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    Archives for September 2018

    Where France Stood in Churchill’s Geopolitical Landscape

    September 30, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    The British Isles amount to a satellite of the European continent, itself an appendage of Asia. Whereas continental Europe looks very easy to reach and easy to hold—essentially a large, flat surface funning from the Atlantic to the Urals—Churchill regarded the British Isles as easy to reach but hard to hold. The English Channel set it apart from the land armies which periodically rampaged through the Continent. Celts, Germans, and Romans all made their mark, but none could simply dominate British space.

    Too close to the continent to isolate themselves from it, the peoples of the Britain best used their geography in commercial and maritime activities, preserving a small land army except in emergencies. Such an army, supplementing a formidable navy, could defend the realm while making limited, balanced, and eventually republican government possible, inasmuch as army officers threat civilian rule more effectively than naval officers ever do. If British statesmen acted with prudence, political liberty and commercial prosperity could be established and defended more readily there than on the continent.

    For centuries, France posed a principal, and often the principal, threat to British liberty. In Churchill’s telling the French came on to the British scene with éclat in 1066 and the Norman Conquest. A rude awakening, that, but in the end of beneficial one, because it re-linked England to Europe centuries after the Roman Empire had collapsed, preventing Britain from becoming “a Scandinavian empire.” [1] This mattered, because the Normans brought Christian Latinity to the island, which then mingled with the practices of common-law self-government already in place.

    Further, the French practice of trial by jury, along with English common law, combined to resist the tendencies toward statism and absolute monarchy that would bedevil Europe in future centuries. Most notably, these Norman and Saxon practices, combined, made Magna Carta possible, two centuries later. When the state-building Tudor dynasty arrived, the habits of English self-government survived it. England retained what Churchill calls “civilization,” which Aristotle would have recognized as the core of any genuinely political way of life, the practice of ruling and being ruled by turns, not by the masterly rule of command-and-obey. The old English admonition, ‘It’s not cricket,’ expresses this idea vividly, at least to those who have seen the game played; eventually, the other side will have its innings.

    Conveniently, the Normans couldn’t hold the hard-to-hold island. They left, with Britons happily keeping the Christianity and jury trials the Normans had brought with them. But the French remained a threat. By the twelfth century, King Louis VI had consolidated his power; French, Burgundian, and British rulers fought over the west coast of Europe for the next 400 years. With their loose organization of political and military authority—kings, aristocrats, priests, and cities all circulating around one another in colloidal suspension—the feudal states lent themselves to divide-and-conquer strategies. Accordingly, French monarchs would ally with Scotland against the English; the English countered by playing Scottish faction off one another. The French and the Scots would then support factions in the English civil wars. English kings would attempt to unite the country against France—bringing death and destruction to both sides but also the political wisdom seen in Shakespeare’s history plays, a wisdom imbibed (Churchill tells us) by his great ancestor Jon Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, who would later intervene decisively and triumphantly in the Anglo-French wars.

    In the meantime, the feudal state needed replacing by some more stable order. The Tudors provided this new order: the modern, centralized state, initially a despotic or “absolute” monarchy similar to those then prevailing on the continent, but a welcome relief from feudal turmoil and vulnerability. “If this was despotism, it was despotism by consent.” [2]  Initially, the Tudors allied with the Netherlands against France, thus establishing a sort of geopolitical beachhead on the continent without needing to occupy western France. In the twentieth century, such a move would be called ‘containment.’

    It fell to Henry VIII to establish a thoroughgoing continental alliance system, initially with Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Papacy. But Henry understood that a modern state requires a nation to go with it, and a national English state would finally need to sever its ties with Rome. After henry broke with the Church (ostensibly over his marriage to Anne Boleyn, but not real monarch marries without geopolitical calculation in mind), his daughter Elizabeth shifted the anti-French alliance to the Protestant powers on the continent. Although weaker than the Catholic states, European Protestant states would prove themselves capable of keeping the French tied down on the continent.

    There would never be another Norman Conquest, but at times it was a near thing—never so much as during the rule of King Louis XIV, whom Churchill abominates as “the curse and pest of Europe.” [3] The Sun King aspired to make all other European states into his planets, even as he successfully reduced French aristocrats to subordination at the Palace of Versailles. here was the first modern threat to English liberty by a despotic regime, now controlling the financial and military resources of a centralized state, undertaking a plausible attempt at continental empire. In his greatest book, Marlborough: His Life and Times, Churchill explains that English statesmen (and, as it happened, a stateswoman, Queen Anne) had two possible choices: intervene militarily on the continent with as big a land army as the nation could muster; or use naval power “to gain trade and possessions overseas” while fighting selected battles on the continent, especially in the Netherlands, where rulers and peoples alike had every reason to fight hard against the French. [4]

    With a series of brilliant maneuvers, Marlborough chastened even Louis’s ambitions. Churchill remarks that the general wanted more than mere military triumph, however. Marlborough regarded a political settlement as indispensable to a lasting peace on the continent. He advocated what we now call ‘regime change’ in France—the elimination of absolute monarchy and its replacement by what Aristotle, Cicero, and other classical political thinkers had called a ‘mixed regime,’ one combining monarchic and aristocratic elements in some sort of balance. The modern, centralized state would remain, as any nation needed to defend itself from other peoples organized under such states. But a new regime would control that state. Genuine politics or civilization would then be possible in France and, eventually, in Europe altogether. As Churchill puts it, “There might have been no Napoleon!”

    No such luck. But, just as Marlborough had learned from Shakespeare, Winston Churchill had learned from Marlborough; his book appeared in the 1930s, when France (having indeed changed its regime to a republic) had ceased to be a threat but Germany and Russia had replaced it as (if anything) more formidable enemies. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Churchill saw that only regime change would do, and when the opportunity arose, he seized it with a coherent strategic end already in view.

    Marlborough’s immediate successors still had Bourbon France to deal with. They had one advantage their ancestor had not enjoyed; Britain was now Great Britain, having solemnized the union with Scotland, ending the threat of encirclement from the north. In the War of the Austrian Succession, France and Prussia allied against Austria, but the Empress Maria Theresa proved more capable than they anticipated, winning Great Britain as her ally, along with Holland and Saxony. She saved Hapsburg rule, although by war’s end “Austria and Holland were no longer great powers on the Continent,” the British had retreated under pressure of factionalism at home, and “the Grand Alliance was dead.” Nothing, Churchill continued, “was settled between Britain and France,” and “the only gainer was Frederick the Great,” who took the opportunity to seize Silesia and its rich coal mines. [6]

    Less than a decade later, the Seven Years’ War again pitted Great Britain against France, but this time the British backed Prussia against Austria, now allied with France against Frederick who successfully invaded Saxony after securing the British alliance. British and French troops had already clashed in western Pennsylvania, as Britain tested the strength of France’s containment strategy in North America. The new alliance proved beneficial; France and its allies (at one point including not only Austria but Russia and Sweden) could not reverse Prussia’s territorial gains, while the British broke French imperial designs in both North America and India. While its continental allies held down the French, Great Britain became even greater, becoming the full-fledged British Empire. The major risk to Great Britain, a planned French invasion of the British Isles, failed with two French defeats at sea in 1759. For its part, Prussia, nearly crushed in a four-front war, triumphed when the new Russian Czar, Peter III, abandoned his alliance with France and sided with Frederick, not only withdrawing Russian troops but assisting in obtaining a truce between Prussia and Sweden. This reconfiguration of European politics suited Great Britain well, and lasted for a generation, until the French Revolution and Napoleon.

    After the failure of the moderate republic of 1789, Jacobin France declared war on Austria in April 1792, with Prussia allying with Austria against the radical-republican threat. British Foreign Minister Lord Grenville sounded the alarm at a regime ambitious to establish itself as “the general arbiter of the rights and liberties of Europe,” and especially as the ruler of the Netherlands—then as for centuries an indispensable continental ally of Britain. [7] What is more, revolution in France might prove contagious, particularly in Ireland.

    With the rise of Napoleon, the threat only intensified. This time, the two geopolitical and geo-military strategies of the powers could not have been starker: a commercial mixed regime wielding the world’s best navy against a military tyranny wielding the world’s best army. Rebounding from his naval defeat at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon played to his strength as an army general, defeating Austria and allying with an intimidated Czar Alexander, thereby isolating Great Britain. In an attempt to blockade the island, Napoleon involved himself in Spain, which proved a far better resister of imperialism than a practitioner of it. Once checked the tyrant’s strength became hi weakness. Having eschewed the authority found in legitimacy, morality, civil society, and tradition, tyranny finds its only strength in success and the prospect of future success.

