heart’s “work is the seeking of happiness; and its happiness is in the gnosis (marifat) of God Most High.” “It acquires this knowledge of God Most High through the knowledge of His handiwork, and this is the totality of the universe.” The human senses are the initial means of such knowledge. “Knowledge is [the heart’s] prey; the senses are its net.” That is why human beings need their bodies, as the senses are bodily. Once the net captures the elements of nature, the internal powers of perception go to work on them. Just as there are five senses, so there are five such internal or heart-powers: imagination, thought, memory, recall, and conjecture. Taken together, these are the ten “armies” at the command of the heart.

    Al-Ghazali elaborates on the metaphor of human nature as a regime, to be classified as a kingdom. The body is the “nation”; lust is the “tax collector”; anger is the “policeman”; reason is the king’s “chief minister”; the heart is the “king.” Al-Ghazali doesn’t like tax collectors any more than you do: bodily appetite or lust “is a liar, a babbler, and a confuser,” “always desir[ing] to confiscate whatever wealth there is in the kingdom under the pretext of taxation.” He doesn’t like cops, either. Anger, “the policeman of the state,” is “wicked and very hot-tempered”; “it always loves killing, breaking, and overthrowing.” The only defense against these malefactors is the king, who must “always… consult the minister of reason,” ignoring the corrupt blandishments of the tax collector and “tightly” controlling the policeman. If the king governs with reason, “the kingdom will be well-ordered.”

    If the “kingdom” that is the individual human being is well-ordered, the passions of lust and anger serve the body by nourishing and defending it; the body exists to “bear the senses,” to be their servant; the senses serve “for the intelligence-gathering of reason,” “spies” for the king’s minister; reason then advises the king, which is the spirit of command or, as we ‘moderns’ would say, the will, which issues commands. “Reason has been created for the heart, to be its candle and lamp. By its light, the heart may see the Divine Presence which is its Paradise.” In so seeing, the heart “becomes the slave and servant of the Divine Presence.” Al-Ghazali quotes God as reported by the Quran: “I created the jinn [angels] and mankind only that they might worship Me.” That is, the human will, the ‘king’ of the human person, serves as the commanding executive of God’s commands.

    How do the other internal powers of perception fit in? Imagination serves as a postmaster, collecting the ‘mail’ or impressions the senses bring in. Memory is the “mailbag and repository” for these impressions. “At the appropriate time, the information will be presented to Minister Reason,” who “will arrange [the kingdom’s] affairs and the journeys of the king,” “tak[ing] the necessary steps if he finds that one of the armies, such as lust or anger… is in rebellion against the king, and has acted in disobedience, intending to kill him” and to usurp the rule of the human being’s rightful monarch, itself the rightful slave of the King of kings.

    In dealing with such rebellions, “the minister does not seek to kill the rebel.” The kingdom cannot be ruled without tax collectors and policemen. “Instead, he arranges to bring the rebel back within the boundaries of obedience,” to tame him, make him a friend; thus the former rebel “will receive a robe of honor in due time.” On the Day of Resurrection, all the qualities of each individual human being “will be revealed, and their forms will correspond to their natures.” Souls ruled by bodily desires will be revealed as pigs, as “impure” men; predators as wolves, “tyrannical” men. “Form follows nature, so that every one is seen in the same form that is inside him.” Shifting his metaphor, al-Ghazali compares the heart to a mirror, whereon “repugnant traits are like smoke and darkness,” preventing any reflection of the Divine presence.” If kept clean, however, the heart is “a shining mirror the displays the whole universe,” from whose order one intuits the presence of God.

    In all of this, it is easy to see why many Muslims view the Sufi with suspicion. It isn’t that Sufis are mystics in the sense of being hazy-minded navel-gazers, hippies avant la lettre. It is that they resemble Platonic philosophers, albeit in Quranic apparel. Perhaps to forestall such accusations, al-Ghazali adopts a more emphatically ‘religious’ tone in his central and subsequent chapters.

    He begins by addressing his question respecting the origin of the human being. After all, “How do we know that [man] has been created for angelicness and the moral nature [of the angels], so that he may acquire that, and not for the other [non-angelic] traits?” “Some”—the Hugh Hefners among us—”suppose that man has been created for eating, sleeping, copulating and taking pleasure.” Others, “like the Arabs, the Kurds, and the Turks”—here the Persian al-Ghazali’s ‘comparativist’ knowledge acquired in his travels comes in—”suppose that man was created for dominion, violence, and conquest.” “Both groups are in error” because carnal appetites are not distinctively human, and indeed man isn’t as good at satisfying them as some animals: “A camel can eat more than a man, and the copulation of sparrows is more frequent than that of mankind. So, how are humans superior to them” in that respect. And many animal species are more voracious and efficient predators than we humans are. Notice that al-Ghazali appeals not only to the philosophic mind, which intends to classify the elements of nature so as better to understand it. He also appeals to the political mind, interested in rule, in justifying a claim to rule founded upon some natural superiority. Sufism isn’t necessarily any more apolitical than it is mystical.

