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    Archives for July 2019

    The Logic of the United States Constitution

    July 11, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Paul R. DeHart: Uncovering the Constitution’s Moral Design. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007.

     

    Note: I am grateful to Robert R. Reilly, Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, for drawing my attention to this book.

     

    To uncover the Constitution’s moral design, most scholars examine the writings and speeches of its Framers, especially those available in the records of the Constitutional Convention and in the ratification debates. Some also consult the pre-Constitutional documents issued by the United States, foremost among them the Declaration of Independence, but also the Northwest Ordinance and other major state papers classified as ‘organic laws’ of the United States. Some might also look to early Supreme Court decisions for clarification on certain points, and to post-Constitutional presidential papers and debates in Congress.

    DeHart takes a different approach. Somewhat along the lines of the post-World-War-II New Critics in literature departments, he observes that any text has an integrity of its own, apart from the intentions of its author or authors; by ‘design’ he means the structure of the document, not ‘design’ as ‘intent.’ If I intend to say, ‘The sky is blue’ but mistakenly type ‘The sky is not blue,’ the meaning of the sentence I have typed is the opposite of my intention. It is nonetheless the meaning of the sentence I have typed, and any lawyer, including a constitutional lawyer, would take due note of that. The New Critics maintained that whatever John Keats’s intention may have been, “Ode on a Grecian Urn” means something that can only be discovered first by looking at the words he put on the page. Other elaborations may follow, but that is the indispensable first step. As DeHart puts it, “The writings of the key framers cannot serve as a proxy for the Constitution.”

    Unlike the New Critics, DeHart is also a logician. To uncover the Constitution’s moral design, and indeed tp determine if it has one, he compares what it says to several familiar moral doctrines, including Aristotelianism, Hobbesianism, Kantianism, positivism, and nihilism. When he finds that a given moral doctrine contradicts some important clause or clauses of the Constitution, he rules it out as the source of that design. “General categories as classical, modern, or positivist bundle together logically discrete propositions concerning sovereignty, the common good, natural law, and natural rights”; therefore, such propositions are open to confirmation or refutation as elements of the Constitutional framework, the institutional structure it ordains. “We must turn our attention to uncovering that framework by analyzing the logic of and assumptions underlying the practical, institutional arrangements put into place by the Constitution.” In this he follows the lead of no less a constitutionalist than James Madison, who distinguished what he called the “true meaning” of the Constitution from “whatever might have been the opinions entertained in forming the Constitution.” This, Madison went on to say, included the Constitutional debates, which he recorded, and The Federalist, which he helped to write. Madison did not deny the value of such extraconstitutional writings in clarifying points in the Constitution, only that such writings closed cases.

    More, DeHart undertakes not only a scholarly exercise but an exercise in moral philosophy. “The overriding question is this: Is the Constitution’s normative framework philosophically sound?” Is “the Constitution’s assumption about the common good,” once identified, “in fact good”?

    There are some merits in this approach. For example, scholars have found antecedents of the Constitution in texts ranging from Genesis to The Spirit of the Laws. God and Montesquieu are not to be confused. Does this make the Constitution incoherent? No: “It remains possible to draw on incompatible thinkers in ways consistent with a particular normative framework.” Indeed, “the framers did not tell us how they drew on various thinkers”; “it is logically possible that the Constitution is partly modern and partly classical.” Research into their writings “will not provide us with a determinative answer concerning the Constitution’s normative framework.” Or, as Hamilton put it, “Nothing is more common than for laws to express and effect more or less than was intended.”

    By “the Constitution” DeHart means not only “writing on parchment” but what the Constitution constitutes: the “practical institutional arrangement” of the United States government, what the Greeks called the politeia or form of the American national government. The politeia in turn influences, and is influenced by, “the incentive patterns” of citizens who live under the governmental form, the Bios ti or way of life of the American people, and especially of those who undertake to govern. “On this understanding, the Constitution also includes the normative framework that is presupposed by its particular institutional arrangements,” its telos or purpose. Readers of Aristotle will recognize all these as elements of what he calls the regime of a political community. In considering the moral design of the American regime as seen in the United States Constitution, DeHart considers four main topics: sovereignty, the common good, natural laws, and natural rights.

    DeHart gets down to particulars, discussing Madison’s accounts of the controversy over whether presidents had the power to remove officers appointed with the Senate’s advice and consent, a point nowhere explicitly addressed in the Constitution.  In addressing he issue, “Madison exhibits the sort of reasoning I have in mind.” He begins by observing what he calls “a principle that pervades the whole system,” namely that there should be “the highest possible degree of responsibility in all the executive officers thereof.” Executive officers therefore should be responsible to the chief executive officer, the president; this in turn will make the president directly responsible to the American people for “the conduct of the person he has nominated and appointed.” DeHart glosses Madison by calling this argument a specimen of “reasoning in terms of the institutional structure of the Constitution.” He finds “beneath the surface of Madison’s reasoning… an application of the law of noncontradiction,” inasmuch as to make the president’s removal power contingent on Senate approval would render executive power, and therefore executive responsibility, “virtually nonexistent.” On the larger point, Madison compares the principle of executive action under the Constitution (responsibility) to a particular action (the removal of an officeholder) and finds that the action in question logically coheres with the principle—more so than it does with the legislative and advise-and-consent powers of the Senate.