    In 1810, the British regime made its move, ordering troops stationed in Portugal under the Duke of Wellington to cross the Spanish border. This further bled the French. And Napoleon’s ally, the czar, was getting restless, tempting Napoleon to still greater glory in an invasion of Russia. Famously, it failed. At the Vienna peace conference, the allies cut France down to its original size and arranged for the restoration of a much-sobered Bourbon family to its former throne. Wisely, the British foresaw the day when France might be needed as a counterweight to Prussian ambitions in the east; the peace was not punitive. Unlike the Versailles Treaty of a century later, the Peace of Vienna settlement disregarded nationalist passions. The “well-being of Europe was to be secured not by compliance with the assumed wishes for the peoples concerned, but only by punctual obedience to legitimate authority” [8] Regime change, yes, but regime change with a view toward a moderate politics, which, under the circumstances, meant the Holy Alliance regimes on the continent. Nationalist democracy was a brew too heady for political consumption by peoples unfamiliar with the common-sense realities of decent political life.

    Churchill understood British geopolitics respecting France during the centuries when France was his country’s most dangerous rival as the use of the British Isles as a platform for naval defense of the realm, political and commercial liberty and, ultimately, worldwide imperial power—all of these while containing the major continental power by judicious alliances with the lesser continental powers threatened by France’s very greatness. As the preeminent British statesman of the twentieth century, Churchill would deploy this same strategy, no longer against France but with it.

    By the twentieth century, European politics had altered substantially. France was no longer Great Britain’s enemy. Napoleon III’s loss of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 had ruined the reputation of French monarchism for good, and the Third Republic would provide unimpressive but unthreatening government for the next seven decades. Meanwhile, the British regime had liberalized and democratized, with three major Reform Acts extending the franchise to the majority of the male population. The two regimes had become compatible.

    Both were militarily worthy allies, as well. The Royal Navy continued to rule the waves. For its part, the French army was far from incapable of defending the Republic; after all, France was the location of the Western Front in the Great War, and that front held against superior German forces. Those who sneer at the supposed loss of French military power and valor in the first half of the new century overlook that. Churchill never did. He knew France provided a nearly indispensable buffer against the ambitions of Germany and, later Russia.

    In other ways, European geopolitics also stayed the same. Another potential continental tyrant had arisen: united Hermany, substantially outweighing France in population and in military-industrial capacity. The Prussian aristocrat, Otto von Bismarck, a master of diplomacy and the mastermind of German unification, hoped to moderate French rancor at its defeat in the war by taking Alsace but refusing Lorraine. But the calmer head did not prevail. With both provinces in hand, Bismarck “knew the quarrel with France was irreconcilable except at a price which Germany would never consent to pay,” and built German alliances around “that central fact.” Prudently enough, he set policies which “always included the principle of good relations with Great Britain.” If the German military with its territorial ambitions insisted on making a permanent enemy of the French, at least Bismarck could work to isolate that enemy diplomatically. [9]

    In 1890, a new generation of German rulers pushed the old man out. Supposing his moderation uselessly retrograde, the German military attempted to rival Britain for dominance of the seas. Unlike the republican regimes, the oligarchic German regime could plan for aggressive war without political consequence, and it did.

    This pushed Britain and France closer together, as France partnered with its old rival and with Russia, enacting what we now call a ‘containment’ strategy against its menacing neighbor. For their part, the Germans allied with Austria-Hungary—Austria having been the one German state from that federation. The balance of power held as long as Europe retained its moral consensus as a predominantly Christian civilization, animated by peaceful sentiments; but already Christianity’s long, melancholy withdrawal had exposed hard nationalist reefs. Added to the formidable new military technologies and the social democratization of modern life, which permitted mass mobilization of armies not seen since the Napoleonic era, nationalist passions “enable[d] enterprises of slaughter to be planned and executed upon a scale, with a perseverance never before imagined.” [10]

    By 1912, Great Britain and France had formalized a defensive naval alliance, the British tasked with guarding the Channel and France’s Atlantic coast, freeing the French navy to defend the Mediterranean. When war came two years later, the strategy worked; without British control of the sea lanes, Germany would have severed Allied sea communications and exposed France to a two-front war—the ultimately fatal position of Germany itself. An increasingly desperate German naval command resorted to the use of submarines against merchant ships, a move which led to the American intervention and subsequent German defeat.

    On land, the grim features of modern warfare on the Western Front (that is to say, France) are well-known. The trenches constructed by both sides immobilized the conflict, preventing the flanking maneuvers seen in most land wars. Artillery barrages and poison gas attacks ensued, with valorous soldiers pinned in place like insects in a museum collection. Although Churchill registers profound esteem for the French wartime leaders—Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and General Ferdinand Foch represented the democratic and aristocratic traditions of their nation with courage and wisdom—he has sharp criticism for the initial strategic concept of the French military, summed up in the catchphrase, “L’attaque, toujours l’attaque.” No notion could have been more futile and ruinous.

    Fortitude and devotion “rendered a sublime recovery possible” for the French, but the “frightful butchery” which preceded that sublimity needed not to have been so extensive. [11]  Fortunately, France’s Eastern-Front ally, Russia, relieved some of the pressure on France itself. In a pattern to be repeated in the Second World War, initial Germany advances in France caused an overconfident Germany military command to transfer forces to the East, where they gradually wore themselves out. The Germans could no more conquer all of Russia than Napoleon could. By the time the Germans returned their main attention to the Western Front, French and British troops had taken the time to dig in, and their lines held for the rest of the war.

    No satisfactory settlement followed the Allied victory. “How is a forty million France to be defended against sixty, seventy, eighty million Germany?” Churchill asked. [12]  Moreover, if it is true that commercial republics don’t fight each other, Churchill and the French both understood Weimar Germany wasn’t a real republic at all. “Powerful classes” in Germany entertained the same revanchisme toward victorious France as the defeated French had entertained after 1871 against victorious Germany. These classes, including the military classes, could appeal to Germany’s “multiplying and abounding youth.” To the extent that Germany was democratic, it was not liberal, and to the extent that Germany was not really democratic, it remained more militaristic than commercial; its industrialists had no reason not to build weapons instead of widgets. [13]

    At the Versailles Peace Conference, Marshall Foch argued that France needed control of the Rhineland. The new Bolshevik regime in Russia would no longer serve as a reliable ally of France, he said; the League of Nations would not really guarantee French security; German disarmament would not last; and, given all that, any Anglo-American military guarantees would fail to deter the Germans. The Anglo-Americans pinned their hopes on genuine German regime change and the League; reluctantly concurring, Clemenceau overruled Foch. When the United States Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty, France could only turn to the construction of the Maginot Line system of fortifications, and to alliance with Poland and other central European states wary of Germany. France soon seized the coal-producing Ruhr district of Germany, as well, hoping to cripple German reindustrialization.

    These actions prevented the implementation of Churchill’s preferred postwar geopolitical strategy, which consisted of “ending the thousand-year strife between France and Germany” by “weaving Gaul and Teuton so closely together economically, socially, and morally as to prevent the occasion of new quarrels, and make old antagonisms die in the realization of mutual prosperity and interdependence.” As early as 1923, he wrote, “No one could feel assured that a future generation would not see Europe laid in dust and ruin as it had been in this same quarrel as it had been more than once before.” [14]

    The stunning conquest of France by Nazi Germany in May and June 1940 stripped Great Britain of its continental buffer, exposing it to nightly aerial raids intended to pulverize its industry and terrify its population into submission. British strategists worried that the German navy might attempt to encircle the island and cut it off from the rest of the empire—parts of which were threatened not only by Germany but potentially by the Soviets, ever alert for spoils of war. Nonetheless, France continued to figure prominently in Churchill’s strategic calculations, perforce in an entirely new way, one that severely tested Churchill’s judgment and equanimity.

    Churchill favored Charles de Gaulle to head the French government in exile, and it is important to see why. Quite apart from his impression that de Gaulle had the strength of character to carry on the fight (sometimes against Churchill himself, as the Prime Minister would soon learn), de Gaulle was the only member of the last Cabinet of the Third Republic who refused to accede to the armistice. The collaborationist regime at Vichy, nominally in control of southern France, put a price on his head. Churchill and de Gaulle understood, however, that this one-man link to the Third Republic—this thread of legitimacy, however slight—would enable de Gaulle to rally resistance to the Nazi occupation via the British Broadcasting Company’s microphones. De Gaulle, who turned out to be a fine public speaker, immediately rose to that task.

    But realistically, was that all Churchill could do? No mean orator himself, the Prime Minister moved to shore up de Gaulle’s reputation. In his celebrated “Finest Hour” speech of 18 June 1940, Churchill blamed “the colossal military disaster” in France on the French High Command—that is to say, the people who now sat at the top of the Vichy regime—which failed to get their northern armies out of Belgium to reinforce their broken lines to the West along the Meuse River and France’s Sedan district. Yet, while deflecting any blame for the British retreat from France, Churchill also called recrimination “futile and even harmful.” [15] Disappointment and resentment don’t win wars.