    “The true nature of a human being is that his perfection and his nobility lie within him.” This sounds like Plato or Aristotle. But al-Ghazali adds a religious promise: “When he dies, neither anger nor lust remains. Either a bright, gleaming essence, adorned with the spiritual knowledge or gnosis of God Most High in the form of an angel” will be his now-revealed nature, or he will be “dark, gloomy with head bowed in shame,” gloomy because tarnished by sin and ashamed because he hasn’t lived up to what he could have been. The shameful soul “will be with Satan in Sijjin,” Hell.

    Further tying his doctrine to a form of religiosity, al-Ghazali asserts that the “nobility” of the heart has two “degrees”: knowledge and power. Knowledge is also divided into two degrees: what the mass of mankind can know and what can be known only by the few. What can be known by the few has two degrees: dreaming and the inner voice of inspiration—both non-sensual. Non-sensual dreams are similar to the thoughts derived from the meditative practices al-Ghazali mentioned earlier, abstracting the heart from all bodily and worldly forms. He now adds another element to those meditative practices. More than only closing your eyes and “suspending the work of sensory organs,” the Sufi will call out to God (“Allah! Allah!”) “with the heart and not the tongue until one is unaware of one’s self and has no report of the entire world or of anything save God Most high; if it is thus, then the window of the heart will open even though one be awake and one will see while awake what others see in sleep,” namely, “the kingdoms of the earth and the heavens,” as revealed by “the prophets.” “Do not concern yourself with the arrangements of this world, for He will manage your affairs Himself,” acting as your “Protector.” “The way,” the regime, “of the saints is this, and it is the way of prophethood.” The scholar’s way of acquiring knowledge by learning is also “great,” but “it is trivial in comparison with the knowledge of the prophets and saints which came to their hearts from the Divine Presence without an intermediary or the instruction of human beings.” The prophet also differs from the saint. Both achieve gnosis of God, but the prophet is a messenger, one who takes God’s Word to others, whereas the saint does not, either because “when the Religious Law is new there is no need for another kind of invitation, or because public propagation of the faith needs certain qualities that the saint may not possess.”

    But what about the “creative” dimension of the heart? Al-Ghazali explains that knowledge of God endows the prophet with “the power to subject some of the physical bodies of the world to itself”—to effect what are called “miracles,” contraventions of ordinary natural laws. “Some spirits—nobler and stronger, nearer to and more resembling the angelic essence—[are] obeyed by other bodies external to it so that should his awe affect a lion, it will become abject and obey him.” On the other side, “what is called ‘the evil eye’ and that which is called ‘sorcery’ are of this kind and are the effects of a person’s spirit on the bodies of others.” Persons with such powers have connected their hearts with the demonic powers. Weaker versions of such extraordinary powers for good or evil may be seen in everyday life, in what we now call ‘psychosomatic’ effects, as “when a sick person acquires hope [and improves],” or “when a sound person becomes anxious, [and] falls ill.”

    A prophet, then, has three qualities: the knowledge others achieve in a dream state, when their bodies and bodily passions are passive, the prophet attains while awake; the prophet’s heart affects the bodies of others; he knows in his heart what others know by learning. It is in this that al-Ghazali’s Sufism invites the term ‘mysticism.’ Although rational, its rationality seems to be a matter of pure noesis. There is no suggestion that the prophet or the saint arrives at this noesis by the way of logical argument, of thought governed by the principle of non-contradiction. Indeed, “no truth has been disclosed to a person who learns the way of disputation in defense of belief.” A philosopher would concur in this judgment, if by disputation al-Ghazali means the sort of argumentation often heard in law courts or in political disputes—rhetoric in the pejorative sense of the work, polemic. A philosopher would balk if al-Ghazali means by disputation any argumentation at all.

    That he cannot simply reject any rational argumentation at all may be seen in his more-or-less Aristotelian account of human happiness: “The pleasure of everything lies in that it is required by one’s nature.” As a Muslim, he of course goes beyond Aristotle by asserting, “no spectacle can be more pleasurable than the spectacle of the Divine Presence, and that is according to the demand of the spirit’s nature.” That is, he goes beyond Aristotle insofar as he understands the Divine Presence to be the Allah invoked in the Qu’ran rather than the Good posited by Aristotle. Al-Ghazali also upholds the doctrine of the immortality of the spirit of the individual human being more insistently than Aristotle does.