    Plato illustrates this more generally in his analysis of “proper function”: “the proper function of a thing, Q, is that work which only Q does or that which Q does better than anything else.” Additionally, to perform its proper function Q must be in good condition; “a dull pruning knife will not even succeed in cutting a vine where a sharp dagger will.” “Plato’s rule for discerning the work appropriate to a thing, its purpose, has nothing to do with the intentions of a designer.” The designer of the object we identify as a pruning knife may or may not have designed it for pruning. We infer its function from its design. Returning to the Constitution, DeHart proposes to compare several moral theories with the Constitution, determining how many points in each theory contradict the structure of the Constitution; he will then “try to figure out which moral assumption” in each theory “explains or is consistent with the most constitutional features and which assumption requires the least auxiliary hypotheses in the course of providing an explanation.” Finally, at the “teleological level” of explanation, he will determine not only whether a given moral assumption is “the best fit” with Constitution, but whether it is a sound moral assumption. This final step will answer his “overriding question” as to the moral soundness of the Constitution itself. If a given moral theory both fits the Constitutional structure and proves philosophically sound, then the Constitution is good.

    The first of the four topics DeHart addresses is sovereignty, “the right to determine what shall or shall not be law by giving consent to what will or to what has already gone into effect.” In classical ‘regime’ terms, sovereignty belongs to a person or persons, the “ruling body” or politeuma. The Constitution “presumes the sovereign to be both popular and constrained.” Whether or not it is popularly constrained, the sovereign may delegate its powers to others (as, for example, between the national government and the government of provinces) because “the exercise” of sovereign power “is not essential to sovereign power”; “it is enough for the sovereign to be able to weigh in on how these functions are performed,” reserving the “final determining power” to itself, should it “decide to exercise it.” DeHart adds that sovereign power could be given away. Therefore, the fact that “We the People” have ordained the Constitution of the United States doesn’t prove that we have retained sovereignty, now that the Constitution is operating. To assume so would be to commit what logicians call the ‘genetic fallacy’—that the origin of a thing constitutes that thing, simply and entirely.

    DeHart finds three main possible explanations of sovereignty under the Constitution. Positivists claim that “the people retain an unconstrained sovereignty,” authorizing “officials and institutions to carry out their will.” Modernists claim that the Constitution “presupposes that the people transfer sovereignty from themselves to the authority they establish,” making the government sovereign, no longer the people. Classicists claim that the Constitution “presupposes a sovereign constrained by the dictates of justice, whether this sovereign be popular, mixed, etc.” The Declaration of Independence clearly states what DeHart calls the classical view, laying down as major premises of its argument that human beings are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, rightly secured by governments. But DeHart must find evidence for this in the Constitution itself. Given the Constitution’s substantial powers to govern the American people, “they are a greatly constrained sovereign,” a collection of citizens who “cannot get what they want, right when they want it.” Although “all governmental authority traces back to the will of the whole people,” either directly or indirectly—thus establishing popular sovereignty—the people must exercise that sovereignty under certain self-imposed constraints. Their “long-term will” may prevail, but to prefer the long-term will of the people to their short-term will strongly suggests that there must be some criterion whereby long-term popular will is preferable to short-term will. This doesn’t tell us (as the Declaration does) what that criterion is. To put it in terms of a major Constitutional controversy, it doesn’t tell us that Lincoln was right about the character of the moral lights Senator Douglas was blowing out when he argued for unlimited popular sovereignty; it does tell us Douglas was wrong.

    What, then, does the Constitution tell us about the common good, about justice? Positivists deny the existence of any “objective common good.” Obligation “derives from the command of the sovereign,” period. Modernists (beginning with Hobbes) say that the common good is peace. Classicists say that the Constitution includes peace, self-preservation, but also “includes all the dimensions of human well-being and rightly ordered relationships.” He then adds another possibly relevant moral theory, elaborated by Kant, who distinguishes both the classical and the modern teleological accounts of a real common good from “deontic” accounts. Kant locates morality not in the fulfillment of some end or purpose but in the sincere attempt to enact some a prior principle (for Kant, the categorical imperative)—not so much a good end but a good will.

    DeHart rejects Kantianism. “We cannot, by recourse to the will, determine whether any particular exercises of the will are good or bad.” He prefers classical teleology, whose proponents argue that “human well-being” or goodness “is composed first and foremost of a rightly ordered soul—a soul in which reason governs the appetites through the passions (or the spirited part)” of the soul. “This is true because the human function, or work, is to live according to reason,” which is as much the distinctive quality or virtue of the human soul as a cutting edge is the distinctive quality or virtue of a knife. The full exercise of reason requires the exercise of other virtues, including “courage, friendliness, generosity, and prudence,” along with moderation and courage.

    Unlike positivists, the Constitution does not deny the existence of an objective common good. Nor does it encourage the undiscriminating expression of human desires; indeed, it discourages such expression. Nor is there anything in the Constitution that indicates support for Kantianism, given the Constitution’s obviously purpose-driven structure (to say nothing of its Preamble, wherein the purposes of that structure are clearly spelled out). With respect to modernist or ‘thin’ teleology, which holds that the Constitution aims only at peace or self-preservation, the Constitution’s structure provides for more than civil peace alone. By delaying decisions, by discouraging impulsive acts, the Constitution valorizes reason over passions and appetites. “Passion is a passing thing. Unjust factions animated by passion do not endure for long. If the lawmaking process is a slow one in which laws are repeatedly brought under reexamination, passionately driven factions will likely dissipate before their demands can be met.” Therefore, the Constitution “should be understood as an institutional structure that takes the governance of the political community by reason for its goal.” As DeHart knows, this is exactly what Madison said it was.