    Materially, de Gaulle had very little of the stuff that does. Furthermore, the eventual allies who did have that stuff, the United States and the Soviet Union, had no use for de Gaulle and his Free French organization. President Franklin Roosevelt alternated between viewing de Gaulle as Churchill’s stooge and as a highly suspect potential dictator. And of course Stalin had his own network in France; the French Communist Party went underground after the armistice but organized itself to stand up a new French regime in the event the war’s fortunes turned. Desperately needing his allies, Churchill could scarcely alienate them by promoting de Gaulle as the head of some future French government, even had he been inclined to do so.

    In his memoirs Churchill tells how he and the Americans dealt with the French in a spirit of justifiable duplicity, with Churchill sponsoring de Gaulle while the Americans stayed “in close and useful contact with Vichy.” By the end of 1941 Churchill urged that this tactic be made part of a policy: If Vichy would cooperate with the Allies in French North Africa, then postwar reconciliation with their regime might be possible; if Vichy continued its collaboration with the Nazis, “the Gaullist movement must be aided and used to the full.” [16]  Churchill trusted de Gaulle no more than de Gaulle trusted Churchill. The Prime Minister suspected that de Gaulle intended to drive a wedge between Great Britain and the United States, upsetting his grand strategy of a permanent Anglo-American alliance. [17]  Add to this the perennial quarrels over British military encroachments on French colonies, particularly Syria—Churchill was trying to win a war, de Gaulle wanted to make sure he didn’t grab any French possessions—and we have the makings of a series of relatively small but perfect storms, lasting to the eve of D-Day itself.

    After that great victory, Churchill saw much more clearly what de Gaulle had actually accomplished in his years at the head of a militarily unimpressive government-in-exile. In that time, de Gaulle established an intelligence network on the ground in France, which vetted and readied a network of experienced non-communist administrators, lawyers, teachers, and other personnel who would be ready to stand up a viable government immediately upon liberation. The re-founding of republicanism in France began in London. De Gaulle’s most celebrated ally in this effort was a former departmental prefect named Jean Moulin.

    Before his torture and murder at the hands of the Gestapo eighteen months into his mission, Moulin out-organized the French communists. Others carried on, including a courageous lawyer named Michel Debré, future draftsman of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. By D-Day, seventeen Regional Commissioners of the Republic were charged with ensuring the security of Allied armies from behind-the-lines attacks, providing administration, re-establishing “republican legality,” and coordinating material supplies to the population. “Thus,” in de Gaulle’s words, “among the French people, in the face of the Allies as of the defeated invader, the authority of the state would appear: integral, responsible, and independent.” [18]

    Churchill attested to de Gaulle’s achievement in letters to Roosevelt. “In practice… I think it would be found that de Gaulle and the French National Committee represent most of the elements who want to help us,” whereas “Vichy is a foe.” [19]  By November 1944, having visited Paris and walked the Champs-Élysee with de Gaulle to the ovation of the crowds, Churchill could report, “Generally, I felt in the presence of an organized government, broadly based and of rapidly-growing strength, and I am certain that it should be most unwise to do anything to weaken it in the eyes of France at this difficult, critical time” in view of “communist threats.” [20]  Although Churchill raged at de Gaulle on several occasions during the war, he never quite got round to getting rid of him, and that turned out to be a very good thing.

    Victory against Nazi Germany left standing still another would-be continental tyrant: Stalin and his newly-expanded empire. The Russians, Churchill told his Chiefs of Staff, were now further west than they had ever been except at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, capable of “march[ing] across the rest of Europe and driv[ing] us back to our island.” [21]  After Stalin interpreted the February 1945 Yalta Conference agreements on Poland strictly in terms of Soviet interests and ideology, Churchill frankly admitted to the very ill Roosevelt, “We British have not the necessary strength to carry the matter further.” [22]  Nor could Great Britain’s imperial holdings help; they were lost, and Churchill saw that, too. For real defense, Churchill soon turned to the proposed North Atlantic Treaty Organization; he judged the proposed European Army or European Defence Community a weak reed by comparison. He vigorously supported the Marshall Plan for European economic revival.

    As for France, Churchill recurred to his original intention after World War I: peace between Gaul and Teuton. Accordingly, he opposed the Morgenthau Plan, which would have reduced the Germans to agrarianism, and also French proposals (first floated by the new, short-lived de Gaulle administration in 1946, but more or less universally applauded by all French  factions at the time) to keep the western portion of Germany broken up and weak. This was revanchisme in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Germany was indispensable to resisting Soviet power; it was now on the front line, and the French—and indeed his fellow Britons, their family members killed by German bombing—needed to see and accept that brute fact.

    “Never before has there been such a clear need for one country to be strong as there is now for France,” Churchill told the French. French greatness can return if the French “unite in the task of leading Europe back in peace and freedom…. By saving yourselves you will save Europe and by saving Europe you will save yourselves.” [23]. Neither French nationalism alone nor European internationalism alone could suffice. They must be intertwined. [24]  Seven decades on, France, the United Kingdom, and the rest of the European countries continue to debate the right terms of that balance.

    At this time, Charles de Gaulle could not agree to the resuscitation of Germany: French public opinion remained even more powerfully anti-German than British public opinion. But de Gaulle would later concur with Churchill’s wise judgment. When he returned to power in 1958, founding the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle reached out to his Western German counterpart, that great and good Rhinelander Konrad Adenauer, to form exactly the sort of entente cordiale Churchill had advocated.

    througho0ut his long and eminent career, Churchill had hoped to preserve the greatness of Britain by maintaining the Empire and Commonwealth, by a strong Anglo-American partnership, and by increased European cooperation on a republican basis. Except for the “special relationship” with the Americans, he could not achieve these things; the tyrannies he helped to kill had injured Great Britain too much, before dying. That notwithstanding, his actions and words endure as a legacy of statecraft, a testimony to the geopolitics of liberty.

     

     

    Notes

    1. Winston S. Churchill: A History of the English-Speaking Peoples. 4 volumes. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1956-58. Vol. I. 176.
    2. Ibid. II. 17-18.
    3. Winston S. Churchill: Marlborough: His Life and Times. 6 volumes. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933-38. Vol. I. 258.
    4. Ibid. III. 195.
    5. Ibid. VI. 84.
    6. A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, op. cit. II. 157-158.
    7. Ibid. III. 285-291.
    8. Ibid. III. 384-385; IV. 7.
    9. Winston S. Churchill: The World Crisis, one-volume edition (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942), 7-8.
    10. Winston S. Churchill: The Aftermath (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929), 481-483.
    11. Ibid. 559.
    12. Ibid. 222-223.
    13. Winston S. Churchill: The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1948), 26.
    14. Ibid. 28.
    15. The Aftermath, op. cit. 486.
    16. Winston S. Churchill: Blood, Sweat, and Tears (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1941), 348.
    17. Winston S. Churchill: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1950), 631, 651.
    18. Ibid. 801.
    19. Charles de Gaulle: War Memoirs, three volumes, Richard Howard translation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), II. 199-200.
    20. Churchill to Roosevelt, 20 June 1944, in Warren F. Kimball, ed.: Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 195.
    21. Churchill to Roosevelt, 16 November 1944, ibid. 391-392.
    22. Martin Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill, Volume 8, Never Despair 1945-1965 (Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, 2013), 38.
    23. Martin Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill, Volume 7, Road to Victory, 1941-1945 (Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, 2013), 1250.
    24. Winston S. Churchill: “France and Europe,” speech at Metz, 14 July 1946, in Robert Rhodes James, ed.: Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, 8 volumes (New York: Bowker, 1974) VII. 7359.
    25. See Churchill to Duncan Sandys, November 1946, in Gilbert, Never Despair, 286-287.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Thucydides and Political Liberty

    September 26, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Mary P. Nichols: Thucydides and the Pursuit of Freedom. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

    Originally published in Social Science and Modern Society, Volume 53, Number 1, January/February 2016. Republished with permission.

     

    Leo Strauss addressed his theme, “the city and man,” by considering a dialogue (Plato’s Republic), a treatise (Aristotle’s Politics), and a history (Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War). A student of Strauss and of his close collaborator, Joseph Cropsey, Mary P. Nichols has set her own publishing career on much the same arc. Having published illuminating studies on the Republic and the Politics, she has now turned her attention to Thucydides; as before, she has not merely followed Strauss but built on his work, raising a firm, civil voice of correction from time to time. Cheerful, lynx-eyed, and unruffled, she engages the range of recent Thucydides’ scholarship, always remaining very much her own woman.

    Thucydides often gets pegged as the archetypal ‘foreign policy realist’—even a determinist. Nichols demurs: “In this book I explore”—that turns out to be one of her favorite words—”Thucydides’ commitment to the cause of freedom.” Athenians and Spartans both aim for freedom in the war, and although they sometimes “fall short of their claims to act freely and for the sake of freedom,” at other times they do not. What is more, “Thucydides is taking freedom as his cause.” His history, a “possession for all time,” as its author immodestly but accurately calls it, “speaks very much to our time, encouraging the defense of freedom while warning of the limits and dangers that arise in its defense.”