    Al-Ghazali concludes with an argument anticipating that of Thomas Aquinas, finding in the design of the human being a sort of proof of God’s existence. (In this, it should be noted, he plays the scholar, not the prophet or the saint.) First, from “a droplet of fluid,” semen, a person develops. “There is no work in the world more wonderful than this”; resurrection after death “will be [much] easier!” Second, what being other than an all-knowing one could do such a thing? Finally, we learn from this act of creation that God’s “Grace, Mercy, and Care for His servants is limitless,” as body has exactly the parts it needs to live and function and more, “that which was not needed or necessary, but would improve [man’s] appearance,” “such as the blackness of the hair, the redness of the lips, the arch of the eyebrows, a straight posture.” And all of these physical attributes “are trivial in comparison with the knowledge of the heart.” If man “throws the alchemy of happiness upon the essence of the heart, he will travel from the degree of the beasts to the degree of the angels.”

    In On Knowing God” al-Ghazali again indicates the esoteric character of his teaching on the heart. “It has two aspects”: one “more obscure,” which “cannot be explained to ordinary folks, or is telling it [to them] proper”; the other understandable “by everyone.” “A person knows from his own essence the existence of the essence of God, may He be praised and glorified!” He knows this because man couldn’t create one hair on his head, and this points to the existence of an intelligent creator. What Thomas calls the argument from design is an exoteric argument. God is the perfect version of our lesser, imperfect natures, which parallel but in no way approach His nature. And just as a person may come to know God by knowing himself (as argued in The Alchemy of Happiness) so he can know himself, his own “ineffability and inscrutability,” from “the ineffability and inscrutability of God.”

    This leads to another instance of al-Ghazali’s much-favored arguments from analogy. Just as your heart rules your body and its passions through the “tenuous substance [that] physicians call ‘spirit,’ [which] carries the powers of perception and motion,” so God’s Will rules the universe. The natural scientist and the astrologer understand the universe through physical observations and measurements; this gives them correct but incomplete knowledge of Being. This may be why al-Ghazali distrusts disputation, whereby each participant “may have spoken the truth from one aspect of the truth, but they see some part and suppose that they have seen all.” Only “the ocean of knowledge of prophethood… encompasses all sides of the kingdom and all the agents, captains, and servants of the Lord.”

    Those who appreciate the comprehensiveness of God’s wisdom, if only through trust in the prophets and arguments via analogy to human experience of the human soul, will readily glorify God. Al-Ghazali discusses four statements whereby a Muslim will glorify Him. These statements are not expressions of mere sentiment but, taken together, convey “knowledge of the Divine.”

    The first is “Glory be to God.” It signifies the “absolute incomparability” of God contrasted with the partial “incomparability” of man. God, man, angels (and presumably fallen angels, demons) have heart, spirit, unlike all other beings. Human incomparability is only partial because human beings also have a physical nature, shared with animals.

    The second statement is “Praise be to God.” It signifies that “your sovereignty is a particle of His sovereignty, that all causes and means are in its service as in a pen in the hands of a scribe.” Hence all praise and gratitude are rightly directed toward God, “as there is no benefactor other than He.”

    Third, “There is no god but God.” It signifies that “there is no one other than He to command His own secret.” No form of polytheism is acceptable, and of course Muslims reject the Christian Trinity, the teaching that God has three ‘Persons,’ all of Whom partake in His knowledge and power. “No one knows God perfectly and truly save Himself.”

    Finally, “God is greater.” This doesn’t mean that there is some scale of measurement by which God’s superiority can be weighed. “There is nothing with Him for Him to be greater than. All existing things exist through the light of His existence.” “He is greater than anything by which man can know Him by logical analogy.” This means that al-Ghazali’s can intend his arguments-by-analogy only as “illustrations,” not as real arguments. “All of these are illustrations so that a person, in accordance with human weakness, might in fact comprehend something of the beauty of the Divine Presence.” And even this level of comprehension can only be hinted at, here. “An explanation of the knowledge of God Most High is lengthy and cannot be put in a book like this as it would not be satisfying.” It must be experienced directly; “a person’s [spiritual] happiness is in gnosis and in the service to and worship of Him.”

    To achieve this gnosis, which will impel the individual to such service and worship, there are two possible ways of proceeding. One is “through his own reasoning, desire, and independent judgment.” It is “impossible” to know God that way “because his desire will master him and always conceal the way to God from him. Whatever he desires will appear in the image of correctness.” The other way is “through another.” That s the right way. “But just anyone is not fit for this,” only “the wisest of people,” namely, the prophets. The Religious Law or Sharia enunciated by the prophets shows how right service and worship are to be undertaken. All else is transgression. As the Quran teaches, “He who transgresses God’s limit, verily he wrongs his soul.”