    If the Constitution encourages the rule of reason, what is reason ruled by? Logically, it is ruled by the principle of noncontradiction. But noncontradiction is a means to an end. What standard does reason discover, when it functions according to its nature, when we think non-contradictorily? DeHart maintains that “the Constitution presupposes a view of natural law in which the requirements of that law are known through noninstrumental, or substantive, reason.” “It is essentially Thomistic or Aristotelian”—presumably more Thomistic than Aristotelian, as Aristotle doesn’t make nearly as much of natural law as Thomas does, centering his ethics on natural right, which gives more play to the importance of circumstances in making moral choices. The emphasis on natural law instead of natural right may derive from the advent of Christianity between Aristotle’s life and Thomas’s. Be this as it may, although the common good provides the content of the natural law, law itself is a type of command. “The natural law adds prescription to the common good, telling us that we are obliged to pursue good and avoid evil.” He quotes the Catholic moral philosopher Knud Haakonssen, himself following Suarez, who writes that “the natural law… reflects the two inseparable sides of God’s nature, namely his rational judgment of good and evil and his will prescribing the appropriate behavior.”

    DeHart distinguishes natural law theory from theories grounded on the ‘moral sense,’ closely associated with theories grounded on ‘moral sentiments.’ In such theories, moral premises “are underivable by reason.” Some of these theories are more ‘sentimental’ or emotion-based than others. Those that define principles derived from the moral sense as effectively the first principles of practical reason are hard to distinguish from Thomists, who give a careful account of synderesis or conscience as the faculty of moral perception. Those who derive such principles from emotions tend to involve themselves in circular reasoning: If morality derives from emotions, but not all emotions are moral, how do the emotions know which sentiments are moral and which are not, other than by claiming that some sentiments make us feel as if we are good? By contrast, Thomas’s noninstrumental reason proceeds “via consideration of the objects to which the natural inclinations point”; by “inclinations” Thomas means “not ‘desire’ or ‘preference’ but rather the aim or goal (i.e., the disposition) of the design plan of human nature.” Noninstrumental moral reason looks at the nature of a human being and wants to know what is good for this kind of being. Moral actions will conduce to that good, which is really a constellation of goods.

    Turning to the Constitution, DeHart that it “can’t presuppose” that the standard of morality “is known by emotion” because its design favors (at the very least) long-term emotions” over “immediate ones.” The standard for such a preference cannot itself be an emotion, as that would entail circularity. As seen in the Constitution itself, and in Madison’s writings, the Constitution favors the rule of reason, not sentiment.

    If so, why does the Constitution countenance the kind of slavery that is based upon race, not at all upon reason? Because “the slavery provisions taken together can be understood as allowing slavery, in order to secure ratification of the Constitution by slave states, while providing constitutional means to work for its eventual elimination.” And of course the Constitution itself has banned slavery since the Civil War amendments were added. “To end slavery, Union was necessary; to form the Union, providing for the protection of slavery for the time being was necessary.” In sum, “a noninstrumentalist account of natural law fits with the Constitution in that the Constitution promotes the rule of reason over desire and sentiment, presumes, at a minimum, widespread moral knowledge, and seems to fit with the classical natural law account of the relationship between natural law and human law.”

    Where does this leave the doctrine of natural rights, as enunciated most prominently in the Declaration of Independence? DeHart argues that natural-law theory doesn’t deny the existence of natural rights but asserts the priority of natural law (and thus of duties) over natural rights. He regards the claim that natural rights precede natural law as modern, although of course both precede conventional or humanly-willed law, which should indeed secure natural rights, as the Declaration says. “The Constitution presupposes that natural law precedes natural rights and grants to natural rights what obliging force they have.” As G. E. M. Anscombe maintains, rights can only be justified by positing the existence of certain “necessary tasks.” By this she means that “if one has a right to perform a (morally) necessary task, one also has a right to the means of performing that task.” To prevent me from performing that task is to violate my right. A “necessary task” imposes a “stopping cannot” upon anyone who considers any such prevention. “A natural right is a ‘stopping cannot’ with a logos protecting a ‘can’ that a person possesses in virtue of human nature. That is, if N has a natural right to do Z, then something about N’s nature as a human being morally enables N to do Z and morally restricts others (whether individuals or the government) from preventing N from doing Z.”

    If one maintains, with Hobbes, that natural rights precede natural law, then the law of nature is “instrumental or conditional, telling people [in Hobbes’s central claim] that if they want peace, then they must surrender this right (insofar as others are willing to surrender it too).” That is, in the state of nature, which Hobbes calls a war of all against all, I and many others may decide that our natural right to self-preservation would be better served by making the rational choice to transfer our right to defend ourselves to the government we constitute for that purpose. And, Hobbes adds, that government must be sovereign, absolutely so, “unconstrained in any way”—a “‘can’ with no ‘stopping cannots.'” There can also be a variant of this, whereby the rights that dictate natural law shall not be contradicted by any individual or governmental act. “The Declaration [of Independence] says that the Creator endowed man with inalienable rights,” “imparting to his human creations an inviolable value sewn into the fabric of their beings.” Whatever John Locke may have thought of the Creator-God, he also may take governmental actions to be limited by prior natural rights, particularly the right to self-ownership.

    On this last point, DeHart prefers to enlist Locke on the natural-law and indeed theistic side of the debate, arguing that to say, as Locke does, that “human persons are God’s property, subject to duties [God] imposes upon them,” but they are also self-owners in the sense that they own themselves as trustees of God so long as they enjoy the gift of life from God. DeHart also cites Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments: the religious right to follow one’s conscience is a right I hold against other men, but with respect to God it is my duty. Be these scholarly interpretations as they may, the Constitution aligns with the priority of natural law, “plac[ing] constraints upon the will of the popular sovereign precluding the people from doing whatever they want in this matter.”