    By “freedom” Thucydides means first of all political freedom in two, complementary dimensions: the city’s autonomy—literally, its ability to give laws to itself and not to acquiesce in another city’s imperial rule—and a regime within the city that enables citizens to participate in public life—as celebrated, famously, in Pericles’ funeral oration. This is real and not imagined freedom; Thucydides’ account of “speeches and deeds that do make a difference” in the course of events, “for better or for worse.” Grim Ananke or necessity may limit human speech and action, but it does not determine it.

    Thucydides also points to another kind of freedom, what we call intellectual freedom—his own freedom as a historian. Although he adheres to facts rather than myths, binding himself to an austere recording of givens, of necessities, he also “calls attention to the fact that he himself is a writer of speeches.” He admits that he puts speeches into the mouths of the actors in his real-world drama; absent a record of his statesmen’s speeches, he has supplied them with speeches responsive to the circumstances in which they spoke. More, “it is Thucydides’ account, or logos, that examines the things said in light of the deeds. His freedom in writing his history lies not merely in his pursuit of the facts with a clear mind, but in his evaluation of them. Facts serve as a test of speech, but speech also interprets the facts, or speaks for them.” He is “a philosophic historian,” but because he limits his freedom by his overall adherence to facts he serves as “a better model” than the poet—and perhaps even the philosophic writer of dialogues and treatises?—who must not ascend too far into the realm of ideas.

    Nichols organizes her book into five chapters, each centering on a statesman, beginning with Pericles, “the only one whom Thucydides allows to speak uncontested in Athens.” And rightly so: “Contrary to both the democratic and realist critics of Pericles, Thucydides presents Pericles as a model of statesmanship” who explains the Athenian regime and way of life in his funeral oration in terms of freedom, and the actions that are appropriate to freedom.” Pericles understands freedom as self-rule—”a potential, not a necessity, although it is necessary for full humanity,” that is to say the rule of the human soul by its distinctively human aspect, which is reason. The one man rules the many, the democratic regime of Athens, by speech not by force. Pericles rules Athenians by their consent.

    Specifically, Pericles anticipates the Peloponnesians’ intention to cut Athens down to size, persuading his fellow citizens that ‘war is necessary to preserve [the Athenians’] freedom.” This is a moral not a physical necessity, inasmuch as Athenians could sacrifice their autonomy to the demands of Sparta and its allies. Like Thucydides himself, who argues for the “weakness” of “ancient times,” Pericles takes his moral bearings not from tradition, not from “filial piety,” and therefore not from the laws but from prudential reasoning itself and from the character of the Athenian regime, which is self-sufficient—capable, in Pericles celebrated phrase, of loving beauty with thrift and loving wisdom without softness. When the harshest necessity, the plague, hits Athens immediately after Pericles delivers his oration, neither he nor the Athenians blame the gods or turn to them. Nor do they surrender to the Peloponnesians. The plague does induce Pericles to admit that Athenian self-sufficiency can never be absolute. In facing the desperate, agonized, dying Athenians, “he presents himself to the Athenians as unaffected by adversity”; “in his bearing before the city, if not in fact, he does not succumb to the plague.”

    Thus Pericles presents Athenians with “an image” of freedom—not the real thing as experienced during catastrophe but real in the sense of being a model, something to be lived up to. Moderating the hubris of the Athenians, their fear, and even their anger, “Pericles’ rule is… characterized by balance or measure, both in his policies and in the effect of his rhetoric on the people.” “With Pericles in charge Athens might have succeeded against Sparta.” Pericles’ best critics speak up here, saying that he expected too much of his successors, few of whom proved capable of such measure. Nichols agrees that “in demanding the beautiful, Pericles demands too much of his city—and also of himself.” But she adds that behind Pericles and his noble speech one must always remembers the presence of Thucydides, who “shows the human without undermining the beautiful.” “Pericles is therefore wrong when he says that he is inferior to no one in knowing what is required and interpreting it.” Thucydides is to Pericles what Plato is to Socrates. The image of Athens Thucydides presents “does not abstract this city from time and failure” in the way Pericles does:
    “Like a true Athenian, as Pericles presents him, Thucydides does not have to hide. he does not have to hide his own weakness. Pericles conceals his. That is, in presenting an image of Athens, Thucydides demonstrates a freedom even greater than Pericles’, for he speaks without any pretense of self-sufficiency.”

    Having shown the connection between measure or balance and freedom as Thucydides presents it, Nichols turns to the theme of “Athenian freedom in the balance”—an image that suggests both the scales of justice and a turn of fortune. To win the war, Athens needed allies, including its colonies. A polis on the island of Lesbos, Mytilene, located to the northeast of Athens near Asia Minor, sought to exploit the Peloponnesian threat (coming from the southwest of Athens) to win freedom from the Athenian empire. This leads to the first Athenian debate Thucydides presents, in which the general Cleon debates the mysterious Diodotus on whether to exterminate the Mytileneans. Absent the persuasive Pericles, Athenians must deliberate not over whether to consent to one speech but rather over which of two arguments seems better; this too is freedom—indeed the greater freedom of going from consenting to the one statesman of Chapter One to choosing between the arguments of the two statesmen of Chapter Two.

    Cleon seeks to exploit democrats’ impatience with one another, their longing for reaching decisions, taking actions. He “denounces the endless speech and indecisiveness endemic to democratic government.” Diodotus “aims at moderating the passions of the Athenians in order to make space for thought and deliberation,” arguing that “the Athenians are responsible for their treatment of Mytilene.” Cleon uses speech to undermine “the legitimate role for speech in democratic government” like some of Socrates’ critics, he is a misologist. Although he “speaks frequently of enemies,” he “never uses the word ‘friend,'” perhaps because friends are usually on ‘speaking terms.’ Diotdotus’ name means “gift from the god”—a phrase Plato’s Socrates uses to describe himself. He overcomes Cleon’s misology by imitating Pericles—bringing his fellow citizens to reflect upon themselves, to know themselves as Athenians, that is, as self-ruling democrats. he brings them to reason by reasoning, by bringing out the self-contradiction of a speaker who speaks against speech. He then invites them to reason about their circumstance, to consider whether harsh dealings with Myutilene will really prove advantageous to Athens, which needs more allies not fewer. Justice—more specifically, equity—exhibited now may well redound to advantage in the defense of Athens and its regime in the future. In defense of Athenian freedom, “he implicitly warns Athens against its own erōs and hope, which can lead human beings to suppose they can do more than they can.” The equitable mind inclines toward pardon, which literally means “to know with,’ that is, to understand what the other did when he acted.”

    By urging Athenians to think for a moment like Mytileneans, Diodotus would have them think of the rebels as human beings, to love wisdom in something like the sense of a Socratic ascent from the cave of one’s own polis, with its customs and passions. This is of course what Pericles had said what the Athenian regime does, what it is. “Justice must be understood in terms of what is good for the one who is just”; to be followed it must not be other-regarding, Putting it another way, the limits of this philosophic self-transcendence that simultaneously affirms the ‘self’ or character of the polis may be seen in the  fact that the Athenians do agree not to exterminate the Mytileneans, but do vote to enslave them.

    And what of Diodotus himself? “As far as we know from the historical record, he exists only in speech—in Thucydides’ work—and not in fact.” Diodotus may be saying what Socrates would have said, had Socrates spoken on this occasion. And if “Diotdotus were invented by Thucydides,” he would not be a “gift from Zeus,” but “Thucydides’ gift to Athens”—the continuation of Periclean statesmanship. As Plato had Socrates present a city in speech, Thucydides has presented a statesman in speech.

    Thucydides juxtaposes Athenian statesmanship, as it was and as it might have been, with the actions of the Spartans against Plataea. Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans don’t really deliberate at all, but only make a show of deliberating. Nichols devotes her third and central chapter to the Spartans and their principal general, Brasidas.

    Not Brasidas but King Archidamus serves as the Spartan answer to Pericles with respect to speech, praising his countrymen for not having too much learning to “look down upon the laws” and for exhibiting such “severity” as to be “too moderate to disobey them.” As a consequence of this law-abiding severity, Spartans alone “do not become arrogant when successful.” For Sparta, freedom comes not from abstaining from war but from preparing for war and avoiding it until ready Archidamus seems “wary about risking Sparta’s freedom to pursue freedom for others.” But despite his caution (and perhaps because he is a Spartan, none too persuasive as a speaker?) the Spartans vote for war; there are limits event to Spartan self-limitation. The war-vote brings Brasidas forward.

    Unquestionably the most able Spartan, Brasidas isn’t especially Spartan in spirit. Hew speaks as well as he fights. Nichols points out how ‘Diototean’ Brasidas is, gathering allies for Sparta by offering liberal terms to those cities who will join in the coalition against Athens. Although Brasidas “depicts a noble view of his city to the world,” he “never speaks before the Spartan people” and receives tepid support from them for his expeditions. Unlike Pericles, he is never quite at home in his native city. He died in battle at Amphipolis, a “one-man show” with “no home, not people”—except, in the end, Amphipolis, where the citizens consider him their savior in victories death.