    Al-Ghazali calls the transgressors “libertines.” Their ignorance takes seven forms. Some believe in no God at all. Seeking God “in the treasury of imagination and whim,” they fail to find Him, consequently looking to “the stars and physical nature” for guidance, in the manner of astrologers and some philosophers. Some believe in no afterlife, supposing that death is the end of human life, as it is for plants and animals. Others believe in God and the afterlife, but weakly. They are ignorant of Religious Law. Such ignorance weakens their souls because their failure to achieve the “gnosis and abstention from sin” that lead to “a sound heart,” one strong enough to deserve salvation.

    Some know the Religious Law but doubt its effectiveness, claiming that it does not cleanse the heart of sin. These might be some Christians, who deprecate the Law in a misguided attempt to exalt spirituality. But the Religious Law “was enjoined [upon us] to control anger and lust or carnal passion, and to hold them in check so that they do not overcome the Law and reason.” We will likely still commit “minor sins,” which God can forgive, but obedience to the Law will guide us away from the major sins. Human beings are not free of lust and anger; they control their lust, and forgive those with whom they are angered.

    Some do not know God’s attributes. They suppose that because God is merciful He will not punish libertines harshly. Eventually, they will learn otherwise. Some are ignorant “of their own pride.” They believe that they have overcome their sins. But only God is perfect. Indeed, He has no sins to overcome. Finally, there are those who know God and His Law but remain self-righteous, denying that their immoral behavior is immoral. “Dealing with such people is done better by the sword than by the argument of reason,” as they have already, as we now say, ‘rationalized’ their own conduct and passions.

    In both of these works, al-Ghazali effectively identifies reason with revelation, not with thought governed by the principle of non-contradiction—or at least not primarily so. He centers his readers’ attention on noesis, not so much reasoning itself. Reasoning unassisted by Quranic study will fail to achieve noetic apprehension of God. His figure of the will, not reason, as the sovereign, and of the will as minister or adviser to the will, could easily lead to the assumption that he is a proto-Nietzschean of sorts, that even God is primarily the supreme Will and not the supreme Logos. This remains ambiguous, however, because the Will of God does, and the will of man should, listen to reason and be guided by it. The will is sovereign in the sense that it makes the decision, but it evidently can choose whether it follows reason, thumos, or appetite. For human beings, ‘reason’ means preeminently gnosis of God and His Law. What does Reason mean for God? Does God’s Reason submit itself to God’s Will, to some kind of creative Will to Power? But why would an omnipotent Being aim at more power? How could He, given His omnipotence? Or are God’s Reason and Will one? And His Law the expression of that perfect combination of His Will and His Reason? As al-Ghazali might say, these are questions beyond the scope of this book.

    Much of the reasoning al-Ghazali does undertake is fairly loose, consisting mostly in analogies based on introspection. His emphasis on introspection is likely what has gained Sufism the reputation as a form of mysticism—this, along with his emphasis on meditation, staying still—its downplaying of action. This is a matter of degree, however. He ends with an adjuration to take forceful action (to the point of death) against some libertines. As for the principle of non-contradiction, it too has its place in al-Ghazali’s thought, as seen in his overall critique of the libertines, which depends upon seeing the contradiction between their beliefs and conduct and the beliefs and conduct of those who follow the Religious Law.

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Political Partisanship Now

    October 19, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Russell Muirhead: The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.

     

    Hand-wringing over the partisan animosities of the day bore me somewhat, as it strikes me that the day deserves them. Legal abortions or not? An administrative state oligarchy or a constitutional republic? And what about China? Given such conflicts, political tranquility would be a very bad sign. Under these circumstances, lack of animosity would betray weakness of anima in Americans.

    Professor Muirhead understands the thumotic dimension of politics. “I prefer the eighteenth-century phrase ‘party spirit’ to the social-scientific ‘partisanship'”; “party spirit” captures the spiritedness of politics, its characteristic claims to rule and demands for ‘recognition.’ “Reason can—and should—inform, guide, and chasten party spirit” (why else write a scholarly book about it?) but politics will never be purely rational, whatever Enlightenment worthies may have believed. “Rather than expect that partisanship can be overcome, or transcended, or simply turned off in those places where its presence would be corrupting, it, is better—more true to the real possibilities for democratic politics—to differentiate between more elevated and more base expressions of party spirit.” American politics needs “not less partisanship, but better partisanship,” party spirit aiming not merely at victory but at the implementation of policies informed by “convictions, principles, and perceptions of the common interest.” As it will transpire, he understands that victory is indispensable to the implementation of such policies, and also that a tyrant might have convictions, principles, and perceptions of the common interest.