    But what about the Declaration’s stance, which at least may be construed to be that rights are prior to natural law? DeHart rejects it. “It is difficult… to see how natural law (or how obligation) can be generated by natural rights.” Taking property rights as his example, he asks, “Why should the fact that N has property in a thing or an act entail anything about what others are obliged to do with respect to N? There is a huge gaping hole left by a messing premise in the move from N’s property to everyone else’s mysteriously generated obligation to respect N’s property. In fact, the obligation of others to respect N’s property doesn’t exist unless there is first a rule or law such that if some thing or act O is the property of N, then others must respect N’s property and not interfere with his use of O or doing of O.” “The ground of the right must be an ontologically prior law imposing an obligation upon individuals to respect the property of others”; “the idea that rights, by themselves, generate obligations seems self-referentially incoherent.”

    One must ask DeHart: Why so? If God endows one (or more) of the species He creates with certain unalienable rights, then it isn’t necessarily a law that is ontologically prior to the right. God is ontologically prior, and His will is morally binding. God might of course create the human species by means of natural law, and that would make the law prior to the right, but if the right is endowed by the very act of creation then it is prior to the natural law. It is on this point that DeHart’s attempt to ‘Thomistify’ the United States Constitution and to decouple the Constitution from the principles of the Declaration breaks down. This is not to say that the Constitution need be based on either the priority of natural right or the priority of natural law. The Constitution leaves that ontological issue open.

    This notwithstanding, DeHart concludes, in my opinion indisputably, that “the Constitution’s presupposition of obligation antecedent to human willing seems to entail rights in the full sense (both as enabling ‘cans’ for the person with the right and as ‘stopping cannots’ for the person not in the possession of the rights) that are antecedent to and normative for human willing. It also seems to presuppose that these rights are inalienable.” This is “the philosophy latent in the Constitution.” And it is why the Constitution is good, the framework for a good regime.

    As a final note, it should be observed that DeHart’s interpretive strategy could be used with extraconstitutional texts, not only with moral theories. So, for example, a reader might compare the Declaration of Independence, or indeed any writing on the American regime, with the Constitution, to determine which texts ‘fit’ the Constitution and which do not. This would reintroduce the study of the Founders’ political thought to Constitutional interpretation, without making those texts authoritative to such interpretation in an arbitrary way.

     

     

     

    Filed Under: American Politics

    Solzhenitsyn on Russian Reconstruction

    July 8, 2019 by Will Morrisey

    Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals. Alexis Klimoff translation. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991.

    Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century. Yermolai Solzhenitsyn translation. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995.

     

    Born a year after the Bolshevik Revolution, Orthodox-Christian Russian patriot Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn lived to see the much-welcomed demise of that tyranny. By 1990, when he published this Rebuilding Russia in his own beloved language, he saw that “Time has run out for communism,” although “its concrete edifice has not yet crumbled.” Russians therefore “must take care not to be crushed beneath its rubble instead of gaining liberty.” The tyrants had used human blood as mortar; “we have lost a full third of our population” in “labored pursuit of a purblind and malignant Marxist-Leninist utopia,” a body count including those killed in “the ineptly, almost suicidally waged ‘Patriotic War'” against Nazi invaders. With this physical devastation, a moral-political crisis has ensued; “a helplessless bred of the absence of rights permeates the entire country,” as “we cling to only one thing: that we not be deprived of unlimited drunkenness.”

    Not quite one, only, however: “Human beings are so constituted that we can put up with such ruination and madness even when they last a lifetime, but God forbid that anyone should dare to offend or slight our nationality!” “Such is man: nothing has the capacity to convince us that our hunger, our poverty, our early deaths, the degeneration of our children—that any of these misfortunes can take precedence over national pride.” To begin reconstruction of Russia under a new and better regime, Russians need less to feel their nationhood than to think about it, to make it (as Marxists would say) conscious, thoughtful. Far from the dogmatic nationalist his enemies have called him, Solzhenitsyn wanted Russians to deliberate with him about what it means to be Russian.

    “What is Russia?” The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “will break up whatever we do.” Much of it has consisted of non-Russian peoples gathered under that regime, an ideological rather than a national construct. Russians should declare “loudly, clearly, and without delay” the independence of eleven of the Soviet ‘republics’: Moldavia (“if it feels drawn to Romania”) along with those in the Baltic area, in Transcaucasia, and in Central Asia (except Kazakhstan, which has a substantial Russian population). Without these peoples, who long for self-government according to the ethoi of their own nationalities, there would remain “an entity that might be called Rus,” consisting of “Little Russians” (Ukrainians), “Great Russians,” and Belorussians. Since those Russian peoples live in areas home to dozens of other nationalities and ethnic groups, “a fruitful commonwealth of nations,” a “Russian Union,” will require Russians to “marshal all the resources of our hearts and minds to the task,” in part by “affirming the integrity of each culture and the preservation of each language.” In his own way, Solzhenitsyn is a ‘multiculturalist.’

    The American regime initially founded its ‘multicultural’ regime on natural rights; the Bolsheviks founded their regime on Marxism-Leninism. What does Solzhenitsyn offer as the foundation of a new Russian regime?

    He addresses each Russian group in turn. To his fellow ‘Great Russians,’ he warns that “we don’t have the strength,” economic or moral, to sustain the existing, collapsing empire, “and it is just as well.” Unfortunately, “the awakening Russian national self-awareness,” no longer narcotized by Communist ideology, “has to a large extent been unable to free itself of great-power thinking and of imperial delusions,” continuing to take pride in a ‘superpower’ status that it is losing. Against this, Solzhenitsyn appeals to the example of Russia’s rival in the war that began to reveal the decline of the Czarist regime—Japan, which found “a way to be reconciled with its situation, renouncing its sense of international mission and the pursuit of tempting political ventures,” gaining prosperity in return. As Solzhenitsyn must know, Japan did this with the aid of a powerful American ‘prompting’ in the person of the American general, Douglas MacArthur, backed up by his occupying troops. Russians haven’t been conquered; they will need to write their own new constitution, then live by it. To do this, Solzhenitsyn would redirect Russian pride away from imperialism and toward the preservation and enhancement of Russianness, “clarity of what remains of our spirit,” a “precious inner development” that alone can reverse Russians’ harrowing demographic decline. “‘Taking pride’ is not what we need to do, nor should we be attempting to impose ourselves on the lives of others. We must rather, grasp the reality of the acute and debilitating illnesses that is affecting our people, and pray to God that He grant us recovery, along with the wisdom to achieve it.” Christianity in the form of Russian Orthodoxy would then replace atheism in the form of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.