    As for Thucydides, Nichols remarks that his appreciation of Brasidas’ “daring and intelligence”—virtues “Pericles attributes to Athens”—demonstrates that such virtues are “not dependent on a specific regime”; they are human. But if man is a political animal, in addition to a daring and intelligent one, then such virtues are nonetheless dependent upon  the support of some polis, some regime. “While Brasidas does not need Sparta in order to act with daring and intelligence, he needs Sparta for his daring and intelligence to be truly good.” “In politics, no one can be a one-man show.” But the politics of the regime of his city aims at autonomy in the world while restricting citizen freedom at home. Its law-abiding severity almost literally alienates its best general. Thucydides’ appreciation of virtue, and of politics, when seen among Athenians or Spartans, gives added weight to his claim to have been “present on both sides” of the war, owing to the exile imposed upon him by the Athenians. His presence is both physical and intellectual.

    The battle at Amphipolis results in a treaty followed not by lasting peace but a truce. The truce “bring[s] Alcibiades to the forefront of Thucydides’ history”—another man without a country, this time from Athens. He advances still another notion of freedom. He shares Chapter Four with decent, plodding, hapless Nicias, and their debate parallels the Cleon-Diodotus debate in the parallel second chapter.

    Strauss argues that the Athenians met disaster in Sicily because they recalled the impious but able Alcibiades, leaving the apparently pious Nicias in charge; “not indeed the gods, but the human concern with the gods” caused the failure. Nichols maintains that Alcibiades is the real source of the problem. A man of vast, politically vague but self-centered ambition, Alcibiades regards the Athenian way of life as “motion for its own sake.” Unlike Pericles, Alcibiades does not consider peace the object of war; unlike Pericles (and his greatest student, Abraham Lincoln) he fails to see the sense in fighting only one war at a time. Without any publicly definable goal, political strategy loses its point; following Alcibiades in spirit even as they rightly distrust the man himself, the Athenians come to define “eternal law” as the enforcement of the will of the strong over the will of the weak. “Their appeal is less an acceptance of necessity”—as they claim in the famous debate on Melos—”than a pretext for their imitation of the gods.” “If realism teaches human limits in the pursuit of power, it is a teaching the Athenians at Melos reject.” The spirit of Alcibiades lures Athenians into a pseudo-realist power fantasy.

    In his own way, Nicias is no better. “His ‘piety’ masks his caution. He does not manifest genuine piety, any more than the impious Alcibiades does. Genuine piety does not lie in ceding the human capacity to deliberate, judge, and act to divine forces, as Nicias does when he yields to the seers. Nor is it found in imitating the power of the gods to rule over the weak, as the Athenians imply at Melos, and Alcibiades manifests in his deeds. Rather, it consists in accepting the limits of the human in relation to the divine, limits in both knowledge and control, which by circumscribing action make it possible. Paradoxically, it is that great humanist Pericles who recognizes those limits and is able to act, as when, for example, he traces the plague to ‘daimonic things’ that are ‘beyond reason,’ while continuing to prosecute the war with Sparta, or when he cautions them that they must pay back whatever gold necessity requires than to take from Athena’s statue to continue the war.”

    It seems likely that Mary Nichols is right about the gods. Alcibiades does indeed “act as if he were freer than he is”—acting as if he were the playwright in his own drama. And the Athenians imitate him, forgetting the prudence of Pericles and Diodotus. He is “the human face hidden behind the law of necessity to which [the Athenians] appeal” during the Melian debate. Neither he nor his country can rule themselves, any more. They both suppose that the conquest of Sicily is ‘about’ themselves, not Sicily. But the Sicilians will have something to say, and do, about that. Under the influence of Alcibiades, the Athenians have come to define beauty not as measure, as harmony, but s splendor, as magnificent excess.

    Limitlessness in politics implies homelessness, a refusal not only of laws but of the limitations imposed by regimes—the theme of Nichols’s fifth chapter. Accused (falsely, Nichols suspects) of desecrating sacred sculptures, Alcibiades declines to return home to face the charges but offers his services to Sparta and eventually takes his one-man show to Persia—all the while hoping to angle back into Athens and take it over. In arguing for being allowed to return, he describes his love of Athens, which he defines not as a regime (as Pericles had done, and as Aristotle defines the polis as such) but as a locale. Alcibiades is not merely indifferent to regimes but “hostile to all regimes.” Because “regimes stand between the individual and his city, structuring their relationship and interaction,” Alcibiades rejects them in rejecting structure for the limitlessness of “pure possibility.” This is freedom reconceived democratically in the most radical sense: as doing what you want, regardless of reality. It is the joint at which democratic and tyrannical longings conjoin. “Against Alcibiades, and an Athens under his sway, Thucydides defends a political realism” to which ‘freedom is essential”—freedom as self-government, freedom as measure, freedom as the exe4rcise of reason, as action within the limits set by nature and by the gods.

    Nichols’s interpretation enables her to explain the opening words of the History: “Thucydides, an Athenian….” Although an exile, Thucydides never imagines that freedom entails placelessness. The Athenian regime gave him the chance to inquire about Athens and not merely to obey it. “It is Athens that has the custom or law of funeral orations, which naturally lead the speaker to reflect about why its soldiers gave their lives for their city. Athenians stand out in Thucydides work for their self-reflection.” Self-reflection leads Thucydides to know that he doesn’t know, leads him to inquiry itself.  That inquiry results in his account of how Athenians came to forget self-reflection, to believe in accordance to their own desires without knowing, to think wishfully. In a sense, he needed to be exiled; he and his countrymen really were going in opposite directions. In sending Thucydides into exile, Athenians exiled themselves.

    In her book on Aristotle, Nichols reported the fine discovery that Aristotle regarded a wife’s practical wisdom no less impressive than a husband’s. Here, too she plays the role of Mrs. Adams to her mentors, Strauss and Cropsey, adjuring them to remember the ladies. The ladies Nichols has in mind are Archedice—her name “sounds like ‘just rule'”—the daughter, sister, and wife of tyrants who ruled some eighty years before the Peloponnesian War, who herself “Possessed a moderation that the Athenians” who came later “would have done well to emulate”—and the unnamed wife of the Melossian king, Admetus, who intervenes on behalf of the exiled Themistocles, saving his life by teaching him how to speak to her husband. “Like Themistocles,” Thucydides, in recalling these incidents, shows that “he is able to learn from women”—those who prefer not to dare exceedingly, and whose connectedness to generation orients them toward “something more immediate and fundamental than the unwritten memory or fame Pericles promises those Athenians who give their lives for their city.” One could do worse than to learn from some women.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    Beauvoir’s Politics

    September 26, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Simone de Beauvoir: The Second Sex. H. M. Parshley translation. New York: Bantam Books, 1964 [1949].

    Sonia Kruks: Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

     

    Although it may seem so, The Second Sex was not all Simone de Beauvoir wrote. An experienced scholar who knows her business, Sonia Kruks invites readers to see Beauvoir’s political writings as a whole. She also wants to bring Beauvoir into contemporary debates on liberal rationalism and poststructuralism, showing that Beauvoir staked out a position critical of the former without succumbing to the arbitrary nominalism of the latter As an existentialist, Beauvoir held that political judgments involve the whole being of the individual who makes them—not only the pure mind of the rationalists but that stubborn fact, the body, with its instincts, vulnerabilities, and powers. Human beings find themselves situated not only in one mind and one body (one life) but also in concrete social milieus that tend to disclose and to foreclose moral and political choices, empower and weaken the scope for political action Beauvoir thus insisted upon the ambiguity of all political judgment and action, their complex incompleteness. Oddly, and unlike her contemporary Simone Weil, Beauvoir never seems seriously to have engaged the writings of philosophers much before Immanuel Kant—precisely those who turned to political philosophy in the first place. Aristotle makes a brief appearance in The Second Sex, but only to get slapped on the wrist for having failed to understand human embryology.

    Writing in the tradition of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger—all of whom rejected nature as a source of right and defined freedom as the absence of natural constraint—the existentialists called for “active engagement in the world.” Beauvoir distinguished herself from Jean-Paul Sartre, however, by thinking more carefully about the body, “at once the site of both freedom and constraint,” and by giving greater emphasis to social relations. These concerns caused her to emphasize the ambiguity of human life, its “irresolvable antinomies,” most especially the ways in which our embodied sociality opens us both to “reciprocity” and “violent harms.” She resists all Hegelian and Marxist attempts at some grand synthesis or ‘end of History’ which would resolve these antimonies. Most interestingly, and unknowingly, she came upon something very like the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning, now approached via the existentialist notion of liberty. There is an “ontological freedom [la liberté] and the practical, or effective freedom that is required in order to act in the world [la puissance],” the latter “requir[ing] the presence and support of others.” Ignoring classical political philosophy, she soon began “to incorporate a non-reductionist Marxism within her analysis.” I am reminded of Nietzsche’s remark on Ralph Waldo Emerson: With Emerson, we lost a philosopher.”