    In contemporary America, “intense partisanship is the new normal,” as “government has become a theater for entertaining partisan true believers rather than a setting for brokering, negotiation, deliberation, and compromise.” Party spirit now pervades the souls of many people, not only “political elites.” Lack of shared “values and goals” makes people distrust one another, which in turn “can threaten the unity of the political community” because “losers to political conflict have less reason to abide by the constitutional processes that delivered their loss” and may even “decide that violence or secession is preferable to peaceful opposition and constitutional obedience.” This is why George Washington warned against what he called the “baneful effects of the spirit of party” in his Farewell Address. Thomas Jefferson concurred, but nonetheless “founded the first opposition party” out of concern that elements among those who had supported ratification of the 1787 Constitution surreptitiously harbored monarchist ambitions. Muirhead sympathizes with Jefferson’s dilemma: “No open society over the past three centuries has succeeded without parties and partisanship.”

    Moving ahead to the present (for him, this is 2014), Muirhead remarks the increasingly “conservative” (and therefore partisan) character of the Republican Party, but oddly contrasts this with the Democrats, whose party, he claims, “retains its catch-all flavor,” “continu[ing] to cover a greater variety of ideological views.” At best one might say this is no longer true. The statement that “the tactics that the Republican Party uses in office appear to be less compromising and more destructive of the trust that governing requires” than those of the Democrats is equally dated. Again dubiously, Muirhead equates ‘liberalism’ with ‘progressivism,’ following the old New Dealers’ self-description, which was plausible only when New Dealers contrasted themselves with Marxists and their ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’ And of course his suggestion that liberals, so defined, “might be more effective if they could see themselves as more partisan, and as engaged in a partisan fight” hardly applies to American politics now, even if it did in 2014. (It didn’t.)

    What Muirhead “want[s] to defend” is “a kind of party spirit that is worn lightly, one that is open to facts and revision, and tolerant of—even appreciative of—opponents.” Partisans animated by that spirit would serve the right functions of partisans: with “a shared memory” of past achievements,” they “come together, and stay together, to protect these achievements.” What partisans should avoid is erecting “a ‘perceptual stream’ that filters out all information embarrassing to one’s own party,” thereby suffering “epistemic closure that makes it impossible to contemplate one’s own party’s errors and misdeeds.” Individual partisans must do a bit of that, anyway, simply in becoming partisans—that is, in joining a party that includes fellow-citizens who do not agree with every detail of their own opinions on all ‘issues.’ If partisans refuse to, as it were, lighten up, they might “render the government incapable of governing.” As he knows, this is what more-or-less happens in civil wars, and (as he seems not to know) this is what foreign enemies want to happen, as they essay to divide us preliminary to ruling us.

    Muirhead steps back to consider party spirit as understood by Americans in the past, and by the ‘ancients’ as well as ‘moderns.’ In America, the Progressives hoped to reduce that spirit to an absolute minimum because they regarded contemporary parties as defenders of oligarchy, “corrupt[ing] government of the people by substituting for it government by party bosses and special interests,” such as big industrial corporate bosses who paid off those bosses. Not only did Progressives valorize “the ideal of the independent citizen who could think and vote free from the influence of party,” their “lasting reforms” (i.e., not prohibition of alcoholic beverages) “all aimed to circumvent the parties and directly empower the people.” These reforms included the secret ballot, the direct primary, direct election of U.S. senators, ballot initiatives, and recall of suspect public officials. Crucially, he ignores the new oligarchy Progressives substituted for the parties: tenured civil servants in an ‘administrative state’ or bureaucracy. Woodrow Wilson wrote as tellingly about that as he did about the ‘democratic’ side of his proposed ‘new-republican’ revolution.

    Muirhead sees that there’s much more to it than that, however. The modern critique of parties comes from the modern reconception of parties themselves, itself a part of the modern reconception of politics. “The modern conception of politics is founded on principles of political morality that are taken to be true (and thus beyond contestation) in contrast to the traditional conception of politics, which denied that any political regime could be founded on truth.” Both modern party spirit and modern anti-partisanship share “an exaggerated sense of the work that moral principles can do in politics,” thereby “inflat[ing] expectations for a commonsense pragmatic politics that can only, in the end, leave citizens disappointed and confused.” Traditional anti-partisanship makes more sense because it shifts the highest moral expectations away from politics.