    To Ukrainians and Belorussians, he recalls that “our people came to be divided into three branches by the terrible calamity of the Mongol invasion, and by Polish colonization,” but originally “we all sprang from precious Kiev,” where “we received the light of Christianity.” It should be noted that the Russians originated in Scandinavia—probably from Viking stock, which would explain a certain battle-readiness as well as the incidence of red hair in the population (not unlike the Irish). It is also noteworthy that Kievan Rus didn’t extend very far east, not even to the Volga River. Nonetheless, “the Muscovite state” was “created by the same people who made up Kievan Rus,” and the Rus people who eventually fell under Polish and Lithuanian rule to the west “resisted Polonization and conversion to Catholicism.” That is, they maintained not only their ethnic but their spiritual identity.

    This notwithstanding, Solzhenitsyn acknowledges that many Ukrainians or ‘Little Russians’ no longer feel any strong allegiance to their ‘Great-Russian’ brethren. What to do? Invite them to join the Russian Union, but do not force them in. Each locality within Ukraine should be allowed to vote themselves in or out. For himself, Solzhenitsyn exhorts them to come in: “Brothers! We have no need of this cruel partition. The very idea comes from the darkening of minds brought on by the communist years. Together, we have borne the suffering of the Soviet period, together we have tumbled into this pit, and together, too, we shall find our way out.” Insofar as Ukrainian Russians and Belorussians have indeed developed “cultures” distinct from that of ‘Great Russians,’ those cultures should enjoy “free manifestation,” “not only on their two territories but among the Great Russians as well.” Parallel schools should be established, with children attending in accordance with “the parents’ choice.” As for the dozens of smaller nationalities and ethnic groups, to grant sovereignty to each would lead to chaos, but they could find political representation in a Council of Nationalities in the Russian Union—”a forum in which event the smallest of national groups can have its voice heard.”

    Once paths to separation of most major nations in the Soviet empire and the consensual union of Russians have been established, Russians must begin their inner reconstitution as a well-ordered nation. Materially, “a patriot and a true statesman” will eliminate such unnecessary expenses as aid to “the tyrannical regimes we have implanted the world over,” the manufacture of offensive weapons, the ‘space race,’ subsidies to Eastern European countries, and the Communist party and state bureaucracies. Above all, “our people must urgently be made aware of the meaning of work, after half a century when no one could see any advantage to putting forth an effort,” while recognizing that “Nature, disdained so ungratefully by us, is taking its revenge” by the pollution of Russian earth, water, and air by radioactive and other poisonous materials. “On top of all this,” Russians “must now prepare to resettle those compatriots who are losing their places of residence” in lands that will free themselves of the imperial grip.

    Morally, “a public admission by the Party of its guilt, its crimes, and its helplessness would at least be the first step toward alleviating the oppressiveness of our moral atmosphere.” The political corollary to this moral statement would be the dismantling of the KGB. But political reform must be preceded by social reform. “There can be no independent citizen without private property”; lands now ‘owned’ by the Communist state must be leased or sold to individual Russians or Russian families (not to corporations and not to foreigners). Such privately-owned lands will easily feed the country, as indeed the few private plots permitted under the Communist regime had done. Small businesses, anti-monopoly and anti-usury laws, environmental laws, regulated foreign investment, and stable prices all will underwrite a decentralized governmental system, featuring “perhaps forty centers of vitality and illumination throughout the breadth of the land.” “The road back to health must begin at the grassroots”; Solzhenitsyn’s stays in Switzerland and rural Vermont, with their responsible local governing authorities, reminded him of Russia’s own practice of village self-government dating back to the Middle Ages. These governments and the small-scale economic structures that enable them to flourish, will require revival of “normal families,” which “have virtually ceased to exist in our country” because women were forced into the workplace and men lacked salaries sufficient to support a household. Further, underpaid local schoolteachers were required to teach “ideological gibberish” to the children. “All changes and all efforts to salvage true knowledge must begin with revamping the curricula at the teachers’ colleges.” As for the overall culture, the Soviet regime “gave our country superb protection against all the positive features of the West,” such as civil liberties, respect for the individual, and civil-social organizing, but it “permitted the continuous seepage of liquid manure,” that is, “the self-indulgent and squalid ‘popular mass culture” “mindlessly ape[d]” by Russian youth.