    This moral and social thinker found herself confronted with politics by 1939. But, and again understandably in view of her intellectual formation, she described this experience in historicist terms: “History seized me and never let me go again.” Very much to her credit, she continued to resist the determinist side of historicism. After the war, which she spent in occupied Paris, the French Communist Party beckoned, especially since “there appeared to be no middle ground between unqualified support for the Soviet Union and a pro-American position, which aligned one with the exploitative forces of capitalist domination and imperialism” (as distinguished, of course, from the exploitative forces of communist domination and imperialism). To her credit, she could not quite bring herself to join the party, which “demanded an unquestioning discipline from its members which Beauvoir could not accept” (that ‘freedom’ issue, again), “espous[ing] the highly deterministic, orthodox version of Marxism (or, more precisely, Marxism-Leninism) that Stalin had formulated.” With Sartre, although never merely imitating him, she would develop an existentialist form of neo-Marxism, some of which entered the thought of the American New Left a generation later. Meanwhile, and in line with a French tradition dating back at least to Chateaubriand, she toured America in 1947. In her book, America Day by Day, she displays her by now well-honed capacity for the ambiguous and indeed ambivalent response: America was “the belly of the imperialist monster,” a land of “shrill anti-Communism” and “chauvinism,” itself conflicted with its “high-flown rhetoric of freedom” and its conditions of racism and poverty; “but she is also in love with the vibrancy of America, its sheer scale, its physical and social diversity, and its lack of stuffy European formality.”

    Her most influential book, The Second Sex, elaborates on the question of the relation of freedom and the body. The argument is now familiar: “Women’s material dependence on men and their lack of control over their own fertility constitute fundamental elements of their oppression,” an oppression that Marxian economics alone cannot come close to relieving. Under current social conditions, a woman lives “continuously divided against herself”: both “an active subject,” a free person, and one “who is obliged to make herself both ‘object and prey'” in the mating game. Beyond the socioeconomic ‘class’ dialectics of Marx, she insists upon an underlying sexual dialectic centered on the body. Kruks doesn’t leave it there, however, showing how Beauvoir went on to criticize French imperialism in her 1954 novel The Mandarins, subsequently bringing sexual politics, imperialism, and her ‘existentialist’ preoccupation with the ultimate limit on freedom, death, all together in her substantial memoirs, weaving the personal with the political. “Simone de Beauvoir lived her philosophical orientation to the world.”

    What blocked Beauvoir from having recourse to classical philosophy was her historicist rejection of the notion of human nature, and especially the idea that the distinctive human characteristic is the capacity to reason—which, however, she identifies with Kant’s “autonomous, rational will.” “Whatever there may be that is universal to human existence does not preexist particular lives and their specific projects and is brought into being only through them.” “Projects”: There is the modernist assumption that “freedom” consists of freedom from the physical; modern materialism puts this freedom in a precarious place, in a condition (as Beauvoir would say) of ambiguity and indeed of existential threat. She accordingly rejects contemporary ‘humanism,’ including the affirmation of ‘human rights,’ denying all remnants of human nature conceived as rational in the manner of Enlightenment thinkers and the historicists who followed. Beauvoir sees, however, that to throw the ‘human rights’ baby out with the ‘humanist’ bathwater can only lead to nominalism or even nihilism, as Hitler had so forcefully demonstrated. “A critical politics does still need to be anchored in some portrayal of what it is to be human.” (To put it in the language of a later notion of ‘deconstructionism,’ if we assert ‘the death of the subject’ how can the personal be the political?) Again, Beauvoir runs up against a problem well known to the classical philosophers she ignored, the distinction between ‘human being’ as an idea and ‘human being’ as a way of life. Unlike them, she assumes that rationality cannot be the source of freedom, as indeed it cannot if rationality’s most important discovery are ‘iron laws of history.’ She settles on understanding the human being as an “embodied subject”; “the lived body [is] ‘the radiation of subjectivity.” “No exterior reality determines our choices”—as in Hegel and Marx—”yet situations that we cannot but assume may so powerfully predispose us to act in particular ways that freedom may, in practice, be significantly curtailed.” Freedom comes not from the culmination of a rationally-determined historical dialectic but in strengthened social relations “chosen, built, and sustained in the here and now”—existentially, as it were.

    Aristotle finds in the reciprocal rule of husband and wife in the household the nucleus of political rule in the polis. In her own way, so does Beauvoir: As subjects, the ‘otherness’ of others “is rapidly tempered by the reciprocal realization that each one of us is an object for the other, who is thus, like us, a subject.” Unlike Aristotle, she requires that such reciprocity meet the standard of egalitarianism; in this, she registers the democratic sociopolitical regime described by Tocqueville, although unlike Tocqueville she allows it to determine her moral and political doctrine. In this sense, she is no philosopher, having never ascended from the ‘cave’ of her time and place.

    In considering oppression, Beauvoir doubts that Hegel’s ‘master’ in the ‘master-slave’ struggle for recognition truly esteems his masterly status because it exacts recognition from ‘his’ slave. Upon reflecting on Beauvoir’s work, Kruks identifies three kinds of oppression: asymmetrical recognition, indifference, and aversion. Dehumanization is the most extreme form of oppression. As seen in the Nazi extermination camps—where human beings “were just so much material to be processed efficiently”—to the old-age or (as they are called) retirement homes, where “the aged are frequently viewed as nothing more than pure objects,” dehumanization means treating the subject as object, as in Hegel. But of course there is a difference between dehumanization motivated by extreme aversion, as in the ‘camps,’ and the milder aversion seen in our attitudes toward the aged, as in the ‘homes.’ Sexual politics, in distinction to both of these, derives from asymmetrical recognition; it isn’t that men don’t recognize the subjectivity of women but rather that they subordinate it by the deployment of self-satisfying myths about ‘The Woman.’  In Beauvoir’s witty formulation, The Woman is “the mirror in which the male Narcissus contemplates himself,” or, as Kruks more prosaically puts it, “the object of male fantasies.” Such ‘objectifying asymmetrical nonrecognition also describes the ways in which Europeans (mis)understand Africans, Asians, even Americans. In America itself, dehumanization manifests itself most usually in an indifference fortified by complacency in contemplating the abstract principles of the Declaration of Independence and of constitutional law.

    There is a difference between the dehumanization of the aged and the other kinds. The others are remediable. Although the attitudes toward the aged taken by their relatives and caretakers may be changed, aging itself cannot. Kruks remarks that, unlike The Second Sex, Beauvoir’s late book, The Coming of Age, does not conclude with a section on liberation. To borrow a Sartrian phrase, there is no exit in this life from the coming of age. “With the approach of old age one makes the startling discovery that one’s body, in its brute physical facticity, is itself ‘Other.'” Aging kills not only our bodies but our “projects,” our freedom, along with them. The old man does nothing: “He is defined by an exis, not a praxis.” She blames capitalism for this, inasmuch as “for many, a prior life of alienated labor also means that they have no existential resources to enjoy the enforced ‘leisure’ of retirement.” Old age “exposes the failure of our entire civilization,” Beauvoir writes, hyperbolically. She does not explain why socialism, as distinguished from, say, religious convictions, could help, and Kruks has nothing much to suggest, either.

    Unlike many socialists from middle- or upper-class backgrounds, Beauvoir confronted her own privilege. Drawing upon Beauvoir’s thought but also supplementing it, Kruks insists on the limitations of “a politics of self-transformation” often seen among contemporary leftists, including feminists. She blames this on “a tacit neo-Kantianism” which centers on recognition of ‘the Other’ as “an autonomous rational will.” But as Beauvoir argues, and as Kruks agrees, rationalism, however well-intentioned, won’t bring us to a condition of fully egalitarian practice. “It may be preferable to acknowledge that one is privileged but then to act from one’s privileged location: to deploy one’s privilege as effectively as possible.” Beauvoir herself began to see her own privileged position as the Algerian war of independence from France intensified in the late 1950s. In the face of French brutality in Algeria, she could not deny that she was not French. But neither did she attempt to reject “her own privileged culture, or her privileges as an intellectual” within it. “Aware of her privileged status, she instead learned to deploy it as a basis for effective, public, political intervention.” Against French nationalism vis-à-vis the Algerians, she in turn deployed an appeal to patriotism, to France as the vindicator of The Rights of Man. “In actuality, Beauvoir supported a project of decolonization that did bring very significant changes in the world (not all of them perhaps for the best).” Indeed: As Kruks observes, the Third-World ‘liberation’ movements included the 1979 Iranian revolution, itself a denial of the rights of women Beauvoir had championed for so long; she broke with such French leftists as Michel Foucault, who foolishly and unjustly supported the mullahs when they “demanded that women wear the veil.” In her own way still a child of the Enlightenment, Beauvoir didn’t like veils on anything or anyone.