    By traditional anti-partisanship Muirhead means Aristotelian regime theory, not the actual practices of partisans in the ancient polis. Aristotle understands partisan politics as fundamentally a contest between oligarch and democrats, each faction making claims to rule, and each finding their claims “convincing and complete,” matters of “right and wrong, justice and injustice.” Aristotle disagrees. Political philosophy distances itself from such claims; that’s what got Socrates in trouble—eventually, Aristotle too. “To the philosopher, the claims each group advances look more partial than they seem from the inside” because those claims “reflect a group’s particular interest” rather than any dispassionate, reasoned consideration of the political community as a whole. To understand a political community as a whole includes seeing the reasons for the claims to rule made by partisans, some of which are more reasonable than others. Such claims “involve arguments about who deserves what; they are connected to ways of life and understandings of character that are nourished by and sustained by these ways of life.” They are claims about not only who should rule here and now but about the best regime, what the best way of life is, what the best human ‘type’ is, and what place each human type justly occupies in the political community. Every regime has one set of rulers and not another; every regime remains incomplete for that reason, while mistakenly believing itself to be complete. Questioning that completeness will likely enrage the rulers.

    Muirhead rightly notes that “traditional partisanship is motivated fundamentally not by selfish interests but by pride.” He means that Aristotle understands claims to rule to register not material desires primarily but honor: the desire for the prestige of office. This sense of honor or pride tends to foreclose reasoning. “Citizens must be unaware of their own—and their regime’s—partiality,” and when the annoying reasoner points this out they do not to it kindly. This inevitable and to some extent indispensable prejudice can be tempered by civic education. In its mild-mannered, eminently civil way, Aristotle’s Politics consists not only of thoughts interesting to philosophers but of considerations thoughtful if non-philosophic citizens need to weigh, teaching them (among many other things) why their partisan enemies think the way they do.

    James Madison shared much of Aristotle’s understanding of the party spirit. The tenth Federalist “adapts the traditional worry to the circumstances of commercial society, where the fundamental classes of the ancient polity—the demos and the oligarchs—are fragmented into a multiplicity of interests.” Although Muirhead doesn’t say it (persisting in his neglect of modern statism), Madison’s solution to excessive partisanship or factionalism depends in part upon the scope of the modern state, as well as upon the form of that state Madison famously commends: federal republicanism, the “extended republic.” Within that state, Madison would encourage a vast free-trade zone, fostering “a dynamic and extensive commercial society” that will multiply factions, preventing any one faction to become strong enough to dominate the others. By so “offer[ing] a modern solution to the partisan threat, he saw the threat in traditional terms.” Modern political parties would aspire to a size big enough to win national elections, and in so doing would encompass many of the factions seen in that nation. ‘Extended’ political parties would therefore be somewhat more faction-like than the American nation, but not nearly so factional and impassioned as the ones that troubled the small poleis of antiquity.

    Muirhead adds the familiar argument that modern political thinkers set a somewhat lower bar for political life than the ancients did. “No more is politics about justice in the sense of upholding an idea about which way of life is most worthy”; modern politics aims “principally” at “self-preservation and commodious living,” while ‘privatizing’ the quest for higher things. Its way of life is commercial, leaving room for religion but not establishing any particular church or creed, “tak[ing] rival conceptions about how best to care for the immortal soul out of politics”. Those thinkers did so in a largely successful attempt to end religious warfare in Europe and, in consequence, prevent its appearance in Europe’s North American colonies.

    This did not, and was not intended, to preclude the formation of what Muirhead calls a “last party,” that is, a party “distinguished by its commitment to the rational first principles of political morality at a moment when these principles remain in dispute.” He gives Whigs, Marxists, and John Rawls’s “deliberative democracy” proposal as examples of such parties, although he unaccountably ignores the Founders and their distinguished defender Abraham Lincoln. He objects to such efforts: “This is the wrong way to conceive of political unity. What defines a liberal politics is not an agreement only to disagree within certain bounds (never touching foundational ideas), but to disagree in a certain way; according to constitutional procedures, in a certain manner.” Whether Progressives, Whigs, Marxists, or Rawls would endorse this is irrelevant, however; it is the Founders who count when it comes to the United States Constitution and the regime it fortifies. If ‘liberalism’ now means ‘Progressivism,’ or some closely related phenomenon, then that simply means that Progressives have likely departed from Constitutional principles.

    Muirhead commits this error because he misconceives the “fundamental points” underlying “modern representative democracy,” at least as the Founders stated them. He cites rule by consent of the governed, liberty (especially liberty of conscience), and “the affirmation of political equality” (especially the rejection of slavery). But the Founders base their regime not on political right but on natural right, and the regime fought a civil war in large measure over just that point, which was denied by the regime of the secessionist entity.

    He continues, quite reasonably, to say that “We agree, while disagreeing about procedures, Court decisions, and the ends politics should serve, to keep our guns in their holsters.” That is the core of liberalism as Muirhead defines it, and it means that neither the Founders nor the Progressives (to say nothing of Marxists and American Whigs) were liberals in his sense. He reaches firmer ground when he observes that partisanship “ultimately concerns the most fundamental questions of politics,” the regime questions: Who rules, and who deserves to rule? What are the purposes of the political community? And what does it stand for?