    If Russians address these crucial matters in a measured and prudent way, they can avoid “repeat[ing] the chaos” of February 1917, which led to the ruinous Bolshevik Revolution in October. “A decisive change in regime calls for thoughtfulness and a sense of responsibility”—exactly what Russian intellectuals and politicians generally lacked during and in the years preceding the Great War. “There is no guarantee whatever that the new leaders now coming to the fore will immediately prove to be far-sighted and sober-minded.” Nonetheless—and this is the monumental risk Solzhenitsyn judges Russians must take to avoid such chaos and resultant tyranny, this time—Russians will need a “strong central authority” to undertake the transition to a genuinely federal and republican Russia at some time in the future. An immediate democratic-republican revolution will not work under current conditions of economic impoverishment, spiritual desolation, and political inexperience. “Beyond upholding its rights, mankind must defend its soul, freeing it for reflection and feeling.” Mankind cannot do that collectively, but only nation-by-nation and indeed village-by-village, family-by-family. “If a nation’s spiritual energies have been exhausted, it will not be saved from collapse by the most perfect government structure or by any industrial development: a tree with a rotten core cannot stand.” “That is why the destruction of our souls over three-quarters of a century is the most terrifying thing of all,” a destruction planned, carried out, and perpetuated by “the corrupt ruling class,” shamelessly hanging on to positions of power in government, business, and the universities. “West Germany was suffused with the feeling of repentance before the coming of their economic boom. But in our country no one has even begun to repent” Even the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy partakes in the corruption, unable thus far event to reform itself, let alone to undertake the moral reformation of Russians. Russians can only look to themselves, under God, in a spirit of “conscious self-limitation,” making a virtue out of material and political necessity.

    As a writer, Solzhenitsyn can assist in one area to which he can indeed limit himself, in adherence to his own advice. “Before the [Bolshevik] Revolution, the bulk of our people had no experience with political concepts, and the ideas that were pounded into our heads by propaganda in the subsequent seventy years served only to cloud our minds. But not what our country has begun moving in the direction of real political life, and when the forms of the government-to-be are already being discussed, it is useful to focus on the precise meaning of some terms in order to prevent possible mistakes.” A writer can attend to his nation’s language, and Solzhenitsyn does that.

    To talk sensibly of regimes, of governmental forms, he recurs first to Spengler and to Montesquieu, both of whom emphasized the need to fit the regime to the physical size of the country, its topography, history, traditions, and ethos. “The task is to set in place a structure that will lead to a flourishing of this people rather than to its decline and degeneration” (and not to worry so much about the flourishing of ‘that‘ people somewhere else, which has a very different territory, history, tradition, and ethos, and thus quite likely a different regime or variation of the same kind of regime suited to Russia). Solzhenitsyn cites Aristotle’s tripartite regime classification (rule of the one, the few, the many), noting that each type can have a good or bad version, and that the type chosen will survive only if prudent statesmen choose carefully. “Many new countries have in recent years suffered a fiasco just after introducing democracy; yet, despite such evidence, this same period has seen an elevation of democracy from a particular state structure into a sort of universal principle of human existence, almost a cult.” But democracy, whether defined politically as popular sovereignty or civil-socially (as by Tocqueville) to mean social egalitarianism, does not guarantee liberty. To be just, democracy needs individual freedom and a government of laws, what one of the 1917 Constitutional Democrats called “a certain level of political discipline among the populace,” “precisely what we lacked in 1917,” and what “one fears that there is even less of,” in the Russia of 1990.

    Therefore, if republicanism is to be introduced gradually to Russia, to Russians as they are, statesmen must institute well-defined electoral procedures—procedures that do not merely express the popular will in direct elections (“in a country as huge as ours,” direct election of representatives can only means that voters won’t know the people they vote for), but also (as Madison famously wrote) refine and enlarge the public views. Once lost, self-government is hard to recover. “European democracy was originally imbued with a sense of Christian responsibility and self-discipline, but these spiritual principles have been gradually losing their force,” increasingly replaced by “the dictatorship of self-satisfied vulgarity, of the latest fads, and of group interests.” Unlike such Central European thinkers as Adam Michnik and Vacláv Havel, Solzhenitsyn doesn’t hope or expect that either elections or the political parties competing in them aim at “the search for truth.” More, even in democratic regimes the parties tend toward oligarchy, whether of party leaders or of administrative agencies with no enforceable responsibility to the people they rule. Political parties and other civil associations should “exist freely, propounding ay views and issuing publications at their own expense,” as long as their records are “open to public inspection,” are “registered”—as lobbyists are, in the United States— and make their “programs” public. No political parties could legally interfere in the workplace, in the service sector, or in the schools. Elected party candidates would be required to suspend their party membership for the duration of their term in office.

    In many ways the zemstvo—a territory organized for self-government—serves as the centerpiece of Solzhenitsyn’s institutional structure. A zemstvo would exist on several levels of government, measured by size: a local unit (consisting of a mid-sized municipality, a district in a big city, or a group of villages); a large city; a region; and finally an all-Russian body, the All-Zemstvo Assembly. Western readers will recognize in such a system the embodiment of the principle of subsidiarity. “For us who have completely lost touch with genuine self-government, the task will be to assimilate this sequence step by step, starting from the bottom,” a sequence “useful for many in the population to acquire political skills.” Candidates for seats in the local zemstvo “normally will be well known to the voters,” and elections campaigns would consist only of the candidates’ programs, biographies, and “views.” Election to a larger zemstvo would be determined by a vote by the zemstvos within its territory. Bureaucracies would be curbed, although Solzhenitsyn gives no details on how to do it; he seems to envision a zemstvo veto on bureaucratic regulations. Meanwhile, a powerful head of state would be elected directly by national vote from a list of nominees provided by the All-Zemstvo Assembly. There would also be a second house of the legislature, its 200-250 members consisting of representatives of various “estates’ (soslovia)—persons with a common occupation, elected by members of each designated estate. This body could veto presidential candidates proposed by the All-Zemstvo Assembly and to interdict laws and actions proposed by a government institution or agency, but this would need to be a unanimous decision by the members. This means that the estates assembly would at most exercise a certain moral authority, inasmuch as it is nearly inconceivable that a 200-member body would deliver a unanimous vote on any matter.