    Such conflicts bring Kruks back to Beauvoir’s theme of the ambiguity of politics, and of human life generally. Beauvoir rejected reason as the standard of political judgment. As “acts of situated freedom,” political judgments are and should be made “with our entire being,” including our bodies, emotions, and “personal history.” Hence she treats political judgment most thoroughly in a novel, The Mandarins, not an essay. There, the main character arrives at the same political judgment Beauvoir espoused in the late Forties: alignment with a ‘third way’ democratic-socialist party in France but geopolitical support for the Soviet Union, which, “for all its deformations,” remains “the greatest force for progress and, as such, must be given support” against capitalist, imperialist America. Such judgments must always be open to revision, however, given exactly the self-knowledge they require, and also the limitations of our knowledge, both of our situation and our selves. “A political judgment is, even at its best, but an informed and reasonable guess, one made by a particular, ‘idiosyncratic’ self in a particular situation—and like all human action it is subject to failure.” (As indeed Beauvoir’s assessment of the Soviet Union so obviously was.)

    “That these personal elements play a role does not mean, however, that reason is absent,” but rather that “political judgment must be understood as an existential choice.” Although Kruks doesn’t emphasize this point, she should, inasmuch as in the absence of reason, which is really nothing more than the principle of non-contradiction, judgments and choices would descend to incoherence or, when coherent, they would be so by chance, at random.

    Prudential reasoning informs political life, but its end is justice, the topic of Kruks’s final chapter. Given Beauvoir’s socialism, one expects a discussion of distributive justice, but Kruks makes the more interesting choice, turning to the question of punitive justice. In her 1946 essay, “An Eye for an Eye,” Beauvoir considers the case of French Nazi collaborator Robert Brasillach, who had publicly identified Jews and Resistance members during the Occupation, effectively guaranteeing their “deportation, torture, or execution.” An opponent of capital punishment before the war, Beauvoir admitted that her heart wanted Brasillach dead. She distinguished punishment, defined as “the purely retaliatory treatment that revenge demands,” from sanctions, “those penalties that have intended purposes other than revenge,” such as deterrence or reform. “Revenge as a response to atrocity is almost always a failure on its own terms” because it cannot erase the effects of the crime. Nonetheless, true to her contention that judgment is not and should not be wholly rational, she finds hatred of “those who commit absolute evil” and “appropriate response”—a passion but not “a capricious passion.” This especially pertains to bystanders, those not directly injured by the wrongdoer; their response expresses “the inherent sociality of individuated existence,” the “intense personal bonds” we feel for those unjustly and cruelly injured and killed. Human sociality constitutes part of “who I am.” “For our world is suffused, our existence shaped, by our participation (often unchosen) in various anonymous social collectivities.” Although Kruks herself doesn’t approve of it, Beauvoir refused to sign a petition asking for clemency for Brasillach. Brasillach deserved to suffer the death penalty, in Beauvoir’s judgment, “as an expression of society’s extreme revulsion at [his] violation” of “the values that his crimes [had] violated.” Kruks prefers our contemporary ‘truth and reconciliation’ committees, whereby societies turn to a sort of therapeutic response to atrocity. She concedes that many members of those societies find reconciliation as unsatisfying as she (and to some degree Beauvoir) find punishment and sanction. As Beauvoir concluded at the end of her essay, “failure haunts all human action, love as much as vengeance.” The persistent ambiguity of human thought, sentiment, and action did not impede her “struggle for greater freedom in the world.”

    Kruks’s helpful, comprehensive view of Beauvoir’s political thought shows a thinker who, beginning and remaining entirely within the horizon of ‘late-modern’ or post-Kantian political thought, with its valorization of freedom in opposition to ‘nature’ conceived as brute matter, nonetheless can be seen as struggling with the same considerations of prudence and of justice seen in Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Never having studied them carefully, she ties her own thought into unnecessary knots. Given the seminal character of her best-known book, The Second Sex, her argument there should be considered in light of the handicap imposed by her own intellectual formation.

    As an advocate of freedom, Beauvoir begins with critiques of the three most prominent determinisms of the time: biology, Freudian psychology, and Marxism. “The fact is that the individual, though its genotypic sex is fixed at fertilization, can be profoundly affected by the environment in which it develops.” She concurs with Hegel’s judgment that biology enables men to act as ‘subjects,’ as individuals well adapted for activity, “while the female remains wrapped up in the species.” By this she means that after copulation the male mammal is free to leave whereas the female is stuck with pregnancy. Men create; they “strike out from temporal unity in general.” Women maintain; “in the female it is the continuity of life that seeks accomplishment” in her. “The individuality of the female is opposed by the interest of the species; it is as if she were possessed by foreign forces—alienated.” This begins well before pregnancy in menstruation and continues after it in nursing the child. The woman’s individuality remains “the prey of outside forces” until another ‘outside’ force, menopause, relieves her of these natural cycles; throughout her life, “there are many times when she is “not in command” of herself. “In comparison with her the male seems infinitely favored: his sexual life is not in opposition to his existence as a person, and biologically it runs an even course, without crises and generally without mishap.” Beauvoir resolutely overlooks the satisfaction that women take in their womanhood, and especially in child-rearing.

    What she does insist upon is that although these “biological facts… are one of the keys to the understanding of woman,” they do not “establish for her a fixed an inevitable destiny” and remain “insufficient for setting up a hierarchy of the sexes.” “Woman is weaker than man” (not for her the absurd claim of some later feminists, that opening up sports for girls will result in women competing on an equal basis with men on the athletic field), but her weakness “is revealed as such only in the light of the ends man proposes, the instruments he has available, and the laws he establishes”—seen particularly in violent competition. “Thus we must view the facts in of biology in the light of an ontological, economic, social, and psychological context”; “the nature of woman has been affected throughout the course of history.”

    Turning then to one of those elements, psychology, she observes that “all psychoanalysts systematically reject the idea of choice and the correlated concept of value, and therein lies the intrinsic weakness of the system.” (Decades later, feminists who argued in favor of the right to abortion ‘on demand’ framed the issue in exactly Beauvoir’s existentialist terms, as a matter of free choice.) Freud, for example, “endeavored to replace the idea of value with that of authority; but he admits in Moses and Monotheism that he has no way of accounting for this authority.” In contrast, “I shall place woman in a world of values and give her behavior a dimension of liberty,” with “the power to choose between the assertion of her transcendence [of biological and other determinisms] and her alienation as object.”

    The same goes for historical materialism. Contra Marx, Beauvoir contends that the aforementioned “course of history” is not destiny. Although “the theory of historical materialism has brought to light some important truths”—notably, that “humanity is not an animal species” and “human society” arises against nature, “tak[ing] over the control of nature in its own behalf” by its “practical action.” But the conquest of nature for the relief of man’s estate also relieves woman’s estate, beginning to “annul the muscular inequality of man and woman.” It also liberates women from much household drudgery (without the need to enslave other human beings) and even liberates them from multiples pregnancies and from some of the burdens of child care. Marx and Engels misunderstood gestation and childbirth as ‘labor’ in the sense of artificial production; gestation and labor, and especially the sexual impulse that leads to them, register more than “productive force” in the manner of carpentry or welding. Woman “is for man a sexual partner, a reproducer, an erotic object—an Other through whom he seeks himself.” Even under the democratic socialism Beauvoir advocates, after the abolition of social classes, “sexual differentiation would keep all its importance” (emphasis added).  “Underlying all individual drama, as it underlies the economic history of mankind, there is an existentialist foundation that alone enables us to understand in its unity that particular form of being which we call human life.” For Beauvoir, for existentialism, the modern conquest of nature and the freedom it gives to the conquerors, relativizes all determinisms that modern scientists and philosophers have held up in its wake.

    Indeed, history amounts to the story of this progressive conquest redounding to the favor of women. In the earliest societies nature bound women down with pregnancy and children; the true curse laid upon Eve was her exclusion from the “warlike forays” of men, “for it is not in giving life but in risking life that man is raised above the animal,” thereby “transcending” mere life by inventing tools (including weapons) and generally “shaping the future.” If this sounds very much like Hegel, Beauvoir acknowledges that indeed it does: “Certain passages in the argument employed by Hegel in defining the relation of master to slave apply much better to the relation of man to woman.” “Doomed to immanence”—the opposite of manly transcendence—for centuries, women slowly began to benefit from the victory of “Spirit” over “Life,” of “technique over magic, and reason over superstition.” Because woman instantiates the larger immanence of nature itself (more tellingly, ‘nature herself’), “the devaluation of woman represents a necessary stage in the history of humanity.” But this is only a dialectical stage, not a permanent condition, and it too shall be transcended. There are even foreshadowings of future equality in some historical moments, such as ancient Egypt, where the goddesses lived on equal footing with the gods and “woman had the same rights as man, the same powers in court,” and the same property rights. Although Beauvoir doesn’t say so, this means that the exodus of Jews from Egypt was a dialectical reversal of that early, just social condition, for which humanity as a whole was not yet prepared; in fact she will go on to excoriate Judaism and Christianity for their masculinism.