    Since “being reasonable is never sufficient to permanently and justly settle conflict” in practice, he turns to a modern liberal who recognizes that fact and addresses it, well, reasonably. John Stuart Mill acknowledges the partial cogency of both Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian rationalism and Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s esteem for tradition. Muirhead rejects the argument of the Declaration of Independence because its “self-evident” truths are not really self-evident. Mill’s version of utilitarianism, at once more capacious and refined than Bentham’s, comes close to appropriating Aristotle’s sense of the philosophic umpire captured, however imperfectly, by the mind of the civically-educated citizen, one who tests his own convictions against those of others and against stubborn realities of everyday life. If “what we need is not less partisanship but better partisanship,” then Mill’s brand of utilitarianism may point the way to it. It might, except that it’s hard to distinguish Mill’s mild skepticism from ‘being reasonable,’ the very stance that Muirhead finds insufficient to settle conflict.

    One thumotic characteristic of political life is loyalty. “It is possible to be loyal and to see the object of our loyalty as it is, with all its faults.” Indeed so: Christians call this agapic love. (This is a point that Dartmouth political scientists may be excused for not noticing.) In ordinary circumstances, however, loyalty is double-edged, as it may lead both to crucial support in difficult times and to foolish assent to evildoing. “If loyalty were merely strategic, it would boil down to a form of prudence.” True enough, but there’s more than one form of prudence, as when Jesus tells His disciples to be innocent as doves but prudent as serpents. To love my friend, in the sense of desiring the best ‘him,’ will require me to know him, to know the good, and to figure out how to fit those two knowledges together. (The same goes for loving my enemy, or myself.) Muirhead sees some of this when he writes, “to be loyal we do not need to close ourselves off to the terrain of elemental facts.” We can ‘fact-check’ our own party’s candidate, not only the other party’s candidate. What is more, in doing this and in undertaking other political tasks we can exercise “remembrance and patience,” the latter again being a consequence of agapic love. “The judgments we make today are subject to revision in light of events and developments that have yet to take place.” Partisanship coupled with patience proves “necessary to any government that tries to serve a popular purpose” and, one might add, any government that serves nearly any purpose.

    Having availed himself of Christian virtues without invoking Christianity, Muirhead now turns to several specific matters relating to modern-day democratic politics in the United States. The first is the primary election. Progressives advocated ‘primaries’ as a device to reduce the power of party ‘bosses.’ This didn’t so much eliminate party spirit as extend it to the voters who show up to vote in party primaries, who no longer necessarily expected government jobs from winning candidates (those were increasingly filled by professional administrators) but instead were motivated by ‘issues’—very often advanced in a manner that stirred passions strong enough to impel party members to show up at the polls. Following his prescription, Muirhead wants simultaneously to elevate and moderate the many issues-oriented voters. This is hard to do, and “few democracies in the world today routinely invite the general citizenry to participate directly in party nominations,” as Americans have done in the past 120 years or so. Here, only primaries closed to everyone except registered party members can make it likely that the candidate will be a genuine representative of his party, but the logic of inclusion characteristic of democracy has made closed primaries things of dubious legitimacy, even in the eyes of loyal partisans. He sees nothing more than increased “civic knowledge” among voters as a possible solution to this dilemma. The real solution would be to get cut back on the administrative state and offer spoils to the victors, again. Is this any more corrupt than a primary system in which special-interest money will always get in, somehow, and an administrative state and a popularly-elected legislature both far from immune to cozy alliances with oligarchs.

    Of the three branches of American government, the legislature provides the most natural home for partisanship. “This is where modern partisanship was born, and where it continues to be nourished.” Organization along party lines is the only way to get things done in such a body, an excellent point, given the common assumption that parties in legislatures lead only to ‘gridlock.’ Further, “without party unity, voters would have a far more difficult time sorting out what their vote is endorsing or rejecting,” as they “would need to track the voting records of individual legislators.” Like any good follower of Mill, however, Muirhead finds an exception to this rule: the unicameral legislature of Nebraska, “one of the only nonpartisan legislatures in the world” and also one of the most popular with citizens. It is true that this results in piecemeal, even incoherent, legislation when an observer searches for any overall policy and purpose in Nebraska lawmaking, as shifting coalitions vote for laws on a case-by-case basis. The legislature’s designer, the well-known early Progressive George Norris, wanted government to run ‘like a business,’ solving concrete problems; in this, he partook of the pragmatic Progressivism of (for example) John Dewey, rather than the German-idealist Progressivism of a man like Wilson. This is all too businesslike for Muirhead, who protests that the business model exists to maximize profit, but in government “there is no single purpose that must be prioritized over all rivals”. But if the Nebraska legislature proceeds piecemeal, and yields no coherent overall policy, how can it be criticized for being too businesslike, too focused?