    Solzhenitsyn deliberately leaves his proposals incomplete, acknowledging that he has said nothing about the military or the courts. He wants Russians to act for themselves. “Building a rational and just state is a task of surpassing difficulty, and the goal can only be approached slowly by means of successive approximations and small, cautious steps.” Caution makes sense, as Solzhenitsyn shows in another brief and readable book, The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century, which amounts to a short history of Russia since the beginning of the Romanov Dynasty. That history illustrates “the numerous blunders in our past” from which “our plight today in many ways stems.” If initially Russians must work with the handicap of unfamiliarity with civic life, a history can at least give them some vicarious experience of what ruling entails—from the viewpoint of rulers, not only of the ruled (a viewpoint with which they are much too familiar).

    The very young aristocrat Mikhail Romanov ascended to the Russian throne in 1613, elected by the Zemsky Sobor during the first of three ‘Times of Troubles’ identified by Solzhenitsyn—the others being the collapse of the czarist and Communist regimes in 1917 and 1991, respectively. An assembly organized around three social groups—aristocrats and top bureaucrats; Orthodox clergy; commoners (of course excluding the vast peasantry)—the Zemsky Sobor had been founded some three generations earlier, in 1549, by Ivan IV, a couple of years after his marriage to a Romanov. When Tsaritsa Anastasia died under suspicious circumstances in 1560, Ivan went on a rampage against the aristocrats, whom he supposed had poisoned her (hence “Ivan the Terrible”). When Ivan’s dynastic line ended with a childless czar, in 1598 the Zemsky Sobor elected Boris Godunov, the last Rurikid czar’s brother-in-law, he moved to ruin the Romanovs, who had contested his election. This succession crisis occurred during the desperate Polish-Muscovite War; as in 1917, foreign and domestic crises intersected, although ‘intersected’ is a painfully abstract term for describing such a crisis of blood and honor.

    Solzhenitsyn takes a political lesson from this crisis, beyond an account of dynastic struggle over the monarchy. Citing historian Andrei Platonov, he writes that “the tortuous and enervative Time of Troubles brought also a beneficent change to the political outlook of the Russian people; even with no Tsar, with Russian no longer his ‘estate’ and its people no longer his ‘servants’ and ‘serfs,’ the State must not collapse, but must be salvaged and shaped by the people themselves.” Local authorities prospered and took charge of their own communities, linking themselves with one another to form a “council of the all the land.” “This testimony to the Russian people’s organizational abilities provides instructive examples for us, the descendants.” “Thus arose the zemstzo.” Solzhenitsyn adds, heuristically and patriotically, that “this entire system of State was not created under any Western influence, and by no means amounted to an imitative structure.”

    It didn’t last. Mikhail Romanov’s son, Alexei, began to replace the zemstvo rule with bureaucracy. Although he won his war against Poland, recovering lands lost in the previous generation, Czar Alexei contracted the notion that Russia would need to modernize or Westernize the country, which project included a thus-far critical weakening of the Orthodox Church. After his son by his second marriage, Peter, won his own dynastic fight in 1682, Russia embarked on a thoroughgoing effort to ‘modernize.’ “Peter I was a man of mediocre, if not savage, mind. He could not grasp that one cannot transfer specific results of Western culture and civilization without the psychological atmosphere in which these results had ripened.” Russia did indeed require Western science and technology for survival in the modern world, Solzhenitsyn concedes, “but not at the cost of stamping out (in quite a Bolshevik fashion and with many excesses) her sense of history, her people’s beliefs, soul, and customs, for the sake of accelerated industrial development and military might.” And not only for technological prowess: Peter ‘the Great’ greatly centralized the Russian state, making it into a modern state with himself, an ‘absolute’ monarch, at its head, in the process destroying the Zemsky Sobor because it stood as a barrier to both the administrative structure of statism and the regime power of absolute monarchy. He also finished the task his father had begun, “bridl[ing] the Orthodox Church, [breaking] its spine.” And in a 1714 decree, he established gentry primogeniture and “turned the peasants into the direct property of landowners,” who in turn were firmly subordinated to himself, having been deprived of the assembly in which they had exerted some governing influence in Russia as a whole. Peter thus made himself not a reformer but a revolutionary, one who built up the state with these policies straight out of Machiavelli, adding to them the equally Machiavellian policy of attempting to unite the nation by embroiling it in foreign wars.

    “Pausing at the end of the eighteenth century, one cannot but marvel at the string of errors committed by our rulers, at their concentration on matters superfluous to the life of the people.” A policy of offensive war and territorial expansion—imperialism—replaced the only right kind of war against the Western powers, defensive war. “Unfortunately for us, this mindset persisted long into the nineteenth century,” as Alexander I needlessly provoked Napoleon’s invasion, then, after devastating sacrifices, won that war only to return to ‘The Great Game’ of imperial meddling. At home, even the liberation of the serfs in 1861 granted only personal freedom, not the right to own land and the fruits of the peasant’s work on that land—the kind of liberty that makes personal freedom sustainable. As in the 1990s, the people were thrown into a market economy without the material resources or (above all) the moral and mental preparation for the rigors of market competition. Then as now (that is, the 1990s), usurers and speculators took charge. Solzhenitsyn cites the novelist and short story writer Gleb Uspensky, who understood that peasant “rule of the land” was indispensable to giving “our people patience, humility, strength, and youth; take it away and there is no people, no national world view, only a spiritual void” because “rule of the land held the peasant in obedience, developed in him a strong family and social discipline, kept him from pernicious heresies; the despotic rule of the earth-mother went together with her ‘love’ for the peasant, thus easing his labor and making it the prevalent task of life,” protecting him from the personal and exploitive rule of oligarchs. Because land is impersonal, its “rule” caused no resentment; the land is what it is, and those who live on it learn to work it or starve—a point not unfamiliar to readers of the New Testament.