    “Christian ideology has contributed no little to the oppression of women,” subordinating them under its legal code and banning abortion as a result of “endowing the embryo with a soul”; abortion thus “became a crime against the fetus itself,” which it never had been under the preceding Roman law. In “demand[ing] a new status,” today’s women “wish that in themselves, as in humanity in general, transcendence may prevail over immanence.” She avers that “it is in Soviet Russia that the feminist movement has made the most sweeping advances,” citing as evidence the constitution of the Soviet Union—not necessarily the most reliable reflection of the realities of the Soviet way of life.

    As in history, so also in myths, which persist into modern times. “The cult of the leader, whether he be Napoleon, Mussolini, or Hitler, excludes all other cults.” Bizarrely (given the status afforded to Lenin, Stalin, and soon to Mao Zedong), she claims that “socialist ideologies, which assert the equality of all human beings, refuse now and for the future to permit any human category to be object or idol: in the authentically democratic society proclaimed by Marx there is no place for the Other.”

    Leaving aside her pro-Communist niaseries and looking at the core of her argument, one notices that Beauvoir has a problem to solve. The earliest religions, matriarchies, valorized Woman but also identified her with nature, with immanence. Ultimately, Man must rebel against her. “It was Christianity, paradoxically, that was to proclaim, on a certain plane, the equality of man and woman” in its renunciation and indeed hatred of ‘the flesh’ along with the world and the devil. Women are equally invited to renounce the flesh, which they (in Beauvoir’s terms) live in and through. “If she agrees to deny her animality, woman—from the very fact that she is the incarnation of sin—will be also the most radiant incarnation of the triumph of the elect who have conquered sin.” However, she can only do this by worshipping and serving Jesus as the Christ—a male god. “This is the supreme masculine victory.” It can only be overturned dialectically by valorizing eroticism as the new spirituality, by a sort of Hegelian synthesis of body and spirit, immanence and transcendence, all expressed in social egalitarianism. This is possible because human life itself consists not only of the bodily but of a tension between body and spirit, necessity and freedom. “The bond that in every individual connects the physiological life and the psychic life—or better the relation existing between the contingence of an individual and the free spirit that assumes it—is the deepest enigma implied in the condition of being human, and this enigma is presented in its most disturbing form in woman.” “What is she?” For her answer Beauvoir again calls upon Egypt: Woman is “a sphinx,” the riddle, “a fundamental ambiguity” who—and that—must be addressed.

    In the second half of The Second Sex Beauvoir accordingly abandons consideration of history and mythology, turning to “woman’s life today.” The modern world is the world of human transcendence, of nature-conquest. To be sure, men have led the way so far, but their victories have readied the world for the ascent of woman, that is, for full human liberation. In terms of this non-deterministic version of historicism, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,” a being produced by “civilization as a whole,” a civilization that aims at such liberation by the means of conquering nature. Even in the course of nature itself, the pre-pubescent girl is physically and mentally equal to her male cohort; such feelings of inequality she may entertain result from social indoctrination, especially from bans on risk-taking—climbing trees, fighting. But with puberty, nature imposes restrictions. The girl finds herself now “consumed in waiting, more or less disguised.” “She is awaiting Man,” daydreaming of “the liberator,” the “rich and powerful” Prince Charming. To attract him, she must cultivate “grace and charm,” appearing “weak, futile, docile.” Whereas “the young man’s journey into existence is made relatively easy by the fact that there is no contradiction between his vocation as human being and as male,” the young woman becomes “divided against herself,” “doomed to insincerity and all its subterfuges.” On the other hand, this conflict, this ambivalence, causes her inner life to “develop more deeply than that of her brothers”; barred from action, she must think. Her eroticism is, because it must be, much less unsubtle than the man’s. Also, despite her natural inclination to maintain rather than to create and transcend, the woman’s life cycle manifests itself in “crises—puberty, sexual initiation, the menopause—which are much more decisive than in the male.” Natural reality stares the woman in the face more intently. Oddly, Beauvoir additionally contends that these facts makes the woman less socially conformist than men; she could only be thinking of herself, and not the generality of women, who are surely no less conformist than men.

    Already, in 1949, the conquest of women has transformed marriage into a contract between “two independent persons.” Marriage for the woman is “a more advantageous career than many others,” inasmuch as most jobs are still closed to her, but it is nonetheless a career choice, not a necessity. “Today the house has lost its patriarchal splendor,” having become merely “a place to live in,” no longer the locus of ancestor-worship, as it was in ‘the ancient city’ described by Fustel de Coulanges. Middle-class women who “lack outside interests” will busy themselves with make-work projects, “just to have something to do.” (Indeed, one of the ‘moms’ in my old neighborhood would clean the house every day, topping this off by a weakly waxing of the patio tiles, and then prohibit her husband and their three sons, as well as the rest of us, from entering her spic-and-span domain without removing their shoes.) And when she does find something to do outside the home, typically her activities amount to good-works civic associational activities, undertaken again for the sake of warding off boredom—Tocquevillian civil society gone pretentious and silly. (To some extent, Beauvoir needs to denigrate women’s ‘clubs,’ given her commitment to a statist socialism that would absorb such things into its all-encompassing egalitarian embrace.)

    In her drive to liberate women from what has been considered necessity, Beauvoir does not hesitate to attack the continued valorization of motherhood. Returning to abortion, she claims that laws against abortion rest on “the old Catholic argument” that “the unborn child has a soul, which is denied access to paradise if its life is interrupted without baptism.” But, she objects, the Church does not oppose capital punishment or war; indeed the Holy Wars were launched against the unbaptized. In this she ignores the obvious point that murderers and marauding anti-Christian soldiers deliberately oppose Christian principles and practices, unlike unborn children. And of course by rejecting natural right she can simply avoid the question of a natural right to life. As for the mother who gives birth, she “is almost always a discontented woman” who attempts “to compensate for all [her] frustrations through her child,” spanking her child as a means of “taking her vengeance on a man, on the world, or on herself.” It is again difficult to resist the thought that Beauvoir takes a jaundiced view toward mothers and their supposed discontentedness. She also overlooks the maternal love of one’s own, which explains the ambitions mothers entertain for their children at least as well as displaced frustration. Admitting the strength of the love of one’s own would throw both her eroticism and her socialism into serious question.

    Summarizing her analysis, Beauvoir writes that “Woman does not entertain the positive belief that the truth is something other than men claim; she recognizes, rather, that there is not any fixed truth,” a recognition based on the decided changes in her own body that occur at certain junctures in her lifetime. In denying the fluidity of truth, man is the one who is finally the greater hypocrite, “pompously thunder[ing] for his code of virtue and honor” while secretly inviting woman “to disobey it” and confidently expecting her to do so. “Man gladly accepts as his authority Hegel’s idea according to which the citizen acquires his ethical dignity in transcending himself toward the universal, but as a private individual he has a right to desire and pleasure,” marrying one woman and frolicking in a whorehouse with another, or others. Under these circumstances, woman consoles herself with religion, “the mirage of some form of transcendence.”

    Beauvoir assures her readers that a forthrightly atheistic if not materialist democratic socialism will change all this. Equal work, equal pay, “erotic liberty,” consensual marriage which can be broken “at will,” free contraception and abortion, State-paid pregnancy leaves, State-sponsored child care (children will not “be taken away from their parents” but “would not be abandoned to them” by society): “Only in a socialist world” can these dreams be realized. The Hegelian dialectic will be consummated in mutual recognition of man and woman, but without any permanent ‘synthesis’ or ‘end of History,’ inasmuch as “sexuality will always be materialized [in] the tension, the anguish, the joy, the frustration, and the triumph of existence.” Nature, conquered, will also be redeemed as fully human, as Marx promises. By sexualizing Hegel and Marx, Beauvoir corrects them, relieving their theories of excesses of masculine ‘transcendence’ while making socialism more humanly satisfying, less Heaven-like.

    Having remained entirely within the horizon of modern philosophy, Beauvoir underestimates nature both as a physical entity and as a source of right. (It almost goes without saying that she rejects God as the ultimate source of right.) Accordingly, she assumes that she can maximize freedom and equality at the same time, a circle not so easily squared if one respects the integrity of circles and the principle of non-contradiction. In presenting laws of change as an account of Being as a whole, Hegelian logic aims at overcoming that principle, of incorporating it into a larger movement. Beauvoir’s version of Hegelian and Marxian dialectic partakes of the dubiousness of its forebears, but it has succeeded in bringing modern feminism along with it.

     

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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