    Another proposal for legislative reform is the establishment of a “Centrist Party,” which would perform the same function in a legislature as the middle class would do in Aristotle’s ‘mixed regime’: serving as a balance wheel between the two more extreme, and possibly larger, parties. Unlike the Nebraska system, this “does not suppose that politics, ideally, will lack partisan conflict.” Muirhead doubts that it would work, as the Centrist Party itself would still be a party but at the same time “could not easily elicit passions and devotion because it can offer no stead principles, it can invoke no social or historical history about itself, and it cannot connect in a stable way with concrete social groups.” In this it would be quite unlike Aristotle’s middle class.

    Beyond legislative politics one finds the executive and judicial branches. In them, partisanship works less well than it does in the legislature. The original duty of the executive under the Constitution as originally understood was precisely to execute, and nothing else: to execute the laws passed by Congress in accordance with the constitutional framework and to defend the country against any sudden foreign attacks or domestic violence on those occasions when there was no time to consult Congress. The original duty of the judiciary was to “say what the law is,” and surely not to ‘interpret’ the Constitution in such a way as effectively to amend it. But “in the twentieth century, beginning with Theodore Roosevelt and even more notably with Woodrow Wilson presidents became partisan in a new way: they were charged”—by themselves, it should be noted—”with formulating and advancing a program that would orient the actions of both the national legislature and the executive administration.” The intention to “us[e] the presidency to transform eighteenth-century constitutional democracy into twentieth-century party democracy was Woodrow Wilson’s idea,” Muirhead rightly remarks. As a result, when Ronald Reagan essays ‘conservative’ policies, he could only act as a ‘visionary’ Wilson-like president, exercising ‘leadership.’ That was the way the circumstances of the office of the presidency effectively had been rearranged. By contrast, but still within the same framework, President Barack Obama presented himself as an above-the-fray manager, as if he were the Bureaucrat of all bureaucrats. “Hidden in this [was] an arrogant insistence that everyone should agree with us, without the bother of explaining why.” Obama’s difficulties in justifying his national health care program were self-created; he pretended that a partisan, indeed socialist or quasi-socialist policy could be fobbed off as a mere tying-up of a governing loose end. Muirhead goes on to criticize Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush, not for Olympian complacency but low-minded, partisan use of the Attorney-General’s office.

    The Department of Defense also has become partisan in the wrong way, Muirhead charges. The white, male, and Southern enlistees who predominantly populate the American military vote Republican. “The specter of a military coup seems fantastic only because the nonpartisan posture of military officers has made it so unthinkable.” But, according to him, “this professional norm is the principle that retired generals invade when they endorse political candidates.” Given the fact that numerous retired generals have not merely endorsed political candidates but have become political candidates—Washington, Jackson, Grant, and Eisenhower being among the more prominent—with no ill effects, it is hard to take this complaint seriously.

    Muirhead concludes, “The modern conceit—that having discovered the first principles of political morality, we have escaped the partisan predicament of traditional politics—is overdrawn.” It is, although neither the Founders, nor Lincoln, nor any of the major political figures of eighteenth and nineteenth century America thought of politics that way. The “self-evident” truths asserted in the Declaration of Independence were a casus belli, not a settlement, of a partisan dispute; those same truths also saw not merely partisan but violent partisan defense in the Civil War and in several foreign wars.

    This notwithstanding, Muirhead correctly observes that “the realignment of conservative southern whites away from their habitual attachment to the Democratic Party”—it had become “habitual” during and after the slavery controversy, in opposition to the Republicans—”and toward the Republican Party is what allowed the parties to become more ideologically distinct.” The “bipartisan consensus” that had prevailed, rather briefly, from roughly 1940 through the mid-to-late Sixties, came at the price of tolerating systematic violation of the natural rights of the descendants of slaves. But he misreads the immediate future, supposing that the “disconnect” between the American people and the political elites will hinge on popular disinclination to pay higher taxes colliding with the elites’ sober recognition that higher taxes will be necessary to pay the national debt. The actual “disconnect” has in fact been not financial but moral—or, as one says now, ‘cultural’—and economic. A substantial portion of the American people reprehend the libertine morality of the elites, and their attempts to prevent the practice of traditional morality by that portion of the American people. At the same time, many of these same persons have lost well-paying manufacturing jobs as the result of internationalist economic policies designed by the elites. Hence Trump—much to the dismay of the elites. ‘Conservatives’ have been saying such things for years; seldom heeded or even noticed by the elites, including those ensconced at Ivy League political science departments, and have only begun to take notice in the years after Professor Muirhead published his book.

    This intelligently-argued if often confused book contributes to the discussion of the party spirit in America, a discussion that itself has become partisan.

     

     

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

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