    One might add that the modern West, especially in Europe, garnered its power precisely from the fact that its philosophers, beginning with Machiavelli, but going along through Bacon, Descartes, and their followers, resented and rebelled against the personal but beneficent rule of the Creator-God and the impersonal ‘despotism’ of nature. For these forms of rule they substituted the human rule of the scientists, absolute monarchs in control of nationalized churches, and both aristocrats and smart commoners who made themselves into financial and industrial oligarchs. The American Founders may be said to have countered or at least moderated this project by the political revolution of federal republicanism founded upon nature—natural rights—and religious liberty. Although Solzhenitsyn sees that Russia cannot and indeed should not imitate America, he seeks a similar result. But on Russian terms, and in the (perhaps very) long run.

    Oligarchs’ rule of Russian peasants, who unlike American yeoman farmers didn’t rule their own land, economically or politically, “flowed organically into a revolutionary mindset and rebellion” by the beginning of the twentieth century, as did the monarchy’s continued imperial, ‘great-power’ ambitions. (“Even Dostoevsky, despite his incomparable acumen, failed to resist this subjugating influence: the dream of Constantinople, ‘the East will bring salvation to the West.'”) One of the few Romanov czars Solzhenitsyn praises, Alexander III, did understand “the ruinous effect of both Russia’s service to the interests of others and her pursuit of new conquests,” rightly preferring to focus his rule “on the inner health of the nation.” But even he “failed to detect the worrisome deadening of the Orthodox Church,” the one institution that might have reset the nation’s moral compass. His successors went back to the same policies of imperial expansion and ill-judged foreign alliances that set the nation on the course for ruin in the second ‘Time of Troubles’ in 1917.

    Solzhenitsyn needs to show that the people could and did do better than the czars, and not only in the distant past. He finds this demonstration (somewhat paradoxically) in one great effort of Russian expansion, the settlement of Siberia. There, the Russian people enjoyed “complete freedom for private economic activity,” as well as “freedom to select both occupation and place of residence.” And in Russia generally, the bureaucracy was opened to commoners of proven ability, an “independent and open courts system” was established, and the revived zemstvos provided “free, high-quality medical care to the population.” Briefly, between 1906 and the Great War, Russia even had “a true parliament and multi-party system (for both of which we pine today as a novel achievement).”

    For reasons detailed in his novel, March 1917, the misjudgments of Czar Nicholas II, the follies of liberal politicians, and the pressures of the war enabled “the defeat of Russia by the Bolsheviks.” (In a rare display of injustice, Solzhenitsyn cynically remarks that this revolution “was quite advantageous for the Allies,” as “they would not have to share with Russia the spoils of victory.”) As for the new regime itself, its mass-murderous rage at its ‘class enemies,’ its initial relinquishment of territories inhabited by Russians, its subsequent return to an imperialism even more hubristic than that of the czars, its gross mismanagement of the national economy all need little description, as by the mid-1990s they were acknowledged by all but the most benighted Leftist ideologues. Far from joining in the chorus of accolades for the last Soviet premier, Mikhail Gorbachev, Solzhenitsyn dismisses him as an example of the “usual Bolshevik stupidity,” a bungling craftsmen of the oxymoronic “socialist market,” the “perestroika” or “restructuring” that merely replicated the old Leninist ploy of token liberalization, and the “glasnost” or “opening” of free speech by which “he was flinging the doors wide open for all the fierce nationalisms” of the components of the tottering Soviet empire. That empire “was not only unnecessary for us, but ruinous.”

    At the time of Solzhenitsyn’s writing, “Russia has truly fallen into a torn state: 25 million have found themselves ‘abroad’ [in Ukraine and elsewhere] without moving anywhere, by staying on the lands of their fathers and grandfathers,” now relinquished by Moscow. To reverse this, Solzhenitsyn recommends three policies: evacuation of Russians who wish to leave the Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries, with resettlement in Russia; a call to the Baltic states to fully comply with “all-European standards of national minority rights”; and some degree of reunification with areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan with Russian-majority populations. (He never advocates forceful reunification, however; in this, President Putin has quite outdone him.) He very sensibly warns Western politicians not to keen over Russian weakness, as “circumstances will arise… when all of Europe and the United States will be in dire need of Russia as an ally.”

    As for Russian regime politics, Solzhenitsyn derogates the parliament-and-party system of democracy because it attempts to impose democracy undemocratically, “from above, from the central parliament,” “with the party deciding who shall represent a particular electoral district.” “Our ingrained and wretched Russian tradition” refuses “to learn how to organize from below,” leaving Russians “inclined to wait for instructions from a monarch, a leader, a spiritual or political authority.” In the mid-1990s, “such are nowhere to be seen, while small-fry bustle at the heights.” Economic ‘shock therapy’ in the form of abrupt introduction of free-market principles meanwhile has resulted in “the triumph of the frisky sharks of non-producing commercialism”; instead of following the example of postwar Japan, which “entered world civilization without losing her distinctiveness,” Russia has only aped the West. But “national consciousness must always and everywhere be respected”; for Solzhenitsyn, nationalism never means ‘blood and soil,’ but “a person’s”—and then a people’s—”orientation of preferences.” And this consciousness or orientation is never above criticism: “”Patriotism means unqualified and unwavering love for the nation, which implies not uncritical eagerness to serve, not support for unjust claims, but frank assessment of its vices and sins.”

    Therefore, the three ‘Times of Troubles’ that have brought catastrophe down upon Russia “could not have just been accidents. Some fundamental flaws of State and spirit must be to blame.” The main purpose of Solzhenitsyn’s historical account of Russia since the founding of the Romanov dynasty is precisely to identify those flaws, just as the main purpose of Rebuilding Russia was to suggest some pathways toward mending them.

     

    Filed Under: Nations

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